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|/SEX CRIMES DIVISION E LACEY District Atlomey of Los Azgeles County By. REINHOLD MUELLER. SBN 210472 Deputy: District Attomey | HALL OF JUSTICE 211 W. TEMPLE STREET, 9" FLOOR, LOS ANGELES, CA 90012 213) 257-2071 ‘Attorney for Plaintiff SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Case No, BAGS7932. Plaintiff, PEOPLE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER FOR v PROSECUTION 01 DANIEL PETER MASTERSON, Defendant Date: October 19,2020 Time: 8:30am. Court: Dept 30 TO THE HONORABLE MIGUEL ESPINOZA, JUDGE PRESIDING, AND 10 THOMAS MESEREAU AND SHARON APPELBAUM, COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT DANIEL MASTERSON: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Pasi in the sbove entiled matte, respectfully request that this court deny defendant DANIEL MASTERSON’s Demurer for Prosecution based upon the points of law and fact set forth in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and such points and arguments asthe People may make at the hearing on said Motion. Dated: October 1, 2020 Deputy Distiet Attorney Attorney fr Plaintiff ‘BEOPLE'S OPPOSITION 76 DEFEROAIT DEORRER FOR PROSECUTION PER STATEMENT OF TE CASE On June 16, 2020, the Los Angeles County District Attomey’s Office filed a felony complaint for waran, in case BA4S7S932, charging the defendant in Count 1 with Foreible Rape, 8 felony in violation of Penal Code §261(a)2), committed on April 25, 2003 against Jane Doe-I; in Count 2 with Forcible Rape, a felony in violation of Penal Code §261(8\2), committed between October 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003 agains Jane Doe-2; and in Count 3 with Forcible Rape, a felony in violation of Penal Code §261(3)(2), committed between January 1, 2001 to November 30, 2001 against Jane Doe-3. 1s futher alleged, within the meaning of Penal Code section 667:6() and (e)(4), aso counts 1,2 and 3 thatthe defendant commited an offense specified in Section 667.61(c) against more than one victim, On June 17, 2020, defendant was arested in connection with the felony complain for warrant. (On September 18, 2020, defendant waived time for arraignment and filed a demurrer to the complaint. Hearing on the demurrer i set for October 19, 2020. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1, DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER IS MERITLES: Defendant demurrers tothe felony complain “on the ground tht it appears from the face of said complaint that the prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations." [DemurreI:17-20) Further, defendant contends that “Yo proceed with this prosecution would be to deny the defendant his Fifth Amendment right to due process by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.” [Demurrer: 7:1-2] Both claims are devoid of merit. Additionally, the latter is not an established ground upon which a demurrer may be brought, ‘A. Legal Standard for Demurrer ‘A demurrer a pleading that rises an issue of law as tothe suficency ofthe accusatory pleading, Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal. 1069, 1090. A demurrer tests only those ( ( éefecs that appear onthe face ofthe accusatory pleading. Penal Cod $$1002-1004; Shortridge Minicipal Court (1984) 131 Cal App.34 611, 616; People v. Williams (1979) 97 Cal. App-3d 382. 387-388. Penal Cade $1004 establishes five grounds upon which a demumer may be brought. These enumerated grounds are exclusive, People v: McConnell (1890) 82 Cal, 620, 621; People . Meditister (1929) 99 Cal.App. 37, 40, 44. It is well-settled that a demurrer is not = proper means of testing the sufficiency of evidence supporting an accusatory pleading. People Blane (2013) $8 Cal4" 81; Tobe, supra, 9 Cal at 1090; Willams, supra, 97 Cal App.3d at 393; Ratner v, Municipal Court (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 925. In ruling on a demurrer, itis presumed that all factual averments are rue. The sole question raised by demurrer is whether the Pleading is facilly-not factully-deficient. People v.Jimenes (1993) 19 Cal Appa 1175, 1177 B. The Prosecution Is Not Time-Barred by the Statute of Limitations ‘The prosecution is required to file a charging document that is not, on its face, timex barred. People v. Willams (1999) 21 Cela 335, 345. For most cases, that will be apparent from how the case is charged and no additional pleadings will be required. In such situations, etermining whether a prosecution is timely isa legal issue for the court. People »: Castillo (2008) 168 Cel.App.4 364. Here, the prosecution is timely and isnot time-barred by the statute of limitations, In his demurrer, defendant embarks on a brief analysis of what he deems to be the ‘spplicable statute of limitations in this matter. Defendant concludes that “[s}ix years is the applicable statute of limitations... fand that) (the charges agains (defendant) expired in 2007 ‘nd 2009." (Demurrer: 3:3-18] Defendant's analysis isnot only flawed, its misplaced since no limitation period exists for indeterminate crimes, as inthe instant