Caporaso. International Relations Theory and Multilateralism - The Search For Fundations PDF

International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations
Author(s): James A. Caporaso

Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 599-632
Published by: The MIT Press
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Internationalrelationstheoryand
multilateralism:thesearch
forfoundations
JamesA. Caporaso
Whyhas the conceptof multilateralism not played a more prominentrole in

theoriesof international relations?The primafaciecase forthe importanceof
multilateralactivityin theinternationalrealmwouldseem great.The world,we
constantlytell ourselves,is increasinglydrawntogether.The Swedishecono-
mist Assar Lindbeck argues that most external effectsof productionand
consumptionare externalnot onlyto the householdbut also to the countryin
whichtheyoccur.1Accordingto manydifferent indicators,interdependenceis
on the increase in nearly all parts of the world. Internationalpolitical
rangingfrompeace to pollution.
economiststalk about global indivisibilities,
Most importantinternationalproblems-includingpollution,energy,manag-
ingairlinetraffic,
and maintaining rulesfortradeand investment-intrinsically
involvemanycountriessimultaneously. What makesa probleminternational is
thatoftenit cannotbe dealt witheffectively withinthe nationalarena. Costs
and benefitsspillintothe externalarena. These externaleffectsare frequently
so great that domestic goals cannot be accomplishedwithoutcoordinated
multilateralaction.
This articlewas preparedforthe Ford FoundationWest Coast Workshopon Multilateralism,

organizedbyJohnGerardRuggie.I am gratefulto theFord Foundationforfinancialsupportofthe
project. I also acknowledgethe support of the Virginia and Prentice Bloedel Chair at the
University of Washingtonas well as the Departmentof InternationalRelations,Research School
of PacificStudies,AustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra.For theircommentson earlierdrafts
of myarticle,I thankWilliamDrake, Jeffry Frieden,Ronald Jepperson,RobertKeohane, Edgar
Kiser, Stephen Krasner, Lisa Martin,George Modelski, Richard Sherman,Janice Thomson,
AlexanderWendt,and severalanonymousreviewersforIntemationalOrganizationand Columbia
University Press.
1. Assar Lindbeck,"Economic Dependence and Interdependencein theIndustrializedWorld,"
FromMarshallPlan to Global Interdependence (Paris: OrganizationforEconomicCooperationand
Development,1978),pp. 59-86.
IntemationalOrganization
46, 3, Summer1992
? 1992bytheWorldPeace Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology

600 InternationalOrganization
Multilateralism:ignoredbytheworldor byinternational
relationstheory?
The puzzling question motivatingthis article is "Why is multilateralism

neglectedin international relationstheory?"The questioncontainsan assump-
tion-namely, that the treatmentof multilateralism in the scholarlyinterna-
tional relationsliteratureis less than would be expected on the basis of its
observedimportancein theworld.
Perhapsthisassumptionshouldbe questioned.One possible reason forthe
paucityof theoryconcerningmultilateralism is that there may be so little
multilateralism in practice.Advocates of this view mightcite the declining
importanceof theUnited Nations(UN), at least before1990,the disaffections
with the General Agreementon Tariffsand Trade (GATT), the rise of
bilateralismin U. S. trade policy,and the numerousselectivearrangements
drawnup by the European Community(EC), such as the multifiber arrange-
ments.
One scholarlamentsthat "too manypeople in both countries[the United
Statesand theSovietUnion] see theproblems,and theirsolutions,as bilateral,
overlookingthe need for the additional cooperation of Europe in the
multilateralworldof the late twentiethcentury."2 Another,a formermember
of the U. S. Council of Economic Advisers,arguesthatthe United States has
become "the bullyof the world tradingsystem"and that it has done so by
"unilaterallyredefining 'unfair'trade."3Finally,Inis Claude, Jr.,reflecting on
almostthirty years since the publicationof Powerand IntemationalRelations
(1962), today accords much more weightand effectiveness to the balance of
power,whichhe earliercontrastedwithcollectivesecurityand worldgovern-
ment,the lattertwooptionsbeinginherently moremultilateral.4 The balance-
of-powersystemis a decentralizedsystemof relations among powers. It
acknowledgeslittleifanydebt (exceptforthe traditionestablishedbyHedley
Bull) to worldorderor multilateral commitments.
Claude's assessmentis provocativeand has at least some validity.He argues
thatduringthelastquarter-century, thestockofbalance ofpower(presumably
also in itsbipolarform)has improved.Decision makersno longerbelieve that
universalsolutionsare invariablybest, that peace is indivisible(Europe has
been farmorepeaceful thanthe Middle East and SoutheastAsia), thatlocal
clashesshouldbe metwithworldwideresponses,or thatregionalalliancesare a
bad thing.
Anotherexplanationforinattentionto multilateralism lies at the ideational
level. In what ways,if any,does contemporary internationalrelationstheory
2. Thorold Masefield, "Co-prosperityand Co-security:Managing the Developed World,"

IntemationalAffairs65 (Winter1988-89),pp. 1-14.
3. WilliamA. Niskanen,"The BullyofWorldTrade," Orbis33 (Fall 1989),pp. 531-38.
4. Inis L. Claude, Jr.,"The Balance of Power Revisited,"Reviewof IntemationalStudies 15
(April 1989),pp. 77-86.

Multilateralism 601
inviteor discourageattentionto multilateralism? It would be possible,albeit

for practitionersof liberal economic theoryto explain wars, but it
difficult,
would be incoherentwith the theoryto ask about state interests,unequal
exchange(in ArghiriEmmanuel'ssense5),and theoriesofdevelopmentresting
on absoluteimmiseration. It wouldbe difficult fora realistto explainextended
cooperation not tied to specific,identifiablegains, but it would not be
impossible.6It would be impossibleto motivatea realist argumentabout
goodwill,communityspirit,or a state's desire to minimizeits power. What
theoriesmakeimpossibleto explaintheirpractitioners ofnecessityavoid.What
theymake merelydifficult to explain oftenpreoccupiesmost of theirtime.
Betweenthatwhichis conceptuallyimpossibleand thatwhichis natural(ergo
obvious),therelies theregionofwhatis problematic.For realists,theproblem
of cooperation is particularlysalient. For liberals,why there is ever war,
protection,autarky,and Pareto-inferior behavioris oftena puzzle so exoticas
to discourageinquiry.
Since I anticipatemisunderstanding on thispoint,let me clarifymyclaim.I
am notarguingthatmultilateral activitiesand organizationshavebeen ignored.
Indeed, multilateralism as a subjectmatterhas been thegristforvolumes.The
UN itselfhas spawned a large literature.Complex multilateralnegotiations,
such as those concerningGATT and the Law of the Sea, have been studied.
And manyprocessesthatdo notgo underthename ofmultilateralism, such as
regionalintegration and coordinationof economicpolicies,have occupied our
attention.My point is that multilateralism is not extensivelyemployedas a
theoreticalcategoryand that it is rarelyused as an explanatoryconcept.
Indeed, even in cases in whichmultilateralism providesthe centralconceptual
focus, cooperation or institutionsusually turn out to do the important
theoreticalwork.
and conceptualization
Multilateralism:definition
The terms"multilateralism" and "multilateral"suggestsome linguisticconsid-

erations.The noun comes in the formof an "ism," suggestinga belief or
ideology rather than a straightforward state of affairs.UnderlyingJohn
Ruggie'sconceptionofmultilateralism form,"a
is the idea of "an architectural
deep organizingprincipleof international life.7As an organizingprinciple,the
institutionof multilateralismis distinguishedfrom other formsby three
generalizedprinciplesofconduct,and diffusereciproc-
properties:indivisibility,
5. ArghiriEmmanuel, Unequal Exchange:A Studyin the Imperialismof Trade (New York:

MonthlyReviewPress,1972).
6. Indeed, thisis preciselywhat Robert 0. Keohane does inAfterHegemony:Cooperationand
Discordin theWorldPoliticalEconomy(Princeton,N. J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1984).
7. See the followingworksof JohnGerard Ruggie:"UnravellingtheWorldOrder:The United
Statesand theFutureof Multilateralism,"mimeograph, University of California,San Diego, 1989;
and "Multilateralism: in thisissue ofIO.
The Anatomyof an Institution,"

ity.These threepropertiesshouldbe treatedas a coherentensemblewhichis

itselfindivisible,ratherthanas additive,detachableindicatorsof multilateral-
ism. Indivisibilitycan be thoughtof as the scope (both geographic and
functional)overwhichcostsand benefitsare spread,givenan actioninitiatedin
or among component units. If Germanyexperiences recession, are there
consequences for Germans alone, the French, the membersof the EC, or
nationals in everycorner of the earth? Generalized principlesof conduct
usuallycome in the formof normsexhortinggeneralifnot universalmodes of
relatingto otherstates,ratherthandifferentiating relationscase-by-caseon the
basis of individualpreferences, situationalexigencies,or a prioriparticularistic
grounds.8Diffusereciprocityadjusts the utilitarianlenses forthe long view,
emphasizingthatactorsexpectto benefitin thelongrunand overmanyissues,
ratherthaneverytimeon everyissue.9
The distinctionbetween multilateralinstitutionsand the institutionof
multilateralismis cognizantof two levels of related internationalactivity.
Multilateralinstitutions focusattentionon theformalorganizationalelements
of internationallifeand are characterizedby permanentlocationsand postal
addresses, distinctheadquarters,and ongoing staffsand secretariats.The
institutionof multilateralismmaymanifestitselfin concreteorganizations, but
itssignificancecutsmoredeeply.The institution ofmultilateralism is grounded
in and appeals to the less formal,less codifiedhabits,practices,ideas, and
normsofinternational society.Bilateralism,imperialhierarchy, and multilater-
alismare alternativeconceptionsofhowtheworldmightbe organized;theyare
notjust different typesof concreteorganization.
There are at least two reasons formaintainingthe distinction.The first,as
Lisa Martin argues, is that multilateralinstitutionsand the institutionof
multilateralism do not alwaysmirrorone anotherwithina givenissue-area.
Depending on the structureof interests,one may be strongand the other
weak.10The second reason is that the two typesof multilateralism may be
related in complex cause-and-effectways. Multilateral organizationsmay
providearenas withinwhichactorslearn to alter perceptionsof interestand
beliefs.1"The institutionof multilateralism mayin turnspawn,maintain,alter,
and underminespecificorganizations.Ernst Haas's studyof learningwithin
numerous internationalorganizations,includingthe InternationalLabour
Organizationand the WorldBank, illustratesthe firsteffect.12 Jean Monnet's
8. See Ruggie,"Multilateralism."
see Robert0. Keohane, "Reciprocityin International
9. For a discussionof diffusereciprocity,
Relations,"IntemationalOrganization 40 (Winter1986),pp. 1-27.
10. Lisa L. Martin,"Interests,Power, and Multilateralism," IntemationalOrganization, forth-
coming.
11. See the followingworks of Ernst B. Haas: Beyondthe Nation-State:Functionalismand
IntemationalOrganization (Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,1964); and WhenKnowledge
Is Power:ThreeModelsof Changein IntemationalOrganizations (Berkeley:University of California
Press,1990).
12. Ibid.

