THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.

EDITED BY
tT. B. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D.
f E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. tw. H. D. ROUSE, .Lirr.D.
L. A. POST, L.H.D. B. H. WABMINGTON, m.a., i.r.hist.soc.

PLOTINUS
III

442
 PLOTINUS
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
A. H. ARMSTRONG
FB07E3S0B OF OKBEE, CNIVEKSITT OF LIVERPOOL

IN SIX VOLUMES

III

ENNEAiDS
m. 1-9

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
HARVAKD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
M0MLX7H
) The President and Fellows of Etarv^rd Colleg^ 1967

CONTENTS
SIOLA
PAGE
........................................................................................................vii

BNNEAD III.

Printed in Great Britain
1. ON DESTINY................................................................................. 5
2 AND 3. ON PROVIDENCE (l) AND (ll) . . . . 37
4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT .... 139
5. ON LOVE.............................................................................................. 163
6. ON THE IMPASSIBILITY OP THINGS WITHOUT BODY 205
7. ON ETERNITY AND TIME.............................................................. 291
8. ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION AND THE ONE . 367
9. VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS...................................................... 403

V
 SIGLA
A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A' = Codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
B = Laurentianus 86, 15.
R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
S = Berolinensis Gr. 376.
N = Mopacensis Gr. 216.
M = Marcianus Gr. 240.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
V = Vindobonensis philosophicus Gr. 226.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 667.
D — Marcianus Gr. 209.
W= AE.
X= BRJ.
Y= USM.
Z= QL.
mg = in margine.
ac = ante cofrectionem.
pc = post correctionem.
yp = ypd^erat.

vii
 ORDO ENNEADVM COMPARATVR
CVM ORDINE CHRONOLOaiCO
Enn. chron. Enn. chron. Enn. chron.
I 1 63 II 1 40 ITT 1 3
I 2 19 II 2 14 ni 2 47
I 3 20 II 3 52 III 3 48
I 4 46 II 4 12 III 4 16
I 5 36 II 6 26 ni 5 50
I 6 1 II 6 17 III 6 26
I 7 64 II 7 37 III 7 46
I 8 61 II 8 35 III 8 30
I 9 16 II 9 33 III 9 13
Enn. chron. Enn. chron. Enn. chron.
IV 1 21 V 1 10 VI 1 42
IV 2 4 V 2 11 . VI 2 43
rv 3 27 V 3 49 VI 3 44
IV 4 28 V 4 7 VI 4 22
IV 6 29 V 6 32 VI 5
IV 6 41 V 6 24 VI 6
23
34
PLOTINUS
IV 7 2 V 7 18 VI 7 38
IV 8 6 V 8 31
IV 9 8 V 9
VI 8 39 ENNEAD III
5 VI 9 9

ORDO CHRONOLOGICVS COMPARATVR

CVM ORDINE ENNEADVM
chron. Enn. chron. Enn. chron. Enn.
1 I 6 19 I 2 37 II 7
2 IV 7 20 I 3 38 VI 7
3 III 1 21 IV 1 39 VI 8
4 IV 2 22 VI 4 40 II 1
6 V 9 23 VI 5 41 IV 6
6 IV 8 24 V 6 42 VI 1
7 V 4 25 II 5 43 VI 2
8 IV 9 26 III, 8, 44 VI 3
9 VI 9 27 IV 3 46 III 7
10 V 1 28 IV 4 46 I 4
11 V 2 29 IV 6 47 III 2
12 II 4 30 III 8 48 III 3
13 III 9 31 V 8 49 V 3
14 II 2 32 V 6 50 III 6
15 III 4 33 II 9 61 I 8
16 I 9 34 VI 6 62 II 3
17 II 6 35 II 8 ‘63 I 1
18 V 7 36 I 6 64 I 7
viii
 SVMMARIVM

TdSe evean HXcorlvov (j>iXoao<^ov ewedSo?

TpiTTjS'
III. 1. 1.6' rie/Jt elfmpfjJvrjs.
III. 2. k' Ilepl TTpovoias vpcbTov,.
III. 3. Ka' Ilepi Ttpovolas Sevrepoy.
III. 4. K^' IIe/)trod €lXr])(6ros ij/u.d? BaLpx>vos.
III. 5. Ky' Ile/Jiepcoros.
III. 6. kB' Ilepi d-TTadetas rdiv d.ao)p,drciiv.
III. 7. i<e' Yiepl aldjvos /cat ypovov.
III. 8. Ks' Ilept <f)vcr€cos /cat decjplas /cat rov
t /
€VOS*.
III. 9. K^' ’FiTnaKet/jeis Bia^opoi.
i

I
I

ENNEAD III. 1
 ON DESTINY
ciples. The Peripatetic account of the immediate causes
of events accepted as true as far as it goes (ch. 1). But it
is lazy and superficial not to look for higher and remoter
causes, and philosophers have in fact done so. The princi­
pal non-Platonic explanations; all things, even human
III. 1. ON DESTINY thought and action are caused by (o)' atoms (the Epicu­
reans) or (6) the world-soul (Stoics or stoicising Platonists;
Introductory Note see note to oh. 4) or (c) the stars (astrologers) or (d) the
This early treatise (No. 3 in Porphyry’s chronological universal chain of causation (Stoics) (ch. 2). Refutation of
order) is very much a conventional Platonic school dis­ these in the same order (a) ch. 3, (5) ch. 4, (c) chs. 5-6, (d)
cussion of its period. After a formal scholastic statement ch. 7. Brief statement of the true Platonic doctrine;
of the question to be discussed, the views of opponents of universal soul and individual souls; freedom of rational
the Platonic position, Epicureans, Stoics and astrological and virtuous action (chs. 8-10).
determinists, are stated and refuted on conventional lines,
and the treatise ends with a brief statement of the Platonic
doctrine, with its discrimination of the parts played in the
causation of human action by universal and individual
souls which leaves room for human freedom within the
universal order. Br6hier, in his introduction to the trea­
tise, cites a number of parallels which show the conven­
tional nature of the contents, and he and Harder, in the
introduction to the notes on it in his second edition, have
some interesting suggestions about particular opponents at
whom some of the arguments may be directed. But,
though the subject was well worn and the arguments here
are hackneyed, the problem of reconciling human free­
dom with the universal divine order was an important one
for Plotinus, and he treated different aspects of it more
fully and originally later, in the work On Providence which
comes next in the Third Ennead (III. 2 and 3), in the
treatise on astrology (II. 3) and iH his writings on the soul
(especially IV. 3, 8 and 9).

