RA 9344 – JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANNY PAREDES and SANTOS PAREDES, JR.

alias “TITING”
G.R. No. 115217, 21 November 1996

FACTS:

Danny Paredes and Santos Paredes, Jr., brothers, were charged for the murder of
Evangelio Asis, Jr.

The trial court acquitted Danny but adjudged Santos guilty as charged and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Evangelio in the amount of Php
50,000.00, and to pay the cost.

Santos assails his conviction, claiming that there is clear and convincing evidence that
he was not at the scene of the crime when it was perpetrated, and that the granting he
is guilty there is clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority as he was only fifteen (15) years old at the time of
the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:

Is Santos, being fifteen (15) years old, entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance?

RULING:

Yes, he is.

HELD:

Article 13, Paragraph (2), of the Revised Penal Code provides that the circumstance
that the offender is under eighteen (18) years of age is mitigating and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Article 80 of the same Code. However, Article 80
has been expressly repealed by Chapter III of Presidential Decree No. 603 otherwise
known as “The Child and Youth Welfare Code.” Article 189 of Presidential Decree No.
603 defines “youthful offender” as a child, minor, or youth, including one who is
emancipated in accordance with law, who is over nine (9) years but under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.

Obviously, the trial court erred in no considering the age of Santos at the time of the trial
because the law is explicit in this regard. The testimony of Santos that he was only
fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commission of the offense is material because
under Article 68, Paragraph (2), of the Revised Penal Coe, upon a a person over fifteen
(15) and under eighteen (18) years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper trial.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code punishes murder with reclusion temporal
maximum to death. In view of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed in its proper period pursuant to Article 68,
Paragraph (2), of the Code, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
medium.

- AIMEE N. CALO -
 RA 9344 – JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT

MICHAEL PADUA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 168546, 23 July 2008

FACTS:

Michael Padua, seventeen (17) years old, was charged for selling dangerous drugs.
During the pre-trial conference, his counsel manifested that Padua was willing to
withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted
to first-time offenders under Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Padua later filed a Petition for Probation alleging that he is a minor and a first-time
offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No.
968, otherwise known as “the Probation Law of 1976” and Section 70 of Republic Act
No. 9165.

Such petition was, however, denied on the ground that under Section 24 of Republic Act
No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted
by the Probation Law.

ISSUE:

Was Padua’s right under Republic Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006,” violated?

RULING:

No, it was not.

HELD:

Padua cannot argue that his right under Republic Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006” was violated. Section 68 of Republic Act No. 9344 pertain to
suspension of sentence and not probation.

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 could
no longer be retroactively applied for Padua’s benefit. Section 38 of Republic Act No.
9344 provides that once a child under eighteen (18) years of age, the Court shall
determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty one (21) years. Padua has already reached twenty one (21)
years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of
applying Republic Act No. 9344. Thus, the application of Section 38 and 40 appears
moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

- AIMEE N. CALO -
 RA 9344 – JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICKY GALIT ADAMERO, INTOY LUCINDO y

REBADULLA, MARLON GALIT y ADAMERO, and RAQUEL TAGALOG y
ROTAMULLA, INTOY LUCINDO y REBADULLA, and MARLON GALIT y ADAMERO
G.R. No. 97432, 01 March 1994

FACTS:

Ricky Galit y Adamero, Intoy Lucindo y Rebadulla, Marlon Galit y Adamero, and Raquel
Tagalog y Rotamulla were convicted of robbery with homicide and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, Ricky and Raquel, having been found to be
youthful offenders as defined in Article 189 of Presidential Decree No. 603, are entitled,
to the mind of the Court, to the suspension of their sentence. Considering the reports of
the Social Worker that the herein minors appear to have no confirmed delinquent
tendencies, are first offenders and responsive to constitutional lifestyle, they were
directed to commit themselves to the care and custody of the National Training School
for Boys (NTSB) for rehabilitation until they shall have reached twenty one (21) years of
age or for a period as the Court may deem proper.

Subsequently, Ricky’s counsel filed for his release from NTSB as recommended in the
Final Report submitted by the Senior Officer of the NTSB on the ground that Ricky had
complied with the conditions of his rehabilitation.

ISSUE:

1. Are Ricky and Raquel entitled to the suspension of their sentence?

2. Can Ricky be released?

RULING:

1. No, they are not.

2. No, he cannot.

HELD:

1. The benefits of suspension of sentence are not available where the youthful
offender has been convicted of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or
death. The last paragraph of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1210 provides:

“The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once
enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted
of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted
for an offense by the Military Tribunals.”

The offense charged in this case, Robbery with Homicide, is punishable by

reclusion perpetua to death. As a matter of fact, Ricky and Raquel were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the
suspension of sentence as provided under Article 192 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, does not apply to Ricky and Raquel.

2. It is not the responsibility of the Court to order the release of Ricky without the
benefit of a review of the recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare
by the trial court. Article 196 of Presidential Decree No. 603 provides:

- AIMEE N. CALO -
 RA 9344 – JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT

“Art. 196. Dismissal of the case. – If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court
that the youthful offender whose sentence has been suspended, has behaved
properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community,
even before reaching the age of majority, upon recommendation of the
Department of Social Welfare, it shall dismiss the case and order his final
discharge.”

It is therefore clear that in cases where the DSDWD recommends the discharge
of youthful offender, it is the trial court whom the report and recommendation is
subject to judicial review. Recommendation alone is not sufficient to warrant the
release of a youthful offender. In reviewing the DSWD’s recommendation, the
trial judge must not base his judgement on mere conclusions but should seek out
concrete, material and relevant facts to confirm that the youthful offender has
indeed reformed and is ready to re-enter society as a productive and law-abiding
citizen.

- AIMEE N. CALO -