Multilateralism 603
insistencethattherebe a unitedesfaitsamongnumerousactorsin international

societybefore concrete regional organizationscan take hold illustratesthe
second.13
The term"multilateral"can referto an organizingprinciple,14 an organiza-
tion,or simplyan activity.Any of the above can be consideredmultilateral
whenitinvolvescooperativeactivity amongmanycountries."Multilateralism,"
as opposed to "multilateral,"is a beliefthatactivitiesoughtto be organizedon
a universal(or at least a many-sided)basis fora "relevant"group,such as the
groupof democracies.It maybe a beliefbothin theexistentialsense of a claim
about how the worldworksand in the normativesense thatthingsshould be
done in a particularway.As such,multilateralism is an ideology"designed"to
promotemultilateralactivity.It combinesnormativeprincipleswithadvocacy
and existentialbeliefs.
Definitionshave implicationsforthebroaderconceptualframework and for
theory.First,the term "multilateral"does not analyticallypresuppose any
particularnumberof countriesin the way thatunilateral,bilateral,trilateral,
and universaldo. These termsnow describespecificpointson an underlying
continuumfromeveryonegoingitalone to everyoneparticipating. Multilateral
suggests"many"actors,butitis unspecificas to whatnumberconstitutes many.
"Many" could referto anything froma minimumof threeto a maximumof all.
Multilateralrefersto a region,ratherthana point,on the continuumand thus
can be analyzedin termsof gradations.When conceptualizedin thismanner,
multilateralactionis compatiblewiththeoriesconcerningthresholdsin groups
of less thanuniversalmembership.
Second,thedefinition of theterm"multilateral"presumescooperation.Not
all cooperationis multilateral,but all multilateralactivitiesinclude coopera-
tion.In a Hobbesian warof each againstall,we do notsaythatstatesbehave in
a multilateralfashioneven thoughtheyare interactingin highlyinterdepen-
dent ways. However,it is consistentto thinkof some states as carryingout
multilateralactivitiesagainstothers,such as under the auspices of a military
alliance.
The questionarises as to whethermultilateralism is a means or an end, an
instrument or an expression,or both.Statesor theiragentsare conceptualized
as conscious,goal-seekingactors.As such,it is easy to see howmultilateralism
is one means amongmanyto be used or ignoredaccordingto the instrumental
calculus.In instrumental theories-thatis,theoriesstressinggivenpreferences
and consciouschoice-cooperation has been used to mean a processbywhich
states activelyadjust theirpolicies to take into account the preferencesof
others.In game theory,a cooperativechoice (whichmaybe partof an overall
strategy)generallyrepresentsan effortto take account of the otherplayers'
cooperation,see Jean
13. For a discussionofthisaspectofMonnet'sphilosophyoftransnational
Monnet,Memoirs,trans.RichardMayne (London: Collins,1978).

interests,even ifthe dominantinterestis to defect.This makes cooperationa

''move,' an instrumental actionthattakesplace withintheoverallcontextof a
social dilemma.
Whileinstrumental approachesto multilateralism are important, theydo not
exhaust the possibilities.Multilateral activitiesmay also be an end, or
consumptiongood, accordingto whichstatespreferto do thingsmultilaterally.
Stated in thisway,the noninstrumental versionmaybe hard to defend.How,
for example,can one account for the vastlydifferent formsof organization
across differentsectorsbythe same states?But thereis somethingin between
the ideal typesof means and ends. In uncertainenvironments, statesmaybe
forcedto make strongpresumptionsin favorof one or anotherapproach. In
thisway,multilateralism maynotalwaysbe thoughtout and chosenon thebasis
of exactingcalculationsof costsand benefits.To the extentthatpresumptions
in favorof multilateralism exist,it becomes part of our ongoing,taken-for-
grantedunderstanding of international life.
As Ruggie argues,multilateralism is a demandingorganizationalform.15 It
requiresitsparticipantsto renouncetemporary advantagesand thetemptation
to definetheirinterestsnarrowlyin termsof national interests,and it also
requires them to forgo ad hoc coalitions and to avoid policies based on
situationalexigenciesand momentary constellationsof interests.Yet itis byno
means a rare organizationalformin the world. This promptsthe question,
"What coherenttheoriesdo we have to accountformultilateralism?" Since my
approach to answeringthisquestionis unconventional, a wordof explanation
maybe in order.My argumentis thatinternationalrelationstheory,withfew
exceptions,does not offer"off-the-shelf' theoriesto explainmultilateralism.16
This complicatesthe task and promptsme to look in part outside of the
international relationsliterature.In whatfollows,I drawfromnumerousareas,
includingsociology,experimentalpsychology, organizationtheory,and game
theoryin an attempt to identifyalternativefoundationsfor theories of
multilateralism. I identifythe elementsof threeparadigms,pointingout the
similaritieswithand implicationsforinternational relationstheory.
Threeroutesto multilateralism
In thissection,I explorethreetheoreticalroutesto understanding multilateral

activities.The firstroute is providedby an individualist paradigm in which
states "enter into" contractual relations with other states in a rational,
way.The
self-interested bare bones equipment of thisapproach includes states
and state interests(both unproblematically given), capabilities,and strategies
15. Ibid.
16. For creativetheoreticalsuggestionsalong these lines, see Martin,"Interests,Power, and
Multilateralism";and Robert 0. Keohane, "Multilateralism:An Agenda forResearch,"Intema-
tionalJoumal45 (Fall 1990),pp. 731-64.

Multilateralism 605
bywhichto interactwithothers.The second routeto be exploredis foundin a

loosely connected assemblage of writingslabeled the social-communicative
approach. The focusof thisapproach is stillon the identitiesand powersof
individualstates,but the "interactionrepertoires"of statesincludecommuni-
cation,persuasion,deliberation,and self-reflection.Ontologically,the stateis
separatelyconstituted, buta bitmoresocialityis broughtintoitsself-definition.
The exact cutoffpoint between the firstand second approaches is not my
concernhere.As partoftheirproject,radicalindividualists mayseek to derive
the second conceptionof states fromthe firstand to explain even minimal
elementsof socialityamongstatesas outgrowths of a model based on nothing
more than autonomous,self-interested actors. Similarly,proponentsof the
second approach may argue that the firstworksonly as long as it imports
elementsof theirmodel as unexaminedpremises.Theymayask, forexample,
how self-interestedstatescan contractwithoutsome commonunderstandings,
rules,and practices.Ratherthantryingto solve thisdemarcationissue in the
abstract,I pursuetheimplicationsofthedistinction below.
The thirdperspectiveis providedby an institutional approach. Since there
are numerouscompeting"new" institutional approaches,I willtryto stakeout
the groundforthe approach dealt withhere. Institutionalism has ties to the
second approach in its insistence on the importanceof communication,
reflection,discussion,learning,and interpretation.However,it departsfromit
in a numberof ways.It is not necessarilymethodologically does
individualist,
nottreatpreferencesas exogenous,and does notunderstandsocial relations-
includingmultilateral relations-solelyas productsofindividualself-interested
calculations.This is a negativeway of describingthe institutionalapproach.
Whattheapproachstandsforin a positivesense willbe outlinedlater.
The individualistparadigm
The individualistlabel is meant as a shorthandfora collectionof theories
that attemptto explain social behavior by appealing to characteristicsof
individualactors,particularlypreferencesand capabilities,and theirstrategic
environments. The analogues in internationalrelationstheoryare realism,
neorealism,and game theory.Even some theoriesofinternational cooperation,
institutions,and organizationcould be includedinsofaras theytheorizethese
phenomena as lyingoutside the definingpropertiesof states. This diverse
collectionis unifiedby its focus on states as conscious goal-seekingagents
pursuingtheir interestswithin an external environmentcharacterizedby
anarchyand the powers of other states. The paradigmaticquestion is how
statespursuetheirgoals giventheconstraints underwhichtheyoperate.When
goals are interdependent,the questionassumesa strategicform:How can one
stateachievewhatitwants,giventhepreferencesand capacitiesofothers?
Withinthisparadigm,theroad to multilateralism logicallyinvolvestwosteps
not necessarilytemporallysequenced. First,theremustbe an explanationof

cooperation. Second, the theorymust provide the conditionsunder which

cooperationbecomes multilateral.The explanationof one is not reducibleto
the other.The problemof cooperationis a problempreciselybecause state
interestsare independentlygiven,often in conflictwith one another,and
pursuedwithinan environment ofanarchy.Furthermore, mostofwhatwe take
as social (includingrules,sharedunderstandings, and collectivebeliefs)is not
partof the representation of theproblemof cooperationin eitheritsverbalor
game-theoretic form.In thestandardversionofnoncooperativegame theory,17
agents,preferences,and strategiesare represented.Some rules are assumed
(for example, if you are a prisoner,you should not grab the warden, thus
changingthepayoffmatrix,or threatento haveyourpartnerkilledifhe or she
defects,thuschangingtheincentivesforcooperation),butthisamountsto very
little in playingthe game. Absent are norms,morality,and the abilityto
communicate,to promise,and to make bindingcommitments. To explainwhy
states cooperate in the bilateral case seems difficultenough. To establish
cooperationmultilaterally is a problemcompounded.
I mentionthese difficulties not to criticizeat thispointbut simplyto remind
that the individualistapproach does not make thingseasy for itself.18 Some
approaches assume much of what they want to prove. Outcomes to be
explainedare thenprogressively revealedbyuncoveringtheassumptionsofthe
theory.Empiricalresearchgiveswayto deductiveelaborations.That is close to
theoppositeofwhatthe individualist approachhas done. Verylittlesocialityis
builtintoitscentralpremises.Ifthisapproachworks,itis morepowerfulinthat
it explainsa complexsocial activitysuch as multilateralism withoutaccess by
assumptionto much of that sociality.It is as if, froma world of isolated,
self-seeking individuals,complexsocial structureresults.Below, I explorehow
severalspecificindividualist modelshelp explainmultilateralactions.
The k group. Of thethreestandardsolutionsto theproblemofcooperation-

the k group,side-payments, and repetitionof the game-the firstseems to
providethesafestfootingformultilateralism. Repetitionofthegame (Kenneth
Oye's "shadowofthefuture"19) mayenhancethevalue ofreputationand make
it more attractiveforparticipantsto thinkabout net benefitsin the long run,
but it provides littleguidance as to how the time frameshould affectthe
comprehensiveness of cooperativeactions. Side-paymentsmay help to bring
potentialdefectorsin line,buteventheseincentiveswould seem to presuppose
an alreadyexistingpatternofcooperation.
17. See JosephE. Harrington, Jr.,"Non-cooperativeGames," in JohnEatwell,MurrayMilgate,

and PeterNewman,eds., Game Theory(New York: Norton,1989),pp. 178-84.
approachcan
18. I understandthattheassumptionsI have used to characterizetheindividualist
be and have been relaxed in both internationalrelationstheoryproper and game theory.My
approachhereis a deviceused to see howfarthissimplifiedmodel can takeus.
19. KennethA. Oye, "ExplainingCooperation Under Anarchy:Hypothesesand Strategies,"
WorldPolitics38 (October 1985),pp. 1-24.

Multilateralism 607
The logic of the k group,however,holds some promise.Given an n-person

social dilemma,we know that the dominantindividualstrategies,if played,
yielda deficientequilibrium.In the international environment, whicharguably
models the n-personsocial dilemma,the defectoptionis betterregardlessof
whattheothersdo. But ifall defect,as thefamiliarstorygoes,theoutcomesare
nextto lastin thepreferenceschedulesoftheplayers.Now suppose,to counter
thisresult,thatamongthen playersthereexistssome subset(called k) whose
cooperationwouldensureresolutionofthedilemma,no matterwhattheothers
(n - k) did. This stillwould not ensuremultilateralcooperation,since defect
wouldstillbe thedominantstrategy, unlessindividualscould be convincedthat
each contributionwas crucial to resolvingthe dilemma. Deciding on the
membersofthesubsetwouldbe difficult butcritical,and some assurancewould
have to be giventhatothersdo not contributeor, more exactly,thatk group
membersdid notthinkthatotherswould contribute.
While k groups do provide some basis for multilateralcooperation,this
approachneeds a mechanismto identify or designatewho the membersof the
groupare so as to ensurethatno one else is perceivedas a possiblecontributor
and to establisharrangements forenforcing theseconditions.There is another,
moreimportant complication,however.The smallerthek group,theeasier itis
to cooperatebut theless multilateralthe arrangement willbe. The largerthek
group,the more multilateralthe cooperativearrangementmightbe but the
more difficult it is to pull offcooperation.Solutionsmay be available to get
around the problem,but such solutionsmake assumptionsand introduce
variables that take us to the other side of my classificatory divide-from
interest-oriented
individualist, to social-communicative theories.
Repetitionof the game. A second approach to multilateralcooperationis

to relaxthe assumptionthatthe game is playedonlyonce and to allow foran
indefinitelylarge numberof plays,more or less as in real life.If the game is
playedonlyonce or is playeda finite,knownnumberof times,the incentiveto
defectis dominant.If the game is repeatedan unknownnumberof timesor if
uncertainty of benefitsfromlong-term
is presentin otherways,the possibility
cooperationmustbe weighedagainstthepossiblegainsof a defectmovein the
shortterm.20
Lengtheningthe time frameover which individualsinteracthas several
One is thatitopens thedoorto conceptssuchas "dynamiccooperation,"
effects.
in whicha comprehensivestrategy-thatis, a seriesof relatedmovesor a plan
for choosingmoves over the entiregame-rather than a singlemove is the
object of equilibriumthinking.Anotheris that it allows forvariabilityin the
value of reputationand trustworthiness, as well as conditionalif implicit
20. For the logicbehindthisapproach,see David Kreps and RobertWilson,"Reputationand

ImperfectInformation," Joumalof Economic Theory27 (August 1982), pp. 253-79; and David
Kreps, Paul Milgrom,and Robert Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the FinitelyRepeated
Prisoners'Dilemma,"JoumalofEconomicTheory27 (August1982),pp. 245-52.