Synopsis
Formal statement of the problem to be discussed, that of
causation. All things have a cause except the first prin­
6
 III. 1. (3) nEPI EIMAPMENHS
1. Anavra ra ywoiifva /cat T<i ovra Kar
atTta? ylverat rd ycvo/j^va Kal eart ra ovra, i)
avev air las djj,<f)Ct}' ^ rd fiev dvev air las, rd §e
/ter alrlas iv djj,(f>or€poi,s' ^ rd fxev ywojxeva fier'
6 airlas rravra, rd Se ovra rd fj,ev avrcov eari fier’
airias, rd S’ dvev alrlas, fj ovSev fier' alrlas' fj
avanaXiv rd fjuev ovra fier' alrlas irdvra, rd Se
yivofaeva rd jj,ev ovrcjs, rd Se e/cetVoi?, fj ovSev
avrcdv jxer alrlas. ’Etti p,ev odv r&v .diSlwv rd
p.ev Trpwra els dXXa alria dvdyeiv ovy oidv re
10 TTputra ovra' oaa Se e/c rwv Trpcdrcov Tjprrjrai, ef
€Kelva)v rd etvai eyeroj. Tds re ivepyelas eKaarojv
aTToSiSovs ns sttI rd? ovalas dvayerur rovro yap
eari rd etvai avrip, rd roidvSe evepyetav aTroSiSdvai.
Ilepi Se rwv yivofievwv tj dvrcov p,ev del, ov rrjv
IS^avrrjv Se evepyetav •noiovp.evwv del Kar alrlas
arravra XeKreov ylveaOai, rd S’ dvalriov ov rrapa-
SeKreov, ovre rrapeyKXlaeat Kevais ytopav SiSdvra
^ An interesting variation and expansion of Timaeus 28A
4-5. Plato merely says that all things that come into being
8 9
III. 1. ON DESTINY
1. All things that come into being and all things
that really exist either have a cause for their coming
into being (those that come' to be) or for their exis­
tence (those that really exist), or haVe no 'cause; ^
or else, in both classes, some have a cause and some
have not; or all things which come into being have a
cause, but things which really exist have some of
them a cause and some not, or none of them has a
cause; or it is the other way round; all things that
really exist have a cause, but things that come into
being do so some this way, or some that way, or none
of them has a cause. Well, then, among the eternal
realities it is not possible to refer the first of them to
other things which are responsible for their existence,
just because they are first; but it must be admitted
that all those which depend on the first realities have
their being from them. And in giving an account of
the activities of each of them one should refer them
to their essences; for this is their being, the due
output of a particular kind of activity. But as for
things which come into being, or which always really
exist but do not always act in the same way, we must
say that all always have a cause for coming to be;
nothing uncaused can be admitted; we must leave
must have a cause. Plotinus also takes into account the eter­
nal realities, because for him even the Forms in Intellect have
a cause, the One, as he indicates in the next sentence.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 1.
ovre KLvijaet acofidrwv rrj e^ai<f>vr]5, ovSevos
'TTporjyTjaafievov VTriarrj, ovre ’pvx'^js dpii/fj epm\rjKT<p
IMTjSevos Kivriaavros avTrjv els ro ri vpa^aL <Lv
20 TTporepov ovK eTTOtei.. "H avrw ye rovrw piel^cov^
dv ns eyoi avrrjv dvdyicr) ro' p,rj aiirrjs elvai,
<f>epea9ai Se rds rocavras (f)opds d^ovXrprovs re Kal
dvairlovs ovaas. *H * * yap ro ^ovXrjrov—rovro Se
rj« €go) 'qt\y ^ €Kivqaev
€iaco—q ro ^Tnuvp/qrov 9 / » €l9
q,
pLrjSh^ opeKroV eKwrjaev, ovS’ dv oXcos eKiv-rjOri.
26 Vvyvop.evo}V 8e rrdvroyv Kar alrias rds p.ev
•npoaexels eKdarip pdSiov Xa^eiv Kal els ravras
avayeiv otov rov PaSiaai els dyopdv ro olTjdrjvat.
Setv riva ISetv ^ XPeo? arroXa^eZv Kal oXms rov
rdSe ^ rdSe eXeadai Kal oppLrjaai enl rdSe ^ rd
^av^vai eKdarcp raSl Troieiv. Kal rd p.ev errl rds
30 reyvas dvdyeiv rov vycdaai rj larpiKrj Kal 6
larpos. Kai rov TrXovrijaai Orjaavpds evpedels fj
Soms rrapd rov ^ e.K ttovcov t] reyvrjs
aaaOai, Kai rov reKvov 6 rrarrjp Kal et ri
avvepydv e^cvOev els- vaiSoTTOuav dXXo -nap' ddXoV
r^Kov otov airla roidSe ^ Kal oXLyw rrpoauirepd
^ fjLei^ow edd.: fj.elt,ov codd.
^ eiT rdSe Harder, H—S: eiretra Se codd.
* The famous uncaused atomic “slant” or “swerve” of
Epicurus, the cUrtamen of Lucretius (II. 292; cp. Bailey’s
commentary on II. 216-293 in his edition^ Cicero refers to it
equally impolitely in De Fato 23 (commenticia dedinatio) and
De Finibus I. 19 (res commenticia).
® Cp. Aristotle, Physics II. 6. 196b 33-34.
• Theiler’s excellent emendation {(yovrjy ^ yvvrj for the MSS
10
ON DESTINY
no room for vain “ slants ” ^ or the sudden movement
of bodies which happens without any preceding
causation, or a senseless impulse of soul when nothing
has moved it to do anything which it did not do be-,
fore. Because of this very absence of motive a
greater compulsion would hold the soul, that of not
belonging to itself but being carried about by move­
ments of this kind which would be unwilled and cause­
less. For either that which it willed—\Vhich could
be within or outside it—or that which it desired
moved the sojil; or, if nothing which attracted it
moved it, it would not have been moved at all. If
all things have a cause for their happening it is easy
to apprehend the causes which are immediately rele­
vant to each happening and to trace it back to them:
for instance, the cause of going to the market-place is
that one thinlis one ought to see someone or to collect
a debt: * and in general the cause of choosing this or
that or going after that is that it seemed good to the
particular person involved to do that. And there are
some things whose causes should be assigned to the
arts; the cause of getting well is the medical art
and the doctor: and the cause of getting rich is a
treasure which has been found or a gift from someone,
or making money by labour or skill. And the cause
of the child is the father, and perhaps some external
influences coming from various sources which co­
operate towards the production of a child; for in­
stance, a particular kind of diet, or, slightly remoter,
seed, which flows easily for begetting, or a wife well ®
1} yvvy, adopted here, is supported by the fact that it gives
a verbal reminiscence of Plato, Laws 740D 6-7, ols av evpovs
rj y^vecris (though the context there is different).
II
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 1.
35 evpovs els TraiBoTrouav ‘(yov^y ^ yvvf] emTqSeios
els TOKovs. Kai oXti>s els <f>v(jiv.
2. Mexpi- p-ev oSy rovrcov eXdovra ava-navaaoBai
Kal rrpos to dvo) pur) eOeXrjaai xeopeiv paOvpov tacos
Kat ov KaraKOvovros tcov im rd irpcora Kal eirl
rd €Tr€K€iva atrca dviovrcov. Aid rl ydp rcdv
6 avrtov yevopevcov, otov rfjs aeX'qvrjs cfjaveCarjs^ o
pey ^pnaaev, 6 S’ ov; Kai rcdv opoLcoy €K rod
vepieyoyros rjKoyrcoy 6 pey eyoarjaey, 6 8’ ov;
Kai TrXovaios, 6 ‘Be Treyrjs €k rwp avrcdy epycoy;
Kai rpoTToi Brj Kal TjOj] Bidcf>opa Kal rvyai em rd
TToppco d^iovaiy levai' Kal ovtco Bt) del ovy
lardpevoi oi pey dpyds acopariKds depeyoi, otov
10 dropovs, rfj rovrcov <j>opa Kai TrXrjyats Kal avpirXo-
KaZs vpos dXXrjXa eKaara TToiovvres Kal ovrcos
eyeiv Kal ylveaOai, ^ eKeiva avviarrj TroieZ fe "Kal
■ndayei, Kal rds •qperepas oppds Kal Bi&Oeaeis
ravrrj eyeiv, cos dv eKeivai iroicdaiv, dydyKrjv ®
ravrrjv Kal rrjv rrapd rovrcov els rd ovra eladyovai.
15 Kay dXXa -Be' ns acopara dpxds BiBw Kal e«
rovrcov rd ‘ndvra yiveadai, rjj napd rovrcov
dvdyKri BovXeveiv TTOieZ rd ovra. 01 8’ enl rr]v
rov TTavros dpx^v eXdovres dvr’ avrijs Kardyovai
■ndvra, Bid ■ndvrcov <^oir'r]aaaav alrlav Kal 'ravr'qv
20 ov povov^ Kivovaav, dXXd Kal nroiovaav eKaara
Xeyovres, eipappevrfv ravrrjv Kal Kvpicordrrjv alrlav
^ {yovn ) ^ yunj Theiler, H—: rj Jp®C: ly wBRJ'^^'USQ, H—S^.
^ dvdyKTjv Ap®, edd.: dvdyiaj codd.
* ov fiovov Ap®, edd.: fidvov ov codd.
12
ON DESTINY
adapted to bearing children: and in general, one
traces the cause of the child back to Nature.
2. But to come to a halt when one has reached
these causes and not to want to go higher is char­
acteristic, perhaps, of a lazy person who pays no
attention to those who have ascended to the first
and the transcendent causes. For why in the same
circumstances, for instance when the moon shines,
does one man steal and another not ? And when the
influences Which come from the environment are
similar, why does one falHll and another not ? And
why does one become rich, another poor from the
same activities? And dilferent ways qf behaving
and characters and fortunes require us to go on to
the remoter causes. So philosophers have never
come to a standstill [when they have discovered the
immediate causes]: some of them posit corporeal
principles, for instance, atoms; they make both .the
way individual things exist, and the fact of their
existence, depend on the movements of these, their
clashings and interlocldngs with one another, the
way in which they combine and act and are acted
upon; even our own impulse’s and dispositions, they
say, are as the atoms make them; so they introduc'p
this compulsion which comes from the atoms into
reality. And if anyone gives other bodies as prin­
ciples, and says that everything comes into being
from them, he makes reality the slave of the compul­
sion which comes from them. Others go back to the
principle of the universe and denve everything from
it, saying that it is a cause which penetrates all
things, and one which does not only move but also
makes each single thing; they posit it as fate and the
13
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 PLOTINUS: LNNEAD III. 1.
eiprjvrac Xoyot, dXrjdets. Et 8e §17 /cai deZro ns
TOiavras apyas, ovS’ ovrcos dvayKaZov ovre rrjv
Kara ndvrcov dvdyKrjv ovre tt]v dXXojs elpapp,evr]v
etreaBai. Oepe ydp npiorov rds drop,ovs elvat..
10 ASrai roivvv Kwrjaovrai -rrjv p,ev els ro Kara)—•
ecTTco ydp n Karco—Trjv 8’ e/c TrXayicnv, 07777
ervyev, dXXai kot dXXa. OvSev 817 raKTCos ^
rd^ecos ye ovk ovcrqs, to 8e yevop-evov tovto, ore
yeyqve, irdvrois. "Qare ovre Trpopprjais ovre
pai>Ti.Kr] TO TTapd'nav dv eh], ovre 'qns Ik rexvyjs—-
16 TTWS ydp im rois drdKrois reyin];—^vre rjTts
evdovaiaapLov Kal em-nPoias' Set ydp Kal evravOa
(hpLopAvov TO peXXov elvai. Kat acop&cri pev
eoTai rrapd twv dTopiov Tidayeiv TrXTjTTopevois,
direp dv eKeZvai ^eputaiv, e^ dvdyKTjs' ra 8e 877
20 ifwxfjs epya Kal ndOrj nai, Kiin^aeai tu>v dTopojv
avad’qaei tls ; Iloia ydp TrXrjyfj ® KdTCO <j>epo-
pe}’r)s, rj ottovovv 7rpoaKpovovcn]s ev Xoyiapois
TOMiaSe rj oppais ToidtcrSe rj oXcos ey XoyicrpoTs r)
oppaZs ^ KLVQaemv dvayKaiats elvai ^ oXcos elvai;
Orav Se 877 evavncoTai ^vyrj toZs tov acdpaTOs
26 rrad'jpam; Karo, rroias 8e (f>opds dropcov d pev
yecoperpiKOS dvayKaadrjaeTai elvai, 6 he dp'idp-q-
TiKrjv Kal darpovopiav emuKeifieTai, 6 he aoifios
eoTai; "OXcos ydp to rjpeTepov epyov Kal to
^ipois elvai avoXeZTai <f>epopevcov ^ Td crcopaTa
* raKTws Orelli, H—S: ndyrtos oodd.
* j7-ot9 ydp nXriyjj Harder, H-S'*: mia yap TrXijyrj oodd.
16
ON DESTINY
have been brought forward. But even if one did
posit principles of this kind, they would not even so
necessarily entail universal compulsipn or fate of a
different kind. Let us start by admitting that atoms
exist. Then they will be moved, some with a down­
ward motion—let us grant that there is really a
“ down ”—some with a sideways, just as it chances,
others in other ways. Nothing will be ordered—
there is no order—but this world which comes into
existence, when it has come to be, is completely
ordered. So [on the atomic theory] there would be
no foretelling or divination, neither that which comes
from art—for how could there be an art which deals
with things without order?—nor tha?t whiph comes
from divine possession and inspiration;^ for here,
too, the future must be deterniined. And bodies
■will suffer, compulsorily, when they arQ struck by
atoms, whatever the atoms may brihg; but to what
movements of atoms will one be able to attribute what
soul does and suffers ? For by what sort <5f atomic
blow, whether the movement goes downwards or
strikes against it from any direction, vrill the soul be
engaged in reasonings or impulses of a particular kind,
or any sort of reasonings or impulses Or movements,
necessary or not ? And when the soul opposes the af­
fections of the body ? By what movements of atoms
will one man be compelled to be a geometer, another
study arithmetic and astronomy, and another be a
philosopher ? Our human activity, and our nature as
living beings, will be altogether done away with if
we are carried about where the [primary] bodies take
' This distinction between the two kinds of divination is
taken from Phaedrus 244C.
17
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 1.
ayei (hdovvra rjiu.as ua-rrep aifwxa vu>p.ara. Td
30 avra 8e -ravra /cat Trpos rovs erepa acifiara atria
ra>v TTavrcDv riOepevovs, /cat on deppLaiveiv pev
Kal ijjiixeiv -pfias Kal <f>9elpeiv Se ra dadevearepa
Svvarai ravra. ^pyov Se ovSev rwv oaa
ipydCerai rrapd rovroiv dv y'Lyvoiro, dXX' d<f>’
erepas Set ravra apy^js levai.
4. AAA apa p,ia ns ^vy^j Sia navros Si'qKovaa
nepawei ra rravra eKaarov ravrrj Kivovpiivov ws
p,epovs, ^ ro oXov dyei, (f>epop,evojv Se eKeWev ru>v
ain<x)v aKoXovdoiv dvdyKt] rrjv rovrcov eifie^rjs
5 (Tweyeiav Kal arvp,TrXoK^v eipiappievrjv, olov el
(f>vrov e/c ptfij? rrjv dpxrjv eyovros rrjv evrevdev
€ttI rravra Stot/cTjcrtv avrov ra pieprj Kal rrpos
d)^if]Xa avp.rTXoK7]v, rro^rjatv re Kal rreiaiv, SioiK-qaiv
p.iav Kal olov elp,app,ev7]v rov ^vrov ns etvai
Xeyoi; ’AAAd rrpwrov p.h rovro ro a<j)oSp6v rfjs
10 avayKTjs Kal rrjs roiavrrjs eip.app,evr]s aiiro rovro
r7]v eip,app,evrjv /cat rcov alrlajv rov elppov /cat rfjv
avp.rrXoKrjv dvaipei. 'Qy ydp ev rots -^pierepois
p.epeai Kara ro rjyepiovovv Kivovpievois dXoyov ro
■ j. section (ohs. 4^7 incl.) directed against the determin-
ists has a good deal in common with the long discussion of fate
in the commenta^ of Calcidius on the Timaeus (chs. 142-190)
which Waszink gives quite good reasons for supposing to derive
ultimately from Numenius (op. the preface to his edition pp
Ivm-km). So the immediate source of Plotinus here may
well be Nunienius. The opponents envisaged throughout may
be Stoics: there is nothing necessarily un-Stoio in this chapter
i8
ON DESTINY
us, as they push us along like lifeless bodies. The
same objections apply against those who posit other
bodies as causes of all things; and also say that these
bodies can make us hot or cold and even destroy the
weaker part of us; but no one of all the activities of
soul can come from them, but these must come from
another principle.
4. But, 'then, does one soul, permeating the uni­
verse, accomplish everything, ehch individual thing
being moved as a part in the way in which the whole
directs it ? ^ And must we, as the consequent causes
are brought into action from that one source, call
their continuous ordered interweaving “ destiny,” m
if, when a plant has its’principle in the root, one were
to call the direction which extends from there over all
its parts and their mutual interrelation, acting and
being acted upon, a single direction and, so to speak,
destiny of the plant ? But, first of all, this excess of
necessity and of destiny so understood itself does
away with destiny and the chain of causes and their
interweaving. For just as with our own parts when
they are moved by our ruling principle the statement
and the philosophical background of the astrological determin­
ism criticised in 6 and 6 is Stoic. But it is odd, in this case,
that Plotinus makes so clear a distinction between those who
hold that all things are determined by the world-soul and those
who hold that they are determined by thb universal chain of
causation (2. 15-26 and 31-36; 7.5-9).* There was a Platonic
view which identified fate as & substantial reality with the
world-soul (Ps.—Plutarch, De Fato 568e: Calcidius In Tim.,
ch. 144, p. 182, 16 Waszink). And it is possible that some
Platonists who held this (though not Numenius) may have
adopted a Stoic-type determinism, and it is against them that
Plotinus is arguing here (cp. Br^hier in his introduction to this
treatise).
19
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 1.
Ka9 et,ij,apfj,evr)v Xeyew Kwelodai—ov yap dXXo
15 fj,ev TO evSeSaiKos rrjv KLvrjaw, dAAo Se to Trapa-
Se^afievov Kal Trap' avrov rfj opp-ij Keyp-r^pivov,
aXX €K€ivo eari -npwTOv to Kivijaav to OKeXos—
TOV aVTOV TpOTTOV CL Kai C7TL TOV TTaVTOS COTat
TO TTav TTOLOVV Kol TTaoxov Kal OVK dXXo Trap’
aXXov KaT aiTLas rrjp dpayojy^v del c<f>’ cTCpov
20 cyovoas, ov Srj aXrjdes KaT acTLas rd rravra
yLyveodaCj aXX ev coTat Tct rravTa. *^£Io’t€ ovtc
■fjpeis -qpeLS ovtc tl rjpcTcpov epyov ovSe Xoyi^o-
peOa avTOL, aXX cTcpov Xoyiapol rd rjpcTcpa
^ovXevpaTa- ovSc TrpaTTopcv ■qpeZs, diOTrcp ovS’
OL TToSe^ XaKTi^ovacv, dXX’ “^peLs Sid pcpcbv tu>v
26 eavTtdv. AXXa yap Set Kal cKaoTov cKaoTov
CLvaL KaL TTpa^cLS rjpcTcpas Kal Siavolas virapyciv
Kai Tas CKacTTov KaXds tc Kal alaypas irpa^eis
Trap avTov CKaoTov, aXXa p7^ T<p ttovtI t^v yovv
Twv alaypatv TroCrjaiv dvaTidivai.
^ 6. AAA Laws pep ovy ovtojs eKaoTa TTCpaipcTaL,
7] pc <j)opa SLOLKovaa iraPTa Kal twp doTpcop
KLpyoLS OVTWS CKauTa TLdrjaLP, dis dp irpos dXXrjXa
OTaaews eyr] papTvplaLs Kal dpaToXaZs, Svacai tc
6 KaL Trapa^oXaZs. Atto tovtwp yovp paPTCVopcpoL
irpoXcyovaL irepL tc twp cp T<p rraPTl eaopcpcop
TTcpL TC CKaoTOV, OTTCos TC TvyTjs Kal Siavotas oity
Tj/aora c^cl. 'Opap Se Kal rd dAAa Cv® -re Kal
(f>VTd drro Trjs tovtwp avp-rradeLas av^opcpd tc /cat
pcLovpcpa /cat ra aXXa Trap’ avTWP irdayoPTa, tovs
20
ON DESTINY
that they are moved according to fate is unreason­
able—^for there is not one thing which imparts the
movement and another which receives it and takes its
impulse from it, but the ruling principle itself is
what immediately moves the leg—in the same way
if in the All the All is one thing acting and being
acted upon, and one thing does not come from another
according to causes which always lead back to some­
thing else, it is certainly not true that everything
happens according to causes but everything will be
one. So, on this assumption, we are not ourselves,
nor is there any act which is our own. We do not
reason, but our considered decisions are the reason­
ings of another. Nor do we act, any more than our
feet kick; it is we who kick through pa^ts of ourselves.
But, really, each separate thing must be a separate
thing; there must be actions and thoughts that are
our own; each one’s good and bad actions must come
from himself, and we must not attribute the doing of
bad actions at least to the All.
5. But perhaps particular things are not brought
about in this way, but the heavenly circuit, directing
everything, and the movement of the planets, arranges
each and every thing according to the relative posi­
tions of the planets in their aspects and rising, settings
and conjunctions. The evidence for this is that by
divination from the planets people foretell what is go­
ing to happen in the All and about each individual,
what sort of fortune and, in particular, what sort of
thoughts he is going to jiave. And they say that one
can see that the other animals and plants grow and
diminish under the sympathetic influence of the
planets, and are affected by them in other ways; and
21
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 1.
10 re TOTTOVS rovs im yTjs Sia(f>epovras dXX'qXojv
etvai Kara re rrjv rrpos to nav /cat rrpos
TjXiov p^Xlotol' cLKoXovOeiv §e roXs rorrois ov
ftovov rd dXXa (f>vrd re Kal dAAd /cat dv9pu>-
■7TCOV etSr] re Kal p,eye9rj /cat p^pda? Kal 9vp,<tu^ Kal
15 em9vp,ias emrrjSevpLard re Kal 7j9r]. Kvpla dpa
ri rov iravros ndvrwv <j>opd. Ilpds- Sij r&vra
rrpwrov p,ev eKeXvo prjreov, on Kal odros erepov
rpoTTov e/cetVotj dvan9fjai, rd ■qp.erepa, ^ovXds Kal
•7Ta9rj, KaKias re Kai opp,ds, •^puv Se ovhev SiSovs
Xi9ois j>epop,evois /caTaAetVet etvai, dXX‘ ovk
20 av9pumois eyovai Trap' avraiv ko,1 -e/c t^? avrwv
<f>vaeoJS "epyov. AAAd ypr) diSovai p.ev rd r^pierepov
ifjp,iv, TjKeiv 8e eis ra rjpierepa rivd ovra Kal
oLKeXa 7]p,d)v dnd rov navros drra, Kal Siaipovpie-
vov, riva fiev T]fieis epya^op,e9a, rlva 8e irdayopiev
e^ dvdyKrjs, /x^7 Trctt'ra eKeivois dvari9evai- Kal
25 levai p.ev rrapd rwv roTTCOv Kal rijs Siaijjopds rov
7repie)(ovros eis '^p.ds otov 9epp,6rr]ras ipv^eis ev
rfj Kpacrei, 'levai Se Kal irapd rdiv yeivapievojv ^
rots yovv yovevoiv d/xotot /cat ret eiSr] <hs rd noXXd
/cat riva riov dXoycov rijs ’pvyrjs va9u)v, Ou pdjv
oAAct /cat op>ouov ovrcvv roXs eXSeoi irapd rods
30 roiTovs ev ye rois T)9ecri irXeCanj irapaXXayij Kal
ev rais Siavoiai^ evoparai, coy dv dir’ dXXrjs
dpx^js ruiv roiovrcov idvrcvv. At re irpds rds
Kpaaeis ro)v acvjxdroyv /cat irpds rds eiri9vp.las
evavriwoeis /cat evrav9a irpeirdvrios Xeyoivro dv.
22
ON DESTINY
the regions of the earth differ from each other accord­
ing to their position in relation to the All, and particu­
larly to the sun; and not only do the other animals
and plants correspond to the regions but also the
forms and sizes and colours, the tempers and desires
and ways of life and characters of human beings. So
the universal circuit rules all things. In answer to
this we must say, first, that this man too, in a different
way, attributes to those principles what is ours, acts of
will and affections, vices and impulses, but gives us
nothing and leaves us to be stones-set rolhng, but not
men who have a work to do of ourselves and from our
own nature. But one must give to us what is ours
(though there must come to what is oups, already
something and our own, a certain amount from the
All), and make a distinction between what we do
ourselves and what we experience of necessity and
not attribute everything to those' principles. And
something certainly must come to us from the regions
and the difference of the surrounding atmosphere,
for instance, heat or coldness in our temperaments,
but something also comes from our parents; at any
rate, we are generally like our parents in our ap­
pearance and some of the irrational affections of our
soul. Yet all the same, even when people are alike
in appearance, corresponding to their regions, the
greatest difierence is observed in their characters and
thoughts, so that things of this kind would come from
another principle. Our resistances, also, to our
bodily temperaments and our lusts could ap­
propriately be mentioned here. But if, because,
yava/icWf Sleeman, H-S: yi(y)voi>Avo>v codd.
23
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 1.
1?? 0
ShL S’ ort eij rqv ro)v aarpcov
V t
axeaiv opcovres nepi
35 iKdoTmv \iyovai rd ywopieva, nap' dKeivoiv
noieladai^ T€Kp.aipovTai, 6p.oUos dv Kal ol opve^s
nocrjriKol Jiy arjpMivovatv dev Kal ndvra, ets a
^Xenovres ol fidvrets npoXeyovaiv. "Eti Se Kal
€K TcdvSe aKpi^earepov dv ns nepl tovtcov
imoK^aLTO. "A ns dv ISdjv els t})v twv darpojv
40 axiaiv, Tjv etyov ore eKaaros eylvero, npoelnoi,
ravra <j>aai Kal ylveadai nap' avrwv ov ar)p.aiv6v-
Twr p,ovov, dAAd Kal noiovvrcov. "Orav rolvvv
nepl^ evyevelas Xeycomv cos evSo^cov rcov
narepwv^ Kai p,7]repcov, na>s evi noieladai Xeyeiv
ravra, a npovndpyeL nepl rovs yoveXs nplv rdjv
46 ayiaLv yeveadaL ravrrjv rwv dorpcov df
npoXeyovai; Kai p.^v Kal yovicov rvyas and rdiv
nalScov rijs yevdaecos Kal naiScvv Siadeaeis otai
eaovrai Kal onoiais avveaovraL rvyais and rdiv
narepcxiv nepl rd>v ovnoj yeyovdrcov Xeyovcn Kal
aSeX^cdv aSeX(^d)v davdrovs Kal €k ywaiKtov
60 ra yepl rods dvSpas dvdnaklv re ck rovrcov
€jcetva. ITai? av oSv ■jj enl eKdarov ayecns ^ .rdiv
darpcvv noyl, d ’qdrj cV narepaiv ovrojs e^eiv
Xeyerac; H yap eKetva rd. nporepa earai rd
noLovvra,^ rj el p.r] eKeXva noiet, ovSe ravra. Kal
p.r]v Kal ri 6p.oi6rr]s ev rots etSeai npds rods yoveas
oodd” Kirohhoff, H-S^: ^Kdarov oxdms eVi
24
ON DESTINY
looking at the position of the stars they announce
what has happened to particular people, they adduce
this as evidence that the happenings were caused
by the stars, then in the same way birds would be the
causes of what they indicate, and so would everything
at which the soothsayers look when they foretell.
Further, one could investigate these matters more
exactly starting from the following observations.
Whatever someone foretold, looking at the position
which the stars held when a particular man was born,
this, they say, was broughfabout by the stars, which
did not only indicate but also caused the happenings.
But when they talk about peoples’ noble birth, that
is that they come of illustrious fathers and mothers,
how is it possible that the stars caused what the
parents had already before the position of the stars
came about from which they foretell ? And they tell,
too, the fortunes of parents from the nativity of
their children, and what the children’s dispositions
are going to be and what fortunes they will meet
with from the nativity of their parents speaking
of children who are yet unborn, and they tell of the
death of brothers from the horoscopes of their
brothers, of what concerns husbands from the horo­
scopes of their wives and, the other way round, of
wives from the horoscopes of their husbands. How,
then, could the position of the stars over an individual
cause what is already stated as going to occur on
the evidence of the horoscope of the parents?
Either those former astrological circumstances are
the cause, or, if they are not, neither are those at the
birth of the individual. Again, too, people’s likeness
in appearance to their parents declares that beauty
25
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 1.
^ 65 oLKodiv Kal KaXXos Kal ahxos ievai, aAA’ ov
■n-apa ^opds darpcov. EvXoyov re Kara rovs
avTovs xpovovs Kat apa re TTaproSand Kal
dvdpuirrovs dpa yLveadai- ots drraaiv expijv rd
aiird etvai, oh 17 avrrf ayems. 11(3? oSv dpa pev
av0p(x)7Tovsy apa Se ra aXXa Bid rojv oxrjpdrojv j
6. ’AAAd ydp yLyverai pev eKaara Kard rds
avridv ^vaeis, ittttos pev, on e$ imrov, Kal
avOpcvTTOS, on e^ avOpamov, Kal roioaSe, on eK
roiovSe. "Eoreo Se avvepyos Kal ^ rov navrds
6 (f>opd avyxMpovaa rd ttoXv rots yeivapevois
earcoaav Se irpds rd rov awparog rroXXd acopa-
riK&s SiSovres, depporrjras Kal ijjv^eig Kal atvpd-
rojv Kpaoeig eiraKoXovdovoas, TTwg ovv Td Kal
emrTjSevpara Kai paXiara ovy daa SoKei Kpdaei
oojparoiv SovXeveiv, otov ypappariKos rig Kal
* 16 yewperpiKog /ecu Kv^evriKog Kai revvSe rig evper^g ,*
TTOVTjpia Se TjOovg rrapa decov ovriov Tvd>g dv SoBeirj;
Kai oXcug ocra Xeyovrai SiSdvai /ca/cd KaKovpevoi,
on Svvovai Kal on vttp, yrjv 4'^pdvrai, ddoTrep
Sid(f)op6v ri Tracyovreov, el rrpdg ■^pdg Svvoiev,
16 aAA ovK ael errl a(f>alpag ovpavlag <j>epopevo)v, Kal
‘ Sleeman: yiTO/tcVoty codd, H-S.
, * I read here yavaiUvois (Sleeman, Class. Quart. 20, 1926,
152), for the MSS yivoixivois, because it gives a much better
sense (it is difficult, indeed, to see how “the things which
26
ON DESTINY
and ugliness come from the family, and not from the
movements of stars. It is reasonable, too, to sup­
pose that at the same time both all sorts of living
creatures and men are born together; and all of
them, since they have the same position of the stars,
ought to have the same destiny. How, then, are at
one and the same time both men and other living
creatures produced by the arrangements of the
6. But, in fact, all individual things come into being
according to their own natures, a horse because it
comes from a horse, and a man from a man, and a
being of a particular kind because it comes from a
being of a particular kind. Admitted that the
universal circuit co-pperates (conceding the main
part to the parents) ,1 and admitted that the stars
contribute a great deal corporeally to the con­
stituents of the body, heat and cooling and the wn-
sequent bodily temperaments; how, then, are they
responsible for characters and ways of life, and
especially for what is not obviously dominated by
boffly temperament—becoming a man of letters, for
instance, or a geometer, or h ^ce-player, and a dis­
coverer in these fields? And how could a wicked
character be given by the stars, Avho are gods ? And
in general, how could all the evils be given by th^
which they are said to give when they are brought
into an evil state because they are setting and passing
under the earth—as if anything extraordinary hap­
pened to them if they set from our point of view, and
they were not always moving in the heavenly sphere
come into being,” makes any sense at all here) and is consistent
with the whole argument of the preceding lines.
27
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. i.
ON DESTINY
npo^ rrjr, yr,v airily ^^6vrojv oximv; OiZk
A^rec. a^AAo, a'AAo. .’Sci. ra>. W and holding the same position in relation to the earth ?
Mqv Kai arda,v x^^P<^v ^ Kpdrrco^, yiverar Nor must it be said that when one of the gods sees
jre^evnfov.ras pk. ^p^as .5 .o.e?., ^aLv hi. another in this or that position he becomes better or
worse so that when they are in a good state they do
20 trr"" good to us, but harm us when the opposite. We must
ZciyS^ Kal dAA,?v rather say that the moveinent of the stars is for the
preservation of the universe, but that they perform

