India's Foreign Policy (BOOK)

Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series
Series Editor: Mark Beeson, Winthrop Professor of Political Science and

International Studies at the University of Western Australia
Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific showcases new research and scholarship on what
is arguably the most important region in the world in the twenty-first century.
The rise of China and the continuing strategic importance of this dynamic
economic area to the United States mean that the Asia Pacific will remain cru-
cially important to policymakers and scholars alike. The unifying theme of the
series is a desire to publish the best theoretically informed, original research on
the region. Titles in the series cover the politics, economics and security of the
region, as well as focussing on its institutional processes, individual countries,
issues and leaders.
Titles include:
Stephen Aris
EURASIAN REGIONALISM
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Toby Carroll
DELUSIONS OF DEVELOPMENT
The World Bank and the Post-Washington Consensus in Southeast Asia
Aurel Croissant and Marco Bunte (editors)
THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Shahar Hameiri
REGULATING STATEHOOD
State Building and the Transformation of the Global Order
Lee Jones
ASEAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Hiro Katsumata
ASEAN’S COOPERATIVE SECURITY ENTERPRISE
Norms and Interests in a Regional Forum
Jikon Lai
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN EAST ASIA
Arndt Michael
INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM
Erik Paul
OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
A Study of the Nation-State, Regional and Global Order
Joel Rathus
JAPAN, CHINA AND NETWORKED REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA
William Tow and Rikki Kersten (editors)
BILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL SECURITY
Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region
Barry Wain
MALAYSIAN MAVERICK
Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times
Mikael Weissmann
THE EAST ASIAN PEACE
Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding
Robert G. Wirsing and Ehsan Ahrari (editors)
FIXING FRACTURED NATIONS
The Challenge of Ethnic Separatism in the Asia-Pacific
Robert G. Wirsing, Christopher Jasparro and Daniel C. Stoll
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER WATER RESOURCES IN HIMALAYAN ASIA
Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series

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India’s Foreign Policy and
Regional Multilateralism
Arndt Michael
Lecturer at the Chair for International Relations, University of Freiburg, Germany
© Arndt Michael 2013
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Contents
List of Figures and Tables vii

Acknowledgements viii
Abbreviations x
1 Regional Multilateralism and Norm Localization 1

Theoretical underpinning: norm diffusion in international
relations and norm localization 6
Norm localization 7
Conditions and catalysts for the process of norm localization 9
The global norm of regional multilateralism 12
The concept of norm sublimation 16
Methodology and research questions 17
The scheme of the book 19
2 India’s Cognitive Prior: Ideas, Norms, and the Evolution of
India’s Foreign Policy 21
Traditional norms and values of India’s foreign policy:
the idealist tradition 22
The framework of India’s foreign policy 31
Major stages in the development of India’s foreign policy
1947–2012: from moralism to pragmatism 37
3 Regional Multilateralism in South Asia 48
Asian regional conferences: early concepts of regional
multilateralism from 1949 to 1961 48
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) 57
4 Regional Multilateralism Beyond South Asia 113
The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
(IOR-ARC) 113
The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC) 145
The Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and the BCIM
Regional Cooperation Forum 163
v
vi Contents
Asian regional multilateral fora: the Asia Cooperation

Dialogue (ACD) and the Asian-African Sub-Regional
Organizations Conference (AASROC) 175
5 Conclusions: Competing Regionalism and Panchsheel
Multilateralism in South Asia and Beyond 182
The explanatory power of norm localization and competing
regionalism in South Asia and neighbouring regions 182
Recurring patterns in regional multilateralism in South Asia 185
Regional multilateralism—India’s next ‘tryst with destiny’? 189
Policy recommendations 190
Notes 193
Bibliography 201
Index 220
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
1.1 The concepts of ‘pruning’, ‘grafting’, and ‘norm

sublimation’ 16
3.1 SAARC institutional set-up (2012) 108
4.1 IOR-ARC institutional set-up and dialogue partners (2012) 140
4.2 BIMST-EC institutional set-up and priority sectors (2012) 160
4.3 MGC institutional set-up (2012) 171
5.1 Intersections of competing regionalism 186
Tables
1.1 Regional multilateralism: ideal-type features 14

2.1 The Panchsheel principles 33
2.2 Milestones in the evolution of India’s foreign policy 46
2.3 India’s cognitive prior 46
3.1 Regional Asian Conferences and Meetings 1949–61 49
3.2 SAARC conventions and agreements 109
3.3 SAARC features of Panchsheel multilateralism 110
4.1 The Indian Ocean Rim: attempts at regional
multilateralism 1971–97 118
4.2 IOR-ARC features of Panchsheel multilateralism 142
4.3 BIMST-EC features of Panchsheel multilateralism 162
4.4 MGC features of Panchsheel multilateralism 172
vii
Acknowledgements
This book would not have been possible without the support and gen-
erosity of a number of individuals and organizations. I wish to thank
Professor Jürgen Rüland, Chair for International Relations, University of
Freiburg, who accompanied the project from start to finish. I am espe-
cially indebted to Professor Anand Kumar, Centre for the Study of Social
Systems, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, who
served as an invaluable source of support and was my advisor during
my stay at JNU as a visiting scholar in 2006. I would also like to thank
the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut and its Director, Professor Heribert
Weiland, for the financial and institutional support.
I gratefully acknowledge the support of Clemens Jürgenmeyer (Freiburg),
Professor Dietmar Rothermund (SAI Heidelberg), and Dr. Klaus Voll
(New Delhi). Also, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Delhi and the Friedrich
Naumann Stiftung Delhi were very supportive while I conducted field
work in New Delhi, Shimla, and Kathmandu. This field work was made
possible by a DAAD research scholarship.
During the research of this book, I had the opportunity of conduct-
ing more than 60 elite interviews in New Delhi and Kathmandu with
a number of representatives of the Indian and Nepali foreign policy
and strategic elite. I especially want to thank the former Prime Minister
I. K. Gujral, the former Minister of State for External Affairs, late Digvijay
Singh, C. Raja Mohan, and Manoj Joshi. I am especially grateful to
Kuldip Nayar, Professor S. D. Muni, and Professor Mahendra Lama.
In addition, I wish to profusely thank the following individuals and
institutions:
In New Delhi: Commodore (retd.) C. Uday Bhaskar (former Director,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis), P. R. Chari (Institute of Peace
and Conflict Studies), Brahma Chellaney (Centre for Policy Research),
Shipra Chatterjee (Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry), Bibek Debroy (Secretary General, PHD Chamber of Commerce
and Industry), Goutam Gosh (SAARC Desk, FICCI), Vinod Grover
(former foreign secretary, Ministry of External Affairs), Nagesh Kumar
(Research and Information System (RIS) for the Non-aligned and Other
Developing Countries), Rajiv Kumar (former Director, Indian Council
for Research on International Economic Relations), George Mathew
(Director, Institute of Social Sciences), L. L. Mehrotra (former foreign
viii
Acknowledgements ix
secretary, Ministry of External Affairs), Lt.-General (retd.) Satish Nambiar

(former Director, United Service Institution), the staff of the JNU Central
Library, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML) and the SAARC
Information Centre.
In Shimla: the staff of the Indian Institute of Advances Studies (IIAS).
In Kathmandu: Lok Raj Baral (Director, Center for Contemporary
Studies), Dev Dahal (Director Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Kathmandu),
Kanak Mani Dixit (Journalist, Editor Himal), Sadhar Katri (South Asia
Center for Policy Studies), Vinod Kwatra (Director India, SAARC),
Madhukar Rana (former Finance Minister Nepal), Yadav Silval (former
SAARC Secretary General), and the staff of the SAARC Secretariat.
Finally, I would like to express my warmest thanks to Professor Mark
Beeson, series editor of the ‘Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific’ and
Christina M. Brian, Senior Commissioning Editor IPE, Development and
Environment, Palgrave Macmillan, for their support.
Abbreviations
AAM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

AASROC Asian-African Sub-Regional Organizations Conference
ABI Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut (Freiburg)
ACD Asia Cooperation Dialogue
ACMECS Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic
Cooperation Strategy
ACS Association of Caribbean States
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area
AICC All India Congress Committee
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Community
ARC Asian Relations Conference
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ARO Asian Relations Organization
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia Europe Meeting
ASSOCHAM Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India
BCIM Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar
BCSIA Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University
BIDS Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
BIISS Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic
Studies
BIMST-EC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation
BISTEC Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic
Cooperation
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China
x
Abbreviations xi
BTILS BIMST-EC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study

BWG BIMST-EC Working Group
CASAC Coalition for Action on South Asian Cooperation
CCI Chamber of Commerce and Industry
CEDA Centre for Economic Development and Administration
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia
CMP Common Minimum Programme
CoM Council of Ministers
CoW Committee of the Whole
CSO Committee of Senior Officials
CSSS Centre for the Study of Social Systems
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECP Economic Cooperation Program
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FICCI Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
FIEO Federation of Indian Exports Organizations
FMM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
FNS Friedrich Naumann Stiftung
FTA Free Trade Area
GARNET Global Applied Research Network
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEP Group of Eminent Persons
GMS Greater Mekong Sub-Region
HDI Human Development Index
xii Abbreviations
HLTF High Level Task Force

HPA Hanoi Programme of Action
IIAS Indian Institute of Advanced Studies (Shimla)
ICRIER Indian Council for Research on International Economic
Relations
ICWA Indian Council of World Affairs
IDSA Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
IFA Institute of Foreign Affairs (Nepal)
IFIOR International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region
IGC Inter-Governmental Committee
IGM Inter-Government Meeting
IMF International Monetary Fund
INC Indian National Congress
IOC Indian Ocean Commission
IOMAC Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation
IONN Indian Ocean Network News
IOR Indian Ocean Rim
IOR-AG Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group
IOR-ARC Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional
Cooperation
IOR-BF Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum
IOR-CBN Indian Ocean Rim Consultative Business Network
IORI Indian Ocean Rim Initiative
IORNET Indian Ocean Research Network
IOTO Indian Ocean Tourism Organization
IOZP Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
IPA Integrated Programme of Action
IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force
IR International Relations
ISIS Institute of Strategic and International Studies
IT Information Technology
JNU Jawaharlal Nehru University
Abbreviations xiii
JWG-CTIC Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and

International Crimes (BIMST-EC)
KAS Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
KI Kunming Initiative
LDC Least Developed Countries
LoC Line of Control
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDF Mekong Development Forum
MEA Ministry of External Affairs (India)
MERCOSUR Mercado Commun del Sur
MFN Most Favoured Nation
MGC Mekong–Ganga Cooperation
MGCF Mekong–Ganga Cooperation Forum
MGCI Mekong–Ganga Cooperation Initiative
MGSP Mekong–Ganga Swarnabhoomi Programme
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP New Economic Policy
NIC Newly Industrializing Country
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTB Non-Tariff Barriers
PIDE Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
PM Prime Minister
PMC Post-Ministerial Conference
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement
RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs
RIS Research and Information System for Non-aligned and
other Developing Countries
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
xiv Abbreviations
SADC Southern African Development Community

SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Association
SAGQ South Asian Growth Quadrangle
SAIC SAARC Agricultural Information Centre
SAPTA South Asia Preferential Trading Arrangement
SARC South Asian Regional Cooperation
SAVE SAARC Audio Visual Exchange
SDC SAARC Documentation Centre
SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organization
SIS School of International Studies
SMRC SAARC Meteorological Research Centre
SOM Senior Officials’ Meeting
SSS School of Social Sciences
STEOM Senior Trade and Economic Officials’ Meeting
TEMM Trade and Economics Ministers‘ Meeting
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UPA United Progressive Alliance
US United States
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WCFIA Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (Harvard
University)
WGHM Working Group of the Heads of Mission
WGTI Working Group on Trade and Investment
WTO World Trade Organization
1
Regional Multilateralism and
Norm Localization
Although multilateralism in the form of regional cooperation, or sim-

ply regional multilateralism, has been successfully initiated and imple-
mented in numerous regions of the world, similar developments cannot
be observed in South Asia, which is still ‘the least integrated region in
the world’ (World Bank, 2007). At present, there are four large regional
organizations1 in South Asia and its neighbouring regions. In South Asia
itself, regional multilateralism began in 1985 with the official launch of
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In 1994,
the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral-Economic Cooperation
(BIMST-EC) was founded. The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional
Cooperation (IOR-ARC) was formed in 1997, and in 2000, the Mekong–
Ganga Cooperation (MGC)2 came into existence. India has been a found-
ing member in all four of them.
At the time of writing, three of these four regional organizations are
regarded as failures. In 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
summarized the essence of 20 years of SAARC cooperation: ‘The honest
answer is that regional economic cooperation in South Asia has fallen
far short of our expectations and the dreams of our founding fathers.
It remains far behind the more successful examples in both Asia and
other regions of the world’ (Manmohan Singh, 2005). In 2007, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar Nyan Win concluded that ‘there
has been a general perception that, despite seven years of efforts by
MGC countries to move forward in areas designated for cooperation, there
has been very slow progress’ (Win, 2007). And in 2009, the then Indian
Minister of External Affairs Shashi Tharoor commented on the IOR-ARC
that after 12 years of cooperation, ‘[IOR-ARC has not] done enough
to get beyond the declaratory phase that marks most new initiatives’
1
2 India’s Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism
(Tharoor, 2009). Only BIMST-EC constitutes a regional organization

which exhibits a modest level of success.
Two counter-examples of successful and thriving processes of regional
multilateralism are the European Union (EU) and the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN):3 Since its inception in the 1950s,
the EU has gradually evolved into a full-fledged economic and political
union in which a number of member countries have now commenced
to actually forgo parts of their state sovereignty by adopting a common
currency and harmonizing parts of their respective foreign and security
policy. In Asia, ASEAN—‘one of the most successful regional organiza-
tions in the developing world’ (Acharya, 2001, p. 208)—has gradually
evolved into a visible and vocal organization in the region, effectively
following its own ‘ASEAN way’ of institutional–organizational minimal-
ism and an informal, non-legalistic method of cooperation.4 ASEAN
has taken tentative steps to transform itself into a security community
(Acharya, 2001), and since 1 January 2003, the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) is operational.
Several schools in the field of international relations attempt to explain
processes of regional integration. However, the main body of literature
has traditionally focused on developments in Europe5 and Southeast
Asia.6 Since the first early deliberations on regional cooperation in South
Asia took place, numerous studies have addressed the historic develop-
ment, economic prospects,7 or security-related aspects,8 and the main
body of literature on South Asian regionalism has, as the years progressed
without tangible results, especially analysed reasons for the apparent
failure of regional cooperation in the region. In general, the reasons cited
for this failure can be summarized and grouped into seven different ana-
lytical categories.
(1) Political conflicts between the countries of South Asia. In South Asia,
a common civilizational heritage, a common shared legacy of British
colonial domination, and common identical problems of social and
economic backwardness highlight an underlying streak of ‘unity’ of
the region. At the same time, sharp divisions and manifold interstate
conflicts exist which make cooperation very difficult.9 These political
conflicts especially exist in the spheres of territory, terrorism, sharing of
natural resources, and refugees: The Kashmir crisis10 between India and
Pakistan has been the source of four major wars between the two coun-
tries. Sri Lanka and India differ over alleged Indian involvement with
Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka. The border situation between Nepal and
India has remained problematic, and there are also unresolved political
Regional Multilateralism and Norm Localization 3
disputes between India and Bangladesh over alleged illegal migration

from the Chittagong Hill Tracts and illegal migration into Assam, about
the demarcation of boundaries and the problem of sharing water of the
Ganges river. Especially, the India–Pakistan conflict11 seems irresolvable,
and due to the existence of nuclear weapons in the two countries there
is the possibility of a spillover on the global level.
(2) Balance of power equation.12 Besides these interstate problems, the
general balance of power situation in South Asia is regarded as a major
contributing factor for the failure of cooperation. India eclipses every
nation state of South Asia: India’s sheer size and population, in addition
to its unmatched military resources in the region, constitute an asym-
metry in political, economic, and social terms. Besides, India practi-
cally shares borders with all countries in South Asia, and India’s centre
position and her resources make her the unquestionable focal point in
South Asia.
(3) Different political systems and different levels of democratization.13
Since 1947, several different political designs have existed in the region
(democracies, dictatorships, autocratic regimes, kingdoms), and only
since 2008 has there been a time in which, from a formal standpoint, all
countries, including Pakistan and Nepal, at present, possess democratic
regimes; yet it is uncertain whether democracy will prevail in the long
run in all countries.
(4) Different domestic decision-making structures.14 Besides the differences
in political systems, the decision-making structures in the individual
countries differ markedly and concomitantly in the manner in which
foreign policy decisions are taken. Also, the degree to which opposition
groups or civil society actors can influence the discourse on foreign policy
varies greatly.
(5) Communal violence.15 The recurring phenomenon of communal vio-
lence between Hindus, Muslims, and also Christians has been a source
of great conflict and violence and has led to fault lines, not only within
the countries of South Asia, but at the same time also transcending the
borders of the respective nation states.
(6) Nationalism.16 The two-nation theory—formally proclaimed for the
first time in 1940—argued that the Hindus and Muslims of South Asia
were two separate nations.17 This idea contributed to the partition of
British India into the two separate states of Pakistan and India and has
been fanning nationalist sentiment until today. Hindu nationalism is
a constant in the political and social arena in India. Also, suppressed
Bengali nationalism led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Besides,
Sri Lanka suffered from decades of civil war between the Sinhalese
and the Tamils.18 In the north of South Asia, the situation between
Afghanistan and Pakistan has been a constant area of tension with
regard to the Pashtun area.
(7) Socio-economic development.19 The countries of South Asia exhibit
starkly differing socio-economic developments. In the 2011 Human
Development Index (HDI), the countries are ranked between 97 and 172:
Afghanistan, 172; Bangladesh, 146; Bhutan, 141; India, 134; the Maldives,
109; Nepal, 157; Pakistan, 145; Sri Lanka, 97 (Human Development
Index, 2011). According to the World Bank,20 the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) in 2007 was as follows (in US$ billions): Afghanistan, 11.6;
Bangladesh, 67.7; Bhutan, 1.1; India, 1171; the Maldives, 1.1; Nepal,
10.2; Pakistan, 143.6; Sri Lanka, 32.4.
These seven categories covering interstate as well as intrastate problems

clearly demonstrate that South Asia suffers from major fault lines in the
political, sociocultural and economic sectors. Still, an explanation for
the failure of regional cooperation which uses arguments derived from
the above falls short of providing satisfactory answers to the following
set of questions:
(1) Why has India, despite the Indo-centric character of South Asia,
entered into four regional (economic) arrangements in the first place?
Because of the hegemonic position that India undoubtedly occupies, the
economic advantages of regional cooperation can be reaped by exclu-
sively entering into bilateral agreements with every country, rather than
participating in regional multilateral agreements.
(2) Why have the other countries of South Asia until now not taken a
conscious decision to cooperate in the South Asian regional organiza-
tion, intentionally excluding India, in order to form a counter-weight
to the asymmetrical power structure in the region?
(3) Why do all four regional organizations (SAARC, IOR-ARC, BIMST-EC,
and MGC) exhibit comparable deficiencies and have failed to achieve a
greater level of integration?
(4) Why have the four regional organizations overlapping member-
ship, i.e., why are several countries of South Asia party to geographi-
cally and thematically similar regional arrangements (e.g., SAARC and
BIMST-EC)?
(5) Why have South Asian regional organizations not followed the
path of ASEAN, by either emulating the institutional framework or
adopting the successful elements of ASEAN cooperation?
(6) Why is there such an apparent gap between rhetoric in favour of

regional cooperation and institutional reality in South Asia and neigh-
bouring regions?
Especially, the often-cited balance-of-power structure in South Asia does

not adequately account for India’s decision to become a member in four
different regional organizations already, or for the existence of these
four regional organizations. Arguing that India’s hegemonic position in
South Asia has stymied regional cooperation does not capture the intri-
cacies and complexity of India’s foreign policy norms and culture. It is
undeniable that the rhetoric in favour of regional cooperation is a con-
stant in Indian foreign policy circles. On the other hand, arguing that
either Pakistan alone or the Indo-Pakistan conflict have been mostly
responsible for the lack of progress in SAARC since 1985 cannot explain
why the same problems of institutional stasis and lack of achievement
are, e.g., visible in the IOR-ARC and BIMST-EC, the two organizations
in which Pakistan has not been admitted into.
Considering the above, few studies on South Asian regionalism have
attempted to provide a theoretical backdrop that addresses the par-
ticular situation in South Asia,21 and there is hardly any literature on
regional multilateralism in the Indian Ocean Rim, the Bay of Bengal or
the Mekong–Ganga. Also, there is, at present, no theoretical approach
enabling a comparative study of the development, design, and short-
comings of all four organizations in the founding of which India was
involved. The present study attempts to fill this gap in the existing schol-
arship on South Asian regional cooperation by using a novel analytical
perspective and providing an alternative explanation for the develop-
ment and institutional set-up of the regional architecture that has been
implemented in the four regions at hand.
The focus of the present examination is the genesis and evolution
of regional multilateralism from a normative standpoint by using the
vantage point of India’s foreign policy and the latter’s ‘cognitive prior’,
i.e., Indian foreign policy ideas, norms, and values, and the particular
‘Indian way’ of responding to and implementing an external international
norm. The global norm which serves as the analytical point of refer-
ence for the present study is regional multilateralism.22 The study will
examine the process of the localization (Acharya, 2004, pp. 239–75)
of regional multilateralism and its implementation in four specific
regions, namely, South Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal, and
the Mekong–Ganga area. ‘The framework of localization […] is helpful
in understanding why any given region may accept a particular norm

while rejecting another, as well as variation between regions in under-
going normative change’ (Acharya, 2004, p. 269). The focus of norm
localization is thus the analysis of transnational or international ideas
and the question of why these find greater acceptance in one region or
setting than in another. This issue is of great relevance for developments
in international politics, since successful norm diffusion can greatly
impact the behaviour of states.
In providing a theoretically informed analysis of regional coopera-
tion by using a specific local/regional lens, this study responds to Peter
Katzenstein’s critique that theoretical analyses on Asian regionalism
have so far ignored ‘local, national, or regional political contexts central
to those writing on Asian regionalism’, and especially ideational forces
originating from within the region (Katzenstein, 1997, p. 6). With
this approach—at the interface of international relations, comparative
politics, political ideas, and political economy—the idiosyncrasies of
regional cooperation in the South Asian region can be portrayed in
a new scientific manner, and policy recommendation can be given
about the future prospects of cooperation in those organizations and
regions.
Theoretical underpinning: norm diffusion in international

relations and norm localization
Norms, depending on the theoretical perspectives, are ‘standards of

behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’ (Krasner, 1983,
p. 2); they can be defined as ‘shared expectations about appropri-
ate behaviour held by a collectivity of actors’ (Checkel, 1999, p. 83)
or ‘intersubjectively shared, value-based expectations of appropriate
behaviour’ (Boekle et al., 2000, p. 4). International relations (IR) theory
distinguishes between different types of norms: regulative norms, which
order and constrain behaviour, and constitutive norms, which create
new actors, interests, or categories of action.23
International norms often carry social content: they are often inde-
pendent of power distributions and they provide states/agents with an
understanding of interests. Therefore, they ‘constitute them’ (Checkel,
1999, p. 84). Also, there are evaluative norms as opposed to prescriptive
norms.24 Norms have varying strengths. Legro (1997, p. 63) notes that
different norms generate different degrees of agreement. Some norms are
international, whereas others are regional, domestic, or local. In related
issue areas, there may be competing norms. If a norm has not been fully
internalized by actors and still generates disputes regarding its validity

(Keck and Sikkink, 1998), then it may face another competing norm that
embraces a different set of rights and obligations.
Norms can have particular salience. Norm salience at the interna-
tional level depends, in large part, on which states promote a norm in
question. Some states are crucial to the process of norm dispersion, as
they can effectively exercise diplomatic power to persuade other states
to accept the norm. Regime theorists view norms from a utilitarian
perspective that posits actors as following the logic of consequences
(March and Olsen, 1989). From this perspective, state actors are ‘utility
maximizers’, pursuing their desired goals based on rational cost–benefit
calculations, and actors comply with norms that match their interests
and objectives. In other words, regime theorists contend that norms
have an instrumental role in affecting state behaviour and that norm
compliance reflects the self-interested and rational behaviour of states.
Norm localization
The concept of localization is rooted in the constructivist frame of refer-

ence, stressing key aspects such as ‘norms’, the potential for ‘change’,
and ‘social learning’. In constructivist perspectives on socialization,
norm diffusion is viewed as the result of adaptive behaviour in which
local practices are made consistent with an external idea. Acharya has
used Southeast Asian historiographical concepts, which maintain that
Southeast Asian societies were not just passive recipients of foreign
(especially Chinese and Indian) cultural and political ideas, but active
borrowers and localizers. Localization, in short, describes a develop-
ment of idea transmission in which, e.g., Southeast Asians borrowed
foreign ideas about authority and legitimacy and adapted them to
match local traditions, practices, and beliefs. Ideas that could be made
to fit prevailing traditions had a better status than those that did not
have such potential: ‘Localization is progressive, not regressive or static.
It reshapes existing beliefs or practices and foreign ideas in their local
context. Localization is an evolutionary or “everyday” form of progres-
sive norm diffusion’ (Acharya, 2004, p. 252).
Acharya (2004) has used the framework of norm localization for inves-
tigating norm diffusion that analyses the ‘agency role’ of norm-takers
through what he terms ‘a dynamic congruence-building process called
localization’. He emphasizes that ‘in localization, the existing norma-
tive order and an external norm are in a “mutually constitutive” rela-
tionship, but the resulting behaviour of the recipient can be understood
more in terms of the former than the latter, although it can only be fully
understood in terms of both’ (2004, p. 252). Subsequently, he defined
localization as the ‘active construction (through discourse, framing,
grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which
results in the former developing significant congruence with local
beliefs and practices’ (2004, p. 245).
In his study, Acharya examined how international norms shaped an
existing regional institution (ASEAN). His analysis highlighted how
transnational ideas and norms produced institutional change as the
dependent variable of norm diffusion in ASEAN. The ‘ASEAN way’—
representing local practices—is regarded as a unique set of norms and
practices shaping regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The focus of
Acharya’s analysis was ASEAN’s response to two specific external norms:
In the 1990s, ASEAN and its normative orthodoxy were confronted with
concepts of ‘cooperative security’ and ‘constructive intervention’ or
‘flexible engagement’. The first concept aimed at introducing a notion
of a multilateral security institution (comparable to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)) for the Asia-Pacific region based on a com-
mon security norm. The second concept referred to the notion of human-
itarian intervention, whose roots are essentially normative. Both these
concepts posed a normative challenge to ASEAN and required that ASEAN
transcend its customary adherence to the norm of non-interference in the
internal affairs of its member states.
Acharya used the concept of ‘pruning’ (a cultural pre-selection of parts
of the new norm and a subsequent adjustment to foreign ideas to find
a better match with existing local beliefs and practices) to examine how
these two norms with roots in Western conceptions underwent specific
changes, so as to be applicable to a specific normative (local) environ-
ment. The examples of multilateral security cooperation and flexible
engagement demonstrated how the cultural environment bent and
shaped—‘pruned’—the norms to prevalent cultural exigencies, which
worked in one case and failed in the other. The first concept was local-
ized, whereas the second was rejected. Acharya explains this variation
by using the concept of norm localization. He concluded: ‘Central to
the norm dynamic is the contestation between emerging transnational
norms and pre-existing regional normative and social orders’ (Acharya,
2004, p. 241).
In localization, the initiative to seek change normally belongs to
the local agent. Localization may start with a re-interpretation and
re-representation of the outside norm, including framing and grafting,
but may extend into more complex processes of re-constitution to make
an outside norm congruent with a pre-existing local normative order.

It is also a process in which the specific role of local actors is more
crucial than that of outside actors. Instead of treating the concepts of
framing, grafting, and other processes of adaptation as merely disparate
and unconnected phenomena, Acharya uses localization to unite them
under one conceptual framework, particularly stressing the agency role
of local actors in performing these actions.
Acharya (2004, pp. 245–6) derives three conclusions from the general
impact of ideas and the effects these can have on a specific regional
setting. First, the idea of the local initiative (an indigenous initiative
and adaptation and the act of cultural selection); second, the concept
of the idea—recipient’s adjustments of the shape or content (or both)
of foreign ideas to make them more congruent with the recipient’s prior
beliefs and practices. This is followed by adjustments of foreign ideas
which are thus, as Acharya terms it, pruned, in order to ‘find a better
fit with existing local beliefs and practices.’ And finally, instead of ter-
minating local beliefs or practices, these foreign ideas may help one to
broaden the profile and prestige of local actors and beliefs, thus having
a lasting effect.
Localization describes a complex process and outcome by which
norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms (includ-
ing norms previously institutionalized in a region) and local beliefs
and practices. In this process, foreign norms are incorporated into local
norms, even though they may not at first fit together with the local
beliefs. The success of norm diffusion strategies and processes depends
on the extent to which they provide opportunities for localization.
Acharya thus writes that
Localization does not extinguish the cognitive prior of the norm-takers

but leads to its mutual inflection with external norms. […] Hence, in
localization, the existing normative order and an external norm are
in a ‘mutually constitutive’ relationship, but the resulting behaviour
of the recipient can be understood more in terms of the former than
the latter, although it can be fully understood in terms of both.
(Acharya, 2004, pp. 251–2)
Conditions and catalysts for the process of norm

localization
Acharya explicitly refers to Indian ideas and their impact on regional

identity. In Southeast Asian historiography, Indian ideas came to be
accepted once the rulers realized it could help in enhancing their

authority by associating the kingship with the notion of a universal
sovereign found in Hindu religious–political traditions (which was
absent in local theology). But the borrowing could be done in a man-
ner such that even after Hindu ideas amplified their status and author-
ity, indigenous identities such as a belief in the ruler’s innate spiritual
energy were not fundamentally altered, but remained dominant. The
localization of Indian ideas, according to Acharya, thus produced two
kinds of change: expansion of a ruler’s authority to new functional and
geographical areas, and the creation of new institutions and regula-
tory mechanisms that in turn legitimized and operationalized such
expansion.
Localization is likely to occur when the following conditions exist:
First, norm-takers are convinced that new external norms—initially
feared and resisted simply because of their external quality—could be
used to enhance the legitimacy and authority of their existing institu-
tions and practices (and the norm-takers themselves), but without funda-
mentally altering their existing social identity. A second factor favouring
localization is the strength of prior local norms. Some local norms are
foundational to a group. They may derive from deeply ingrained cul-
tural beliefs and practices or from international legal norms that had,
at an earlier stage, been borrowed and enshrined in the constitutional
documents of a group. In either case, the norms have already become
integral to the local group’s identity. The stronger the local norm, the
greater the likelihood that new foreign norms will be localized rather
than accepted completely. A third condition favouring localization
is ‘the availability of credible local actors (insider proponents) with
sufficient discursive influence to match or outperform outside norm
entrepreneurs operating at the global level’ (Acharya, 2004, p. 248). The
actors can be individuals, regionally based epistemic communities, or
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), whose primary commitment
is to localize a normative order and whose main task is to legitimize and
enhance that order by building congruence with outside ideas. Fourth,
localization is facilitated by the norm-takers’ sense of identity, especially
if they possess a well-developed sense of being unique in terms of their
values and interactions.
Two questions arise when analysing these specific pre-conditions for
norm localization: first, why should the demand for new norms lead
to their localization and, second, why are some key characteristics of
the pre-existing normative order retained rather than displaced? Using
a rationalist perspective, localization is simply ‘easier’, especially when
prior norms are embedded in strong local institutions. With regard

to institutions, liberal-institutionalist scholars argue that it is ‘easier
to maintain and adapt existing institutions than to create new ones’
(Nye and Keohane, 1993, p. 119). But existing institutions might have
lost their appeal, with the consequence that local actors may ponder
replacing them with new institutions. Localization is indicated when
an existing institution responds to a foreign idea by expansion, be it
functionally or membership-wise, and creates new policy instruments
to pursue its new tasks or goals without supplanting its original goals
and institutional arrangements. In localization, changes in institutional
terms—e.g., task extension or an improvement in matters of procedure—
result from this acceptance of a locally modified foreign norm.
While some original norms and practices may significantly be modi-
fied, the overall norm hierarchy and the institutional model remain
the same. Consequently, this also means that a locally modified foreign
norm can enter the norm hierarchy of an existing institution without
necessarily taking precedence over other prior norms. In the long term,
localization may produce a shift towards an elemental change or even
norm displacement. After local actors have become acquainted and
had their own experiences with the new ideas, functions, instruments,
and resistance to new norms may actually fade, enabling fundamental
changes to the prevailing norm hierarchy. However, this is the last
element in the process of localization. Localization provides an initial
response to new norms anticipating norm displacement, which may or
may not occur.
Finally, localization is subject to different catalysts. First, a major
security or economic crisis (such as war or depression) can make norm
borrowing a necessity. A second catalyst is systemic change, such as gen-
eral shifts in the distribution of power or the great powers’ interests and
interactions. An example is the Cold War, leading to a noticeable impact
of an (essentially) European norm about ‘security cooperation’, which
in turn attracted the attention of regional actors outside the Europe.
A third possible catalyst is domestic political changes. For example, new
democratic regimes may seek to import ideas about human rights pro-
motion and assistance on the basis of their foreign policy because such
ideas would legitimize their authority and (new) identity.
Although Acharya defines localization as a dynamic process, the com-
patibility between foreign and local norms (maybe even in an existen-
tial form) should not be ignored as another catalyst. The prior existence
of a local norm might enable local actors to introduce an external norm
making similar claims in terms of behaviour or promise. Moreover, the
external norm must have a quality that makes ‘pruning’, or adjust-

ments that make it compatible with local beliefs and practices, possibly
without compromising its core attributes. Hence, the scope for grafting
and pruning presented by a new foreign norm contributes to the norm-
taker’s interest in localization and is critical to its success. Jetschke and
Rüland (2009, p. 194) summarize that localization
may either be achieved through fusion of external ideas or by adopt-

ing foreign ideas through their rhetorical emulation without, how-
ever, systematically fusing them with the local ideational structure.
While the first type of localization stands for a harmonious combi-
nation of essentially disparate ideas, the second signifies ideational
compatibility problems in the localization process.
The global norm of regional multilateralism
Multilateralism as a norm at the global level has certain key features,

depending, e.g., on whether the goal of the organization is political, eco-
nomic, or financial. Consequently, a working definition of multilateralism
has to incorporate the various shades of multilateralism in the world, in
economic (e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF)), politi-
cal strategic (e.g., NATO), regional (e.g., EU, ASEAN), or mixed terms.
For Keohane, multilateralism in general means ‘the practice of coordi-
nating national policies in groups of three or more states.’25 Also, multi-
lateralism can also be defined in two different ways:
The definition that is more consistent with ordinary usage conceives

of multilateralism as institutionalized collective action by an inclu-
sively determined set of independent states. Truly multilateral organ-
izations are open to all states meeting specified criteria. The rules
of multilateral organizations are publicly known and persist over a
substantial period of time.
(Keohane, 2006, p. 1)
Consequently, looking at the inherent logic of this definition, it is

apparent that here multilateralism is explained in institutional terms,
not in normative terms. Keohane sees the advantage of this defini-
tion in that ‘[it makes] it possible meaningfully to ask causal questions
about whether multilateral institutions promote norms such as those
of diffuse reciprocity’. A second definition by Ruggie (1993, pp. 11, 14)
defines multilateralism as the ‘coordination [of] behaviour among three
or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct’, a

definition that limits the scope of multilateralism. Two important fea-
tures of multilateralism stressed by Ruggie are indivisibility and diffuse
reciprocity, that is, multilateral cooperation is expected by each mem-
ber to yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and over
time. Different institutions bear different degrees of diffuse reciprocity
(Ruggie, 1993, pp. 6–11).
Regional multilateralism as a global norm first emerged in the 1950s
with regional cooperation in Europe and the evolution of the EC since
1957. With a view to the cooperative aspect, Haas defined regional coop-
eration already in 1958 as follows: ‘Regional cooperation is a vague term
covering any interstate activity with less than universal participation
designed to meet commonly experienced need’ (Haas, 1958, p. 16). In the
case of inter-regional or trans-regional institutions,26 Rüland (2001,
pp. 7–9) has identified five major functions, i.e., balancing, rational-
izing of multilateral global fora, agenda setting (or agenda control-
ling), identity-building, and institution-building. In the present study,
regional multilateralism will be defined in a comprehensive manner:
Regional multilateralism denotes the voluntary formation of an

institutionally-robust organisation in a region in which at least three
states agree on a specific, rule-based agenda in order to mutually
advance in given areas of cooperation; cooperation means equality
in voting and agreement on the working principles of the organiza-
tion, and no country being permitted to force its values and norms
on other members.
The normative value of regional multilateralism consists in initial

shallow or non-existent cooperation leading to deepened cooperation,
thereby contributing to more regional and interstate interaction in
agreed sectors of cooperation, which should in the long run spillover to
several other sectors. More specifically, regional multilateralism exists
when the 13 key features enumerated in Table 1.1 are present, although
the absence of certain elements does not mean the absence of regional
multilateralism per se. Rather, it means that regional multilateralism is
weaker and less robust.
Voluntary formation (No. 2). No country should feel obligated to join
a multilateral organization. Yet a country can feel pressured to join,
despite having serious reservations; not joining the organization might
have negative repercussions for the country in political, economic, or
social terms.
Table 1.1 Regional multilateralism: ideal-type features
(1) Three independent states (minimum number)

(2) Voluntary formation
(3) Equal voting rights (equality)
(4) Working together to achieve specific goals and projects (purpose/scope/
general agenda setting)
(5) Coordination of national policies (specific agenda)
(6) Rejection of unilateralism in agreed fields and inclusive approach
(7) Diffuse reciprocity
(8) Institutional set-up: independent, goal-oriented work on agreed goals/
projects
(9) Common identity-building
(10) Institution-building
(11) Regional geographical clarity
(12) Possibility of discussing bilateral issues
(13) Absence of normative hegemon
Coordination of national policies (No. 5). Cooperation serves specific

goals; the fact that cooperation is on the agenda requires the states to
come to terms with what exactly they want to achieve. National poli-
cies thus receive a regional aspect, albeit only in certain areas; it means
the coordination and a possible shaping of those policies in accordance
with the aims of the regional organization.
Institutional set-up: independent goal-oriented work on agreed goals/projects
(No. 8). Some degree of institutional independence, however limited,
is necessary if the organization is to be more than simply a part of a
national ministry responsible for the organization. In other words, if
the organization cannot function and act independently, it suffers from
institutional paralysis (if not institutional stasis) and cannot evolve.
Common identity-building (No. 9). In the long run, identity-building is
a necessary prerequisite for deeper cooperation. Only once a common
identity starts to grow will an organization start to become meaningful
for the region, and spillover effects are more likely to happen. Identity-
building can thus serve as a catalyst for cooperation, and the lack of it
can severely hamper further cooperation.
Institution-building (No. 10). Independent institutions should enable
the organization to work effectively in the sectors of cooperation, without
(constant) interference from the member states. If institution-building,
i.e., a consolidation of the respective regional institution(s), does not
take place, then an organization will remain a mere extension of a
national ministry.
Regional geographical clarity (No. 11). Regional multilateralism is an

evolving project in which—in theory—the organization can and should
add new members on a regular basis. Here, two issues pertaining to
membership are relevant, one of geographical boundaries and the other
of a geographical ‘vision’: First, regional multilateralism delineates a dis-
tinct geographical area. If during the initial deliberations of the states
wanting to found a new organization, it is not clear if all countries that
theoretically belong to the region should also be eligible for membership—
i.e., a conscious exclusion of certain countries in that very area—the nor-
mative content of regional multilateralism is at stake. Second, ‘clarity’ also
refers to a clear vision where the region begins and ends. The author was
told several times with regard to the IOR-ARC and BIMST-EC that the nego-
tiators had no clear mission of how far the new organization could expand
or where it should begin. Without a clear picture of which countries belong
to the region, the whole project of regional multilateralism is in question.
Possibility of discussing bilateral issues (No. 12). The purpose of every
multilateral organization is cooperation, which is patently impeded by
bilateral problems. The possibility of using a regional forum to discuss
matters must be a theoretical option. By definitely and permanently
excluding this key issue, the normative value of the norm is at stake.
Cooperation cannot function when contentious issues are never allowed
to be on the agenda. Also, economic cooperation cannot be viewed as
being entirely separate from political- and/or security-related issues.
Absence of normative hegemon (No. 13). The idea of cooperation implies
reciprocity. The idea of cooperation also means equality. Fawcett (2004,
p. 444) emphasizes that ‘while state sovereignty reduces the capacity of
regionalism, strong states are likely to abuse it.’ Should a norm suffer due
to the hegemonic designs of a country, the cooperative idea is negated.
In every regional organization, the actual or potential hegemon must
be willing to negotiate the pertinent issues with the other countries,
right from the scratch and on a clean slate, without dictating the terms
of engagement. Otherwise, the norm does not represent the result of
balanced negotiations.
The above definition comprises elements of the definitions by Keohane
and Ruggie, i.e., institutional and normative aspects. However, the
norm of regional multilateralism is Janus-faced. It possesses two features
each of which carries the same weight. It has both a regulative and a
constitutive dimension. It is regulative since it aims at regulating a
state’s behaviour, and it is also constitutive in that it creates a specific
frame of cooperation. These features of ‘regional multilateralism’ will
serve as the frame of reference for the question as to the extent to which
regional multilateralism has been implemented and localized in the

organizations examined here.
The concept of norm sublimation
Considering that Acharya has used the example of an existing institu-

tion (ASEAN) in order to demonstrate how norm localization takes
place—especially with a view to institutional change—the process and its
concomitant trajectory must be modified for the purposes of the present
analysis. Also, it is necessary to modify norm localization because the
presence of a hegemon—normative, political, and economic—demands
a different focus, one that captures the essence of the idiosyncrasies, the
authority and the supremacy of that hegemon.
The new concept introduced here will be called ‘norm sublimation’.
Norm sublimation denotes the immediate phase transition that takes
place if external norms are subject to an instant transformation and
alteration in the process of (pre-)localization, without undergoing an
intermediate phase of comprehensive norm negotiations, due to the
impact of a political hegemon. The external norm clashes with prevail-
ing domestic norms, overleaps an intermediate phase and leapfrogs
directly to a new phase. Norm sublimation as a political process hap-
pens in the form of negotiations. The result is the norm in its subli-
mated form. Figure 1.1 shows the difference between pruning/grafting
and the process of norm sublimation.
Norm sublimation takes place especially in cases in which an exter-
nal norm challenges a basic or defining element of the indigenous
ideational orthodoxy, in short: a fundamental native basic belief or
conviction which is particular to the issue-area challenged and the
NORM PROCESS OUTCOME
EXTERNAL NORM, e.g. IMPLEMENTATION EXTERNAL NORM ACCEPTED

Regional Multilateralism Example: EU
EXTERNAL NORM, e.g. < – > Pruning/Grafting <–> LOCALIZED NORM

Regional Multilateralism Example: ASEAN
EXTERNAL NORM, e.g. Norm Sublimation LOCALIZED &SUBLIMATED NORM

Regional Multilateralism (HEGEMON!) ‘Panchsheel Multilateralism’
Example: SAARC, IOR-ARC,
BIMST-EC, MGC
Figure 1.1 The concepts of ‘pruning’, ‘grafting’, and ‘norm sublimation’

region it is supposed to permeate. The domestic resilience is such that

in general the idea represented by the outside norm is accepted—maybe
to enhance the norm-takers’ or norm-agents’ standing, maybe to gain
more influence on account of the new norm—but is immediately given
a shape which configures the external norm to the prevailing ideational
orthodoxy and legacy. The normative content is accepted to a limited
degree, yet the original form is not.
India, as will be attempted to be demonstrated throughout the study,
insisted on the immediate inclusion of a set of non-negotiable aspects,
thereby forcing its normative matrix upon the other states without
normative contestation. It is this aspect of a sudden major normative
impact that distinguishes the concept of norm sublimation from other
concepts used in norm diffusion and norm localization.
The outcome of this process of norm sublimation is a very specific
type of regional multilateralism: Panchsheel multilateralism, with ref-
erence to the Indian contract with China in 1954. The Panchsheel
principles are, in the final analysis, principles of behaviour between
sovereign states in their foreign relations. While the successful process
of cooperation with a horizontal and vertical dimensions taking place
in Europe can be regarded as the ideal-type form of regional multilater-
alism, Panchsheel multilateralism is defined here as the particular Indian
concept of multilateralism. It exhibits a shallow degree of institution-
alization and the lowest degree of commitment and interdependence
of interstate cooperation. This kind of multilateralism is, to use a term
from the realm of regime theory, ‘dead letter’ multilateralism which
created a ‘minimal multilateralism’ or ‘torso multilateralism’. It lacks
institutional robustness, cannot fulfil the archetypal aims of regional
multilateralism, and is bound to remain in a state of underachievement
and stasis.
Methodology and research questions
The approach of this book is based upon mixed methodology. Drawing

on an extensive number of primary and secondary sources and data—
among them memoirs of decision-makers, 62 personal interviews and
discussion with policymakers and analysts of the Indian and Nepali
foreign policy establishment, transcripts from official proceedings of the
Lok and Rajya Sabhas, reports in the media and statistics provided by
the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the IMF, and the World Bank—
this study employs process-tracing27 to illustrate how the two processes
of norm localization and norm sublimation shaped the Indian reaction
to the attempts of introducing an international norm at different points

in time.
A process-tracing account establishes a causal sequence that is inter-
twined with an analytical explanation, embedded in theoretical varia-
bles. Process-tracing does not only attempt to provide explanations for
specific cases, but it also aims at testing and refining existing theories
and giving generalizable explanations for a given type of phenomenon.
For George and McKeown (1985, p. 35),
the process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the

actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli
to arrive at decisions; the actual behaviour that then occurs; the
effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing,
and behaviour; and the effect of other variables of interest on atten-
tion, processing, and behaviour.
The present study will endeavour to establish the causal relationship

between the independent variable ‘India’s foreign policy’ and the
dependent variable ‘regional multilateralism’, which otherwise would
remain invisible inside a ‘black box’.28 Accordingly, the present analysis
will look for evidence of localization in terms of the dependent variable.
The series of questions that the phenomenon of South Asian regional
multilateralism raises requires a scholarly analysis that centres on three
thematic focal points:
(1) What are the major determinants of India’s foreign policy, i.e., what
are the driving forces, the local norms, and ideas behind its evolution
and development?
One of the central arguments of the book is that India’s participa-
tion in ‘regional multilateralism’ contradicts India’s two central foreign
policy paradigms of ‘independence’ and ‘bilateralism’. At the same time,
there are contradictory objectives discernible in India’s foreign policy
culture. These objectives need to be explored in depth before analysing
India’s role and behaviour in regional multilateralism.
(2) How has regional multilateralism in South Asia and neighbouring

regions evolved and why has it remained in a state of stasis?
The concepts of norm localization and norm sublimation should make
it possible to elucidate the correlation between India’s foreign policy and
the approach to and particular style of regional multilateralism in South
Asia and adjacent regions.
(3) Why is there a process of competing regionalism taking place with

four regional organizations in South Asia and neighbouring regions?
Another salient issue pertaining to South Asian regionalism is the
question whether the four regional organizations analysed in this study
are connected with each other. The study will attempt to demonstrate
that Indian policy vis-à-vis regional multilateralism has resulted in a
state of competing regionalism.29 Competing regionalism here means
that a country is party to several regional organizations and uses its
membership in one organization to exert leverage on the other where it
is a member as well. Since India is a member of (at least) four regional
organizations or groupings, one should expect that there is a clear separa-
tion among the organizations and that the benefits of being a member
of these organizations accrue to each state on an equal basis (i.e., no
mutual ‘cannibalizing’). However, it is hypothesized here that these
organizations overlap in membership and geographical area and thus
reciprocally compete for political and economic resources. This then
results in competition among the organizations. In the end, one organi-
zation might be preferred (i.e., strengthened) if it achieves the hoped-for
results in a better fashion. BIMST-EC could take preference over SAARC,
the MGC could take precedence over BIMST-EC, etc.
The scheme of the book
After this introductory chapter has outlined the empirical puzzle, the
theoretical concepts, and the three research questions of the study, the
following chapters are structured as follows:
Chapter 2 proceeds with outlining India’s major foreign policy ideas.
The chapter examines the general ideational orientations and normative
basis of India’s foreign policy, beginning with the ancient idealist and
realist ideas. Also, specific Indian ideas towards regional multilateralism
developed before independence are analysed in this chapter. The third
part of this chapter charts the evolution of India’s foreign policy from
1947 until 2011.
Chapter 3 uses the findings of the previous two chapters in order to
explore the impact of India’s behaviour on the process of norm locali-
zation on the SAARC as the major regional organization in South Asia.
The chapter begins with a summary of the development and achieve-
ments of regional conferences in Asia between 1947 and prior to 1978.
The chapter will examine specific ideas that were promulgated with a
particular view to regionalism and multilateral cooperation.
Then, the SAARC is analysed by using India’s foreign policy as the

independent variable and the matrix of ‘regional multilateralism’ as
the dependent variable. The chapter examines the major stages of the
genesis and evolution of this organization. India was involved in the
founding of the SAARC, and the stages of early deliberations and actual
coming-into-being are at the centre of the first part of the analysis.
Finally, SAARC achievements in the political sphere and with regard to
transnational terrorism issues are discussed.
Following this is Chapter 4 which investigates regional multilater-
alism beyond South Asia. Here, the origins and developments of the
IOR-ARC, the BIMST-EC and the MGC are examined, also using a process-
tracing approach and the matrix of ‘regional multilateralism’. Two fur-
ther regional multilateral fora are examined at the end of the chapter:
the AASROC and the ACD.
Chapter 5 concludes with summarizing the analytical results of the
previous chapters and provides policy recommendations.
2
India’s Cognitive Prior: Ideas,
Norms, and the Evolution of
India’s Foreign Policy
For the purpose of analysing the specific role norm localization played in
the genesis and evolution of regional multilateralism, the ‘cognitive prior’
of the individual norm entrepreneur (and/or norm-recipient, depending
on the situation) has to be specified and mapped out first. According to
Acharya (2009, p. 21), a ‘may be defined as an existing set of ideas, belief
systems, and norms, which determine and condition an individual or
social group’s receptivity to new norms.’ In other words, in order to iden-
tify the rationale for the local or regional response to an external norm,
it must be clear what those local norms and the local identity actually
represent, i.e., where they come from and how robust they are.
A country’s foreign policy is both part and parcel of the political cul-
ture of a nation.1 The core elements constituting a ‘political culture’ are,
however, subject to interpretation. Wendt (1999, p. 141) defined political
cultures in general terms, capturing the constructivist’s view, as ‘socially
shared knowledge [which] can be conflictual or cooperative; like game
theory, cultural analysis is analytically indifferent toward the content of
social relationships.’ According to Risse-Kappen (1994, p. 209), politi-
cal cultures refer to ‘those worldviews and principled ideas—values and
norms—that are stable over long periods of time and are taken for
granted by the vast majority of the population.’
The foreign policy that India formulated after independence reflected
her idiosyncratic culture and political traditions.2 Speaking in the Lok
Sabha, the lower house of the Parliament of India, in March 1950,
Nehru affirmed: ‘It should not be supposed that we are starting on
a clean slate. It is a policy which flowed from our recent history and
from our national movement and its development and from various
ideals we have proclaimed’ (Nehru, 1961, p. 34). In fact, the foreign
policy culture of India is an elite culture,3 meaning, in effect, that the
21
writings and speeches of select leading figures of the Indian foreign

policy elite provide an insight into the key ideas and norms constituting
the foundation of India’s foreign policy. All these elements, in the final
analysis, have consequences for the way India’s foreign policy reacts to
new ideas and norms (e.g., the global norm of regional multilateralism)
and rejects—or translates—these into new strategies.4
Jawaharlal Nehru is the architect of India’s foreign policy. However,
referring to India’s foreign policy as being the product of one single
person, Nehru himself categorically maintained that
it is completely incorrect to call our policy ‘Nehru Policy’. It is incor-

rect because all that I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have
not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India,
inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental
outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind
during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances
of the world today
(Nehru, 1961, p. 56)
This statement effectively summarizes the crucial influence of various

cultural and historical factors on Indian foreign policy. The traditional
values of India’s foreign policy can be traced back to ancient books such as
the Arthashastra, the Manu Smirti, or the Mahabharata. With these works,
India possesses the heritage of an ancient civilization and culture; yet this
culture is full of inner contradictions and opposing ideas which neces-
sitated that conflicting strands of normative standards, ideals, and ethics
had to be reconciled, with one or the other prevailing at times. Nalini
Khant Jha described the essence of India’s political culture as follows:
A preference for the middle path is the hallway of Indian tradition

and culture as seen in the Sanskrit saying which goes, ati sarvatra var-
jayet: let us eschew excess at all times. This saying underlines India’s
philosophical abhorrence of absolutes, of extremes, of the tendency
to see things strictly in terms of black and white.
(Nalini Khant Jha, 1989)
Traditional norms and values of India’s foreign

policy: the idealist tradition
India’s past exhibits the existence of certain ‘idealist’ values which

were expressed either in the writings of India’s thinkers or embodied in
India’s Cognitive Prior 23
ancient institutions and customs. Three such major traditions can be

discerned, and they have all left an indelible mark on the underpinnings
of India’s foreign policy, viz. (1) the idea of tolerance, (2) the equation of
means and ends, and (3) the adherence to non-violence (ahimsa).
Tolerance constitutes a fundamental part of the Indian idealist tradi-
tion. In essence, this means that views that differ from one’s own self
should be respected and that no one should be forced to accept the
other’s opinion. The idea and ideal of tolerance is of more than any
mere academic significance for India. At the centre of India’s national
flag is the Ashoka Chakra (Sanskrit: Chakra means wheel), which is a
depiction of the Dharma Chakra, or the ‘Wheel of Dharma’. This pres-
ence of the Ashoka Chakra is meant to show historical continuity with
the ideas and ideals of Ashoka. This very tradition of tolerance is one
major factor underlying the policy of non-alignment which India has
followed since 1946 (see below). A belief in tolerance is also the basis of
India’s emphasis on the reconciliation of different viewpoints through
peaceful negotiation. Many passages from Nehru’s speeches confirm
this.5 Speaking in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Parliament of
India, on 12 December 1957, he said: ‘Our approach […] is not to stress
the differences but rather to stress the similarities. It is an approach of
reconciliation’ (Rajya Sabha Official Report, 1958, Columns 2342–53).
A second traditional value which is found in Indian (political) thought
is that the means to be employed to achieve an end are as important
as the end itself, and both should be in accordance with moral law—an
idea which has best been expressed in Gandhi’s writings (e.g., M.K.
Gandhi, 1954, pp. 6–7). Gandhi insisted on the purity of means to
achieve ‘noble’ ends. Nehru stressed this relationship several times.
In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on
20 December 1956, he repeated that ‘means are as important as ends.
If the means are not right, the end is also likely to be not right, how-
ever, much we may want it to be right’ (Nehru, 1961, p. 179).
The third major traditional value of India’s foreign policy is the com-
mitment to ‘non-violence’. The basis of non-violence—ahimsa—is a
principle already found in the Upanishads (see, e.g., Appadorai, 1981,
p. 35). Ahimsa does not only mean not to kill anybody or to abstain
oneself from doing harm to others, but also connotes genuine harmless-
ness in thought, word, and deed. However, this ancient Hindu tradition
and custom did originally not have a political and social dimension.
The actual revolution that Gandhi set into motion—other founders of
religions such as Buddha or Jesus also taught the universality of non-
violence—was the application of this ‘traditional’ Indian custom to
politics, first in his early career as a lawyer against the British regime in
South Africa and then later against the British authorities in India.
The idea of non-violence became a constant in India’s foreign policy
rhetoric. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi commented on the regional relevance
of non-violence:
India’s foreign policy has been well established for over 37 years
now. […] In a way, our foreign policy was not very different from the
course of our independence struggle. It is a development of the same
movement on a world-wide basis. […] And if you really go down to
the basis of our outlook on disarmament, are we not getting back to
Gandhiji’s ahimsa on a wider scale? […] We have been taking certain
initiatives in our region. We feel that it is important that we develop
the best possible relations with all the countries in our region keep-
ing our own basic ideologies, our basic policies intact and not deviat-
ing from them.
(Rajiv Gandhi, 1987b, pp. 295–6)
In the final analysis, these idealist norms and values and the concomi-
tant peaceful and benign approach to politics should have been the ideal
bedrock for the implementation of regional multilateralism with India’s
neighbours. However, besides these idealist norms and values, there is
also no dearth of realist approaches either. Power politics in ancient
Indian tradition is best exemplified by Kautilya in his Arthashastra.
The realist tradition—Kautilya and the Arthashastra