608 International
Organization
promising and reciprocity.

Clearly,theintroduction oftheseconceptsallows
fora muchricheranalysis thantheone-play gamesdo.
In additionto theirincreasedcomplexity, iterated gamesaremoresupport-
ive of cooperativeoutcomes.Both Russell Hardin and Michael Taylor
demonstrate of cooperation,"
"the possibility as the titleof Taylor'sbook
cautiously As RobertKeohaneargues,"The essentialreasonforthis
putsit.21
difference [betweensingle-play and iteratedgames]is that,in multiple-play
Prisoners'Dilemma,defectionis in the long run unrewarding, since the
short-run gainsthereby obtainedwillnormally be outweighed bythemutual
punishment thatwillensueoverthelongrun."22
RobertAxelrodhasshownthata mixedstrategy ofselectivecooperation and
defection canbe a winning He also demonstrated
strategy.23 withconsiderable
successthatconditional cooperationis a winningstrategy and one thatis
collectivelystable-thatis, resistantto anyinvasionby a different strategy.
Axelrod'sexperiments werecarriedoutin a setting inwhichone couldsingle
outa partner, defections
identify andcooperative moves,andbringsanctions
or rewardsto the appropriate party.The resultsdepended,probablyto a
considerable extent,on thememory ofparticulardyadsandon thereputations
oftheirconstituent members.
RudolphSchuesslerdevelopeda different formof the game,an iterated
prisoners'dilemmawithan exitoptionaftereach play of the game.24By
constructing thegameinthisfashion, he was ableto exploretheconditions of
cooperation wheretherewereno memory or reputational effectsand where
defectors couldnotbe identified,traced,andpunished. Instead,ifa playerfelt
exploited, he or she could simplyexit.Even underthesespareconditions,
closerto an anonymous ratherthanGemeinschaft,
Gesellschaft Schuessler was
abletodemonstrate considerablecooperation.
The problemsbeginwhenwe ask howthiscooperative behaviorof dyads
generalizes to becomemultilateral. BothAxelrod'sand Schuessler's analyses
wereofdyadicinteractions withina largepopulation. Manyindividuals were
involved andtheywereall playing a prisoners'dilemmagame,butthiswasnot
thesamethingas ann-person dilemma
prisoners' game.In thelanguageofthis
itwasaggregate
article, bilateralismratherthanmultilateralism.Axelrod'sand
Schuessler'splayers werecooperating withspecific relevantothers,notwiththe
group.
By contrast,in The Possibility
of Cooperation,Taylor focused on n-person
games,particularly dilemma.He developeda supergame
prisoners' consisting
21. See Russell Hardin, CollectiveAction (Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins UniversityPress,

1982); and Michael Taylor,ThePossibility
ofCooperation(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1987).
22. Keohane,After Hegemony, p. 75.
23. Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists," AmericanPolitical
ScienceReview75 (June1981),pp. 306-18.
24. Rudolph Schuessler,"Exit Threatsand CooperationUnder Anonymity,"JoumalofConflict
Resolution33 (December 1989),pp. 728-49.

Multilateralism 609
of "a countablyinfinitenumberof iterationsof a singleconstituentgame" in

whicha player'spayoffswere a functionof his or her strategy(cooperate or
defect) in the constituentgame and of the number of other playerswho
cooperatedin thatgame.25Here, the incentivesto cooperateor defectwere in
part (perhaps in large part) determinedby an unspecifiednumberof other
playerswithwhoma givenplayermayor maynot have been in directcontact.
Taylor'sconclusionwas that"Cooperation amongsta relativelylarge number
ofplayersis 'less likely'to occurthanCooperationamongsta smallnumber."26
Partof the reason has to do withthe obviousfactthatsince moreactorsexist,
more interestsare involvedand have to be taken into account. But the main
reason, accordingto Taylor, is that "Cooperation can be sustained only if
conditionalCooperatorsare presentand conditionalCooperatorsmustbe able
and costsof monitoring,
to monitorthe behaviorof others."27The difficulties
whichI discussbelow,go up as thenumberof actorsgoes up.
Transaction costs, multilateralism,and regimes. Transactioncosts are

all thecostsincurredin exchange,includingthecostsof acquiringinformation,
bargaining,and enforcement,as well as the opportunitycost of the time
In a sense,the idea of transactioncoststakesus
allocated to these activities.28
beyondnoncooperativegames.In the standardversionof thesegames,agents,
payoffs,and rules are given by assumption. These parameters are not
problematizedand do not functionas costs of playingthe game. In addition,
theidea of enforcement excludedin noncooperativegames.
costsis specifically
Nevertheless, we can thinkoftransactioncostsin a thinnersense as thecostsof
discovering relevantagentsand theirpreferences, ofnegotiating,of identifying
defectionor cooperation,and of bringingrewardsand penaltiesto bear on the
relevantparties.29
Whatis therelationshipbetweenthenumberofactorsinvolvedin a potential
multilateralscheme and the costs of transacting?The costs of transacting
almostcertainlyincreasewithan increasein actors.The costsofidentifying the
relevantothers,of discoveringtheirpreferencesand strategies,and of devising
policiesthatare capable of discriminating amongdefectorsand cooperatorsall
go up. Justhowor bywhatfunctionthisincreasetakesplace is difficult to say.A
linear relation suggeststhat complicationsare directlyproportionalto the
numberof actorsinvolved.An exponentialrelationsuggeststhatcosts rise in
reactionto the numberofpairsor n-tuplesinvolved.Anotherpossibility is that
while costs rise, thereare dampeningfactorsas n increases.Taylorsuggests
25. Taylor,ThePossibility
ofCooperation,p. 83.
26. Ibid.,p. 105.
27. Ibid.
28. Douglass C. North,"TransactionCosts, Institutions,and Economic History,"Joumalof
Economics,vol. 140,1984,pp. 7-17.
and Theoretical
Institutional
29. Here, I am speakingof rewardsand penalties resultingfromdifferentmoves withinthe
game, not from resources outside the game. The latter would amount to an enforcement
mechanism.

that a critical concept for cooperation in large groups is "conditional

cooperation,"definedas the strategyof cooperatingon the conditionthat
others cooperate.30Conditional cooperatorshave to monitorthe moves of
others;otherwise,theirown movescannotbe conditional.However,as Taylor
pointsout,conditionalcooperatorsneed to knowonlythata certainfractionof
otherscooperatedin a priormove,not whichones in particularcooperated.3
Whilethismaydecrease information costs,it does not eliminatethem.
What relationshipmightwe expectbetweenmultilateralorganizationsand
transactioncosts? Ruggie pointsout thatsometimesinstitutions are multilat-
eral because to organizethemdifferently would be more costly.32If the costs
are largeforeach pair of statesand ifthe activitiesgeneratingthese costs are
essentiallythe same (that is, repetitive),large gains maybe expectedthrough
multilateralorganization.Some of thesegainsmaybe Smithian,derivingfrom
the same advantages that make factoryproduction more efficientthan
individualproduction,advantagessuch as decreasingthe amountof timeand
resourceswasted in movingbetweendifferent pointsof production.Keohane
refersto political economies of scale.33The marginalcosts of handlingan
additionalagreement(that is, anotherbilateralagreement)withina multilat-
eral organizationwillbe lowerthanthe averagecost.
But multilateralactivitywithoutan organizationto facilitateand enforce
agreementsbringsup all of the problemsthat haunt internationalpolitical
cooperationin the firstplace: absence of trust,weak and unreliableinforma-
tion,incentivesto defect,and renegingon agreementswhen it is convenient.
While transactioncosts may be lower for multilateralthan for bilateral
agreements,the arrangementsin this case may still be bilateral. Such
nonoptimaloutcomesare notrarein international politics.
One proposed way around this problem is providedby the literatureon
internationalregimes.InAfterHegemony, Keohane makesthe case forregimes
loweringtransactioncosts. At the simplestlevel, theymake it cheaper for
governments to negotiateagreements.34 They provideadministrative help, an
ongoingforumin whichrepresentatives of different statescan meet,and a set
ofrulesand proceduresfordealingwithproblems.In addition,regimesprovide
valuable informational servicesthatfacilitatemultilateralcontact.Theycollect
information, standardizeconceptualcategories(definingthe characteristics of
a nontariff barrier,for example), codifyrules and practices,and attemptto
increasethe transparency of both cooperativeand defectingmoves.Although
GATT is a relatively smallinternational organization,itis hardto imaginehow
individualstateswould manage theirglobal traderelationsbilaterally.Finally,
sinceregimesprovidea framework of rules,a continuingorganizationin which
30. Taylor,ThePossibility p. 105.

ofCooperation,
31. Ibid.
32. Ruggie,"UnravellingtheWorldOrder,"pp. 26-27.
33. Keohane,AfterHegemony, p. 90.
34. Ibid.

Multilateralism 611
states come back formore everyday, theyfacilitatesanctioning.Even if the

actual rewardsand penaltiesare carriedout bythe statesthemselves,regimes
make the whole idea of a "violationof rules" intelligibleand meaningfulin
some intersubjective sense.
The idea of transactioncosts provides a bridge of sorts between the
individualistapproach and the social-communicativeapproach. As noted
above, transactioncostsare all the costsassociatedwithpullingoffexchanges,
coststhatare usuallyassumedto be zero in theperfectly competitiveideal. The
conceptof transactioncostscontainswithinitmuchmaterialthatis anteriorto
and outside of exchange and strategicinteractionper se. Insofar as this
materialhas to do withthe makingand implementation of bindingcontracts,
thetransactioncostsapproachoverlapswithotherapproaches.
In a worldofzero transactioncosts,therewouldbe no need forinternational
multilateralor otherwise.It is the recognitionof positivetransac-
institutions,
tion costs that leads us to inquire about the role of institutionsin solving
problemsof exchange.In thisregard,Lisa Martinasks a straightforward but
productivequestion: "What is the instrumental value of multilateralnorms
underdifferent configurationsof stateinterest?"35Takingonlythe interestsof
statesas primarydata, she exploreswhatimplicationsthese strategicconsider-
ationshave formultilateralinstitutions and theinstitutionofmultilateralism.
While Martinfocuseson several typesof strategicstructures, the contrast
betweencoordinationand collaborationgames is instructive. In coordination
games,actorshave a strongincentiveto reachan agreementand do nothave an
incentiveto depart fromit once it has been reached. The constellationof
interestsgivenby coordinationgames does not require a strong,centralized,
multilateralinstitutionto enforcesolutions,since the temptationforopportu-
nisticbehavioris smallto nonexistent. Bycontrast,in collaborationgamessuch
as prisoners'dilemma,thereis a strongincentiveto defectand a consequent
need for monitoringand enforcementmechanismsto prevent unilateral
defection.But as Martinargues,multilateralnormsare likelyto be dysfunc-
tional for collaboration problems. This is because the norms of diffuse
reciprocityand indivisibility require unconditional cooperation and may
discouragethe specificdetectionand selectivepunishmentrequiredbytit-for-
tat strategies.36
For thisreason,opportunistic behaviorand freeridingcan be
more effectively dealt with throughbilateral arrangementsthan through
multilateralones.
In broad terms,then,Martin argues that there is a tensionbetween the
highlygeneralizednormsof multilateralism on the one hand and the specific
knowledgeand actionsrequiredto enforcecomplexagreementson the other.
Beth Yarbroughand Robert Yarbroughalso exploitthis tensionby arguing
thatbilateralismcan be seen as an enforcement mechanismfordealingwiththe
35. Martin,"Interests,Power,and Multilateralism."