case ‘The timeframe for any statute of limitations analysis is measured from when the offense ‘was committed to when prosecution is commenced. Penal Code §804 states that prosecution is commenced when . . . (d) An arrest or bench warrant is issued. For all felony offenses 'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS DEMURRER FOR PROSECUTION, FE §290(c) [formerly 290(a)2MA)] ~ ie, all offenses requiring lifetime er reistration ~ the limitation period is ten (10) years, Penal Code $801.1(0). ‘This ar statute of Himita ‘became effective on January 1, 2001 and was codified in former Pene! Code section S03(h). The 1O.year statute of limitations applies to felonies committed on or afer Sapuary 1, 2001, as in the ease at bar, and to felonies committed before that date when 7 the statue of limitations had not expired as of January 1.2001 (ie times committed on o after § |[eanuary 1, 1995), Peopte ». Holle (2010) 180 CaLApp.t 1262; In re White (2008) 163, 9 ||Cal-App.4® 1576. Again, this analysis is inap to the present case since the charged offense(s) are punished by an indeterminate term, Sex crimes prosecuted pursuant to the One Strike statute under Penal Code $667.61 are 2 Pnishable by an indeterminate term. Indeterminate or life offenses earry no limitation period 3 14 || Pursuant to Penal Code §799(a), which provides in relevant part: “Prosecution for an offense 15 || punishable by... imprisonment inthe state prison for life... may be commenced at any time.” 16 || Therefore, for crimes punished by an indeterminate term, there is no statute of limitations as in 17 | the case at bar. Here, defendant argues that “[tJhe underlying offense should govern the statute of limitations... and... thatthe One Strike Law has not extended the statute of limitations for Penal Code section 261(3)2).” [Demurrer: 5:8; 6:17-19] In support of his argument, defendant 20 2 | ties upon the reasoning of People v. Turner (2005) 134 Cal App.4* 1591 to his detriment. The 22 || precise holding of Turner does not apply tothe case before this eour, 3 |n Turner, supra, the defendant was charged with first degree residential robbery and it 24 || was alleged that he suffered prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law. Id at 1593, 25 |11595. Defendant argued tothe trial court thatthe statute of limitations forthe robbery had run, © lout the tal court hel that section 799 governed because the Three Stikes law provided for « n life sentence, Id at 1595-1596. The reviewing Court of Appeal disagreed and stated that “the 28 ‘issue is whether the ‘offense’ referred to must itself be punishable by life imprisonment, or ee OA Sposman TO DERG S UENURRER TOR RECTION PUR ————— wheter the Legislature intended fo include any offense whieh may result in lfe sentence based "upon facts other than the commission of the offense itself... [T]he former interpretation is Jomect ...." Twner. supra, 134 Cal.App.s* at 1596, The holding of Truc considered the situations of those “who commit a current felony offense, aad who are vevidivist offenders” fender the Three Strikes law. d at 1597. ‘The instant case does not involve recidivism and the Precise holding of Tumer does not apply. In People ¥. Peres (2010) 182 CaLApp.a!* 231, 241. the Court of Appeal agreed that Turner “should be narrowly construed to apply only to the antreidivst Three Strikes law, and not o the One Strike law, which punishes, as relevant here, ‘not recidivism but the commission of sexual offenses against mere than one victim.” Ld at 241 | Perez, supra, an information charged defendant with four counts of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child in violation of Penal Code secion 288(6)1), each involving a sifferent victim. The information further alleged that each count was committed within the caning of Penal Code section 667.61(b) and (e) against mote than one victim. 1d at 234, Defendant, relying upon the reasoning in Timer, demurred to the information on the basis that the charges were outside the statute of limitations. The prosecution responded that because defendant was charged under the One Strike statute (section 667.61) and thus subject to a life Sentence, the charges were authorized by section 799 and were not stale. The trial court overruled the defendant's demurrer, and defendant appealed. The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the tial courts decision stating, “rJecent Califonia Supreme Court authority establishes thatthe trial court's ruling was correct.” Id at 236 (ing recent opinions in People v Jones (2009) 47 Cala $66 and People v. Brookfield (2008) 47 Cala 583) [“detemnining whether an offense is punishable by life imprisonment must tike into account an altemative sentencing scheme that applies to the offense based on other criminal conduct Jones stated, “{ulnlike an enhancement, which provides for an additional term of imprisonment, (an altemative sentencing. scheme) sets forth an altemate penalty for the een FE Soros To DERG OEUURRER FOR ROSTCUTIRS FOE ————— ' Jfondertsing felony itself..." People. Jones. supra, at S78 The Coust’s analysis in Jones was © jf supported by the Court's opinion inthe companion ease of People »: Broolfeldl(2009) 47 Cala” Im Brooffictd, the court held that the “life term does not . . . constitute a sentence enhancement, because itis not imposed in addition to the sentence forthe underli rather, iti an alterate penalty for that offense.” 