Kautilya and the Arthashastra6 are inextricably linked with India’s
political and foreign policy culture. The Arthashastra is a collection
of rules and a description of how a state should be run; these rules
are to be followed by a king or a potential ruler either to gain or to
maintain power. The Arthashastra has served as a manual of statecraft
which influenced generations of Indian thinkers and politicians and
constituted the political philosophy of the Mauryan Empire. In his
essay ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Max Weber summed up the significance
of the Arthashastra: ‘Truly radical “Machiavellism”, in the popular
sense of that word [,] is classically expressed in Indian literature in the
Arthashastra of Kautilya (written long before the birth of Christ, osten-
sibly in the time of Chandragupta): compared to it, Machiavelli’s “The
Prince” is harmless’ (Weber, 1978, p. 220).
The Arthashastra in its entirety is clearly not a work of an ancient
‘international’ relations theory, but it certainly provides the foundations
for the discussion of a number of inter-state issues, which are relevant

to this study and the question of how ‘regions’ ought to relate to one
another. Here, the focus is on Kautilya’s writings regarding foreign
policy, i.e., enlargement of territory by conquest or, in today’s terms,
enlargement of a sphere of interest and national interest.
At the centre of all Kautilya’s analysis is the vijigishu (the king desirous
of fresh conquests, or the ambitious king), the king who is intent on act-
ing and achieving goals. The vijigishu is living in a world of matsyanyaya,
governed by the law of the fish where the big ones eat the little ones.
Since territorial size enhances the security of the ruler, the objective is to
consolidate one’s own strength at the expense of other powers. In order
for the vijigishu to survive in the matsyanyaya system, it is imperative that
he knows his position in the mandala system of states. The idea of the
mandala7 is a model of the international system that, abstractly speak-
ing, means a circle with a centre or nucleus, commonly translated as the
‘circle of states’. Modelski even refers to it ‘in modern terms, as the model
of a loose bi-centric international system’ (Modelski, 1964, p. 554).
The mandala is based on the (geopolitical) assumption that the vijigishu
is at its centre. A state of constant (real or potential) opposition is the
norm; his immediate neighbour state is most probably an ari (enemy);
the state next to the immediate neighbour is the enemy of this neigh-
bour and likely to be vijigishu’s mitra (friend). Behind the friendly or
mitra state is located another unfriendly state (ari–mitra or friend of the
enemy state) and next to that a friendly state (mitra–mitra or friend of a
friendly state) and so on.
Modelski wrote that Kautilya’s mandala concept may be regarded as
‘the germ of the concept of an international society’ (Modelski, 1964,
p. 555). Kautilya developed a particular model of the international sys-
tem, although one which reflected the realities of his time. Modelski
summarized it as follows:
We might call it a checkerboard model, because the basis of it is the

proposition that one’s neighbour’s enemy is therefore one’s obvious
friend. This regular alternation between friends and enemies pro-
duces, for the system, a checkerboard effect. The ‘locational deter-
minism’ implied in Kautilya’s circle may need to be qualified and
was, in fact, qualified in the Arthashastra.
(Modelski, 1964, p. 554)
Kautilya’s systemic analysis leads to two conclusions: first, all the states
in the mandala system face the same dilemma: they are surrounded
by a ring of allies and enemies, middle states, and neutral powers. The
second conclusion is that of certain flexibility (if not fluidity): rela-
tionships are not fixed, but have to be reassessed on a constant basis,
thereby creating new opportunities of alignment in all directions.
Within the geographical boundaries, states are interrelated in a variety
of ways. Kautilya’s system is thus hierarchical, where the actions and
orientations of the ruler are determined by his status of either inferior-
ity or superiority.
Kautilya’s relevance for India’s foreign policy and regional

multilateralism
Kautilya’s significance for India and the Indian political community
was often referred to by Jawaharlal Nehru, e.g., in the letters he sent
to his daughter Indira Gandhi while he was in prison (Nehru, 1934,
pp. 49–52). The same applies to Nehru’s book ‘Discovery of India’, in
which he referred to Kautilya several times, and in which he outlined
ancient Indian traditions and the future course of the Indian nation
(Nehru, 1946b, pp. 125–8, 143). Considering that Nehru is mostly asso-
ciated with having advocated a universal moralism in world politics,
his writings disclose that the means advocated by Kautilya were at least
considered by him, or eventually employed to safeguard India’s interest,
rhetoric notwithstanding.
Kautilya expressed the view that what produces unfavourable results
is bad policy. Kautilya was not concerned with ‘ideals’, but with achiev-
ing practical results for the ruler. Diplomacy in this sense was an instru-
ment; it was paramount to achieve whatever purpose was desired with
it. Nehru initially had reservations about following any sort of realist
course of action:
I hope there is nothing immoral about the part I have played in

our foreign policy. In any case, I want no moralizing, especially
about this. We should use our good sense as much as possible.
Idealism alone will not do. What exactly is idealism? Surely it is
not something so insubstantial as to elude one’s grasp! Idealism is
the realism of tomorrow. It is the capacity to know what is good for
the day after tomorrow or for the next year and to fashion yourself
accordingly. The practical person, the realist, looks at the tip of his
nose and sees little beyond; the result is that he is stumbling all
the time.
(Nehru, 1961, p. 51)
The Sino-Indian war in 1962 drastically changed Nehru’s officially pro-

fessed position. He declared: ‘We were getting out of touch with reality
in the modern world and we were living in an artificial atmosphere of
our own creation. We have been shocked out of it, all of us, whether it is
the Government or the people’ (Gopal, 1984, p. 223). Thus, Nehru had
to finally acknowledge that the reconciliation of different viewpoints
and negotiations based on ideas of peace and friendship were noble
principles, but in dealing with countries with aggressive intentions,
securing a country’s vital interests required a different strategy. In today’s
geostrategic situation in South Asia, India occupies the position of the
vijigishu at the centre, geographically speaking, being surrounded by
bordering states to its northwest, north, and northeast. Hence, India’s
geopolitical situation, especially in a regional organization, is similar to
the one described by Kautilya.
George Tanham rightly described the Kautilyan mandala aspect when
he noted that
India’s security strategy [was] favoured by many Indians: as a series

of circles or rings (mandala). The first circle is India itself. The second
circle encompasses India’s smaller contiguous neighbours: Sri Lanka,
Nepal, Bangladesh, and Maldives. […] The third circle includes
Pakistan, the only subcontinental state that has dared to challenge
Indian regional military power; China, India’s giant Asian rival; and
the Soviet Union, India’s best friend and partner in the geopolitical
sphere of Asia, and perhaps the world.
(Tanham, 1992, p. 23)
The role of Kautilya for India’s foreign policy and foreign policy elite
formed part of the series of interviews conducted by the author. For
many an analyst which the author interviewed, Indira Gandhi’s style
of politics was very much ‘Kautilyan’, so was Narasimha Rao, who was
described by one interviewee as ‘a disciple of Kautilya’. Kautilya was
said to constitute ‘the DNA of India’s foreign policy’, and an analyst
seconded by noting that Kautilya’s ideas formed part of the Pakistani
officer training in order to teach them the ‘Indian way’ of thinking.8
Often, Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War’ was cited as the Chinese equivalent of
the Arthashastra, especially in terms of its lasting cultural and political
impacts. Almost every politician and political analyst interviewed by
the author stressed the impact of this classical tradition for contempo-
rary Indian foreign policy.
Indian ideas on regional multilateralism before independence: the

(ideational) first wave of regional cooperation
After having outlined the ancient idealist and realist tradition, this sec-
tion presents an overview of the major ideas on regional cooperation
that were publicly pronounced by Indian leaders before independence.
In fact, the idea of cooperation played a prominent role in the speeches
and works of the Indian National Congress (INC) before 1947. The INC
saw the emergence of a great ‘Asiatic Federation’ as inevitable and the
participation of India in a ‘union’ of the colonized nations of Asia as
the precursor for the eventual freedom of every nation. Pursuing the
idea of an ‘Eastern Federation’, the Congress even discussed political
ideas that included the Himalayas and most of the surrounding seas
and recognized that the freedom of Asiatic nations could result in the
organization of an ‘Eastern Federation’ (Zaidi/Zaidi, 1980, p. 287).
Nehru maintained that small states had no future in the world that
was being forged and that they were certain to be reduced to the status
of mere satellite states. He, therefore, advocated the creation of a South
Asian Federation of India, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Burma (Bright,
1950, p. 379). The ‘regional policy’ (in its earliest manifestation) of pre-
independence Congress was further elaborated in the All India Congress
Committee (AICC) resolution passed in a meeting held in September
1945 at Bombay. This resolution expressed anxiety at the attempts that
were being made to maintain the political and economic subjugation of
Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, and Indonesia.
Because of her status as a British colony at the time of deliberation and
coming into existence, India did not become a member of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), and this was despite her unchallenged
and clear leadership against colonialism. Nehru observed:
Closer relations between Asian countries have become so absolutely

essential. […] Nowadays, one hears a great deal about regions.
Whether one talks of the Middle East, or Middle West, or South-East
Asia, or China, they all impinge on India; all depend on India, eco-
nomically, politically and for defence purposes. They cannot help
looking at India and we cannot help looking at them. […] So it seems
that in the modern world it is inevitable for India to be the centre
of things in Asia.
(Nehru, 1946a, p. 323)
Nehru’s statement reveals the India-centric view of the Indian elite,

a view that has been a mainstay of India’s foreign policy rhetoric and is
to cause anxiety among her neighbours until the present day, with direct
repercussions for regional multilateralism in South Asia and beyond.
An important statement on Nehru’s particular views on regional mul-
tilateralism can be found in The Discovery of India (1945). In the section
‘Realism and Geopolitics: World Conquest or World Association. The
USA and USSR’, Nehru already rejected regional security multilateralism
and ‘power politics’:
Mr Walter Lippman’s vision of the three of four orbits encompassing

the globe—the Atlantic community, the Russian, the Chinese, and
later the Hindu–Muslim in South Asia—is a continuation of power
politics on a vaster scale, and it is difficult to understand how he can
see any world peace or co-operation emerging out of it.
(Nehru, 1946b, p. 600)
On the eve of India’s independence, the Indian Council of World

Affairs (ICWA) convened an Asian Relations Conference (ARC) in
New Delhi in 1947.9 The Chairman of the conference was Nehru.
In his inaugural address, he highlighted the historical significance of
the conference: ‘There was a widespread urge and awareness that the
time had come for us, peoples of Asia, to meet together, to hold together
and to advance together. It was not only a vague desire, but the compul-
sion of events that forced all of us to think along these lines’ (Nehru,
1961, p. 249). Nehru further observed:
Far too long have we of Asia have been petitioners in Western courts
and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We pro-
pose to stand on our own legs and to co-operate with all others who
are prepared to co-operate with us. We do not intend to be the play-
things of others.
(Nehru, 1961, p. 251; Asian Relations, 1948, p. 22)
This fear of becoming a ‘plaything’ was a decisive factor in the subse-

quent normative evolution of regional multilateralism and had a pro-
found impact on India’s dealings with her neighbours and other major
powers.
The agenda of the conference (Asian Relations, 1948, p. 3) covered
eight issues (Appadorai, 1979, pp. 275–80), and the ‘steering committee’
of the conference made two central decisions: first, that the conference
would not adopt resolutions, but would merely accept a report embody-
ing the consensus of opinions expressed in various discussion forums;
and second, that a sub-committee of 15 persons be set up to consider

the advisability of establishing a permanent institute.
This consensus style of not committing to anything or making
any definitive promises in the form of resolutions reflects the Indian
approach of negotiating, a style that made it impossible to execute
any decision after the conference. The 1947 conference was techni-
cally ‘non-official’, because it was organized by the non-governmental
ICWA. Nonetheless, the political significance of the conference and its
intended beacon-like function were underlined by the presence of emi-
nent representatives of several countries, although they attended the
conference on behalf of non-political organizations. The ICWA issued
a communiqué that the conference would deal mainly with cultural,
economic, and like subjects. This is, as will be further elaborated in
Chapters 3 and 4, comparable to the developments of the SAARC, the
IOR-ARC, the BIMST-EC, and the MGC, where the same priorities were
agreed upon; these new regional multilateral organizations have there-
fore achieved a certain historical continuity, albeit one exhibiting the
same weaknesses.
Nehru’s viewpoint of the purpose and proceeding of the conference
was as follows: the conference was not directed against any race or
region, the conference should not deal with bilateral disputes and
there were no ‘leaders’ and no ‘followers’ among the participants. This
particular approach was to continue in all Afro-Asian conferences held
during the next 15 years after India’s independence (see Section ‘Asian
regional conferences: early concepts of regional multilateralism from
1949 to 1961’ in Chapter 3).
The conference excluded defence (security) cooperation from its
agenda. On this aspect of defence cooperation, Acharya notes:
An Asian defence system was originally envisaged by Nehru in 1946.

However, by the 1947 ARC, Nehru had stopped pursuing this idea,
mainly out of concern that any Asian defence system would draw in
outside powers (‘the security of Asia had more than an Asian inci-
dence’) and rekindle big power rivalry in Asia. This concern foreshad-
owed and formed the basis of Nehru’s opposition to SEATO [South
East Asian Treaty Organization], displayed in 1954–55, as well as a
more general reluctance in Asia to engage in any form for collective
defence, including those limited to Asian states because of the reali-
zation that an indigenous collective defence system would become
entangled with great power interests and encroachment.
(Acharya, 2005, p. 23)
For Nehru, such collective defence pacts—organized by great powers—

were a new form of intervention by outside powers and an unacceptable
violation of state sovereignty.
The final outcome of the conference was unsatisfactory due to its
decision, as was pointed out earlier, that there should be no formal
resolutions. The conference, nevertheless, decided to establish an Asian
Relations Organization (ARO) in New Delhi with, inter alia, the objec-
tives to promote the study and understanding of Asian problems and to
foster friendly relations and cooperation among the peoples of Asia.
Given these objectives, it could have been expected that the ARO
would eventually develop (and morph) into the political and economic
pillar of an Asian federation, as envisaged by the Congress earlier.
However, the provisional council that was constituted and was headed
by Nehru only met once and the organization was already wound up
in 1957, without ever having met for a second time. Incidentally, those
objectives are almost the same objectives that are to be found in the
SAARC charter (see Section ‘The South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC)’ in Chapter 3.2.).
The framework of India’s foreign policy
The impact of British colonialism on the development of India’s

foreign policy10 and the primacy of independence and national
interest
British rule in India impacted, in five different dimensions, the develop-
ment of India’s foreign policy. First, it gave a stimulus to the national
movement for freedom which in turn led to India’s support for the free-
dom of dependent peoples; second, racial inequality that existed during
British rule made India wary of racial discrimination and, in turn, led
to India’s emphasis on racial equality in her foreign policy; third, India
voluntarily chose to remain a member of the Commonwealth even
after becoming a republic and Nehru then acted in the name of the
Commonwealth. A fourth impact was that British rule fanned the (fad-
ing) memory of India’s historical and civilizational achievements, real
or imagined. As a consequence, these achievements were publicly pro-
nounced time and again in order to remind the Indians of their ‘glorious’
past. Finally, British rule left an indelible scar on the psyche of the
Indian people and on India’s policy-makers: the fact of having been the
losing party for almost two hundred years, of having been dominated
(a ‘plaything of others’, Nehru, 1961, p. 251) with direct consequences for
regional multilateralism and the limited scope of India’s commitment.
Despite small steps towards granting Indian politicians possibilities

of representing India abroad (Appadorai, 1981, p. 50), Indians were
excluded from the decision-making process in India’s foreign policy
before the country achieved independence. Foreign policy for India
was conducted in London and through consultations with the Viceroy
when Indian matters were concerned. The two main ideas emanating
from this are the supremacy of the idea of independence and national
interest. As Head of the Interim Government, Nehru declared as early
as 7 September 1946 the principal objectives of India’s foreign policy:
‘We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with
our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation’ (Nehru,
1961, p. 2). On 26 September 2002, Yashwant Sinha, the then External
Affairs Minister of India, reiterated this point and summed up:
In foreign policy, one of the fundamental principles that India has

always sought to uphold, and will continue to uphold, is to fully pre-
serve her freedom of independent thought and action. Every country
is a product of its own history and experience. The way it behaves
is moulded by the way it came into being. India’s freedom was the
result of one of the most profoundly ethical and visionary struggles
that history has witnessed and the principles of our foreign policy
came to be moulded by that experience. […] These principles will
continue to guide us in the years ahead.
(Sinha, 2002)
India’s independence and national interest serve as the first point

of reference for any actions related to her foreign policy, an argument
which was forwarded time and again during interviews conducted by
the author (see also I.K. Gujral, 1998c). Also, this focus on complete
independence led to the formulation of the Panchsheel principles, which
govern the relations between India and other states.
The Panchsheel principles

The peaceful co-existence of nations of different ideologies and inter-
ests is another of the central tenets of India’s foreign policy (see Nehru,
1961, pp. 99–105). In practice, it means that nations with different
beliefs and different social system can—and must—co-exist peacefully,
while each follows its own political system and convictions. This basic
Indian philosophy was formally recognized when on 29 April 1954 India
and China signed the Declaration of Five Principles, or Panchsheel,11 as
the basis of their mutual relationship. The Sino-Indian agreement was
Table 2.1 The Panchsheel principles
1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty

2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence
aimed at enhancing trade and interaction between the Tibetan region

of China and India. The five principles enumerated in the preamble of
the agreement are enumerated in Table 2.1 above.
The term Panchsheel was formally used by Nehru at a state banquet
given in honour of visiting Indonesian President in September 1954.
Nehru put forth his five principles of peaceful co-existence as an alter-
native vision to the ‘immorality of the Cold War’. Nehru maintained
that the idea of peaceful co-existence was not new and was rooted in
ancient Indian thought and culture:
These principles form the basis of our relations with other nations.
We are convinced that on this basis the relationship between the
countries will be healthy, peaceful and co-operative, because it rests
on equality and mutual respect and peaceful co-existence, and rules
out aggression and internal interference. Trouble arises when one
country dominates over another or interferes in another’s internal
affairs. If Panchsheel is fully and sincerely accepted by all countries,
peace would be assured everywhere, and co-operation would follow.
(Nehru, 1961, p. 101)
Panchsheel, as a concept, therefore, originated in 1954 between India

and China. The term Panchsheel soon became so popular that Nehru
called it an ‘international coin’. These principles were incorporated
in the Declaration on World Peace and Cooperation, adopted by the
Asian–African Conference held at Bandung (Indonesia) in April 1955
(see Section ‘Asian regional conferences: early concepts of regional mul-
tilateralism from 1949 to 1961’ in Chapter 3), as well as in a resolution
of principles of co-existence adopted by Inter-Parliamentary Union at
its Helsinki session in August 1955. By the end of 1956, many countries
including Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, Nepal, Poland, Saudi
Arabia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Yugoslavia
had endorsed the Panchsheel. The Panchsheel principles were incorpo-
rated in a UNGA resolution on peaceful co-existence (presented by India,
Yugoslavia, and Sweden) and unanimously adopted on 11 December

1957 by the UNGA.
Mutual non-interference and peaceful co-existence are the guiding
principles of India’s foreign policy based on the above-outlined idea of
tolerance of the views of others. The Panchsheel principles serve as guide-
lines for the relations between nations, and in theory also for regional
relations. They constitute one of the unalterable determinants of India’s
foreign policy culture. Nehru also outlined the ‘organic’ connection
between Panchsheel and the Indian mind:
Our development in the past 30 years or so has been under Mahatma

Gandhi. Apart from what he did for us or did not do, the development
of this country under his leadership was organic. It was something
which fitted in with the spirit and thinking of India. Yet it was not
isolated from the modern world, and we fitted in with the modern
world. This process of adaptation will go on. It is something which
grows out of the mind and spirit of India, though it is affected by our
learning many things from outside. Likewise, this idea of Panchsheel
lays down the very important truth that each nation must ultimately
fend for itself. I am not thinking in terms of military fending, but in
terms of striving intellectually, morally, spiritually, and in terms of
opening out all our windows to ideas from others, and learning from
the experience of others.
(Nehru, 1961, pp. 99–100)
The reference to the Panchsheel principles in speeches and writ-

ings of Indian politicians and authors show that India regards these
principles as part and parcel of their political culture. On 11 January
2006, the then Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran summed up
the essence of India’s general foreign policy orientation, stressing the
continuity:
India has maintained a remarkable continuity in the fundamental

tenets of its policy. The core of this continuity is to ensure autonomy
in our decision making. It is to ensure independence of thought and
action. This was and remains the essence of our adherence to the prin-
ciple of non-alignment. It is also the basis of our commitment to the
Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which India
and China jointly advocated in the early 1950s, and still believe to
be relevant in contemporary international relations. There are other
key elements of continuity as well. These include maintenance of

friendly relations with all countries, resolution of conflicts through
peaceful means and equity in the conduct of international relations
(emphasis added).
(Saran, 2006)
The policy of non-alignment, the paradigm of bilateralism, and

India’s civilizational claim
Besides the Panchsheel principles, India’s foreign policy firmly rests on
the concept and policy of non-alignment. The policy was initiated and
pursued by Nehru between 1946 and 1954. Soon after assuming office
as an interim Prime Minister, Nehru had announced in September 1946
the broad framework of the policy of non-alignment:
We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics

of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to
world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster
scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the
denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and
lead to conflict and war.
(Nehru, 1961, p. 2)
India adopted non-alignment as an instrument, or a means, of foreign

policy in order to safeguard her newly achieved political independence
and promote her national interests. Nehru made it clear that India had
no desire of joining any of the two emerging power blocs. India sup-
ported the decision of the United Nations (UN) that North Korea had
committed the aggression (1950) against South Korea. The USSR was
critical of India’s support to the UN on the Korean issue, but when
India criticized the USA for invading North Korea and moving towards
China, the Soviet Union, to a certain extent, also became appreciative
of India’s stand.
Moreover, India’s insistence on non-alignment appears to have become
a method of attaining an equal status with other large states, and hence
an attainment of equal power, as witnessed by the nuclear deal between
India and the USA. The determination on India’s part to pursue an inde-
pendent foreign policy as the bedrock of her relationship with the world,
later to uphold such a policy during Nehru’s term—despite concessions
and occasional wavering—and further to continue to cultivate it by his
successors as a legacy (albeit at times a rhetorical one, as shown by the
1971 Indo-Soviet treaty) eventually translated into an attempt at safe-

guarding India’s strategic autonomy in world affairs.
In addition to non-alignment, another determinant of Indian foreign
policy is the paradigm of bilateralism. In the interviews conducted for
this book with several high-ranking members of the Indian political
and strategic elite, this key tenet was stressed as one of India’s major
foreign policy determinants. Essentially, the paradigm of bilateralism is
a direct consequence of the Panchsheel and the policy of non-alignment.
It safeguards India’s sovereignty by allowing her to exclusively focus
on her own priorities without possible third-party intervention or
concessions.
Finally, another key element in India’s foreign policy culture is her
focus on past civilizational achievements and on civilizational–historical
continuity. This has become a rhetoric determinant in India’s foreign
policy, referring, on the one hand, to 3500 years of common civilization
in South Asia, but encompassing, on the other hand, also the coun-
tries which were influenced by culture radiating from India through
travellers and pilgrims. India regards its pre-colonial past as an era of
greatness and believes this past offers universal lessons other countries
should heed. Statements by Indian politicians underscore this particu-
lar feature of India’s foreign policy: On 27 May 1998, the Indian Prime
Minister noted in the Lok Sabha that India ‘would continue to reflect
a commitment to sensibilities and obligations of an ancient civiliza-
tion, a sense of responsibility and restraint’ (cited in Perkovich, 1999,
p. 423). Henry Kissinger (1994, p. 26) saw India’s foreign policy ‘leav-
ened by the traditions of an ancient culture.’ In the same spirit, the
then India’s External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh said in 2005: ‘Why
India matters is not in the interrogative; it is a statement of fact that
needs elaboration and elucidation. India does matter. India has always
mattered. From the very dawn of history, whether it is for matters
of mind or something more material, the world has recognized that’
(Natwar Singh, 2005). And on 16 December 2010, India’s External
Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna declared that ‘as inheritors of ancient
civilizations, the modern nation-states of India and China have the
maturity and wisdom to deal with any differences through dialogue and
diplomacy’ (Krishna, 2010).
India’s permanent focus on her ‘civilizational heritage’ is quite unique
in the international arena (and is also a constant in Chinese foreign
policy). Throughout the four case studies, this particular aspect will be
highlighted in order to demonstrate the significance of this for India’s
claim to (normative) hegemony in regional multilateralism.
Major stages in the development of India’s foreign policy

1947–2012: from moralism to pragmatism
After the preceding sections have focused on the major principles and
determinants of India’s foreign policy, this section traces the devel-
opment of India’s foreign policy and analyse how these principles
and determinants shaped the evolution of India’s foreign policy. The
development of India’s foreign policy can be divided into four distinct
phases: The first phase began in 1947 and ended with Nehru’s death
in 1964, whereas the second phase ended in 1990/91 with the end
of the Cold War. The third phase took place between 1991 and 1998,
the year in which India became a nuclear power. Since then, Indian
foreign policy has entered into the fourth phase as a major interna-
tional power.
Although India emerged as an independent state in August 1947, the
general direction of Nehru’s foreign policy orientation for India in the
developing post-war context had already been publicly stated when
he became the head of the interim government in early September 1946.
The refusal to join either power bloc and be incorporated in a sphere of
influence was based on India’s determination to act independently and
be the master her own foreign policy. The objective of always retaining
India’s full foreign policy autonomy was the most fundamental aspect
of Nehru’s foreign policy. Despite the determination to stay out of the
two power blocs, Nehru underlined the primacy of national interests as
determining the nature of foreign relationships.
With India’s independence and the concomitant founding of Pakistan,
the actual consolidation of the Union of India and the incorporation
of the princely states became the first and foremost priority (Guha,
2008, pp. 25–102), and 1947/48 immediately witnessed the first Indo-
Pakistani war over Kashmir. At the global level, Nehru incessantly cam-
paigned for universal nuclear disarmament, and in 1954, Nehru and
the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai signed the Panchsheel agreement
(cf. above). Under Nehru’s guidance, India’s adherence to these goals
was uneven and ambiguous. For example, India failed to unequivocally
condemn the Soviet invasion of Hungary, but expressed early reserva-
tions about the role of the USA in Vietnam. Later, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi did not comment on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
This lack of impartiality had dire adverse consequences for India. In
1961, when Indian forces marched into the then Portuguese colonial
enclave of Goa after protracted negotiations for Portugal’s withdrawal
had failed, the USA sharply condemned the Indian action. Two years
later, during the Sino-Indian war, the USA only reluctantly came to her
assistance. It became obvious that the requirements of India’s national
security could hardly be reconciled with India’s moral posture at the
global level. In the aftermath of this war, although India still refused
to abandon non-alignment, it had to face the realities of the inter-
national environment and fundamentally altered her defence policies.
It embarked on a significant programme of military modernization entail-
ing a dramatic reappraisal of her security policies by means of Soviet
military assistance.
The Sino-Indian war proved to be an utter shock to Nehru and his
policy of non-alignment. Michael Brecher drew two conclusions from
what he termed as ‘non-alignment under stress’ during the 1962 war. For
him, India’s policy changed (a) from equidistance in relation to super
powers to ‘equal proximity’ to Moscow and Washington and (b) from
an active, dynamic involvement in world politics to a more passive non-
alignment (Brecher, 1979/80).
One of Nehru’s major objectives was to transform India into a major
power (Nayar/Paul, 2004), and his attempts to slowly build the capabili-
ties to achieve this objective over the longer run were fundamental to
his foreign policy strategy and that of his successors, especially Indira
Gandhi. The Indian foreign policy determinant of ‘independence’—
which indubitably remains India’s key foreign policy tenet—emerges as
an end and means of a potentially great power to protect the attainment
of that goal in the future. The end of achieving something akin to what
Nehru dreamt of could only be achieved with realist means. Nehru him-
self defined the essentials of independence: ‘It consists fundamentally
and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All
else is local autonomy. Once foreign relations go out of your hands into
the charge of somebody else, to that extent and in that measure you are
not independent’ (Nehru, 1961, p. 240).
Whether Nehru, as the architect of India’s foreign policy, was driven in
his policy by political realism (i.e., power politics) or idealism still remains
a contentious issue in the literature. Nehru publicly discussed both con-
cepts at length. K. Subrahmanyam argues that Nehru had actually been
a practitioner of realism and balance-of-power policy (Subrahmanyam,
1990, pp. 102–30). Subrahmanyam acknowledged that in the execution
of Nehru’s policy, there may have been errors of consistency, but he
believed that overall Nehru had acted in accordance with the tenets of
realism. In the same vein, Kissinger (1984, p. 564) argues. Against this
line of realist analysis, a competing school argues that Nehru’s policy was
actually one of idealism (Poulose, 1998, pp. 77–84). Jaswant Singh (1999,
p. 34) criticized Nehru’s ‘idealistic romanticism’. That, at any rate, was

the public image of his policy.
It was in the policy of peaceful coexistence (ahimsa) that the con-
tradiction between policy pronouncements and actions taken by India
is most apparent. While the Gandhian faith in non-violence was con-
stantly reiterated, Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha on 15 February 1956:
‘I am not aware of our government having ever said that they have
adopted the doctrine of Ahimsa (non-violence) to our activities. They
may respect it, they may honour the doctrine, but as a government it is
patent that we do not consider ourselves capable of adopting the doc-
trine of ahimsa’ (Nehru, 1961).
Thus, while India insisted on moral arguments and urged other states
to resolve disputes through negotiations, she at times resorted to the
use of force, and, for example, decided to use military action against
the princely states of Junagadh (1948) and Hyderabad (1949) and later
Goa (1961) which Portugal refused to relinquish. Nor did the policy of
non-alignment prevent Nehru from seeking military aid from the USA
and Great Britain during the brief Sino-Indian border war of 1962. In
short, Nehru certainly behaved in realist terms, while attempting not to
neglect the possibilities of idealist policy.
After Nehru’s death in 1964, his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri (in office
1964–1966) successfully coped with the consequences of the September
1965 Pakistani attack on India in which both the USA and China sup-
ported Pakistan. India defeated Pakistan and Shastri successfully negoti-
ated a peace accord with his Pakistani counterpart in Tashkent. Shastri’s
successor in office was Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi. She became
Prime Minister in January 1966 and remained in office for 11 years
(1966–77, and again in 1980–4). She quickly became a practitioner of
realist politics at both domestic and international levels.
The Indian food crisis of 1966–7 had domestic roots, yet profound
foreign policy consequences. The near-collapse of the agricultural
production in India’s key regions—as a result of two consecutive poor
monsoons—caused India to turn to the USA for food assistance. The
USA was willing to provide such assistance, yet it wanted India to
reform her agricultural procurement practices, to adopt more market-
friendly economic policies and to dismantle significant barriers to for-
eign investment. US President Lyndon Johnson adopted a policy which
made a continuing of food aid dependent on a change in India’s public
diplomacy on the Vietnam question. In the end, however, the Indian
foreign policy establishment made few concessions except in the realm
of economic policy-making.
This experience made Indira Gandhi acutely aware of India’s vulner-

ability to external pressures. Ironically, the erosion and eventual jetti-
soning of Nehru’s vision of foreign policy and his high moral aspiration
were started under her leadership. The term ‘Indira Doctrine’ came to
be associated with her style of dealing with other countries of the
region. Publicly, she and her circle of advisers continued to reiterate the
Nehruvian principles that (supposedly) were the basis of India’s foreign
policy. Thus, India opposed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
of 1968 on the grounds that it was discriminatory since it provided the
non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons while placing no
equivalent restrictions on the actions of the nuclear weapons states.
Consequently, when the USA began an attempt at rapprochement
with China in 1970, she made overtures towards the Soviet Union.
India forged intensive diplomatic and security relationships with the
Soviet Union, which, in the final analysis, served India well in terms of
securing vital aspects of her national security for the next two decades.
The Soviets, longing for good relations with India to counter US and
Chinese influence in South Asia, provided India with diplomatic sup-
port regarding her disputes with Pakistan over Kashmir.
Just weeks before the Indo-Pakistani war, India dispensed with the
concept and practice of non-alignment when Indira Gandhi signed the
Indo-Soviet ‘Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation’. The treaty,
inter alia, provided that both countries would respect the independence,
territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the other and that neither of the
two would participate in any military alliance directed against the other
party. Unsurprisingly, the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty resulted in harsh criti-
cism. It was argued that non-alignment had been turned into alignment
with the USSR, especially since the latter had promised help to India. The
treaty also ensured the transfer of a huge quantity of Soviet weapons,
which helped India to pursue her military interventions in East Pakistan
(subsequently Bangladesh) in December 1971 and defeat Pakistan. Again,
Indira Gandhi’s pragmatic and non-ideological approach to foreign and
defence policy goals were successful.
During 1971, joint efforts of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and
India’s initiative in raising the issue of superpower presence in the
Indian Ocean at the UN led to the passing of the UNGA resolution
A/2832 of 16 December 1971. The Indian Ocean was subsequently
declared as a ‘Zone of Peace’; however, the resolution never achieved
any tangible success. The bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union,
although highly beneficial to India, did entail certain diplomatic costs.
Inevitably, India’s closeness to the Soviet Union kept her relations with
the USA rather distant. This distance also existed with her neighbouring
states in South Asia, especially with India’s annexation of the kingdom
of Sikkim in 1975.
The new Janata government in 1977–9 did not alter the policy of
non-alignment. India remained non-aligned even though Janata lead-
ers were generally pro-West, but the government gave no evidence of
deviation from the Indo-Soviet friendship. India’s relations with China
also did not improve, apart from a careful attempt to enhance relations
in 1978. This attempt failed when China attacked Vietnam during the
visit of Indian foreign minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China, with the
Chinese telling Vajpayee that they were teaching Vietnam a ‘lesson’,
just as they had taught India one in 1962. Finally, India’s ties with the
Soviet Union also inhibited the development of better relations with
the states of Southeast Asia. India refused to sign the NPT.
Indira Gandhi, in her second tenure (1980–4), and Rajiv Gandhi’s
(1984–9) government maintained cordial relations with the USSR, but
the robust Indo-Soviet relationship was disturbed in the wake of the lat-
ter’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. At the time of the inva-
sion, India had an interim government under Prime Minister Chaudhary
Charan Singh. The invasion proved costly for India, both in symbolic
and material terms. At the level of political symbolism, India’s interna-
tional image was tarnished because it was the only democratic state that
appeared to uncritically accept the Soviet explanation for her actions
in Afghanistan. It also proved costly in material terms, as ASEAN was
reluctant to accept India’s overtures in its direction. When in 1981 Indira
Gandhi was asked about India’s pro-Soviet stance despite professed non-
alignment, she replied ‘We are neither pro-Soviet nor pro-USA; we are
not anti-Soviet, or anti-USA, or anti-China, or against any other country;
we are pro-India, and we are non-aligned. But the Western press has tried
to project this image.’
Indian dependence on the Soviet Union continued during Rajiv
Gandhi’s government. His sporadic attempts to reform the near-stagnant
Indian economy contributed to further improvements in Indo-US rela-
tions. As India began to slowly dismantle the complicated regulatory
apparatus that had governed her investment and trade regimes, US firms
showed an increased interest in the Indian economy. With this growth
of commercial ties, some government-to-government contacts also wid-
ened, yet India’s relations with most of her neighbours suffered. India
became drawn into the civil war in Sri Lanka, helping to negotiate a
peace accord between the Sri Lankan and the principal Tamil insurgent
group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In addition, India
sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to help monitor the peace.
The LTTE, however, failed to adhere to the terms of the accord, and very
quickly the IPKF’s role changed into one of military enforcement and
occupation. The IPKF was ill-suited for its assigned mission, and after
two years it withdrew.
Relations with Pakistan deteriorated during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure in
office. In late 1986 and early 1987—two years after the official found-
ing of the SAARC—India carried out her largest peacetime military
exercise, called ‘Brasstacks’. These events hardly served as confidence-
building measures between the two countries and highlighted the ten-
sions that actually existed, despite rhetorical confession to cooperation
in SAARC.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to
a fundamental reappraisal of India’s foreign policy goals and choices:
Indian leaders, starting with Rajiv Gandhi, tried to improve relations
with the USA and China. Under his successor, P.V. Narasimha Rao,
India embarked on a ‘Look East’ policy designed to cultivate better rela-
tions with the states of Southeast Asia (see Section ‘The Mekong–Ganga
Cooperation (MGC) and the BCIM Regional Cooperation Forum’ in
Chapter 4). Rao’s efforts to improve ties with the Southeast Asian nations
dovetailed with the economic reform process that he and his finance
minister, Manmohan Singh, undertook in 1991 to rescue India from
the imminent danger of a looming acute financial crisis. With regard to
India’s relations with regional organizations, these efforts first led to India
finally becoming a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in the sectors of
trade, investment, tourism, and science and technology in 1993. Later,
in 1995, at the fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, in acknowledgment of
India’s potential as a major power, her status in ASEAN was upgraded
to full dialogue partner. India then became a member of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996, and a genuine summit level partner—on
the same level with China, Japan, and Korea—in 2002. For India, this
status had been an important objective in order to develop closer ties
with the economically booming member countries of ASEAN.
In the 1990s, India faced several critical foreign policy choices. Sino-
Indian relations at that time were affected by the limited progress in
settling the border dispute and the low priority that China accorded to
India in her foreign policy calculations. Another major international
crisis was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. India, which had long
had good relations with Iraq, found herself in a predicament. It could
hardly endorse the invasion. At the same time, it did not wish to alien-
ate a major supporter in the Arab world and a critical supplier of oil.
More to the point, it had several thousand expatriate workers in Iraq

which were an important source of income. In the end, Indian leaders
decided to adopt a cautiously supportive policy toward the US-led coali-
tion forces in the Gulf. In a departure from past practices, it even allowed
US aircrafts to refuel in Bombay. This decision, however, was overturned
once the matter was made public.
In June 1992, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao again affirmed
India’s strict adherence to the policy of non-alignment and noted the
latter’s continued relevance:
The pursuit of a non-aligned policy is even more relevant today than

ever before. Non-alignment basically consists of the espousal of the
rights of nations to independence and development, regardless of
the bloc phenomenon. Whether there is one bloc or more at a given
moment, the urge of a non-aligned country would continue to be to
maintain its independence, to take decisions according to its rights,
not tagging itself in advance to others.
(Cited in Khanna, 2005, p. 58)
Relations with the USA, which had shown some signs of improve-
ment, again became strained as the decade of the 1990s ended. When the
‘NPT Review Conference’ started in New York, India did not attend the
formal proceedings, but nevertheless sought informally to forge a Third
World coalition against the unconditional extension of the treaty. The
Indian efforts proved futile, and the US initiative prevailed. Subsequently,
India took a far more active stance at the ‘Geneva Conference on
Disarmament’, which was attempting to draft a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT). India, which had proposed the treaty as early as
1954, now emerged as one of its most vocal critics on the basis of a
number of technical reservations. In particular, India objected to the
unwillingness of the nuclear weapons states to make firm commitments
toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the end, India’s objec-
tions were overruled.
In 1996, I.K. Gujral became the foreign minister in the Deve Gowda
government. Gujral himself later became Prime Minister. He subse-
quently initiated a new foreign policy doctrine, called ‘Gujral Doctrine’,
which stressed the idealist tradition and normative orientation of India’s
foreign policy. The doctrine presented India as the region’s largest coun-
try willing to unilaterally help and support the smaller neighbours.
Gujral advocated people-to-people contacts, particularly between India
and Pakistan, to create an atmosphere that would enable the countries
concerned to sort out their differences amicably. In an interview with

the author, a former secretary from the Ministry of External Affairs
(MEA) and former ambassador called the doctrine ‘the most idiotic of
all’ and that ‘Gujral simply announced it, and we [in the MEA] were
never consulted.’
Regardless, it was in pursuance of this policy that late in 1996, India
concluded an agreement with Bangladesh on the sharing of Ganga
waters. This agreement enabled Bangladesh to procure slightly more
water than the 1966 agreement between the two countries had pro-
vided. The confidence-building measures agreed upon by India and
China in November 1996 were also a part of efforts made by the two
countries to improve bilateral relations, and freeze, for the time being,
the border dispute.
The Gujral doctrine was also applied when India unilaterally announced
in 1997 several concessions to Pakistan tourists, particularly the elder
citizens and cultural groups, relating to visa fees and police reporting.
The doctrine assumed special significance when in June 1997 talks
between India and Pakistan were held at the level of foreign secretary,
during which the two countries identified eight areas for negotiation so
as to build confidence and seek friendly resolution of all disputes.
India’s decision to detonate nuclear devices12 in May 1998 stemmed,
in considerable part, from the international pressure that was being
applied to make India renounce her nuclear weapons program but also
had domestic roots. The tests were carried out under the auspices of the
coalition dominated by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), without sig-
nificant consultation or prior public debate. Nevertheless, the tests were
mostly popular among the Indian electorate. Despite international pro-
tests, India’s image was not tarnished for long. The Indian nuclear tests
also forced the Pakistani political leadership to test their own nuclear
weapons. In the aftermath of these tests, India and Pakistan appeared to
embark on a path toward rapprochement. The high point of this process
involved Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore, Pakistan, in February
1999, to inaugurate a bus service between Lahore and New Delhi.
During the 12th NAM Summit held in Durban in September 1998,
India’s particular foreign policy conduct and the force of her ideational
orthodoxy became visible again. The summit was presided over by South
African President Nelson Mandela, and India was represented by Prime
Minister Vajpayee. While discussing international disputes, President
Mandela in his inaugural address mentioned Jammu and Kashmir and
hinted at a possible mediation by the NAM. India immediately took
strong exception to this third-party mediation offer. Consequently, South
Africa assured India that it had no intention of interfering in Indo-Pak

bilateral disputes. Second, an attempt was made to condemn India
and Pakistan for their May 1998 nuclear tests, which was immediately
resisted by India. Eventually, only general ‘anxiety’ was expressed for
conducting the tests.
In early May 1999, the Kargil war between India and Pakistan broke
out, and consequently Indo-Pak relation remained deeply strained. In
a renewed effort to improve relations with Pakistan, Prime Minister
Vajpayee invited General Musharraf to Agra for an extraordinary sum-
mit in 2001 which failed to accomplish much.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September
2001, the Indian parliament was also attacked by terrorists on
13 December 2001. India responded with ‘Operation Parakaram’ that
witnessed the mobilization of 500,000 Indian troops for over eight
months on the India-Pakistan borders. However, beginning in 2004, a
new peace process between India and Pakistan was under way, includ-
ing high-level negotiations on the Kashmir issue. The 2007 bombing of
the Samjhauta Express (connecting India with Pakistan) and the 2008
Mumbai terrorist attacks then resulted in a severe blow to the India-
Pakistan peace talks, which were restarted in 2011.
Besides these developments between India and Pakistan, India has
begun to steadily improve and strengthen its bilateral relations with the
USA, Russia, and China. On 18 July 2005, US President George W. Bush
and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared their resolve to
transform the relationship between the two countries. India entered
into a strategic partnership with the USA, which was regarded as a
new phase and a turning point in India’s foreign policy orientations.
Washington agreed to resume full civilian nuclear cooperation with
India; in turn, India agreed to separate her civilian and military nuclear
facilities and place the former under international supervision. In 2008,
after several setbacks, the US–India civil nuclear cooperation finally
became operational, a milestone in US-Indo relations. In addition to
these relations with the USA, Russia has remained a significant source
of arms and is also a strategic partner for India. Moreover, India entered
into a strategic partnership with China, the latter now being India’s
single largest trading partner. Since 2003, India has also entered into
strategic partnerships with more than 30 other countries, among them
Iran, Japan, and the EU, which demonstrates India’s proclivity for
interest-based bilateralism.13
Table 2.2 summarizes the major dates in the evolution of India’s
foreign policy.
Table 2.2 Milestones in the evolution of India’s foreign policy
1947 Indo-Pakistan War

1954 Panchsheel principles adopted
1961 Eviction of Portuguese from Goa
1961 India—a founding member of NAM (Belgrade)
1962 Sino-Indian War
1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation
1975 Annexation of Kingdom of Sikkim
1987 IPKF intervention in conflict in Sri Lanka (–1990)
1998 India becomes nuclear power
1999 Kargil War with Pakistan
2008 US–India Civil Nuclear Agreement
Culture, norms, and strategies of a future world power

The above analysis shows that India’s foreign policy is based on politi-
cal realism. In international affairs, the primacy of independence and
national interest and the paradigm of interest-based bilateralism have
been the determining factors of India’s foreign policy. However, there has
also been a noticeable paradigm shift since 1998, with India becoming a
nuclear power (C. Raja Mohan, 2005) and entering into various strategic
partnerships. The concept of ‘genuine’ non-alignment has clearly been
transcended, and India has now repositioned herself on the international
stage. Table 2.3 lists the 12 features that have been outlined above and
that make up India’s foreign policy culture and norms (i.e., cognitive
prior), constituting the independent variable.
Table 2.3 India’s cognitive prior
1. Tolerance
2. Equation of end and means
3. Non-violence (ahimsa)
4. Non-discrimination
5. Mission for world peace
6. India representing a civilization
7. Mandala strategy
8. Non-alignment
9. Panchsheel principles
10. Primacy of independence/sovereignty
11. Primacy of national interest
12. Paradigm of interest-based bilateralism
India’s cognitive prior thus reflects a clear dichotomy with a con-

tradictory idealist (Gandhi, Nehru, and Gujral) and Kautilyan-realist
thrust, following an assertive civilizational approach and publicly still
adhering to non-alignment, while at the same time focusing on bilater-
alism with the major powers of the world.
This assessment is not of an academic nature. On the contrary, it is of
significance for any valid assessment of the evolution—and especially
prospects—of regional multilateralism in South Asia. Chapters 3 and 4
will therefore especially focus on India’s impact on the genesis and evo-
lution of regional multilateralism and analyse how India’s foreign policy
culture and norms influenced regional multilateralism in South Asia.
3
Regional Multilateralism
in South Asia
Having analysed India’s foreign policy cognitive prior in Chapter 2, the

focus will now be narrowed down to India’s stance towards regional
multilateralism and the developments taking place prior to the found-
ing of the first genuine South Asian regional organization in 1978.
Consequently, it is first necessary to analyse regional conferences that
took place with India’s participation and examine India’s behaviour
in those conferences. This chapter then charts the genesis, evolution,
and achievements of the SAARC as the only genuine pan-South Asian
organization. The analysis will attempt to ascertain how Indian foreign
policy reconciled her normative and ideational traditions and convic-
tions with normative ‘pull factors’ in the regional context and examine
if the preconditions for norm localization and norm sublimation as
enumerated in Chapter 1 have been fulfilled.
Asian regional conferences: early concepts of regional

multilateralism from 1949 to 1961
While pre-independence foreign policy declarations on regional coop-

eration outlined in the preceding chapter represented the ideational
first wave of regional multilateralism in South Asia, the ensuing post-
independence regional conferences represented the second wave: The
idea of regional multilateralism as such is not alien to South Asia; on
the contrary, the region can look back on several attempts at regional
cooperation in different shades, in the form of various small and large
conferences and initiatives. Several important political conferences took
place in the late 1940s and 1950s in which South Asian and Southeast
Asian countries participated, though none of those led to the establish-
ment of permanent institutions,1 e.g., the Asian Relations Conference
48
Regional Multilateralism in South Asia 49
Table 3.1 Regional Asian Conferences and Meetings 1949–61
Name of Conference Year
1 New Delhi Conference on Indonesia (India) January 1949

2 Baguio Conference (Philippines) May 1950
3 Conference of Southeast Asian Prime Ministers, April 1954
Colombo (Colombo Powers Conference) (Sri Lanka)
4 Bogor Conference (Conference of Southeast Asian December 1954
Prime Ministers) (Indonesia)
5 Bandung Asian–African Conference (Indonesia) April 1955
6 Shimla Conference (India) May 1955
7 Brioni Conference (Italy) July 1956
8 Belgrade Conference (NAM Summit) (Yugoslavia) September 1961
or the Bandung Conference. On the other hand, economic cooperation

did not take place at all except through the United Nations Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)2 and the
involvement of international organizations. These eight pan-Asian
regional conferences (see Table 3.1) eventually determined India’s aus-
tere position vis-à-vis regional multilateralism.
The Conference on Indonesia on 20 January 1949 was convened by
India as an immediate reaction to the Dutch intervention in Indonesia
on 18 December 1948. Using this ‘emergency’ forum, the by now emerg-
ing failure of the Asian Relations Organization (see Chapter 2) prompted
Nehru to suggest the formation of some sort of permanent ‘Asian
Organization’ and to make an open appeal for regional integration:
Is it not natural that that free countries of Asia should begin to think
of some more permanent arrangement than this conference for
effective mutual consultation and concerted effort in the pursuit of
common aims—not in a spirit of selfishness or hostility to any other
nation or group of nations, but in order to strengthen and bring
nearer fulfilment the aims and ideals of the charter of the United
Nations?
(Nehru, 1961, p. 410)
India had strong geographical, historical, and cultural linkages with