36. Ibid.

relentlessopportunistic pressuresinherentin prisoners'dilemmastructures.37

Bilateralismimpliesthatindividualcountriesbear responsibility fordetecting
violationsof agreementsand forimposingsanctions.Imposingsanctions,in
turn,requiressome capacityto inflictcostsfornoncooperation.Yarbroughand
Yarbroughsuggestthat the exchangeof economichostagesmay providethe
basis for imposingpenalties. "Economic hostages" are defined as binding
precommitments to investin assets thatare specificto a transactionand to a
partner.Japanese automobilesfittedwithpollutiondevices requiredby U. S.
regulationsare one example.
While the theoreticalpoint here is well taken, I am skeptical about
generalizingtheconditionsofeconomicexchangeto multilateral settings.First,
we should not underestimatethe difficulty of hostage exchange in political
terms.A great deal of intragovernmental coordinationand power would be
requiredto tailorregulatorypolicyto the specifications of foreigntrade.This
suggestsa worldinwhich"domestic"regulatory policyis drivenbythedesireto
set up sanctioningmechanismsin the event of the breakdownof foreign
exchange.Second,we can questionthe hostageargumenton itsown terms.To
discourage opportunism,the link between countriesmust show high asset
since this conditionindicateshigh opportunitycosts. But if this
specificity,
conditionexists,by definitionit worksagainstmultilateralgeneralization.A
countrycannothave a different regulatory environment in the same issue-area
for each partner. By contrast,if assets are standardized (the condition
suggestedbypolicyconvergence),the costsof shifting to anotherpartnerwill
be low.
A wayout of thisdilemmamightbe to tailorregulationsto each partnerin
specific(different)issue-areas.This procedurefacesnumeroushurdles.Surely
regulatorypolicies will overlap and interferewithone another,limitingthe
degreesof freedomforpolicymakers. Moreover,specificassets are sunkcosts,
whichslowadjustmentto ever-shifting comparativeadvantage.
In this section, I have examined the path to multilateralcooperation
providedby approaches based on individualist,state-centeredtheory.Since
these approaches build verylittle socialityinto theirpremises,theyare of
limitedvalue in explainingmultilateralcooperation.The sparestversionofthis
theorydrawson noncooperativegames in whichthe rules,the agents,and the
preferences,beliefs,and choices of agentsare establishedby assumption.In
the one-shotdilemmagame, defectionis a dominantstrategy.By selectively
relaxingtheassumptions,complexity and realismcan be introduced.The game
can be repeatedso as to allowsignaling(a formofcommunication), interdepen-
and variousvalues forreputation.Coopera-
dentstrategies(such as tit-for-tat),
tiveresultscan be and are produced.Indeed, some arguethattheyare robust.38
37. Beth V. Yarbroughand Robert M. Yarbrough,"Reciprocity,Bilateralism,and Economic

30
Agreementsin InternationalTrade," IntemationalStudiesQuarterly
'Hostages': Self-enforcing
(March 1986),pp. 7-8.
38. See, forexample,Schuessler,"Exit Threatsand CooperationUnder Anonymity."

Multilateralism 613
Nevertheless,extensivemultilateralcooperationis fragileand compounded

byincreasingthenumbersofplayers.Iteratedgamesimplycooperationbutnot
necessarilymultilateralcooperation.As the numberof actors increases and
powerdiffuses, thesize ofthesolutionsetcan change.39 Further,as JohnOrbell
and his colleagues show,cooperativesolutionsare oftenbehaviorally depen-
denton a consensusfarin excessofthelevel of agreementrationally needed to
produce optimal results.40 While resultscould be produced by a k group (a
subset of n), how does a k group know that it is one and who should be a
memberof it? The existenceof a minimalcontributing set (a small group
capable ofprovidinga publicgood) is nota mechanicalquestionrelatingto the
distributionof capabilities. It requires consciousness about the common
situationand shared interestsas well as positiveactions regardingsharing
information and forming coalitions.Moreover,as Tayloremphasizes,even ifa
k groupexistsitis likelyto be thecase thatit is in theinterestofsome members
to getothersto join in place ofthemselves:"In thosecases wheresubsetsof the
playersfindit collectivelyworthwhile to providethe publicgood,therearisesa
quite different strategicproblem,whichresultsfromsome playershavingan
incentiveto ensure that the subsetwhichprovidesthe public good does not
includethemselves."'41 Thus, problemsof freeridingand strategicpreferences
do notdisappearjustbecause a privilegedgroupexists.
The idea of transactioncosts,applied in conjunctionwithregimes,perhaps
takes us furthertowardunderstandingmultilateralinstitutions. However,it
also takes us furtheraway fromapproaches based purely on interestand
strategicchoice and closer to those based on communication and making
bindingcommitments.
Social-communicative approaches
In makingthe transitionfromindividualistto social-communicative ap-
proaches, we move fromrepresentationof autonomous agents engaged in
strategicinteractionto a view thatprogressively incorporatessocial structure
and communication. The changeis notqualitativebutone of degree.
The social approach does not throwout individualrationality; it situatesit
and broadens it. Individualintentionality is embedded in social relationsin
whichcommunication,shared beliefs,norms,and identitycommitments are
present.Thus, the focus is not only on individualchoice but on how the
choosingagentreflects, triesto buildconsensus,
discusses,trustsand distrusts,
alters others' perceptionsof the world, and, in general, uses his or her
capacities as a social being to identifyproblems,solve them,and shape the
39. JamesK. Sebenius,"NegotiationArithmetic:Addingand SubtractingIssues and Parties,"

37 (Spring1983),pp. 281-316.
Organization
International
40. JohnM. Orbell,RobynM. Dawes, and Alphonsvan de Kragt,"The Limitsof Multilateral
Promising,"Ethics100 (April 1991),pp. 616-27.
ofCooperation,
41. Taylor,ThePossibility p. 82.

environment. Withrespectto JonElster'smetaphorsofmarketand forum,this

approach is closer to the forum.42With respect to Anatol Rapoport's
distinctionbetweengames and debates,it is closer to debates.43Withingame
theoryproper,itdrawsmoreon cooperativethannoncooperativegame theory.
In theremainderofthissection,I exploreseveralroutesto multilateralismthat
approach.
relyon the social-communicative
Discussion and persuasion. In noncooperativegame theory,whethera

Nash equilibriumis reachedcan depend to a considerableextenton the ability
to coordinatepolicies.One wayforthiscoordinationto come about is through
preplaycommunication. Oftenitis thecase thatan actorwantstheopponentto
playhisor herbest movein responseto the actor'sownmove.44
In experimentalsocial psychology, studiesconcerninghow actorsdeal with
social dilemmashave demonstratedthatgroupdiscussiongreatlyincreasesthe
incidence of cooperation. It does so withoutany help froma leviathanor
centralenforcementagency,iterationof the game, side-payments, or other
narrowlyself-interested reasons. Indeed, some scholarsargue,discussionwill
have an effecton cooperationdespite the factthatthe cooperativechoice is
strictlydominatedbythedefectchoice.45
The exactmechanismbywhichdiscussionworksis notclear. By itselfit is no
panacea. Manydiscussionsand negotiationsin international relationsproduce
no agreementsat all, and sometimesit is not even possible to get to the
negotiatingtable. If the structureof interestsis "deadlock," no amount of
discussionalone will produce cooperation;one side musteffectively persuade
the other to see interestsdifferently.Theoretically,discussionmay work to
alterpreferences,to createa feelingof sharedidentity,to encouragenorms,or
to facilitatepromisingbehavior.
How importantis discussionin internationalrelationstheory?Accordingto
thepredominantmodelofstrategicinteractionin noncooperativegames,states
act on theirinterestsgiventhe interestsand strategychoices of others.The
emphasisis on arriving at thebestoutcomes,possiblyone fromwhichtherewill
be no rationalincentiveto depart.Since not all outcomeshave thisproperty,
attentionis paid to devisingmechanismsof monitoringand verificationto
prevent"cheating" or "shirking."This orientationsuggestslittle role for
discussion.
42. JonElster,"The Marketand theForum:Three Varietiesof PoliticalTheory,"in JonElster

and Aamund Hylland, eds., Foundations of Social Choice Theory(Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress,1986),pp. 103-32.
43. Anatol Rapoport,Fights,Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: Universityof MichiganPress,
1960).
44. See Joseph Farrell, "Communication,Coordination and Nash Equilibrium,"Economic
vol. 27, 1988,p. 209. If thereis onlyone Nash equilibrium,the equilibriumoutcomemight
Letters,
resultwithoutcommunication. I am indebtedto RichardShermanforthispoint.
45. JohnM. Orbell, Alphons van de Kragt,and Robyn M. Dawes, "ExplainingDiscussion-
Induced Cooperation,"JoumalofPersonality 54 (May 1988),p. 811.
and Social Psychology

Multilateralism 615
In the descriptiveworldof internationalrelations,a plausible case can be

made for the importanceof discussion.For example, Jeffrey Frankel and
KatherineRockettsuggestthattheabilityof discussionto improvecooperative
outcomesamongdecisionmakersdepends on its abilityto produceconsensus
on the "true" model of economicreality.46 However,theyemphasizethatthe
"assumptionthat policy makers agree on the true model has little,if any,
empirical basis."47 Still others, such as Robert Putnam and C. Randall
Henning,see discussionas quite central.48
In theircase studyof the 1978 Bonn summitmeeting,Putnamand Henning
analyzed the economic policy preferencesand interestsof seven advanced
capitalistcountries(Britain,Canada, France, Germany,Italy,Japan,and the
UnitedStates) and foundthatthepoliciesadoptedwere different as a resultof
negotiations.49The core ofthe Bonn accordinvolvedan agreementon thepart
of Germanyand Japan to reflatetheirdomesticeconomiesin returnforthe
U. S. commitment to raise domesticoil pricesto worldlevels.50As the authors
pointedout,the interestsof the statesdiffered, witheach havingitsown target
levels regardingoutputs,employment, fiscalpolicy,interestrates,and energy
policy.Moreover,the decision makers'beliefsabout whichkindsof policies
were likelyto lead to targetedgoals differedmarkedly.Sometimes these
differences had to do withvariationsin the resultsof forecastingmodels. A
West Germanmodel,forexample,predictedgrowthfor1977 in the 4.5 to 5.5
percent range, a much strongerperformancethan that forecastedby the
OrganizationforEconomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Some-
times these differencesstemmedfromtheoreticaldisputes about important
parametersin macroeconomicmodels.How muchgrowthwould resultfroma
tax cut of quantityx or a money supply increase of size y? How much
unemployment wouldresultfromdecreasinginflation bya givenamount?
The extensivecase materialprovidedbyPutnamand Henningdocumentsin
detailthe importanceof deliberation,negotiation,and attemptsto changethe
beliefsof othersabout the macroeconomicenvironment. Interests,power,and
strategicinteractionwere not irrelevant, but the abilityto changeperceptions
of interestusing technicalknowledgewas importantas well: "In practice,
negotiation(especiallyinternationally) is more than mere bargainingover a
fixed,known payoff matrix. Much of what actually happens is attempted
at
persuasion.Behaviorally least, our account oftheeventsof 1977-78suggests
that it is highlymisleadingto disregard the degree to whichpolicymakers,
46. Jeffrey A. Frankel and Katherine E. Rockett, "International Macroeconomic Policy

CoordinationWhen Policymakers Do Not Agree on theTrue Model," AmericanEconomicReview
78 (June1988),pp. 318-40.
47. Ibid.,p. 318.
48. RobertD. Putnamand C. Randall Henning,"The Bonn Summitof 1978: A Case Studyin
Coordination,"in RichardN. Cooper et al., Can NationsAgree?Issues in IntemationalEconomic
Cooperation(Washington,D. C.: BrookingsInstitution,1989), pp. 12-140.
49. Ibid.,p. 13.
50. Ibid.,pp. 18-19.

actuallytryto convinceone another that their

negotiatinginternationally,
respectivemodels of the world and even their respectivepreferencesare
mistaken.Under uncertainty, internationalcommunicationsand persuasion
can change minds,move the undecided, and heartenthose in the minority,
domesticallyspeaking."51
Minimal contributingsets. A minimalcontributing set (MCS) is definedas

the smallestnumberof actorswho togethercould providea publicgood ifthey
werewillingto do so. As the earlierdiscussionofk groupsindicated,forsome
subsetofn (all actors),totalbenefitsexceed totalcosts,regardlessofwhatthe
othersdo. While the MCS is formallyidenticalto the k group,the literature
suggeststhatthereare somewhatdifferent mechanismsto bringtheseminimal
groupsintoexistence.
Within the internationalrelations literature,much attentionhas been
directedtowardidentifying the conditionsthat make k groupspossible. The
investigations propertiesof
have pointedscholarsin the directionof structural
the internationalsystem,propertiessuch as the numberof importantactors
and the concentrationeither of aggregatepower or sectoral power. Thus,
sharesofworldtrade,investment, monetaryreserves,and energysupplieshave
functionedas indicatorsof hegemonyor of the concentrationof powerin the
handsof a fewstates.
Proponentsofhegemonicstability theorydo notclaimthattheconcentration
of power automaticallytranslatesinto the provisionof public goods by the
hegemon.The existenceof a hegemonmay not even be necessary,let alone
sufficient.52At most, theyclaim that hegemonicdistributionsof power are
conduciveto the provisionof internationalpublic goods. The stabilityof the
BrettonWoods systemfrom1945 to 1971 was facilitatedbythe overwhelming
economic power of the United States, just as the dominance of the gold
standardwas associatedwithBritain'shegemonyduringthe second halfof the
nineteenthcentury.53
It is in thiscontextthatthe experimentalliteratureon MCSs is relevant.It
attemptsto provide some of the missinglinksbetween aggregatestructural
factssuchas theinternational distributionofpowerand process-levelphenom-
ena. Amongotherthings,the literaturefocuseson discussion,the dissemina-
tionof information (forexample,about the identityof membersof the MCS),
and optimal levels of provision.For public goods with specificthreshold
provisionpoints,itis importantto identifythe relevantactorsand the required
amountof contribution. It mayalso be importantto convinceMCS members
that each of their contributionsis essential; otherwise,there would be a
temptationto freeride.
51. Ibid.,p. 110.