^
loirZT
kZ T e.’8oVa. ^Xinovras
ypwara cimy.vcia-
ra fieXXo^a €k raiv (Txrjpdrcov Kara to
in addition another service; this is that those who
know how to read this sort of writing can, by looking
jaAoyov t6 cnjp.a,v6pevop- cZan.p at them as if they were letters, read the future from
their patterns, discovering what is signified by the
systematic use of analogy—for instance, if one said
7. Aoindv Sk ISeiv rkjv imnXiKovffav Kal olov that when the bird flies high it signifies some high
heroic deeds.
7. It remains to look at the [theory of the] prin­
ewa^v ^^^<f>,povaav apxk,v rcd,pivr,v piav. d<f>’ ciple which interweaves and, so to speak, chains
5'EaT “ OTTeppariKoks nepaiverac. everything to everything else, and makes each in­
5 Bare p,,. oSv Kal adr^ ^ 8o'^a rij, dividual thing be tlie way it is, a principle assumed to
naaay Kac ayeenv Ka, Kivr,a,v djpL^ripav re Z be one, from which all things come about by seminal
ITr 'I'-XVS vZcu Lyodar,s. :i formative principles. This opinion is close to that
T. yjpZv Kal iKdarocs yapLcZc ds which says that all states and movements, both our
^ -nap ruMov noi€iv -n, ’'Eyei pd oSy tXv
own and all others, come from the soul of the uni­
verse, even if it does allow us, even as individuals,
some room for action of our own. It certainly has in
it absolute universal necessity, and when all the
ovbey yap en TO kojXvcjov r) a”AAco? yeviadai
noc^troy, d jrdyra dXrjnTa. iy Trj d^p^Zn causes are included it is impossibleTor each individual
thing not to happen: for there is jiothing left which
ToiavTa he oyra w? diro p,ias dpxrjs coparjuiva
will hinder it or make it happen otherwise if all causes
7}fuv ovSev /caroAetUet, *n SeoeaOaL nTm ^ are included in fate. If they, are hke this, starting
d)9r) AT er.^ ' I V 9^p€<^^ac 07777 €K€Lva
r T X°-P TOi? TTpovynaaaiyots from a single principle, they will leave nothing for us