West and Southeast Asia and could not remain untouched by the events
and problems in those regions. However, the wider Asia region com-
prises nations with geographical, cultural, political, and economic diver-
sity and other political alignments. A common anti-colonial sentiment
was really the only common sentiment among the countries, which, in
the final analysis, was not conducive to forming a regional block. There
was, even in the minds of the Indian foreign policy elite, no clear vision
of how exactly regional collaboration could look like, especially in terms
of shape and scope. Nehru’s statement in the Constituent Assembly on
8 March 1949, following the Conference on Indonesia, reflected the
lack of clarity in the Indian outlook on regional multilateralism:
At the conference one of the resolutions passed was that we should

explore methods of close cooperation […] Possibly we might have
another conference to consider the possible lines of cooperation.
[…] We have not yet decided what the region of cooperation might be,
because […] India is interested in several regions in Asia. Whether all
should be grouped together or separately. I do not know. That is for
us to consider together and to decide what is more feasible (emphasis
added).
(Nehru, 1961, p. 21)
As outlined in Chapter 1, ‘regional clarity’ is an important prerequisite

for successful regional multilateralism. Even though Nehru was only
speaking in general terms, an uncertainty about the geographical scope
of regional organizations has remained until today (see below the sec-
tions on SAARC and IOR-ARC). At this conference, Nehru also expressed
his aversion towards Indian becoming a leader of other countries.
The conference—termed as ‘the first Asian political Conference’ and
described as ‘the first inter-governmental Conference on the political
level to be held in Asia’ (Sharma, 2001, p. 37)—could not agree on the
exact coordinates of an Asian organization (membership; institu-
tional set-up). Still, while some countries agreed on some of the issues
raised, others objected on formal grounds (the question of institu-
tional set-up was not on the agenda) (Jansen, 1966, p. 74). The almost
exact deliberations took place 30 years later on the occasion of the
founding of SAARC, an historical parallel that shows the ideational
strength of diverging national political convictions and also the resil-
ience of normative convictions.
Another regional conference was then held at Baguio, Philippines
(Gupta, 1964, pp. 45–8) in May 1950. This conference was attended by
Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. It discussed the H-bomb,
the question of Tunisia and Morocco, and communism. India wanted
to single out the issue of the H-bomb and Indo-China, but other coun-
tries were interested in emphasizing different issues. For Pakistan, the
Kashmir question was paramount, for Ceylon the danger of communism,
for Burma economic cooperation, and the Afro-Asian Conference for

Indonesia. The conference did not produce any tangible results, and
it clearly showed that each country wanted to use the conference for
discussing their own agenda.
The next attempt at regional multilateralism was the Colombo Plan
for Economic and Technical Cooperation, which was launched in
1951 by British Borneo, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Japan,
Laos, Malaya, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
and Vietnam. The plan envisaged a survey of the needs of the area, an
assessment of the available resources and manpower, and providing an
international framework for a regional cooperative effort. Even though
the economies of the region were all competing against each other
(rather than complementing each other), India nevertheless showed her
willingness to collaborate with the other countries of the region in the
economic sphere.
The Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan
held their first meeting in April 1954 in Colombo and organized them-
selves into a group known as the Colombo Powers. As a specific clause
in a draft joint communiqué to be issued by the Colombo Powers, the
drafting committee (India and Burma) of the Colombo Conference pro-
posed ‘a solemn agreement of non-intervention’ by China, the United
Kingdom (UK), the USA, and the USSR ‘to refrain from giving aid to the
combatants or intervening in Indo-China with troops or war material’
(cited in Acharya, 2005, p. 24). Pakistan was not ‘opposed to the prin-
ciple of non-intervention’. Finally, it was agreed on ‘steps necessary to
prevent the recurrence or resumption of hostilities’ so that ‘the success
of […] direct negotiations will be greatly helped’. It was at this Colombo
Conference that the idea of an ‘Asia-Africa Conference’ was proposed by
Indonesia, organized by the Colombo Powers.
The final preparations for the Asia–Africa Conference were made in
a second meeting of the Colombo Powers held in Bogor, Indonesia, in
December 1954. The Bogor Conference recognized the ‘principle that
the form of government and the way of life of any one country should
in no way be subject to interference by any other’ (cited in Acharya,
2005, p. 25).
At the Bogor Conference, Nehru’s ideas about how relations between
countries were to be organized and the international world order set the
tone (and agenda) for the planned Bandung Conference. Participation
in collective defence pacts in Asia was anathema to Nehru. A com-
muniqué issued at the end of the Bogor Conference in December 1954
outlined the objectives of the planned Bandung Conference, which
were (1) to promote goodwill and cooperation between the nations of

Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as com-
mon interests, and to establish and further friendliness and neigh-
bourly relations and (2) to view the position of Asia and Africa and
their peoples in the world of today and the contribution they can make
to the promotion of world peace and cooperation (see Kahin, 1956,
pp. 76–85).
The Bandung Conference3 was finally convened on 23 April 1955 by
the five Colombo Conference participants, i.e., Burma, Ceylon, India,
Indonesia, and Pakistan. The conference was attended by 29 Asian and
African nations and included almost all nations which had gained free-
dom from colonial rule.4 Nehru elaborated on his dislike, even aversion
for any sort of collective defence pact, such as those that were being
promoted by the USA in Asia and the Middle East at that time. At the
conference he argued:
This resolution [Final Resolution of Bandung Conference] repre-

sents the ideals and the new dynamism of Asia. We are not copies
of Europeans or Americans or Russians. We are Asians and Africans.
It would not be creditable for our dignity and new freedom if we
were camp-followers of America or Russia or any other country of
Europe.
(Nehru, 1961, p. 271)
The whole subject matter of collective defence has two major impli-
cations: it denotes that countries cooperate in crucial political-strategic
fields and pool their military resources under one collective umbrella.
This is of significance for regional multilateralism, since Nehru’s rejec-
tion of this kind of political regional cooperation was bound to have
repercussions for any sort of future cooperation in political sectors,
which, in the final analysis, is precisely a matter of the norm localiza-
tion of an external norm. On the issue of collective defence, Nehru
stated his distinct opinion in the Lok Sabha, 30 April 1955:
They [the principles set out in the Bandung Declaration] contain

nothing that is against the interests of our country, or the estab-
lished principles of our foreign policy. The Declaration includes
a clause which has a reference to collective defence. The House
knows that we are opposed to military pacts and I have repeatedly
stated that these pacts based upon the idea of balance of power and
negotiation from strength and the grouping of nations into rival
camps are not, in our view, a contribution to peace. We maintain

that view.
(Nehru, 1961, p. 277)
Two comments highlighted the difference in perceptions about the

value and expediency of collective defence, and therefore the normative
rift between India and smaller countries on questions of multilateral
political cooperation. At that time, Pakistan was a member of both the
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the SEATO. Pakistan’s Prime
Minister Mohamed Ali stated that Pakistan only followed her ‘national
interest’ and that it being an independent sovereign nation did not
feel it ‘necessary for us to justify our actions to anybody except to our-
selves’ (cited in Acharya, 2005, p. 1). Carlos Romulo, representing the
Philippines (which was also a SEATO member), strongly disagreed with
Nehru’s critical evaluation of collective security. He argued for a differ-
ent approach, to be ‘realistic and not be starry-eyed visionaries dream-
ing utopian dreams’ (Acharya, 2005, p. 1).
The normative beginnings of a particular Asian regional multilateral-
ism that excluded working together in matters of political relevance that
had begun with regional conferences prior to India’s independence
reached an early ‘normative’ climax at the Bandung Conference, as the
statements that were exchanged during that conference demonstrate.
The ‘absolute’ Indian standpoint—absolute in India’s rejection of col-
lective security—was already contested by her immediate neighbour
Pakistan and by a smaller country, the Philippines. These three repre-
sented two different cultural traditions—India and Pakistan, on the one
hand, the Philippines, on the other hand—yet Pakistan did not follow
India’s standpoint and normative convictions. The secretary-general of
the Bandung Conference, Roselan Abdulghani, saw the purpose of the
conference in not only ‘to continue the struggle toward a full materi-
alization of national independence’ (Abdulghani, 1964, p. 72),5 but also
‘the formulation and establishment of certain norms for the conduct of
present-day international relations and the instruments for the practical
application of these norms’ (Abdulghani, 1964, p. 103). The final Bandung
Communiqué 6 enumerated 10 principles. A sub-clause of Principle 6 (6.a)
allowed collective defence,7 but another sub-clause (6.b) advocated the
‘abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries’.
This formulation (the Bandung injunction) advised the newly independent
states to refrain from joining collective defence pacts.
India’s initial efforts at Asian regionalism were marked by a certain
deal of confusion about the region which it wanted to promote for
cooperation and collective identity (Muni and Muni, 1984a, p. 12).

Nehru aired his concerns, highlighting the relationship between ‘defence
alliance’ and ‘independence’:
‘I can understand a number of countries coming together for their

own defence and thus making an alliance.[…] It means that any
internal development in that area might also entitle these countries
to intervene. Does this not affect the whole conception of integrity,
sovereignty and independence of the countries of this area?
(Nehru, 1961, pp. 88–9)
Considering India’s cognitive prior, this statement shows how much

the ideational orthodoxy influenced Nehru’s thinking. He regarded
SEATO and CENTO as posing a threat to India’s sovereignty and
security, especially with Pakistan’s membership in both. In a further
statement of his, he echoed a Kautilyan analysis: ‘Moreover, SEATO
and the Baghdad Pact, apart from being basically in the wrong direc-
tion, affect us intimately. In a sense, they tend to encircle us’ (Nehru,
1961, pp. 94–5). Michael Brecher commented that to Nehru, collec-
tive defence pacts were a reminder of India’s ‘long experience with
colonial rule’ and represented ‘an indirect return of Western power to
an area from which it had recently retreated’ (Brecher, 1959, pp. 555,
584). The sources of Nehru’s rejection of Cold War collective defence
pacts were his moral beliefs, influenced by Gandhi. These Gandhian
values, especially anti-colonialism, thus defined Nehru’s unrelenting
position. He rejected an international norm (that was in the process
of emerging) and created the basis of a norm against collective defence
in Asia. A comparable move happened again during the deliberations
on the implementation of the norm of ‘regional multilateralism’ (see
Chapters 4 and 5).
India convened another Conference at Shimla in May 1955, invit-
ing all members of the Colombo Plan. The agenda for this conference
covered, e.g., the concrete utilization of special allocations for the
development of intra-regional trade and the creation of a permanent
secretariat for the Colombo Plan. The response to the Indian invitation
was indifferent at best—a low-level representation by most countries,
with Burma declining the invitation and Sri Lanka objecting to any
multilateral arrangements. On account of evident political as well as
economic divergences in the countries concerned, and also because of
a lack of outside support, the Colombo Plan never became a purpose-
ful vehicle for the economic ‘regeneration’ of Asia (Muni, 1996, p. 2).
Also, the Colombo Plan idea on closer economic cooperation did not
make much progress because of the absence of a central organization,
a headquarters or a permanent secretariat, recurring deficiencies in the
vast majority of Asian regional endeavours (see below).
In July 1956, Nehru, Tito, and Nasser met at a Conference in Brioni
to discuss issues of peace and solidarity. TIME Magazine cited Cairo’s
Al Ahram as having concluded that this was ‘the most important
political conference of the post-war world’. At the end of the confer-
ence, a joint communiqué was issued. TIME Magazine summed up the
essence of it:
[The] communiqué carried little but vague platitudes of a pronounced

Nehruvian cast. “Points on which there could be no agreement were
just left out,” explained one Indian diplomat. […] The difficulty with
the diplomatic doctrine that Nehru likes to call “non-alignment” is
that is has no philosophic basis, no platform; it can only respond.
Since the positive objectives of its adherents vary widely, neutralist
powers, as Brioni proved, are rarely able to agree on anything but
negatives.
(TIME Magazine, 1956)
The conference in Brioni did not achieve any tangible results, despite
the usual rhetorical confessions.
Six years after Bandung, Yugoslav President Tito led the first official
Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which was held in September 1961 in
Belgrade (Muni, 1981, pp. 159–72). Twenty five countries attended; the
five criteria for joining NAM were that the country followed an independ-
ent foreign policy based on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence,
that the country was opposed to colonialism and imperialism, that it
should not have been a member of a Cold War-related military bloc,
it should not have had a bilateral treaty with any of the super powers
and that it should not have allowed any foreign military base on its
territory.
India was already in a difficult position with regard to regional inte-
gration in the 1950s, 30 years before SAARC as the first genuine South
Asian Organization was finally founded. S.D. Muni quite appropriately
captures this dilemma in promoting Asian regionalism during this time
when he observes:
The attitude of small neighbours constrained India from taking initia-

tives for regionalism after 1949. India almost reluctantly participated
in the Baguio Conference (1950) and subsequently let Sri Lanka and
Indonesia take initiatives. India’s opposition to military pacts spon-
sored by the Western powers, right since the Baguio Conference and
specially after the US military aid to Pakistan in 1954, turned it luke-
warm towards the ideas of Asian regionalism, which in the then exist-
ing context could not avoid cold war orientation. This appeared to be
a complete negation of the principles of non-alignment and peaceful
co-existence to which India stood fully committed.
(Muni and Muni, 1984a, p. 15)
This second wave of the process of regionalism then abruptly petered

out in the early 1960s; the Asian Relations Conference (1947) repre-
sented the primary attempt to integrate the states in Asia on the issues
of anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, world peace, and of supplement-
ing the political freedom which had been achieved at last by tangible
economic progress. However, India’s initial tentative efforts failed to
‘unify’ Asia in regional terms, and not long after, India fought wars
with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965, 1971, and again in 1999). These
early efforts to promote regional multilateralism also lacked economic
content and were inspired primarily by the grand world-view of Nehru
who wanted to pursue the higher ideals of world peace through non-
alignment. The efforts of the UN later to promote economic coopera-
tion in the region through the mechanisms of UNESCAP were again
weak efforts which produced little tangible results. There was an initial
local initiative on the side of India at regional multilateralism, yet it
faltered, for various reasons.
Regardless, a global norm (sovereignty in the form of non-intervention)
with a specific Asian face evolved through interactions in the form
of various conferences taking place in Asia. All of the above can be
subsumed under the first part of the trajectory of norm localization,
namely pre-localization in its most basic form. It was only at the end
of the 1970s that a new initiative at forming a regional organization
in the South Asian was taken, originating from Bangladesh. Before
that, the principles of the Panchsheel were India’s most vocal and most
visible show of how it wanted the relations between nations to be
governed. Concomitantly, the specific Indian concept of the scope and
limits of multilateralism developed over the course of several decades,
yet the normative origins and roots of regional multilateralism still
stem from the 1950s and Nehru’s opposition to multilateral security
cooperation.
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC)
The subsequent part is divided into two parts. The first part is the actual
process-tracing of regional multilateralism in South Asia. The starting
point of the analysis is the emerging discourse on regional multilateral-
ism in the late 1970s in South Asia, with the end point being the 17th
SAARC Summit in 2011. The second part then conducts an analysis of
SAARC achievements in terms of political, military, and trans-national
terrorism issues.
Contextualizing SARC8: international and national catalysts for

regional multilateralism
The gradual diffusion of the norm of regional multilateralism took a
long time in South Asia. After the ‘ideational’ first wave of regional
multilateralism in the 1920s and the second wave in the form of
post-independence regional conferences until 1961, the concept and
resultant implementation of regional multilateralism in the form of
SAARC in the 1970s and 1980s represented the third wave of regional
multilateralism in South Asia.
Since 1961, with the convening of the Belgrade Conference, no fur-
ther serious attempts at regional multilateralism had been made. In the
final analysis, the whole Afro-Asian movement had not succeeded in
achieving anything of political or economic substance, but India none-
theless emerged as the leader of the NAM in the post-colonial world.
Nehru’s pursuit of economic development through industrialization
and his zeal for world peace through non-alignment clearly provided
Indian foreign policy with an international status and reputation. Yet,
India’s political position in the world, in general, and in Asia, in particu-
lar, suffered a serious setback in the 1960s, on account of deteriorating
relations with China, which resulted in the unexpected (and for India
humiliating) China war of 1962.
Nehru’s death in 1964 signified a defining moment in the history of
post-independence India, and it eventually meant a departure from the
policies and ideas of the Indian freedom struggle. Further, a period of
drought which lasted for three years and crop failure during the third
five-year plan (from 1961 to 1966) brought India to the brink of economic
collapse. India had to import food to prevent starvation and the World
Bank in 1966 enforced the devaluation of the Indian currency, an event
that left a lasting impression on Indira Gandhi and, in the final analysis,
made her wary of humiliating India vis-à-vis other countries. Also, the
view prevailed that India would not be able to feed herself and would not
survive long as a united country (Subrahmanyam, 1985, pp. 33–41).
The year 1971 then marked a turning point for South Asia and for
India’s role in the region (see Bradnock, 1990, pp. 1–10). The Indo-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship signed in 1971 had to some extent undermined
India’s non-aligned status in the post-Nehru period, since it demon-
strated that even India needed to ‘align’ herself with one of the super-
powers in order to secure her position, in economic, military, and security
terms. The emergence of India as a regional power in South Asia and the
refusal of the USA and China to actively support Pakistan in the 1971
war with India enhanced the fear and mistrust of India’s neighbours
about her behaviour in the region (Ayoob, 1990, pp. 107–35). India’s
decisive victory against Pakistan in 1971 resulting in the creation of
Bangladesh, the achievement of self-sufficiency in food production and
the first nuclear test explosion at Pohkran (1974) restored India’s self-
esteem, her credibility, and her image as a potential hegemon in inter-
national politics. It was the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979 and the Western response to this event that caused concern espe-
cially among the smaller states of the region. The USA was already mak-
ing efforts to establish a regional security arrangement in South and
Southwest Asia in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At
the same time, due to the Iran–Iraq conflict, a move to establish a Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) with the support of the USA was made to
respond to the security situation in Gulf.9 The South-East Asia region
had already witnessed the creation of ASEAN in the 1960s. Ideas on
finally promoting and strengthening regional multilateralism in South
Asia began taking shape while these momentous political developments
unfolded. Given the history of the apparent failure of Indian initiatives
to bring together different Asian nations after decolonization, it was
significant that the new initiative was now taken by a smaller Indian
neighbour: Bangladesh.
The coming into existence of SAARC—from an institutional and nor-
mative point of view and representing the first true-life regional response
(i.e., localization) to the external norm of regional multilateralism—
can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase began with
the official initiative of Bangladesh in 1979, which continued up to
August 1983 and was characterized by explorative meetings at the
foreign secretary level; the second phase commenced with the first
meeting and deliberations, caveats, and eventual compromises of the
respective foreign ministers on 3 August 1983, resulting in the Delhi
Declaration and the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA), and the

third phase began with the first SAARC Summit in Dhaka from 7 to 8
December 1985.
The first phase: pre-localization—a ‘Proposal for Regional

Cooperation’ by Bangladesh
The historical backdrop outlined above set in motion a reaction towards
more cooperation in the region. The politico-strategic context of South
Asia at that time was considered favourable to the idea of regional
cooperation, a major catalyst that favoured the process of norm locali-
zation as outlined in Chapter 1. Various Asian think tanks and insti-
tutes initiated the first discussions and concrete proposals dealing with
new attempts at regional multilateralism, after a period of regional
inactivity that had lasted almost 20 years. Especially Indian foreign
policy inactivity in this sector was noticeable. Among the institutes and
think tanks, the Marga Institute of Sri Lanka, the ICWA—it had already
played an important role during the Asian Relations Conference—,
the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), the Pakistan
Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), and the Centre for
Economic Development and Administration (CEDA) in Nepal played a
pivotal role.
The ideas of these regional think tanks on regional cooperation were
crucial for influencing the early regional cooperation discourse. In the
beginning, there was general agreement on at least 14 issue-areas for
further exploration.10 In an interview, former Nepali Minister of Finance
Madhukar Rana told the author that the countries of the region—though
not India—wanted an extensive regional cooperation scheme—‘as much
cooperation as possible’—and that during these very early stages many
analysts were already wondering: ‘How will India react? We all knew
that we had to make concessions to India, but we didn’t know to which
extent.’
It was against this early backdrop of exploring different areas of coop-
eration that the idea of forming a South Asian Regional Cooperation
(SARC) Organization was publicly mooted by Ziaur Rahman, president
of Bangladesh until 1981.11 He discussed the possibility of organizing
regional cooperation in South Asia during his visits to Nepal, India,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in the late 1970s and in 1980.12 The first ASEAN
Summit in Bali in 1976 and the resolve of the ASEAN to strengthen coop-
eration in several sectors were also important factors for Bangladesh’s
motivation (Dash, 2008, p. 85). Therefore, Bangladesh played the role
of a norm entrepreneur by advocating the introduction of regional
multilateralism in South Asia. Regional multilateralism was thus a top-

down project. Rahman wrote in a letter which was sent to the heads of
state or government of several South Asian countries:
Recent events and developments in and around South Asia and

Middle East represent considerable threat to global peace and stabil-
ity. The situation in Afghanistan continues to underline the tension,
and conflict that characterise the present day world has to be viewed
with concern. Under these circumstances we believe there is an urgent
need for cooperation among the countries of this area for preserving peace
and stability which is so essential for sustaining the process of eco-
nomic and social development. […] The contemporary experience
in inter-state relations all over the world strongly emphasizes the
need for regional cooperation with a view to maximizing either security
and stability or accelerating economic and social development (emphasis
added).
(Z. Rahman, 1978)
Thus, this first ‘open invitation’ at regional multilateralism had a dis-

tinct political note to it. The issue of political stability in the region and
a longing for peace, plus vocal concerns of solving security issues were
the motives behind the Bangladeshi initiative. President Rahman dis-
cussed the issue of such a South Asian regional approach also at length
with the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi in February
1980, shortly after Gandhi had again become Indian prime minister.
A former Indian foreign secretary told the author that he was called by
Indira Gandhi to discuss the issue. She informed him that she was rather
sceptical and apprehensive about the Bangladeshi motives and that she
had made it very clear to Rahman that Bangladesh had to make ‘signifi-
cant concessions’ if India was to join any kind of regional cooperative
endeavour. Also, she had told Rahman that ‘we adhere to the Panchsheel
principles and regional cooperation has to fit into that scheme.’13 The
visit of Rahman in turn was followed by the visit of a senior Indian offi-
cial for further talks and discussions in Dhaka. President Rahman’s call
for a six-nation summit (without the Maldives) on 2 May 1980 was the
result of these exploratory talks and a first culmination of the initiative
taken by Bangladesh (see Muni, 1985b, pp. 391–404).
Encouraged by the positive response from South Asian capitals,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh under Foreign Minister
Muhammad Shamsul Haq drafted a proposal and circulated it among the
countries of the region in November 1980. Explaining the motivation
behind President Ziaur Rahman’s initiative, this ambitious proposal—

termed ‘Bangladesh Paper’ (see SAARC Secretariat, 1988b, p. 1)—provided
the rationale for regional cooperation in South Asia and contained all the
relevant elements of an ideal-type form of regional multilateralism. The
proposal summarized that the countries of the region had already been
cooperating with each other in fora like the UNESCAP, the NAM, or the
Commonwealth, and it asserted that the full potential of regional coop-
eration had not been fully exploited in South Asia. The paper argued that
while other regions had evolved institutional arrangements for consulta-
tion on matters of mutual interest and cooperation in the economic,
social, and cultural fields on a regional basis, South Asia was the only
region which did not have any such arrangements for regional coopera-
tion; the paper suggested an institutional structure with heads of state
and government of member states at the apex to meet once annually or
as often as necessary to give directions, provide guidelines, and review
the activities of the organization and suggested a ‘Council of Foreign
Ministers’ of member states as the principal functional organ; it also
suggested the setting up of a secretariat to be headed by a secretary-general
as the principle executive of the organization.14
The paper then identified 11 areas of potential cooperation among
the South Asian states in the fields of agriculture, science and technol-
ogy, transport, market, promotion, education, and culture. The proposal
even outlined the steps required for preparations of the summit meet-
ing. It was suggested that the proposal be considered as a working paper
on which ideas, responses, and further suggestions or corrections of
other governments should subsequently be obtained to crystallize and
finalize concrete programmes for consideration of the first preparatory
meeting of foreign secretaries. Reflecting the results of the early informal
consultations, the proposal from Bangladesh categorically maintained:
‘Such cooperation is not, however, intended to take the form of any
new block or alliance. The institutional arrangements set up for such
cooperation would strictly conform to the principles of non-alignment
to which all the countries in the region are firmly committed’ (SAARC
Secretariat, 1988b, p. 2).
In political terms, the proposal referred to ‘independence’, the
Panchsheel principles and the NAM—all of which confirms that Indira
Gandhi’s early insistence on the inclusion of these principles had influ-
enced the proposal. Very early concessions towards the Indian standpoint
are obvious. Nevertheless, while the proposal was immediately endorsed
by Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, initially both India and
Pakistan still displayed reluctance, though for different reasons.
The Pakistani and Indian position

In political terms, Pakistan was reluctant to endorse the proposal and
was apprehensive that because of her great strength, India would simply
eclipse Pakistan in regional multilateralism. It was feared that SARC
could eventually be turned into an instrument of Indian hegemonic
designs. On the other hand, Pakistani scholars also argued that in such a
regional organization, the interest of the smaller nations could possibly
converge, which could then compel India to behave in a more concilia-
tory manner. Ross Masood Hussain (1991, p. 2) argued that
President Zia-ur-Rahman might have perceived that such a regional

forum would help neutralize India’s position of advantage in rela-
tion to the smaller nations of South Asia. Informal discussions with
Bangladesh officials revealed their view that the only way to restrain
India’s overbearing attitude was through the discipline inherent in
the membership of a regional organization.
(see for this aspect also Bokhari, 1985, pp. 371–91)
In economic terms, Pakistan had also specific fears of Indian future

domination of trade and commercial links, especially if these were
advanced in the industrial infrastructure and the regional trade market
(Atiur Rahman, 1986, p. 16). At the same time, Pakistan sensed that in the
case of non-participation, it would be excluded from enjoying beneficial
trade relations with the other members of SARC. This, as will be further
elaborated below, is also the case with BIMST-EC and hence displays his-
torical continuity in considerations of regional affairs. Bharti Chhibber
(2004, p. 108) argued that ‘Pakistan also wanted to develop profitable
relations with the Muslim states of the Southwest Asian region and felt
that these chances might be weakened by joining a South Asian regional
association. This clearly brings out how different perceptions of national
interests and perceived threats were viewed by South Asian states.’
As far as India was concerned, there were, according to S.D. Muni,15
genuine apprehensions in India, especially considering the protracted
history of bilateral disputes in the region, that the proposed regional
multilateral forum might be used by her neighbours to ‘gang up’16
against her. An attempt by Bangladesh to bring in Nepal as a party to
the central issue of sharing Ganga water with India was seen as heading
in this direction (Muni, 1985b, p. 397). Consequently, India followed
a careful and vigilant approach as it was apprehensive of the regional
organization being used as a forum where the smaller nations could col-
lectively seek to bargain with India.
Also, the proposal, although already noticeably influenced by the

informal talks between Indira Gandhi and Rahman, still contained major
aspects that contravened India’s interests. The Indian government
therefore accepted the proposal only ‘in principle’ (Chhibber, 2004,
p. 108). India made it clear that for her to associate with the proposal
and subsequent practical implementations, any strategic- and security-
related aspects would have to be excluded.
India’s then Minister for External Affairs, P.V. Narasimha Rao com-
mented on 25 March 1981: ‘India’s approach to regional cooperation is
positive, we are convinced that it will add a new and qualitative dimen-
sion to the ongoing activities among the countries of the region in a
meaningful and overall beneficial manner’ (cited in Chhibber, 2004,
pp. 108, 135, footnote 27). This official statement reveals that there was
no outright rejection of ‘regional multilateralism’ on India’s side and
confirms India’s general acceptance of the norm, but also discloses an
uncommitted attitude: a ‘positive approach’ certainly does not automati-
cally equal a committed approach, which is a prerequisite for imple-
menting full-fledged regional multilateralism. India had serious caveats
which it could not relinquish; otherwise it could have endorsed the
proposal in full.
Analysing India’s predicament, S.D. Muni observed:
India could not reject the proposal either because the idea of regional
cooperation in itself was a positive one and could play a useful role
in India’s own regional policy. An outright rejection of the proposal
by India could also give legitimacy to the neighbouring states going
ahead with it on their own. This in effect would have made the
forum an instrument of neighbours ‘ganging up’ against India. […]
India, therefore, had to be careful in its response to the proposal.
It activated its diplomacy to see that the proposal was moderated and
redefined so as to become compatible with essential aspects of its perceived
interests in the region (emphasis added).
(Muni, 1985b, p. 396)
Besides these ‘interests’, India’s normative and ideational orthodoxy

as expounded in Chapter 2 proved its dominance. The conceptual tools
provided by an application of norm localization allow one to accurately
explain an uncompromising Indian view on regional matters. In the
context of the prevailing political and security environment in South
Asia and given the mindset of her neighbours, India apprehended that
the initiative for South Asian regional cooperation might be an attempt
to limit her actions in South Asia, which was not acceptable when
looking upon her struggle for complete independence in foreign policy
actions. It was Bangladesh that had played the role of a pre-localizer,
assisted by insider proponents in the form of think tanks. The proposal
and Rahman’s initial talks can thus be subsumed under the ideal-type
shape of ‘regional multilateralism’. Now India took charge in order to
immediately shape what was to come according to her foreign policy
convictions. Already before any actual negotiations had taken place,
the exchange of views between Gandhi and Rahman and the public
restraint by India had markedly influenced the discourse. India’s extreme
caution towards regional cooperation was reflected in Gandhi’s early
opposition to certain parts of the Bangladesh’s proposal (Hussain, 1991,
pp. 9–10).
Throughout the different stages of pre-localization, India played the
most influential role and managed to ensure that her initial precondi-
tions were met from the earliest possible moment in time. Taking into
account that Indira Gandhi had made her position clear already in the
first informal deliberations, and also bearing in mind that Rahman him-
self had only very abstract ideas on what an ‘ideal’ cooperation in the
region might look like, these initial developments disclose that India
had much stronger convictions as to what cooperation should not look
like, which was even agreed upon by the other actors in the process,
all of which indicates India’s hegemonic role in the process and the
‘pushing aside’ of the original norm entrepreneurs.
Developments 1981–3: the negotiating stages

Given the political realities of the sub-continent at that time, it seemed
practically impossible to exclude political issues from South Asian region-
alism. The foreign secretaries of seven South Asian countries gathered in
Colombo from 21 to 23 April 1981 in order to discuss the Bangladesh
proposal. During this meeting, the Indian Foreign Secretary R. K. Sathe
outlined India’s approach. Sathe explained that India had special rela-
tions with her neighbours, based on their shared history and traditions
and formalized by treaties and agreements. He also expressed India’s
position of following a gradual course of action regarding regional coop-
eration. He opposed the creation of any institutional arrangement at
this early stage. India was not as enthusiastic as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
Maldives, and Bhutan, all of which suggested that preparatory work and
an establishment of an institutional framework should immediately go
hand in hand. These latter countries openly supported Bangladesh’s
idea of cooperation as delineated in the draft proposal. India’s reaction
to the Bangladesh proposal was, as already stated above, that of cau-

tion.17 India’s Foreign Secretary, at the outset, restrained the enthusiasm
of Bangladesh and smaller states:
We fully subscribe to the view expressed therein that in the foresee-

able future, regional cooperation in South Asia has to be confined to
economic, technical, scientific, social and cultural fields. It is inevi-
table that there will be some differences of emphasis if not percep-
tion in regard to a preliminary document of this nature. We feel that
till detailed examination has taken place it would be premature to
consider the institutionalization of regional cooperation through the
establishment of a secretariat etc.
(cited in Muni and Muni, 1984a, p. 108)
This statement did not reflect the original intention of Rahman or the
proposal. At the meeting, it was agreed that there was an urgent need
for regional cooperation, but it was also agreed that this should not be
a substitute for bilateral or multilateral cooperation.
As a first step, the assembled foreign secretaries agreed to set up five
study groups, one of each on agriculture, rural development, telecom-
munications, meteorology, and health and population activities. It was
also agreed to set up a ‘Committee of the Whole’ (CoW), comprising
senior officials of the seven countries to handle and process the informa-
tion and data collected in respect to the assigned areas, and to identify
and report on other areas of possible cooperation. Further, the Indian
Foreign Secretary voiced two important preconditions for regional coop-
eration in South Asia:
At this stage it would also be useful to stress that we reach unequivo-

cal agreement on what I would call the ‘ground rules’ which should
govern regional cooperation exercise and which in fact appear in
the Bangladesh paper itself. Here I would submit that the principle of
avoiding discussions in regional framework of all bilateral and contentious
issues and of unanimity as the principle on the basis of which decisions in
regard to regional cooperation are taken should be followed scrupulously.
(emphasis added) (cited in Muni and Muni, 1984a, p. 109)
This meeting, thus, agreed upon the need for regional cooperation
only and solely as a complement of already existing bilateral and mul-
tilateral cooperation among the countries of South Asia and decided to
proceed step-by-step on the basis of careful and adequate preparation for
the realization of such cooperation.18 These ‘ground rules’ reflect India’s

position as outlined in Chapter 2. These rules and their application
firmly established Indian normative hegemony. The norm of ‘regional
multilateralism’ in the form of regional cooperation was thus not resisted,
but it was immediately given a shape that was in accordance with
India’s position, without the possibility of discussing a number of rel-
evant issues. From the beginning—instantaneously—India declared her
position, desired it be realized, and insisted it be executed. Due to India’s
hegemonic and unrelenting role, Bangladesh had to give in and accept
the Indian position: the implementation of regional multilateralism
in South Asia was agreed upon, but only in a ‘torso’ shape. In light of
the fact that other countries of the region had no choice but to accept
the Indian position, it is evident that an actual ‘pruning’ did not take
place, as India demanded adherence to the Panchsheel and insisted
on the avoidance of bilateral and contentious issues as preconditions
ab initio. The norm of ‘regional multilateralism’ was thus immediately
sublimated, resulting in Panchsheel multilateralism, which resembles the
ideal-type regional multilateralism only in shape, but not in content.
During the deliberations, the Indian Foreign Secretary further main-
tained: ‘First and foremost it is important for us to remember that our
present exercise has to relate to functional cooperation in areas which
are most relevant for the socio-economic development of our peoples’
(cited in Muni and Muni, 1984a, p. 100). The Indian Foreign Secretary
also gave a firm and clear indication of India’s policy of small steps
towards regionalism in South Asia. In his concluding speech he noted:
We have an obligation to lay a solid and secure foundation on which

regional cooperation can be built. If there are delays one should not
become pessimistic. Rome was not built in a day. Neither were other
regional groupings established without several meetings and thor-
ough discussions. In fact, I would submit that while we should no doubt
profit from the experience of other regions in the world, we should not
replicate or copy those patterns. A pattern of regional cooperation in South
Asia should evolve itself. We do no[t] have to jump steps ahead and
create an organisational superstructure without first agreeing upon
arrangements, modalities and programmes of regional cooperation
(emphasis added).
(cited in Muni and Muni, 1984a, pp. 111–12)
The phrase used by the Foreign Secretary—‘evolve itself’—in the final

analysis meant that India had more time for leverage and for exerting
normative dominance. It appears that Pakistan and Nepal (see Khatri,

1985, pp. 426–53; Upreti, 1991, pp. 111–25) also favoured a step-by-step
approach like India, while Sri Lanka (Kanesalingam, 1991, pp. 180–
201), the Maldives (Dubey, 1991, pp. 136–43), and Bhutan (Labh,
1991, pp. 125–36) were unequivocal in their support of the idea of an
extensive concept of regional cooperation in South Asia and a speedy
realization.
In a note to the CoW, India made several suggestions19 and proposed,
e.g., a common strategy directed towards reforms in the international
monetary system, stabilization of prices of commodities of common
interest for their joint marketing and measures for facing competition
from synthetics in the world market (SAARC Secretariat, 1988b, p. 13).
The CoW then met in Colombo from 31 August to 2 September 1981
and after detailed deliberations identified 13 areas for possible coopera-
tion to be considered by the foreign secretaries.
The second Meeting of Foreign Secretaries was held at Kathmandu,
Nepal from 2 to 4 November 1981. The secretaries agreed to endorse the
recommendations of the five study groups and convert these into work-
ing groups (SAARC Secretariat, 1988b, pp. 22–3). While Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bhutan wanted a firm commitment to hold
a meeting at the ministerial level, India and Pakistan advocated lower
level meetings. The Indian Foreign Secretary Sathe explained the Indian
restraint:
When we have worked out a substantial programme of cooperation,

we should move in the direction of recommending to our Foreign
Ministers to convene a meeting at their level in order to launch such
a programme and to provide guidance for further progress.
The third Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries, which was held in

Islamabad, Pakistan from 7 to 9 August 1982, considered and reviewed
the reports of the study groups which were constituted in the second
meeting on the three new areas (transport, postal service, and scientific
and technological cooperation). In this third meeting, India was deter-
mined to incorporate tourism and trade as areas of cooperation in the
agenda. The Indian Foreign Secretary M. Rasgotra mentioned ‘trade’ as
a field of great importance for regional cooperation. He said:
In fact, in many other regions of the world, cooperation in trade was

established at a relatively early stage starting with certain specific
sections. As developing countries we all have understandable dif-

ficulties in liberalising trade flows which might necessitate drastic
changes in our trade regimes. But it should be possible to consider
limited cooperation based on a regional system of trade preferences.
The Indian Foreign Secretary, in consonance with India’s philosophical

foreign policy outlook and step-by-step approach, further explained that:
At our level we have made some important progress. A lot more

remains to be done; we have yet to complete our task of presenting
to the ministers a concrete and comprehensive action-oriented pro-
gramme including specific measures for its coordination and imple-
mentation. For this a few more meetings at our level would seem
necessary. Though this need not mean an unduly extended time
frame for the meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers.
Until then, this crucial field of cooperation had been excluded. The
fourth Meeting of Foreign Secretaries was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh
from 28 to 30 March 1983, under the chairmanship of Bangladesh. This
meeting endorsed the recommendations of the sectoral working groups
and of the CoW. The Indian Foreign Secretary Rasgotra again wanted
tourism and trade and industry to be included in the items for coopera-
tion. However, the Indian suggestion was not acceptable to Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and Nepal. In addition to the argument against venturing
into too many fields too quickly, an underlying streak of apprehension
of India’s domination in these fields, particularly in the field of trade
and industry, might have also been a factor behind this position.
As a result of several exchanges of views and opinions at the Foreign
Secretary level during a period of five years, a rather limited form of
South Asian regional cooperation evolved. Other than tourism and joint
matters, all other sectors of cooperation mentioned in the ‘Bangladesh
Paper on Regional Cooperation’ from November 1980 were accepted in
principle and further pursued. The Indian position was characterized
by restraint with regard to the speed of cooperation and the insistence
on issues related to trade. The evolution as traced above clearly shows
India’s dominant position; India had become the agenda setter and had
pushed through her normative agenda by excluding any issues related
to political or strategic fields from the deliberations.
The second phase: developments 1983–5

The process of regional multilateralism in South Asia moved to the next
level when the foreign secretaries at last decided to raise the level of inter-
action to the foreign ministers’ level (see Bokhari, 1985, pp. 371–91).
The first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka was held in New Delhi from
1 to 2 August 1983. This meeting was of considerable significance
because it was here that the objectives of SARC were framed. The ses-
sion was inaugurated by the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The
Indian position towards regional multilateralism was articulated in her
inaugural address, making reference to several key features of India’s
cognitive prior (Indira Gandhi, 1984, pp. 255–9). In the meeting, she
assured the SARC members that the vast size of India would not be a
hindrance for further regional cooperation. While Gandhi stressed South
Asian common denominators such as a shared ancient civilization,
geography, cultural experiences—which were in consonance with major
strands of India’s foreign policy—she also referred to each country’s
individual personality, distinctive perception, and different political sys-
tem. Gandhi also repeated India’s strict policy of non-alignment and
summed up her vision of the regional grouping:
Our policy is not to interfere in the affairs of others. […] The regional
grouping that brings us together is not aimed against anyone else.
Nor are we moved by any ideological or military considerations. Our
cooperation in no way limits each country’s freedom of judgment. […] We
are all equals. We are against exploitation and domination. We want to
be friends with all on a footing of equality. We should be ever vigilant
against the attempts of external powers to influence our functioning
(emphasis added).
By using the word ‘exploitation and domination’, she (advertently or

inadvertently) echoed the words of her father Jawaharlal Nehru who
had said in 1945 that India had for too long been the plaything of
others (Nehru, 1961, p. 251). The direct historical and argumentative
connection between the years 1945 and 1983 becomes apparent here,
as does the lasting impact of British colonialism. Some South Asian
scholars considered these remarks of the Indian Prime Minister as an
indication that India’s long term objectives of the SARC were ‘much
broader than the achievement of collective self-reliance in economic
matters’ (Muni and Muni, 1984a, p. 184).
At the conclusion of the meeting, the Foreign Ministers signed and

adopted a Declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation (New Delhi
Declaration). India clearly prevailed in her refusal to discuss political or
strategic matters other than on a strictly bilateral basis. The princi-
ples of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence,
non-interference in internal affairs of other states and cooperation
for mutual benefit were reiterated in the declaration—in fact the five
principles of Panchsheel. Two highly significant conditions reflecting
the Indian position were also incorporated as General Provisions under
the institutional arrangements, viz. decisions at all levels would be
taken on the basis of unanimity, and bilateral and contentious issues
would be excluded from the deliberations (SAARC Secretariat, 1988b,
pp. 58–60).
It was envisaged that cooperation would be complementary to, rather
than a substitute for, existing bilateral cooperation. The document made
it clear that the future association was to be an inter-governmental one,
not a supra-national one. It did not involve a pooling of any part of the
sovereignty of the member countries. It explicitly stated that ‘regional
cooperation should be based on and in turn contribute to mutual trust,
understanding and sympathetic appreciation of the national aspirations
of the countries of the region.’ The document acknowledged
‘the declaration on collective self-reliance among non-aligned and

other developing countries adopted at the 7th Non-Aligned Summit
held at New Delhi which called upon all countries concerned to
mobilise all necessary resources and deploy the requisite means in
support of sub-regional, regional, and inter-regional cooperation
among non-aligned and other developing countries.
India, as mentioned above, considered the issue of trade to be an impor-

tant element in regional cooperation. Its exclusion in the SARC Declara-
tion was attributed to the fear of India’s neighbours that a liberal trade
regime would work to the advantage of a dominant India. Therefore,
it is clear that India was not content with the exclusion of trade, and,
predictably, she raised the issue in all future meetings.
Comparing the ASEAN founding document in 1967—representing the
founding of an organization that South Asian scholars and political prac-
titioners wanted to emulate—with the SARC one, there are important
differences.20 The most conspicuous difference between the founding
documents of SARC and ASEAN are that the New Delhi document under
the general provisions specifically mentioned that ‘decisions at all levels
shall be taken on the basis of unanimity’, thus allaying fears in both India
and other members of each other. There is no such rule as far as ASEAN
is concerned, since ASEAN does not encourage voting so that decisions
must be reached by consensus.
At this point in time, what was significant was that despite the
absence of essential ingredients of a common ideological and politi-
cal perception and common foreign policy orientations, the move for
evolving a regional cooperation forum could reach the launching stage
in South Asia. However, the existence and diffusion of an external
global norm had repercussions, for South Asia in general and India in
specific, although in a way that transformed this external norm to a
locally acceptable one. Multilateralism received a particular South Asian
‘face’.
Another meeting to discuss and reaffirm the commitment to South
Asian Regional Cooperation was held in New Delhi on 27 February
1984. The then Indian Minister of External Affairs Narasimha Rao
elaborated India’s position: ‘It is also necessary to ensure the involve-
ment in this process [of regional cooperation] not only of Governments
but also the peoples of our countries, specially leaders of commerce
and industry, scientists and intellectuals’ (Narasimha Rao, 1984a,
p. 73). The meeting called for developing friendly political relations
along with the development of socio-economic cultural cooperation
among the South Asian countries. In the two meetings of August 1983
and February 1984—both of which were held in New Delhi—‘India
played a leading role in transforming the SARC idea into the SAARC
concept of mutual cooperation for development’ (Ghai, 2004, p. 471).
The second meeting of the Foreign Ministers was held at Male, Maldives,
from 10 to 11 July 1984. In order to attend the meeting at Male, the
Indian and Pakistani Foreign Ministers travelled together in an Indian Air
Force Plane. This was interpreted as a sign of reduced political tensions
in the region and as a result of commitment of SARC (Ramchandran,
1985) and could thus also be interpreted as a positive result of norm
diffusion. The meeting laid strong emphasis on a collective regional
approach to global economic issues. In his speech during the meet-
ing, Rao elaborated on the grim international security and economic
environment:
We have witnessed an intensification of conflict in many parts of the

globe. The arms race continues unabated and threatens world peace
and security. All this has had an inevitable fall-out in our own region.
Meeting as we do in the middle of the Indian Ocean, we cannot but
recall with regret that our long hard struggle to rid the Indian Ocean
of tension and conflict has yet to bear fruit.
(Rao, 1984b, pp. 216–20)
While the meeting managed to adopt a fairly coherent position on the

overall world economic situation, a similar position on global, political,
and strategic issues was avoided, in accordance with India’s dislike of
such issues. One such strategic issue, which was of concern to most of
the SARC members at that time, was the military presence of the USA
and Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. Since the members had serious
differences on what needed to be done to make the Indian Ocean a zone
of peace, it was not raised during the SARC deliberations, despite strong
statements in that direction made by the Indian Foreign Minister and
other delegates about it (Muni, 1984b, pp. 76–87). Here, reservations of
the delegates’ vis-à-vis Indian hegemony became visible. On the crucial
issue of a prospective summit meeting of SARC countries, the Indian
minister observed:
Obviously, such a meeting will require thorough preparation so that

we are in a position to put something concrete before our leaders.
Before we initiate the preparatory process, we would need to have a
clear perception of what we should aim to achieve at the summit (empha-
sis added).
(Rao, 1984b, p. 219)
This statement reveals India’s reservation and her wish for a gradual
evolution, without too fast an approach; India was apparently not
pressed for time to hold the summit meeting. An important issue that
came up for discussion at Male was widening the scope of SARC by
adding additional areas for cooperation. India had regularly raised this
issue at earlier SARC meetings. Bangladesh was the only country that
seemed enthusiastic about the Indian proposal for cooperation in trade
and industrial development. It was then agreed to recommend to the
respective heads of state or government that the first summit be held in
Dhaka in the last quarter of 1985, to be preceded by a preparatory meet-
ing of the foreign ministers in Bhutan in May 1985 (SAARC Secretariat,
1988b, p. 71).
The third meeting of the Foreign Ministers was convened in Thimpu,
Bhutan, from 13 to 14 May 1985. On the most important issue of
summit meeting, the Indian Minister of External Affairs clarified his
government’s position and showed that India had become interested
in institutionalizing the organization, albeit in a manner that befitted

India’s interests and was in concordance with the Panchsheel framework
of regional cooperation:
As the scope of SARC activities grows, we must ensure that we have

an adequate framework to provide the necessary institutional sup-
port. This will be an important issue before the first SARC summit to
be held this year. […] It is a matter of satisfaction that a consensus
has been reached at the Standing Committee that a South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation will be created. My delegation
is in favour of a Council of Ministers and the establishment of a
Secretariat at the appropriate time.
(Rao, 1985, p. 130)
While the decision regarding the summit could be taken by con-

sensus, no such decision could be made regarding the creation of a
secretariat. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan wanted to give SARC
an institutional shape corresponding to ASEAN. India was strongly
opposed to this idea (Muni, 1984b, pp. 76–87; see also Bokhari, 1985,
pp. 371–91). Looking at the shape the norm regional multilateralism
had already received—in its sublimated form—it is understandable
that India wanted no negotiations about aspects that strengthened a
multilateral organization.
In the fourth meeting of Foreign Ministers in Dhaka on 5 December
1985, the foreign ministers discussed the overall preparation for the first
SARC summit. The Ministers recommended a draft charter, a declara-
tion, and an emblem of the SARC for adoption by the summit. Three
days later, on 8 December 1985, SAARC was launched, with President
H.M. Ershad of Bangladesh as its first chairman.
Even though the event of launching SAARC can be looked upon
as a success in itself, the asymmetry of size, population, and power
potential between India and her neighbours was cited time and again
by analysts of other South Asian states in order to justify the states’
search for extra-regional support to countervail their big neighbour
India. A Bangladeshi observer maintained in 1985 that most of the rul-
ing elite of India had been consciously pursuing the tactics suggested
by the Kautilya that ‘do not trust your neighbour who is your natural
enemy, but rather look for support from the states beyond who are
your natural allies, or, as a supplementary principle, if you have to be
surrounded by two or more larger states, play them off against each
other’ (Syedur Rahman, 1985, p. 415). This statement demonstrates that
India was regarded as practicing Kautilyan statecraft and of heeding

the advice that Kautilya made in his Arthashastra, an ‘accusation’
that precisely reflected Indian strategic thought and foreign policy
essentials.
The analysis conducted in the preceding section has shown that it
was India’s foreign policy and ideas that ab initio substantially shaped
the early SARC negotiation process. During the seven years of negotia-
tions, India time and again confirmed her firm adherence to certain
unalterable principles, right from the first meeting, and never showed
any willingness of making concessions. The meetings that had taken
place prior to the first SAARC summit were a prelude to safeguard that
regional multilateralism would evolve in the way envisaged by India,
proving the explanatory power of norm localization and of the model
of norm sublimation. The model of norm sublimation predicted that a
normative hegemon will be able to sublimate a norm due to its over-
whelming impact and that the norm will be quite different in content
compared to the ideal-type. For the first and second phases of regional
cooperation in South Asia as charted above, this prediction holds true
with a view to India’s role in regional multilateralism.
The third phase: the first SAARC Summit and the SAARC
Charter
Ideationally, normatively, and formally committed to the foreign policy
principles of non-alignment and independence, all political or security
matters were excluded from the first SAARC summit on India’s insist-
ence (Muni, 1985a, pp. 26–32; Muni, 1985b; Prasad, 1989). This posi-
tion was, as before mentioned, a consequence of past experiences of
political and security pacts leading to an increased influence of extra-
regional powers in the region and thereby contravening India’s policy
of non-alignment (e.g., SEATO). The distinct Nehruvian position and
the experiences with regional conferences still had a direct impact. The
‘Indian question’, as noted by Jetly (1991, p. 40), ‘became the most
significant feature for the whole of the SAARC region.’ It was a posi-
tive outcome of the SARC process that despite visible deteriorations in
Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Sri Lankan relations during 1984, the SAARC
summit was able to launch the regional association in 1985 (Hariharan,
1985; see also Ramchandran, 1985). The heads of the state and govern-
ment of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka formally established the SAARC at the first SAARC Summit, held
in Dhaka on 7–8 December 1985.21 At this summit, the leaders adopted
a charter and the ‘Dhaka Declaration,’22 which described the first meet-
ing as a ‘tangible manifestation of their determination to cooperate
regionally’.
The charter enunciated the objectives, principles, and the institutional
framework of SAARC and repeated and reaffirmed elements of the cor-
responding founding declarations, i.e., the Bangladesh Proposal and the
New Delhi Declaration. The document also showed adherence to the
UN charter. India’s two unalterable pre-conditions—no bilateral and
contentious issues to be discussed in SAARC and the principle of una-
nimity for decision-making—were incorporated in the SAARC charter as
‘general provisions’. The basic objectives set forth in the charter were,
inter alia, (i) to promote the welfare of the people of South Asia and to
improve their quality of life and (ii) to promote and strengthen collec-
tive self-reliance among countries of South Asia.
Between 1985 and 1987, India served as the chairman of SAARC.
During that time, SAARC adopted a multitude of new goals and pro-
grammes for increased cooperation in select fields. A few months before
the first SAARC summit, Rajiv Gandhi stressed that there were central
principles which India would not be willing to negotiate, confirming
how ingrained they were in India’s foreign policy (culture):
The utmost importance in any foreign policy must be given to our

neighbours. And we have been paying a lot of attention to how we
can improve our relations with our neighbours. But no matter what
some Members might feel, the thing of prime importance is India’s
integrity, unity, the ideology and the principles we stand for. These
cannot be comprised.
(Rajiv Gandhi, 1987b, p. 298)
In this context, Pran Chopra noted the change in India’s policy behav-
iour since Indira Gandhi’s days in power: ‘Instead of tactics of intimi-
dation associated with the politics of Mrs. Gandhi, both in domestic
politics and in relations with neighbours, tactics of reassurance and
reconciliation took over under Rajiv Gandhi’ (Chopra, 1986, pp. 28–9).
In his speech at the first SAARC summit, Rajiv Gandhi almost nos-
talgically remembered and echoed Nehru’s declaration in the Asian
Relations Conference (1947) where Nehru had affirmed that ‘we meet
together, we hold together, we advance together’ (Rajiv Gandhi, 1985,
p. 407). Rajiv Gandhi asserted that the new South Asian cooperation
was an important step towards realizing the larger Asian consciousness.
But he juxtaposed his nostalgia of the Nehruvian past with the realities
at the national and international level and India’s firm commitment
to its cognitive prior when he expounded the Indian policy towards
regional cooperation in South Asia, especially stressing the paradigm of
bilateralism:
We affirm the sovereign equality of the seven States of South Asia.