52. Keohane,After Hegemony,p. 31.
53. BarryEichengreen,"HegemonicStabilityTheoriesof the InternationalMonetarySystem,"
in Cooper et al., Can NationsAgree?pp. 255-98.

Multilateralism 617
In the experimentsset up by Alphons van de Kragt and his associates,54

subjects were placed in a social dilemma and given a choice between
cooperating(contributing) and defecting(freeriding).If theycooperated,the
groupwouldbe awardeda bonusto be sharedbyall (a publicgood). If theydid
not cooperate,therewas no guaranteeof a bonus. If the bonus were given,
however,theywould sharein thebenefitsat no cost.Subjectswere dividedinto
twenty-four groups,halfofwhichallowed discussionand halfofwhichdid not.
In all twelvediscussiongroups,the memberscontributedto the public good;
and in tenofthesediscussiongroups,theycontributedtheoptimalamount.55
Accordingto the designersof thisexperiment, the mostimportantfactoris
"criticalness."Each memberof the groupis motivatedto contributewhenthe
contribution of each is seen as a sine qua non forprovisionof the publicgood.
Individualsare placed in the same relationto goods as theyare in private
markets:eitherpay and receive or else pay nothingand receive nothing.If
memberscan be convincedthatsome otherswill not contribute(thus falling
shortof the minimalset), theircontributions are in effectequilibriummoves
fromwhichthereis no rationalincentiveto depart.56
While the structuralproblem addressed by MCS is the same as that
addressedbythek group,the resolutionforthelatteris considerablydifferent.
Emphasis is placed on discussionand explicitcoordinationof interests.The
abilityto designateexplicitlywho is and is not a memberof the k group is
critical.The logic of the solution is limited to public goods with explicit
provisionpoints where participantscan be broughtinto contact with one
another,discuss,and designatecontributors.
Norms, promising, and group identity.In exploringthe effectof norms,

promisingbehavior,and group identityon cooperationin social dilemmas,I
discuss the resultsof laboratoryexperimentsconstructedto show the social
dimensionsof decisionmakingin n-persondilemmas.The generalformof the
experiments rational
is thatof a social dilemmain whichthe set of individually
movesnotto cooperate (not to contributeto thepublicgood) is dominantand
thereforeproduces a deficientequilibrium.I should add that the decision
situationsare anonymousand limited to one time frame (no iteration);
therefore,tit-for-tatstrategiesare notpermitted,and thevalue of reputationis
zero. Althoughthe processes leading up to decisions are social, the actual
decisionsare completelyprivate.57 While normsare ultimatelydismissedas a
key mechanismexplainingcooperationin these experiments,group identity
and promisingare not.
54. Alphonsvan de Kragt,JohnM. Orbell,and RobynM. Dawes, "The MinimalContributing

Set as a Solutionto Public Goods Problems,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview77 (March 1983),
pp. 112-22.
55. Ibid.,p. 114.
56. Ibid.,p. 116.
57. See Orbell,Dawes, and van de Kragt,"The Limitsof MultilateralPromising."

The firstexperiment was designedbyRobynDawes, Alphonsvan de Kragt,

and JohnOrbell to determinewhethergroup identityindependentlyaffects
cooperation,apart fromself-interest, reputation,mutual altruism,or even
conscience.58 The subjects were divided into various discussiongroups and
weretoldthatthey could make a contributionto theirowngroupiftheywished
but not to othergroups. The researchers found thatindividualsgave to their
groupevenwhen it was not in their to
self-interest do so, but theyadopted no
generalizednormabout giving:"Our experiments have led us to concludethat
cooperationrates can be radicallyaffectedby one factorin particularthatis
independentof the consequences forthe choosingindividual.That factoris
group identity.Such identity-or solidarity-can be establishedand conse-
quentlyenhance cooperationrespondingin the absence of anyexpectationof
futurereciprocity, or currentreward or punishment,or even reputational
consequences among othergroup members;moreover,thisidentityoperates
independently ofthedictatesof conscience."59
In another experiment,the same researchersattemptedto extend their
analysisof cooperationby exploringthe psychologicaland group dynamics
involvedin promise-making and promise-keeping behavior.Startingfroma
baseline of bilateral promising,they attemptedto generalize the logic to
multilateralpromisingin groupsof up to fourteensubjects.It turnedout that
the generalizationwas not at all straightforward. What theyfoundwas that
promisesin large groupswere keptwhen all groupmembersmade thembut
weremuchless bindingwhenonlysome membersmade them.60
The centralquestionis how to make sense of the factthatthe investigators
found no evidence that promisingincreases cooperation in cases in which
promiseswere not made universally.A commonsenseapproach to promising
and groupidentityis to thinkof the twophenomenaas continuously relatedto
cooperativebehavior.A littlepromisingor groupidentity is betterthannone; a
lot is betterthana little;and so on. But thiscommonsenseapproachdoes not
squarewiththestep-levelfunctionobservedin theexperimental results.Whyis
unanimity so important, evenwhenthe supplyof publicgoods is continuousor
whentheprovisionthresholdis shortofunanimity?
A numberof hypothesescome to mind. First,it may be that individuals
believe that cooperation will only occur when everyone promises. The
hypothesisleaves thisbeliefitselfunexplained,but it is suggestive.The fearof
an agreementunravelingmighthighlightthe importanceof unanimity("one
forall, all forone"; "unitedwe stand,dividedwe fall"). In addition,unanimity
providesa prominentsolutionin Thomas Schelling'ssense-that is, a point
which can be singled out and around which expectationscan converge.61
58. RobynM. Dawes, Alphonsvan de Kragt,and JohnM. Orbell,"Not Me or Thee But We:
The Importanceof Group Identityin ElicitingCooperationin Dilemma Situations:Experimental
Manipulations,"ActaPsychologica68 (September1988),pp. 83-97.
59. Ibid.,p. 86.
60. Orbell,Dawes, and van de Kragt,"The Limitsof MultilateralPromising."
61. Thomas C. Schelling,TheStrategyofConflict(New York: OxfordUniversity Press,1963),pp.
57-58.

Multilateralism 619
Payoffto
coopera-
torsand
defectors
COO~(O
n defect -
w / k k+ I n- I ncooperate
FIGURE 1. Thestructure
ofincentives exchange
in multilateral
Source.JohnOrbell,RobynDawes, and Alphonsvan de Kragt,"The Limitsof Multilateral
Promising,"Ethics100 (April 1991), p. 624. Modifiedand reproduced,withpermission,fromthe
authors,Ethics,and theUniversityof Chicago Press.
Second, group identitymay somehowbe triggeredby unanimousconsent.If

everyoneagrees,feelingsof solidarityamonggroupmembersare likelyto be
high.Still,it is hardto accept thata fewnoncooperativeindividualscould have
so disproportionate an effect.Third,and thisis not completelydistinguishable
fromthe firsthypothesis,universality in promisingmay simplydescribe the
conditionunderwhichindividualsperceivetheirownpromisesas binding.This
amountsto sayingthat a promise is an offerof cooperationcontingenton
everyoneelse also cooperating.
While these interpretations unresolved,let us exploresome of
are currently
the differences between bilateral and multilateralpromises.In the bilateral
case, the payoffspresentclear informationabout the benefitsand costs of
differentchoices.If one ofthetwoactorsrefusesto make a promise,thisyields
an outcome of "both defect."62In the multilateralcase, however,therewill
almost always be levels of cooperation that are less than universal but
nonethelessyieldpayoffs betterthanat thepointwhereall defect.
This point is illustratedin Figure 1, which is adapted fromthe work of
Orbell, Dawes, and van de Kragt. There are manypoints along the x axis
62. Orbell,Dawes, and van de Kragt,"The Limitsof MultilateralPromising."

(numberof cooperators)wherethe gains fromcooperation(y axis) equal and

then exceed the gains fromall defecting.This is true even if cooperationis
dominatedby defectionat the individuallevel (the defectline has the same
slope buta higherinterceptthanthecooperateline). Anypointto therightofk
is sociallysuperiorto anypointto theleftof it.Yet theentireregionbetweenk
and n - 1 on the horizontalaxis describesa span where cooperationis not
forthcoming as a resultofpromising.63
conclude thatperhapsthe answerlies
Orbell and his colleagues tentatively
withinthe realm of uncertainty, cognitivelimitations,and the difficultyof
specifyinga prominentrule, one that is "simple enough to be generally
recognized,and general enough to apply to the manyn-prisoners'dilemma
game parametersthatare possible."64The economicallyattractiverule "Your
promiseis ethicallybindingwhenanynumbermorethank (includingyourself)
have also promised"65would do nicely,but it may be beyond the cognitive
competenceof the actors.If so, we can see whymembersof the groupmight
pushtowarduniversality: iteliminatesfreeriding,diminishestheobstaclesthat
envyand relativedeprivationmightthrowup, and is equitable. However,a
multilateralcooperativearrangement thathas no mechanismsfordealingwith
local defectionswouldbe extremely fragile.
Institutionalapproaches
To use the term "institutional"today is to evoke a host of competing
conceptionsaboutwhatinstitutions First,thereis
are and how theyfunction.66
the old (but stillalive) institutionaleconomicsof JohnCommons,Clarence
Ayers,and ThorsteinVeblen.67Second, thereis the muchmore recent"new
institutionalism"ofneoclassicaleconomics,sometimescalled "theneweconom-
ics of organization."This approach,whichhighlights principal-agentproblems
63. This does not mean thatcooperationdoes not occur in thisregion.It just means thatthere
are no significantdifferencesin cooperation across groups that promise (short of universal
promising)and groupsthatdo not.
64. Orbell,Dawes, and van de Kragt,"The Limitsof MultilateralPromising,"p. 265.
65. Ibid.
66. The contemporaryliteratureon institutionsis voluminousand growingrapidly.For an
overviewofone kindof"new institutionalism," see JamesG. Marchand JohanP. Olsen,"The New
Institutionalism:OrganizationalFactors in Political Life,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview78
(September 1984), pp. 734-49. For an overviewof recentwork in internationalrelations,see
Robert0. Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions: Two Approaches,"IntemationalStudiesQuarterly
32 (December 1988), pp. 379-96. For a surveyfroma rationalchoice perspective,see KennethA.
Shepsle, "StudyingInstitutions:Some Lessons fromthe Rational Choice Approach,"Joumalof
TheoreticalPolitics1 (April 1989), pp. 131-47. Finally,foran overviewof sociologicalapproaches,
see Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational
Analysis(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1991). My use of the term"institutional"does not
exactlyreplicatethe usage of any single approach. Yet it drawsheavilyon JohnRuggie forhis
emphasison ideas and norms,on Stephen Krasnerforhis notionsof path-dependence,and on
RobertKeohane forhis argumentsabout thewaysin whichinstitutions shape incentives.
67. For a descriptionofthisapproach,see thespecialissue ofJoumalofEconomicIssues,vol. 21,
no. 3, September1987.