- re op^ai .ard Wra. eWa:. sLpUZZZ except to move wherever they push us. For our
mental images will depend on pre-existing circum­
stances and our impulses will follow our mental
28
29
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. i.
ON DESTINY
images, and “ what is in our power ” will be a mere
Y^vvwfj.ev7]s- toiovt6p re r6 -f,SL “ word; it will not exist any more just because'it is we
who have the impukes, if the impulse is produced in
accordance with those pre-existing causes; our part
will be like that of animals and babies, which go on blind
impulses, and madmen, for these also have impulses—
,s.>.Ta. „„i ToX“ yes, by Zeus, fire,has impulses too, and everything
which is enslaved to its structure and moves according
to it. Everyone else sees this jand does not dispute
amW loravral Z7J T ^ it; but they look for other causes of this impulse of
ours, and do not stop at this universal principle.
t rT^7222222. 8. What other cause, then, occurs to us, besides
these, which will leave nothing causeless, and will
preserve sequence and order, and allow us to be
'S^ s„ „3„.„ 2”r something, and not do away with prophecies and divin7
ations ? Soul, surely, is another principle which we
222122,2,1 ™"'*«! must bring into reahty—not only the Soul of the All
TtX4k€LV rn
' OlUKpds OVOTIS
but also the individual soul along with it as a principle
’7z,l’z:;2r^’ of no small importance; with this we must weave all
things together, which' does not itself come, like
"A.^ev jrz rr' ^P^:°^pyo0 alrias other things, from seeds but is a cause"which initiates
activity. Now when the soul is without body it is in
absolute control of itself and free, and outside the
causation of the physical universe; but when it is
brought into body it is no longer in all ways in control,
Vvavov oirrre ..A ' t f^^aov, TO TToMa as it forms part of an order with other things.
v2os2 ,U r72, 2‘vi“ 2 *• Chances direct, for the most part, all the things round
it, among which it has fallen when it comes to this
middle point, so that it does some things because of
t. MoS,a i„e,2 ? d^|.<2 these, but sometimes it masters them itself and leads
them where it wishes. The .better soul has power
over more, the worse over less. For the soul that
gives in at all to the temperament of the body, is
3°
31
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 1.
ON DESTINY
VydyKaarac ^ Wa.j razr«^ f, ^AotJro:?
compelled to feel lust or anger, either abject in
V fvuaf^eac rvpawos- -f, U Kal eV ro?j a{,roZ, poverty or puffed up by wealth or tyrannical in
power; but the other soul, the one which is good by
nature, holds its own in these very same circum­
Toi? 6e avyxojpyjaat p,ij p^rd. Kdxrjs. stances, and changes them rather than is changed by
them; so it alters some of them and yields to others
y. AvayKaia puev oSv ravTo. ■ >
if there is no vice in yielding.
9. So all is necessary that comes about by a mixture
HaWco. M4,eivrJr&v alrZv of choice and chance; for what else could there be
besides? But when all the causes are included,
K r^s <!>opas awreXetrai. "Qrap ukv oSv AX everything happens with complete necessity; if
Xo^ioeeioa ■rrapA rcbv l^o. . anything from the universal circuit makes its con­
tribution, that, too, is counted among the external
causes. When therefore, the soul is altered by the
external causes, and so does something and drives
on in a sort of blind rush, neither its action nor its
oisl /ye^oZai!rr^r6pZ^'T disposition is to be called free; this applies, too, when
it is worse from itself and does not altogether have its
impulses right or in control. When, however, in its
<f>arAov ehac TaTL^°"^" impulse it has as director its own pure and untroubled
reason, then this impulse alone is to be said to be
^Tvn, ^ « eKovoiov, Kal rovTo
in our own power and free; this is our own act, which
IsZl ttTTO ‘®"'-
KClOolDCLS T77C ihny/tne- * * • a
Kal Kvplas. dS' 'odZxdiZlfi
does not come from somewhere else but from within
from our soul when it is pure, from a primary prin­
ciple which directs and is in control, not suffering
15 aymias nadodayis v ^rrav Rf « error from ignorance or defeat from the violence of
.e««Atec,a. the passions, which come upon it and drive and drag
'“7 ?7 it about, and do not allow any acts to come from us
0. TeAos 8:, o' Ao'yo? ,rc£vra p^kv anaak any more but only passive responses.
ea^ai /cat ^ 10. To sum up, the argument says that all things
are indicated [by the stars] and all things happen ac­
away Kai ra p,kv ino iPvx'^s, rd Sk Si’ dXXas cording to causes, but there are two kinds of these;
and some happenings are brought about by the soul,
32
33
VOL. HI. c
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 1.
a’lTLas ras kvkXco. UpaTrovcras Se ij;vxas oaa
5 vparrovai, Kara- p,ev Xoyoi^ iroiovaas opdov rrap'
avTwv TTparrew, orav nparrcom, ra S’ dXXa
ep.’TToSi^ojxevas rd avru>v rrpcbrreiv, irdaxeiP re
p^ov TTpdrreiv. ’’Clare rov jxev prj <f>povelv
d^a acria etvai- ‘Kal ravra torw? opdov Kad'
eipappevrjv Xeyeiv npdrreiv, ols ye Kal hoKei
10 e^oidev rqv elpappevrjv amov etvai- rd Se dpiara
nap’ ravrt]s ydp Kai Trjs (f>vaed)s eapev,
orav povoi ojpev Kai rovs ye anovSaiovs-npdrreiv,
Kal in avrois^ rd KaXd npdrreiv, rovs Se dXXovs,
Kad’ oaov dp dvanvevacvai avyxcoprjdevres rd KaXd
nparreiv, ovk aXXodev Xa^ovras rd <j>poveiv, orav
15 (j>povojaif povov Se ov KcoXvdevras-
34
ON DESTINY
others through other causes, those round about it.
And souls, in all that they do, when they do it ac­
cording to right reason, act of themselves, whenever
they do act, but in everything else are hindered in
their own action and are passive rather than active.
So other things [not the soul] are responsible for not
thinking; and it is perhaps correct to say that the
soul acts unthinkingly according to destiny, at least
for people who think that destiny is an external cause;
but the best actions come from ourselves; for this
is the nature we are of, when we are alone; good and
wise men do act, and do noble actions by their own /
will; but the others do their noble actions in so far as
they have a breathing space and are allowed to do
so, not getting their thinking from somewhere else,
when they do think, but only not being hindered.

I three and three only, the One, Intellect and Soul, on which
III. 2 and 3. ON PROVIDENCE
Introductory Note
These treatises (Nos. 47 and 48 in the chronological order)
are Porphyp^ s chyisions of a single long work on Provi-
dence which Plotmus wrote towards the end of his life.
The subject was a traditional one: many Stoics and Middle
Platomsts had written on Providence before him: but this
austere, honest and profound work is the finest of all
Greek contributions to theodicy. The object of Plotinus
. 13 to explain how belief in the existence and goodness of
divme providence can be justified in the face of all the
apparent evils m the world: the opponents he has in view
are the Epicureans, who denied providence, the Peripa­
tetics, who denied that it extended to the world below the
moon, and prhaps most of all his intimate enemies the
Gnostics, who held that the material universe was the
°f the arguments he uses
frL developed
from Plato s great theodicy in Book X of the Laws (%.
Br6hier s introduction to the treatises). But there is
much that is original in his use and elaboration of them.
1.“ one: themes and arguments
recur and are handled m different ways from different
pomts of view, not always without some inconsistency.
It IS one of the works in which we have most vividly tL
impression of Plotmus thinking aloud, discussing the sub-
ject with himself as he writes.
A notable feature of the work is that Plotinus speaks in
I +U t ^ alone, of a logos, a rational forming principle, of
the whole umverse, which looks at first sight like a dfatinct
38
!
ON PROVIDENCE (I) AND (II)
hypostasis, incompatible with the normal hierarchy of
he insists so strongly elsewhere. But Br6hier, in his intro­
duction (pp. 18-22), is almost certainly right in under­
standing logos here, not as a distinct hypostasis, but as a
way of speaking of the living formative and directive
pattern, derived from Intellect through Soul in the usual
way, which keeps the material universe in the best possible
order and brings it into a unity-in-diversity of contrasting
and clashing forces which, though far inferior to the unity
of the intelligible world, is its best possible image in the
sharply divided world of space and time.
Synopsis
III. 2
It is unreasonable to suppose that the world is produced
by chance, but there are difficulties about universal pro­
vidence which ought to be discussed., This .universe is the
everlasting product of the trud, eternal universe of In­
tellect, which is at unity and peace with itself (ch. l)i
This universe is not truly one: there is separation in it,
and therefore conflict. It is not the result of any kind
of planning or decision,- but the natural product of In^
tellect, necessarily inferior.because of its material element
but with its own kind of harmony dominating its conflicts
(ch. 2). It is good as a‘whole, 'and eve^thing in it is good
and seeks the Good, each in its de^e (ch.’ 3). The de­
struction of one thing by another is necessary, and leads
to new life. Disorder and lawlessness result from failure
to attain the good, and lead inevitably and justly to punish­
ment (ch. 4). Evils often lead to good, for the whole or
the individual (ch. 5). How can we reconcile the obvious
injustices of human life with providence? (ch. 6). This is a
second-rate world, after all. Individual souls, 'too, must
take their share of responsibility. But providence does
39
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
t STuiv..’; bul^sr f; ‘'■■‘
they deserve a/the'^hS
Of the wicked through their own slackness and fX
Divnie providence must leave room for human initiative
Men cannot expect the gods to help them if they do not do
is necessary for their own well-being (chs 8-9)
Se’"KhsTr?2)^°^i • Ti^®^““«tbeinequalities
^ • 1 I* IS important to take previous
feteT)X“) Th f “g the justice of men’s
animals and men (which do not affect man’s trJIXiersX
are part of the great game, incidents in the plot of the plav
movements in the dance, notes in the melody of the^S:
verse, which must be as it is because it is neoessarUv
secondaiy, imperfect, not fully unified (chs. 15-16) Th^
imiverse is less one than its rational formative principk
the loffos. In its clashing disunity “ each man^kills the
hmg he loves. The loffos, in producing its play gives
human souls parts in it according to the characters fliovr
must not thni of the actors in our cosmic drama as im.
provismg to fiU in gaps in the play. If we take nwnv'
respoSS the fog-05 we shaU take away
responsibfiity for good as well. But if we give it all
ON PROVIDENCE (I) AND (II)
are taken account of in the universal plan. It is absurd
to complain because man is not better than he is: he is as
good as he can be given his place in the order of thin^ m
this universe which itself follows upon, and is less perfect
than. Intellect and Soul (ch. 3). Man is not simple, but
double, with a higher, free principle besides his lower self.
Higher and lower providence, and higher and lower prm-
ciples in man: -the lower depend on and are caused by the
higher. Again, we must take previous lives into account
(ch. 4). The inequalities of the providential order; each
individual thing in its place contributes in its o-;m way to
the Hiugle result. Fate (lower providence) and higher pro­
vidence. Evil actions are not done by providence but then-
results are worked into the universal order. The differen<ms
in men’s reactions. Their good actions are done by thein-
selves, but according to providence (oh. 6). Divination is
possible because of the universal harmony and corres­
pondence of all things (ch. 6). Diversity, mequality and
evil are necessary if there is to be any. universal order at aU:
all things in their multiplicity grow from a single root
(ch. 7).

Tim ^versal logos includes the logoi of all souls good

and bad, and each of them, while remaining itself ’forms
part of a complex living unity, within which strife snd
opposition have their place (ch. 1). The logos is like a