[…] Enduring cooperation is cooperation adapted to the realities of our
condition. The model we have evolved for ourselves is a model which
is in accord with our realities. Our compulsions and our genius. We
have not sought to melt our bilateral relationships into a common regional
identity, but rather to fit South Asian cooperation into our respective foreign
policies as additional dimension. We have evolved modalities which
do not allow bilateral stresses and strains to impinge on regional
cooperation (emphasis added).
(Rajiv Gandhi, 1987b, pp. 399–402)
The first SAARC summit generated high expectations of future things

to come. Dinesh Singh, the former Indian Minister for External Affairs,
speaking in the Indian Parliament said:
The summit at Dhaka fills the gap in the global chain of regional
organizations. This was the only area in the world that did not
have a regional organization. […] Now that we have a South Asian
Association, I hope it would be possible for a larger group to par-
ticipate in a wider dialogue. I am happy that China has welcomed
SAARC—it gives the hope of the possibility of that wider Asian
organization.
(Singh, 1986, p. 65)
India’s objective in eliminating any kind of anti-India (political) issues

from the SAARC agenda was to ensure its smooth initial take-off. In
other words: norm sublimation as conducted by India proved success-
ful for furthering India’s goals and ensuring that the organization had
a shape in accordance with India’s foreign policy interests. Considering
that the founding of SAARC was a positive sign for the region and could
be interpreted as a measure of mutual confidence building, India still
carried out her largest peacetime military exercise without prior notice
(Operation Brasstacks) from November 1986 until March 1987. This
move showed that regional multilateralism was present only in rhetoric,
but not in reality.
SAARC developments 1986–90

The second SAARC Summit was held on 16–17 November 1986 in
Bangalore. The summit took a major step towards institutionalizing the
SAARC by endorsing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)23 on
the establishment of the SAARC Secretariat signed by the CoM. The
Bangalore Declaration adopted by the summit called for more con-
crete and action-oriented projects within the ‘Integrated Programme of
Action’. The summit leaders considered several new ideas for expand-
ing and strengthening the cooperative programmes under SAARC.24
They also agreed, in principle, to expand the SAARC efforts at coopera-
tion to five new fields (Batra, 2002, pp. 31–9). This summit provided an
opportunity for Rajiv Gandhi to recap the Indian perspective and the
policy objectives in SAARC. In his speech, he confirmed India’s cogni-
tive prior and the Indian insistence on her unalterable foreign policy
ideas and norms:
Ours is not a political association. We have much to gain from peace,

progress and stability in our neighbourhood. This is the logic of our
working together. Bilateral relations have their difficult moments.
SAARC reminds us that at such moments we should seek what unites
us and not what divides us. We have consciously decided not to burden
SAARC with our bilateral concerns, yet by providing a framework for
forging a cooperative set of relations among our countries, SAARC
can help us positively in growing out of these problems (emphasis
added).
(Rajiv Gandhi, 1986a)
To reinforce the Indian objective of a non-controversial and unani-

mous cooperative framework, Rajiv Gandhi emphasized the role of
sports and culture to raise the peoples’ consciousness of their identity
as South Asians. In his concluding remarks he said: ‘During the years
to come, let us explore how we might use culture and the mass media
as vehicles for enhancing our awareness of each other without detract-
ing in any way from our individual national identities (emphasis added)’
(Rajiv Gandhi, 1986b). His statement again reflects India’s unrelenting
position on regional multilateralism. While discussing the non-political
nature of SAARC, Gandhi also mentioned the logic of South Asian nations
working together as the ‘gains’ to be achieved through peace, progress,
and stability. There seemed to be an apparent contradiction in these
assertions, since peace and stability could not be achieved without
political harmony and shared strategic perceptions.
The Bangalore summit proved this point when intense and detailed
discussion took place between India and Sir Lanka on the vexed eth-
nic problem in Sri Lanka. An Indian newspaper emphasizing the sig-
nificance of bilateral issues during the SAARC summit at Bangalore
noted that Sri Lankan President Jayawardene’s arrival some three hours
ahead of others made it possible for him and Prime Minister Gandhi to
exchange views at the airport itself (Katyal, 1986). Janaka Nakkawita,
a commentator in a Colombo newspaper, observed:
SAARC has kept out bilateral issues out of its deliberations. It is naïve
to imagine that there are no bilateral conflicts among the countries
concerned. SAARC is not attempting to gloss over these and bilateral
consultations do take place among the countries to overcome these
differences. […] This is important as in the final analysis cohesive-
ness and regional identity depend on minimizing or elimination of
differences among the countries concerned.
(cited in Suman Sharma, 2001, p. 118, footnote 40)
The consensus on the general formulations on terrorism during the

Bangalore summit was evidence that the SAARC agenda could not be
confined to mere economic, technical, and cultural issues as origi-
nally envisaged. Public tensions between India and Pakistan were also
evident, e.g., on the principle of bilateralism: The Pakistani Foreign
Secretary Abdul Sattar maintained that the principle of bilateralism
did not exist in the 1971 Shimla Agreement25 signed between the two
countries after the 1971 war, whereas India maintained that the princi-
ple of bilateralism was the most important feature of this agreement.26
Another moot point was the issue of trade. ‘The Hindu’ noted:
The declaration will be silent on the issue of expanding the scope

of SAARC, on which India had set its heart, but which was strongly
opposed by Pakistan (it did not want trade and industry to be included
in the cooperative pattern). India did not push the point, even though
it was supported by Bangladesh.
(Katyal, 1986)
At the outset, prevailing regional political problems and issues were thus
creeping into the SAARC agenda. At the same time, India was keen to
expand the scope of cooperation by including trade and industry among
the areas of cooperation, which is a logical step in the Panchsheel frame-
work of regional multilateralism and economic diplomacy.
The third SAARC Summit was convened in Kathmandu, Nepal on 2–4

November 1987. There were indeed ‘political’ issues which were dis-
cussed at the summit. These issues were, first, Afghanistan’s application
for membership in SAARC, and, second, a mentioning of the Indo-Sri
Lanka Accord in the final declaration. Afghanistan applied for member-
ship just before this summit. It argued that it historically belonged to
South Asia and shared a cultural heritage. Pakistan was opposed to both
issues and argued that Afghanistan’s problems should be settled before
SAARC actually adopted a stand on her admission, and with regard to Sri
Lanka, Pakistan questioned in principle as to ‘whether SAARC under the
provisions of the charter could discuss a bilateral and contentious issue,
and in the context of the presence of Indian Forces in Sri Lanka also drew
a parallel between Afghanistan and Sri Lanka’ (Hussain, 1991, p. 15).
The rejection of Afghanistan is surprising, considering that Afghanistan
is geographically connected to South Asia and her express exclusion
(or non-admittance) undermined regional cohesion. But the norm ‘regional
multilateralism’ in its Panchsheel-shape lacked robustness to enable a
common stance on this issue. In the ideal-type form, regional multilater-
alism should have offered a clear geographical delineation for the coun-
tries concerned. But India’s treatment of the norm and its sublimation
resulted in this particular weakness, which in turn resulted in a charter
that contained little substance and therefore no room for independent
institutional growth.
In any case, India wanted to expand the scope of cultural cooperation
and once again add to the SAARC agenda the issue of cooperation in
trade.27 The Indian Prime Minister emphasized that
our planning experts have foreseen the advantages of cooperation in

trade and industry, money and finance. It would be useful to author-
ise studies on the scope and modalities of cooperation in these sec-
tors. We could make an objective determination later as to whether
the balance of advantage lies in our entering these fields.
India at the same time underlined the civilizational dimension of region-

alism in South Asia when the Prime Minister explained India’s viewpoint
on the implications of regional cooperation beyond the stipulated areas.
He argued:
Foremost it [regional cooperation] fosters a sense of regional identity,

a sense of shared destiny. This adds a second common dimension to
our respective foreign policies. The first, of course, is the membership

of each of our countries in the Non-Aligned Movement. SAARC is
thus taking shape as a factor in determining our place in the world,
collectively as a region and individually as independent countries.
In a broad perspective, such regional understanding is a positive
political development.
The mention of ‘political’, however, has to be seen in light of India

prevailing with her ideas and sublimating the norm of regional mul-
tilateralism to Indian normative standards. The Indian insistence on
keeping bilateral political issues out of the SAARC agenda notwith-
standing, the political dimension of interstate relations among SAARC
member countries determined from the very beginning the behaviour
of countries in SAARC deliberations. How the aforementioned ‘regional
identity’ should be fostered with such limited institutional possibilities
remains a puzzle.
During the meeting it was decided to extend the cooperation to the
suppression of terrorism and adopted the Kathmandu Declaration,28
which called for intensified cooperative efforts in areas of trade, indus-
try, disaster management, and environment conservation. In addi-
tion, the summit witnessed the signing of two important agreements.
The first was the SAARC Food Security Reserve.29 The proposal for
the establishment of such a food reserve was made by India. This was
important for India where memories of the food shortage under Indira
Gandhi in the 1960s were still present. Such a reserve could, in the
case of food shortage, mean independence from help of other states,
which is a direct link to the idea of complete independence. The sec-
ond agreement was the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression
of Terrorism.30 The member countries pledged to refrain from organiz-
ing, instigating or participating in civil strife or terrorist acts in their
areas.
The fourth SAARC Summit was held on 29–30 December 1988 in
Islamabad. An analysis in the ‘The Hindu’ on 29 December 1988 pre-
dicted a marked shift in India’s Pakistan policy before the summit:
The indications here […] are that the outcome of the meeting will see
a substantial change in India’s policy approach to Pakistan. […] The
emphasis in the Indian diplomatic approach is likely to shift signifi-
cantly from the earlier insistence that there could be no discussion
on confidence-building measures until Pakistan abandoned her

covert support to terrorism in Punjab.
(cited in Suman Sharma, 2001, p. 110, footnote 92)
This summit was also held against the backdrop of lessening tensions
between the USA and the Soviet Union and the restoration of democ-
racy in Pakistan. A sense of frustration was creeping into the delibera-
tions at the slow growth of the SAARC process. In her inaugural speech
Benazir Bhutto asked the SAARC leaders to look for ‘a regional solution’:
‘It is, therefore, time that SAARC states should consider ways of limit-
ing their arms expenditures and seek a regional solution for curbing
the arms race and the danger of nuclear proliferation and war’ (cited in
Suman Sharma, 2001, p. 225).
In his address to the summit, Rajiv Gandhi pointed towards the
‘momentous events’ which had taken place and were ‘fundamentally
altering the world and the world order’ (Rajiv Gandhi, 1988, pp. 423–27).
His speech had a political connotation, which hinted at a change in
his perception on regional multilateralism. In this regard, he specifi-
cally pointed out the treaty concluded between the USA and the Soviet
Union on the dismantling of nuclear weapons systems, the revival of
cooperation between India and China in working toward a new world
order based on the Panchsheel, the Indian response to the request for
assistance from the Maldives to thwart the invasion by foreign merce-
naries and democratic elections in Pakistan leading to the installation
of a new government in that country. The frustration at the slow pace
of growth of cooperation in SAARC was manifested in Gandhi’s speech
when he termed the association as ‘laggards’ and asked: ‘Can it, how-
ever, be said that South Asian regional cooperation has grown at a pace
commensurate with these developments of fundamental significance to
the international community and the emerging world order?’
One of the basic reasons for the Indian frustration was lack of cooper-
ation in the core economic areas, particularly trade. For India, economic
cooperation was paramount. Regional multilateralism was primarily
regarded as a means of economic diplomacy. In the light of this, the
words of the Prime Minister were a logical consequence. Rajiv Gandhi
tried to assuage the apprehensions of the smaller SAARC member coun-
tries with regard to India’s size and economic:
Given the disparity in size, levels of development and degrees of

diversification in the economies of the countries constituting our
association, there will, of course, have to be special measures and

safeguards built into any scheme of regional cooperation to protect
the interests of each of us and to promote the common interests of
all. India has no hesitation in declaring at the outset that it is fully con-
scious of its special obligations and special responsibilities. We will not
seek to secure any unfair advantage at the expense of any of our part-
ners. Indeed, the interests of none of us can be secured by damaging
the interests of anyone else (emphasis added).
Economic cooperation and particularly ‘trade’ among SAARC member

countries was a sensitive issue which was not confined to mere eco-
nomic arguments. Bajpai maintained that the Bangladeshi and especially
Pakistani rejection of trade symbolized political resistance to Indian
domination and argued that ‘trade brings non-economic benefits not
just symbolically but also very concretely in the form of influence-
building benefits which make trade and economic cooperation more
generally worthwhile’ (Bajpai, 1996, p. 78).
After the successful conclusion of the Islamabad summit, an Indian
analyst made the following assessment:
This summit again proved that Indo-Pakistan relations are pivotal to

the conduct of SAARC. It was the beneficiary of the dramatic upsurge
of goodwill in bilateral ties as a consequence of the re-emergence of
democracy in Pakistan. If SAARC provided the opportunity and the
venue for the Rajiv-Bhutto summit, the bilateral exchanges moderated
the tenor of proceedings of the regional forum […]. One notewor-
thy development at Islamabad, again directly related to the radical
change in Pakistan’s political scenario, was stirrings of SAARC as a
force that could provide moral and psychological support to the cause
of democracy in the region.
(Sharma, 1989)
The summit ended with the Islamabad Declaration.31 The leaders

expressed satisfaction at the operationalization of the South Asian Food
Security Reserve and the ratification of the SAARC Convention on
Suppression of Terrorism. The summit decided to declare the year 1989
as the SAARC Year for Combating Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking and
directed the concerned technical committee to examine the possibility
of a regional convention on drug control.32 All of this shows that several
non-political activities were taking place, or being planned; still, nine
years after the initial deliberations tangible results were hard to detect.
The fifth SAARC Summit was scheduled to be held in Sri Lanka in

December 1989. However, this summit was repeatedly postponed due to
Sri Lanka’s refusal to host the meeting (see Katyal, 1990). The summit
was finally convened in Male, Maldives on 21–23 November 1990. This
summit was a significant landmark in the evolution of SAARC in the
sense that the association survived its first test to ‘uphold’ the provision
to keep bilateral political disputes out of the SAARC agenda. In fact, the
dissent against this provision was articulated by the King of Bhutan:
It may neither be possible nor desirable to limit the discussion in our

meetings to issues of a non-political nature. The political climate of
our region will undoubtedly cast a long shadow over our delibera-
tions. In the geo-political realities of our region it would be unrealis-
tic to ignore the primacy of the political factor as in the final analysis
it will be the political environment of the region which will deter-
mine the shape and scope of regional cooperation in South Asia.
(SAARC Secretariat, 1997b, p. 8)
Still, no changes in the charter were made; instead, India again dis-
cussed the issue of trade. The Indian Prime Minister highlighted the
slow progress of the SAARC process in core economic areas. Reiterating
India’s unrelenting position regarding bilateral disputes, he concluded:
Economic cooperation among the South Asian countries has its own
logic and compulsions. The framers of SAARC charter, therefore,
displayed foresight and wisdom in not making such cooperation
contingent upon the solution of bilateral problems. […] The nature of
cooperation among the SAARC countries that exists today is modest
and limited.
(Chandra Shekhar, 1990, pp. 12, 14)
The localization of ‘regional multilateralism’: an evaluation of

India’s regional policy 1979–90
During 1985 and 1990, the institutional activities and achievements
of SAARC as a direct consequence of norm sublimation were scant and
negligible. True tangible progress in SAARC was hardly detectable. The
IPA was initiated. Specialized SAARC regional institutions were created,
e.g., the SAARC Agricultural Information Centre (SAIC) or the SAARC
Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC). There were various ongoing
activities to promote people to people contact, e.g., the SAARC Audio
Visual Exchange (SAVE) or the SAARC Documentation Centre (SDC).
The establishment of the SAARC Food Security Reserve, the ratifica-

tion of the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism,
agreements on a SAARC travel document, and an agreement on a draft
Convention on Prevention of Narcotic Drugs were the major achieve-
ments. Besides, the leaders of the SAARC member states met on a regu-
lar basis.
In sum, a balance sheet of SAARC after the initial years of institu-
tionalization presents a mixed picture of achievements and failures.
The early ‘gains’ on institutionalization and resilience to an adverse
political environment were marred by continued inter-state tensions
while India and her neighbours had to adjust to realities of a new
world order (Gosh, 1995, pp. 214–29). Indian neighbours perceived
India as a nation in search of a regional platform for seeking a global
role and in the process absorbing or assimilating them and threatening
their distinct national identities (see Cheema, 1986, pp. 103–19), and
India’s bilateral relations with her neighbours during the second half
of eighties were thus uneasy. Analysing the years 1985–91, J. N. Dixit
observed: ‘Regardless of the factual position of New Delhi’s commit-
ment to the principles of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence,
regional perceptions about India were that it harboured hegemonic
ambitions. This impression had to be defused and eradicated’ (Dixit,
2003, p. 171). Also, the Indian dilemma of reconciling the paradigm
of bilateralism with the objectives of SAARC became evident when,
during the inaugural summit, Prime Minister Gandhi emphasized that
bilateral relationships were not to be subsumed into a common regional
identity.
Considering the South Asian political strategic environment at that
time, one can only observe that there was no congruence of ideological,
political or security interests in the region. There were clear strategic
differences in perception between India and her neighbours, especially
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal:
1. Relations with Pakistan did not progress during this period, despite
the restoration of democracy in Pakistan in 1988 (Parthasarthy,
1988). The newly elected government in Pakistan could not with-
stand the pressures of hard-line segments in the Pakistani political
and military establishment (Chadha, 1996, pp. 89–124). In Pakistan’s
perception, India’s goals and attitudes in the region were a major
hurdle to SAARC’s positive progress. The SAARC process was not seen
as contributing, in any manner, to diminishing fear and mistrust
between India and Pakistan.
2. In the case of Sri Lanka, India’s mediatory efforts to resolve the

Tamil ethnic crisis failed and the IPKF in Sri Lanka was considered
as an unjustified military intervention into a neighbouring coun-
try, particularly since the IPKF failed to neutralize the LTTE, the
Tamil separatist group waging war against the Sri Lankan govern-
ment (see Muni, 1993a, pp. 248–62). India’s official position was to
maintain that Sri Lanka was seeking to use the SAARC mechanism
to bring pressure to bear on India on a bilateral matter and thus her
conduct was in violation of Article X (1) of the charter, providing
that bilateral and contentious issues would be excluded from the
deliberations (see Nihal Singh, 1989). There were, however, views
which advised the Indian policy establishment to deal with her
neighbours with much greater sensitivity and diplomatic skill. The
continued presence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka was seen as violating
the latter’s sovereignty and hence the SAARC charter which stipu-
lates that cooperation ‘shall be based on respect for the principles
of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence,
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and mutual
benefit.’ Commenting on this very crisis, A.P. Venkateswaran, a former
Indian foreign secretary, noted:
Most regrettably, the postponement of the SAARC meetings of

Foreign Ministers marks the transformation of India in the minds
of other members of the regional organization [SAARC] from a
peaceful and powerful neighbour into an aggressive and self-
righteous bully. On Sri Lanka, the only sensible course for India
to take is to cut her losses and withdraw the IPKF, thereby pre-
serving whatever little credibility remains of our peaceful pos-
tures vis-à-vis our neighbours. Otherwise we would have handed
over a bonanza to our enemies who would capitalize on it.
(Venkateswaran, 1989)
The criticism of India in the ‘Daily News’ (Colombo) evoked the

Panchsheel and expressed misgivings as to India’s apparent violation
of these principles. These principles were criticized as being a mere
rhetorical device:
It was a matter of regret that despite the noble principles of Panch

Seela [Panchsheel] so vigorously enunciated by the Republic of
India, her rulers today should give cause to a smaller neighbour
to entertain misgivings as to her intentions. The event has belied
that promise India has repeatedly declared her respect for this
island’s sovereignty. But her present reluctance to accede to the
request of the President of Sir Lanka to withdraw her IPKF by a
specified date, sadly contradicts her professions of sensitivity to
international obligations.
(Daily News, 1989)
3. Nepal also voiced complaints against India for not providing ade-
quate transit facilities for her trade and, apprehending Indian domi-
nance, entered into substantial defence supply arrangements and
economic cooperation projects with China,33 a move that angered
India.
Norm sublimation of regional multilateralism and the concomitant

weakness of the SAARC charter had political and institutional conse-
quences which, in the final analysis, became the main source for the
slow development of regional integration. The conflicts between India
and most of her neighbours, a political-strategic divergence in their for-
eign policies, the exclusion of bilateral contentious issues from SAARC
agenda and an obvious failure to develop any policy consensus marked
the slow growth of SAARC during its initial years. J. N. Dixit provided a
summary of India’s SAARC policy:
Consequently, India pursued a policy of forging cooperation with

its neighbours in the fields of culture, tourism, trade and transfer of
technology and information. New Delhi also indicated that despite
political hurdles put forward by Pakistan, India would fully activate
SAARC for regional well-being. At the same time, India was firm in
ensuring that SAARC was not used as an instrumentality to pressurize it
to compromise on disputes with its neighbours which would affect its ter-
ritorial integrity or security interest (emphasis added).
(Dixit, 2003, p. 202)
India’s policy during the first five years of SAARC’s existence was char-
acterized by her concern to avoid contentious bilateral issues. In this,
India stayed true to the principles outlined in Chapter 2. The beginnings
of SAARC showed how ingrained the idea of complete independence was
in India’s dealings with her neighbours and that SAARC was the legiti-
mate off-spring of the Nehruvian ideals he promoted time and again
during the Asian conferences. The contentious political issues in the
South Asian context inevitably led to an ‘India versus others’ syndrome
due to the asymmetric power equation in the region. Indian anxiety in

ensuring the exclusion of (anti-India) political issues, therefore, was an
uncompromising (and pragmatic) policy prescription for regionalism to
take roots in South Asia. The second Indian pre-condition regarding the
unanimity in decision making in SAARC, however, must have reassured
all member countries of SAARC that they had at least an equal stake in
the organization. Meanwhile, India was unwilling to dilute or give up
the principle of bilateralism in resolving the political disputes with her
neighbours. This explained her pronouncement regarding South Asian
regionalism as an added dimension in the foreign policy objectives in
order to help improve bilateral relationships in the region. India did
not want to give up her larger objective of an Asian unity under Indian
leadership.
India’s regional policy was also marked by an apparent contradic-
tion since it intended to achieve peace, progress, and stability in the
region and still called SAARC a non-political association. This objective of
achieving peace, progress, and stability cannot possibly be understood
as anything other than an absolute political objective. It appears that
India’s definition of ‘political’ in the context of SAARC denoted only
bilateral contentious issues with her neighbours, which India wanted to
tackle and solve outside the realm of SAARC. Such a limited view of the
prevailing regional political situation resulted in simmering discontent
among the smaller SAARC member countries against the provision of
excluding bilateral contentious issues from the SAARC agenda. This per-
ception made those countries less than enthusiastic about India’s efforts
to expand the scope of regional cooperation by including areas of trade
and industry. Pakistan, in particular, opposed the Indian move in this
regard, considering it legitimate to resist the probable Indian economic
domination in the region.
In conclusion, the initial years of institutionalization of SAARC
and the continuation of the regional integration process displayed an
under-institutionalization and lack of robustness of the norm of regional
multilateralism, with adverse repercussions for the process of regional
multilateralism.

The globalized economic context compelled a ‘growing recognition that
regional cooperation in South Asia is no longer an option but a neces-
sity’ (Bhargava, 1995a, p. 370). The second cycle of summits began in
1991, when the sixth SAARC Summit was finally held on 21 December
1991 in Colombo, after it had been postponed.
Sandy Gordon noted that ‘India’s effective scuttling of the 1991

SAARC summit, scheduled to take place in Colombo, was widely inter-
preted as an expression of Indian anger against Sri Lanka for having
provided arms for the Tamil Tigers at the very time Indian peacekeeping
forces were active in Sri Lanka’ (Gordon, 1996, p. 206).34 The postpone-
ment of the summit without doubt vitiated regional harmony.35 An
editorial in the ‘Daily News’ observed ‘that no power, however big or
powerful, should regard an association founded as an instrument of
regional cooperation as a means of delivering diplomatic snub of one
kind or another’ (Daily News, 1990; see also The Hindu, 1991).
The sublimated norm of regional multilateralism proved inadequate
for furthering the specific goals of the countries of the region and of
the original goals of the SAARC charter, and consequently it came
under attack, a move which showed that the countries of the region
were unsuccessfully attempting to play the roles of norm promoters.
The Sri Lankan president suggested that the unanimity clause in the
SAARC charter should be eliminated. According to Suman Sharma (2001,
p. 15, footnote 22) the Sri Lanka government along with Pakistan and
Bangladesh wanted to discuss the ‘unanimity clause’ in the SAARC char-
ter with then Chairman of SAARC, President Abdul Gayoom (Maldives).
Furthermore, this group of countries wanted to explore the possibility
of amending the charter to especially prevent the sudden cancellation
of meetings or programmes because of the voting behaviour of just one
member. This attempt by the Sri Lankan government to change the
ground rules was criticized by S. D. Muni who questioned the Sri Lankan
determination to make SAARC become a success:
Within months of hosting the First Foreign Secretary level meeting

in Colombo in 1981, Sri Lanka approached ASEAN for membership
only to show its scant regard for SAARC. If not snubbed by ASEAN
then, Sri Lanka would have joined ASEAN long back […]. In 1989,
Premadasa refused to hold the SAARC summit in Colombo because
of the IPKF presence in his country.
(Muni, 1991)
This analysis notwithstanding, the Indian policy of pushing forward

regional economic cooperation was further underlined by Indian Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao, who observed:
Our cooperation must ascend to the truly regional as distinct from a mere
sum total of bilateral arrangements. We should not be diffident of newer
forms of cooperation. Collective economic security can assure benefits

not necessarily confined to the economic field. […] The long-term
vision of SAARC must undoubtedly include the removal of internal
barriers and the free movement of goods, capital and peoples through-
out SAARC. Sheer necessity dictates that we do more in the area on
intra-regional commercial and economic exchange. […] We must deny
ourselves the advantages of geographical proximity (emphasis added).
(Rao, 1993a, p. 356; see also Hindustan Times, 1991)
Yet, the normative thrust—or lack thereof—that regional multilateral-

ism had been given by India’s normative hegemony in the initial SAARC
deliberations made these words mere rhetoric. The norm of Panchsheel
multilateralism was of too little substance to allow further integration as
envisaged by the Indian PM.
The Colombo Summit Declaration36 emphasized the vital importance
of assessing the nature and extent of international economic interde-
pendence and of the need for reviving the North–South dialogue as well
as for vigorously promoting South–South economic cooperation to off-
set the negative consequences of international economic developments.
The summit indeed made a beginning by setting up a ‘Committee on
Economic Cooperation’.
The next summit, the seventh SAARC Summit, scheduled for 12
December 1992, was postponed twice on account of political develop-
ments in India. The summit was first postponed in December 1992 in
the light of communal killings in India as well as similar killings and
other violent acts in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The second, indefinite
postponement in January 1993 was done presumably on account of
developments in Bangladesh, where several fundamentalist declared that
they would resort to a ‘Long March’ and vowed to transgress into Indian
territory to reconstruct the demolished Babri Masjid mosque at its origi-
nal site. In assessing India’s failure to handle the (political) fallout of the
communal events on SAARC, S. D. Muni blamed India for lacking diplo-
matic maturity and the courage to face criticism from neighbours and
demonstrating a panic-stricken aggressiveness in getting the summit
postponed twice (Muni, 1993b). These events underlined the fragile
nature of the whole process of regional multilateralism in the absence of
an authoritative political design that would allow to bring some sort of
harmony into the region—the latter a result of the shape of the norm
of regional multilateralism.
The seventh SAARC Summit, finally held in Dhaka from 10 to 11 April
1993, adopted a declaration renewing the pledge to further strengthen
mutual economic cooperation; the Foreign Ministers signed the South

Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) in order to liberalize
inter-regional trade. This particular summit marked the beginning of
SAARC economic cooperation by accepting the framework agreement on
preferential trade. In his address, the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha
Rao noted the slow growth of SAARC process and attempted to give
reasons:
This summit marks the beginning of the second cycle of summit

meetings of our region. […] Introspection leads me to the conclusion
that the content and range of cooperation within the SAARC region
has been slower than what we wished for. The reasons are the geo-
demographic disparity amongst member countries and inhibitions
born of problems inherited from the past. We cannot wish these
away. But, we certainly can abide by the stipulation in the SAARC charter
by setting aside issues on which there are differences of opinion, issues
which are essentially bilateral (emphasis added).
(Rao, 1993b)
This very assessment of ‘slow progress’ has practically been repeated

in every subsequent summit until 2012.
Yet, it is questionable if these words hinted at an actual Indian willing-
ness to rethink the process of regional multilateralism; from a normative
viewpoint, the weakness of the norm in its Panchsheel shape is once
again apparent. In an assessment of India’s regional policy, S. D. Muni
in 1993 observed two divergent perspectives on SAARC in the Indian
Foreign Service bureaucracy:
One [perspective] inclined to build SAARC as a multilateral instru-

ment of harnessing the cooperative potential of the region in socio-
cultural and economic fields. This in turn could moderate political
and strategic divergences among the member countries and improve
climate for bilateral interactions as well. The other perspective is
based upon the assumption that SAARC needs India more than India
needs SAARC, because the best way for India to interact with its
neighbours is through the bilateral channel.
(Muni, 1993b)
The eighth SAARC Summit was then held in May 1995 in New Delhi,
after the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade negotiations and the creation of the World Trade Organization

(WTO). The member states noted with satisfaction that the first round
of trade negotiations to exchange trade concessions among member
states under SAPTA was complete. They directed that all necessary steps
be taken to facilitate ratification by all member states and operationalize
SAPTA by the end of 1995 as mandated (Bhargava, 1995b, pp. 5–7). The
specific Indian policy vis-à-vis regional multilateralism was echoed by
her Prime Minister:
Collective self-interest has been the fundamental basis of regional

cooperation all over the world. Those regional groupings that have
succeeded have opened doors to free flow of goods, services, capital
and people. This is also the route we have to adopt. The external
economic environment continues to be unfavourable for develop-
ing countries […] the international trading system is coalescing
into powerful regional trading and economic coalitions involving
major economies. It is essential for us to provide political impetus to
effectively bring SAPTA into the operation by the end of this year as
agreed to at the Dhaka Summit.
(cited in SAARC Secretariat, 1997b, pp. 133–4)
India thus showed that it was willing to play a more active role—
‘political impetus’—in order to further regional economic cooperation;
the Indian view and understanding of regional multilateralism as a tool
of economic diplomacy is disclosed in these words.
Sub-regional cooperation: a South Asian growth quadrangle?

Widespread dissatisfaction with the ‘achievements’ of SAARC led to
attempts at re-introducing the norm of regional multilateralism in a form
that made progress tangible. The idea of sub-regional cooperation was
advanced in the context of a markedly slow growth of SAARC process
in economic areas (Upreti, 1998), and a positive political climate gener-
ated among the four countries which mooted a South Asian Growth
Quadrangle (SAGQ). Since the slow progress of regional multilateralism
had time and again been criticized, the SAGQ seemed to provide a viable
alternative.
In May 1996, the SAARC Council of Ministers had endorsed the idea
of forming a growth triangle consisting of the north-eastern part of
India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, and thereby excluding Sri Lanka
and Pakistan. In September 1996, the Indian Prime Minister Gujral also
reaffirmed the idea of sub-regional cooperation in a lecture he delivered
at London’s Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) (Nuruzzaman,
1999, pp. 311–23).
In December 1996, Nepal circulated an approach paper at the meet-
ing of the SAARC Council of Ministers on the feasibility of sub-regional
cooperation (SAARC Secretariat, 1996). The signing of the Mahakali
Treaty between India and Nepal in 1996, the transit facilitation for
Nepal to Bangladesh via the eastern corridor of India and through
Bangladesh to overseas countries in 1997 and the ‘Ganga Water Sharing
Agreement’ between India and Bangladesh in 1996 provided the appro-
priate catalyst for the foreign ministers of these countries to seriously
consider sub-regional economic cooperation (see Dubey et al., 1999a,
pp. 7–9). In April 1997, the Foreign Secretaries of the SAARC countries
agreed on a document containing the objectives, principles, and plan
of action for the growth triangle (SAARC Secretariat, 1997d). Six sectors
were identified for cooperation to be undertaken outside of SAARC—
these were multi-modal transport and communications, energy, trade
and investment facilitation and promotion, tourism, and optimum
utilization of natural resources endowment and environment.
The concept of sub-regional cooperation outside SAARC was not
acceptable to Pakistan, while Sri Lanka and the Maldives were initially
hesitant. Pakistan considered this an attempt to isolate the three coun-
tries and potentially damaging for SAARC. The Sri Lankan President
Chandrika Kumaratunga (The Times of India, 1997) affirmed: ‘No, we
don’t need to form blocks within SAARC, there is nothing we can’t
resolve within ourselves through dialogue.’ The issue was discussed dur-
ing the SAARC summits at Male (1997) and Colombo (1998) (see for both
summits also below). The Male Summit Declaration expressly reiterated
the ‘determination to reinforce the unity and cohesion of SAARC’ and
further decided that ‘with the objective of enhancing regional solidarity
and promoting overall development within SAARC, the Heads of State
or Government encouraged under the provisions of Article VII and X of
the charter the development of specific projects relevant to the special
individual needs of three or more Member states.’37
The SAGQ constituted an unsuccessful attempt of introducing regional
multilateralism with a clear economic focus through the backdoor. The
deliberate exclusion of Sri Lanka and Pakistan (and their reactions) are a
testament to the simple fact that the introduction of the norm of regional
multilateralism—after almost 17 years—had not achieved a level of
robustness necessary to further cooperation. The founding of BIMST-EC
also has to be seen in light of the SAGQ, since its membership equals
SAARC minus Pakistan plus Thailand (see Chapter 4, Section: BIMST-EC).

The ninth SAARC Summit (Male, 1997) decided to advance the date of
realizing the SAARC Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by four years to 2001. The
summit directed that a Group of Eminent Persons (GEP) be constituted
comprising one representative from each member state and the SAARC
Secretary-General as an invitee, to undertake a comprehensive appraisal
of SAARC, identify measures including mechanisms to further vitalize
and enhance the effectiveness of the association in achieving its objec-
tives, to develop a long range vision and formulate a perspective plan
of action including a SAARC Agenda for 2000 and beyond (Bhargava,
1997). The Male Declaration noted that the ongoing political dialogue
would help ‘foster good neighbourly relations, relieving tensions and
building confidence as means to promote peace, stability and acceler-
ated social and economic cooperation in our region’ (Cited in Ghai,
2004, p. 479). The operationalization of the preferential trade arrange-
ment among the SAARC member countries was greeted by the Indian
Prime Minister Gujral. In his inaugural address he noted contently:
Economic cooperation has received the focus it deserves in recent

years and is making rapid progress. […] The canvas of our economic
cooperation is now wide ranging, covering areas such as investment
promotion and protection, avoidance of double taxation, harmoni-
sation of customs procedures and documentation, upgradation and
coordination of standards and modalities of smooth arbitration.
(Gujral, 1998a, pp. 136–7)
It was, in the final analysis, Indian determination that was causal for
strengthening SAPTA despite reservations by other countries. Economic
cooperation had finally received the prominent position that India had
wanted all along.
The 10th SAARC Summit was held at Colombo, Sri Lanka from 29 to
31 July 1998. The summit took place against the backdrop of a severe
financial crisis that affected the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs)
of East Asia (Krugman, 1994, pp. 62–78) which had enjoyed an extraor-
dinary record of sustained high growth over a long period of time. The
crisis did not seriously affect economies in South Asia. India, in particu-
lar, maintained macro-economic stability as strict government controls
over capital inflows and outflows existed (Manab Majumdar, 1998).
The summit was also held after India and Pakistan had conducted
nuclear tests and had declared themselves as nuclear powers. The infor-
mal bilateral meeting between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan
at the SAARC summit consequently acquired a great deal of political
significance (see Naqvi, 1998).
The Sri Lankan President M.S. Chandrika Kumaratunga observed in
her speech at the summit that although the issue of the nuclear tests
was not on the official agenda, South Asia’s nuclear consensus could
not be separated from the global security environment. The President
of the Maldives, Abdul Gayoom, was of the view that SAARC should
now focus more on the issue of nuclear disarmament. The Pakistani
President Nawaz Sharif suggested that SAARC should start to discuss
political problems of the region, including bilateral problems between
the member states—obviously hinting at discussing the Kashmir issue.
However, due to Indian persistence, the summit eventually ‘chose’ to
uphold the provisions of the SAARC charter, which meant excluding
discussions on bilateral disputes and problems. This discloses that other
SAARC countries wanted to alter the way the organization functioned,
which would, in effect, have amounted to a novel approach towards
regional multilateralism.
The Indian Prime Minister reiterated the commitment of his country
to the ongoing efforts at forging economic cooperation in the form of
SAPTA and to the eventual goal of SAFTA and a South Asian Economic
Community (Balachandran, 1998). The Prime Minister alluded to the
apprehensions expressed on account of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests
before the summit and used this opportunity to assert once again the
Indian policy to promote socio-economic cooperation among the SAARC
countries:
Apprehensions have been expressed in some quarters that recent

developments in South Asia could cause a setback to the SAARC
process. […] It is in recognition of this that the founding fathers of SAARC
took a conscious decision not to burden it with bilateral concerns, many of
which existed even then, and to keep contentious issues out of SAARC. […]
At the same time, we have every reason to hope that building a posi-
tive framework of cooperation in our region will have a beneficial
effect on bilateral relations (emphasis added).
(Gujral, 1998b, pp. 64–5)
In a way, the words used by the Indian Prime Minister stood in dia-
metrical opposition to the state of affairs of regional multilateralism in
South Asia. Unresolved political and contentious bilateral issues were

responsible for the lack of progress. Also, a critical report prepared by
the GEP was released; it stated that SAARC cooperation was to continue
to remain limited due to a lack of political will and that the association
was still far away from its goal of a high-level regional (economic) group-
ing. It also held that several decisions taken at the SAARC meetings were
yet to be implemented by the member states. It expressed concern over
the nuclear tests and argued that the ensuing escalation of tensions in
the region could impede the progress of regional cooperation.
The report of the GEP and the results of its analysis of achievements
and failures confirm that regional multilateralism had not reaped the
benefits hoped for. The causes it identified can well be explained with
India’s cognitive prior and the Panchsheel-shape of the norm, which suf-
fered precisely from the weaknesses identified by the report. The ensu-
ing summit declaration ignored all political issues and the nuclear tests
conducted by India and Pakistan and instead focused on economic
cooperation in the region. The declaration expressed strong disapproval
of the members of the practice of imposition of unilateral coercive
economic measures as an instrument of policy against developing
countries and demanded the abolition of such practices. The declara-
tion stated comprehensively the economic agenda of SAARC, especially
with a view to accelerate the progress of the next round of negotiations
for SAPTA and the removal of discriminatory practices and non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) on the items covered under tariff concessions. Special
emphasis was put on the coordination of SAARC positions before the
WTO. Also, a document entitled ‘Road Map to SAFTA’ was presented
(Kanwaldeep Singh, 1998).
After this 10th SAARC summit, despite positive indications, the
progress of SAARC stalled again and the 11th summit, scheduled to
be held in Nepal in the second half of 1999, also had to be postponed
in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan
and the re-establishment of military rule in Pakistan in October 1999.
Sri Lanka took this decision to postpone on India’s request due to the
latter’s concern over the military coup in Pakistan. India expressed
strong reservations against the participation of an ‘illegitimate’ mili-
tary regime in the deliberations of a SAARC summit (Raja Mohan,
1999). It was feared that if the summit had been held, it could have
given the Pakistani General Musharraf an opportunity to provide his
rule in Pakistan with a certain degree of legitimacy. Besides the exist-
ence of a military dictatorship in Pakistan, the increased intensity
of the Tamil Problems in Sri Lanka—a war-like situation between
Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE—also kept SAARC cooperation at a very
low level.
All the events which led to the eventual postponement of 11th
SAARC summit were another reminder that political and security con-
siderations could not be ignored in the regional integration process.
Fourteen years of regional cooperation should ideally have led to an
atmosphere of trust and especially a level of intensified multilateral
cooperation in South Asia. Yet, not even a small measure of trust
between India and Pakistan in view of regional multilateralism had
materialized until 1999. Thus, Nehru’s vision of only a loose South
Asian cooperation and the Panchsheel-way of cooperation was con-
firmed on all accounts. Moreover, with the lack of the regulative aspect
of the Janus-faced norm, no institutional leverage existed to influence
the behaviour of the member countries towards solving differences
intra-mural.
In July 2000, Pakistani General Musharraf explained the Pakistani per-
spective on SAARC and complained about the state of affairs of regional
multilateralism, thereby probing into key features of the Panchsheel norm.
He noted:
Look at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. We

cannot even discuss issues that are creating tensions in the region.
We can achieve so much and we have achieved nothing. Who is
obstructing SAARC? India can play a major role in moving SAARC
forward. As the biggest country in the region, it should take others
along. One would like to go along if India had the correct attitude.
(Hindustan Times, 2000)
Musharraf called for enlarging the mandate of SAARC by including

political issues for discussion under the SAARC framework. Sri Lanka
took the initiative in the year 2000 to revitalize the SAARC process and
a SAARC senior official meeting was held in Colombo in November
2000. The meeting covered a wide range of topics related to the associa-
tion’s economic, social, technical, and cultural agenda. In ‘The Hindu’,
Katyal highlighted in May 2001:
India does not intend vetoing the move for the SAARC summit nor
is it averse to the use of that opportunity for top-level contacts with
Pakistan […] New Delhi is thus prepared to let the SAARC process,
beginning with next month’s meeting of the Foreign Secretaries, take
its course. This means it is agreeable to the next two higher-level

contacts—the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and then the summit.
(Katyal, 2001)
The Pakistani position is understandable vis-à-vis Indian normative

hegemony. Owing to India’s overwhelming influence in shaping regional
multilateralism, especially with a view to regional economic diplomacy,
Pakistan could do no better than simply follow India, rather than leave
her own imprint on the organization.
On 5 January 2002, the 11th SAARC Summit (Kathmandu) finally
opened in an environment which was clearly dominated by the con-
tinued Indo-Pakistani military build-up all along the borders and the
Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. Despite the pressure resulting from
strains in Indo-Pakistani relations, the summit tried to restart the proc-
ess which had stalled since 1998. All leaders regretted the virtual failure
of SAARC to effectively implement its decisions, but at the same time
expressed the resolve to make determined efforts towards promoting
intensified cooperation for the development of the region. Addressing
the closing session of the summit, the Nepalese Prime Minister Sher
Bahadur Deuba described it as a ‘major step’ (cited in Ghai, 2004, p. 483)
that the grouping had resumed its task after a gap of three years. The
‘Times of India’ summed up:
While Indo-Pakistan developments dominated the SAARC Summit,

it ended with a clear warning from other member countries to the
two nuclear neighbours to get together and sort out their differences.
Indeed, despite the lack of tangible political and economic achievements,
Kathmandu demonstrated the utility of SAARC as a forum where the smaller
South Asian countries could exercise some emotional influence over the
larger neighbours. At a time when tension between India and Pakistan
is providing outside powers like the US and Britain with a handle to
present themselves as brokers, the Summit provided a fleeting glimpse
of South Asia’s own ability to generate compromise and dialogue (emphasis
added).
(Aunohita Majumdar, 2002)
The 12th SAARC Summit took place in Islamabad on 4–6 January

2004. During the summit, India and Pakistan tried to normalize their
relations by pursuing the peace process through confidence building
measures. In a joint press statement issued after a meeting between
Vajpayee and Musharraf on 6 January 2004, both leaders welcomed

the steps being taken for the normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations
and highlighted that the agreed-upon ‘composite dialogue’ would pro-
mote progress towards the common objective of peace, security, and
economic development. SAARC was thus used as a political forum by
Indian and Pakistan. The summit declaration once again confirmed the
importance of the Panchsheel principles:
Desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity and progress in the

region through strict adherence to the principles of the United
Nations charter and Non-Alignment, particularly respect for the prin-
ciples of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independ-
ence, non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of
the states and peaceful settlement of all disputes.
Still, neither of the two summits in 2002 and 2004 pushed the insti-
tutionalization of the SAARC any further, nor did they deepen regional
multilateralism. On the contrary, the biggest achievement was the mere
fact that the summits took place. This ‘non-performance’ notwithstand-
ing, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), the new coalition govern-
ment governing India, noted the following in its Common Minimum
Programme (CMP) on 27 May 2004:
The UPA Government will pursue an independent foreign policy,

keeping in mind its past traditions. This policy will seek to promote
multi-polarity in world relations and oppose all attempts at unilat-
eralism. The UPA Government will give the highest priority to building
closer political, economic and other ties with its neighbours in South Asia
and to strengthen SAARC. Particular attention will be paid to regional
projects in the area of water resources, power and ecological conser-
vation (emphasis added).
(United Progressive Alliance, 2004)

The leaders of the SAARC member countries convened for the 13th
SAARC Summit in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 12–13 November 2005. The
heads of state agreed that the summit provided a unique opportunity
to consolidate the gains made in regional cooperation during its first
two decades and to chart a forward-looking strategy to promote effec-
tive cooperation at all levels to realize the objectives and principles
set out in the charter. They underlined the need to accelerate regional
cooperation through all possible means and mechanisms, including

exchange of best practices in various fields of the member states. Natwar
Singh, the then Indian Minister for External Affairs, stressed the Indian
commitment to SAARC and the necessity of economic integration in a
speech given on 6 November 2004:
It is only natural, but not necessarily inevitable, that our smaller

neighbours look upon India with some degree of apprehension and
fear of domination by it. A key objective of our policy is to reassure
our neighbours, and anchor this assurance in a virtuous web of cross-
border, economic and commercial linkages. Once India is looked
upon as an opportunity, then India’s size and its economic strength
would become an asset rather than a liability in dealing with our
neighbours. The road to South Asia, which is at peace with itself, lies
in economic integration (emphasis added).
(Natwar Singh, 2004)
In his speech, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh wondered:

‘At this point in SAARC’s journey, it is fair to ask whether, in these 20
years, we have done justice to that initial blueprint for regional coop-
eration’ (Manmohan Singh, 2005). However, the ‘initial blueprint’
he was referring to was exactly the blueprint India had insisted on
during the SARC/SAARC deliberations, namely regional multilateral-
ism in the form of Panchsheel multilateralism. On the plus side, then
Minister of State for External Affairs E. Ahamed pointed out that ‘with
Afghanistan’s entry, SAARC has acquired a more complete regional
identity’ (Ahamed, 2005).
In the light of ‘regional multilateralism’, Afghanistan’s entry finally
fulfilled the requirement of ‘regional clarity’, which was clearly absent
since 1985. Besides this, Singh’s words only proved that in the sub-
limated form, the norm regional multilateralism could not fulfil the
expectations harboured for 20 years, even though it was India’s original
initiative as the normative hegemon that was responsible for sublimat-
ing the norm.
It took two years for the next summit to take place, without any further
achievements taking place apart from meetings at the sub-ministerial
level. The leaders of the SAARC member countries met again at the
14th SAARC Summit held in New Delhi, India on 3–4 April 2007. The
heads of state and government welcomed the entry of Afghanistan into
SAARC and recognized the importance of connectivity in fulfilling the
objectives of the charter. The member countries emphasized that in its
third decade of existence, there was an urgent need to move SAARC

from declaratory to implementation phase. After 28 years of uncount-
able sub-ministerial deliberations, ministerial meetings and 14 summits,
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recognized a willingness of
the SAARC member countries to turn the organization into an effec-
tive instrument of regional cooperation and saw ‘a new dawn break-
ing out over South Asia’ (Manmohan Singh, 2007). More importantly,
Manmohan Singh hinted at a possible change in the normative set-up
of regional multilateralism, when he saw signs of hope that the SAARC
governments were finally addressing bilateral political issues and he
explicitly announced unilateral ‘reciprocity’, albeit only in sectors related
to education, the academia, and health (visas for students, teachers,
professors, journalists, and patients from SAARC countries) (Manmohan
Singh, 2007).
The Prime Minister of Pakistan remarked: ‘Let us move from debate
and discussions to concrete action’ (International Herald Tribune, 2007).
This led one political analyst to comment that
by observing the overall mood at the 14th SAARC Summit […] one
might sense that a change in the perception about SAARC may be
occurring. This position may have been influenced by the increases
in economic growth that has happened in many member states and
by the realisation that, in the current wave of globalization, eco-
nomic integration rather than political separation is the best way to
achieve and sustain economic prosperity.
(Chowdhury, 2007)
However, these statements and developments did not justify a reas-

sessment of SAARC changing its normative features. With Afghanistan’s
membership and India’s announcements of a few concessions, impor-
tant features of the norm could have been in a flux. Still, despite the
rhetoric against the rhetoric, the normative shape of regional multi-
lateralism had not undergone the kind of fundamental change which
would allow a changed norm localization perspective, as the future lack
of progress demonstrated:
One year later, the 15th SAARC Summit took place in Colombo, Sri
Lanka, on 1–3 August 2008. International observers were the EU, China,
Iran, Japan, Korea, Mauritius, and the USA. A wide array of issues were
discussed, among them connectivity in South Asia, energy security,
environment, water resources, poverty alleviation, the SAARC Develop-
ment Fund, transport, information, and communications technology
development, science and technology, tourism, culture, SAFTA, the

SAARC Social Charter, education, combating terrorism, and the admis-
sion of Australia and Myanmar as additional observers. Guidelines were
adopted about SAARC’s engagement with observers, i.e., they were
allowed to participate in the inaugural and closing sessions of summits,
while a moratorium on admission of new observers was imposed.
One of the major issues of the deliberations was food security; a
special statement was released, along with the Summit Declaration,
in which the SAARC countries affirmed their determination to trans-
form South Asia into a ‘granary of the world’, by means of a series
of inter-connected and specific regional collaborative projects. With
regard to energy security, it was specifically decided that the common
SAARC approach would rest on numerous pillars, including, inter alia,
the development and conversing of conventional sources of energy;
a focus on alternative and renewable energy sources, including solar
power, hydro-power, wind power, and bio-fuels; the increase of energy
efficiency, transfer of technology, and trade in energy. On the issue of
terrorism, the summit finalized and signed the Convention on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. As a result of the summit discus-
sions, a follow-up (extra-ordinary) meeting of the SAARC agriculture
ministers was convened in New Delhi, India in November 2008.
Another two years passed until the 16th SAARC Summit (‘Silver
Jubilee Summit’) was held in Thimpu, Bhutan on 28–29 April 2010, the
first time for Bhutan to host a SAARC summit. Climate change was the
central issue of this summit, whose theme was: ‘Towards a green and
happy South Asia’. The member countries signed the SAARC Convention
on Cooperation on Environment and pledged to plant 10 million trees
over the next 5 years. Also, India announced the India Endowment for
Climate Change, a fund to cope with the challenges posed by climate
change; India also offered to set up a climate innovation centre in South
Asia to develop sustainable energy technologies.
Some leaders of member countries again raised the issue of the (lack
of) achievement of regional cooperation in South Asia. Manmohan
Singh called SAARC, after 25 years, ‘a glass half empty’ and Bhutan’s
Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley said that SAARC was not focusing
enough on pressing issues such as poverty or food security. Still, the
president of the Maldives, Mohammad Nasheed, predicted that the
summit would eventually lead to a greater dialogue between India and
Pakistan. Indeed, an important event of summit was the Indo-Pakistani
meeting on 29th April, between Manmohan Singh and his counterpart
Yusuf Raza Gilani. It was the first meeting of both leaders after their
last meeting had taken place in Sharm-el-Sheikh in July 2009. No joint

statement was issued, but it was agreed to arrange meetings at the level
of foreign minister and foreign secretary. No further progress took
place on SAFTA. The member countries noted the proposal from India
for preparing a roadmap for developing a SAARC market for electric-
ity (SAME). In the Thimpu Declaration, the need for more efficient,
focused, time-bound and people-centric activities was highlighted and
a call was more for ‘appropriate reflection of all the SAARC decisions
into the national policies and programmes of Member States.’ This call
for action dovetails with the requirements of the ideal-type features of
regional multilateralism and shows that the weaknesses of the localized
norm were recognized in the declaration.
After a period of two-and-a-half years, the 17th SAARC Summit
(summit theme: ‘Building Bridges’) was held on 10 November 2011 in
Addu City, Maldives. In his inaugural address, President Nasheed of
the Maldives appealed to the SAARC leaders to deepen economic inte-
gration and build bridges of cooperation between their countries and
people. Nasheed also requested SAARC members to make progress on
three areas of cooperation, namely (1) trade, transport, and economic
integration; (2) security issues, especially piracy, and climate change;
and (3) good governance. On the margins of the summit, Indian PM
Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Raza Gilani
first held delegation-level talks for about half an hour, which was then
followed by a one-on-one meeting. After their meeting, they pledged
to write a ‘new chapter’ in the Indo-Pakistan relationship, and Gilani
later informed the press that ‘we have discussed all core issues including
Kashmir. We hope the next round will be more constructive, more posi-
tive, and will open a new chapter in the history of both the countries’
(The Hindu, 2011).
In his summit address, Manmohan Singh announced new measures to
open India’s markets for the least developed members of the SAARC and
said that the Government of India had decided to reduce the number of
items on the SAFTA sensitive list from 480 to 25. In the Addu Declaration
which concluded the summit, the ‘need to further strengthen the insti-
tutional mechanisms of SAARC in order to bolster and enhance regional
cooperation’ was recognized, and four agreements were signed, namely
the SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters, the
SAARC Seed Bank Agreement, the SAARC Agreement on Multilateral
Arrangement on Recognition of Conformity Assessment, and the SAARC
Agreement on Implementation of Regional Standards. With regards to
trade, the accent was on effective implementation of the free trade pact,
paring the sensitive lists, eliminating non-tariff barriers and harmoniz-
ing standards and customs procedures.
The outcome of the 17th SAARC Summit shows that after 27 years,
SAARC has become somewhat valuable as a forum for informal politi-
cal discussions, but real progress in regional multilateralism has not
taken place.
SAARC cooperation in the political and security sector