Multilateralism 621
and focuseson transactioncosts,is discussedin thewritingsofDouglass North

and OliverWilliamson.68 of political
Third,thereis the "new institutionalism"
sciencedescribedbyJamesMarch and JohanOlsen.69Proponentsof thisthird
approach argue for the relative autonomyof political institutionsand the
importanceofbeliefsand norms.
The three institutionalapproaches are not carbon copies or modified
versionsof one another.They oftendifferin philosophicalassumptions,core
theoreticalconcerns,researchprograms,and method.The institutionalism of
Commons, Ayers, and Veblen looks to Charles Pearce for his theoryof
semioticsand to German historicistssuch as Wilhelm Dilthey.70The new
economics of organization,tracingits roots to Ronald Coase's 1937 article
entitled"The NatureoftheFirm,"interprets economicinstitutionsas reducing
transaction costsinvolvedincertaintypesofmarketexchange.71 The institution-
alism of March and Olsen reclaimsparts of a much older political science
traditionwhileenrichingittheoretically throughinsightsdrawnfromorganiza-
tion theoryand the workof recentsocial scientistssuch as Theda Skocpol,
StephenKrasner,and PeterKatzenstein.72
I will firstdescribe the major componentsof the institutionalapproach
employedhere and thentryto drawout some implicationsformultilateralism.
What I describe borrowsselectivelyfromthe three approaches discussed
above,butthefinalversionis notreducibleto anyone ofthem.
The startingpoint for wantingto develop an institutionalparadigmis a
dissatisfaction withrationalchoice, pluralist,and internationalsystemicap-
proaches to internationalrelations theory.73Individualisticrational choice
approachesfocuson individualsattempting to maximizetheirutilityfunctions.
Pluralistapproachesview policies and behavioras resultsof the pullingand
haulingof pressuregroups,and internationalsystemicapproachesexplainthe
rangeof state optionsin termsof variationsin internationalstructure.All of
68. See Douglass C. North,Structureand ChangeinEconomicHistory (New York: Norton,1981);

North,"TransactionCosts,Institutions, and Economic History";OliverWilliamson,Marketsand
Hierarchies:Analysis and AntitrustImplications(New York: Free Press, 1975); and Oliver
Williamson,TheEconomicInstitutions ofCapitalism(New York: Free Press,1985).
69. See March and Olsen, "The New Institutionalism."
70. See Philip Mirowski,"The PhilosophicalBases of InstitutionalistEconomics,"Joumalof
EconomicIssues21 (September1987),pp. 1001-37.
71. See Ronald H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm,"Economica, vol. 4, 1937; reprintedin
Ronald H. Coase, TheFirm,theMarket,and theLaw (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1988),
pp. 33-55.
72. See Theda Skocpol,Statesand Social Revolutions(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,
1979); Stephen D. Krasner,DefendingtheNational Interest:Raw MaterialsInvestment and U. S.
ForeignPolicy (Princeton,N. J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1978); and Peter J. Katzenstein,
"Introduction:Domestic and InternationalForces and Strategiesof ForeignEconomicPolicy,"in
PeterJ.Katzenstein,ed.,BetweenPowerand Plenty(Madison: University ofWisconsinPress,1978),
pp. 3-22.
73. For a similar,but not identical,motivation,see G. JohnIkenberry,David A. Lake, and
Michael Mastanduno, "Introduction:Approaches to Explaining Foreign Economic Policy,"
IntemationalOrganization42 (Winter1988),pp. 1-14.

these approaches are valuable in their own rightyet are inadequate for
understandingmultilateralcooperation. Most choice-theoreticapproaches
take preferencesand rules as given,neglectingthe waysin whichinstitutions
shape preferences.Internationalsystemicapproacheshelp us understandhow
states overcomecollectiveaction problems.They tell us, given a particular
constellationof interests,74whethera cooperativesolutionis likely.But they
tell us littleabout the contentof that solution.75Pluralism,in its traditional
versions at least, provides a good account of the social forces underlying
decision making,but it treats political institutionsas transmissionbelts
conveyingdemands throughthe policy process ratherthan as independent
variablesin theirownright.
These dissatisfactions set the stage forthe institutional
approach outlined
here.I arguethatthereare threecrucialcomponentsoftheapproach.The first
is ontologicaland relatesto the statusof entities,particularly
individualagents
and institutions.The second is theoreticaland is concernedwiththe specifica-
tionof the properrelationsamongpreferences,institutions, norms,and ideas.
The third is interpretiveand has to do with how we are to understand
cooperation.
Ontologically,theinstitutional approachmayacceptelementsofmethodolog-
ical holism.76 While the debate regardingwhethergroups(or individuals)are
"real" is singularlyunproductive,the issue of which levels of organized
complexity"count" is not unimportant.The institutionalapproach assumes
thatenduringstructures and patternsof rule are important.It seeks to explain
individual behavior by reference to "institutionalfacts" rather than to
characteristics of individualsper se. This statementoftenpromptsconfusion,
sinceitsuggeststo some thatinstitutional explanationsinvolvean overriding of
rationalchoice (or intentional)explanationsbyanonymousinstitutional forces.
I arguethatthisis not the properwayto understandthe relationshipbetween
"micro" and "macro" in institutionaltheory.Institutionaltheory is not
74. This is not a trivialpoint.It is one thatis passed over too quicklyin the collectiveaction
literature.This literature,ofwhichhegemonicstability theoryis one expression,generallyassumes
some form of mixed-motivegame in which outcomes (payoffs) can be improved through
coordinationof behavior.That is, it assumes the existenceof some contingentpairs of strategies
which,ifplayed,willyieldbetteroutcomesthanthe noncoordinatedsolutionwouldprovide.If the
structure ofinterestsis zero-sum,a hegemonicdistribution ofpowerwouldhave markedlydifferent
consequences.
75. Ruggie has made this point numeroustimes. See John Gerard Ruggie, "International
Regimes, Transactions,and Change: Embedded Liberalismin the PostwarEconomic Order,"
IntemationalOrganization 36 (Spring1982),pp. 379-415; and Ruggie,"Multilateralism."
76. Institutionalapproaches need not be methodologicallyholist, however. They may be
committedto theviewthatindividualsare theultimateunitsofsocietyand stilltreatcomplexsocial
structures and institutions as describingimportantemergenteffects.In thissense, the ontological
argumentmaybe misleadingin thatit is easyto glidefromtheontologicalpositionthatindividuals
are the ultimateunitsto the theoreticalpositionthatall causation has an individuallocus. I am
indebtedto discussionswithRonald Jeppersonforthispoint;see his articleentitled"Institutions,
InstitutionalEffects,and Institutionalism," in Powell and DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in
OrganizationalAnalysis, pp. 143-63.

Multilateralism 623
primarilyabout nonrational,habit-driven, unthinkingbehavior.It is mostly

about quite purposeful,goal-orientedbehaviorin whichthe identities,prefer-
ences,beliefs,and behaviorofmicrounitsare givena structural determination.
approachattachesprimacyto institutions,
The institutional norms,and roles
thatshape and constrain,as well as facilitate,certainkindsof activity.77While
the individualenterstheworldwithnumerousoptions,the structureof choice
and certain persistentconfigurationsof choice are part of the "given"
environment. The individualmayprovidethe microcomponent of institutional
theory,but social relationsand institutionsare not seen as productsof freely
choosingindividuals;instead,agencyis givena structural determination.
The strong version of this structuraldeterminationargumentis that
individualactions merely"instantiate"the reproductionof structure.78 The
subjects of structuralanalysis are particularroles and locations that are
"occupied" and "executed" by agents. Structuresare deemed to be the
appropriatefocusbecause theyare moredurablethanindividualsand because
theypreserveconsistentpropertiesin the face of greatervarietyamongtheir
occupants.A less extremeversionof the structuraldetermination argumentis
that structures"loosely determine,""condition,"or "establishboundaries"
withinwhichactionstranspire.Individualagentshave some roomto maneuver,
some space withinwhichto exercisechoice,but the boundariesare controlled
by underlyingstructures.This less extremeversionallows for a compromise
between the view that institutionsare by-productsof individualutilitarian
calculationsand the oppositeviewthatnormatively orientedindividualagents
mindlessly reproducestructures. Institutionsare treatedas a leveloforganized
complexity: theyare distinctfromthe sum of individualscomposingthem,yet
theyreston a basis of humanactionsthatare continuallycontested,are only
partlypropelledby normsand role expectations,and alwaysreflecta tension
betweenthedesiresofindividualsand theneeds ofinstitutions.79 An institution
is no moreunproblematicthan an autonomousindividual.As Ruggie argues,
the "collective situation" must continuallybe "negotiated by the parties
concerned."80
77. In "InternationalInstitutions,"p. 384, Keohane stressesthatinstitutions

constrainactivity,
shape expectations,and prescriberoles.
78. For this viewpoint,see AnthonyGiddens, CentralProblemsin Social Theory(Berkeley:
University of CaliforniaPress,1979),pp. 49-95.
79. The phrase"the needs ofinstitutions" mayraise some eyebrows,especiallyformethodolog-
ical individualists.What I have in mind here is not some reifiedentitywithmotivessimilarto
individuals.I am simplythinking oftypesoforganizedcomplexity thatmaybe quite importantfora
collectivityeven thoughtheyare unimportant or perhaps damagingforthe individual.Complex
divisionsof labor maybe alienatingforthe individualbut crucialforsocietal survival.Hierarchy
may be undesirablefor everyonein the firmyet necessaryfor competitiveprofitlevels. The
theoreticalsource supportingthisviewpointis evolutionary theorywherethe forcesoperatingon
institutions are selectivepressuresin the environment. decline,survival,and
Thus, institutional
change can be seen as results of a blind trial-and-error model with selectivewinnowingby
environmental forces.
80. John Gerard Ruggie, "InternationalResponses to Technology:Concepts and Trends,"
IntemationalOrganization 29 (Summer1975),p. 567.

The secondmajorclaimofinstitutionalism concernstherelationshipsamong

preferences,norms,and beliefs. The approach requires us to rethinkthe
conventionalrelationships.We can beginbyviewingthe questionof relation-
shipsas a typeof causal question:Whichvariableis mostimportant?The basic
conceptualissues are thenresolved.What remainsis to estimatethe parame-
tersand determinethe share of the variance attributableto each factor.It is
importantto recognize that both preferencesand norms can functionas
motives,withbeliefssupplyinginformation about howto relatemeans to ends.
Both neoclassical economics and realist internationalrelations theoryap-
proachtheirexplanatoryquestionsin similarways.Agents(individuals,states)
have preferences(or national interests)and act on them with resources
(endowments,nationalcapabilities)at hand. The economicequation is more
complete,since it deals withtechnology(whichconcernsideas about combin-
ing factorinputs)and offerssome insightinto decisionmakingin the face of
risk and uncertainty.Realist internationalrelationstheoryprovidesalmost
nothingin termsof rigoroustheoryand research about beliefs.81However,
internationalrelationsscholarsoutside the realistschool are contributingto
our knowledgeof howideas and beliefsaffectoutcomes.82
For the kind of institutionalism proposed here, the relativeimportanceof
norms,preferences,and beliefsis of less concernthanthe questionofwhichof
these factorsare taken as exogenous and which are taken as endogenous.
Conventionalrational choice models in neoclassical economics start with
exogenous preferences,a given distributionof endowments,and a given
technology.The behavior of agents is explained by showingthat they are
responsiveto changesin costs and benefitsat the margin.In the institutional
approach,however,norms,beliefs,and rules occupya more centralposition.
Individualscome to politicsnot onlywithpreferencesforparticularoutcomes
but also withshared and divisivevalues and variouslydevelopedbeliefsabout
the politicalprocess. In addition,politicsand individualpreferencesundergo
change: not onlydo individuals"act out" theirpreferencespolitically,but as
March and Olsen pointout,the politicalprocessis a forumwithinwhichtheir
to realistinternational
81. In referring relationstheoryhere,I am notincludingtheliteratureon
psychologicalimages, cognitivestructuresand perception,and perceptual distortionin crisis
decisionmaking.Withoutdevaluingthisliterature, itstrikesme thatitspurposeis moreto identify
thesourcesofperceptualdistortion thanto arguehowbettermeans-endsknowledgeor alternative
interpretivemodelscan facilitatecooperativeoutcomes.
82. See, for example, Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communitiesand
MediterraneanPollution Control,"IntemationalOrganization43 (Summer 1989), pp. 377-403;
JudithGoldstein,"The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy:The Originsof U. S. Agriculturaland
ManufacturingPolicies," IntemationalOrganization43 (Winter 1989), pp. 31-71; and Emanuel
Adler, The Powerof Ideology(Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1987). Since the timemy
articlewas written,a special issue ofIntemationalOrganization has been publishedon thissubject.
See PeterM. Haas, ed., "Knowledge,Power,and InternationalPolicyCoordination,"Intemational
Organization46 (Winter1992),pp. 1-390.