own (Ch. 2). Mans.mdmduahty and his acts of choice

40
41
 III. 2. (47) IIEPI nPONOIAS IIPQTON
1. To /J.ev avrondrw Kal SiSoWt rovSe
rov TTwros tj oiaLav Kal aiiaraaiv <Ls S.Xoyov
Kai avBpos ovre vovv oHre aheTjacv KeKrr]f,dvov,
JV^ov nov Kac^p6 X6yov Kal ^oXXol Kal tWoi
KarapefSXrjvrai deiKvwres rovro Xoyoi- to Se rls
prponos rov ravra yiveo9ai eVaara Kal 7Te7roLfia9ai,
e? (vv Kai evLMv cbs ovk op9ws yivop.ivtov dnopelv
'^T'. -^o^os npovoias avpi^aivei. Kal rots
en^Aee p.r]Se dvai dneiv. rots Si M (and it has occurred to some people to say that it
KOKOV S7]ptovpyov ian yeyevrjfMivos. imaKii/jaa9ai
10 npoarjKe, av<o9ev Kal dpx^js r6v Xdyov Xa^dvras.
npovotav roiwv rrjv pip if iKdarcp. ^ iarC Xdyos
npo epyov ottcos SeT yepia9ai f, p-i, yevio9ai rt roiv
ov JeoPTCop -TTpaxdrjpai Jj Sttcos ti et-n ^ pX etv
-n^p, a4eia9ai- ^pSi rov napris Xiyopep npdpoiap
dpac.^ ravrrjp^ vno9epepo, rd i<j>e^Hs avpdnrcopep.
iii pep ovp ano TWOS xpovov -npdrepop oi>K 6pra
TOP Koapop eXeyopep yeyopipai, t^p adr^p dp tu>
Aoy<« CTc9epe9a. otap Kal ini rols Kard pipos
Koofxov Picinus, H—S: xP^^ov codd.
tad
^ The Gnostics: cp. H. 9 [33], of which the title is given by
42
III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)
1. To attribute the being and structure of this All
to accident and chance is unreasonable and belongs
to a man without intelhgence or perception; this is
obvious even before demonstration, and many ade­
quate demonstrations have been set down which show
it. But the way, in which all these individual, things
here come into being and are made, some of which,
on the ground that they have not rightly come into
being, produce difficulties about universal providence
does not exist at all,i and to others that the universe
has been made by an evil maker),^ this we ought to
consider, starting our discussion from the v^
ning. Let us leave out that providence [or foresight]
which belongs to the individual, which is a calculation
before action how something should happen, or not
happen in the case of things which ought not to be
done, or how we may have something, or not have it.
Let us postulate what we call universal proydence
and connect up with it what comes after. If, then,
we said that after.a certain time the universe, which
did not previously exist, came into being, we should
in our discussion lay down that providence in the AU
was the same as we said it was in partial things, a
I- 8-18
Porphyry in Ufe, oh. 24, 66-67, as “ Against those who say
that the maker of the universe is evil, and the universe is evil.
43
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
eXeyofiev ehai, Trpoopaaiv rwa Kal Xoyiap.6v Oeov,
d>s av yivoiTo r6Se t6 Tray, Kal d,s aiy dpcara /cari
20 TO SvyarXy elr,. ’ETrei Ad Kal t6 oSttotc
fir) TM Koap,(p TwSe <j)ap.ev irapdvai, Tqv -npovoiav
opOais av Kai aKoXovdws Xeyoip,ev rw rravrl etvai
TO Kara vovv aiirov etvai, Kal vovv npo avrov
eivai ovx ais^ XP°>'V 'n-porepov ovra, dXX' Sti irapa
voG iari^ Kal ^Gaei npArepos eKeivos Kal airios
25 Tovrov apxervTTOv otov Kal TrapdSeiypia eiKovos
TOVTOV^ OVTOS^ Kal Si' CKeiVOV OVTOS Kal VTTOardvTOS
ad, rovSe rov rpo-rrov tov vov Kal tov ovtos
<f>dais kSojios early 6 AXy^divAs Kal rrpdiros, oi
Staord? d^’ eavroG ovSe aadevr^s rw piepiapiip
ovSe eXXiTT^s ovSe rol? p.4peai yevdpievos are
30 eKaorov aTToaTraadevros roG oXov dXX' r)
naaa Cwi) airoG Kal rras voGs eV evl fdicra Kal
voovaa ojioG Kal ro p.epos rrapexerai oXov Kal rrav
avrcp (f)iXov ov x<^pi-cr9d d'AAo Att' aXXov ovSe
er^pov yeyevTjpie'vov /aovov Kal riov AXXcov ATreievco-
p.ivov S6ev oGS^ ASiKei d'AAo d'AAo oiS' Av
35 ivavrlov. YiavraxoG S'e Av iv Kal riXeiov AttovoGv
earrjKe^ re Kal AXXoicoaiv ovk exei- ovSe yap
TTOiei aXXo els aXXo. Tivos yap av eveKa ttoioi
eXXeiTTov oiSevl; TL S' Av XAyos XAyov ApyAaairo
Plotinus frequently attacks the idea that God first planned
the universe and then created it, and insists that it is ever-
lasting and not the result of divine deliberation and choice
44
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
foreseeing and calculation of God about how this All
might come into existence, and how things g^t b®
as good as possible. But since we affirm that this
universe is everlasting and has never not existed,
we should be correct and consistent in saying that
providence for the All is its being accorffing to
Ltellect, and that Intellect is before it, not in the
sense that it is prior in time but because the umverse
comes from Intellect and Intellect is prior in nature,
and the cause of the universe as a kind of archetype
and model, the universe being an image ot it and
existing by means of it and everlastingly coming into
existence, in this way; the nature of Intellect and
Being is the true and first universe, which does not
stand apart from itself and is not weakened by division
and is not incomplete even in its parts, since each
part is not ciit off from the whole; but the whole
life of it and the whole intellect hves and thinks a
together in one, and makes the part the whole and
all bound in friendship with itself, since one part is
not separated from another and has not become
merely other, estranged from the rest; and, there­
fore, one does not wrong another, even if they are
opposites. And since it is everywhere one and com­
plete at every point it stays still and Imows no
alteration; for it does not make as one tlung acting
upon another. For what reason could it have tor
roaking, since it is deficient in nothing ? \^y should
a rational principle make another rational principle,
of a suontaneous outflow of creative power without be-
„in„inv or^end. For a particularly notable statement of his
feasonf for rejecting divine planning and subsequent creation,
op. V. 8 [31] 7.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
7? aAAov; 'AAAct rc5 S.’ aiirov b^vaadal
r. apa oi^ ,S nd.rr,. d^Xd radnj
^0 nocov.ro, Kac KcvovpJvov. KaO' 5 rc ko.1 vecpl
earr rocs Se nd.rr, pxcKaplocs eV airocs iardvac
Kac rovro ecvac. 6nep dal. pcdvo. dpKec. r6 U
rroXvnpay^vdv oi,K da,j>aXk iavroi, air&v
rryaKcvoyacv. ’AAAd ydp odrcv pca^dpco. KdKecvo.
‘“5 ^PYd^eaOac. koX d
45 TW eayrov p,evec. ov opccKpd nocecv.
^ 2. 'T^tWrai yovv 4k rov Kdapcov rov dX-nOcvov
€Kec.ov Kac e.os Kdafws oSros ovy ef? dXr,ecus-
TToXvs yov.^ Kac ds nXrjOos f.epcepcap4.os koX <^AAo
aTT^ aAAot, a4earr,K6s Kal iXXdrpcov yey,vr,pdov
xac ovKerc <f,cXca, pdvov. dXXd Kal iyOpa rv
aXXo aXXcp. Ov yap apKd aircp rd pcdpos. ddXd
ocpCopevo. rep dXXep rroXipcdv dare. id>’ oS
ro€ Sec. ye.e'adac,
c^Xa 4>vae<vs Sevripas d.dyKrp oi ydp rocovro.
yeco^ oh. eayay. et.ac rw. Siercv.. Epedro.
yap 7). /cat noXXr,. Sd.apc. eyo. Kal rrdaa.- koX
ravrr]. roevv rdj. rov nocec. dXXo d.ev rov
Cvyc. nocijaac. ’’HSt) ydp &. airdde. oi,K elye.
« ^l:^rec. ovS d. dK rrjs airov oiaias. dXX’
f oto. rexyrrj, dn> airov rd nocec. o^k dyco.,
aXX enayro., eK rov f^aOec. Xa^ch. rovro. NoCc
rocenj. Sovs rc iavrov els liXy,. drpepc-?,, Kal
46
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
or an intellect another intellect ? Being able to make
something by itself is the characteristic of something
which is not altogether in a good state but makes
moves in the direction in which it is inferior. For
altogether blessed beings it is alone enough to stay
still in themselves and be what they are; restless
activity is unsafe for those who in it violently move
themselves out of themselves. But that true All is
blessed in such a way that in not making it ac­
complishes great works and in remaining in itselt
makes no small things.
2. For from that true universe which is one this
universe comes into existence, which is not truly one;
for it is many and divided into a multiplicity, and one
part stands away from another and is alien to it, and
there is not only friendship but also enmity because ot
the separation, and in their deficiency one part is ot.
necessity at war with another. For the part is not
self-sufficient, but in being preserved is at war with
the other by which it is preserved. This umverse
has come into existence, not as the result of a process
of reasoning that it ought to exist but because it was
necessary that there should be a second nature; for
that true All was not of a kind to be the- last ot
realities. For it was the first, and had much power,
indeed all power; and this is the power to produce
something else without seeldng to produce it. ror
if it had sought, it would not have had it of itselt,
nor would it have been of its own substance, but it
would have been like a craftsman who does not have
the ability to produce from himself, but as something
acquired, and gets it from learning. So Intellect,
by giving something of itself to matter, made all
47
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
■qavxos TO. ndvra elpydCero- oSros Be 6 Aoyo? «
vov pveLs. ^ To yap diroppeov €/c vov Xoyos, Kal del
aTToppet, ecos dv ^ -rrapdjv eV rols oSat. vovs.
Llatrep Be eV Ao'yw tw eV OTreppLari 6p.ov irdvroiv
20 /cat ev rep avrw ovrcov /cat ovBevos ovBevl pi,axop,e-
vov ovBe Bicuj)epop,evov ovBe epcTToBi'ov ovtos
ycverac ri -^jBr,^ eV SyKcp Kal oAAo ixdpos dAAayoC
/cat Brj ^ Kal ep-TToBiaeiev dv erepov erepu) Kal
anavaX^aeiev dXXo dXXo, ovroj Brj Kal 4v6s vov
/cat roO an avrov Xdyov dvea-n) roBe ro ndv Kal
25 Siearr] Kal e^ dvdyKrjs rd ji'ev eyevero <j>[Xa /cat
npoarjvrj, ra ^ Se eyOpd Kal noXepLia, Kal rd p.ev
eKovra, ra Be Kal aKovra dXX'qXois dXvjj.'qvaro /cat
<f>9eip6p.eva ^Odrepa yeveaiv dXXijXois elpydaaro,
Kai ^tav in avrols roiavra noiovai Kal ndayovaiv
ojuas dpjMvlav ivecrryaaro (j>9eyyopLevcvv jiev
30 eKddrwv rd avrcdv, rov Be Xdyov in’ avroLS rrjv
apfioviav /cat p,lav rrjv avvra^iv els rd dXa
noiovjxivov. "Eon ydp tA nav rdSe ody ddanep
€Kei vovs Kal Xoyos, dXXd p^ereyov vov kal Xdyov.
Aio^ /cat eBei]97] dppovlas avveX9dvros vov Kal
dvdyKTjs, rrjs pev npos rd yetpov eXKOvarjs Kal
36 et? dXoylav ^ ^epovarjs are ovk ovarjs Xdyov,
apyovros 8e vov opcos dvdyKrjs. '0 pev ydp
vorjrds 'pdvov Xdyos, Kal oi5/c dv yivoiro dXXos
^ The analogy of the seed (which in his way of thinking is
supenor in its concentrated unity to the full-grown plant)
18 a favourite one with Plotinus: op., e.el. III. 7 1451 ] 1 2t-9r
^ Plato, Timaeus 48A2. ^
48
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
things in unperturbed quietness; this something of
iteelf is the r^ational formative prinaple flowing from
Intellect For that which flows out from Intellect
is formative principle, and it flows f
in the formative principle in a f
together and in the same °“ts jn
fi/dits tvith any other or is at odds with it or gets in
S war the/something comes to be in bulk, and
the different parts are in different places, and then
one really could get in another’s way and e'^en
sume itj so from Intellect which is one, and the
formative principle which proceeds from it, this A
has arisen and separated into parts, and of necessity
iXame ftiendl, »d gentle, ■>*»'« “ me
at war, and some did harm to others wilhngly, sdme,
tL umigly. and some by their destruction
brought about the coming into being of others, an
over^them all as they acted and were acted upon in
these kinds of ways they began ^
of them uttering their own sounds, and the toeing
principle over them producing
Se ordering of all together to the whole.
All of ours is not intellect and rational principle, hke
All There,butparticipates in intellect and ratm^^^^
nrincinle Therefore, there was need ol a concora
to which “ intellect and necessity ’ came together,
49
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
hovpv Aoyoy el bi rt eyeWro dAAo
€Kelv6v xal p,^ X6yov, f,rjS’ aS {iXr)v r,vd- LZ^Z
ZxTyoZTeZ T - aA,v«, .A,
ov KaKonaOelv Srf vop.iCe,v daara
Sco^Kovaav roSe rA ,.5^ rfj olor> ^apoLla. ‘
^ KatovK av r,s ^k6tcos oiS^ ro6rco'a^a>Lacro
P . ef avayKYjs ovros avrov Kal ovk eV
ON PKOVIDENCE (I)
principle; but if something else did come into exist­
ence, it had to be less than that other universe, and
not rational principle, nor yet some kind of matter, tor
that would be without beauty and order; so it had
to be a mixture [of both]. Its terminal points are
matter and rational principle; its starting-point is
Soul presiding over the mixture. Soul which we must
not think suffers any harm as it directs this All with
the utmost ease by a sort of presence.
3 And it is not proper for anyone to speak ill 01
evek this universe as not being beautiful or the best
of all things which have body; nor to blanae the