While the above analysis of the norm localization of regional multilat-
eralism has used a process-tracing approach to follow the evolution of
SAARC since its inception, this section will use the results of the forego-
ing analysis and examine the level of cooperation in the political sector,
in the sector of trans-national terrorism and in the sector of nuclear
proliferation:
Political issues have formed an important part of informal, behind-
the-scenes summit talks: at the first SAARC Summit in Dhaka in 1985,
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Zia met informally and dis-
cussed bilateral issues. This was followed by a bilateral visit to India by
General Zia where the discussions continued. During this summit, both
leaders agreed not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities. In November
1986 in Bangalore, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani
Prime Minister Juneo discussed the ongoing Indian military exercise
Brasstacks near the Indo-Pakistan border which led to tension between
the two states. During the Dhaka and Bangalore summits, the Indian
and Bangladeshi leaders discussed the Chakma insurgency and the Teen
Bigha dispute and agreed to resolve their differences over the sharing of
river waters. At the 1987 SAARC Foreign Ministers’ meeting, India and
Sri Lanka forged an agreement for the deployment of the IPKF.
By the time the fourth SAARC Summit was held in Islamabad in 1988,
bilateral relations between India and Pakistan had improved. The two
countries signed three agreements relating to the avoidance of double
taxation on mutual trade, the promotion of cultural exchanges, and
an agreement on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations.
Similarly at the fifth SAARC Summit in Male in 1990, Pakistan Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Chandra Shekhar
agreed to resolve disputes peacefully and set the date for the meeting
of the foreign secretaries. The ninth SAARC Summit in Male in 1997
summit played a crucial part in the restarting of the dialogue process
between the two states and corroborates the viewpoint of historian
Dietmar Rothermund in an interview with the author38 about the piv-

otal role of behind-the-scenes discussions during summits. At this sum-
mit, the President of the Maldives urged for a ‘SAARC Declaration on
Principles of Political Cooperation and Stability’ for strengthening bilat-
eral relations. However, this declaration was never issued. Also, at the
11th SAARC Summit in 2002 in Kathmandu, Indian and Pakistan leaders
had another important opportunity to meet informally. In April 2010, on
the sidelines of the 16th SAARC Summit, Indian PM Manmohan Singh
and Pakistani PM Yusuf Raza Gilani met for the first time after their last
meeting had taken place in Sharm-el–Sheikh in July 2009; it was agreed
to arrange meetings at the level of foreign minister and foreign secretary.
And again, on the occasion of the 17th SAARC Summit in November
2011, Manmohan Singh and Gilani held a one-on-one meeting.
In view of the above, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema correctly summarized:
It is indeed strange that SAARC excludes discussion on bilateral

contentious issues whereas most of the problems in South Asia are
of bilateral nature […], indeed political discussions take place on a
wide variety of matters including contentious bilateral issues. What
is lacking is the mechanism for formalizing and regularizing the
informal discussions on contentious bilateral issues.
(Cheema, 2001)
Regarding terrorism issues, SAARC member states signed the Regional

Convention on Suppression of Terrorism in November 1987 at the third
SAARC summit. It came into force in August 1988 following ratification
by all member states. The convention highlights that the members were
‘aware of the danger posed by the spread of terrorism and its harmful effect
on peace cooperation, friendship, and good neighbourly relations and
which could also jeopardizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
states.’ The convention adopted and gave a regional focus to many of the
principles of international law with regard to terrorism. The convention
asked member states to extradite or prosecute alleged terrorists and binds
the contracting parties not to organize, finance terrorist acts or be a part
of any such act. Exchange of information, intelligence, and expertise were
stressed as areas of regional cooperation to combat terrorist activities.
The Colombo Summit Declaration in 1991 mentioned that members
‘expressed serious concern on the spread of terrorism in the region
affecting the security and stability of all member states […] cooperation
among SAARC states is vital if terrorism is to be prevented and eliminated
from the region.’ The SAARC leaders also stressed the urgent need for the
expeditious enactment of enabling legislation at the national level for

the speedy implementation of the SAARC Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism and the need for a constant dialogue and consultation among
the related agencies of member states. Further, the SAARC Terrorist
Offences Monitoring Desk was established in Colombo in 1995 to col-
late, analyse, and disseminate information on terrorist activities.
At the seventh SAARC Summit, held in Dhaka in 1993, SAARC reiter-
ated its unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods, and practices
of terrorism as criminal. Members pointed out that the efforts to combat
the growing threat of terrorism have diverted valuable scarce resources
form development work. At the 10th SAARC Summit in 1998, SAARC
member states still emphasized the urgent need to complete enabling
legislation at the national level in order to implement the SAARC
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism.
India’s initiative in making the fight against terrorism a top priority
issue in the summit declaration at the 11th SAARC Summit in
Kathmandu in January 2002 was not opposed. The summit declaration
mentioned that the heads of state of government have ‘affirmed their
determination to redouble efforts, collectively as well as individually
to prevent and suppress terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.’
Members also once again promised to accelerate the implementation of
the 1987 SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism within a defi-
nite time-frame. The 15th SAARC Summit then finalized and signed the
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters in 2008.
Concerning terrorism, a new declaration was issued on Cooperation
in Combating Terrorism at the SAARC Ministerial Meeting held on 28
February 2009. This declaration is the latest addition to a series of dec-
larations and conventions, highlighting the significance of a common
(rhetorical) stance on terrorism for the countries of the organization.
Discussions about nuclear weapons and the need for disarmament were
part of the SAARC summit agendas from the very beginning. The acquisi-
tion of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan added another dimension
to aspects of regional security in South Asia. The third SAARC Summit
in 1987 in Kathmandu called for the early conclusion of the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The
leaders declared their resolve to support every effort to conclude a treaty
prohibiting vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.
At the fifth SAARC Summit in 1990 in Male, the heads of state expressed
the hope that the talks between the two superpowers on arms control
would culminate in the conclusion of an agreement for substantial
reduction and ultimately total elimination of nuclear weapons.
At the 10th SAARC Summit in 1998 in Colombo, all nuclear weapon

states, whether party or non-party to the NPT, were called upon to engage
constructively through a transparent and credible process of negotiations
at the Conference on Disarmament. Also, the SAARC member states
urged the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a
comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory international instru-
ment prohibiting the use or the threat of nuclear weapons as well as
eliminating such weapons in existing arsenals.
These declarations notwithstanding, India conducted three under-
ground nuclear explosions on 11 May 1998 and declared herself a
nuclear weapons state. Two further tests were conducted on 13 May 1998.
Subsequently, Pakistan conducted five tests on 28 May and one more on
30 May. Following these developments, SAARC Chairman Abdul Gayana
called upon SAARC members to contain the situation arising out of the
tests and to begin informal consultations to develop a peaceful environ-
ment. At the 12th SAARC Summit at Islamabad in 2004, the Indian
Foreign Secretary Shashank and his Pakistani counterpart Riaz Khokhar
issued a statement charting out a roadmap for the composite dialogue on
all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. This SAARC summit,
therefore, received a very political note. As this case of the behaviour of
Pakistan and India vis-à-vis nuclearization shows—after then 13 years of
regional cooperation—the two countries clearly put their national inter-
est first and the other countries of SAARC were not even informed about
the momentous military developments in India and Pakistan.
In conclusion, the above chronicle of three areas of cooperation
shows that no substantial gains have been achieved until 2012. This, of
course, is not a surprising result considering that the charter expressly
excludes bilateral contentious issues to be discussed. Still, the above
chronicle of the fate of the Regional Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism highlights the lack of willpower and seriousness on the part
of SAARC member states. Even after a decade of its ratification, the con-
vention could still not be implemented. There was also no consensus on
the definition of terrorism among the members. Thus, though SAARC
has institutional arrangements for combating terrorism, the problem
evidently lies at the level of implementation.
SAARC institutional set-up and SAARC Conventions and

Agreements
The SAARC charter has determined a pyramidal structure with summits
at the apex, supported by the ‘Council of Ministers’ (CoM), i.e., foreign
ministers, and the ‘Standing Committee’, comprising foreign secretaries

of the member states. The present SAARC institutional set-up is shown
in Figure 3.1, while Table 3.2 enumerates all SAARC conventions and
agreements until 2012.39
Conclusion: India’s impact on regional multilateralism in

South Asia
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that India has modelled
SAARC according to her normative and ideational orthodoxy. The
norm of regional multilateralism in the form of SAARC has ‘suffered’
due the process of norm sublimation and India’s normative hegem-
ony. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, the norm of regional multi-
lateralism is Janus-faced. It is precisely the regulative aspect of the
norm which India rejected and which resulted in a weak institution
whose further development was negatively influenced by the lack of
certain essential key features. Even after more than 27 years, regional
multilateralism in South Asia has been little robust and successful,
a direct consequence of the sublimation of ‘regional multilateralism’
to its Panchsheel-shape. Referring to the idea of Panchsheel, Nehru
was already cited as having noted that the ‘idea of Panchsheel lays
down the very important truth that each nation must ultimately
fend for itself’ (Nehru, 1961, pp. 99–100). This idea of each nation
‘fending for itself’ has become an institutionalized reality in SAARC.
Table 3.3 lists the key features regional multilateralism has received
in SAARC.
The process-tracing above has also shown that India’s participation in
SAARC cannot be solely explained with the argument of peer-pressure
(‘ganging-up’ against India, i.e., putting collective pressure on India), an
argument which is sometimes discussed in the literature on South Asian
regional cooperation. The idea of cooperation has always been part of
India’s cognitive prior, and India played an important part in the early
stages of negotiations and prevailed in the important question of sec-
tors of cooperation and institutional set-up. Even though India was not
the initiator of the idea of SAARC, it is clear that at no point during the
different phases of the SAARC process was India pressured to give in to
the wishes of the smaller member states, as the Panchsheel elements of
the organization plainly show. In other words: India’s initial suspicion
of the motives of her neighbours—unfounded or not—eventually only
led to SAARC receiving the blueprint which was in consonance with
India’s cognitive prior.
108
Ministerial
Meeting
Summits
Council of Ministers
(Foreign Ministers of Member States) Committee on
= ‘Cabinet’ Economic Further
Standing Committee Cooperation Committees
(Foreign Secretaries of Member state) (COEC)
Standing
Committee
Programming Action Regional Technical

Committee Committee Committee Committee
Social
Agriculture Health and
Development Environment Science and Communication
and rural population Meteorology Energy
(women, youth, and forestry Technology and Transport
development activities
children)
Figure 3.1 SAARC institutional set-up (2012)40

Table 3.2 SAARC conventions and agreements
SAARC Conventions and related documents

Combating and Prevention of Trafficking of Women and Children for
Prostitution
Promotion of Welfare of Children
Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters
Convention on Narcotics Drugs
Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism
Additional Protocol on Terrorism
Convention on Cooperation on Environment
SAARC Agreements
Agreement for Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council
Final Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation
Final Agreement on Customs Matters
Establishment of SAARC Development Fund (Charter)
Establishment of SAARC Food Bank
Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)
Establishment of Establishment of South Asian Regional Standards Organization
(SARSO)
SAARC Charter on Democracy
SAARC Social Charter
SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters
SAARC Seed Bank Agreement
SAARC Agreement on Multilateral Arrangement on Recognition of Conformity
Assessment
SAARC Agreement on Implementation of Regional Standards
Besides this impact of India’s cognitive prior, the lack of common

perception among the South Asian states poses another hurdle for
deeper cooperation: A threat perception as in the case of ASEAN did
not constitute the basis for South Asian regional cooperation. Instead,
it was the initial concern of smaller countries in South Asia of how to
solve pressing socio-economic problems in the neighbourhood; while
being a catalyst for cooperation, this concern was not strong enough
to effect a conceptual change. SAARC member states never shared a
common perception. Each of the member states had a different reason
to join the association in accordance national interests and its position
in the region. Pakistan felt that the association would lead to India’s
110
Table 3.3 SAARC features of Panchsheel multilateralism
Non-negotiable Panchsheel principles ab initio

No contentious issues and no bilateral issues
Mutual respect for each other’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty
Mutual non-aggression
Mutual non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs
Equality and mutual benefit
Peaceful coexistence
SAARC—Institutional Key Features

Three independent states (minimum number) Yes
Voluntary formation Questionable: peer pressure,
suspicion of ‘ganging up
against India’
Equal voting rights (equality) Yes
Working together to achieve specific goals Weak, but economic
and projects (purpose/scope/general agenda cooperation envisaged through
setting) SAPTA/SAFTA; tourism,
and culture; South Asian
interconnectedness
Coordination of national policies (specific No
agenda)
Rejection of unilateralism in agreed fields and No
inclusive approach
Diffuse reciprocity No, specific reciprocity
Institutional set-up: independent goal-oriented No, extension of national
work on agreed goals/projects ministries
Common identity-building No: a genuine Indian
civilizational identity is
assumed
Institution-building No: institutional stasis since
1985 (SAARC Charter)
Regional geographical clarity No: Afghanistan first rejected,
member only since 2007
Possibility of discussion of bilateral issues No
Absence of normative hegemon No: India; initial norm
entrepreneur Bangladesh
‘pushed aside’
hegemonic domination over the other regional states. Moreover,

Pakistan was also apprehensive of an involvement in SAARC as it
would hurt her seriousness in developing closer ties with other Islamic
states. Eventually, it joined the SAARC so as not to isolate herself in
South Asia. As far as smaller members are concerned, they perceived
SAARC as a forum to collectively bargain with India with a view to
securing concessions on various issues. Bhutan saw the association
as a way of expanding her foreign and economic relations with other
states. The Maldives used the association to air their concerns regard-
ing the security of small states. Nepal wanted to tap her vast water
resources through cooperation.
In the absence of a common perception, there are serious limita-
tions to achieving the SAARC objectives as regards social and economic
cooperation. Though SAARC, as was noted above, officially keeps the
political sphere out of its formal agenda, all SAARC Summits, bilateral
meetings between state leaders on such occasions, ministerial meetings,
and foreign secretary meetings are noticeably conducted at the political
level and frequently bilateral political issues were discussed behind-the-
scenes, which means that this kind of institutionalized regional coop-
eration has at least provided opportunities for better bilateral relations
through informal political consultations.
In conclusion, it is obvious that the processes of norm localization in
South Asia transformed the global norm ‘regional multilateralism’ to a
specifically ‘Indian-style’ multilateralism (Panchsheel multilateralism).
This particular form of multilateralism, in the final analysis, represents
the Indian answer to a global norm and model of cooperation, provid-
ing a culturally and historically based reaction to the attempt of intro-
ducing a global concept to South Asia. From the very beginning India
instantaneously ensured that regional multilateralism received a dis-
tinct Indian normative shape; the regional organization coming into
existence underwent norm changes due to the Indian ideational and
normative impact, with repercussions until today. For India, traditional
conceptions of sovereignty and independence—i.e., political realism—
remain paramount for regional cooperation. ‘Genuine’ regional mul-
tilateralism cannot be detected in South Asia, and the performance of
regional multilateralism remains in a state of stasis, a fact that has been
recognized time and again in speeches and commentaries, but has not
been addressed in institutional terms. Practically every interviewee for
the present book stressed that SAARC had achieved close to nothing,
but that there was a huge potential once the economic side of the inte-
gration process started to function properly. Indeed, in the economic
field, first through SAPTA, which was followed by SAFTA, SAARC has
demonstrated some degree of tangible collective purpose, though clearly
lacking in performance. Until 2012, the restrictions in trade have lim-
ited the SAARC trade to 10% of its actual potential. The decisions taken
in the 17th SAARC Summit in November 2011 might at least constitute
the beginning of a gradual increase in SAARC trade.
4
Regional Multilateralism Beyond
South Asia
After Chapter 3 analysed the process of norm localization in South Asia,

whereas this chapter widens the geographical scope beyond South Asia,
and examines the genesis, evolution, and achievements of three further
regional organizations—the IOR-ARC, the BIMST-EC, and the MGC—
and two other regional multilateral fora: the ACD and the AASROC.
The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional

Cooperation (IOR-ARC)
The countries of the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR)1 vary in numerous respects:
population size, economies, social, and technological development.
The region suffers especially from divergences in the economic devel-
opment, and the social conditions in the respective countries reflect
this development. Besides industrialized nations (Australia, per capita
GDP US$42,130; Singapore, per capita GDP US$37,789), there are NICs
belonging to ASEAN, lesser developed economies and landlocked states,
and a great number of the least developed countries. In 2009, per capita
GDP for India was calculated to be US$1192, and US$428 for Mozambique
(for all data, see World Bank, 2009). Besides, several regional organiza-
tions exist in the IOR, such as ASEAN, the GCC, the ADC, and, of course,
SAARC.
Yet, the countries of the Indian Ocean share a common history with
common denominators, especially with regard to trade and commerce.
In a position paper on the IOR, the Indian MEA summarized:
Over the centuries, the countries, cultures and economies on the

Rim have been bound together into a wider Indian Ocean network
113
of littoral societies. Traders, seamen, fisherman and pilgrims operated

different matrixes of markets and cultures. Large number of ports
enabled the integration of littoral economies into the Indian Ocean
trading network.
(MEA, 1997)
The diffusion of Indian culture, religion, and thoughts took place in

this setting, an aspect of historiographic salience and for ‘civilizational
continuity’ as part of India’s cognitive prior. The Indian Ocean is also of
geo-strategic importance because it lies at the strategic intersection of
three continents.
Previous attempts to unite the countries of the Indian Ocean region,
particularly through the Asian Relations Conference and the Bandung
Conference (see Section ‘Asian regional conferences: early concepts of
regional multilateralism from 1949 to 1961’ in Chapter 3), did not bring
the hoped-for results, besides the fact that these efforts did not clearly
focus exclusively on the Indian Ocean, but covered a diverse mix of
land and sea states. For several decades, no efforts at regional multilat-
eralism took place. Influenced by the international changes after the
end of the Cold War and in response to the proliferation of regional
institutions during that period, initial proposals for a closer cooperation
among the Indian Ocean littoral states then originated in South Africa
and Australia. Naturally, India’s geographical position and size placed
her at the centre stage of this process of regional multilateralism as well.
Consequently, an analysis of norm localization in the context of the
IOR has to reflect on two aspects: first, India’s special strategic interest
in the Indian Ocean region; and second, the special roles of Australia
and South Africa. These aspects are intertwined with lasting repercus-
sions for the evolution of the IOR-ARC. Any kind of norm diffusion and
norm localization in such a setting receives a distinct cultural, political,
and strategic note, and both have to reconcile complex normative pull
and push factors.
Contextualizing the IOR-ARC: ideational origins, geo-strategic

background, and catalysts for cooperation until 1993
In order to adequately evaluate India’s Indian Ocean policy and objec-
tives, the role of the USA and the changing power scenario in the Indian
Ocean area have to be acknowledged. In the post-World War II period,
after Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands had ultimately withdrawn
from Asia and the Indian Ocean, the USA continued to protect its stra-
tegic interest in the region, developing Diego Garcia into a full-fledged
Regional Multilateralism beyond South Asia 115
air and naval base, thereby making it a crucially important part of their
Indian Ocean strategy.
This involvement, the military presence and the continuing arms
build-up of the USA and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean region
was openly criticized by numerous states of the Indian Ocean, especially
India. They strongly protested against the maintenance and establish-
ment of military bases and of the US and Soviet fleets with nuclear
capabilities in the Indian Ocean. The actual roots of an uncompromis-
ing view on an Indian involvement in the Indian Ocean lie precisely
in this historical development. Indian self-perception of powerlessness
at that time towards involvement with regard to ‘her’ own ocean has
been resented until today—actually an ‘ideal’ catalyst for cooperation
in order to forge a common front against a stronger ‘opponent’. It was
when the littoral states, keen on containing the growing military pres-
ence of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean—particularly with regard
to their nuclear-weapon presence—asked that the ocean be declared a
‘peace zone’ that it became the focus of the other littoral states, espe-
cially those belonging to the NAM, in the post-1962–3 period. The
move was initiated by Sri Lankan Prime Minister Bandaranaike at the
Cairo Conference in October 1964 and the matter was further pursued
at the Lusaka Conference in September 1970.
With regard to the Indian Ocean region, India pleaded strongly in
favour of an economic cooperation among countries of Southern Asia,
Australia, and New Zealand in 1968. This was publicly announced dur-
ing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 18-day tour of Singapore, Australia,
and New Zealand. In each of these countries, she stressed the promotion
of economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. On 30 May 1968,
she declared in Kuala Lumpur that India was willing to ‘participate
in and support’ regional associations in Southeast Asia on the basis of
equality and mutual benefit (Jha, 1978, p. 375). These words seemed to
indicate a more idealist and benign version of foreign policy on the part
of Gandhi. Yet, no concrete action followed.
The efforts of the NAM and India’s initiative in raising the issue at
the UN led to the passing of the General Assembly resolution (A/2832)
of 16 December 1971, declaring the Indian Ocean a ‘Zone of Peace’
(IOZP).2 On 15 December 1972, the UNGA created a 15-nation ‘Ad Hoc
Committee’ on the IOZP to implement the declaration of the Indian
Ocean as a Zone of Peace, chaired by Sri Lanka. Later on, this committee
was expanded and apart from the permanent members of the Security
Council, certain maritime powers were also included so as to secure
their cooperation in the implementation of the resolution. In 1979, the
UNGA decided to convene a conference to be held in Colombo in 1981

to consider how to implement the resolution. However, on account of
differences among members of the Ad Hoc Committee, the conference
could not be held. Other countries insisted on the revision of the text
of the declaration, taking into account the disturbance in West Asia, the
Persian Gulf, and the Middle East. At that time, the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq war with ensuing political instability in
the Persian Gulf led the USA to further expand and strengthen its naval
presence in the Indian Ocean.
At a follow-up meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee held on 25 May
1983, a group of countries presented a paper entitled ‘Proposal for a
Set of Principles on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace’. The paper
emphasized the strengthening of security and peace in the region. This
proposal, however, was not acceptable to the littoral and non-aligned
states and consequently no agreement could be reached for convening
a conference in Colombo.
In the context of norm localization, these events outlined above are
significant in that they reveal the normative rift between the countries
of the region. This effort at ‘torso’ regional multilateralism in the Indian
Ocean during the late phase of the Cold War suffered due to two major
limitations: first, though on the surface some Afro-Asian littoral states
voted for the UN resolution, they were direct (or indirect) partners in
one or the other superpower politico-military alliance systems in the
region. And second, the NAM in fact remained an organization whose
members had little in common besides ambitious rhetoric, and the
movement never succeeded in providing its policy with effective eco-
nomic content. India learnt an important lesson, namely that coopera-
tion could impede rather than promote her own interests. This aspect
was highlighted during an interview conducted by the author with an
Indian analyst.3
Two major initiatives in the direction of more institutionalized regional
cooperation in the Indian Ocean region were then launched during
the time of the Cold War in the 1980s. One particular initiative that
aimed at closer cooperation in the region was the so-called Indian Ocean
Commission (IOC) which was deliberated between 1982 and 1984 and
founded in 1984 to promote economic cooperation among the island
states of Comoros, Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, and La Reunion.
It was the first cooperative effort in the Indian Ocean area and was
primarily the result of a French initiative. It was, however, confined to
a few states of the Western Indian Ocean and concentrated particularly
on marine fishery, with its headquarters in Mauritius (K. R. Singh, 1996,
p. 40). This initiative hence did not primarily address economic issues
such as trade, investment, and services, but focused on the resource

side. Moreover, the fact that France, as a former colonial power in the
Indian Ocean region, initiated the Indian Ocean Commission could not
easily be accepted by the countries of the Indian Ocean Rim, especially
by India with her colonial past. These factors ultimately led to the fail-
ure of the Indian Ocean Commission.
The move towards the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation
(IOMAC), another early attempt at regional cooperation, was initiated by
Sri Lanka in 1981 and afterwards supported by Australia. Sri Lanka thus
played the role of a pre-localizer.4 In this respect, it can be compared
to the role Bangladesh played in the starting of the SAARC process.
However, Australia also showed some initiative. The Australian initia-
tive was given shape during a conference at Colombo in 1987 when
37 states met at the ministerial level and the IOMAC was formally
launched (Singh, 1996, p. 39). IOMAC’s final document dealt primarily
with environmental and maritime affairs connected with the Indian
Ocean and hardly dealt with land-based trade and investment. It included
Indonesia, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
other non-Indian Ocean states.5
India practically ignored this particular Australian initiative at regional
multilateralism in the Indian Ocean, an important reason being that the
initiative sought to legitimize the role of non-Indian Ocean actors in
the field of regional cooperation. Compared to the IOC of 1982, IOMAC
already had wider participation and included members from beyond
the Indian Ocean. Yet, the most noteworthy feature of the IOMAC
Colombo meeting was that India and the USSR did not take part. As a
result, IOMAC never achieved any political or economic impact; in any
case, it was a basic attempt to achieve cooperation among the Indian
Ocean countries, on the one hand, and establish some institutional
mechanism in the region, on the other hand.
In short, both these early efforts at Indian Ocean cooperation failed.
A major inhibiting factor was that India had kept herself aloof from
both initiatives because she did not wish to join what she considered to
be Western initiatives. India’s foreign policy thus showed her adherence
to non-alignment even when it came to her own backyard. This dem-
onstrates that without India’s active participation, no regional initiative
can be sustained. Attempts at the pre-localization of a norm without
India’s active involvement in the region is thus an undertaking destined
to fail, and India’s policy behaviour based on her foreign policy norma-
tive convictions—here by not participating—achieved an impact which
was felt in the region. Table 4.1 lists the various attempts at regional
multilateralism between 1971 and 1997.
118
Table 4.1 The Indian Ocean Rim: Attempts at regional multilateralism 1971–97
Year Venue Name of Initiative/Conferences Convened by/Main No. Indian Result

Protagonist Participation
1 1971 New York Indian Ocean Zone of Peace UN/India/NAM 15 Yes Declaration
(IOZP)
2 1979/ Colombo IOZP Colombo Conference UNGA/Ad Hoc 15 Yes Conference did not
1981 Committee take place
3 1983 New York Proposal on Set of Principles of Ad Hoc Committee 15 Yes Not adopted
IOZP
4 1982 Mauritius Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) France 5 No Established
(1984)
5 1987 Colombo Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Sri Lanka/Australia 37 No Established
Cooperation (IOMAC)
6 29–13 Mauritius Indian Ocean Rim Initiative Mauritius 7 Yes M7 Working Group;
March (IORI) IOR-Business Forum;
1995 IOR-Academic
Group, IOR
7 11–13 Perth International Forum on the Australia 23 Yes Working Group
June Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR)
1995
8 5–7 Mauritius Indian Ocean Rim—Association Australia/India 14 Yes Charter; Ministerial
March for Regional Cooperation Meetings Since 1997
1997 (IOR-ARC)
The backdrop of the IOR Initiative in 1993: imperatives of

cooperation and the process of pre-localization
The end of the Cold War led to a basic restructuring and reshaping of
the international order, with new international actors and new politi-
cal forces. The EU, ASEAN, the ARF, the North-American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the G3-Free Trade Agreement, and the Association
of Caribbean States (ACS) were prominent examples for regional coop-
eration occurring in different parts of the world. By the early 1990s,
the one major region lacking any kind of cooperative dialogue was the
Indian Ocean region. From 1993 to 1995, the governments of three larg-
est economies in the region—India, South Africa, and Australia—were,
each in their own way, moving towards the conclusion that the time
was ripe for some type of IOR regional multilateralism.
For India, the imperatives were historical and also based on the need
to restructure the Indian economy in line with emerging global trends.6
Since 1991, India had reoriented her economic policy, and her new polit-
ical and financial elite were more than willing to liberalize the country’s
economy. India embarked on a process of opening up her economy to
global competition and was also seeking to define her place in both the
regional and global order in the wake of the collapse of the USSR. This
change in policy coupled with an ever growing and financially potent
middle class and the subsequent rise of consumerism made India an
attractive economic partner.
These developments in the 1990s also allowed India to dovetail her
policies with those of the members of ASEAN or the Southern African
Development Community (SADC). India, for her part, was largely
excluded from the regional and transregional fora in the Asia-Pacific,
and her bid to join the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) was rejected. New
forms of South–South cooperation, especially as the NAM had lost much
of its momentum after 1989, seemed to be one of the few viable alterna-
tives (Burrows, 1997, pp. 233–41). Strengthening regional cooperation
was seen as a strategy towards this end. The idea of closer economic
cooperation within the Indian Ocean rim was also discussed within
academic circles in India and South Africa (Campbell and Scerri, 1995,
pp. 11–37).
A major factor that favoured regional cooperation in the Indian
Ocean was the radical change in South Africa’s political landscape.
India’s economic relations with South Africa had been minimal as New
Delhi refused to trade with the apartheid regime. However, trade in
some commodities was always conducted through third parties. Soon
after the regime change in Pretoria, there was a flurry of official and non-
official trade exchanges between the two countries, leading to the formal
launching of Indo-South African trade relations in 1993. A common
colonial background, the presence of a large and active ‘Indian Diaspora’
as well as the fairly developed industrial and manufacturing sectors in
both countries were viewed as positive factors in enhancing economic
relations once South Africa had returned to majority rule. Under the
new leadership of Nelson Mandela, South Africa was then welcomed
as a partner in regional cooperation. For South Africa, the imperative
was thus an economic need to open up to a previously ‘closed’ world if
investment and trade were to be encouraged.
After 1947, India’s geopolitical interests were different from those of
Australia. While Australia was firmly committed to her alliances with
Britain and the USA, India strove to follow the path of non-alignment
(even though the Indo-Soviet Treaty seemed to contradict this policy).
After the Cold War, the economic and political imperatives for Australia
were the need to find new markets, new trading partners, and to locate
the nation in the Asia-Pacific world as her former links with Europe
underwent profound changes.7
In Australia, there was a concerted move in the direction of economic
deregulation and the pursuit of a new regionally based position in the
world. In security terms, Australia moved to upgrade her almost non-
existent defence establishment on the west coast and formulated a ‘two
oceans’ naval defence policy whereby 50% of the Australian navy was
to be located on the west coast by the first decade of the twenty-first
century. Symbolizing this ‘westward’ trend, the Australian government
published a report on India in 1994 titled ‘India’s Economy at the
Midnight Hour. Australia’s India Strategy’. The report comprehensively
listed the economic advantages to both countries through their mem-
bership in an Indian Ocean Rim organization. The report projected that
with an annual growth rate of 5%, India would overtake Australia in eco-
nomic terms by the year 2000, which would in turn double Australian
annual exports to India.
In short, the end of apartheid in South Africa, the process of eco-
nomic liberalization in South Asia, and Australia’s changed security
perception removed impediments to expanding multilateral dialogues
and eventually were the catalysts for regional cooperation and eco-
nomic integration in the Indian Ocean. However, while the common
imperative was economic, there were different national perceptions of
the type of regional economic cooperation needed. In general, there was
agreement that there was a need to increase intra-regional trade and
investment flows as a means of boosting economic growth, but there

were different ideas about how this should be accomplished. Kenneth
McPherson, the then Director of Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies
in Perth, published an article that discussed an Australia–India–South
Africa axis as the possible beginning of a new political and economic
arrangement which could lead to an Indian Ocean zone of cooperation,
very much
on the lines of similar exclusive economic zones in Europe, North

America and the Pacific. […] The challenge of the 1990s for the coun-
tries which border the Indian Ocean will be to seize the opportunity
to develop a mechanism for regional cooperation which will advance
the economic and security interests of the nations of the region on a collec-
tive basis (emphasis added).
(cited in Saeed, 1995/96, pp. 72 and 94, footnote 5)
The Australian perception revealed an interest in incorporating ‘security’—

a move that diametrically contravened the Indian approach towards
regional cooperation and thus had to lead to a normative contestation,
namely a contestation of whose norms would prevail in the long run.
The conceptualization and evolution of IOR-ARC 1993–7

As a response to the events outlined above, two distinct multilateral ini-
tiatives were undertaken to promote intra-regional cooperation. While
the apartheid regime ended, South Africa began to explore opportuni-
ties for closer political and economic links with IOR countries. Official
and non-official exchange of delegations started taking place between
South Africa and India in the early 1990s. The director of South African
Trade and Investment visited India in May 1993 and called for an
Indian Ocean Rim bloc to be developed both by South Africa and India.
Hardly a month later, in June 1993, a delegation of the Federation of
Indian Exports Organizations (FIEO) reciprocated the South African visit
and supported the idea of a rim trade bloc consisting of India, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, Madagascar, Comoros, and
the Reunion Islands.
New initiatives were launched in November 1993 by Pik Botha, the
then Foreign Minister of South Africa, when diplomatic relations between
India and South Africa were established. The visiting foreign minister
greeted the new official relationship with the call for an economic group-
ing of IOR countries covering the East African countries, the Gulf coun-
tries, India, and Pakistan. Australia was not mentioned at that time. Such
a grouping was initially supposed to take up environmental and marine

affairs and other similar issues, and move on later to matters of trade.
In a meeting without aides which he held with the then Indian External
Affairs Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, Mr. Botha expressed his country’s
willingness to convene a conference of the states of the Indian Ocean
in Durban in August 1994 to discuss ways and means to improve trade
ties (see McPherson, 1994, pp. 12–13, 17).
Botha expected India’s cooperation in holding the first congress of
the IOR group and put forward a proposal for doing so. Yet, Botha
could not evoke a positive response, and India’s reaction remained
somewhat restrained. Again, just as in SAARC, the Indian response to
this initiative was governed by a positive but cautious approach, largely
because of her past experiences in the region. This reaction is compa-
rable to India’s acceptance of regional cooperation in South Asia only
‘in principle’. A striking example of how India prevailed in the pre-
localization stage is the visit of Botha in India: Botha mentioned the
Kashmir issue in a meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister and sug-
gested how the issue could be resolved in a forum such as was being
discussed. Saeed observed:
The fact that the South African Minister felt it necessary to mention
the Kashmir dispute at all was as significant as the total absence
eventually in the final communiqué of any current disputes in the
Indian Ocean Region which impinge upon its regional security envi-
ronment. India’s official position thus managed to prevail on the Kashmir
issue, simply because other countries which could have posed a challenge
were not included for discussions (emphasis added).
(Saeed, 1995/96, p. 74)
Discussing the Kashmir issue was anathema to India. This was in har-
mony with the principles of India’s foreign policy as outlined earlier. In
any case, India obviously felt that the 1993 South African initiative was
rather premature, but began to take a more positive approach after the
state visit of Nelson Mandela to Delhi in January 1995. This visit helped
to modify India’s perception and thus smoothed the path towards the
IOR initiative. President Mandela reinforced Pik Botha’s rim idea:
Recent changes in the international system demanded that the coun-

tries of Indian Ocean Rim could come together on a single platform.
The natural urge of the facts of history and geography should broaden
itself to include exploring the concept of an Indian Ocean Rim, of

socio-economic cooperation and other powerful endeavour.
(Das, 1995, p. 8)
President Mandela further suggested forming a ‘trading alliance’

in the Indian Ocean, a proposal which was welcomed by India. Yet,
Mandela did not mention the holding of a follow-up conference, e.g.,
in Durban, with its strong Indian community and historical Indian ties,
or elsewhere in South Africa. The inference that can be drawn from
this is that while South Africa supported cooperation among the rim
countries of the Indian Ocean, the Mandela government was either not
interested in—or able to—taking any major initiative for the Indian
Ocean concept, maybe hoping for an initiative from another country
to follow. This, of course, made it easier for India to become the agenda
setter. In a position paper, Pik Botha commented that ‘even though
there is a broad support for the IOR initiative in terms of priorities, how-
ever, it must be borne in mind that South Africa’s future economic and
political integration will first need to be into its immediate region and
thereafter into a broad region such as the IOR’ (Chhabra, 1995, p. 8).
These events show South Africa’s role as an initial norm entrepreneur
for regional multilateralism, in tandem with India.
A similar attempt at gathering support for regional cooperation was
undertaken by Mauritius at about the same time, almost in synchro-
nicity with South Africa. During a visit to India in August 1994, the
Foreign Minister of Mauritius, Ahmed Swala Kasenally, discussed the
first steps towards the setting up of an economic grouping of the IOR.
He held long discussions with the Foreign Minister of India. Kasenally
talked about the proposal to hold a conference of the ‘core’ countries of
the IOR-ARC in Port Louis, Mauritius. The countries to be invited were
India, South Africa, Australia, Mauritius, Kenya, Oman, and Singapore.
The Mauritius Foreign Minister underlined the need and significance of
such a grouping in the post-Cold War era and expressed his hope that
such an Indian Ocean grouping could take up the challenges posed in
the post-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) world (Das,
1995, p. 8).
The cornerstones for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean were
then laid down in March 1995. It was promoted by two different
initiatives, one from Mauritius and one from Australia (Mehta, 1997,
pp. 243–62). The final shape regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean
could take was already being limited by India’s refusal to have any kind
of political aspects included in the early deliberations. Again, norm subli-

mation of regional multilateralism at the earliest possible stage was about
to take place.
The Mauritius Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IORI)

(29–31 March 1995)
In March 1995, the government of Mauritius launched the Indian Ocean
Rim Initiative (IORI) in order to probe the possibility for an intensified
Indian Ocean Rim cooperation. As originally proposed by Mauritius
in December 1994 and supported by India, the first Inter-Government
Meeting (IGM) of Experts of Indian Ocean Rim countries was held in Port
Louis from 29 to 31 March 1995. The seven participating states—Australia,
Singapore, India, Oman, Kenya, South Africa, and Mauritius—were
supposed to represent seven sub-systems of the Indian Ocean region.
Besides government officials, members of the business community and
academia were also included in the consultations. Mauritius initially
favoured the approach of ‘moving through sub-regions rather than get-
ting stuck because all the elements are not there for forward movement
in the whole of the Indian Ocean region,’ as explained by her foreign
minister in August 1992 (Mehta, 1997, p. 255).
The precise nature of the proposed framework, however, was not
spelt out. Sandy Gordon highlights that ‘the Mauritius process was
developed by Mauritius under the guiding hand of India (emphasis added)’
(Gordon, 1996, p. 199), a clear reference to the early, marked impact of
India’s diplomacy. The meeting considered the significant political and
economic changes in the conduct of world affairs in recent years, the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in April 1994
and the setting up of the WTO, the growing trend towards regionalism,
and the increasing adoption of market-friendly policies by a growing
number of countries. It acknowledged the fact that the Indian Ocean
region shared a common history, had loose cultural links, and a long
history of close trade and economic relations. During the meeting, it
was decided to set up a working group comprising the representatives of
the seven participating countries and chaired by Mauritius to formulate
ideas and proposals in a report to achieve the objectives and advance
the implementation of the activities set out above. The meeting also rec-
ommended an intergovernmental meeting to be convened by Mauritius
within 12 months, to which the report of the Working Group would
be submitted.
Remembering her role in the promotion of Afro-Asian solidarity,
India, as explained by V. K. Grover, head of the Indian delegation at
Mauritius, ‘perceives an Indian Ocean Rim Initiative from the depths of

the Afro-Asian consciousness which Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal
Nehru imbued in us, as well as from shared experience.’ The Afro-Asian
rationale, however, ‘does not exclude Australia as Nehru, in defining
Asia, liked Australia to come nearer to Asia. There they are’ (Grover,
1997, p. 5).
The meeting acknowledged the vital interests shared by the Indian
Ocean region in the expansion of free trade and investment, both at
the regional and global levels, and expressed the conviction that close
cooperation was needed to utilize more effectively the human, natural,
and other resources of the Indian Ocean Region. In a joint statement
issued at the end of the meeting, the participants declared:
The Indian Ocean Rim Initiative seeks to establish a regional forum,

tripartite in nature, bringing together representatives of government,
business and academic, for promoting economic cooperation. In the
spirit of open regionalism, it seeks to build and expand understand-
ing and mutually beneficial cooperation through a consensus based,
evolutionary and non-intrusive approach.
(World Focus, 1995a, p. 19)
The Mauritius meeting concentrated primarily on economic matters

with the objective of stimulating intra-regional trade and investment,
and synergizing competitive advantages in commodities, manufacture,
and service sectors. The meeting noted that there was adequate consen-
sus among the members for proceeding further. A working group, com-
prising the seven founder members, was constituted (working group of
the M7) to formulate a charter as well as a future work programme.
The group also agreed that though the membership would be open to
all sovereign states of the Indian Ocean region, the expansion would
be carried out in phases and based upon consensus. The presence of busi-
ness people as well as of retired diplomats and members of the academic
community during that conference was an innovation in conference
diplomacy. Despite the presence of these persons, the Mauritius initia-
tive was an inter-governmental initiative and hence carried the stamp
of formal official policy. The new aspect of diplomacy associated with
this initiative towards regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean was the
emphasis upon the so-called track-two policy in which informal non-
official meetings were held, along with the formal official level delibera-
tions and the deliberations of both were dovetailed when reaching the
final decision. Political and strategic issues were consciously excluded.
The International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region 11–13 June

1995—The Perth Conference, Australia
The second initiative to forge the IOR countries into a wider political and
economic forum was again mooted by Australia, already a member of
the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) and thus experienced in
dealings with regional multilateralism. The meeting of the International
Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR) was held in Perth from 11
to 13 June 1995. IFIOR had a strong trans-national approach. Delegates
included nationals from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka in
South Asia, all the M-7 members, and participants form other rim coun-
tries, bringing together 122 participants from business, academia, and
government in their personal capacity from 23 Indian Ocean region
countries. While the track-one dialogue, the M-7, was official in nature,
the track-two dialogue was held at Perth. It was a non-governmental
meet and even government officials were presumed to have participated
in their private/personal capacity. The forum sought to complement and
provide ideas for the Mauritian government’s inter-governmental Indian
Ocean Rim initiative. The purpose of this first meeting was to develop a
sense of community among the countries of the Indian Ocean region, to
identify and explore opportunities for closer trade and investment and
prospects for enhanced regional cooperation in a wide range of areas
and to explore the interest in the development of networks among busi-
ness and academics of the region (World Focus, 1995b, p. 21).
Australia, as was pointed out earlier, had been promoting the idea
of Indian Ocean regional cooperation since the 1980s and was one of
the major promoters of the IOMAC. For this forum, the Australian for-
eign minister, Gareth Evans, strongly advocated participation by non-
officials, with business people, academics, and bureaucrats as observers.
Addressing the delegates, Evans said that prospects were better now than
at any time since World War II to actively explore regional cooperation.
He cited the Indian economic liberalization, among other factors, as
having created an atmosphere conducive to such initiatives. The Indian
Ocean states, according to Evans, had to become more outward looking,
deregulating their economies in order to capture the enormous growth
potential that interaction with other states offered. Evans prophesied
that ‘the emergence of regionalism in the Indian Ocean would certainly
not be before time,’ since ‘many states have come to recognize how effec-
tive regional cooperation can be for advancing a broad range of national
interests’ (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995).
The work of the forum was undertaken by a large group of panellists
and participants from the region in plenary discussions, an ‘Economic
Working Group’ on regional trade, investment, and economic coopera-

tion and a so-called ‘Other Issue Working Group’ covering issues such
as the environment, maritime issues, human resources development,
and options for regional security dialogue. Unlike the Mauritius meet-
ing, the Perth meeting had a more comprehensive agenda that included
economic and fiscal matters, social, political and strategic issues, as well
as maritime issues dealing with the Indian Ocean per se, all of which the
Mauritius group had virtually ignored. A scrutiny of the Perth agenda
reveals its close parallels to the IOMAC programme, which is not sur-
prising considering the role of Australia. According to K. R. Singh, ‘some
participants, particularly from India, successfully tried to restrict the
debate to economic matters’ (Singh, 2005, p. 348).
Indian official delegates were apprehensive that bilateral disputes
might be raised if, in a proposed multilateral association like the Perth
Forum, ‘security’ was placed on the agenda. Some felt that ‘Canberra
does not seem to be too keen on economic cooperation, since it is part
of the APEC. It is more interested in roping in other countries as a pos-
sible bulwark against the rising power of China,’ while some even sus-
pected that Australia’s interest in regional security may be driven by her
desire to ultimately legitimize Western military presence in the Indian
Ocean (Mahapatra, 1996, p. 18). Sandy Gordon noted:
The Australian initiative created some discomfort on the part of India

which saw it as a challenge to the Mauritius process. […] Tensions
between the two processes were also exacerbated by the inclusion of a
discussion on comprehensive security at the Perth meeting. The inclu-
sion of security at Perth had been hotly contested both prior to the
meeting and in the course of it. A number of leading regional countries […]
argued strongly that it was premature to introduce security issues. They were
of the view that security issues would detract from the economic goals of
regionalism and could even derail the regional process (emphasis added).
(Gordon, 1996, p. 201)
In view of the problems besetting the rim, Australia initially expressed

her keen interest in including security issues (Gareth, 1995). The issue
of security was introduced into the IFIOR agenda at the insistence of
Australia, with the ‘consensus’ being summed up by a senior Indian
official thus:
[The Indian Ocean Initiative] should be an economic bridgehead. […]

We want [it] to concentrate on economic cooperation […]. It is best
to work together on something that unites us rather than on that

which separated us. It is our firm belief that economic cooperation
and the resultant growth and development of our Indian Ocean world
will itself have a beneficent leavening influence on the political and
security climate of the region.
(cited in Gordon, 1996, p. 201)
This straightforwardly demonstrates India’s normative approach and

position as outlined above and reveals that Australia, as the first norm
entrepreneur in the process of normative contestation, originally fol-
lowed her own (normative) agenda. The divergence of approach over
the rim plan overtly came to the fore at Perth. Australia preferred
‘security issues’ to be included along with economic matters in the new
type of forum. Similarly, Australia also preferred a broad-based repre-
sentation of the rim countries. A majority of the delegates at the Perth
Forum, openly influenced and led by India, insisted on excluding
the security agenda and on a limited membership, in harmony with
India’s traditional approach to regional cooperation. At the forum, the
Australian attempts of bringing regional security into the ambit of
the rim agenda eventually proved futile and unsuccessful, which led
the Australian media to conclude that the ‘defeat of Australia’s pro-
posal to establish a new organization of the littoral states of the Indian
Ocean […] is a major setback for the “Look West” strategy’ (Mahapatra,
1996, p. 19).
Australia practically refrained from raising security issues again (Downer,
1997). It was thus at this early point in time that norm sublimation
from the original regional multilateralism to the shape of Panchsheel
multilateralism took place.
The Mauritius group of seven states decided to give a more concrete
shape to the initiative. A Working Group composed of members of all
the seven sponsoring states was constituted to formulate a charter, chalk
out a future work programme, as well as dealing with future members,
a question that seemed most relevant in light of the diverse composi-
tion of countries of the IOR.
Three institutions—IFIOR, the Indian Ocean Rim Consultative Business
Network (IOR-CBN), and the Indian Ocean Research Network (IORNET)—
were suggested, mostly as non-governmental business and academic
networks. The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry agreed
to act as the interim coordinator for the business group. The Indian
Ocean Centre was set up at Perth, financed by Australia. The Australian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry agreed to act as Interior Coordinator
for the Consultative Business Network and report to the meeting in New
Delhi. The IORNET was to serve as point of reference to any interested
party in the Indian Ocean region and was to promote the exchange of
information and data, consultative dialogue between researchers and
encourage joint research projects.
Meetings of the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IORI) Working

Grouph8
As a follow up, the first Working Group Meeting of IORI was held in
Port Louis, Mauritius, from 15 to 17 August 1995. A tripartite Working
Group (government officials, academic, and private sector) decided to
create a second track process. The working group meeting approved
the gradual extension of IORI. Among other things, it recommended
that the membership be expanded from 7 to 14 countries.9 According
to the Chairman of the Working Group, Mr. R. Bheenick, ‘the Indian
Ocean Rim will make a declaration regarding the adhesion of other
countries within it during the course of its next meeting’ (World Focus,
1997b, p. 73).
This decision was in accordance with the Indian position on a gradual,
block-by-block approach to the expansion of membership, which was
supported and accepted by the Working Group Meeting. According to
the former Indian Commerce Minister, P. Chidambaram, ‘it [the estab-
lishment of a regional organization in the Indian Ocean] will not be
an easy exercise. While I am extremely optimistic, I must caution that,
given the diversity of countries, we should proceed with care and only
after deliberations. Controversial bilateral issues should be excluded
from the deliberations’ (cited in Gordon, 1996, p. 216).
Mauritius was assigned the task of coordinating the Work Programme
of IORI. The Working Group Meeting established an Indian Ocean Rim
Business Forum (IOR-BF) and the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group
(IOR-AG). Based on comments made and written inputs to be received
from other delegations, the working group mandated India to coordi-
nate the preparation of a draft charter for the considerations of the next
working group meeting. Thereby, India was able to draft the charter
according to her own predilections and preferences, as had happened
a decade earlier in the case of SAARC. Being the agenda setter, regional
multilateralism was localized by taking on a shape that was in accord-
ance with Indian norms.
The second Working Group Meeting of IORI was held in Port Louis on
14–16 May 1996. Representatives from seven member states attended the
meeting. The Mauritian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Paul Berenger, echoing similar statements during the SARC delib-
erations, was quoted as having said:
Politically it is high time that we graduate to a higher level. We have

a lot of lost time to catch up so as to become a serious interlocutor
of other similar regional groupings and international institutions.
Past experience in regional cooperation at the level for the region’s
respective sub-regions should enable the region to move at a reason-
able pace.
(Indian Ocean Network News, 1996a)
The Indian-crafted first draft of the ‘Indian Ocean Rim Initiative

Charter’ was discussed, revised, and referred to governments of both
member states and prospective member states. In addition, the draft
‘Indian Ocean Rim Initiative Work Programme’ was discussed, as was
the ‘Agreement on the Development of an Action Plan’ based on the
work programme and proposals of the IOR-BF and the IOR-AG. IOR-BF
and IOR-AG met in separate sessions to examine the work programme
with a view to contributing to it. IOR-BF and IOR-AG reports were also
discussed.
The third Working Group Meeting of IORI involving the M-7 was
held on 9 September 1996 in Mauritius, back-to-back with the second
IGM on 10–11 September 1996. The working group finalized the details
which were then discussed in the inter-governmental meetings held at
Mauritius from 10 to 11 September 1996. The charter was also finalized
and recommended for formal adoption at the first Ministerial Meeting
(Indian Ocean Network News, 1996b).
During this meeting, it was decided that the association was to be called
the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC).
The role played by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce
and Industry (FICCI) in coordinating the business network of the IOR
and the choice of an Indian scholar as the first to hold the Indian
Ocean Chair established by the IOR were not entirely unconnected
to India’s critical role in the genesis of the IOR-ARC, and also India’s
long-term objectives in the organization. Thus, an Indian observer con-
cluded in 1996 in ‘The Hindu’ that ‘wittingly or unwittingly, India has
taken over the leadership role in this regional cooperation programme’
(Chhabra, 1996). Being the normative hegemon in the initial delib-
erations, India safeguarded her political prerogatives of bilateralism
and national sovereignty and arranged for the IOR-ARC to become an
organization in which India was the main agenda setter; for the MEA,
India’s cooperation in the IOR-ARC was ‘[…] inspired by the Nehruvian

vision of Afro-Asian solidarity and coincides with India’s “Look East”
policy’ (MEA 1997).
The South African (post-apartheid) regime’s dilemma of defining her
priorities—choosing between cooperating closer with the North and
the South, between concentrating on the immediate African neighbour-
hood and the broader IOR—led South Africa to take, according to one
analyst, ‘a low key position in the IOR-ARC not having a strong stand
on any particular issue’ (Pienaar, 1996, p. 180). This also allowed India
to become the main actor in IOR-ARC.
The founding and development of the IOR-ARC

The first meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials of IOR-ARC was
held from 3 to 4 March 1997 in Mauritius. In this meeting, guidelines
for projects in the Work Programme were updated. In the beginning,
some members refused to establish a secretariat, because they feared
that IOR-ARC might become over-bureaucratized.10 The significance
and necessity of the IOR-ARC was summarized by Deve Gowda, former
Prime Minister of India:
IOR-ARC fulfils a long-felt need among the states of the Indian Ocean
to give tangible form to their aspirations for enhanced regional econo-
mic cooperation. The momentous results obtained by various regions
of the world through committed collective efforts is a pointer both to
the unrealized potential and enormous possibilities that exist in this
vast region, to which states of the Indian Ocean Rim need to address
themselves with a sense of urgency. Indeed, this effort is a recovery of
history for societies which have enjoyed a close network of commercial and
cultural interchange in the past, but which was disrupted by the colonial
experience. It is also an enterprise necessary to lift the quality of life of
all our peoples. The IOR-ARC will develop in the Indian Ocean Rim
an identity which will enrich and promote a sense of shared identity
(emphasis added).
(World Focus, 1997a, p. 15)
The first Ministerial Meeting of the IOR-ARC was held in 5–7 March
1997 at Port Louis in Mauritius. The Foreign Ministers and representa-
tives of the 14 members of the IOR-ARC11 adopted the charter of the
association and also a chairman’s statement setting out the consensus
and plan of action. A new regional programme for economic coopera-
tion was thus formally launched in the Indian Ocean. The Australian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, subsequently made two

very significant public statements. He declared:
Australia is pleased to have been a part of the Indian Ocean Rim

Initiative since its inception and to be a founding member of the
IOR-ARC. […] The IOR-ARC will be an outward looking forum for
economic dialogue and cooperation, in some respects like APEC,
and all founding members of the Association have agreed that the
Association will not be a preferential trading area. No formal treaty
will be required for its establishment.
(Downer, 1997a)
Shortly afterwards, Downer summed up the achievements of the IOR-

ARC first meeting:
The Government recognises that, in the past, there have been frank dif-
ferences of view among the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean on a range
of international issues. […] I want to emphasise that the Association
is not a forum for discussing security issues in the Indian Ocean. We
believe that it would be counterproductive to bring security considerations
into the IOR-ARC at this formative stage. This is a view shared by all of
the Association’s participants. In time, the countries of the region may
want to consider the introduction of security issues—but it is not on the
agenda for the foreseeable future (emphasis added).
(Downer, 1997b)
This statement dovetailed with the Indian position and revealed that
Australia had suddenly performed a complete turnaround. It had finally
accepted the Indian ‘approach’ (i.e., normative predominance) and thus
India’s normative hegemony in regional multilateralism: economics
and trade were acceptable issues of cooperation, whereas security and
contentious issues were not.
The IOR-ARC structure and the IOR-ARC ministerial meetings

1997–2012
Between 1997 and 2012, 11 official ministerial meetings (foreign min-
isters) were held which were preceded or followed by meetings of the
track-two type. These regular meetings aimed at deepening multilat-
eral cooperation in the IOR. It was agreed on a rotating presidency.
The IOR-ARC Charter prescribes the nature, scope, and limits of the
regional multilateralism that the member states envisage in the Indian
Ocean region. The charter formalized the name of the rim group as the
Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)
and provided for the establishment of a secretariat in Mauritius (‘pilot
mechanism’), which started to function in January 1998, for coordina-
tion, servicing, and monitoring the implementation of policy decisions
as well as for administrative matters.
All sovereign states of the Indian Ocean Rim are eligible for member-
ship. The charter declares in its fundamental principles that it ‘seeks to
build and expand understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation
through a consensus-based, evolutionary and non-intrusive approach’
and that decisions will be taken ‘on the basis of consensus’, and that
‘bilateral issues likely to generate controversy […] will be excluded
from deliberations.’ It also stresses the firm adherence to the Panchsheel
principles:
Article 2(i) Cooperation within the framework of the India Ocean

Rim will be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equal-
ity, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in
internal affairs, peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit.
The main objectives of IOR-ARC as stated in Article 3(i) are to promote

‘sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of the
Member states, and to create a common ground for regional coopera-
tion.’ These goals should be achieved by liberalizing trade and foreign
investment following the rules of the WTO. The charter also recognizes
that almost all the members of the IOR-ARC are members of other
regional organizations. Hence, it explicitly states that the membership
of the IOR-ARC does not prevent member states from being members
of other economic cooperation organizations. Article 2(v), for instance,
states that the association ‘will not be a substitute for, but seek to rein-
force, be complementary to and consistent with their bilateral, plurilat-
eral and multilateral obligation’ of the member states.
The objective of the charter is ‘to strengthen cooperation and dia-
logue among Member States in international fora on global economic
issues and, where desirable, develop shared strategies and take common
positions in the international fora on issues of mutual interest.’ The
focus is on those areas of economic cooperation that provide maximum
opportunities to develop shared interests and reap mutual benefits. The
‘open regionalism’ of the IOR-ARC has four components: trade liberali-
zation (with a non-discriminatory basis towards members, a 2020 dead-
line to reduce tariffs to zero for all member countries of the IOR-ARC),
trade and investment facilitation, economic and technical cooperation,

trade and investment dialogue.
The charter also formalizes the integrative nature of track-two diplo-
macy. It recognizes the inputs of non-official groups like the IOR Business
Forum and the IOR Academic Group, which have been involved not
only in the conceptualization of the IOR initiative, but also in the for-
mulation and implementation of various projects.
Despite the objectives of the charter, two major international develop-
ments slowed down the pace of efforts at forging closer ties in the IOR
shortly after its inception: the nuclear tests on the Indian subcontinent in
1998 and the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. Both events exposed
the fragility of the perceived regional, political, and economic comple-
mentarities. Along with Australia and South Africa, several other smaller
powers in the IOR-ARC (not Mauritius) opposed the Indian nuclear
explosions. But the most vocal reaction came from Australia. An indefi-
nite ban on non-humanitarian aid to India and Pakistan was imposed,
and military supplies and high-level official visits to the subcontinent
were suspended. Australia unsuccessfully pressed the next ARF meeting
to issue a strong declaration denouncing the tests. India, in turn, with-
drew her military attaché from Canberra and announced the banning of
Australian ships from Indian waters and over-flight facilities to Australia’s
military aircraft. The India-Australian relations were thus strained and
made it difficult to cooperate regionally. In her behaviour towards the
member countries of the IOR-ARC, India exhibited the same behaviour as
towards those of the SAARC with a view to the nuclear tests: no member
country of the organization had been informed. Political realism as the
guiding principle of India’s foreign policy was also the major determinant
of India’s behaviour here.
The second IOR-ARC Council of Ministers Meeting was held in Maputo,
Mozambique, in March 1999. The ministers of the member states agreed
to a realistic, outcome focused trade and investment agenda, based
on trade facilitation, trade liberalization, and economic and technical
cooperation. A new Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI)
was created to promote these activities. Much time was spent on the
question of admitting new members, apparently because there was a
great deal of uncertainty with regard to whose membership was accept-
able or desirable.
The forum eventually decided to invite Bangladesh, the Seychelles,
Iran, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to join as new mem-
bers, increasing the members of IOR-ARC to 19. Following the example
of ASEAN, the concept of dialogue partners was introduced, with Egypt
and Japan becoming the first partners (Jayanth, 1999). On 12 December

1997, Stanley Kalpage commented:
A significant omission among the participating countries is Pakistan.