Multilateralism 625
preferencesand beliefschange"as in therestoflife,througha combinationof

education,indoctrination, and experiences."83
Institutions are thoughtto be importantwithrespectto preferences, beliefs,
and normsin numerousways.They help shape preferencesby changingthe
payoffmatrix(forexample,makingiteasier to punishfreeridersand defectors
withinan institutionalcontext) and by offeringan environmentin which
socialization and learningcan occur. The continuouscontact,exchange of
information, and educationaboutvariouscognitivestylesthattakeplace within
multilateralinstitutions serveto alterperceptionsabout both the contentand
the means to achieve privateinterests.In addition to alteringpreferences,
institutionsprovideinformation, increasetrust,and reduce uncertainty about
theactionsofothers.By so doing,theyincrease the capacity of separate agents
to achieve interdependentgoals by easing coordinationproblems.Finally,
institutions promotethe adherence to norms.In the institutionalapproach,
norms are not treated as utilities (or as second-orderutilities) but as
prescriptions lyingoutsideof preferencestructures. The contentof normshas
less to do withwhatagentswantconcretelythanwithhowtheyoughtto behave
in certainsituationsand whatgoals theyoughtto pursue.The UN prohibition
on the use of force to acquire territory, people, or resourcesis a norm. It
proscribesthe use of force for these ends, even though such ends are
representedin thepreferenceschedulesof some decisionmakers.
The thirdmajorcomponentof the institutional approachhas to do withthe
proper way to understandcooperation.Accordingto individualisttheories,
such as neorealism,cooperation is as an outgrowthof individualdesires,
capacities,and choices.Cooperationis instrumental. Whilethe social atomsof
neoclassicaleconomicsare individuals,theprimitive social unitsofrealismand
neorealismare states.These statesand theiridentitiesand ends are instrumen-
tally defined as separate fromthe institutionsof internationalsociety.As
AlexanderWendt and RaymondDuvall point out, thishas importantconse-
quences: "The predominanceof neorealismin contemporaryinternational
relationstheory,with its focus on the conscious choices of self-interested
actors, has meant that the storyof internationalinstitutionsand order is
currentlybeing told overwhelmingly in terms of the strategicproblem of
constructing 'cooperationunder anarchy'ratherthan in termsof an interna-
tionalsociety,albeitan essentiallyanarchicalone."84
Institutionaltheoristssee complexpatternsof cooperationalreadyembed-
ded withinstates and the interstatesystem.There are shared elementsof
internationalsociety(such as commonlanguageand norms),diplomaticrules
prescribinghow statesshould representthemselves,and rules impliedby the
p. 739.
83. March and Olsen, "The New Institutionalism,"
84. Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutionsand InternationalOrder," in
Ernst-OttoCzempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changesand TheoreticalChallenges
(Lexington,Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989),p. 59.

veryconceptof sovereignty. Yet sovereignty, as severalhave pointedout, is a

concept that is laden with social meaningand rests on rules about mutual
recognition,noninterference in domesticaffairs,and rightsof foreigndiplo-
mats.85
The social conceptionoftheinterstatesystemimpliesa different understand-
ingof cooperation.The fundamentalstartingpointis not atomisticinteraction
withinanarchy.The basic questionis nothowto cooperateand to deriverules,
norms,and socialityfroma rule-free,normlessstate of nature. Rather,the
startingpointis a social conceptionof the actors,and thebasic questionshave
to do with how the systemof states can reproduce itself,what tensionsit
incorporates,and what capacityit has foralteringits structuresand rules to
deal withchangingenvironmental pressures.
To summarizethe above discussion,proponentsof the institutionalap-
proach do not view rules, norms,and habits of cooperation exclusivelyas
somethingexternalto agents (states), somethingthat agents"bump into" or
"runup against"as theyinteractwithone another.Instead,theyrecognizethat
these practicesare oftenconstitutive of the identitiesand powersof agentsin
the firstplace. They also recognizethatinstitutions are not necessarilychosen
on a rational basis but instead are the products (residual products) of
unconscioustrial-and-error activity,coupled with selectivepressuresin the
environment.Whether this unconscious activityis at the cultural level of
developingsharedsymbolsand meaningor is hard-wiredintostatesthemselves
is beyondthe scope of this article.However,both conceptionsof rules have
theiradvocates.86
I have proposed three core principlesof institutionalism, the firstone
ontological,thesecondtheoretical,and thethirdinterpretive. These principles
haveimportant implicationsforhowinstitutionalists identify questionsconcern-
ing multilateralism,the methodof analysis,and the substantivecore of their
researchprogram.
The core questionis decidedlynot the state of natureproblematique.The
'problem of cooperation"is notrepresentableprimarily as a game of strategic
interaction,althoughthisdimension of interstate behavior surelyexists.The
emphasisshiftsfromstrategic interactionwith given (and fixed) utilitiesto a
model of debate, communication, persuasion, argument, and discursive legiti-
85. See Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions";FriedrichV. Kratochwil,Rules, Norms and

Decisions(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1989); and RobertH. Jackson,"Quasi-States,
Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: InternationalJurisprudenceand the Third World,"
IntemationalOrganization 41 (Autumn1987),pp. 519-49.
86. The workof RichardAshleyand FriedrichKratochwilseems to be groundedin culturally
acquirednormsand practices.Accordingto Hayek's conceptionof rules,however,our rule-based
behaviorhas its originsin evolutionaryprocesses and is the resultof blind trial and errorand
selectiveretention.Consequently,rules are arrivedat unconsciouslyand are "hard-wired"in the
biologicalorganism,at leastin part.For a discussionofHayek'stheoryofrules,see Anna Elizabeth
Galeotti, "Individualism,Social Rules, Tradition:The Case of FriedrichA. Hayek," Political
Theory15 (May 1987),pp. 163-81.

Multilateralism 627
mation. Indeed, as Friedrich Kratochwilnotes, "Most of our arguments

concerningpolicyor rightsare not so much about the determinationof the
likelyresult,givena certaindistributionof 'preferences,'as theyare debates
over whichpreferencesdeservepriorityover others,whichones oughtto be
changed,and whichjudgementsdeserveour assent. Here the overallpersua-
sive 'weight'of claims ratherthan theirlogical necessityor aggregationis at
issue."87
The internationalsystem,then,is notjust a collectionof independentstates
in interaction.Sovereignty is not a conceptthatis sensiblyapplied to a single
state or to numerousstates in isolationfromone another.It is inherently a
relationalconcept. Multilateralismas an organizingprinciplewould have to
focus on the constitutiveprinciplesof the state systemand to draw out its
implicitand sometimeshidden sociality.Withrespectto multilateralactivity,
heavilyemphasizethe discursive,deliberative,and persuasive
institutionalists
aspects of communicationand argument.The interstatesystemis a forumas
well as a chessboard,and its actorsdebate, argue,and justifyas well as signal
moves.
Another implicationof institutionalism runs along methodologicallines.
This implicationis clarifiedbycontrastingtheinstitutional approachpresented
herewitheconomictheoriesof institutions in the Coase-Williamsontradition.
The analyticstarting pointoftheinstitutional approachrequires,in additionto
data about power and interests,some extantinstitutional data, includingdata
about rules, social structures,values, and commonunderstandingsthat are
"historicallygiven."Economic theoriesof institutions stressthe overallfitof
institutionsto the environment. The emergenceof and changes in organiza-
tions are efficientresponses to environmentalchallenges.88Institutional
argumentsoftenstressthe contingent, path-dependentnatureof institutional
change. These argumentsgenerallyassume a narrativeformin whichtiming
and sequences matter.
These twodifferent approachessuggesttwodifferent The
viewsof history.89
economic orientationrelies on efficiencyand has an equifinal structure.
Institutionsmay offersome frictionalresistance,but in the end theycan be
incorporatedinto the general equilibriummodel of allocativeefficiency.90 In
addition,the model suggestssimilar(if not uniform)institutional outcomes.
87. Kratochwil, Rules,Normsand Decisions,p. 12.

88. See Charles Perrow,"Economic Theories of Organization,"in Sharon Zukin and Paul
DiMaggio, eds., Structuresof Capital: The Social Organizationof the Economy (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press,1990), p. 128.
89. See James A. Caporaso, "Introduction:The State in Comparative and International
Perspective," in James A. Caporaso, ed., The Elusive State: Intemationaland Comparative
Perspectives(NewburyPark,Calif.:Sage, 1989),p. 12.
90. For an importantexception,see Douglass C. North,"Institutionsand Their Consequences
for Economic Performance,"in Karen SchweersCook and MargaretLevi, eds., The Limitsof
Rationality(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 383-401. On p. 392 of thischapter,
Northrecognizesthatthe neoclassical economicsliteratureon institutions focusesprimarilyon
institutions solutionsto problemsof economicorganization.
as efficient

Given the startingpoint described in terms of preferences,endowments,

technology,and transactioncosts, analystscan predictoutcomes,including
institutionaloutcomes.Since the environment in whicheconomicinstitutions
operateis competitive, thereare strongselectivepressurestowardinstitutional
homogeneity. Thus, it does notmattermuchwherethe analyststartsand what
sequences occur. Institutionsrespond to changes in the major independent
variablesindependently of the sequences in whichtheyoccur.The methodof
comparativestaticsdrivesout narrative.By contrast,theinstitutional approach
is moreattunedto variationsin initialconditionsand to thesequences inwhich
particular events and processes occur. It speaks the language of eras,
conjunctures,and historically producedchoices.At the microlevel,individuals
may stillbe describedin instrumental terms,but theirfuturechoices, their
perceptionsof what is possible, and their beliefs and standard operating
proceduresare productsofpast historicalchoices.
The paradigmsofthefirst, or functional,approachare modernizationtheory
and economictheoriesof historyin whichefficiency considerationsdetermine
outcomes. An example of the second, or path-dependence,approach is
AlexanderGerschenkron's theory,whichemphasizeshowimportant thetiming
of entryinto the internationalmarketis for development,particularlyas it
relates to the role of the state in the economy.91The stress on historical
contingency and path-dependentbehaviorsuggeststhatmanydifferent institu-
tional worlds are possible. What we observe at any point in time is not
necessarilyefficient (comparedwithwhat mighthave been chosen had other
historicalcontingenciesintervened).There is even less reason forbelieving
thatuniformity of institutionaloutcomesis likely,since the model producing
theseoutcomesis highlysensitiveto minorvariationsin itsparametersand thus
does nothave robustproperties.
These two views of historyhave implicationsforour understandingof the
multilateralorganizationofour contemporary world.Althoughsocial scientists
do not like to engage explicitlyin counterfactuals,it is necessaryto do so. To
say that somethingoccurredthe way it did because of x impliesthat things
would have been different in the absence ofx. To pose the issue in thisway
promptsus to ask severalquestions:Is multilateralism an inevitableorganiza-
tional formof the modern state system?Is it the institutionthatwould be
recreated if we could replay historywith a number of differentinitial
conditions,choice points,and historicaltrajectories?For example,whatwould
have happened, Ruggie asks, if Germanyhad prevailedin World War II?92
Would Schactianbilateralismhave been discardedin favorof multilateralism?
The apparentdifferences amongtheideas ofprewarGermany,postwarJapan,
the Soviet Union, and the United States withrespectto organizingthe world
politicaleconomyshouldat least givepause.
91. Alexander Gerschenkron,Economic Backwardnessin HistoricalPerspective(Cambridge,

Mass.: Belknap,1962).