Xrzrr'"’’ :'»- cause of its existence when, first of all, it exists of

necessity and not as the result of any proeess of
reasoning, but of a better nature naturally producing
™,9,l rr-’ “‘t-"™* a likeness of itself; then, even if it had been a process
of reasoning which had produced it, there will be
nothing to be ashamed of in its product; for it pro­
duced a whole, all beautiful and self-sufficient and
friends with itself and with its parts, both the more
in ' 'J TOWW €K TcSl- ueoniw
10 TO oAov aVoTroj <5v ely, a^«'aC ' important and the lesser, which are all equally well
««5tA tA AAoi^ Sl aKonelZd adapted to it. So he who blamed the whole because
p4^va Kai apfiOTTovra eKelvco to re AA of the parts would be quite unreasonable in his
blame; one must consider the parte in relation to
fZZ S„a iu.,i
the whole', to see if they are harmonious and in con­
cord with it; and when one considers th^hole one
^‘rrjzirZ^-^ ’T'^r- ^
^
7vZ Z
OTOU xoipis Aa^ovros, otov el navros to'>m,
1 dfieXyjaas t6v ndvra
must not look at a few Httle parte.i This is not
blaming the universe but taking some of its par
separately, as if one were to take a hair of a whole
dpwTTov, Sacfiovcav ti.A o>r ^Xdne.v, ?, n) Ai'a
IMng being, or a toe, and neglect the whole man, a
wonderful sight to see; or, really, to ignore the rest
15 SaVuAw Ktahhoffi^8aJrS^oodd.^'“”“®^ ■■ Aa^oWa oodd.
1 Cp. Plato, Lam X. 903B-C.
5°
SI
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2. ON PKOVIDENCE (I)
ra aAAa f<«a a<f>els r6 eireX^ararov Xafi^dvoc. rj of living beings and pick out the meanest ; or to pass
TO oAo. napel,, oTov r6 dvdpd,nov. Q.paiJv over the whole race, say, of men and bring
^.aovayo.. 'End oS. r6 yev6p.evov 6 .6apl, Thersites. Since, then, what has come into being
is the whole universe, if you contemplate this, you
oavf,nas. rovrou Occ^pCov rdya 5. d/coo'oa., might hear it say, “ A god made me, and ^
yap avTov, <^s «ip^ nenoir,,<e 6e6s Kdycb ^KeWev him perfect above all living things, and complete m
^y€vop.r,v reXeios eV ndvrcov Kat i^avds myself and self-sufficient, lacking nothing, because all
epayr<p Ka. airdp^s odBevds h^6p,evos, or. ndvra things are in me, plants and animals and the nature
of afl things that have come into being, and many
eiMH Km <j>vra Kal C^a Kal av/^ndvrcov rwv gods, and populations of spirits, and good souls and
fvm, Kal Oeol noXXol Kal Smi^.co, men who are^ happy in their virtue. It is not true
Swoi /cat r/wyac dyaffal Kal du0pojnoc dp.rfj E the earth is adorned with all plants and every
evSac^^oves. Ov ydp yij K,K6ap.r,rac ^vr2 “ i „to.l, ««i Ih. po«» of »»1 h.3 ra^hed to
the sea, but all the air and aether and the whole
7 ^^''^oSanoLs Kal p^iyp, QaXdrrr^s heaven is without a share of soul; but up there are
l^de Svvaf^ts. a^p ^^1 aW^p Kal all good souls, giving hfe to the stars and to the
ovpavos avfinas dpocpos, dXX' eVet ^vyal welhordered everlasting circuit of the ^eavep^, which
ayaOa. naam, aVrpot, ScSovaac Kal rrj in imitation of Intellect wisely circks Itself ^
30 evraKrcp ovpavov Kal d.hl<p nep.^>opa .ov centre for ever; for it seeks .f
Everything in me seeks after the Good, tat eacft
KVKX<pJ,epo^,^r, c/x^poVco? n,pl rairXv dd- odUv attata it in proportion to its own power; for the whole
yap efco Ildvra rd d dpol ^<f,Urac t,kv heaven depLds on it, and the whole of my soul, and
rov ayaOov rvyydvet ^ard Sdvapcv eWcor the gods in my parts, and all ammals and plants and
whatever there is in me Qf there is anything) which
35 ^T7™: P'^'' ^VtVou,
is thought to be without life. And some things appear
^aaa Se^^ oi d p,ip,mv ipoZs 6eoi. to participate only in being, others m hfe, others more
Km ra ftpa Se ,ra.ra Kal ^vrd Kal d rt d^vyov fully in hfe in that they have ®®’^®77eSthe
So/cy ehm cV if.oL Kal rd rov dvm othLs at the next stage have reason, and otheis thf
fuUness of life. One must not demand equal grfts
TZ ^7"’ T f ™ P-S^ov dv. r& in things which are not equal. It, is not the finge
a^aSm. rd Sd rjSr, Xdyov .a .Saal
Ciorjv. Ov yap ra ,aa dnacreZv Sd rot? Zorns'

52. and XII. 967A-D.