1d at $91. Sentence enhancements and prior 7 |[eonvietions are generally disregarded in determing the maximum possible punishment for 8 |[statute of limitations purposes. Pena! Code § 80S(a). This, a Three Strikes case that has a 9 |[maxieum punishment of life in state prison solely as a result of priot convictions is not considered an indeterminate offense with no limitation period under section 799(a). People v Turner (2005) 134 Cal App. 4 1591, 1596, n However, offenses that fll under the One Strike Law based! on conduct (eg, burglary, 3 14 |] Kidespping, weapon, injury, multiple victims) are a different matter. Penal Code $667.61, the 15 |]One Strike Law, is an “altemative sentencing scheme” and not considered an enhancement. 16 || People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4 105, 118. Thus, because the alternative sentencing scheme 18 I section 799(a). People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4® 231. te In the case before this court, as in Perez, section 667.61 is an alternate penalty scheme 3 fom te as ees gh npn re sie ttn hen 24 |/as to each count thatthe defendant “in the present case” committed an offense specified in ‘Section 667.61(¢) against more than one victim. Penal Code section 667.61(b) and (e)(4). The © cout in Pere: noted that the “present case of ease language contained in (667.61(e\(4) for n enumerated violations committed against more than one vietim is important toa all explanation 28 of why there is no prosecution deadline in these circumstances. Peres, supra, at 237, PEOPLE'S OPPOSITION To DEFENORRY'S DEMURRER FOR PROBECUTOW: FE ( ( H, DEFENDANT'S FEDER AL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED BY. ANY PRECHARGE DELAY Defendant sceks to have the complaint charging him with three counts of forcible rape ins three separate vets dismissed inthis ease based ona claim that [Jo proced with this Prosecution would be to deny the defendant his Fith Amendment righ to due process by way of the Fourteenth Amendient:"[Demurer 7:12] Defendants claim isnot an established ground upon which a demurrer may be brought ‘A demurrer txts only those defcts that appeat nthe f46e of the accusatory pleading. Penal Code §$1002-1004; Shortridge v. Municipal Court (1984) 151 Cal App.34 611, 616; People v Willams (1979) 97 Ca. App34 382, 387-388. Penal Code §1004 eubises five grounds upon which a demumer may be brought. These enumerated grounds are exchsive. People + McConnell (1890) 82 Cal. 620, 621; People v: Medllister (1929) 9 CaLApp. 37,40, 44. An lege violation ofthe defendants du process righ isnot one ofthe established grounds for a [demurrer. Nevertheless the People will respond to defendants claim which is without merit ‘A. Legal Standard for Violation of Due Process by Pre-Accusatorial Delay ‘A defendant is protected against prejudicial pre-accusatorial delay by the federal Due Process Clause contained inthe Fi Amendinen ofthe United States Constitution, Seherling v Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal 3d 493, S05; People v. Butler (1995) 36 Cal.App.4 455, 463-464; People v. Belton 1992) 6 Cal App. 1425, 1429, Federal due process requires dismissl only if the pre-accusatoral delay causes (I) actual and substantial prejudice wo the defendant's igh 1 @ fair trial, and (2) the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused ‘United States v. Marion (1971) 404 US. 307,324. The court ned not apply a Balancing tet under a due process analysis until the defendant establishes both actual and substantial prejudice, ‘85 well asthe requisite intentionality. Defendant has fled to do so in this instance. COTON PAR ( Although not mentioned in th ‘emurcer, a claim of unreasonable delay in fling crminal ehorges invokes de stave eonsttutlonal eh of due process under Ariel . Sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution, Like federal due process claims, state due process also requrcs the defendant to demonstrate actal and substantial prejudice as a result of the precharge delay. Itenionaity has sbo been required. In People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal3d 615, 640, the 7 ||€Celitornia Supreme Cour held that a delay “must be purposeful, oppressive, and even ‘smack of § |} detiberate obstruction on the part ofthe government’ before relief willbe granted” I at 640. % |] court in People x. Shockey (1978) 79 CeLApp.3d 669, 678-679, reasoned that “{w]here there isa preindictment delay and a contention thet die process has been denied, the balancing test will not be used uni it is established that the delay was intentionally caused by the sate.” 2 ‘The test for @ due process violation based on pre-accusatorial dela is identical for both B 1g |) federal