Multilateralism 629
There is a researchprogramimplied by the institutionalapproach. It is

reflectedin the numerouspuzzles and theoreticalchallengessuggestedbythe
approach,in theunansweredquestionsregardingtheimportanceofnormsand
beliefs, in the tough transitionfrom assumptionto theoryregardingthe
independentimportanceof the institutional levelof analysis,and in thetaskof
developingrigorousmethodologiesto exploretheoreticalissueshistorically, as
I haveused thattermin thisarticle.
In this researchprogram,norms,ideas, and social purposeswill occupy a
centrallocation. Mainstreaminternationalrelationstheoryrelies heavilyon
power, interest,and anarchyfor its explanatoryfoundation.Indeed, since
interest(national interest) is partly determinedby the structureof the
internationalsystem(anarchyand the distribution of power),onlytwofactors
can independently vary.Scholars such as JohnRuggie,HaywardAlker,and
Richard Ashley want to question this paradigm.93Ruggie does not accept
accounts of regimesthat rest on power distributionexplanationsonly. The
concentration of powermaymake it easier to solve collectiveactionproblems,
but it tells us nothingabout the contentof the regime.For this,we must
introduceideas, norms,and social purposes.
researchprogramis alreadybeingcarriedout, although
The institutionalist
notall scholarswould subscribeto thelabel,norwouldtheynecessarilycomply
withall of the componentsof the programelaboratedhere. ErnstHaas's work
on the importanceof consensual knowledge,commonbeliefs,learning,and
perceptualchangein international organizationalenvironments is exemplary.94
Workingwithina domesticcontext,JudithGoldsteinhas triedto demonstrate
howkeynormsand ideas aboutfreetradehavebeen incorporatedintonational
laws and institutions.95The transferof responsibility for commercialpolicy
fromthe legislativeto the executivebranch,the evolutionof the International
Trade Commission,and thedistancingoftradepolicyfrompublicopinionhave
all servedto preservefreetrade,despiteperiodsof highprotectionist demands.
Goldstein'sworkshowsthatmultilateralism is notjust an international
affair;it
has crucial domesticcomponentsas well. Finally,Alexander Wendt's work
focuseson thewaysin whichpowerpolitics,generallytakenas an unproblem-
atic givenof the modernworld,is a construction owingmuchto processesof
socialization, learning,and cognitivechange.96Our present international
93. See Ruggie,"InternationalRegimes,Transactions,and Change"; HaywardR. Alker,Jr.,

"The Presumptionof Anarchyin InternationalRelations,"mimeograph,MassachusettsInstitute
of Technology,Cambridge,1986; and RichardAshley,"The Povertyof Neorealism,"in Robert0.
Keohane, ed., Neorealismand Its Critics(New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1986), pp.
255-300.
worksofErnstB. Haas: BeyondtheNation-State;TangleofHopes:American
94. See thefollowing
Commitments and WorldOrder(EnglewoodCliffs,N. J.:Prentice-Hall,1969); and WhenKnowledge
Is Power.
and AmericanTrade Policy,"IntemationalOrganiza-
95. JudithGoldstein,"Ideas, Institutions,
tion42 (Winter1988),pp. 179-217.
96. Alexander Wendt, "Sovereigntyand the Social Constructionof Power Politics," paper
presentedat theannualmeetingoftheInternationalStudiesAssociation,Washington,D. C., 1990.

systemis noteternal;ithas a history,

and ithas a futurethatwe are ill-equipped
to theorize,giventhestaticnatureofmanyof our theories.
Conclusion
The basic argumentof thisarticlebuilds on the premisethatmultilateralism
has been relativelyneglectedin internationalrelationstheory.While multilat-
eral organizationsand practiceshave been examinedempirically, theirsources
have notbeen thesubjectofmuchconcernin realistand neorealisttheory.Part
of the neglectstemsfroman implicitontologythattakes states as the social
atomsofinternational societyand exploreshowtheirinteraction mightsupport
large-memberorganizationalforms.Nevertheless,individualistapproaches
have metwithsome success,as thediscussionin an earliersectionofthisarticle
demonstrates.
An importantdebate in internationalrelations is takingplace between
proponentsof rationalisttheory,which is exemplifiedby neorealism,and
proponentsof reflectivism, whichis closer to institutionalismas describedin
thisarticle.97Both groupsare interestedin explainingthe socialityof states-
thatis, themannerin whichstatesacknowledgemembershipin and contribute
to internationalsociety.However,each addresses the socialityof states in a
different way.
The theoreticalprojectlaunchedbythe neorealistsinvolvesthe demonstra-
tion thatcooperativebehavioramongmanyplayerscan emergeas a resultof
self-interested strategicinteractionsand can do so withina class of gamesthat
is itselfnoncooperativein itspaucityof communications, trust,and third-party
enforcement. This is not a projectthatis doomed to failure.Some significant
advances have been made.98In addition,there are some researchprograms
broadlyrelated to neorealismthathave not been exploredhere. Theories of
public goods could be examined to see if the scope of externalitiesmight
provide insightinto the question of the generalityof cooperation. The
economictheoryofclubs,whichdeals withimpurepublicgoods and congestion
effects, could be examinedwiththe same questionin mind.99 And thebodies of
literatureon tacticaland partylinkageshave notbeen exploredforthereturns
theymightoffer.
There are limitationsto neorealistapproaches,however.Neorealismunder-
estimatestheextentto whichcooperationdependson a priorsetofunacknowl-
edged claims about the embeddednessof cooperativehabits,shared values,
and taken-for-granted rules. Further,its assumptionthat preferencesare
exogenouslygivenreduces multilateralism to a question of strategicinterac-
97. See Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions."

98. See Taylor,ThePossibility
of Cooperation;and Schuessler,"Exit Threatsand Cooperation
Under Anonymity."
99. See Todd Sandler and JohnT. Tschirhart, "The EconomicTheoryof Clubs: An Evaluative
Survey,"JournalofEconomicLiterature 18 (December 1980),pp. 1481-1521.

Multilateralism 631
tion,makingit difficultto comprehendmultilateralism propelledbycollective

beliefs, presumptivehabits, and shared values. Finally, the absence of a
historical(narrative)approach discouragesthe explorationof counterfactuals
and lends support to the view that arrangements,includinginstitutional
arrangements,are what they are either because they representfunctional
responsesto environmental challengesor because theyreflectthe prevailing
powerdistribution.
rejectthe stateof natureas the appropriatestartingpointeven
Reflectivists
for heuristicpurposes. If states are characterizedonly by interestsand
strategies,cooperativeoutcomeswillnotoccur.Sharedunderstandings regard-
ingtherulesof thegame,thenatureofpermissibleplays,thelinkagesbetween
choices and outcomes,and the nature of agents involvedin the game are
important preconditions.To saythisis to acknowledgethatsharedunderstand-
ingsand communicative rationality are as importantas instrumental rational-
ity.100
Insteadofderivingsocialityfromthestateofnature,thetaskofreflectionists
is to showhow sociallydefinedstates,operatingwithingiveninstitutional sites,
engage in behaviorthatis both competitiveand cooperative.The problemis
how to explaininstitutions and socialitygivensome data on extantand prior
institutionsand sociality.Thus, in tryingto deal with the problem of the
distributionofwealthinternationally, Naeem Inayatullahstartsfroma concep-
tion of state sovereignty that is highlysocial in its mutual recognitionand
ongoingpractices.101 The work of Robert Jacksonis also exemplaryof the
traditionin whichthe social aspectsof statesovereignty are takenseriously.102
In summary, I havepremisedthisarticleon a broad correspondencebetween
individualist,instrumental approaches and neorealismon the one hand and
between institutionalapproaches and reflectivism on the other. Without
rejectingindividualist,instrumentalapproaches, I have triedto identifythe
limitsof theirusefulnessand to open up a theoreticalspace forinstitutional
analysis.While an institutional approach to multilateralismshould not banish
individuals,intentionalbehavior, and strategic interaction,it highlights dif-
ferentthings.It departs from the preference-action paradigm by introducing
structureand behaviorthatdrawon habitual,preconscious,taken-for-granted
understandings. As such,theinstitutional approach"defocalizesinterest." 103 It
100. See Hayward R. Alker,Jr.,"Rescuing 'Reason' fromthe 'Rationalists':Reading Vico,

Marx, and Weber as Reflective Institutionalists,"mimeograph,Massachusetts Instituteof
Technology,Cambridge,1990,p. 10.
101. Naeem Inayatullah,"RedefiningSovereignty," paper presentedat the annual meetingof
theAmericanPoliticalScience Association,San Francisco,1990.
102. See the followingworks of Robert H. Jackson: "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and
Neoclassical Theory";and "NegativeSovereignty in Sub-SaharanAfrica,"ReviewofInternational
Studies12 (October 1986), pp. 247-64.
103. Paul DiMaggio, "Interestand Agencyin InstitutionalTheory,"in LynneG. Zucker,ed.,
Patternsand Organizations:Cultureand Environment
Institutional (Cambridge,Mass.: Ballinger,
1988),p. 3.

mighttryto understandthe emergenceof multilateralism as a productof the

power, resources,and beliefs of importantactors and the reproductionof
multilateralinstitutionsin terms of organizationalinertia,socialization to
systemnorms,and adaptationto the"needs oftheinstitution."
All threeapproaches examinedhere-the individualist, social-communica-
tive,and institutional
approaches-are onlypartlyworkedout,particularly in
theirrelationto multilateralism.None by itselfis a panacea. The questions
addressed are big ones, sometimes even daunting. But the promise is
considerable,too. Hopefully,thisarticlehas identifiedsome of the tasksand
pointedto thechallengesand difficulties
on thewayahead.


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International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations

Author(s): James A. Caporaso

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.34 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:49:39 AM

Whyhas the conceptof multilateralism not played a more prominentrole in

This articlewas preparedforthe Ford FoundationWest Coast Workshopon Multilateralism,

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.34 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:49:39 AM

The puzzling question motivatingthis article is "Why is multilateralism

2. Thorold Masefield, "Co-prosperityand Co-security:Managing the Developed World,"

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.34 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:49:39 AM

inviteor discourageattentionto multilateralism? It would be possible,albeit

The terms"multilateralism" and "multilateral"suggestsome linguisticconsid-

5. ArghiriEmmanuel, Unequal Exchange:A Studyin the Imperialismof Trade (New York:

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.34 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:49:39 AM

ity.These threepropertiesshouldbe treatedas a coherentensemblewhichis

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.34 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:49:39 AM

insistencethattherebe a unitedesfaitsamongnumerousactorsin international

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.34 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:49:39 AM

interests,even ifthe dominantinterestis to defect.This makes cooperationa

In thissection,I explorethreetheoreticalroutesto understanding multilateral

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.34 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:49:39 AM

bywhichto interactwithothers.The second routeto be exploredis foundin a

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.34 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:49:39 AM

cooperation. Second, the theorymust provide the conditionsunder which

The k group. Of thethreestandardsolutionsto theproblemofcooperation-

17. See JosephE. Harrington, Jr.,"Non-cooperativeGames," in JohnEatwell,MurrayMilgate,

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The logic of the k group,however,holds some promise.Given an n-person

Repetitionof the game. A second approach to multilateralcooperationis

20. For the logicbehindthisapproach,see David Kreps and RobertWilson,"Reputationand

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promising and reciprocity.

21. See Russell Hardin, CollectiveAction (Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins UniversityPress,

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of "a countablyinfinitenumberof iterationsof a singleconstituentgame" in

Transaction costs, multilateralism,and regimes. Transactioncosts are

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.34 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:49:39 AM

that a critical concept for cooperation in large groups is "conditional

30. Taylor,ThePossibility p. 105.

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states come back formore everyday, theyfacilitatesanctioning.Even if the

35. Martin,"Interests,Power,and Multilateralism."

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relentlessopportunistic pressuresinherentin prisoners'dilemmastructures.37

37. Beth V. Yarbroughand Robert M. Yarbrough,"Reciprocity,Bilateralism,and Economic

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Nevertheless,extensivemultilateralcooperationis fragileand compounded

39. JamesK. Sebenius,"NegotiationArithmetic:Addingand SubtractingIssues and Parties,"

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environment. Withrespectto JonElster'smetaphorsofmarketand forum,this

Discussion and persuasion. In noncooperativegame theory,whethera

42. JonElster,"The Marketand theForum:Three Varietiesof PoliticalTheory,"in JonElster

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In the descriptiveworldof internationalrelations,a plausible case can be

46. Jeffrey A. Frankel and Katherine E. Rockett, "International Macroeconomic Policy

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actuallytryto convinceone another that their

Minimal contributingsets. A minimalcontributing set (MCS) is definedas

51. Ibid.,p. 110.

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In the experimentsset up by Alphons van de Kragt and his associates,54

Norms, promising, and group identity.In exploringthe effectof norms,

54. Alphonsvan de Kragt,JohnM. Orbell,and RobynM. Dawes, "The MinimalContributing

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