S3
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
TO^o, SaW^ 8^ i»o, ri ,W. ot^ IJi
Kdi TO (XVTOV €)^€1>V,» ' ‘
^ 4. nOp 8J et’ {nr6 ^Saro? o^ivvvraL Kal ^repov
v^o Trvpos^eecperac, p,-rj 6av,j.dar,s. Ka2 ydp els
oAAo avro Tjyayev. oi,K dydiv airov
vjr aXXov eiOaprj, Kal ^XOe hk els r6 et.ac in'
5a;aov ^9opas Ka. ^ <f,9opd Sk air^ oiSi^ i something else, and. its own corresponding destruc­
<^0apeWos nvp6s
■nvp xiAAo yap da<o,uiTw aipavG eVaaro.
l^vet, ey Se rcpSe rw oipaydi nay p.ky del Kal
oaa rc^^a Ka. Kdpca ^dpr,, ai Sk d^^el^lvaac
10 tT' «S« y^V-:^ac.
lO/cat omv Se Svyrjrac. e^w yeykaews araaa ipvxh
H-^a rr,s^ naarjs iarl ^yrjs. ^dp,ara Sk KaJ
e^os Kat Kad ^ oXa hcaara, elnep 4^ airdiy Kal
Qfpa earai Kai rpa^rjaerai- ^coX ydp kvravQa
>«.yovp.e^, eKet Sk dKtyrjros. "ESei Sk Klyrjacy k^
dKcyyaias ecyac Kai 4k rys 4y airj} TX,y e’f
15 avrrjs yeyoyeya. dXXrjy, cloy 4p.nyiovaay k1 oil
<^rpe^vaay l:o>^ydyanyoXty rijs i,pep^ia^s oiaay.
Se ec? a^^Aa ayayKalat ai eVt^eW Kal
^eopat- ovSe yap acSca kylyero. 'Eyiyero Sk, Src
Xoyos ^aaay vXr,y KareXdf^^aye Kal elyey eV a:5r^
SirJhKe S
air! beings in them: I^IV
living and'®
to grow as long as the^ a^‘
ff
54
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
business to see, but this is the eye’s function, and the
finger’s is something else, to be essentially finger
and to have what belongs to it.” ., j,
4. But do not be surprised if fire is extinguished by
water and something eke is destroyed by For
something else brought it.into existence; it did not
bring itself and was then destroyed by something
else? and it came to being by the destruction ot
tion, if it comes, would bring nothing terrible to it,
and there is another fire in place of the fire which was
destroyed. For the incorporeal heaven, each in­
dividual part persists, but in this heaven here the
whole lives for ever and all the noble and important
parts, but the souls, changing their bodies, appear now
in one form and now in another, and also, when it
can, a soul takes its place outside the process of
becbming and is with the universal soul. Bo^es
live by species, and individual bodies as far as they
are wLles,i if living things both come from them a.nd
are to be nourished by them; for hfe is in motion
here, but unmoved There. Motion had to come from
stillness, and from the Ufe which remains in itself
there had to come the life which proceeds from it,
which is different, like a life breathing and stirnng
which is the respiration of that hfe at rest. The
attacks of hving beings on each other, and their
destruction of each other, are necessary; they^d
not come into existence to Hve for ever. They
came into existence because'the forniative P«naple
took hold of the whole of matter and had m itself all
structure of the earth, but to stop growing when they are cut
away from it.
55
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2..
*.)
6^cov airav eW eV r<3 a'vco oipavco-
TTotiev yap av ^Xde p.rj ovtwv e/cet; ’AvOpcLTraiv Se
€L9^an-/,Xovs ahcKiai p,kv &v atrla^ Uemy
rov ayaeov, dSwa/aia rov rvy^iv a<f>aXX6pLevoi
€7t aXXovs rpinovrai. ’'laxovm hk dS.KOvvres
bys KaKvv6p,evo, rats rf^vyaXs hepydais KaKla,
rarrovra. re ek rSnov yeipova- od ydp p.-^nore
eK^vyp ^i^Zkv rX rayd'ev eV rep rov TravrXs
Eari Sk ov Sed rr)v dra^iav rd^is ovSk
bia^rr,u avopMv vdpos. w? ns oterae, Iva yivoero
eKeiva Siard yeipev Kal tva 4,alvoero, dXXd hid
rTjv raiiv eTTaKrXv odaav. Kal Sn rd^is, dra^ia,
30 Kai hia rov vofwv Kal rdv Xdyov, Kal Sn Xdyos.
■7Tapavofj.la Kal dvoia od rwv ^eXndvcov rd yelpw
■TTeTToi-rjKdrwv, tiAAA rwv hkyeadai Seopkvcov rd
ai^cvco <f>vaei rij kavredv ^ avvrvyla Kal KcvXdaei
aXX^v Seiaadai od SeSvvrjpkvcvv. Td ydp inaKrdj
XMl^ov rd^ei rovro dv od rdxoi ^ 8t* adrd nap'
35 avrov r, 8t aXXo nap' dXXov noXXd Sk dn' dXxL
iraaxei Kal dKovroyv redv noiodvrcov Kal npds dXXo
lifievevv. Ta Se St’ adrd e^ovra i kIvtiolv adre^od‘-
acov Ctpa ^e'noi dv Srk fzkv npds rd ^eXrUo, drk hk
^pos ra xejp^. H^v Zk npds rd x^pev rpon^v
Trap avrov ^rjreXv taojs oXk d^cov dXXyr, ydp
Theodoretus: X^ovreav codd.
I.e. Epicurus (cp. Usener, Epicurea 530 ff.).
56
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
living things, because they all exist There, in t^
upper heaven; for where could they have come fro
Kerdid Aot exist There? The cause of the
wrongs men do to one another might be their effort
towards the Good; when they fail through their
impotence to attain it, they turn against other men.
But the wrongdoers pay the penalty, being corrupted
fn thehloulsV their works of ivickedness, and are
Tet in a lower Vei/or nothing -n -er escape
that which is ordained in the law of the All. But
order does not exist because of
cause of lawlessness, as someone thinks, that these
good things may exist and be manifested because of
the worse ones; but disorder and lawlessness exist
because of order, which is imposed from outside.
It is because there is order that disorder exists, and
on account of the law and formative rei^on, just
because it is reason, that there is transgression of the
law and folly; not that the better things produce the
worse, but the things which ought
better are unable to do so because of their otvn
nSure or because of some chance circumstance or
hindrance from others. For when something has its
order from outside it may fail to coreespond to it
either of its own accord and from itself or because of
and impelled by something else; and many thm^
are affected by others when those which act on them
do not intend to do so and are aiming at something
else. But living beings which have of themselves a
movement under their oivn control imght indme
sometimes to what is better, sometimes to what is
worse. It is probably not worth enquiring into the
reason for this self-caused turning towards the worse,
57
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
Sj auWcrr. ^al | ^^dyK^llnZlfa^'^l^aCapl^Z
e?yaarar°Srio™a/£''° oT§’"ljf
6. E. ^ac ^vyaT, eV rǤe r/navrl
ot :4r“L'4of 11/’ '4r-'
«S7n4 6,? aOAa aper^S Trpoleirat. KaJ 47.wz:
nlirfiT? 7“- 7 s<*4
llewa^ 4 Kacvoam roTs fikv dyadoX, odSdu. role
^ aKois ovp,(])opa- ^ Kal dvdyKr) vooeXv erwaara
10 rho / ^ <^vfxnX-qpcoG(,v rov SXov. 'Q? yda
10 </>dape.r^,^ 6 X6yos 6 .rov na.r6, ^aZJl
Zr dXXcOV-odBiv yJp
vdap,r, €K<j>ivyei ro vtt6 rodrov KaraXapi^dveoelZ
ovr<v Kac KaK<vdevro5 a^p.aros Kal fiSLidOeiavs
tt7? ra. Toiavra Traoxovar^s ra ® voaois
/cat /ca/cta KaraXr\4>04vra VTreRX'nfiJ ^ where escapes its grip-so, when a
- /- ^ “^Toiy awdvevK^
TOC, rradovaev, ocou nevia Kal udao,. ^ Si Kalla
58
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
for a deviation which is slight to begin ^th, as it
goes on in this way continually makes the fault mder
and graver; and the body is there too, and, neces-
sarill, its lust. And the first beginning, the sudden
imnulse if it is overlooked and not immediately
cormeted, even produces a settled choice o^hat into
which one has fallen. Punishment certainly follows,
and it is not unjust that someone who has come to be
this sort of person should suffer the consequences of
his condition; people must not demand to be well off
who have not done what deserves well-being. Only
the good are well off; that, too, is what gives the
gods their well-being. , , ii
^ 5. If, then, it is possible for souls to be well off i
this All, we must not blame the place i[some are no
well off, but their own incapacity, m that they hav
not been able to take a noble part in the cutest for
which the prizes of virtue are offered. Why is it
disconcerting if men who have not become godlike
do not have a .godlike life? And poverty, too, and
sickness, are nothing to the good, but advantageous
to the bad; and men must fall sick if they have
bodies. And even these troubles are not altogether
without usefulness for the co-ordmation and comple­
tion of the whole. For, just as when ®
destroyed the formative principle of the All uses
them for the generation of others—for nothing any­
and a soul enfeebled by suffering something df this
kind, what has been seized upon by sicknesses and
vice is subjected to another chain of causation and
another ordering. And some troubles are profitable
to the sufferers themselves, poverty and sickness for
59
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
elpydaar6 rc xPVOCf,ov ds r6 SXov ^apdS.cyaa
bcKr], yevof,,vr] Kal ^oXXd airij,
rrapaaxop,evr]. Kai yap eyprjyoporas eTrolrjae ml
vovv^ Kai avveoiv iydp^a novr,plas. d^ols dvnrar-
^Orpixevcov. Kai laavOdveiv hk noid otov dya96v
ap,^ jrapaedci KaK&v &v oi novTjpol kyova.
Eat ov yeyope rd KaKa Sid ravra. dAA’ Sn
Xp-qrai Kai airols els Se'ov, i-rrel-nep kyivero,
eipyai. Tovro Se Swdfxeojs ixeylcTqs, KaXcds Kai
rois KaKOis xpfjcrOai Sdvad6ai Kai rotj dp.6pd>ois
25y^.ot, eis iripas ,,op4>ds xP^^dai lKad,v
ehai. OXws Se ro KaKdv kXXeujjw dyadov deriov
avayKrj Se eXXeufjiv elvai evravda dyadov, on ev
aXXip.^ To oSy dXXo. eV cS e'crn rd dyaddv, krepov
ayadov ov swifi n^v kXXe4iv rovro ydp oiK
30 dnoXdoeai rd KaKd. Sn
re oMa aXXojv eXarrco rrpds dyadov <f>vcnv erepd
re r^a ^ rov dyadov rrjv alrlav rijs vnoardoews
^ yevdpieva rep ndppcj.
J. h(OOi,
epavXoi Se ra evavrla, rd p,kv Xeyeiv cos ovSev
KO.KOV rip dyadcp ovS' a5 rip ^avXcp dyaddv dpdws
pev Xeyerar dXXd Sid rL rd fckv napd Aiioiv
rovry, ra Se Kard <f>dqw rq, rTOvr,pip; Uids ydp
xaXws vepeiv oiirco; ’AAA’ et’ rS Kard ejodoiv oi
2 Theodoretus: cyetpai codd,
•------------------TaAAg Theiler: aAAa codd.
often-repeated quotation from Plato, Theaetetus
176A5, one of the cardinal texts of Plotinian Neoplatonism.
6o
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
instance, and vice works something useful to the
whole by becoming an example of just punishinen ,
and also of itself it offers much that is of use. Fo
™ak. »d -to up “t
understanding of those who are opposed to the ways
"Sedness" and makes us learn ^
is by comparison ivith the evils of which the wicked
have a share. And evils did not come into existence
for these reasons, but we have explained *1^*, when
they have come into existence,
cinle uses even them to meet a need. Ibis belong
to the greatest power, to be able to use even
evil nobly and to he strong enough to use *'"8®
have beeome shapeless for making other shapes. In
sereralTmust define evil as a faffing short of good;
Ld there must be a faffing short of good ^
because the good is in something else Ibis some
thTn^else then, in which the good is, sinee it is othei
han good, prXees the falhng short; for it is not
Innd ® Therefore “ evils will not be done away
with," 1 because some things are less
comnarison with the nature of good, and the other
Ss wWch have the cause of their existence from
ffie Go^d are different from- the Good and have
Certainly become-the sort of things they are becaus .
As frr^Sle gettog not deserve,
whtn the good get whatl bad and the bad the op-
;Ste!frcorrL to say that nothing is bad fot he
good man and nothing, to
Ld one; but why do things against nature come
the good, and things according to nature to tn
wicked? How can this be right distribution? But
OI
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
ON PROVIDENCE <I)
^oceX ■npooBi^^yjv np6s t6 .iSacpopecv oiS’ aS '
if what is according to nature brings no addition to
well-being, nor, correspondingly, does that which as
contrary to nature take away anything of *e evil
which is in the bad, what does it matter whether it is
10 l^eu
’AAAdKaAo£
r^5 ro acoua n 6e aca^po^
o > < 0't dyaBSs.
, °
this way or that? Just as it does not matter 11 the
, , -npeTTov Kai dvdXoyov Kal rd bad man is beautiful in body and the other, the good
«.»<.» 5, ij,, s A ofc ,W s"
man, is ugly. But that other way, which is not the
’!*'• ,K“i ««; Lao“ .^ri' wav things are now, would be proper and P™P°’‘"
oeoTTOTas etvaL rovs df donate and according to merit; and that wou d e
the way of the best providence. Then, again, it is
-f.vo^. 7 offi. rf^o.. .i not proper that the good should be slaves and the
others masters, and that the wicked should be rulers
of cities and decent men their slaves, even if these
circumstances add nothing to the possession of good
or evil. Then, too, a wicked ruler might do the most
lawless things; and the bad get the upper hand in
wars, and what erimes they commit when they ha,ve
« V7p(}j T(J dXov BAdnecy S^T il Z77./7
' ™ taken prisoners! All these things cause perplexity
about how they can happen if there is a providence.
ciAAd Kal rd pidpr] 6obL
20 S/oiATi a73r<3 ,r«,' ^ rarret^ eV For even if someone who is intending to make some­
thing must look to the whole, yet all the. ssme.it is
^cov. er^JLr'T' rr right for him to set the parts where they ought to be,
especially when they are beings -with souls, and have
life or are even rational; and providence ought to
reach everything, and its task ought to-be just this,
to leave nothing neglected. If, then, we say t^s
All depends on Intellect, and that the power of in­
e/caara rourwv /caAo)? e\'6i. ' tellect has extended to all things, we must try to
7. UpdiToy roLyvv Xr^-nrioy cLs rd KaXA. ' - show in what way each of them is excellently isposed.
S ^a,„r. „-7ri 7 First, then, we must understand that those who
are looking for excellence in what is mixed must not
' «" -?> J*.., ;,,8- *, demand all that excellence has in the unmixed, nor
look for things of the first order among those ot the
62
63
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
T ON PROVIDENCE (I)
^fjrelv ra TrpZra, dXX’ ineiSri /cat awfjLa eyu
5 avyxcopjtv Kat napd rodrov tVmt ds t6 7rav,
anacrdv Se ■napd. tov X6yov, oaov Svvaro Beiaadai
TO iXLyp.a, d ix-qBkv rovrov e’AAetVet- otov, d Ttj
ea/coTret r6v dvOpconov t'ov aladyjrdv 5art? k6.X\io-
Tos,^ ovK S.V Srjnov rw eV vw dvdpcoTrco rj^icoae tov
avTov dvac, dXX ^Kelvo dnoSeSdxeai.‘ro€ novorov.
10 6t o^cc/j aap^l Kal vedpois Kal dardoLs Svra
KaTeXaPe T<p X6y<p, cSare /cat ravra KoXXvvai Kal
TOV Xoyov BovyjO'^vai. iiravOdv ^ rfj vXrj. Taura
TOivvv d7To6dfj.evov XPV -rTpoiivat t6 iv^evOev eVc
Ta em^Yovfieva- rdxa ydp dv eV rot/'rotj tB
tiavimoTov dvevpoifiev rrjs -npovolas Kal tw
15 Svvafieojs, nap' oS iniarrj to ndv. roSe. ’'Oaa
IX€V oSv dpya i/iox^v, S. Sf, iv airats tVraTat raty
^pyaCoi^vai? rd x^lpco. olov Saa /ca/ca2 ^t/vai
aAAay e^Xaipav Kal oaa dAArjAa? at /ca/cat, el av
Kai TOV KaKas dAcoy amds etvai to npovoovv
atrt^To, anaLTetv Xdyov odSd edddvas npoadiKei
20 <<atTta eXop.4vov » StSoWay etp^rat ydp ori
ebei /cat ifivyds /ctt-TjVety ot’/cet'ay dyeiv Kal Sti oi
•pvxai fidvov. dXXd Cva vBr,, Kal Si) Kal oiBdv
eav/aaoTov ovaas 6 eloiv dKoXovdov plov eyeiv
oiBk ydp, STi KdcTfios ^v, iXrjXddamv, dAAA np6
Koaixov t6 Kdap,ov etvai etyov Kal inipieXeiadai
^ iiravOetv Theiler: cVavcAte oodd.
64,
second, but, since they also have a body, one must
admit that something comes from it to the All, and
demand from the rational forming principle only as
much as the mixture can receive, if nothing of it is
deficient; for instance, if someone was looking for the
most beautiful man that we can perceive by our
senses he would not, presumably, expect him to be
the same as the man in Intellect, but would be
satisfied with what his maker had done if he had so
dominated him, even though he was held in flesh and
sinews and bones, by the formative principle, that he
made these material things beautiful, and the for­
mative principle was able to come into flower upon
the matter. So, then, we must take these principles
as the basis of our discussion, and go on from there to
our enquiries; for perhaps we may discover in them
the wonder of providence and of the power from which
this All came into existence. Now, as far as all the
works of souls are concerned, those, that is, which
remain within the souls which do wrong, for instance,
the harm evil souls do to others and the harm they
do to each other, unless one is to blame the pro­
vidential power for their being bad at all, one has no
proper reason for demanding an account or a reckon­
ing from it, as one admits that “ the blame lies with
the chooser”;^ for it has already been said that
souls must have their own movements, and that they
are not only souls but also already [composite] living
beings, and that there is nothing surprising if, being
what they are, they have a hfe corresponding with
their nature; for they have not come into the Uni­
verse because it existed but before the universe they
had it in them to belong to the universe, and to cafe
^5
VOL. III. D
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
^riretv rA np&ra, dAA’ eV«S^ Kal lv«,
6 avyxcopjcu Kal nap^ rov'rov tVm. el, r6 L
airairew 8e irap8. rod X6yov, Saov iSdvaro Se'^aa^ai
TO ixtyp.a,^ eL^p,7]Sev rovrov eAAetVef otov, el nj
6o-/co77€t rov ^Vdpoi-TTOV r6v alaOr^rXv Sotls KdXka-
^os. ovK av Srprovra eV v<3 dvdpc^Trw -Ij^lojoe r6v
aoTW ehac, aXX eKecvo dTroSeSiyeac rov nocrjrov,
10 ec opco, e^aapic ^al vedpot, Kai dardo,, Sura
KareXaPe rep Xoyw, dSare Kal ravra KaXXvvde ,<al
TOP Xoyop SvvTjeijpai dTravdetu ^ rfj vXrj. Tavra
rotwv vnoOepevov yp^ rrpoievai ro evreWev em
ra errcCYovpeva- rdya ydp Sip e'p rodroc, rS
Oavfw.orop apedpoijiep rrjs rrpopolas Kal rijs
8vpap,eojs, nap oil dnearr] ro nap, roSe. "Oaa
ovp ^ya 4,vxd>p, d ip adrals lararae raC,
IPTfo^vai, rd yeipeo. olop Soa KaKal ^evyai
aXXa, e^Xaisap Kal Saa dXX^Xa, at KaKal. eAx
Kae rov ^a/ca? oXco, adrds etpai rS npopoovp
avreepro, ana^re^ Xdyov odU edOdpa, npoadjKee
^0<<acrea .Xopipov » SeSdpra,- elprjrac ydp Sre
ebet Kai t/ivyas Kcprjaei, olKelas iy^w Kal Sri od
^vyai fiopop, aXXd ^epa ■qbrj, Kal Srj Kal odSep
Oavpaaroy ovoa, S etaip dKdXovOop ^Iop Syeip-
ovbe yap, ^ on Kdapo, ^p, iXrjXdeaaip. dXXd npS
Koerpov TO Koafxov ehai elyop Kal impieXetadai
* €7rav9fiv Theiler: cVawA0«v codd.
64
ON PKOVIDENCE (I)
second, but, since they also have a. body, one naust
admit that something comes from it to the All, and
demand from the rational forming principle only as
much as the mixture can receive, if nothing of it is
deficient: for instance, if someone was looking for the
most beautiful man that we can perceive by our
senses he would not, presumably, expect him to be
the same as the man in Intellect, but would be
satisfied with what his maker had done if he had so
dominated him, even though he was held in flesh and
sinews and bones, by the formative principle, that he
made these material things beautiful, and the for­
mative principle was able to come into flower upon
the matter. So, then, we must take these principles
as the basis of our discussion, and go on from there to
our enquiries; for perhaps we may discover in them
the wonder of providence and of the power from which
this All came into existence. Now, as far ^ all the
works of souls are concerned, those, that is, which
remain within the souls which do wrong, for ins'tance,
the harm evil souls do to others and the harm they
do to each other, unless one is to blame the pro­
vidential power for their being bad at all, one has no
proper reason for demanding an account or a reckon­
ing from it, as one admits that the blame lies with
the chooser”:^ for it has already been said that
souls must have their own movements, and that they
are not only souls but also already [composite] living
beings, and that there is nothing surprising if, being
what they are, they have a life corresponding with
their nature; for they have not come into the uni­
verse because it existed but before the universe they
had it in them to belong to the universe, and to care
'65
VOL. III. °
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
25 Kal ^tardvai Kal BioiKdv Kal noietv oW rpoVoj.
etre ^eardiaai Kal StSofJaai rt Trap’ air&v e?re !
Kariovaai ehe at pkv ovrws, at S’ ovrcos- oi
yapdv rd vvv -rrepl rodrcov, dXK’ Sri, Sttcos tto't’
flA ’^o'^'^ois oi piepTrriov.
AAA orav TrpSs rod? iuavrtovs r^v TrapdOeaiv
30TOJV KO.K&V ri, e.copfj, Tre'vTjras dyaBoi, Kal
■novrppovs TrXovatovs Kal TrXeoveKrovvras eV oly
Set dvepiLirovs ovras rovs x^^povs Kal
Kparovvras, Kal iavrcav Kal rd Sdvr, Kal rdy
P-v i^xp<- yfjs 4>edvei;
A^o raw dXXcov ywop.ivoiv Adyw piaprvpiov
S5 rovro Kal p,4ypi yij^ iVmt- Kal ydp Cwa Kal
M I?P-craXap.^dvu.
AXXa <j>6dvovaa oi KpareZ; ’AAAd Cc6ov ivSs
ovras rov rravrSs Sfwiov dv yivoiro, d rty/ce^aA^v
1Mev avOpcSTTOv Kal rrpdacoTrov SttS <f>dcrecos Kal
Xoyov yLveaQai Xeyoi Kparovvros, ro Se Xonrov
40 a^ais dvaddr, alrtais. rdyais dvdyKais, Kal
favXa Sid rovro Si’ dSvva(.tav 4>daeays yeyove'vai.
AAA odS^ Saiov odS’ edae^is dvSdvras rcS
^oAtSj ravra Syeiv Karapiiprj>eaeai rep Troi^^ri.
8. AoittSv S-t) ^rjreZv S^n KaXws ravra, Kal <Ls
ra^eevs ^erdy.i, ^ STrr, pii^. "H od ,caKd)y.
avros T] ^(pov ra p,ev ava>, Trpoaayna Kal
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
fnr it and bring it into existence and direct it, and,
in one way or another, to make it, either by staying
above it Jnd giving something of
coming down, or some m this way and some in that,
for J are not concerned with this in our present
discussion; what concerns us is that, however this
may be, providence ought not to be blamed for the
doings of souls. But what if one considers the com­
parative distribution of evils to inen of opposite
Laracter, that the good are poor and the wicked are
rich, and the bad have more than their share of the
things which those who are human beings must have
and are masters, and peoples and cities b® ° g
them? Is it, then, because providence does not
Jeach'as far as the earth? But the fact that the
other things happen in a rational pattern is evidence
that it reaches *e earth
share in reason and soul and hfe. Does it, then,
reach the earth, but not have full control here ? But,
since the All is a single living being, thp
as if someone were to say that a man s bead and
face had been produced by nature and a rational
forming principle in full control, but should attribute
the rest of the body to other causes—chances or
necessitie^and should say that they were inferior
productions'either because of this or because of the
Fncompetence of nature. But it « “®i*er Pious oy
reverent to censure the work by admitting that these
lower parts are not excellently disposed.
8. So it remains to enquire ih what way these are
excellently arranged, and how they have a share m
order, and in what way not. Certainly they are not
arranged badly. The upper parts of every living
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
Ke<j)a\^, KaXXicu, rd Se ,,/rTr.
dvdpCxJTTOI. 8e cV uioiO Ka) '
5 /cat ot €1/ adrcS Oeor\at rd^T-
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
' /
thing, the face and head, are more beautiful, .and the
odparoj middle and lower parts are not equal to them; but
men are in the middle and below, and above are
heaven and the gods in it; and the greatest part of
the universe is gods and all the heaven round about
if but the earth is like a central point even in com­
parison with only one of the starsd Unrighteousness
in men causes surprise, because people expect man
to be the really valuable part in the All, because there