and state due process claims, There must be both actual and substantial prejudice to the 15 defendant's right to & fair trial, and the delay must bean intentional device to gain a tactical 16 ||advantage over the defendant. Indeod, the due process provisions in Califomnia's Constitution are almost identical tothe federal due process provision stated in the Fith Amendient of the United States Constitution, In People . Belton, supra, at 1433, the cout sated that “ssetially tne due process testis the same under the federal or the state consiutions"” “Thus, under both Federal and state due process analysis, a three-step inquiry is applicable, Fits, the defendant ‘must show the delay caused actual and substantial prejudice and that such delay was intentional 23 |} Second, ifthe defendant meets its burden of showing actual and substantial prejudice, the burden 24 || shifts to the prosecution to justify the delay. Lastly, the court employs a balancing test to measure the harm suffered by the defendant against the prosecution's justification forthe delay 2 I onty ithe court ins the delay unjustified and also decides the harm othe defendant nouns n 0 4 due process violation, is dismissal an appropriate remedy. People v. Archerd (1970) 3 28 (Cal.3d 615, 639-640; People x: Dunn-Gonzale: (1996) 47 Cal.App-4* 899, 910-911 'PEGPLE'S COPOSTTON TO DEFENOANTS DERRER ( ( 1 |] B. Defendanc Feited to Prove the Pre-Accesatorfal Delay Was Inteztional by the St=te in Ovder to Gain a Tactical Advantage Jn onder to advance a federal due process claim, the United Ststes Supseme Covrt has roguired the defense to prove that a pre-sccusatorial delay was the produet of an intention: 5 || device to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant. United States v. Marion, supe at 326 6 || Peomle v. Archerd, supra, at 640. Here, the defendant has not only failed to prove that a pre- aceusatorial delay was intentional by the state, his demurrer is completely silent on the issue, * || Therefore, defendant's due process challenge fal ° €. Defendant Failed to Prove That He Suffered Actual and Substantial Prejudice 10 In onder to advance a federal due process claim, defendant lus the burden of establishing 12 |] that he suffered actual and substantial prejudice from the pre-accussorial delay. U.S. ». Marion, 13 || supra, at 324; Belron, supra, at 1434. A showing of actual prejudice requires proof thatthe delay 14 | impaired the defendant's ability to defend against the charges. People v. Martine, supra, 22 [CaL4 750, 766-767. Further, prejudice will not be presumed. Garcia v. Superior Court (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 148, 151. The defendant must clearly support an allegation of actual prejudice with particular facts. Vague, general, or bare conclusory statements are insufficient to establish actual prejudice. Serna y. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.34 239, 250; Blake v. Superior Court 20 || (1980) 108 Cal App.3d 244, 250-251; Crocker. Superior Court (1975) L4 Cal 3d 433, 442. tn 21 ||the case before this cour, the entiety of the defendant's showing of actual prejudice from the Pre-accusatorial delay is contained in a single sentence stating, “In the intervening years, witnesses have died, memories have faded, potential exculpatory evidence has been lost, all resulting in prejudice tothe defendant.” [Demurrr: 7:11-13] Such ate the “vague, general, (and) bare conclusory statements” that the courts have deemed to be insufficient to establish actual Prejudice, Serna, supra, at 250; Blake, supra, at 250-251; Crocker, supra, at 442. Defendant's 2g || statement is merely an unsupported, conclusory allegation that is wanting of particular facts, and ‘actual Loss as required. Since the defendant is unable to establish that he suffered actual and substantial prejudice, no due process violation has occurred D. ‘The Prosecution Need Not Justify the Delay’Sinee Defendant Has Not Proven Actual or Substantial Prejudice Inthe present ase, the defense requests“ evidentiary hearing and specific information regarding the time delay and investigation during the intervening years.” (Demurter: 8:3, 20; 9:6-8] However, defendant must first establish that he suffered aetual and substantial prejudice before the burden of justifying delay shifts to the prosecution. People v. Dum rales, supra, st 910. “{U}ntil prejudice has been shown by the defendant there should be no inguity into the eason forthe delay.” People v: Archerd, supra, at 641. In this eas, defendant fils to prove any actual prejudice, Therefore, the prosecution need not justify the delay. m. INCLUSION Defendant's demurrer should be denied because the prosecution is not time-barred by the statute of limitations and the defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing actual and substantial prejudice as a result of any pre-charge delay. Therefore, the People respectfilly request thatthe court deny the defendant's Demurrer for Prosecution. Dated: October 1, 2020 Respeciflly submitted, Deputy District Attomey Attorney for Plaintiff