It is inconceivable that the second largest state in South Asia, stra-
tegically situated and with an undoubted interest in India Ocean
affairs should be kept out. This certainly would not be ‘in the spirit
of SAARC’.
(Stanley Kalpage, 1997b)
An extraordinary IOR-ARC Council of Ministers Meeting took place in

Muscat, Oman, in January 2000. The meeting approved applications for
dialogue partner status from China and the UK, and the five new mem-
bers were formally admitted: Bangladesh, Iran, Seychelles, Thailand,
and the United Arab Emirates; in addition, five dialogue partners for
trade and investment: China, Egypt, France, Japan, and the UK; and one
observer: the Indian Ocean Tourism Organization (IOTO). The associa-
tion’s membership was thus raised to 19. The secretariat was upgraded
to a coordinating secretariat, its main functions including coordination,
monitoring, and servicing the association.12 The ministers adopted a
trade and investment plan of action including compendia on customs
regimes, quarantine, and food inspection and investment regimes, to be
completed before the next ministerial meeting in Oman in April 2001.
The most contentious issues were the application of France and
Pakistan. France applied because of her sovereignty of La Reunion but
was rejected as the charter mentioned that only sovereign states of the
region were allowed to become members. The meeting eventually also
rejected the application of Pakistan. India deemed Pakistan ineligible
for IOR-ARC membership. Officially, Pakistan was rejected because it
refused to grant India the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, a precon-
dition for membership laid down in the charter. The author was given
a more compelling reason by a former Indian secretary. Given the long-
standing tensions between both countries on Kashmir, India opposed
Pakistani membership and wanted to make sure that Pakistan could
not use the IOR-ARC for any political manoeuvres. This also dovetails
with India’s policy of ‘competing regionalism’ (cf. research question 3
and Chapter 5). Without Pakistan being a member, India could attempt
to insist on her own economic agenda without having to make conces-
sions to Pakistan. And without the latter, India was undoubtedly the
major player in the IOR-ARC, having already outmanoeuvred Australia
in the initial deliberations.
The third IOR-ARC Council of Ministers Meeting was held in Muscat,

Oman, on 7–8 April 2001. At this meeting, France was admitted as a
dialogue partner. During its meeting, the CoM decided to endorse the
recommendation of the CSO to establish a High-Level Task Force (HLTF)
to study the future direction of the Association, as well as a number of
issues that had been hampering the Association in the achievement of
its set goals. It was also established to revitalize the trade and invest-
ment agenda and to work out organizational reforms. The IOR-ARC
Secretariat assessed the IOR-ARC’s state of affairs and achievements in
2001 as follows:
We have completed this first phase of bringing our peoples together

in a spirit of friendship and solidarity. There is definitely a sense of
belonging as well as a collective identity. We have, therefore, cre-
ated the critical mass necessary for the association to take up the
challenges brought about by globalization and internationalization
of the member economies. The IOR-ARC is also being increasingly
recognized on the international scene.
(IOR-ARC Secretariat, 2001)
However, despite the rhetoric, it remains unclear exactly where a

‘collective identity’ in IOR-ARC had emerged. The HLTF met on 22–23
October 2001 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and presented its first report to
the CSO meeting in Oman in May 2002. Together with India, Australia,
Kenya, Oman, and the Secretariat, South Africa drafted the Report of
the CSO. It was agreed that in order to expedite ministerial approval of
the HLTF report, an ‘Extraordinary CoM’ meeting could be held on the
margins of UNGA in New York in September 2002. However, the New
York meeting was not able to approve the report. The 2003 meetings
of the various components of the IOR-ARC were initially scheduled
for March–April in Colombo, Sri Lanka, but they had to be postponed.
The Seychelles announced their withdrawal from the Association in
July 2003.
Sri Lanka chaired and hosted the fourth IOR-ARC Council of Ministers
Meeting and other related meetings from 7 to 13 October 2003. Realizing
the need to provide continuous direction and orientation for IOR-ARC,
the meeting of the Council of Ministers adopted a decision that the
council should meet annually while the duration of the chair remained
for two years. The report of the HLTF which was widely considered as
the blue print for the future direction of IOR-ARC was adopted at this
meeting.
The fifth IOR-ARC Council of Ministers Meeting and related meet-

ings were again held in Colombo from 21 to 27 August 2004. A total of
143 representatives of IOR-ARC’s 18 members examined strategies for
further strengthening intra-regional trade and investment linkages and
promoting economic development. At the inaugural session, the then
Sri Lankan Minister of Foreign Affairs Lakshman Kadirgama realized
that the organization had not achieved any of its original goals and had
remained a non-performer:
In my view the member States must at this moment in the history

of IOR-ARC, when its early promise is perhaps belied by the harsh
realities of the modern economic world, support the organization
with an infusion of fresh political commitment. This organization
belongs to the member States. They have built a valuable structure
for cooperation with the inclusion of the academic and business
communities. If the organization falters or fails it will be because the
member States had by default let that happen.
(Kadirgama, 2004)
His words clearly reflected frustration at the achievements, and yet

also hope and show a striking similarity with the speeches made at the
13th and 14th SAARC meeting. The meeting agreed that all member
states share equal contributions. At that time, each member contrib-
uted US$6700 per year, but after Mauritius and Sri Lanka discontinued
the support in 2005, each member’s contribution increased to approxi-
mately US$22,000 per year. The meeting agreed to accept Qatar as a new
Dialogue Partner13 and to prioritize projects with high potential and pos-
sibility for the member states, i.e., fishery, tourism, and the facilitation of
trade and investment. Moreover, it is agreed to establish a ‘Special Fund’
from the remaining budget of the Secretariat for the projects’ operation.
The then Indian Minister of State for External Affairs E. Ahamed made
the following statement, which showed India’s position vis-à-vis the
‘candid’ words of the Sri Lankan chairman, and reflected the Indian
approach, with a particular focus on trade:
It [IOR-ARC] needs to be provided greater substance. Only when we

show real progress, would we be noticed and listened. […] But unless
there is commitment of participation from at least a simple majority
of our membership, the enthusiasm gets diluted. […] In assessing the
achievements of our organization, we must also take into account the fact
that we are a diverse group of countries, coming from different geographical
locations, different levels of economic development and belonging to our

respective regional groupings (emphasis added).
(Ahamed, 2004)
While here lack of enthusiasm of other member states was men-

tioned, the failure of the IOR-ARC to achieve practically anything at all
was not adequately addressed by the Indian spokesperson.
At the sixth Council of Ministers Meeting of the IOR-ARC held in
Tehran, Iran, in February 2006, it was decided that a working group
consisting of Heads of Diplomatic Missions of member states based
in Pretoria was to be created in order to review the periodic work pro-
gramme presented by the Chair of the Council, and to fast track the
agenda of the IOR-ARC.
The Working Group of the Heads of Mission (WGHM) met in May
2006.14 On that occasion, South African Deputy Minister van der Merwe
highlighted the importance of the IOR-ARC as an instrument to promote
shared economic benefits between all member states of the Association.15
She also pointed out that the activities of IOR-ARC should not be seen
in isolation but as complimentary to other inter-regional initiatives
such as the New Asian African Strategic Partnership.
The seventh Council of Ministers Meeting took place in Tehran, Iran,
from 6 to 7 March 2007. During the General Debate, the South African
Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad made the following remarks, candidly sum-
marizing the unsatisfactory situation after seven years of ‘regional mul-
tilateralism’ in the Indian Ocean Rim, mirroring similar statements on
SAARC at different points in time on the non-performance and stasis of
the organization:
A Secretariat non-paper calls on us to discuss clear and concrete pro-

posals to re-energise the organization and prevent it from dying
a natural death. We do not have the luxury of allowing our Association
to die naturally or unnaturally. The non-paper identifies some prob-
lems: […] I am sure that we all agree that the IOR-ARC should be
more than a platform for sharing ideas but must serve as a vehicle
towards producing tangible results that have a qualitative impact on
our developmental agenda. An important element of making this
a reality is the strengthening of the necessary institutional capacity.
(Pahad, 2007)
The next CoM meeting also took place in Teheran (eighth Council
of Ministers Meeting, Teheran, 4–5 May 2008), which was followed by
two meeting in Sana’a (ninth Council of Ministers Meeting, 25–27 June
2009; 10th Council of Ministers Meeting, 2–5 August 2010). During the
two CoM meetings in Sana’a, the issue of piracy and its relevance for the
Indian Ocean was debated. However, no decision as to a common posi-
tion or common declaration was reached. The ninth CoM meeting agreed
to support the Yemenite initiative to establish a regional anti-piracy
centre in Yemen. The same discussion took place during the 10th CoM
meeting, also without reaching any concrete agreement or an ensuing
common declaration. The Communiqué adopted by the CoM in Yemen
called for cooperation in investment, trade, tourism, construction, educa-
tion and training, protection of the environment, new renewable energy,
an agro-meteorological advisory service system to increase agricultural
output and forecasting the track, intensity, landfall prediction, and
impact assessment of tropical cyclones. The meeting also endorsed a
revised IOR-ARC charter. The major tangible achievement of the 10th
CoM was to grant observer status to the Indian Ocean Research Group,
only the second observer until 2012.
The 11th Council of Ministers Meeting of the IOR-ARC was held in
Bengaluru, India, on 8–15 November 2011. The Seychelles, which left the
organization in 2003, rejoined the IOR-ARC to become its 19th member.
Expressing concern over the limited growth of intra-regional trade due to
poor connectivity, market complexities, and inadequate trade facilitation,
the then Indian External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna called upon the
member nations to increase intra-regional investment flows. Mr. Krishna
also said the organization had identified six priority areas, namely mari-
time security, disaster management, science and technology, fisheries,
trade and investment, and tourism. Finally, the meeting unanimously
accepted the suggestion made by Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd
to change the name of the organization.
The final results of this CoM are testament to the lacking robustness
of the norm of regional multilateralism. Especially the decision to change
the name of the organization and to now focus on six priority areas are
a clear indicator that after 15 years of its existence, IOR regional multi-
lateralism has practically ended in a deadlock.
IOR-ARC structure and institutional set-up

As of 2012, the IOR-AR has 19 members and five dialogue partners.16
It has formalized 10 work programmes that are to be coordinated among
different members. Since the work programmes are, by and large, the
responsibility of the second track, official institutions are limited to three
bodies (see Figure 4.1): the Council of Ministers (COM), the Committee
of Senior Officials (CSO), and the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum
(IORBF). The IORBF was seen as part of a unique structure, created as an
Council of Ministers
(COM)
Committee of Senior IOR-ARC High-Level

Officials (CSO) Task Force (HLTF)
Indian Ocean Rim Working Group on Indian Ocean Rim

Business Forum Trade and Academic Group
(IORBF) Investement (WGTI) (IORAG)
IOR-ARC Regional
Centre for Science and
Technology Transfer
(IOR-RCSTT)
Dialogue
Partners
United
China Egypt France Japan Qatar
Kingdom
Observer Status
Indian Ocean Indian Ocean

Tourism Research Group
Organization (IOTO) (IORG)
Figure 4.1 IOR-ARC institutional set-up and dialogue partners (2012)
opportunity to increase networking between the three tiers within the

region. The Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group (IORAG) interacts with
the COM, the CSO, and the Secretariat in the consideration, formula-
tion, and implementation of the policy and work programmes of the
IOR-ARC:
India’s impact on the development of regional multilateralism in

the IOR-ARC
India has time and again declared the Indian Ocean her defence perimeter
(Hagerty, 1991, pp. 351–63), a statement which shows the significance of
the Ocean for India’s strategic defence policy.17 The process-tracing of
the evolutionary stages of the IOR-ARC has demonstrated that India’s

active participation was the major prerequisite for the founding of a
regional organization in the Indian Ocean, and it was a necessity for
India as well, especially considering the diffusion of Indian culture in
the IOR, the economic significance, and the political issues (security)
at stake.
Yet, insufficient attention was devoted to the exact institutional
mechanisms (therefore a lack of institutional clarity), the consequences
of using the ‘consensus’ model and of adopting the tripartite govern-
ance model of APEC, without discussing the appropriateness of the lat-
ter for the IOR region. One of the key features of the IOR-ARC (again
comparable to APEC model) is the adherence to the concept of ‘open
regionalism’, with four major components: trade liberalization, trade and
investment facilitation, economic and technical cooperation, and trade
and investment dialogue. Essentially, the objective is the maximization
of trade and investment opportunities through a flexible regulatory sys-
tem and through elastic rules of membership. Compliance is not subject
to any institutional structure specifying rules and regulations. Within
the framework of this open regionalism, India could actually profitably
interact with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore without being a mem-
ber of ASEAN, which could therefore allow India to enlarge her field of
economic interaction.
Still, since the establishment of the IOR-ARC and despite uncountable
meetings of the various IOR-ARC institutions (in 2011, e.g., the IORAG
met for the 16th time since 1997), IOR-ARC has not acquired any public
profile. In 2009, the then Indian Minister of State for External Affairs,
Shashi Tharoor, commented: ‘The organization itself is lean to the
point of emaciation, with just a half-dozen staff (including the gar-
dener!) in its Mauritius secretariat’ (Tharoor, 2009). Considering the elo-
quent speeches and the various activities that took place between 1994
and 1997, the current institutional structure and activities bears little
resemblance to what had been anticipated in the beginning. The IOR-
ARC is therefore another example of the effects of norm localization and
norm sublimation, with a clear Indian ‘bias’ and normative domina-
tion, essentially leading to the institutional shortcomings of Panchsheel
multilateralism. Table 4.2 enumerates the features of Panchsheel multi-
lateralism in the IOR-ARC.
Considering the institutional key features above, the IOR-ARC suffers
from an institutional stasis which is clearly the result of the deliberations
leading to the IOR-ARC charter. From the beginning, politicians stressed
the need to create an institutional framework that would be compatible
Table 4.2 IOR-ARC features of Panchsheel multilateralism
Non-negotiable principles ab initio

No contentious issues and no bilateral issues
Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
internal affairs
IOR-ARC—Institutional key features

Voluntary formation Yes
Equal voting rights (equality) Yes—Consensus model
Working together to achieve specific goals Economic cooperation,
and projects (purpose/scope/general agenda academic cooperation, cultural
setting) cooperation
agenda)
inclusive approach
Common identity-building No, civilizational identity
‘assumed’, no regional identity
Institution-building No
Regional geographical clarity No: Pakistan rejected
Absence of normative hegemon No: Indian normative
orthodoxy dominated, initial
norm entrepreneurs Australia/
South Africa ‘pushed aside’
with other kinds of regional groupings and would strengthen intercul-

tural linkages (see the remarks of Indian Prime Minister Deve Gowda
and Acting Prime Minister R. Berenger of Mauritius [IORBC, 1997, p. 2]).
Yet, until 2012 there has not even been one single summit meeting of
the heads of state and government that could strengthen this kind of
cooperation, thereby providing support to the creation of a common

identity. Also, no regional organization that promotes a different set of
values and principles of cooperation is represented (unlike in ASEM
and APEC). Such representation could lead to a sharper profile of the
organization and therefore the possibility of identity-building (Hänggi,
2003, pp. 197–219).
Compared to other organizations in Asia such as ASEAN, the involve-
ment of the member states ranges from very modest to non-existent. This
lack of support (or restrained support) will make processes of institution-
and identity-building very difficult to achieve. The forum still has no
(robust) institutional framework and rules and procedures (Kelegama,
1999). Also, although the common historical heritage and linkages were
emphasized at the inception in various speeches, considering the vast
geographical distances, the cultural differences between, e.g., Singapore
(broadly speaking: ‘Asian’ values) and Mozambique (‘African-European’
values), it is difficult to fathom how a ‘common identity’ of such diverse
countries can be constructed, rhetoric notwithstanding.
The activities and the networking in the track-two sphere (among
business and academic communities) may in some measure compensate
for the absence of a functional institutional structure. IOR-ARC is coor-
dinated by national focal points, mainly universities, research institu-
tions, and different chambers of commerce and industry. But without an
institutional structure, no coordination of policies can be expected in
the future, a fact which was prominently expressed by Sashi Tharoor:
‘The formula of pursuing work in an Academic Group, a Business Forum,
and a Working Group on Trade and Investment has not yet brought either
focus or drive to the parent body’ (Tharoor, 2009). Also, the Indian
focus in the IOR-ARC has always been on soft issues, such as media and
arts, followed by economic concern. The issue of piracy as one of the
current major threats for global trade and one of the topic of debates
in the 9th and 10th CoM was not addressed by India, since the Indian
‘vision’ of regional multilateralism does not allow for security matters
to play a role on the IOR-ARC agenda.
Finally, besides India, two other SAARC countries—Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh—are also members of IOR-ARC. Pakistan’s request for mem-
bership was rejected by the forum. By doing so, the forum was able to
keep Pakistan outside the organization. Instead of strengthening SAARC,
India has thus weakened the SAARC by showing that her interest in forg-
ing other regional ties amounts to, in the final analysis, alienating mem-
bers in the South Asian grouping (Pakistan). Here, the direct negative
repercussions of a policy of competing regionalism (cf. research ques-

tion 3) become apparent. Weak South Asian regional multilateralism
was followed by an equally weak multilateralism in the Indian Ocean
region, although both regions have similarities and complementarities.
Instead of strengthening one organization at the cost of the other (both
might have been strengthened), both have remained weak.
All of this, in a way, is an outcome of the missing robustness of the
norm of regional multilateralism in its sublimated form. For IOR-ARC,
the outcome, comparable to SAARC, is a normative shape that stresses
economics, without providing even the bare minimum tools necessary
to advance in that field. In 2009, Tharoor remarked that after 12 years
of cooperation: ‘[IOR-ARC has not] done enough to get beyond the
declaratory phase that marks most new initiatives’ (Tharoor, 2009). The
four major problems of Indian Ocean regional multilateralism are in
their entirety a direct consequence of the Panchsheel-style cooperation
and architecture: (1) the refusal to discuss any matters with political or
security relevance, (2) the absence of any clear picture of what regional
multilateralism in the Indian Ocean can realistically achieve, (3) the fail-
ure to reach agreement on an institutional set-up which permits to man-
age such a diverse organization effectively and efficiently, and finally
(4) the weak commitment to any concept of regional multilateralism
going beyond culture and unspecified economic parameters by the
member states of IOR-ARC.
The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical

and Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC)
After having analysed the SAARC and the IOR-ARC in the two previ-
ous sections, this section will now use the process-tracing approach
to analyse the emergence and development of BIMST-EC and evalu-
ate the impact of India’s ‘Look East’ policy from a normative-ideational
standpoint.
Contextualizing BIMST-EC: economic and ideational origins and

India’s ‘Look East’ Policy
The end of the Cold War signalled the beginning of the (not altogether
voluntary) entrance of India into the world economy: In January 1991,
India was left with only US$1 billion in foreign reserves, approxi-
mately equivalent to imports lasting less than two weeks (Reserve Bank
of India, 1992). This was coupled with a balance of payment crisis in
the external sector. Economists concluded that the balance of payment
crisis of 1991 in India took place on account of (the historically and
philosophically based) import-substitution policy of the government
(Ahluwalia, 1999, pp. 26–81). India’s credit rating was downgraded by
international rating agencies, which immediately resulted in the non-
availability of commercial borrowings. The flow of foreign exchange
from Indians working in the Gulf, an important contributor to India’s
foreign exchange income, also drastically decreased as a consequence of
the Gulf War in 1990–1. This balance of payment crisis at last triggered
much needed reforms in the external sectors of the economy. India sub-
sequently announced her ‘New Economic Policy’ (NEP) on 4 July 1991
under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao. India officially declared
the adoption of market-friendly reforms with specific reference to tariffs,
import licensing, export subsidies, exchange rate, and FDI.18
This policy was clearly guided by economic imperatives and was ini-
tiated to finally integrate the Indian economy into the global market
economy; the end of the Cold War and the forces of globalization also
impelled the governments of other South Asian countries to start a proc-
ess of economic policy change and to open up their markets and econo-
mies.19 This paradigm shift in India’s overall economic orientation and
the market liberalization policy led to a concomitant shift in New Delhi’s
overall foreign policy outlook. One of the several concrete results of this
was that, e.g., ASEAN countries started considering India to be a favour-
able economic partner and took multifarious initiatives to promote trade
links with New Delhi. This new economic dynamics and re-orientation
of foreign policy prompted India to become a ‘sectoral dialogue partner’

of ASEAN in January 1992 on trade, investment, tourism, and science
and technology. Another practical realization of this opportunity was
the ‘Look East’ policy.20 Acknowledging the growing importance of the
Asia-Pacific region in international trade and industrial activities and
in pursuance of her own vision of a larger role in the global economy,
Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1993 declared in Singapore that
‘the Asia Pacific would be the springboard for our leap into the global
market place […]. Much more is possible and desirable. India therefore
wants a real and sizeable jump’ (cited in Ghosal, 1999, pp. 150–1).
As a consequence, India started to ‘look’ towards ASEAN and APEC
for closer association and participation (Kelegama, 1999). India’s post-
Cold War ‘new regionalism’ doctrine, as part of her novel foreign policy
agenda towards the countries of Southeast Asia, was officially proclaimed
by Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao in his ‘Singapore Lecture’
in September 1994. Following this speech, the Government of India
officially endorsed the term ‘Look East’ as an official part of her foreign
policy agenda; the ‘Look East’ policy amounted to a paradigm shift in
India’s geo-strategic perceptions.
At the fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in December 1995, ASEAN
leaders decided to elevate India’s status from ‘sectoral dialogue part-
ner’ to ‘full dialogue partner’. In the following year at Jakarta, New
Delhi took part in the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AAM) and the
Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) as a ‘full dialogue’ partner for the
first time. In 1996, New Delhi also participated in the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) in Jakarta which raised the international profile of the
security forum. India’s move towards other regional associations and
groupings was also partly attributed to her frustration and irritation due
to the attitude of her neighbours in SAARC (Muni, 1999, pp. 122–3). The
‘Look East’ policy can therefore also be regarded as the attempt to find
new economic opportunities for India, and in a way an acknowledge-
ment that SAARC has failed to serve India’s interests. On 4 September
2003, Yashwant Sinha, the then External Affairs Minister of India, said
in a speech delivered at the Plenary Session of the second India-ASEAN
Business Summit at New Delhi:
India’s ‘Look East’ policy has now entered its Phase II. Phase I was
focused primarily on the ASEAN countries and on trade and invest-
ment linkages. Phase II is characterized by an expanded definition of
‘East’ extending from Australia to China and East Asia with ASEAN at
its core. Phase II marks a shift in focus from exclusively economic issues
to economic and security issues including joint efforts to protect sea-lanes,

coordination on counter-terrorism etc. On the economic side, Phase II
is also characterized by arrangements for FTAs and establishing of
institutional economic linkages between the countries of the region
and India (emphasis added).
(Sinha, 2003)
How security issues were to be dealt with in more concrete terms was
not specified, even though this would have been the crucial point from
a norm diffusion standpoint, especially with regard to the norm of mul-
tilateral (security) cooperation. In any case, one of the strategic and geo-
political reasons behind the announcement of New Delhi’s ‘Look East’
Phase II-policy was to improve ‘physical’ connectivity and transporta-
tion links with Southeast Asian countries. There was also a convergence
of India’s ‘Look East’ and Thailand’s ‘Look West’ policies: Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh informed a Thai newspaper on 30 July 2004
that ‘[India’s and Thailand’s] shared will and desire at the highest levels
in both countries have given substantial content and new dimensions
to our multi-faceted ties’ (Manmohan Singh, 2004b).
Realizing India’s potential to contribute to regional economic develop-
ment, New Delhi’s status was further uplifted when India was made a
summit partner of ASEAN, called ASEAN+1 in 2002.21 The major Indian
achievement within the trajectory of her ‘Look East’ Policy was her partic-
ipation at the first East Asian Summit at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 2005.
This was no doubt an unprecedented event in the history of Indian for-
eign policy, which in the words of the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh was a ‘historic meeting’ (cited in Chakraborti, 2007, p. 107).
The Indian presence and participation in this summit marked the begin-
ning of India’s possible ultimate integration with the East Asian region
and can be seen as a further stepping stone in fulfilling India’s poten-
tial to play a major role in global affairs in the twenty-first century, an
achievement that corresponds with the normative origins of India’s
foreign policy as laid down by Nehru (see Chapter 2) and India’s aim of
demonstrating to the world a civilizational continuity radiating from
India and impacting on all countries surrounding it. India’s ‘Look East’
policy also resulted in the attempt of introducing ‘regional multilateral-
ism’ in the Bay of Bengal.
The evolution of BIMST-EC from 1994 to 2012

BIMST-EC’s evolution is characterized by two phases. While initially the
focus was primarily on economic matters (from 1996 until 2004), in the
second evolutionary phase this agenda was expanded to include other

sectors: the first phase began with the original conception of the organi-
zation and lasted until the first BIMST-EC summit in 2004. The idea for
creating a sub-regional grouping of the member countries of the Bay of
Bengal Community originated in Thailand. The latter’s initiative and
the role it played in the process was that of a norm entrepreneur and
pre-localizer for the formation of a new regional multilateral organiza-
tion in the area with an economic focus. The second phase began with
the upgrading of the interactions among the member countries to a
summit level with the holding of the first summit in July 2004 and saw
an expansion of issue sectors to include social issues.
BIMST-EC—the first phase

The first phase of BIMST-EC (still called BIST-EC) began in 1994. It
was in that year—three years after the implementation of the ‘New
Economic Policy’ in India—that the idea of setting up a sub-regional
cooperation bloc in the Bay of Bengal basin was first deliberated dur-
ing a meeting in Bangkok, by Thailand and India. The deputy foreign
minister of Thailand also visited other countries and pursued the
proposal. This situation is similar to the behaviour of the Bangladeshi
president in 1979, i.e., a smaller Indian neighbour laying the founda-
tion for cooperation by high-level diplomatic activity.
The Deputy foreign minister of Thailand paid a visit to India in 1996
and further discussed the idea of cooperation with Indian leaders. India
agreed on the condition that cooperation was to be exclusively eco-
nomic. It seems that there were two important considerations behind
India’s acceptance of this first proposal. First, by 1996 the SAARC still had
not been able to show any significant achievements towards regional
cooperation in the region. It proved to be a slow organization and a
victim of political differences among the member countries. And sec-
ond, India had larger economic interest in the ASEAN region. India was
already forging closer relations with ASEAN countries since 1992 (Das,
1997, pp. 10–2; Upreti, 2003, pp. 321–30). Her ultimate goal was to become
a member of ASEAN (C. Raja Mohan, 1998).
India was clearly encouraged to join a new sub-regional group with a
leading ASEAN country. Consequently, the norm of regional multilater-
alism in the Bay of Bengal area was promoted by Thailand and negoti-
ated from the start to contain certain features, while at the same time
had to exclude several others. Thailand’s initiative on BIST-EC indicated
her objective to enhance relations in a multifaceted manner with coun-
tries beyond ASEAN. Obviously, India figured as the major partner in
Bangkok’s South Asian/Look West strategy. In brief, India’s initial inter-

est in fostering the establishing of BIST-EC opened up the possibilities
of enhancing her trade linkages with Myanmar and Thailand as well
as the opportunity to counter China’s strategic designs and influence
within the region.
On 6 June 1997, after a series of inter-ministerial deliberations (with
the support of the ADB and UNESCAP), the first BIST-EC Foreign Ministers’
Meeting (called the Ministerial Meeting of the Establishment of BIST-EC)
was held in Bangkok on 6 June 1997 and the regional forum was formally
launched by the foreign ministers, initially comprising four countries,
namely Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. These countries were
selected because of their proximity and direct access to the Bay of Bengal
(Sampath Kumar, 1997, p. 39).
According to a political analyst interviewed by the author in October
2006,22 Thailand had ‘carefully’ coordinated her approach towards BIST-EC
with India and had agreed to limit the forum solely to economic and
cultural issues. When during the first talks the question of cooperation
in other sectors was raised, the Indian delegation flatly refused to discuss
the matter further. This is in accordance with the Indian behaviour in
the SAARC and IOR-ARC deliberations, and it demonstrates that India
was, once again, the agenda setter. The member countries decided to
cooperate in six areas, with each of the member countries playing a lead
role in planning and implementing programmes in their specific areas.
The meeting committed itself to the principle of open regionalism and
enhanced South–South cooperation.
The aim and objectives of BIST-EC, as enumerated in the 1997 Bangkok
Declaration, are first, to create an enabling environment for rapid
economic development through identification and implementation of
specific cooperation projects in the sectors of trade, investment and
industry, technology, human resource development, tourism, energy and
infrastructure, and transportation. Second, to accelerate the economic
growth and social progress in the sub-region through joint endeavours
in a spirit of equality and partnership. Third, to promote active col-
laboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in
the economic, social, technical, and scientific fields. Fourth, to provide
assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in
the educational, professional, and technical spheres. Fifth, to cooperate
more effectively in joint efforts that are supportive of and complemen-
tary to national development plans of member states which result in
tangible benefits to the people in raising their living standards, includ-
ing improvement in transportation and communication infrastructure.
Sixth, to maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing inter-

national and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.
And seventh, to cooperate in projects that can be dealt with most pro-
ductively on a sub-regional basis among the BIST-EC countries that make
best use of available synergies.
The Sunday Times published a news comment on 8 June 1997 which
stated:
Thai deputy foreign minister Pitak Intrawiyanunt hailed the dec-

laration as opening ‘a new chapter’ in cooperation between the
signatories, to ‘build a bridge linking South and Southeast Asia’.
Combating scepticism that BISTEC would become a largely sym-
bolic ‘talking group’, ministers announced they would frame an air
transportation cooperation project to promote tourism by the end
of the year.
(Sunday Times, 1997)
Pitak was quoted in the same comment as having remarked: ‘Sceptics

might question whether another regional organization will be able to
fulfil any of our expectations. Certainly, many international organiza-
tions have been created, and many have faded away.’
This early phase during the localization process set the future tone
for the new organization. The key features of ‘regional multilateralism’
(ideal-type) were reduced to a minimum, right from the outset. There
was an early ‘steered’ consensus on the scope of the organization. As
an analyst pointed out in an interview with the author, Thailand had
originally thought of cooperating much closer with India through a new
multilateral organization, also in the sector of security, but dropped the
idea completely after Indian diplomats had flatly refused to discuss issues
other than economic and cultural. India’s cognitive prior, once again, con-
stituted the normative guardrail and prevented other countries to expand
the scope of cooperation beyond the ‘unpolitical’ economic sphere.
From 20 to 21 December 1997, preliminary discussions between senior
officials took place, the so-called Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM), which
was immediately followed by a ministerial meeting. On 22 December
1997, a Special BIST-EC Ministerial Meeting was held in Bangkok in
which Myanmar was admitted. Myanmar had already attended the
inaugural meeting in June as an observer and now joined the organi-
zation as a full member at this meeting, upon which the name of the
grouping was changed to BIMST-EC, the Bangladesh–India–Myanmar–
Sri Lanka Thailand—Economic Cooperation. This was of great importance
for India whose persistence in having Myanmar join accelerated the

latter’s accession, clearly with a view to economic gains. In that very
Bangkok conference, the charter of the BIMST-EC was adopted. Thai
officials stressed that talks between the member nations would concen-
trate on economic and not political issues: ‘Ministerial meeting today
will only focus on economic cooperation between the countries’, was
the official statement by Thai officials in a news reporting by the ‘Daily
Star’ (Daily Star, 1997).
The BIMST-EC Economic Ministerial Meeting (Economic and Trade
Ministers), held in Bangkok on 7 August 1998 (‘Economic Ministerial
Retreat’), decided that BIMST-EC would initially start the cooperation
process in six priority areas. It was agreed that each country would play
a prominent role in planning and implementing programmes in each
of the areas for a period of about three years. The sectors and coun-
tries were trade and investment for Bangladesh, technology for India,
transportation and communication for Thailand, energy for Myanmar,
and tourism and fisheries for Sri Lanka. India was designated as ‘lead
country’ of the two important sectors ‘transport and communication’ as
well as ‘tourism’. This Bangkok meeting also imported a new dimension
to economic cooperation between member states. It was agreed that
BIMST-EC should strive to develop into a Free Trade Area (FTA) and
should focus on activities that facilitate trade, increase investment, and
promote technical cooperation among member countries. It was further
reiterated that BIMST-EC activities should be designed to form a bridge
between SAARC and ASEAN (Chakraborti, 2007, p. 113).
The second BIMST-EC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held in Dhaka,
Bangladesh, on 19 December 1998. Nepal was accorded the status of an
observer in this meeting. The meeting emphasized the development of
a comprehensive transport network. It was agreed to forge BIMST-EC
relations with financial and development institutions such as the World
Bank, ADB, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and
UNESCAP. The meeting emphasized Asian solidarity and South–South
cooperation in order to meet the challenges of globalization and liberali-
zation. In Dhaka, the SOM took place on 19–20 December 1997. It was
recommended to constitute an economic forum of BIMST-EC countries,
which would provide a platform for a closer interaction between the pub-
lic and private sector representatives of the BIMST-EC countries (SOM,
1997). The main objective of this forum was to exchange views regarding
effective implementation of various schemes of mutual cooperation.
By the time this meeting took place, the East Asian financial crisis of
1997 had taken a heavy toll on Thailand. It was in a severe economic
crisis and had to cope with her economic problems and consequently
lost momentum. Economically, the crisis literally shook ASEAN mem-
bers so severely that their multilateral approach to development suf-
fered a setback, though briefly. India, too, despite her enthusiasm to
pursue the ‘Look East’ policy, was unable to protect the affected ASEAN
countries from the financial crisis. It was thus India that became the
driving force behind BIMST-EC and had the opportunity to leave her
‘normative’ imprint on the organization as the chief agenda setter.
Further, the projects that were allocated to some member countries had
not made sufficient progress. In any case, despite these international
events taking place, the BIMST-EC Economic Forum was conceptualized
at a meeting in Dhaka in 1999 with representative groups of both the
public and private sectors to discuss matters pertaining to achieving the
objectives of the group.
The third BIMST-EC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting took place in New Delhi
on 6 July 2000. It stressed the necessity of strengthening the institutional
mechanism of BIMST-EC. It was also decided to facilitate trade and
investment opportunities in the region and also to expedite coopera-
tion in the areas of agriculture development and disaster management.
BIMST-EC decided to develop new transport links and expand energy
cooperation, and it was decided to speed up the construction of a
trans-Asian highway. The Ministers also took the decision to set up an
Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) to prepare a concept paper for
free trade among member countries, an initiative which emerged from
the three most developed members of the five countries. The two least
developed members, Bangladesh and Myanmar, however, expressed
reservations and declared their wish to study the matter further. India
volunteered to host the first and second BIMST-EC Expert Group
Meeting on Technology Sector in New Delhi in 2000.
The fourth BIMST-EC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held in Yangon,
Myanmar, on 21 December 2001. The issues of terrorism, territorial
integrity, and security figured in the meeting. The forum reiterated its
commitment to the socio-economic development of the region. India
stated that the prerequisite for the success of BIMST-EC’s cooperation
in all fields—tourism, trade, and investment, in particular—was the
‘availability of a sound infrastructure in transport and communica-
tions’ (MEA, 2001). The first major step in this direction was taken
when the BIMST-EC Expert Group on Transport and Communication
Sector meet for the first time in New Delhi from 23 to 24 April 2001.
The meeting focused on key issues such as transport and cross-border
facilitation, maritime transport, or human resource.
In 2003, Nepal and Bhutan were finally granted full membership

of BIMST-EC, which increased its membership from five to seven. By a
numerical reckoning, BIMST-EC’s strength equalled that of the SAARC.
The ‘absence’ of Pakistan and Maldives in it was made up by Thailand
and Burma. In November 2003, the BIMST-EC ‘Chamber of Commerce
and Industry’ (CCI) was launched with a view to institutionalize a regu-
lar interaction between the business communities. The member coun-
tries also offered training scholarships in technical areas to emphasize
human resource development.
At the fifth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 20 December 2003 at
Colombo, the ministers followed an Indian proposal and agreed to com-
bat the rising challenge of terrorism in all its forms and manifestation.
Sri Lanka proposed that, after six years, the time had come for BIMST-EC
to finally convene a summit of its leaders, which was agreed upon by
other member countries. At this meeting, the level of interaction was
raised from deputy foreign minister to that of foreign minister.
At a trilateral meeting between the Foreign Ministers of India, Myanmar,
and Thailand in New Delhi on 24 December 2003, a decision was taken
to begin the development of the ‘India–Myanmar–Thailand Highway
Project’ (see The Hindu, 2003) which formed an integral part of the larger
Trans-Asian Highway project. Hailing this project, India’s Ambassador in
Bangkok, Leela K. Ponappa, told ‘The Indian Express’: ‘The Project sym-
bolises what economic cooperation among BIMST-EC countries actually
means. Once fully constructed, there will be significant improvement in
tourist and pilgrim traffic’ (The Indian Express, 2004).
Along the same lines, the MEA Annual Report (2002–03) confirmed
that the ‘sub-regional economic cooperation grouping on the rim of the
Bay of Bengal constitutes an important component of India’s “Look East”
policy’, and concurs with the view that ‘it will further strengthen relations
between South and Southeast Asia’ (Government of India, 2003, p. 104).
During the sixth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 8 February 2004 in
Phuket, Thailand, the ministers recommended the adoption of the prin-
ciple of requiring at least three member countries for project implementa-
tion, and at least four member countries for the convening of an expert
group, while consensus was needed for policy decisions, including on
new membership. The meeting endorsed the criteria for BIMST-EC mem-
bership, as formulated by the Bangkok Working Group, with the under-
standing that countries having access to the Andaman Sea also enjoy,
by definition, a direct opening into the Bay of Bengal. Apart from these
ministerial meetings, five rounds of special meetings of the economic and
trade ministers took place until February 2004.
Following her prioritization and true to her foreign policy ideational

orthodoxy—opposition to all forms of political deliberations and secu-
rity issues and approval of closer economic cooperation—India achieved
it major goal in her participation in the BIMST-EC process when the
BIMST-EC member states signed the framework agreement for a BIMST-
EC Free Trade Area (BIMST-EC FTA). The Framework Agreement was ini-
tially not endorsed by Bangladesh, because it was not convinced about
being compensated for the loss of revenue due to the reduction of her
custom duties on goods. Later on, Bangladesh expressed her interest in
signing the Agreement and acceded by signing a Protocol to this effect in
June 2004. The BIMST-EC FTA was supposed to be implemented in two
phases. In the first phase (‘fast track’), the three developing countries
(Thailand, India, and Sri Lanka) would give free access to a number of
goods to the LCDs (Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bhutan) between
1 July 2006 and 1 July 2007. In the second phase (‘normal track’), the
three developing countries would give free access to most of the goods
from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) from 1 July 2010. For their
part, the LDCs would provide free access to a number of products of the
developing countries from 1 July 2011 under the ‘Fast Track’ and from
1 July 2017 under the Normal Track. Under this FTA, different sectors
were identified for economic cooperation. Joint projects in different areas
were also identified with concrete steps to implement those projects. The
Framework Agreement to establish BIMST-EC FTA also included provi-
sions for negotiations on FTA in goods, services, and investment.
In its evolution from BIST-EC to BIMST-EC, the organization estab-
lished various feeble institutional mechanisms for its functioning. Only
small steps were taken for real institutionalization of the organization.
From 1996 to 2004, the norm of regional multilateralism for BIMST-EC
was thus implemented in a ‘torso’ shape; the outcome of seven years
of meetings and deliberations was a rhetorical commitment to coopera-
tion and a common BIMST-EC Economic Forum.
BIMST-EC—the second phase: developments from 2004–12

The year 2004 marked the beginning of the second evolutionary phase
and the BIMST-EC agenda was expanded to social issues. The seventh
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held in Bangkok on 30 July immediately
preceding the summit. On 31 July 2004, after seven years of deliberations
and meetings, the first BIMST-EC Summit finally took place in Bangkok,
Thailand. In fact, the summit which was originally planned to be held
in February 2004 was postponed by five months because of the political
developments leading to a new government in India. This, again, shows
that the other countries of the organization had to accommodate the

Indian situation. The acronym BIMST-EC was changed now to stand
for ‘Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation’. The rechristening of BIMST-EC led The Times of India to
comment that the grouping was renamed in this a way as ‘to keep Pak
from gate-crashing’ (The Times of India, 2004). Dismissing such remarks
as simply false and mere speculation, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
stated: ‘We are not trying to isolate any country. Pakistan is not linked
geographically to Bay of Bengal and it is as simple as that’ (The Times of
India, 2004). In fact, as was pointed out above, the eligibility criteria for a
country seeking membership was ‘[…] to satisfy the conditions of territo-
rial contiguity to, or direct opening into, or primary dependence on the
Bay of Bengal for trade and transportation purposes.’ In this, one of the key
elements of the norm of regional multilateralism—regional clarity—has
been included and has allowed for a clear geographic focus. Delineating
the significance of this first ever summit, the Indian PM said:
This was the first meeting of the leaders of these countries at the level
of the summit. This is one manifestation of our keen desire to pro-
mote regional cooperation in this area, to work with our neighbours,
to strengthen our traditional bonds, to impart a new element of vig-
our, vitality and dynamism to and relations with our neighbouring
countries.
(Manmohan Singh, 2004a)
Further, the Indian PM described the BIMST-EC:
as a collective forum for giving full expression to the widely felt need
to rediscover the coherence of our region based on the commonality of
linkages around the Bay of Bengal. […] Regional integration is not
antithetical to globalization, but can be a useful building block. Our
collective endeavours can be more than the sum of our individual
efforts. BIMST-EC offers us the hope and the opportunity to fulfil this
imperative of our times. We consider our participation in BIMST-EC
as a key element in our ‘Look East’ policy and long standing approach
of good neighbourliness towards all other neighbours—by land and
sea (emphasis added).
The Indian Prime Minister also stressed the economic significance of

BIMST-EC especially for northern India, thereby also confirming that
regional cooperation is primarily a means of economic diplomacy for

India:
The North-Eastern region of India faces considerable handicaps beca-

use of the high cost of transport. The BIMST-EC initiative opens up
the possibilities of making more effectively arrangements for trans-
portation of goods and services to other countries of Southeast Asia
through the land routes, making use of roads, railways and ports
that would certainly help to promote the development of the North-
Eastern region.
The BIMST-EC Summit Declaration at Bangkok placed special emphasis

on sectors such as trade and investment, transport and communications,
tourism, energy, human resources development, agriculture, fisheries,
science and technology, and people-to-people contact. During the meet-
ing, the leaders took ‘an important step’ to set up a BIMST-EC ‘Joint
Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and International Crimes’ ( JWC-
CTIC) to coordinate the efforts of member countries.23 In a statement
reflecting the importance of the religious and civilizational heritage
of BIMST-EC as a region, the Indian PM said in an interview to a Thai
Newspapers on 30 July 2004:
The regional tourism potential is […] immense and joint tourism

projects can provide a joint marketing strategy interlinking and pro-
moting Buddhist destinations in all BIMST-EC countries. Visit BIMST-
EC year 2004–5 is an effort in this direction.
(Manmohan Singh, 2004b)
Besides this, the first summit of BIMST-EC accepted all proposals orig-
inating from India. By doing so, India showed that it had assumed the
grouping’s leadership and initiative and had become the agenda-setter.
India hosted the first meeting of the BIMST-EC JWG-CTIC in New Delhi
in December 2004. The JWG-CTIC was described as a ‘platform for
cooperation among member States to enhance their operational and
strategic capabilities in preventing and suppressing terrorism and tran-
snational crime’ (BIMST-EC, 2004b). The fact that it took place under
Indian direction showed that India was not willing to have the agenda in
this important field set by another country, but wanted to be in charge of
this important issue area. This discloses the continuation of the historical
Nehruvian approach towards security issues, which he had made clear
during the Asian regional conferences portrayed in Chapter 3. After the

meeting, India agreed to continue as chairman and to host further meet-
ings of this working group.
The Department of Science and Technology set up the ‘BIMST-EC
Centre on Weather and Climate’ on 19 August 2004. India expressed her
readiness to share remote sensing data for agriculture, environment,
and disaster management. India also hosted the ‘first BIMST-EC Energy
Ministers’ Conference’ in New Delhi on 4 October 2004 which produced
a ‘Plan of Action of Energy Cooperation in BIMST-EC’. Following the
summit, under an MoU for cooperation in the field of non-traditional
security issues, signed on 25 October 2004, India and Myanmar agreed
to cooperate in preventing the cross-border crimes including terrorism.
During Foreign Minister Natwar Singh’s visit to Myanmar in March 2005,
both sides expressed ‘satisfaction that the evolution of bilateral defence
cooperation is moving in the right direction’ (The Hindu, 2005). Again,
the focus was on bilateral relations, rather than multilateral ones. Also
in 2005, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) became a ‘development
partner’ for BIMST-EC, meaning that it was tasked with undertaking
studies in areas such as a transport or logistics.
At the eighth BIMST-EC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Dhaka, 18–19
December 2005, the ministers recognized the need for a permanent secre-
tariat as BIMST-EC had evolved over the past years in terms of expansion
of its membership, institutions, and agenda. They agreed to set up an
inter-governmental experts’ group comprising representatives of all mem-
ber states, to examine the establishment of a small secretariat, including
its modalities and other relevant details. They further decided that, as
an interim arrangement, the mandate of the BIMST-EC Centre would be
extended to enable it to function as a ‘mini secretariat’. Also, a number of
new priority sectors of cooperation were agreed upon, thereby increasing
the number from the previous 6 to 13.
At the ninth BIMST-EC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in New Delhi on
9 August 2006, the ministers reiterated the need to establish a permanent
BIMST-EC Secretariat and appreciated the work done by the first Inter-
Governmental Experts Group Meeting and directed that the Experts Group
further deliberate on the issue and submit, through the SOM, concrete rec-
ommendations to the 10th ministerial meeting. They also appreciated the
work of the BIMST-EC Centre in providing support for BIMST-EC activities
through the BIMST-EC Working Group (BWG), as an interim arrangement
pending the establishment of a permanent secretariat. Besides these sug-
gestions and various fora for discussions, no tangible progress took place.
The major problem remained the lack of agreement between India and
BIMST-EC countries over the number of products to be subject to liberal

rules of origin (preferential list of items, sensitive lists, and NTBs).
In the beginning of 2007, the second BIMST-EC Summit was post-
poned. The 10th BIMST-EC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting then took place
in New Delhi on 29 August 2007; the foreign ministers reviewed the
progress made in the 13 priority areas of cooperation and reiterated
their determination to conclude the negotiations on trade in goods
under BIMSTEC at an early date, preferably before the second BIMSTEC
Summit. They also welcomed the offer by Bangladesh to establish a
BIMSTEC Poverty Alleviation Centre in Dhaka.
The 11th BIMST-EC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and the 13th Senior
Officials Meeting took place in New Delhi on 11–12 November 2008 to
finalize preparations for the second BIMSTEC Summit which then took
place in New Delhi on 13 November 2008; between this summit and the
first one, seven years had passed. At the summit, the heads of state and
government decided to establish a ‘Centre for Energy’ and a ‘Centre for
Weather and Climate’ in India and the ‘BIMST-EC Cultural Industries
Observatory’ in Bhutan. Another idea that was discussed was the set-
ting up of a food bank, an idea which was originally attempted within
the SAARC framework, but did not materialize. There was widespread
agreement that a comprehensive agreement of all activities was to be
conducted. According to the final declaration, ‘the second BIMST-EC
Summit has given a strong political impetus to the strengthening of
BIMST-EC cooperation in the identified 13 priority sectors’ (BIMST-EC
2008). Agreements were finalized on further cooperation in three areas:
weather, culture, and energy. The leaders also took note of the ‘BIMST-
EC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study’ (BTILS) which was con-
ducted by the ADB in her role as BIMST-EC’s development partner.
Climate change was then included as the 14th priority area of coopera-
tion at the 12th BIMST-EC Ministerial Meeting (11–12 December 2009).
Also, the BIMST-EC Convention on Combating International Terrorisms,
Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking was adopted.
At the meeting, the then Indian External Affairs Minister Krishna stated
that ‘India remains committed to continue its full engagement with its
BIMST-EC partners for strengthening the grouping and realising its goals’
(The Indian Express, 2009).
The 13th BIMST-EC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (20–22 January 2011)
which was preceded by the 15th Senior Official Meeting decided to
finally provide BIMST-EC with a permanent secretariat in Dhaka. The
question of a permanent secretariat had been discussed since 2004 and
remained unresolved, since both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka competed
for hosting the secretariat. Since 2011, BIMST-EC now has a permanent
seat, which could constitute the beginning of the next, the third devel-
opment phase of BIMST-EC.
BIMST-EC institutional set-up

As of 2012, the organizational structure of BIMST-EC is as follows: The
country holding the chairmanship of BIMST-EC is responsible for the
conduct of all regular meetings. The ministerial meetings are divided
into foreign affairs and trade and economic affairs. The annual meet-
ing of the foreign ministers (hosted by member states on the basis of
alphabetical rotation) serves as the main policy body of BIMST-EC. The
ministerial meeting is preceded by a meeting of the senior officials and
concludes with the issuance of a joint ministerial statement. Since 2011,
the secretariat is located in Dhaka, after the BWG had fulfilled the role of
a coordinating body for 14 years. Besides, until 2012 fourteen so-called
priority sectors of cooperation and 15 sub-sectors have been agreed upon
and distributed between the member countries (see Figure 4.2). A lead-
ers’ summit is supposed to take place on a regular basis.
India’s impact on regional multilateralism in the Bay of Bengal

BIMSTE-EC was created primarily because of a first initiative under-
taken by Thailand; Thailand was thus the original norm entrepreneur
for regional multilateralism. BIMST-EC’s membership is similar to that
of SAARC minus Pakistan and the Maldives, but with the addition of
Thailand and Myanmar. The combined size of BIMST-EC countries in
terms of population in 2010 was 1.378 billion. The combined economic
size of the region (in GDP), excluding Bhutan and Myanmar, was US
$938 billion in 2004, with an average annual growth rate of 4.6% (World
Bank, 2006, pp. 292–3).
The forum is unique since is provides a connection between South
Asia and Southeast Asia, thereby bridging India’s ‘Look East’ policy with
Thailand’s ‘Look West’ policy. Right from the beginning, BIMST-EC was
conceived of as an economic forum where bilateral contentious issues
had no role to play. The organization has confined itself to issues related
to economic growth and social development; the orientation of BIMST-
EC is clearly project-specific.
Regional economic integration in BIMST-EC could strengthen intra-
regional cooperation. The full potential of intra-regional trade, how-
ever, has so far remained unrealized because of tariffs and NTBs, weak
communication links, and lack of information regarding the supply
capabilities and other important barriers. A study by the Research and
BIMST-EC Summits
Secretariat (Dhaka)
Trade and Economic
Foreign Ministers’ [formerly: BIMST-EC
Ministers’ Meeting
Meeting (FMM) Working Group,
(TEMM)
Bankgkok]
BIMST-EC Centre;
Institute for Trade Senior Trade and
Senior Officials’
Strategies; University Economic Officials’
Meeting (SOM)
of the Thai Chamber Meeting (STEOM)
of Commerce
Economic Forum & Trade Negotiating

Business Forum Committee
India: Transport and

Communication; Tourism;
Bangladesh: Trade and
Counter-Terrorism and Myanmar: Energy;
Investment; Bhutan: Culture
Transnational Crime; Agriculture
Climate Change
Environment and Natural
Diaster Management
Thailand: Fisheries;
Public Health;
Nepal: Poverty Alleviation Sri Lanka: Technology
People-to-People
Contacts
Figure 4.2 BIMST-EC institutional set-up and priority sectors (2012)
Information System for Non-aligned and Other Developing Countries

(RIS) identified the trade creating potential of the BIMST-EC FTA to be
between US$43 billion and US$59 billion a year. One of the impor-
tant economic problems that BIMST-EC faces among its members—
comparable to the IOR-ARC—is the uneven level of development (RIS,
2004b, p. 1).
Regional multilateralism in the Bay of Bengal also received a distinct
Indian imprint with BIMST-EC. BIMST-EC is another organization that
can effortlessly be subsumed under the definition of Panchsheel multi-
lateralism. In order to achieve a level of genuine integration, regional
cooperation agreements require being of an inclusive nature. An exclusive
arrangement will eventually be unable to fulfil the goals of cooperation

and thus it is most likely to pose a hindrance rather than a boon to inte-
gration. The way BIMST-EC functions is ‘exclusive’ and thus has to fail
in its endeavours. Also, the institutional set-up of BIMST-EC is not con-
ducive to furthering the original aims of regional multilateralism. There
is, exactly as in the SAARC and IOR-ARC, no possibility of institutional
evolution and identity-building. Yet, BIMST-EC fulfilled one of India’s
major normative foreign policy claims, namely civilizational continuity.
Table 4.3 enumerates the Panchsheel features of BIMST-EC.
As this enumeration of the key features above show, BIMST-EC fulfils
more criteria compared to the IOR-ARC and the SAARC. Since it empha-
sizes territorial contiguity, BIMST-EC as a group fits seamlessly into
the regional framework envisaged by Nehru. It potentially fosters the
economic progress of India with her neighbours and comprises coun-
tries that share a common cultural heritage. India has been the agenda
setter right from the start, seizing the opportunity of stepping in for
the economically weakened Thailand, and in the various meetings and
expert commissions it convened, it influenced the evolution of BIMST-EC
according to her own wishes. It is thus a logical step in India’s regional,
economic, and security agenda, without dealing with political issues.
With reference to research question 3, BIMST-EC is a prime example
for ‘competing regionalism’. South Asian BIMSTS-EC member countries
already constitute five out of the seven members of SAARC, the other
two being Pakistan and Myanmar. The political and economic differences
existing in SAARC are therefore also present in BIMST-EC. However,
the absence of Pakistan in both groups is likely to contribute to a more
(politically) cohesive regional grouping, especially in direct comparison
with SAARC. A political analyst assessed: ‘Interestingly enough, prior to
the successful SAARC summit in Islamabad from 4–6 June 2004, New
Delhi had prophetically maintained that in case of the failure of the
summit meeting, BIMST-EC (where there was no Pakistan) would turn
out to be a major project for India’ (Chette, 2007, p. 41). And according
to P.V. Rao, ‘there was speculation that New Delhi was toying with such
ideas—an alternative SAARC minus Pakistan’ (Rao, 2007, p. 39).
Against the backdrop of Pakistan’s reluctance to unconditionally trade
with India (an impediment to the emergence of SAARC as an economic
bloc), the BIMST-EC cooperative framework appeared quite attractive
and profitable to India, which led an Indian economist to recommend:
If SAARC cannot grapple with trade policy issues it will remain a

talking shop and slowly lose its relevance. […] Rather than expend
energy on breathing new life into a moribund SAARC, India will be

better off allowing SAARC to grow at its own pace and at a pace that
Pakistan will allow it to grow by, and instead devote greater energy
and more resources to BIMST-EC.
(Baru,1999b)
Table 4.3 BIMST-EC features of Panchsheel multilateralism
Non-negotiable principles ab initio

Mutual respect for each other’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty
internal affairs
BIMST-EC Institutional Key Features

Voluntary formation Yes
Equal voting rights (equality) Yes—Consensus model
Working together to achieve specific goals Yes: 14 priority sectors of
and projects (purpose/scope/general agenda cooperation. Focus: economic
setting) cooperation (BIMST-EC FTA);
agenda)
inclusive approach
Common identity-building Civilizational identity ‘assumed’
in Bay of Bengal
Regional geographical clarity Yes: ‘territorial contiguity to,
or direct opening into, or
primary dependence on the
Bay of Bengal for trade and
transportation purposes’
Absence of normative hegemon India; initial norm entrepreneur
Thailand ‘pushed aside’
C. Raja Mohan, however, saw a complimentary relationship between

the SAARC and BIMST-EC:
The Bay of Bengal community also creates options other than the
SAARC in pursuing India’s interests in regional economic integration.
This does not necessarily mean that BIMST-EC stands in opposition
to SAARC. In fact, the Bay of Bengal Community could complement
the efforts at SAARC to promote a free trade area in South Asia.
(Raja Mohan, 2004)
Another analyst argued that South Asia’s inability to form a sub-

regional group of its own had boosted the prospects for BIMST-EC, and in
both—the proposed South Asian Growth Quadrangle (see above) as well
as the BIMST-EC—India remains the prime actor (Rao, 2003, p. 144).
In conclusion, India’s regional approach shows clear signs of strength-
ening BIMST-EC at the cost of Pakistan, and therefore the SAARC. After
14 years of evolution, BIMST-EC received a permanent secretariat and
all member states have signed the Convention on Cooperation in
Combating International Terrorism, Trans-national Organized Crime
and Illicit Drug Trafficking. Not surprising, India insisted on being the
lead country for counter-terrorism and trans-nation crime, those two
being areas with potential security implications. BIMST-EC can also
serve as a platform in which the countries can meet and informally
discuss problems. However, by focusing on the economic sector with
those countries that are also members of SAARC, there is a clear thrust
towards competing regionalism. In other words, if SAARC does not
further India’s economic goals, then BIMST-EC might be able to do (see
also Chapter 5). The BIMST-EC FTA now aims to create a free trade area
until 2017.
The Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and the BCIM

Regional Cooperation Forum
The last regional multilateral initiative which will be analysed in this

chapter is the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation, combining the riparian coun-
tries of the Mekong and that of the Ganga. It was launched by India and
five other riparian countries of the Mekong River, namely Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. According to a statement by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, the ‘MGC is a forum for bilateral
and multilateral cooperation linked by two of the great rivers in Asia,
the Mekong and the Ganga. MGC provides a venue for us to maximize
our vast economic potentials as well as create a bridge of economic and

cultural cooperation among our peoples’ (Pibulsonggram, 2007).
Contextualizing the MGC and the conceptualization and

evolution of the MGC 2000–7
In 1992, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched an Economic
Cooperation Program (ECP) for what it described as the Greater Mekong
Sub-Region (GMS).24 It now consists of five Mekong riparian nations:
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, plus the Yunnan Province
of China as its sixth member. The ADB summarized: ‘The program has
contributed to the development of infrastructure to enable the develop-
ment and sharing of the resource base, and promote the free flow of
goods and people in the subregion. It has also led to the international
recognition of the subregion as a growth area’ (Asian Development Bank,
2007b).
The ADB has been the convener of the GMS Ministerial Meetings and
summits. The role of the ADB has to be highlighted in this context,
since it has played the role of a promoter of this particular forum and
has thus played the role of a norm entrepreneur of regional multilateral-
ism. It was also as a specific response to this GMS-ECP that India started
to act in forging closer ties with countries of the region, in further pur-
suit of her ‘Look East’ policy (see Section ‘The Bay of Bengal Initiative
for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC)’).
The evolution of the MGC thus has to be seen in light of the evolution
of the GMS, with a particular focus on the Chinese question. The initia-
tive was, in part, the result of India’s complex earlier interactions and
engagement with the GMS.
Much of the success of actually forming the group had been the
result of efforts of Thailand. It was Thai foreign minister S. Pitsuwan
who was the first to discuss the possibility of such an organization with
Indian leaders and asked India to endorse this idea on the margins of
the 33rd ASEAN post-ministerial conference in July 2000 in Bangkok
(see The Hindu, 2000; Jaynath, 2000).
Therefore, just as in the case of BIMST-EC, the initial norm entrepre-
neur for this regional grouping was Thailand. The earlier name of the
grouping—‘Ganga–Mekong Swarnabhoomi’—was reportedly suggested
by Thailand and accepted by India.25 The actual decision to launch this
initiative was taken by the foreign ministers at this meetings held due
to Indo-Thai interactions. This occasion merits special mention since
ASEAN has shown a much greater impetus in forging regional ties, and
India has been trying to strengthen her ties with ASEAN beyond her
membership in the ARF.
In a meeting from 8 to 9 November 2000 at Vientiane, a ‘Concept
Paper’ prepared by senior officials—with Indian diplomats in charge—
was then approved by the ministers of the other six countries. The
paper stated that the cooperation arrangement was primarily aimed at
increasing tourism, but would also serve as ‘building blocks’ for other
areas of mutual benefit. The MGC’s objective was to announce to the
international community its political willingness and aspiration aimed
at strengthening traditional bonds of friendship.
The concept paper made it clear that ministerial meetings would be
led by foreign ministers and would take place back to back with the
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)/PMC held annually in July of each
year. The initiative was then launched during the inaugural formal MGC
Ministerial Meeting that was held in Vientiane (Laos) on 10 November
2000. As an earlier historical backdrop, the five riparian countries of the
Mekong had already been working together in certain issue-areas. They
had already conceived of similar ideas and launched a programme called
‘Suwanna Phum’, the older Indochina expression for ‘Swarnabhoomi’.
This especially aimed at promoting cultural tourism by pooling available
resources and to make use of the territorial proximity, common heritage,
and existing religious links.
At the inaugural meeting, the then Foreign Minister of India Jaswant
Singh said: ‘We are here from the six countries as a new family in a new
get-together because of the historical affinities between our peoples and
lands and the promise they see in our strengthened co-operation’ (BBC,
2000), stressing the key determinant of civilizational continuity as part
of India’s cognitive prior. Political analysts saw this particular Indian
effort as a sign of trying to curb Chinese influence in the region. The
BBC (2000) commented on the inaugural meeting: ‘Some analysts have
suggested that the real motivation behind the initiative is to form a
regional group which could counterbalance the influence of China. […]
China and Vietnam have a long-time rivalry and they don’t want each
other to dominate influence in this region.’
However, Jaswant Singh felt it necessarily to publicly deny such claims
and that
this [referring to the anti-China argument] is a complete misrepresen-

tation and misreading of the initiative. It is not the Mekong region
alone, it is the grouping of nations from Ganga to Mekong. […] It is
an organization not directed at anyone. It is not a formal grouping of

nations. It is nations bound together by these two great rivers—Ganga
and Mekong. […] This is not directed against anyone. It challenges
nobody.
(cited in Baruah, 2000a)
In this comment, the Indian Foreign Minister viewed the grouping merely
as an affirmation of existing historical, cultural, and geographical ties.
The project particularly stressed the ‘natural connectivity’ of India which
was based not only on the geographical situation, but also on cultural
and civilizational similarities (Government of India, 2001b). The jour-
nalist Amit Baruah in an article in Frontline even enthusiastically pre-
dicted that the MGC ‘signals a new beginning in India’s foreign policy’
(Baruah, 2000b).
The first MGC Ministerial Meeting concluded with the Vientiane
Declaration. Underlining their common heritage and desire to enhance
friendship, the declaration outlined the MGC objectives in four (later five)
specific sectors (see Figure 4.3): tourism, culture, education, and transport
and communications. Specifically, it talked of launching the Mekong–
Ganga-Tourism Investment Guide, promoting famous cultural, religious
and eco-tourism sites, preserving old manuscripts, heritage sites and arte-
facts, providing scholarships, and translating classics and developing road,
rail, and air links. This was to be done in tandem with other multilateral
initiatives like the Trans-Asian Highway and aimed at strengthening the
inter- and intra-regional linkages amongst people. The Minister of State
for External Affairs, Ajit Kumar Panja, stated in the Rajya Sabha:
This initiative aims to promote cooperation among these six countries

[India, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam] in the
areas of Tourism, Culture, Education, Transport and Communication.
Cooperation in the sectors identified under the Vientiane Declaration
between the six countries stresses their civilizational affinity and expresses
the revival, in the present day context, of an interactive vitality that has
proven itself in the past, and can culturally and commercially energise
the region (emphasis added).
(Government of India, 2001b)
The answers of the Minister of State for External Affairs which he

gave in the Lok Sabha provide interesting insights on the Indian foreign
policy perspective vis-à-vis the MGC. He was asked to comment on the
benefits likely to accrue to India from the regional grouping and whether
any steps had been taken for improvement of bilateral relations in differ-
ent sectors with countries associated with the project:
Cooperation in these sectors among the six countries opens up busi-

ness and economic opportunities for Indian companies, and also closer
interaction and exchanges between India and these countries in such
areas as tourism, transport and communication, education and culture.
[…] The Vientiane Declaration on Mekong–Ganga Cooperation has
given a further tangible direction to such bilateral cooperation.
(Panja, 2000)
This answer shows that economic diplomacy and bilateralism were the
driving forces behind the initiative. The Vientiane Declaration committed
the member countries to develop transport networks—in particular, the
‘East West Corridor’ and the ‘Trans-Asian Highway’—under the listed
sectors of transport and communications. For India, this policy initiative
outline was in concordance with her policy objectives of reviving India’s
historical linkage and engagement with this largest river basin of Asia.
However, the fact that it included the same issue-areas and three coun-
tries that were already part of the BIMST-EC was a clear sign of India’s
move towards ‘competing regionalism’.
What was particularly unique about the Vientiane Declaration was its
emphasis on promoting joint research in other fields like dance, music,
and theatrical forms and organize round tables for journalists, writ-
ers, and experts in literature, performing arts, women’s empowerment,
health and nutrition, and the conservation, preservation, and protection
of heritage sites and artefacts. Tourism was an additional field where the
declaration expected the MGC to conduct preliminary strategic studies
for joint marketing, facilitate the travel of people in the region, expand
multi-modal communication and transportation links to enhance travel
and tourism, and promote cultural-religious package tours.
As part of these initiatives, the first Experts Working Group meetings
on tourism, transport and communication, human resource development,
and culture were convened as follows: tourism in Bangkok on 29 May
2001, transport and communication in Vientiane on 7–8 June 2001,
human resource development in New Delhi on 11–12 June 2001, culture
in Phnom Penh on 29 June 2001. All of these evolved their ‘programme
of action’ which was presented at the next MGC Ministerial meeting.
The second MGC Ministerial Meeting of the MGC countries was
held in Hanoi on 28 July 2001. It adopted the ‘Hanoi Programme of
Action’ (HPA). The programme affirmed the commitment to cooperate
in the four sectors that had been stated in the Vientiane Declaration
as priority areas for cooperation. The HPA was an extensive report
and was to have a six-year timeframe from July 2001 until July 2007,
while the progress of its implementation was to be reviewed every
two years. Participating in the second MGC Ministerial Meeting in
Hanoi, the Indian representative K. C. Pant underlined the ‘limitless
possibilities’ for functional cooperation with the GMS. However, the
exact approach to functional cooperation was not further elaborated
on. The Indian representative also expressed India’s desire to be an
equal partner in the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) by under-
taking projects in the Information Technology (IT) sector and English
language teaching in GMS countries (Baruah, 2001). This statement
indicates India’s attempts at approaching ASEAN, and even emulating
ASEAN. The Hanoi Programme, among other elements, highlighted
the need for coordination and transparency.
After 11 September 2001, national and international priorities for the
countries of the region changed, and the next MGC meeting was not
held until June 2003. However, the GMS countries still managed to have
their first summit on 3 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia,
and among its other deliberation it managed to endorse the Strategic
Framework which grouped together 11 flagship priority project. These
directions were on the same lines as MGC priorities and therefore were to
strengthen the chances of cooperation for India’s engagement with these
countries. The third MGC Ministerial Meeting, chaired by Myanmar, was
held in Phnom Penh (Cambodia) on 20 June 2003. The member states
reviewed the progress of the Hanoi Programme of Action and ‘noted that
the progress was slow and much remains to be done to translate idea to
be reality’ (MGC 2003). In the end, this meeting adopted the Phnom
Penh Road Map for Cooperation, urging member countries to accelerate
the pace of MGC activities and project.
Of particular importance was working in conformity with 64 projects
of the ‘Initiative for ASEAN Integration Work Plan’. The ministers sup-
ported the trilateral road linkages among India–Myanmar–Thailand
linking Tamu (India) and Thaton (Thailand). Also, the ministers agreed
to strengthen their institutional network and announced their decision
to give a leading role to the chairing country and designate focal points
for member states. They decided to fix the fourth ministerial meeting in
New Delhi under the chairmanship of Thailand in 2004, while Bangkok
was to host a Senior Officials’ Meeting before the next ministerial meet-
ing. It was also at the third Ministerial Meeting that India offered to pro-
vide US$100,000 for the MGC Fund, and in addition, offered to provide
US$1 million as a grant for the establishment of a museum of traditional

textiles in Siem Reap (Cambodia), thereby becoming the country with
the highest financial contribution.
There were no Ministerial Meetings in 2002, 2004, and 2005. The
fourth MGC Ministerial Meeting was delayed by about three and a half
years. Meanwhile, there was a change of government from the BJP-led
National Democratic Alliance to Indian National Congress-led United
Progressive Alliance. In 2004, India also launched a parallel semi-official
sub-program in the Ganga–Mekong region under the rubric of ‘South–
South Economic Cooperation’ that sought to encourage trade and invest-
ments between India and Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
The next annual MGC-SOM was held in New Delhi on 25 May
2005. This was chaired by Thailand and was convened to review the
implementation of MGC projects and activities and prepare for the
fourth MGC Ministerial Meeting to be held in India in 2006. The GMS
held its second Summit Meeting in Kunming from 4 to 5 July 2005
where it renewed its commitment to different plans and urged to accel-
erate implementation of several other agreements and negotiations. The
meeting adopted the Kunming Declaration and decided that the third
GMS summit would be held in Laos in 2008. Other highlights of this
summit included their dialogue with GMS business leaders, a report on
an East-West Economic Corridor, Cross-Border Transport Agreement,
and many other agreements (Asian Development Bank 2007b).
Following the second GMS Summit Meeting in Kunming, India decided
to host the second two-week GMS programme on E-Governance from 11
to 22 July 2005 in Hyderabad, India. On 9–10 November 2005, New Delhi
then hosted the meeting of the Mekong Development Forum (MDF)
(Asian Development Bank, 2005a, 2005b). All this was an indicator of
India’s continued interest in forging closer ties with the other Mekong
countries. India also hosted the ‘Sustainable Development Summit’ on 2
February 2006 in New Delhi (Asian Development Bank, 2006a). In 2006,
India also set up ‘Entrepreneurship Development Centres’ in Cambodia
and Vietnam and began providing training to ASEAN diplomats at
India’s Foreign Service Institute with the first session being organized in
August–September 2006.
A ministerial meeting was held on 12 October 2006. Thailand, as chair
of the MGC, proposed that India be elected as next chair of the grouping.
At that meeting, Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee reiterated
India’s commitment to strengthen India’s cultural and commercial ties
with GMS countries. The meeting accepted India’s offer to hold the
next MGC ministerial meeting in New Delhi in 2007. The fourth MGC
Ministerial meeting was then held on 12 January 2007 at Cebu, where

Thailand handed over the chairmanship to India. India’s then Minister
of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, E. Ahmad, described the
Mekong–Ganga Cooperation Initiative as a pillar of India’s ‘Look East’
policy and an initiative which especially facilitated a ‘strategic shift’ in
India’s vision of the world, which he called ‘from engaging in trade to
engaging India’s civilizational neighbours’ (Ahamed, 2006). The refer-
ence to ‘civilizational neighbours’ was again indicative of India’s foreign
policy self-perception and is in conformity with the foreign policy
essentials outlined in Chapter 2.
The 14th meeting of the GMS Ministerial Conference was held at the
ADB headquarters in Manila from 19 to 21 June 2007. The Conference
reviewed the progress made in the GMS Plan of Action and endorsed
the findings and recommendations of the Mid-Term Review of the GMS
Strategic Framework, 2002–12. These deliberations also underlined the
weak connections of GMS with South Asia and assured that these would
be addressed in the near future.
The fifth MGC Ministerial Meeting was held in Manila, Philippines, on
1 August 2007. The Meeting reviewed and discussed the progress made
in the implementation of agreed projects since the third Meeting of
Mekong–Ganga Cooperation at Phnom Penh, Cambodia. It was noted
‘that progress has been modest. However, this is not because of any
absence of political will. It was decided that MGC countries will work
collectively for implementation of identified projects’ (MGC, 2007). The
meeting also noted that the HPA continued to be relevant and decided
to extend it for another period of six years, until July 2013. The Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar concluded:
There has been a general perception that, despite seven years of efforts
by MGC countries to move forward in areas designated for cooperation,
there has been very slow progress. I do not believe that this is a result
of lack of political will. Considering a long and rich historical, reli-
gious and cultural background embedded in the two civilization trails,
we would be able to seek ways and means to identify the respective
strengths and comparative advantages of each MGC country and to use
these strengths more effectively to enhance our current cooperation.
(Win, 2007)
These words—almost verbatim—reiterated the concerns about the

lack of achievement voiced on the occasion of the last SAARC summit
and the last IOR-ARC ministerial meeting. Between 2007 and 2012,
no further official MGC Ministerial Meetings took place, and an MGC
Summit that was scheduled to take place in December 2011 in New Delhi
was unexpectedly postponed.
MGC institutional set-up

Figure 4.3 shows the current MGC institutional set-up.
India’s impact on regional multilateralism in the MGC and the role

of the BCIM Regional Cooperation Forum (Kunming Initiative)
MGC, in its present form, is the outcome of a Thai initiative. Since a
regional process of norm localization had already taken place especially
in the form of BIMST-EC, and since the countries concerned, especially
Thailand, can be regarded as having already been acquainted with
India’s particular multilateral approach, Panchsheel multilateralism pre-
vailed right from the beginning, and no further attempts at deeper
cooperation have taken place.26 It appears that Thailand already lost
interest in the MGC in 2003 after it had established the ‘Ayeyawady-
Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy’ (ACMECS),27
bringing together all of the MGC member countries without India.
Here, Thailand practiced her own strategy of competing regionalism.
In normative terms, the MGC suffers from the same deficiencies that
can be detected in SAARC, IOR-ARC, and BIMST-EC. MGC is clearly
modelled after BIMST-EC rather than SAARC, and its institutional set-
up is especially weak due to the absence of a coordinating secretariat
(which, as was pointed out above, BIMST-EC only received in 2011).
Regional identity-building is unlikely to take place as a result of only
few initiatives and a complete lack of public visibility. Weak multilat-
eral cooperation means that once again bilateralism will remain the
Annual
Ministerial
Meetings
Serial Officials’
Meetings
(SOM)
Working Group 2 Working Group 4

Working Group 1 Working Group 3 Working Group 5
Education and Communication &
Tourism Culture Plan of Action
HRD Transport
Thailand Cambodia Vietnam
India Laos
Figure 4.3 MGC institutional set-up (2012)

Table 4.4 MGC features of Panchsheel multilateralism

Voluntary formation Questionable
Equal voting rights (equality) Yes
Working together to achieve specific goals Unclear: Economic cooperation,
and projects (purpose/scope/general agenda also geo-strategic reasons?
setting) Culture? Academic cooperation?
agenda)
inclusive approach
Institutional set-up: independent No, extension of national
goal-oriented work on agreed goals/projects ministries
Common identity-building No, civilizational identity
‘assumed’, no regional identity
Regional geographical clarity No: Chinese part of Mekong
Absence of normative hegemon No, India
prevailing form of cooperation. Moreover, MGC’s specific focus on

transport and communication makes bilateral arrangements more likely
to succeed than multilateral attempts. The other sectors of working
together are of little value for genuine multilateral regionalism and are
unlikely to contribute to identity-building.
In institutional/administrative terms, the idea of following ASEAN
meetings could have resulted in an ensuing regularity and constancy, in
addition to enabling the members to accelerate the process of coopera-
tion; since the latter is not the case in, for example, BIMST-EC, with-
out any real pressure of deadlines, meetings depend on the initiative of
member countries deciding at will when to meet. Yet, this constancy
has not happened with the MGC either. What is striking is that the GMS
has achieved more in terms of institutionalization under the auspices of
the ADB than the MGC. Considering the above, Table 4.4 enumerates
the Panchsheel features of the MGC:
Connectivity in the sense of the free flow of people and goods is a
major part of the MGC initiative. What the countries have in common,
apart from being riparian countries of the Mekong and Ganga, is a
shared experience in colonial history, their common national liberation
struggles, and, generally speaking, common Asian values. Still, India’s

proclivity for merely stressing civilizational homogeneity without pro-
viding a framework for advancing in that field prevailed.
In strategic terms, India’s engagement in the MGC continues to be of
cardinal geo-strategic importance and critical for India for resolving the
manifold political and social difficulties in her North-Eastern region, for
stabilizing her relations with Myanmar in the short run and enabling it
to deal with rising Chinese influence in the long run. In an interview
conducted by the author with a retired German ambassador, he was told
that in diplomatic circles the initiative was regarded as a move by India
to form a bloc against China, especially considering the fact that China,
too, is part of the Mekong.28
The MGC thus is a forum that suffers from a ‘negative’: the lack of
China’s participation is telling, and whether China is allowed to join
(comparable to Pakistan’s desire in the IOR-ARC) remains to be seen. In
an editorial, an analyst summarized:
The selection of the MG-Six did raise a few eyebrows in the region.
But by calling itself the Mekong–Ganga Forum, there were obvious
questions on why China and Bangladesh were not considered. The
answers too were equally obvious. Bangladesh is already a part of
BIMST-EC, while China was fully engaged in the Mekong Basin
projects through a parallel sub-regional platform. So they were con-
veniently left out to make the new body more homogeneous and
close-knit.
(Jayanth, 2000)
This statement is in consonance with the definition of regional mul-

tilateralism, namely ‘regional clarity’. It becomes crucial for India to
‘contain’ Chinese influence through a regional forum. ‘The Hindu’
noted: ‘It is sad but true that BIMST-EC has not taken off after three or
four years, just as the Indian Ocean Rim initiative is weighed down by
teething problems. It is entirely up to India to make at least the MGC
succeed so that the historical links can be converted into a new partner-
ship’ (Jayanth, 2000). China clearly belongs to the GMS, but is kept out.
India’s long-term interests in the region remain, certainly influenced by
China’s behaviour especially with a view to Myanmar.
The BCIM Regional Cooperation Forum (former Kunming Initiative)

The Conference on Regional Economic Cooperation and Development
among Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar (BCIM) was held in
Kunming from 15 to 17 August 1999 under the auspices of the Yunnan

Academy of Social Sciences and the Yunnan Provincial Economic and
Technological Research Center. It was named the Kunming Initiative (KI)
on 17 August 1999, when delegates accepted a proposal to revive the
Stilwell Road, or the ‘Old Burma Road’. This initiative clearly originated
in China. According to Section 2 of the KI Declaration, ‘there was broad
agreement on the need for regional cooperation among the four participat-
ing countries and their sub-regions.’ The original idea behind the KI was
to integrate the BCIM economies through cross-border infrastructure
development, including rail, air, and river links and roads. The forum
was later named Forum of Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar on
Regional Economic Cooperation and again renamed in 2011 as the
Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar Regional Cooperation Forum.
Until 2012, altogether nine meetings of the BCIM Regional Coopera-
tion Forum have been held: Kunming (1999), New Delhi (2000), Dhaka
(2002), Yangon (2003), Kunming (2004), New Delhi (2006), Dhaka (2007),
Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar (2009), Kunming (2011). The forum was origi-
nally designed as a hybrid governmental/track II forum, which means
that for China and Myanmar, governmental organs are responsible, and
in the case of Bangladesh and India, autonomous research institutions
are participating (the Centre for Policy Dialogue [CPD], Dhaka and the
Institute of Chinese Studies and the Centre for Policy Research, New
Delhi). The BCIM focuses on tourism, trade, and transportation. In its
ninth meeting in 2011, the BCIM agreed on the need to improve the
cooperation mechanism, which in essence meant that the hybrid design
had failed to work. Now a ‘multi-track initiative with track I coordina-
tion’ was suggested.
In 2003, the Asia Times highlighted the role of Bangladesh in the
forum:
The Kunming Initiative received a big boost last December [2002]

when Bangladesh Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia met with the
governor of Yunnan province. […] The Bangladeshi spokesman told
the media that the Yunnan governor had asked Zia to encompass
Bangladesh in the Kunming Initiative for an enhanced cooperation
to the mutual benefit. The governor said that his province would co-
operate with Bangladesh in strengthening interaction in economic,
trade and cultural fields under the Kunming Initiative, joined by
Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and north-eastern India.
(Maitra, 2003)
With Bangladesh’s membership in the BCIM Forum as well as in the

MGC, her commitment to SAARC is also in question, since it now deals
with India in three regional multilateral initiatives.
China, with the Kunming initiative, and India, with the Mekong–Ganga
Cooperation, are both trying to reach out to ASEAN markets by promot-
ing mutual economic and infrastructure development and energy secu-
rity. With these two initiatives, both countries are currently in a veritable
race to forge closer trade ties with Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia,
and Indonesia. For China, it is this particular Kunming Initiative with
which it seeks to link the Chinese province of Yunnan with Myanmar,
India’s North-Eastern states, and Thailand in an economic grid.
With India being a member in different regional organizations, the
scope of activity overlaps and it is unclear which organization takes
precedence. More importantly, however, is that India and China clash,
normatively speaking, about their role in an organization, despite the
rhetorical commitment to the Panchsheel. With India as the undisputed
normative hegemon in SAARC, IOR-ARC, BIMST-EC, and the MGC, her
role in the BCIM Regional Cooperation Forum cannot adequately reflect
her normative outreach. China, herself a hegemon, cannot leave nor-
mative hegemony to India, and indeed, India and China have not
been able to further agree on the details of this particular regional mul-
tilateralism. India is clearly not actively participating in the Kunming
initiative, her enthusiasm is lukewarm at best. ‘Frontline’ correctly noted
in 2006: ‘Thus far China has been the initiative’s most enthusiastic
proponent and India its least. The initiative currently remains a track-2
(non-governmental) one despite Yunnan’s efforts to lobby New Delhi to
upgrade it to the governmental level’ (Aiyar, 2006). India’s lack of enthu-
siasm about the initiative can be adequately explained with her cognitive
prior and ideational orthodoxy, China’s leading role as the promoter of
the initiative (i.e., a competing normative hegemon) and the effects of
Panchsheel multilateralism on regional cooperation in general.
Asian regional multilateral fora: the Asia Cooperation

Dialogue (ACD) and the Asian-African Sub-Regional
Organizations Conference (AASROC)
Nehru’s ‘ideational’ successors decided to connect the different Asian

regions in a common forum. They acknowledged that cooperation in Asia
has remained weak and tried to address certain shortcomings. Therefore,
an attempt was made to organize cooperation at a ‘continental’ level
with the ‘Asia Cooperation Dialogue’, and with the ‘Asian-African Sub-
Regional Organizations Conference’, Asian and African organizations
organized a multilateral forum in the spirit of the Bandung.
The Asia Cooperation Dialogue

The Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) was created in 2002 to promote
Asian cooperation at a continental (pan-Asian) level, aiming to integrate
previously separate regional organizations of political and/or economical
cooperation such as ASEAN, SAARC, BIMST-EC, or the GCC. The ACD is
an Asian inter-regional forum, currently comprising 30 countries from
East to West Asia; it is the first forum aiming to eventually encompass
all countries in Asia. The ‘executive summary’ states:
The ACD is a continent-wide forum, the first of its kind in Asia. More
specifically, the ACD aims to constitute the missing link in Asia by
incorporating every Asian country and building an Asian Community
without duplicating other organizations or creating a bloc against
others. A key principle is to consolidate Asian strengths and fortify
Asia’s competitiveness by maximizing the diversity and rich resources
evident in Asia. The core values of the ACD are positive thinking; infor-
mality; voluntarism; non-institutionalization; openness; respect for diver-
sity; the comfort level of member countries; and the evolving nature of the
ACD process (emphasis added).
(ACD, 2002)
This particular idea of an Asia Cooperation Dialogue was initiated by

Thai Prime Minister Thaksin and first raised during the ‘International
Conference of Asian Political Parties’ held in Manila from 17 to 20
September 2000. Just as for the BIMST-EC and the MGC, Thailand played
the role of a norm entrepreneur by suggesting a new dialogue forum
between Asian countries.
Both SAARC and BIMST-EC are partners in the ACD, even though in
this particular case one can no longer speak of an actual diffusion of the
norm ‘regional multilateralism’, since the ACD did not intend to be a
formal regional organization. Still, the ACD is a ‘reservoir’ of regional
organizations in which the normative shortcomings of the four organi-
zations continue to exist.
As for the necessity of the ACD, several reasons were given: coop-
eration for the eradication of mass-poverty, an Asian Monetary Fund,
a common Asian market, a common currency, an Asian parliament and
an Asia-wide inter-parliamentary dialogue. Surakiart Sathirathai, then
Thai foreign minister, suggested that the continent should have its own
forum to discuss Asia-wide cooperation. The need for a new type of
Asian cooperation was based, according to Thaksin Shinawatra, on the
new Asian realism (Shinawatra, 2002).
The idea of an ACD was first formally proposed by Sathirathai dur-
ing the 34th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Hanoi from 23 to 24
July 2001. Just as had happened in the case of SAARC and BIMST-EC,
preliminary talks were held: both Sathirathai and Shinawatra discussed
the possibility of the actual founding of the ACD with various heads of
state and foreign ministries (especially India) and gave several speeches
elucidating the rationale behind the concept of an Asia-wide dialogue.
Sathirathai emphasized Europe’s experience as a model for Asia:
The European transportation network, comprising road, railway and

inland waterway, has been cited as providing an impetus to eco-
nomic integration. Useful lessons can be drawn from the European
experience and legal framework for its procedure governing customs
cooperation, river navigation and land transportation to facilitate
the physical and technical flow of goods, services, capital and move-
ment of people within the region.
(Sathirathai, 2002a)
After further elaborating on the idea at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’

Retreat in Phuket from 20 to 21 February 2002, Thailand decided to
host the first meeting. The ACD had 18 founding members.29 The
first ACD Ministerial Meeting took place in Cha-Am, Thailand, from
18 to 19 June 2002, and was attended by 17 Foreign Ministers (the 18
founding members, excluding Myanmar). The discussion, according
to Sathirathai, revolved mainly around ‘the challenges facing Asia, the
format and modalities of the ACD process, and possible areas of coop-
eration’ (Sathirathai, 2002b). The main objectives of the ACD are:
1. To promote interdependence among Asian countries in all areas

of cooperation by identifying Asia’s common strengths and
opportunities.
2. To expand the trade and financial market within Asia and increase
the bargaining power of Asian countries in lieu of competition and,
in turn, enhance Asia’s economic competitiveness in the global
market.
3. To serve as the missing link in Asian cooperation by building
upon Asia’s potentials and strengths through supplementing and
complementing existing cooperative frameworks so as to become a

viable partner for other regions.
4. To ultimately transform the Asian continent into an Asian Com-
munity, capable of interacting with the rest of the world on a more
equal footing and contributing more positively towards mutual peace
and prosperity.
Consensus was reached on the basic structure of the ACD.30 Shinawatra

stressed that the format of the organization was up to the participants.
They agreed on a very loose, informal association, ‘non-institutionalized’
for maximum flexibility. Another issue was that of ‘comfort levels’,
where the members agreed that issues should be broached only if they
were acceptable to all members, so that easier ones could be dealt with
first, before moving on to more difficult ones; this was meant to prevent
the organization from being stalled by seemingly intractable problems
like the question of democracy in Myanmar or the Kashmir dispute in
South Asia. This was important for India, since she wanted to avoid that
political issues were discussed at the ACD.
A key decision was that of increasing cooperation in multilateral fora
like the World Trade Organization. The other major agreement identi-
fied areas of cooperation and the so-called ‘prime movers’ in each area.
The ministers agreed to submit concept papers on their chosen areas
of cooperation, to continue inter-session dialogues and to hold work-
shops and seminars when necessary. It was also agreed that Thailand
would remain the focal point of the organization, at least until the next
meeting.
The second ACD Ministerial Meeting was held in Chiang-Mai, Thailand,
from 21 to 22 June 2003. It focused mainly on continuing and support-
ing the cooperation projects agreed upon at the last meeting. Several
countries presented concept papers on their chosen areas of coopera-
tion. Shinawatra indicated three major components for poverty allevia-
tion: trade, financial instruments, and technology (Shinawatra, 2003).
Thailand’s Asian Bond Fund initiative, launched in June 2003, and the
ACD Tourism Business Forum it hosted in May 2003, were noted with
approval.
A key issue at the second meeting was the question of enlargement.
Several countries had expressed their interest in joining the group and
four were selected, ensuring sub-regional representation, and main-
taining the above-mentioned ‘comfort levels’ of participating coun-
tries. The four new ACD members were Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Oman, and
Sri Lanka.
Until 2012, 10 official ACD Ministerial Meetings have taken place,31

and membership now includes every member state of ASEAN and of
the GCC. On the occasion of UNGA meetings, ACD consultations have
also taken place. Thailand has remained the only country to have actu-
ally started concrete initiatives and has worked with her neighbours
to built linkages from Singapore to China and from India to Thailand.
India is the so-called ‘prime mover’ in the sectors of biotechnology and
transport linkages. With regard to questions of Asian norm localization,
an interesting point was made by explaining why the ACD fulfils the
purpose of the above-mentioned ‘missing link’. According to the
‘executive summary’:
Missing link here implies something new. Before the ACD was formed
in 2002, forums for cooperation in the Asian region were primarily
sub-regional in character, e.g., GMS, ACMECS, BIMST-EC, ASEAN,
ASEAN+3, SAARC, GCC, CICA.32 When the ACD came about, how-
ever, it was able to draw its membership from all of Asia’s sub-regions,
i.e., Southeast Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Western Asia, the Middle
East and Central Asia, becoming the first pan-Asian forum. What the
ACD did, then, was to bring (or ‘link’) all sub-regions and sub-regional
forums together under one roof. The missing link concept also has
to do with what the ACD aspires to do. The ACD strives to be the
‘missing link’ in Asian cooperation by carrying out projects that not
only do not duplicate those in the sub-regional forums, but also
complement and add value to them.
(ACD, 2002)
SAARC, BIMST-EC, and MGC each form sub-regional groups, the IOR-
ARC an inter-/trans-regional forum, and the ACD a continental/inter-
regional forum. But the ACD is more extensive than BIMST-EC and
MGC, both in sectors of cooperation and in membership. Yet, it was
not specified why non-institutionalization (as pointed out in the execu-
tive summary above) was regarded as a core value, considering that
lack of institutionalization means a lack of coordination. It was also
specifically pointed out that duplication of other organizations was not
intended. The question which arises is if the various sectors of coopera-
tion of other organizations—all of which stress infrastructure and social
development—actually require yet another organization or forum. Next
to already existing weak regional organizations, the least thing needed
in the South Asian region is yet another forum in which cooperation is
discussed and planned, yet not implemented.
With regard to research question 3 about competing regionalism, it

is, as of now, unclear if India’s role in ACD means a weakening of other
organizations. The odd fact remains, however, that India is participating
in a regional dialogue forum in which other regional organizations—
SAARC and BIMST-EC—are listed as members, even though none of the
latter possess an independent actor quality. In the ACD, deficiencies in
Asian regional cooperation were once again identified, but these were
not addressed by actually changing the Asian ‘way’ of cooperating.
Instead, the ACD stresses the same ideas, ideals, and values which have
only resulted in weak institutional cooperation.
The Asian–African Sub-Regional Organizations Conference

(AASROC)
For two years, preparatory meetings for the ‘Asian-African Summit’ in
2005 were conducted through the AASROC process. The first meeting of
the ‘Asian-African Sub-Regional Organizations Conference’ (AASROC I) was
held in Bandung, Indonesia, from 29 to 30 July 2003. On this occasion,
Kofi Annan stated:
I would like to commend President Megawati Soekarnoputri of

Indonesia and President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa for jointly
convening this first-ever Asian-African Subregional Organizations
Conference. By putting in place this important mechanism for part-
nership, they have demonstrated their continued commitment to
the ‘Bandung spirit’, which emerged nearly half a century ago at the
Asian-African Conference and which has inspired the Non-Aligned
Movement throughout its existence.
(Annan, 2003)
The theme of the conference was ‘Invigorating the Bandung Spirit:

Working towards a New Asian-African Strategic Partnership’. AASROC
I identified the following as underlying principles in the development of
a ‘New Strategic Partnership’: (1) the 10 principles adopted at the 1955
Bandung Asian-African Conference; (2) a recognition of the diversity
between and within regions, including different social and economic
systems and levels of development; (3) a focus on Asian and African
ownership based on a common vision, an equal partnership, and a firm
and shared conviction; (4) a commitment to open dialogue based on
mutual respect and benefit; (5) cooperation where there is scope for
common interest and mutual benefit; (6) efforts to strengthen, comple-
ment, and build upon existing regional and sub-regional organizations’
initiatives in both regions; and (7) cooperation based on comparative

advantage and mutual strength.33
The conference noted that since the 1955 Bandung Conference, Asian
and African countries have made significant political advances, but have
not yet attained commensurate progress in the social and economic
spheres. Therefore, many areas of cooperation needed to be further
strengthened and AASROC could play a role in complementing various
initiatives/mechanisms and promoting accelerated growth and pros-
perity in both Asia and Africa.34 The conference expressed its concern
over unilateral trends which undermine the role of multilateralism.
Additionally, the conference emphasized the importance of a multilat-
eral approach in international relations and the need for countries to
strictly abide by the principles of international law, in particular, the
UN charter.
The second meeting (AASROC II) took place on 20 August 2004 in
Durban, South Africa. The ‘Asian African Summit’ was then held in
Bandung, Indonesia, from 22 to 23 April 2005, and was ‘history’s largest
exclusive gathering of Asian and African leaders […]. Although Indonesia
and South Africa were undoubtedly successful in bringing together an
impressive roll call of leaders for the current meeting […], analysts said
they had not found it easy to articulate a concrete agenda to match their
ideals’ (Greenless, 2005).
Regional organizations in the form of the Panchsheel multilateralism
have not been able to achieve much impact. AASROC in a way con-
firmed this fact and these developments and highlighted that Asian
regional cooperation had remained behind expectation. With AASROC
and the ensuing Asian-African Summit, Asian conferences returned
to their origins of 1955 (see Section ‘Asian regional conferences: early
concepts of regional multilateralism from 1949 to 1961’ in Chapter 3),
without having consolidated the process of regional multilateralism in
a sub-regional or inter-regional domain. Rhetoric once again prevailed,
as witnessed by the lack of follow-up conferences. Regional multilateral-
ism had come full circle.
5
Conclusions: Competing Regionalism
and Panchsheel Multilateralism in
South Asia and Beyond
As the process-tracing conducted for the four regional organizations has

demonstrated, regional multilateralism has been subject to the process
of norm localization, with India’s foreign policy authoritatively deter-
mining the extent to which the norm of regional multilateralism has
finally been implemented. The final chapter of this book summarizes
the findings of the foregoing analysis and provides a tentative outlook
of future developments: First, the phenomenon of competing regional-
ism in South Asia and beyond is examined; next, recurring patterns of
regional multilateralism vis-à-vis Indian foreign policy are extrapolated.
The final section of the chapter deals with the question as to whether
India now has a new ‘tryst with destiny’ in the form of regional multi-
lateralism and provides policy recommendations.
The explanatory power of norm localization and competing

regionalism in South Asia and neighbouring regions
The concept of norm localization enabled the author to incorporate ele-

ments of a particular foreign policy culture while analysing the imple-
mentation process of regional multilateralism. This norm conflicted with
deeply ingrained cultural beliefs of the normative hegemon. Although
the original initiative for the formation of SAARC, IOR-ARC, BIMST-EC,
and MGC always came from smaller states, India in due course took the
reins in her hand, influenced the negotiations, and was responsible for
crafting the respective founding documents and for determining the
exact institutional set-up of the organizations. Owing to India’s insist-
ence on implementing a pre-existing (Nehruvian) cultural structure, the
norm was then localized and sublimated right from the start.
182
Conclusions 183
Considering the above, the fact that India has agreed to become a
member of four regional arrangements requires an explanation that
transcends the confines of realist arguments and the latter’s focus on
power. In theory, India as the regional hegemon could make use of a
regional organization to discipline states of the region (SAARC), or to
bind states that are located farther away (IOR-ARC) or that are members
in other regional organization (BIMST-EC) closer to it. However, India’s
insistence on this particular ‘minimal’ regional multilateralism in no
way furthers this goal. On the contrary, the institutional set-up of the
organizations does not allow for political manoeuvrings or strategic
scheming.
The process of norm sublimation applied in the four case studies has
the advantage of explaining the lack of certain components of what con-
stitutes the essence of regional multilateralism. Norm sublimation can
explain why, in the Panchsheel form, the norm suffers from achieving its
normative ‘push’ and has noticeably remained under-institutionalized.
The explanatory power of norm localization in its modified form can
thus be verified for the South Asian regional context.
As a consequence, the current state of affairs of regional multilateral-
ism in South Asia and neighbouring regions is that each country fends
for itself, and cooperation takes place in the bilateral, but not in the
multilateral field. However, by founding the IOR-ARC, BIMST-EC, and
MGC alongside the SAARC and by deliberately excluding certain coun-
tries from joining these organizations, India has also started a process
of competing regionalism.
A time gap of 12 years existed between the founding of the SAARC and
the IOR-ARC. With the genesis of the latter, India clearly had the oppor-
tunity to start a fresh process of regional multilateralism. As the evolu-
tionary phases of the IOR-ARC described above have demonstrated, it
is beyond doubt that India was heavily involved in shaping the newly
created IOR-ARC; India eclipsed Australia as the initial prime mover and
norm entrepreneur of the process of Indian Ocean regional multilateral-
ism. From the beginning of negotiations way back in 1994, there were
two obvious differences, one relating to the scope of the membership
and the second relating to the scope of objectives of such an Indian
Ocean organization. These two were the core issues in the debates
between 1994 and 1997. During the early deliberations, an Indian Ocean
Rim cooperation was envisaged by Australia in 1994 to eventually lead
to an inclusive regional organization, with particular emphasis on eco-
nomic cooperation, security matters, and mutual confidence-building
measures. Clearly, the APEC served as the role model for the Australian
set-up of the IOR-ARC.
On the other hand, there was the regional architecture proposed by
India, the focus of which was almost entirely upon cultural and eco-
nomic cooperation among a select group of Indian Ocean states. India
subsequently assumed the lead role in the evolution of the IOR-ARC,
the selection of its venues, the nature of issues for deliberation (the
agenda), and in matters of membership. The result of this engagement
has again been the sublimated norm of regional multilateralism, i.e.,
Panchsheel multilateralism.
With regard to BIMST-EC, the organization has to be primarily viewed
as an integral part of India’s ‘Look East’ policy. Still, the process-tracing
conducted in section ‘The Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and the
BCIM Regional Cooperation Forum’ in Chapter 4 permits one to deduce
three main elements which constitute the core of India’s policy towards
BIMST-EC and can be seen as a logical outcome of her cognitive prior vis-à-
vis regional organizations, from a political and economical perspective.
First, India strongly supported policies and programmes designed to
promote economic development. In the furtherance of this objective,
BIMST-EC took certain measures such as the enhancement of the level
of interaction among the member countries to the level of a summit, an
identification of core areas of cooperation each of which was entrusted
to a member of the grouping designated as a lead country, and the ini-
tiation of the process of the establishment of a BIMST-EC FTA. Second,
India assisted the individual members of BIMST-EC through bilateral
cooperation in a wide range of areas, including trade, investment, indus-
try, science and technology, transport and communication, energy, tour-
ism, agriculture, fisheries, development of transport corridors, trilateral
highway project, and focus on mega projects in the energy sector such
as natural gas pipelines. Third, India forged a common front against ter-
rorism and trans-national crimes; it has convened the meetings of this
working group several times.
BIMST-EC thus serves various ‘official’ purposes including the promo-
tion of cooperation to ensure the security of waterways, the eradication of
organized crime, piracy and drug trafficking, and the sharing of expertise
in the fields of information technology, space technology, infrastructure
development, and tourism. BIMST-EC is also regarded as an organization
which can serve India’s trans-regional interests in South and Southeast
Asia. Burma’s inclusion in the group as well as the latter’s membership
in ASEAN could turn out to be to India’s advantage, as this inclusion can
Conclusions 185
balance the growing Chinese role in Burma. Raja Mohan highlighted

that ‘[BIMST-EC’s] geo-political significance cannot be underestimated.
It allows India to break out of the constricting confines of the subcon-
tinent that it had long chafed at. In linking five South Asian countries
with two Southeast Asian nations, it shatters the old notions of a South
Asia separated from its eastern neighbours’ (Raja Mohan, 2004).
In addition, BIMST-EC can help India to counter China’s growing
influence in Myanmar (see Vatikiotis, 1997, pp. 29–32). However, the
strong focus on bilateralism within BIMST-EC is again a clear sign for
the process of norm localization and also a clear sign of the impact of
Indian foreign policy determinants. BIMST-EC is only an extension of
national ministries with practically no room for independent institu-
tional evolution.
And finally, with the MGC, India has again decided to cooperate with
Thailand and Myanmar in a regional initiative, focusing on infrastruc-
ture and cultural aspects. The programmes and initiatives of the MGC
also mainly take place in the bilateral sphere and do not allow for any
independent institutional evolution. As an interesting tit-for-tat, the
Thai-led ACMECS appears to be the Thai form of competing regional-
ism, combining all the countries of the MGC minus India.
All in all, India’s involvement in regional multilateralism between
1978 and 2012 has now resulted in the existence of four regional
organizations which overlap in membership, territorial scope, and areas
of cooperation. Figure 5.1 shows the intersections which are observable
in these four organizations.
This very process has led to a weakening of all organizations, rather
than further strengthening integration in the regions. India especially
weakens the organizations by alienating those countries that she suc-
cessfully keeps out of the other organizations (e.g., Pakistan). How India
wants to effectively work together with countries in one organization
while at the same time refusing them membership in another organiza-
tion on formal grounds remains a mystery, as does the question why
India opts to mainly focus on bilateralism in a regional multilateral
setting, as is the case with the BIMST-EC and the MGC.
Recurring patterns in regional multilateralism in South Asia
Regional multilateralism and regional cooperation observably do not

take place in a vacuum; they are promoted and also possibly prevented
by the political and economic events taking place at the national and
Economy, Culture,
Infrastructure
BIMST-EC:
Bhutan
Nepal
Myanmar Sri Lanka
Thailand Bangladesh
SAARC: Pakistan
MGC: Myanmar Bangladesh
Culture, Economy,
Cambodia Sri Lanka
Infrastructure Culture,
Vietnam INDIA Nepal Maldives Infrastructure
Laos Thailand Bhutan Afghanistan
IOR-ARC: Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh
Australia, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia,

Mauritius, Mozambique, Madagascar,
Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa,
Tanzania, UAE, Yemen
Economy, Culture,
Infrastructure
Figure 5.1 Intersections of competing regionalism
international levels. Looking at the developments in Europe, calls for

regional multilateralism were voiced immediately following World War II.
The situation there, however, was conducive to the idea of pooling com-
mon resources and cooperation in the economic field. The European
Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the Treaty of Rome (1957) as the
beginning of European integration were necessary steps in the rebuild-
ing of a war-torn Europe. With World War II as the first major catalyst
for regional cooperation, it was the fall of the Berlin Wall that served as
the second major catalyst and led to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992
and the coming into existence of the European Union, which was then
followed by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the Treaty of Nice (2003),
and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 as the latest stage in the history of
European integration. The current financial and fiscal crisis will most
likely serve as the third major catalyst for furthering cooperation.
Conclusions 187
Events that took place in South Asia since 1947—such as the parti-
tion of India and Pakistan, several full-scale wars between India and
her neighbours, border skirmishes with neighbouring countries, mass
migration, religious communal violence, economic depression, or several
national emergencies—all play(ed) an influential part in the evolution
of the idea and practice of multilateralism in the South Asian region
and beyond. However, the kind of catalyst for regional multilateral-
ism that Europe experienced is still at large for South Asia, where ideas
and norms vis-à-vis regional multilateralism have to be seen in the
light of Indian foreign policy orientations. Rüland, analysing norma-
tive issues in ASEAN, summarized a comparable dilemma in Southeast
Asia: ‘Constructed norms such as pragmatism, flexibility, personalism
and social harmony may foster cooperation in a context of great socio-
economic, political and cultural diversity. But without major trans-
formations, they are not able to build a normative foundation as a
precondition for any substantive deepening of cooperation’ (Rüland,
2000, p. 440).
Clearly, India’s historical narrative is completely different from that
of the European or East Asian one. As the previous examination of the
origins and development of major conferences in Asia, and the genesis
and evolution of four major multilateral regional organizations have
shown, only a proper acknowledgment of the philosophical and idea-
tional roots of India’s foreign policy cognitive prior makes it possible to
understand why regional cooperation in this region of the world will
not, or cannot, follow European ways. India’s state ‘identity’ and Indian
cultural idiosyncrasies shaped a very peculiar form of regional multi-
lateralism. In other words, regional multilateralism contradicts India’s
cognitive prior, which means that any (future) cooperative scheme in
which India is involved will have to take this unalterable constant into
account.
The main argument developed in the beginning of this book and
investigated in the four case studies has been that a hegemon—
normatively speaking—will influence the institutional set-up of an
organization and the potential for its independent evolution. Since this
argument was proved to be correct in theoretical and empirical terms,
it is possible to discern certain patterns which have emerged in the
sphere of regional multilateralism and make predictions about future
developments:
(1) Regional multilateralism in South Asia and beyond will never

follow the same paths as the European model. The state of regional
multilateralism with India’s participation is at best tangible at the track-II

level, while any deepening of cooperation is improbable to occur in the
near future.
(2) The original norm entrepreneurs (Bangladesh, Australia, or Thailand)
have been sidelined in all cases and India has altered each organiza-
tion according to the Indian model and cognitive prior. With each
new attempt of institutionalized regional multilateralism, this will
happen again, with foreseeable results of institutional paralysis and
stasis.
(3) Since political and bilateral contentious issues are always excluded,
none of these organizations can offer more than a simple forum for
high-level talks. Even though the talks between India and Pakistan
on the sidelines of several SAARC summits should not be disregarded,
there are other venues better suited for such high-level talks. A regional
organization should offer concrete solutions to the problems in the
region, and not simply be a talk shop.
(4) Until now, there has been a lack of regional clarity: Afghanistan is
here an example for the SAARC (officially rejected in 1985, accepted
in 2007), Pakistan for the IOR-ARC (rejected) and BIMST-EC (rejected),
and China for the MGC and the ensuing Kunming Initiative. In the
case of the IOR-ARC, the island-nation of the Seychelles was a found-
ing member, then withdrew membership in 2003—despite its cru-
cial geographical position—and then rejoined the organization only
in 2011.
(5) India is now more active in these organizations which serve her
main priority, namely the economic growth strategy. The slow progress
of regional cooperation within South Asia, particularly the inability of
SAARC to promote economic links within the subcontinent, has forced
India to ‘look east’ for trade opportunities. Still, despite an initial enthu-
siasm for the IOR-ARC, BIMST-EC, and MGC, nothing of substance has
been achieved in these organizations either.
(6) Panchsheel multilateralism represents a ‘torso regionalism’, i.e., a
regionalism whose normative features do not enable cooperation beyond
an FTA (if at all) and regional cooperation only in sectors dealing with
low politics such as culture and education.
(7) Regional multilateralism in its present form in South Asia and neigh-
bouring regions is weakened by a trend towards competing regional-
ism. It is not unlikely that new regional organizations will be founded
encompassing a similar set of nations which again will focus on similar,
overlapping sectors of cooperation.
Conclusions 189
Regional multilateralism—India’s next ‘tryst with destiny’?
On 14 August 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru declared in front of the Indian

Constituent Assembly:
Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes
when we shall redeem our pledge […]. At the stroke of the midnight
hour, while the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom.
A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step
out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul
of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance.
(cited in Collins and Lapierre, 1997, pp. 316–8)
India’s ‘freedom at midnight’ and her ‘tryst with destiny’ marked

the end of 200 years of British ‘raj’ and the entry of India on the inter-
national stage as an independent nation. Does India now have a new
‘tryst with destiny’ in the form of regional multilateralism, despite the
negative implications that the recurring patterns in regional multi-
lateralism summarized above entail? Considering the following eight
dimensions bearing on India’s role in the respective regions and in
world politics, the answer to this question is a definitive ‘yes’:
(1) India is the largest democracy in the world. If exerted properly and
earnestly, her influence in any given regional organization could lead to
more democracy in other non-democratic member countries (argument
of democratization).
(2) Geo-strategically, India’s role in regional organizations could counter-
balance designs harboured by other regional hegemons. In hegemonic
terms, China and Russia are both India’s friends and foes. India could
expand her sphere of influence far beyond her geographical borders if the
‘regional organization’—card is played properly (argument of geo-strategy).
(3) Militarily, India and Pakistan are full-fledged nuclear powers. Their
membership in a functional regional organization could one day deter-
mine crucial aspects of non-proliferation, and possibly even détente in
the region (argument of non-proliferation).
(4) Politically, India’s successful integration into regional organiza-
tions in the Indian Ocean or the Bay of Bengal could well serve the
Indian objective of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, besides the symbolism this carries (arguments of projection and
symbolism).
(5) Bilateral relations can be strengthened in a regional organization,

and multilateral relations can deepen friendship among nations and
permit the solution of bilateral conflicts (argument of bilateralism versus
multilateralism).
(6) Membership in a regional organization could provide India with a
much better leverage when it comes to pertinent questions regarding
domestic issues, e.g., energy security (argument of leverage).
(7) The four organizations analysed here represent, geographically
speaking, the whole of the Indian subcontinent, from the Himalayas to
Cape Comorin, plus parts of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean
(SAARC), the whole of the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR-ARC), the whole
of the Bay of Bengal (BIMST-EC), and the riparian countries of the
Mekong and the Ganga (MGC). There are no other organizations in
the world covering such a vast geographical area and huge population
(with the exception of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). These
organizations eclipse the EU, ASEAN, the Mercado Commun del Sur
(MERCOSUR), or the SADC (argument of size of regional organizations).
(8) Economically, intra-regional trade is probably the most relevant
aspect. Economic integration impacts the lives of more than 1.5 billion
people in the four organizations. If these organizations were to function—
e.g., if intra-SAARC trade were to take off—it could drastically improve
the lives and livelihood of the peoples of the region, which in turn could
alleviate the ubiquitous abject poverty in South Asia, provide a better
infrastructure, etc. (argument of economic growth).
Policy recommendations
It is essential for every analyst of political events in South Asia and of

the potential of multilateral organizations and regional fora to under-
stand the causes for the lack of enthusiasm and the lack of support for
regional cooperation that goes beyond very basic economic/cultural
cooperation, plus the inherent limitation in any such endeavour. More
often than not, the organizations examined in this book have been
called ‘non-performers’ and have remained far behind initial expecta-
tions. Further evolution—e.g., the idea of a South Asian security com-
plex, of more intra-SAARC regional trade—is especially hampered by
the institutional set-up of the organizations. Calls for strengthening
SAARC and changing its institutional framework have been continu-
ously made since 1985 (see, e.g., Dahal and Pandey, 2005), yet no action
has followed.
Conclusions 191
The subsequent suggestions use the SAARC as an example, but they

can also be applied to the other three organizations:
(1) A supra-national rather than a inter-governmental approach needs to

be implemented.
(2) The SAARC secretariat should receive a partial degree of independ-
ence from the respective foreign ministries, comparable to the EU
Commission which is responsible for furthering the higher good of the
EU as a whole, as stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon. A priority should
be an independent monitoring system which looks at the actual imple-
mentation of the decisions, declarations, and announcements that have
been made so far.
(3) A sharper profile and vision of the organization must be developed,
going beyond the narrow confines of its current charter.
(4) The SAARC Secretary General should receive more decision-making
powers.
(5) The SAARC staff and finances should be drastically increased in
order to have the manpower to effectively work on the different sectors
of cooperation and common projects.
(6) The fostering of a genuine sense of a South Asian or SAARC identity
is possible by means of select number of projects, e.g., in the sphere of
the global commons or the infrastructure sector. Current projects have
not received adequate funding and lack symbolic value. Traditional, but
also non-traditional security challenges, could serve as a field in which
regional multilateralism could make a difference in South Asia. A ‘South
Asian Security Strategy’ or an ‘Indian Ocean Security Strategy’, along the
lines of the ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS), could serve as a crucial
building block towards the forging of a common South Asian identity.
The SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism or likewise the
BIMST-EC Convention on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism,
Trans-national Organized Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking are important
in their own right, but they do not serve the purpose of forging a com-
mon identity as these conventions are too narrow in scope. Rather, ter-
rorism should become part of a comprehensive security strategy.
All of the above amounts to a paradigm shift in perspectives on regio-

nal multilateralism and entail a novel normative set-up. Sonia Gandhi,
President of the Indian National Congress, said already in 2003: ‘In today’s
interdependent world there is simply no alternative to working in concert
and collaboration with each other’ (Sonia Gandhi, 2003). Unfortunately,
this rhetoric of promoting regional multilateralism—from Jawaharlal

Nehru to Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi—has never been fol-
lowed up by determined action. Still, cooperation in an interdepend-
ent and globalized world is an indisputable imperative. Especially for
a future world power like India—likely to eclipse most other countries
in economic and political might in the foreseeable future—cooperation
going beyond mere bilateral agreements is a necessity. The question of
regional multilateralism is therefore of global relevance with respect
to the four organizations treated here. In the final analysis, a robust
regional organization, besides its obvious economic advantages, can
impact greatly on the course of political events and contribute to the
defusing of political and communal ‘bombs’ in the regions, beset as
they are by a myriad of cross-border problems. Many a simmering con-
flict could be extinguished in such a forum.
In the final analysis, it is actually only the idea of multilateralism
rather than ‘hard’ multilateralism that is the common denominator of
all these organizations until today. If India wants to further strengthen
her credibility and role in the world, a more proactive role than that
displayed so far in regional matters is necessary, as well as a genuine
and lasting ‘Gujral-style’ way of dealing with regional cooperation, and
a concomitant process of norm localization and norm sublimation that
is ‘benign’ toward regional multilateralism. With her normative domi-
nance, India alone will determine the future course of regional multilat-
eralism in South Asia, the Indian Ocean Rim, the Bay of Bengal, and the
Mekong-Ganga. India has, until now, sacrificed regional multilateralism
on the altar of national pride. By adhering to her quasi-monolithic for-
eign policy essentials, she has displayed a normative zeal which bears
‘Ahabesque’ traits. At present, India has chained regional multilateral-
ism like Prometheus to a rock.
Notes
1 Regional Multilateralism and Norm Localization

1. The term ‘regional organization’ is used here to denote institutionalized
activities on the regional level, regardless of the status of an ‘association’,
‘initiative’, or ‘forum’.
2. Different versions and acronyms for the grouping of the riparian countries of
the Mekong river and the Ganga river have been employed. It has been referred
to as the Mekong Ganga Swarnabhoomi Programme (MGSP), the Mekong
Ganga Cooperation Initiative (MGCI), the Mekong Ganga Cooperation Forum
(MGCF), or simply as the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC). Throughout the
book, the acronym MGC will be used.
3. The ASEAN was founded on 8 August 1967 with five members (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). It was expanded in 1984
(Brunei), in 1995 (Vietnam), in 1997 (Laos and Myanmar), and again in 1999
(Cambodia). For a comparison of the ASEAN, the EU, and the SAARC, see,
e.g., Bhargava (1995c, pp. 52–5).
4. See Beeson (2009) and Haacke (2003a, pp. 16–32); for a constructivist analy-
sis of ASEAN, see Rother (2004, pp. 52–76).
5. See Deutsch (1957), Haas (1958, 1964), Lindberg (1963), Mitrany (1966), Nye
(1968), Schmitter (1970), and Moravcsik (1991).
6. See Acharya (2000, 2001), Breslin et al. (2002), Haacke (2003a, 2003b),
Weatherbee (2005), Tarling (2006), Kuhonta et al. (2008), and Jetschke and
Rüland (2009).
7. For Bangladesh in the beginning of the SAARC process, see, e.g., Bhuyan
(1988); for the region, see Wilson and Ostuki (2005).
8. See Buzan and Rizvi (1986), Gonsalves and Jetly (1999), Chaudhury (2006),
and Paul (2010).
9. See George (2001) and Ahmed and Bhatnagar (2008).
10. See Ganguly (1997).
11. See Ganguly (2001) and Paul (2005).
12. See Mohan (2006).
13. See Dash (1996).
14. See Dash (2008).
15. For the impact of ethno-religious conflicts on India’s foreign policy, see
Chadda (1993, pp. 207–29). See also Phadnis (1989), Jetly (1999), and Riaz
(2010).
16. For Pakistani nationalism, see Jaffrelot (2002).
17. See Bose and Jalal (1998).
18. See Rao (1988).
19. See Asian Development Bank (2006b), World Bank (2007), RIS (2008), and
Desai (2010).
20. For the countries, see the section ‘South Asia’ at World Bank (2012).
193
194 Notes
21. Dash (2001) analysed ‘facilitating conditions’ for regional cooperation in

South Asia. Also, Dash (2008) analysed the SAARC by examining domestic
politics and domestic decision-making processes (two-level game).
22. Hettne (2005, p. 32) referred to ‘regional multilateralism’ when analysing
inter-regionalism: ‘A certain kind of regionalism (inter-regionalism) may,
however, be supportive of multilateral principles (regional multilateralism
or multiregionalism). But this is a long-term perspective and will depend
on the strength of the political project of taking regionalism as the crucial
element in reorganizing world order. At present, this project is represented
principally by the EU.’
23. For a discussion of constitutive norms, see Checkel (1999, pp. 83–114).
24. See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 891).
25. On the conceptualization of multilateralism, see Keohane (1990, pp. 731–64).
26. Whether the IOR-ARC is a trans-regional forum or a multiregional one is a
question that is open to interpretation. It appears that it contains several
strands. Wagner (2006, p. 292) noted: ‘More than eleven years after its inaugu-
ration the IOR-ARC seems to be an example for a trans-regional institution.
IOR-ARC is not a forum where the member states meet as representatives of
other regional organizations. Member states pursue their national interests
in a broad range of issue. Yet, like APEC, the IOR-ARC seems to be a border-
line case where the boundaries between regionalism and trans-regionalism
are blurred.’
27. See, e.g., George (1979, pp. 95–124), George and McKeown (1985, pp. 21–58),
Checkel (2005, p. 5), George and Bennett (2005, p. 6): ‘In process-tracing,
the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts,
and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or
implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the interven-
ing variable in that case.’
28. According to George and Bennett (2005, pp. 206–7), ‘the process-tracing
method attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain
and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and
the outcome of the dependent variable.’
29. A study by Fukasaku et al. (1998) uses the term ‘competing regionalism’ in
a different context. It looks at the economic impact of regionalism and con-
trasts different trade strategies as employed in Europe and Asia. Bowles (1997,
p. 226) has used the term ‘multiple regionalism’, where ‘countries belong to
different regional groupings and organizations (some of which have, in prac-
tice “overlapping membership”). […] The point that the concept of multiple
regionalism highlights is that many countries are party to several regional
trade arrangements.’ For Bowles, this development is inherently positive.
2 India’s Cognitive Prior: Ideas, Norms, and the Evolution

of India’s Foreign Policy
1. A nation, by definition, is an ‘imagined community’. It is imagined
because, Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 15) notes, ‘the image of their communion
lives in the minds of its members, bonding people who will never know one
Notes 195
another while depicting non-members, including those known personally,

as alien.’
2. See Bernstorff (1965, pp. 15–34, 113–37).
3. Naipaul (1998, p. 517) wrote: ‘Independence was worked for by people more
or less at the top; the freedom it brought has worked its way down.’
4. Engelmeier (2009) examined the interplay between national identity, nation-
building, and Indian foreign policy and the particular impact of Nehru and
Gandhi in this process.
5. See Nehru (1961, pp. 184–5): ‘If we desire peace, we must develop the tem-
per of peace, and try to win even those who may be suspicious of us or who
think they are against us.’
6. The ‘Arthashastra’ (Kautilya, 2003) was rediscovered in 1909 and subse-
quently translated from the Sanskrit original into English by R. Shamasastry.
The Sanskrit word artha has been translated in several ways, e.g., the study or
science of ‘politics’, ‘wealth’, ‘practical expediency’, or of ‘ways of acquiring
and maintaining power’. However, the literal meaning of Arthashastra in the
way Kautilya employs it is the ‘science of polity’ (cf. Modelski, 1964, p. 549).
The Arthashastra is divided into 15 books. Book 6 deals with the ‘Circle of
Kings’ and Book 7 with the ‘Six Measures of Foreign Policy’. About one-quar-
ter of the Arthashastra deal with matters regarding ‘international’ relations.
These parts are chiefly Books 1, 6–9, and 12–13. In IR literature, relatively
few articles or monographs have dealt with aspects of international relations
in the Arthashastra; see, e.g., Sarkar (1919, pp. 400–14), Modelski (1964,
pp. 549–69), Kühnhardt (1988, pp. 333–55), and Boesche (2002).
7. B. M. Sarkar (1919, p. 401) wrote: ‘This doctrine of mandala, underlying as it
does the Hindu idea of the “balance of power”, pervades the entire specula-
tion on the subject of international relation.’
8. Interviews by author on 5 October 2006, New Delhi, and on 24 November
2006, New Delhi. Sources asked not be named.
9. The Conference was attended by 28 countries including the then Soviet-
Asian Republics and Egypt. There were also observers from the UN, the Arab
League, and from Sydney, London, Moscow, and New York.
10. For a comprehensive treatment of the impact of the British rule, see Appadorai
(1981, pp. 38–51).
11. The term Panchsheel is found in ancient Buddhist literature and refers to five
principles of good conduct of the individuals. These are truth, non-violence,
celibacy, refraining from drinking, and vowing not to steal.
12. These developments have been described by, e.g. Talbott (2004) and
Jaswanth Singh (1999); for the historical evolution of the nuclear weapons
programme, see Karnad (2005) and especially Perkovich (1999).
13. For a complete treatment of contemporary Indian history, see Malone (2011)
and Ganguly (2010).
3 Regional Multilateralism in South Asia

1. For a comprehensive account of some of the major conferences of the view
in 1964, see Sisir Gupta (1964, pp. 28–84).
196 Notes
2. UNESCAP replaced the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE) in 1974.
3. See Kahin (1956, pp. 1–38) for an account of the proceedings; and the
‘Appendix’, pp. 39–85, for the speeches by several participants; for Nehru’s
speech before the Political Committee and excerpts from the closing speech,
pp. 64–75.
4. Twenty nine countries participated in the Bandung Conference held between
18 and 24 April, 1955. They included the five ‘Colombo Powers’: Burma,
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan,
Cambodia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Iran, Iraq, Japan,
Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Vietnam Democratic Republic, South
Vietnam, and Yemen.
5. For an inside account of the events before and during the Bandung Confer-
ence, including confidential reports, see Abdulghani (1981, pp. 40–113).
6. For the complete text of the final communiqué, see, e.g., Kahin (1956,
pp. 76–85); see also Abdulghani (1964, pp. 181–90).
7. Principle 6(a): Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence
to serve the particular interests of any of the big power.
8. The acronym ‘SARC’ is used for referring to the regional grouping in its
formative years prior to the official designation as ‘association’ in December
1985.
9. The GCC was established in Riyadh in February 1981, comprising the United
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.
10. Interview by author with Madhukar Rana, 17 November 2006, Kathmandu,
Nepal. This list was compiled by Madhukar Rana as a result of the early delib-
erations of the Think Tanks who had circulated several discussion papers.
See also Chaudhury (2006, p. 53, footnote 18).
11. For the domestic factors influencing Bangladesh’s initiative, see Dash (2008,
pp. 82–3).
12. For a detailed analysis of political and strategic implications of the Bangladesh
proposal, see Muni and Muni (1984a, pp. 30–43) and Muni (1985b,
pp. 391–404).
13. Interview by the author on 25 November 2006, New Delhi, India. Source
asked not to be named.
14. The paper suggested possible names for the organization, e.g., ‘South Asian
Association for Cooperation’ (SAAC), ‘Association of South Asia’, ‘Association
of South Asia for Cooperation’ or ‘Organisation of South Asian States’, see
Bangladesh Paper, in: SAARC Secretariat (1988b, p. 6).
15. Interview by the author with S. D. Muni, 23 October 2006, New Delhi, India.
16. Suman Sharma (2001, p. 79, footnote 27) cites M. Rasgotra, a former Indian
Foreign Secretary during the SAARC deliberations, as having told her that he
was informed by some high-ranking sources in Bhutan that there might be
an attempt by India’s neighbours to ‘gang-up’ against her.
17. For further details on the Indian reaction to the proposal, see Muni and Muni
(1984a, pp. 31–4), Muni (1985b, pp. 391–403), and Bokhari (1985, pp. 371–91).
18. Suman Sharma (2001, p. 80, footnote 36) cites an interview Rasgotra gave.
He stated that India first wanted to carefully assess the motives and response
of all the other countries to the proposal.
Notes 197
19. For details, see ‘An Indian note regarding areas of cooperation’, in SAARC
Secretariat (1988b, p. 17).
20. For a comparison of the founding processes of ASEAN and SAARC, see the
study by Dosch and Wagner (1999, pp. 20–38).
21. The inaugural Dhaka Summit set the precedent for procedures and modali-
ties to be followed in the future. Each summit was to be preceded by a meet-
ing of the ‘Standing Committee’ and of the ‘Council of Ministers’. After the
conclusion of each summit, a ‘Summit Declaration’ expounding the sum-
mit’s philosophy and thinking was issued along with a ‘Joint Communiqué’
which contained in summary form the substantive decisions of the summit.
See the ‘Rules of Procedure’ in Batra (2002, pp. 21–4). Membership was also
considered for Afghanistan and Burma. Iran was offered an observer status;
for this aspect, see Muni (1996, p. 61).
22. For the complete text, see SAARC Secretariat (1997a, pp. 1–6).
23. For the complete text of the MoU, see SAARC Secretariat (1988b, pp.
179–81).
24. See the ‘Joint Press Release’, issued on 17 November 1986 at the end of the
second SAARC Summit, Bangalore, in SAARC Secretariat (1997a, p. 20). For
further details on the Bangalore Summit, see, e.g., Haq (1987, p. 7–19); see
also Mohanan (1992, p. 68–9), Sudhakar (1994, 160–2), and Naqash (1994,
pp. 61–84).
25. For an inside account, see the section ‘The Shimla Agreement’ in Nayar (2006,
pp. 196–200).
26. For details, see Mohanan (1992).
27. For an extensive study arguing for the ‘urgent necessity’ to include trade
in SAARC agenda, see Fernando (1988, pp. 26–36); see also Singh (1989,
pp. 149–63); for areas of ‘industrial cooperation’, see Waqif (1987, pp. 51–65).
28. See ‘Kathmandu Declaration’, 4 November 1987, in Batra (2002, pp. 31–9).
29. For the text of the agreement establishing the Food Security Reserve,
see SAARC Secretariat (1988b, pp. 289–93).
30. For the text of the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism,
see SAARC Secretariat (1988a, pp. 294–7).
31. ‘Islamabad Declaration’, see Batra (2002, pp. 48–56).
32. For details, see the report by former SAARC Secretary-General K. K. Bhargava
(1990, pp. 11–16).
33. For Indian and Nepali perspectives on the crisis of Indo-Nepal relations in
later 1980s, see Kumar and Muni (1989).
34. Gordon (1996, p. 206) further notes that effective regionalism depends on
enabling areas of cooperation, as compared to facilitating activities: ‘The dis-
tinction between facilitating and enabling activities is usually not as sharp […]
For example, although the relationship between India and Pakistan is a
highly charged one, SAARC has existed in a kind of limbo for a decade, and
within SAARC, a number of facilitating-type activities have been undertaken.
In this case, however, the existence of SAARC has not, in itself appeared
to have facilitated better relations between India and Pakistan or to have
provided a venue in which they can resolve the more important differences
between them. On the contrary, evidence suggests that at times SAARC may
have even exacerbated tensions between regional nations by providing a
theatre in which those tensions could be played out.’
198 Notes
35. Sri Lanka did not invite the King of Bhutan directly because of the unavail-
ability of a direct flight from Dhaka to Thimpu. Later, the King of Bhutan
expressed his inability to attend the summit in view of ethnic disturbances
in his country. For further details, see Muni (1991).
36. ‘Colombo Declaration’, 21 December 1991, in SAARC Secretariat (1997b,
pp. 73–87).
37. See Madaan (1997, pp. 222–3) for the text of ninth SAARC Summit Declaration.
38. Interview by author with Dietmar Rothermund, 31 October 2006,
New Delhi, India.
39. See the SAARC Secretariat (2012) for current and updated information.
40. For an organizational chart of SAARC, see, e.g., SAARC Secretariat (1997c).
4 Regional Multilateralism beyond South Asia

1. The countries of the Indian Ocean rim possess a combined population of
about 2 billion people.
2. According to Stanley Kalpage (1997a), ‘India insists that the Declaration of
1971 must be implemented literally, with the cooperation of the great pow-
ers and the other major maritime uses of the Indian Ocean. India maintains
that the Declaration of 1971 cannot be for purposes other than what it was
formulated for and can only be amended through another resolution of the
General Assembly.’ For background aspects of the Zone of Peace, also see
Kalpage (1997b).
3. Interview by author with Uday Bhaskar, 24 November 2006, New Delhi,
India.
4. Stanley Kalpage (1997a) commented: ‘India has thus far refrained from par-
ticipating in another initiative of Sri Lanka, the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs
Cooperation (IOMAC), founded for cooperation in managing the ocean and
its resources and founded on the concept of integrated ocean management.’
5. Among the states that attended the Colombo meeting were several non-
Indian Ocean states which were considered to be active in the Indian Ocean
(Canada, China, Germany, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Romania, the UK, and the USA). The meeting was also attended by repre-
sentatives of the UN.
6. See especially for the macro-economic aspect, e.g., the section ‘India’ in
Rajan and Marwah (1997, pp. 205–7).
7. See for more details, e.g., the section ‘Australia’ in Rajan and Marwah (1997,
pp. 201–5).
8. See ‘Indian Ocean Rim Initiative, Working Group Meeting,’ in World Focus
(1997b, p. 73).
9. The following new members were suggested: Indonesia and Malaysia from
Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka from South Asia, Yemen from Southwest Asia, and
Tanzania, Madagascar and Mozambique from Southern Africa.
10. See Jakarta Post (1997): ‘They [the diplomats] said the bid by Mauritius to
host the secretariat had been opposed on Tuesday by Australia, backed by
South Africa and Singapore’; see also Freer (1996, pp. 3–5).
11. Australia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Yemen.
Notes 199
12. This was pointed out by Wagner (2006, p. 328, footnote 11).
13. Qatar cannot join the IOR-ARC since it does not border in the Indian
Ocean Rim.
14. The deliberations of the WGHM focused, e.g., on the following issues:
Improved facilitation of business travelling within the region, increasing
trade between member states through trade fairs, enhanced foreign direct
investments, fast-tracking of a Preferential Trade Agreement amongst six
IOR-ARC member states, etc.
15. See South Africa Department of International Relations (2006).
16. IOR-ARC member countries are: Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles,
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen. Dialogue partners are China, Egypt, France, Japan, and
the UK.
17. Although contentious bilateral questions were excluded from the agenda
by the Charter, there is a myriad of security threats prevalent in the Indian
Ocean, e.g., piracy, proliferation of small arms, trafficking of drugs, or
humans, see, e.g., Sakhuja (2003, pp. 689–702).
18. For details see, e.g., The Economist (1992, pp. 21–3), Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1993), Government of India (1993), and Srinivasan (2000, pp. 61–88).
19. For a comprehensive summary of different regional developments, see Page
(2000, pp. 97–206) and Hossain (1999). For key economic indicators, see the
tables in Shand (1998, pp. 31–54).
20. For a detailed analysis of the ‘Look East Policy’, see, e.g., Suryanarayana
(2000), Mohan (2000), and Ram (2000); see also Baru (1999a) and Dubey and
Jetly (1999b).
21. Until 2012, India has participated in eight India-ASEAN Summits. For
current ASEAN-India dialogue relations, see ASEAN Secretariat (2012).
22. Interview by author, 23 October 2006, New Delhi, India. Source asked not to
be named.
23. See the complete text in Government of India (2005).
24. Until 2012, 17 GMS Ministerial Conferences and 4 GMS Summit have
been held.
25. Apparently, this name was objected to by some countries, see, e.g., Manipur
Online (2002). See also Government of India (2001a).
26. For an overview of BIMST-EC and MGC, see Kaul (2006).
27. According to ACMECS (2003), the ‘Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya Mekong Economic
Cooperation Strategy’ is a cooperation framework amongst Cambodia, Lao
PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam to utilize member countries’ diverse
strengths and to promote balanced development in the sub-region.
28. Interview by author, 22 May 2007, source asked not be named.
29. Ten members of ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam),
plus Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, Pakistan, Qatar, and South
Korea.
30. For the different areas of cooperation, see Thailand Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (2002).
31. First ACD Ministerial Meeting: 18–19 June 2002, Thailand; second ACD
Ministerial Meeting: 21–22 June 2003, Thailand; third ACD Ministerial
200 Notes
Meeting: 21–22 June 2004, China; fourth ACD Ministerial Meeting: 4–6
April 2005, Pakistan; fifth ACD Ministerial Meeting: 23–24 May 2006, Qatar;
sixth ACD Ministerial Meeting: 5–6 June 2007, South Korea; seventh
ACD Ministerial Meeting: 16–17 October 2008, Kazakhstan; eighth ACD
Ministerial Meeting: 15–16 October 2009, Sri Lanka; ninth ACD Ministerial
Meeting: 8–9 November 2010, Iran; 10th ACD Ministerial Meeting: 10–11
October 2011, Kuwait.
32. The ‘Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia’
(CICA) was created during the 47th session of the UNGA (1992). The objec-
tive of this inter-governmental conference is the creation of a structure for
dialogue on security issues in Asia.
33. For these points and for the follow-up, see Ministerial Working Group
Meeting in Durban on 24 March 2004: South Africa Department of
International Relations (2004).
34. For these statements, see ASEAN Secretariat (2003).
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Index
A Association of South East Asian

Afro-Asian solidarity, 124 Nations (ASEAN), 2, 4, 8, 12,
agreements, SAARC, 109 41, 119, 145–6
ahimsa, 23, 39. See also Non-violence Australian Chamber of Commerce
All India Congress Committee and Industry, 128–9. See also
(AICC), 28 Indian Ocean Research Network
Arthashastra, 22, 24–6, 74 (IORNET); Indian Ocean Rim
ASEAN+1, 147 Consultative Business Network
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 2 (IOR-CBN)
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AAM),
146 B
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 42, Babri Masjid mosque demolition, 89
119 Baguio Conference (1950), 56
Ashoka Chakra, 23 balance of payment crisis (1991),
Asia–Africa Conference, 51 145–6
Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) balance-of-power policy, 38
aims of, 176 balance of power structure, in South
Asian inter-regional forum, 175–6 Asia, 3, 5
establishment of, 175 Bandung Conference, 51–2, 180
first and Second Ministerial Meeting Bangladesh Institute of Development
at Thailand, 177–8 Studies (BIDS), 59
India’s role in, 180 Bangladesh Paper, 61
necessity of, 176–7 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
objectives of, 177–8 Sectoral-Economic Cooperation
partners of, 176 (BIMST-EC), 1–2, 4, 15, 30, 62,
Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), 119 182. See also Asia Cooperation
Asian–African Sub-Regional Dialogue (ACD)
Organisations Conference assistance to India, to counter
(AASROC), 180–1 China growing influence, 185
Asian Development Bank (ADB), 151, economic and ideational origins
157, 164 and Look East policy of India,
Asian regionalism, 6 145–7
India’s efforts at, 53–4 evolution from 1994 to 2012
Asian Relations Conference (ARC), first phase, 148–54
New Delhi, 29, 75 second phase, 154–9
Asian Relations Organization (ARO), impact of India on regional
New Delhi, 31 multilateralism in, 159–63
Asia Pacific Economic Community India’s assistance to individual
(APEC), 126–7, 141, 143, 146, members of, 184
184 institutional set-up of, 159
Asiatic Federation, 28 BCIM Regional Cooperation Forum,
Association of Caribbean States (ACS), 173–5
119 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 44
220
Index 221
bilateralism, 35–6 Delhi Declaration, 58–9

BIMST-EC ‘Chamber of Commerce Dhaka Declaration, 75
and Industry’ (CCI), 150 dialogue partners, of IOR-ARC, 140
BIMSTEC Free Trade Area (BIMST-EC domestic decision-making structures, 3
FTA), 153–4, 160, 163, 184
BIMST-EC Summit Declaration, 156 E
Bogor Conference, 51 Economic Cooperation Program
Brasstacks peacetime military exercise, (ECP), by ADB, 164
42, 76 European Union (EU), 2, 12, 119
British colonialism, impact on India’s
foreign policy, 31–5 F
FDI, 145
C Federation of Indian Chambers
Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), of Commerce and Industry
53–4 (FICCI), 130
Centre for Economic Development Federation of Indian Exports
and Administration (CEDA), Organisations (FIEO), 121
Nepal, 59 food crisis (1966–7), India’s, 39
Chidambaram, P., 129 foreign exchange, decline from
cognitive prior, 46–7, 107 Indians working in Gulf, 145
definition of, 21 foreign policy, India’s
Cold War, 11, 33, 37, 42, 116, 119, after Independence, 21
145 culture of, 21–2
Colombo Plan for Economic and framework of
Technical Cooperation, 51, impact of British colonialism, 31–5
53–4 non-alignment policy, 35–6
Colombo Powers group, 51 stages in development of, 37–47
Colombo Summit Declaration (1991), traditional norms and values of,
89, 104 22–31
Committee of the Whole (CoW), 65, traditional values of, 22
67–8
common identity-building, 14. See G
also regional multilateralism Gandhi, Indira, 39–41, 60, 63, 115
communal bombs, 192 Gandhi, Mahatma, 125
communal violence, 3 Gandhi, Rajiv, 24, 41–2, 75, 77, 81
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Gandhi, Sonia, 191–2
(CTBT), 43 Ganga Water Sharing Agreement
Conference on Indonesia (1949), (1996), 92
49–50 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Constituent Assembly, Nehru’s Trade (GATT), 123–4
statement in 1949, 50 G3-Free Trade Agreement, 119
conventions, SAARC, 109 grafting, 8–9, 12, 16–17
coordination of national policies, 14. Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS),
See also regional multilateralism 164
credit rating, India’s, 145 Group of Eminent Persons (GEP), 93,
95
D Gujral Doctrine, 43–4
Declaration on South Asian Regional Gujral, I.K., 43
Cooperation, 70 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 58
222 Index
H origin of, 114–18

Hanoi Programme of Action (HPA), at regional multilateralism 1971–97,
168 118
Human Development Index (HDI), 4 structure of, 132–9
Hussein, Saddam, 42 Working Group meetings of,
129–31
I Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum
idealistic romanticism, 39 (IOR-BF), 129–30. See also
Indian Council of World Affairs meetings, of IORI Working
(ICWA), 29–30, 59 Group
Indian Diaspora, 120 Indian Ocean Rim Consultative
Indian National Congress (INC), 28, Business Network (IOR-
191 CBN), 128. See also Australian
Indian Ocean a ‘Zone of Peace’ Chamber of Commerce and
(IOZP), 115–16 Industry
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), 116 Indian Ocean Tourism Organisation
Indian Ocean Marine Affairs (IOTO), 135
Cooperation (IOMAC), 117 Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF),
Indian Ocean Research Network 42, 85
(IORNET), 128–9. See also ‘India’s Economy at the Midnight
Australian Chamber of Hour’ report, by Australian
Commerce and Industry government, 120
Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group ‘Indira Doctrine’, 40
(IOR-AG), 129–30, 134. See also Indo-Pakistani war (1971), 40
meetings, of IORI Working Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI),
Group 168
Indian Ocean Rim-Association for institutional set-up
Regional Cooperation of BIMST-EC, 158–9
(IOR-ARC), 1–2, 5, 15, 30, of IOR-ARC, 139–40
182–3. See also International of MGC, 166, 171–5
Forum on the Indian Ocean of SAARC, 106–8
Region (IFIOR), Australia; institution-building, 14–15. See also
Mauritius Indian Ocean Rim regional multilateralism
Initiative (IORI) Integrated Programme of Action
aspects of, 113 (IPA), 59
backdrop of initiative in 1993, 119–21 international coin, 33. See also
conceptualisation and evolution Panchsheel
(1993–7), 121–4 International Forum on the Indian
features of Panchsheel Ocean Region (IFIOR),
multilateralism, 142 Australia, 126–9
founding and development of, 131–2 International Monetary Fund
India’s impact on regional (IMF), 12
multilateralism development international norms, 6–7
in, 140–4 international relations (IR) theory, 6
India’s Ministry of External Affairs Islamabad summit, 82
position paper on, 113–14 Islamic states, 111
institutional set-up of, 139–40
ministerial meetings (1997–2012), J
132–9 Janata government (1977–9), 41
Index 223
K Nehru Policy, 22
Kargil war (1999), 45 New Economic Policy (NEP), India’s,
Kashmir crisis, 2 145
Kautilya newly industrialising countries
and Arthashastra, 24–6 (NICs), 93, 113
relevance for India’s foreign policy, new regionalism doctrine, 146
26–7 non-aligned movement (NAM), 40,
Krishna, S. M., 36, 139 57, 61, 80
Kunming Initiative (KI). See BCIM non-alignment policy, India’s, 35–6,
Regional Cooperation Forum 41, 43
non-governmental organizations
L (NGOs), 10
least developed countries (LDC), Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 106
153–4 India’s opposition to, 40–1
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 95, 159
(LTTE), 41–2, 85, 96 non-violence, 23. See also ahimsa
Line of Control (LoC), Kashmir, 97 Gandhian faith in, 39
localization framework, 6–9 regional relevance of, 24
Lok Sabha, 21, 36, 52 norm localization
‘Look East’ policy, India’s, 42, 131, conditions and catalysts for process
145–6 of, 10–12
definition of, 7
M explanatory power of, 182–5
Mahabharata, 22 focus of, 6
Male Summit Declaration, 92–3 for investigating norm diffusion, 8
mandala system of states, 25–6. See norms
also Kautilya definition of, 6
Mandela, Nelson, 44, 120, 122–3 role in affecting state behaviour, 7
Manu Smirti, 22 salience, 7
Mauritius Indian Ocean Rim Initiative variation in strengths, 6
(IORI), 124–5 norm sublimation concept, 16–17, 183
meetings, of IORI Working Group, North-American Free Trade
129–31 Agreement (NAFTA), 119
Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization
1–2, 30, 42, 185 (NATO), 8, 12
conceptualization and evolution of, nuclear devices, India’s decision to
164–71 donate, 44
institutional set-up of, 166, 171–5
ministerial meetings, between O
1997–2012 of IOR-ARC, 132–9 Operation Parakaram, 45
Most Favoured Nation (MFN), 135 Other Issue Working Group, 127
Mukherjee, Pranab, 169
multilateralism, 1 P
Mumbai terrorist attacks (2008), 45 Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics (PIDE), 59
N Panchsheel. See also international coin
nationalism, 3–4 origin of, 33
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 1, 21–3, 28, 35, 38, paradigm of bilateralism, 36
49, 125 principles of, 32–5, 70
224 Index
Panchsheel multilateralism, 17, 66, regional policy, of India, 87

141–2, 184 regional tourism, 156
BIMST-EC features of, 161
IOR-ARC features of, 142 S
MGC features of, 172 SAARC Agreement on
SAARC features of, 110 Implementation of Regional
Pohkran nuclear explosion (1974), 58 Standards, 102
political bombs, 192 SAARC Agreement on Multilateral
political conflicts, between South Arrangement on Recognition of
Asian countries, 2–3 Conformity Assessment, 102
political cultures, foreign SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response
definition of, 21 to Natural Disasters, 102
elements of, 21, 36 SAARC Agricultural Information
political realism, 46 Centre (SAIC), 83
political sector, SAARC cooperation SAARC Audio Visual Exchange
in, 103–6 (SAVE), 83
prime movers, 178 SAARC Documentation Centre
pruning concept, 8, 16 (SDC), 83
SAARC Food Security Reserve, 80, 84
R SAARC Free Trade Area (SAFTA), 93,
Rajya Sabha, 23 102, 112
Rao, P.V. Narasimha, 42–3, 63, 71, SAARC market for electricity (SAME),
145–6 102
realism, 38, 177 SAARC Meteorological Research
regional Asian conferences and Centre (SMRC), 83
meetings (1949–61), 48–56 SAARC Regional Convention on
regional clarity, 99 Suppression of Terrorism, 80,
regional cooperation, 13 82, 104
regional economic cooperation, in SAARC Seed Bank Agreement, 102
South Asia, 1 SAARC Year for Combating Drug
regional geographical clarity, 15. See Abuse and Drug Trafficking
also regional multilateralism (1989), 82
regional multilateralism, 1 Samjhauta Express bombing
global norm of (2007), 45
features, 14 Saran, Shyam, 34
origin of, 13 security sector, SAARC cooperation in,
impact of India in South Asia, 103–6
107–12 Sharif, Nawaz, 94
Indian ideas before independence, Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 39
28–31 Singh, Chaudhary Charan, 41
Indian Ocean Rim attempts at, Singh, Manmohan, 1–2, 42, 45, 100,
118 147, 192
India’s tyrst with destiny, 189–90 Singh, Natwar, 36, 99
Kautilya’s relevance for, 26–7 Sinha, Jaswant, 38
localisation of, 83–7 Sinha, Yashwant, 32
recurring patterns in South Asia, Sino-Indian war (1962), 38
185–8 socio-economic development, 4
regional organizations, reasons for South Africa, India’s economic
failures of, 2–4 relations with, 119–20
Index 225
South Asian Association for Regional T

Cooperation (SAARC), 1, 4, 30–1, terrorist attacks on USA, in September
129, 143, 146, 182, 191. See 2001, 45
also Asia Cooperation Dialogue Tharoor, Shashi, 1
(ACD) The Discovery of India (Nehru), 29
conventions and agreements, Thimpu Declaration, 102
106–7, 109 TIME Magazine, 55
cooperation in political and security tolerance, 23
sector, 103–6 trading alliance, in Indian Ocean, 123
developments between two-nation theory, 3–4
1981–3, 64–8
1986–90, 77–83 U
1991–6, 87–91 United Nations Development
1997–2004, 93–8 Programme (UNDP), 151
2005–2012, 98–103 United Nations Economic and Social
first phase of, 59–61 Commission for Asia and the
institutional set-up of, 106–8 Pacific (UNESCAP), 49, 56, 61,
international and national catalysts 151
for regional multilateralism, 57–9 United Nations General Assembly
Pakistani and Indian position, 62–4 (UNGA), 23, 115–16
Panchsheel-multilateralism, features United Nations Security Council
of, 110 (UNSC), 28
regional multilateralism United Progressive Alliance (UPA), 98
localisation, 83–7 universal nuclear disarmament,
second phase of, 69–74 Nehru’s campaign for, 37
sub-regional cooperation, 91–3 US–India civil nuclear cooperation, 45
third phase of, 74–6
South Asian Growth Quadrangle V
(SAGQ), 91–3 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 41, 44–5
South Asian Preferential Trading voluntary formation, 13–14. See also
Arrangement (SAPTA), 90–1, 112 regional multilateralism
South East Asian Treaty Organization
(SEATO), 30, 53–4, 74 W
Southern African Development Working Group of the Heads of
Community (SADC), 119 Mission (WGHM), 138
state actors, 7 Working Group on Trade and
strategic differences in perception Investment (WGTI), 134
between India and neighbours, 84–7 World Bank, 12, 151
structure, of IOR-ARC, 132–9 World Trade Organization (WTO),
sub-regional cooperation, 91–6 90–1, 95, 124, 133

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Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series

Series Editor: Mark Beeson, Winthrop Professor of Political Science and

Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series

Transferred to Digital Printing in 2013

List of Figures and Tables vii

1 Regional Multilateralism and Norm Localization 1

Asian regional multilateral fora: the Asia Cooperation

1.1 The concepts of ‘pruning’, ‘grafting’, and ‘norm

1.1 Regional multilateralism: ideal-type features 14

secretary, Ministry of External Affairs), Lt.-General (retd.) Satish Nambiar

AAM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

BTILS BIMST-EC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study

HLTF High Level Task Force

JWG-CTIC Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and

SADC Southern African Development Community

Although multilateralism in the form of regional cooperation, or sim-

(Tharoor, 2009). Only BIMST-EC constitutes a regional organization

disputes between India and Bangladesh over alleged illegal migration

These seven categories covering interstate as well as intrastate problems

(6) Why is there such an apparent gap between rhetoric in favour of

Especially, the often-cited balance-of-power structure in South Asia does

in understanding why any given region may accept a particular norm

Theoretical underpinning: norm diffusion in international

Norms, depending on the theoretical perspectives, are ‘standards of

internalized by actors and still generates disputes regarding its validity

The concept of localization is rooted in the constructivist frame of refer-

an outside norm congruent with a pre-existing local normative order.

Localization does not extinguish the cognitive prior of the norm-takers

Conditions and catalysts for the process of norm

Acharya explicitly refers to Indian ideas and their impact on regional

accepted once the rulers realized it could help in enhancing their

prior norms are embedded in strong local institutions. With regard

external norm must have a quality that makes ‘pruning’, or adjust-

may either be achieved through fusion of external ideas or by adopt-

The global norm of regional multilateralism

Multilateralism as a norm at the global level has certain key features,

The definition that is more consistent with ordinary usage conceives

Consequently, looking at the inherent logic of this definition, it is

or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct’, a

Regional multilateralism denotes the voluntary formation of an

The normative value of regional multilateralism consists in initial

Table 1.1 Regional multilateralism: ideal-type features

(1) Three independent states (minimum number)

Coordination of national policies (No. 5). Cooperation serves specific

Regional geographical clarity (No. 11). Regional multilateralism is an

regional multilateralism has been implemented and localized in the

The concept of norm sublimation

Considering that Acharya has used the example of an existing institu-

NORM PROCESS OUTCOME

EXTERNAL NORM, e.g. IMPLEMENTATION EXTERNAL NORM ACCEPTED

EXTERNAL NORM, e.g. < – > Pruning/Grafting <–> LOCALIZED NORM

EXTERNAL NORM, e.g. Norm Sublimation LOCALIZED &SUBLIMATED NORM

Figure 1.1 The concepts of ‘pruning’, ‘grafting’, and ‘norm sublimation’

region it is supposed to permeate. The domestic resilience is such that

Methodology and research questions

The approach of this book is based upon mixed methodology. Drawing

to the attempts of introducing an international norm at different points

the process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the

The present study will endeavour to establish the causal relationship

(2) How has regional multilateralism in South Asia and neighbouring

(3) Why is there a process of competing regionalism taking place with

The scheme of the book

Then, the SAARC is analysed by using India’s foreign policy as the