57oAAot. OtTkrAr ‘;f„v T'’ °‘ °‘ ~

eccrtj^, oi
is nothing wiser. But the fact is that man has the
middle place between gods and beasts, and inclines
now one way, now the other, and some men become
Aafcrat- oFS sSrL "" like gods and others like beasts, and some, the
W xparov.ralye 7l%7 majority, are in between. Those, then, who are
corrupted, so that they come near to irrational
15 etat ;^et>o«/j tcaJ ad™i7ai ot5« X' p^
animals and wild beasts, pull down those in the mi(Wle
and do them violence; these are certainly better than
doK-jaavres akv 17 those who assault them, but all the same they are
a^raLt/at'a. Wrl“ IT""’
mastered by the worse men, in so far as they are
/c/zarotc. rk 7Jre IT'" worse themselves too, and are not [really] good, and
TreiTaSevudvcov Kal rn to? if/vyas have not prepared themselves not to suffer wrongs;
20 rd i^dT77T T7T 7^T -- If some boys, who have kept their bodies in good
ai;rwv ra a^/,a Xap.pdvoicv, rl civ t6 training, but are inferior in soul to their bod%
condition because of lack of education, win a wrestle
" i APS H-.SS- ,5 oodd.
with others who are trained neither in body or soul
and grab their food and their dainty clothes, would
ance of the earth in lavage o"stonrTrf “ ^import-
from Aristarchus of Samos onCdrc?^ astronomers parallels. Cicero Somnium Scipionis 8 and 12 may also be
2)t^ta»cea 0/ «As Sun and MTsZ'nfZ compared, though the earth here iS only insignificantly small,
/cat /fcj^rpou Ao'yoi/ foijf^eiov not “ a point ”). Geocentric cosmology did not lead the
its use as a theme of moral and Si ^^o.ipav. Por ancient astronomers and philosophers to a man-centred view
home the insignificance of m ”^ ^¥1^ to bring of the universe, an exaggerated view of man s importance in
see Marcus Aurelius IV. 3 3 /¥ *^®A^orthIessness of famf the scheme of things. It led them rather to stress his small­
commentary, Vol. II, p.’ggg ^^Ooharson in his ness, insignificance and lowly position in the cosmic oruer, as
«8 ’ ooheoted a number of
Plotinus does here.
69
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAt) III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)
^ opSov Kal ri,
the affair be anything but a joke ? Or would it not
s4 Tat'”' be right for even the lawgiver to allow them to sutler
this as a penalty for their laziness and luxury, these
boys, who, though they were assigned training-
grounds, because of laziness and soft and slack hving
allowed themselves to become fattened lambs, the
ra™ ™»S,; IZ J’sf' To« 5i prey of wolves ? But those who do these things are
punished, first by being wolves and ill-fated mep;
r™rTtT-‘'“'
€<mj eWafitf
S/~
TOloi/roy?- oi; ydp
and then as well there lies before them what people
like this are destined to suffer; it does not come to a
stop when they have become bad here and die;
every time the rational and natural consequences
"oLfw;arfl rLZa-°''' s"' follow what has gone before,-worse for the worse, but
better for the better. But this sort of thing has
nothing to do with wrestling-schools; what happens
IZaT > / ^atSco,. aer<J there is play. For if both our sets of boys grew
bigger with their folly, then they would have to gird
themselves and take weapons, and it would be a
Lp aw ofLrs": finer sight than if one gave them wrestling exercise;
but as things are, one set are unarmed, and those
gj. .V .oAw iro' c^:frv2£wr who are armed get the mastery. Here it would not
be right for a god to fight in person for the unwarlike;
OV/C €WVO/i<rLfni.^-. ^>S^' \ r b^pc/^uus-j the law says that those who fight bravely, not those
who pray, are to come safe out of wars; for, in
the same way, it is not those who pray but those who
ZoZr" "I r‘Voi:^o look after their land who are to get in a harvest, and
those who do not look after their health are not to be
healthy; and we are not to be vexed if the bad get
larger harvests, or if their farming generally goes
better. Then again, it is ridiculous for people to do
everything else in life according to their own ideas,
“ ’’from |66A4*°Ep^^ 176D-177A:
commonplace (IV. 1. 127) is, however, closer to the present
.f- O O0DA4, Jipictetus’s version of this
7° passage than anything in Plato.
71
 PLOTINUS:. ENNEAD HI. 2.
jarrcoacv, f, Oeots <t>iXa, a4>Cea6a. 8^ ,,6.ov
i5de<vv ovSe ravra Trocpjaavras, Sc’ cLv K.Xeriovow
avrovj oc deoc acLC^adac. Kal roivvv ol ddvaroc
avrocs^ P,Xrcovs ^ r6 odrco Cdivra, dvac oVcor
^r,v avrovs^o^K mXovacv ot eV ro) navrl v6aoc-
coore ra^v ^.avrCcov ycvof^ivcov. elp^vr,s eV dvoiac,
Kac KaKcacs Trdaacs ivXarTopcivrjs, dpceXws dv
^Oeoxe ra npovocas icLayjs Kparecv Syrens rd xelpcv
Apxovac 8e KaKol dpxop,4vcoy dvaySpia- tovto
y0.p OtKCUOV^ OVK €K€LVO,
9 Od ydp 8^ odreo T^iv Trpdvocav dvac Sec, c3are
l^fev yjp.as ehac. lidvra 8k odarjs irpovolas Kal
l^oyv. avrij, odS’ dy eirp riyo, ydp dy kre el-n;
.AXXa ^oyoy ay e^ rd decay. Toi;ro Kal yvu
^<^jc- >eacnp6,^ dXXo Sk dX^XvBey. oiy ha dyiXr,
TO aAAo, aAA emoyre oloy dydpdjTrcp ^y in’ avrd
rqpovaa ray dyOpevnoy dyra- rovro Si iarc yduL
^poyocas Cd>yra, S 8^ iarc npdrroyra Saa 6 ydaos
avrrjsXeyec. Aiyec Si rocs fiiy dyadocs yeyopci-
vacs ayadoy^ ^coy ioeodac Kal Kecadac Kal els
varepov, rocs Si kokocs rd iyayrea. Kokovs Si
yeyoixevovs d^covy dXXovs airwy acorrjpas etyac
^^Tovs npoefMeyovs od depcerdv edyw ^ocovp.iycvy
?r4“et“3U
conden^nation of the unintelligent
72
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
even if they are not doing it in the way which the
gods hke, and then be merely saved by the gods
without even doing the things by means of which the
gods command them to save themselves.^ And
certainly death is better for them than to stay living
in a way in which the universal laws do not want
them to live; so that if the opposite happened, and
peace was preserved in every sort of folly and vice,
providence would be neglecting its duty in allowing
the worse really to get the upper hand. But the
wicked rule by the cowardice of the ruled; for this is
just, and the opposite is not.
9. Providence ought not to exist in such a way as
to make us nothing. If everything was providence
and nothing but providence, then providence would
not exist; for what would it have to provide for?
There would be nothing but the divine. But the
divine exists also as things are; and has come to
something other than itself, not to destroy the other
but, when a man, for instance, comes to it, it stands
over him and sees to it that he is man; that is, that
he hves by the law of providence, which means
doing everything that its law says^ But it says that
those who have become good shall have a good life,
now, and laid up for them hereafter as well, arid the
wicked the opposite. But it is not lawful for those
who have become wicked to demand others to be
their saviours and to sacrifice themselves in answer to
people who expect the gods to intervene to get them out of
troubles into which they have got themselves by ignormg the
divinely established laws of nature and of human life; an
intelligent Christian would have no difBculty m agreemg with
it.
73
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
ov jolvvv ov8e deovs avriov dpxeiv ra KadeKaara |
a<f>^Tas rov eavruiv ^lov ovM ye rovs dvSpas tov;
ayadovs. d^ov ^Lov Cdjvras rov dpy^s dvdpcomvqs
15 df^ivo), Tovrovs avToiv dpyovras etvai- inel oi8’
aiirot irrep^Xrieriadv rrore, ottcos dpyovres dyadol
yevoivro rdiv dXXcov, ottcos airols (eS) 1 ^ imp,eXor5-
f^evoi, dXXd <f>eovovcrw. idv ns dyados nap' avrov
^vrjrai- enei nXelovs dv eyevovro dyadol, el rovrovs 1
20 enoiovvro npoardras. Tevopievot rolvvv Ccpov ovk
dpiarov, oAAd p,eor]v rd^iv eyov Kal eXopLevov,
oficos iv (L KeXraL roncp vno npovolas ovk icopuevov
anoXeadai, dXXd dva<j,epopLevov del irpos rd dvco
navroiais p-7]xdvais, ats ro deXov ypijrat emKparea-
repav dpepv noiovv, oiK dndiXeae ro XoyiKov
26 eXvai^ ro dvdpwmvov yevos, dXXd pLereyov, el Kal !
aKpcos, ean Kal ao(f>las Kal vov Kal rexyr^s \
Kal SiKaioavv7)s, rfjs yovv npos dXX-^Xovs eKaaroi-
Kat, ovs aSiKovm Se', olovrac SiKalevs ravra noieLv
etvai ydp d^lovs. Ovrw KaXov eariv dvOpamos
rToit]p,a, oaov Svvarai koXov etvai. Kal mw^avdev
30 els rd ndv p,oipav exei rcbv dXXcvv C(p(vv oaa enl
' <€5> Beutler.
^ See note on previous chapter.
T’iu seem at first sight to contradict Plato’s teaching
abouUhe duty of the philosopher to “ go down again into thi
cave and rule the city {Hepublic VII. 619C-521A). But
m fact, Plato makes it quite clear that philosophers in ordinary
unreformed states have no such duty (520A-B). It is only in
74
ON PKOVIDENCE (I)'
their prayers 1 nor, furthermore, to require gods to
SrTctVir affairs in detail, laying aside then o^
|
life, or, for that matter, good men, who live another
I
life better than human rule, to be their rukjs ,
I they themselves have never taken any trouble to see
I that there should be good rulers of the rest of i^n-
kind, who would care that it should 'veil mth
them, but they are envious if anyone naturally be
comes good by himself; for more people would have
become good if they had made the good their leaders.
sLce, then, men are not the best of living creatures
but the human species occupies a middle position,
and has chosen it, yet all the same is
providence to perish in the place where f™
is always being hfted up to the higher regions by all
sorts of devices which the divine uses to give virtue
the greater power, mankind has not lost its character
of bling rational but is a participant even ^ ^ot to
the highest degree, in wisdom and intellect and sk .,
Ind rilhteousness-each and all have a share at least
in the^righteousness that governs their deahngs with
each othtr; and those whom they wrong, they think
that they wrong rightly, because they deserve it.
in ta . no* 0'0.«on, to » h. c»
or
Jp^aXnov <k^rai, with 620B2, airoparoi yap
75
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD HI. 2.
ON PKOVIDENCE (I)
all, that is, which live on the earth. And besides,
ro5^ r,Aow yif, tT°« liS*’’" °“'i’ no one of any intelligence complains of all the other
avOpdnrovs SdKvoc L S ' ^ on roij creatures, lower than himself, which ornament the
35 vow. ’Avc{y,cr, sj ^ earth It would be ridiculous if someone com­
» ^''o-YKV oe Kai raOra elvai- ^nl «,' ' plained of their biting men, as if men ought to pass
yoSrjXoc nap' aird,v oi\ta their lives asleep. No, it is necessary that these,-too,
avevpe TToAAd? o' ypSpos- d>ar^ ' s> . ^ should exist; and some of the, benefits which come

y«aa. aim, I... rSlriTX r‘ 7f“

from them are obvious, and those which are not
evident, many of them time discovers; so that none
of them exist without good purpose; even tor men.
But it is absurd, too, to complain that many of them
»0 amarovvra
10 ’aIv dmwe-r^,
• v^o ’ ' a , ^Wtv; aAAa
are savage, when there are savage men as well; and
if they do not trust men but in their distrust attack
to keep them off, what is there surprising in that ?
10 But if men are unwillingly wicked,^ and are the
ravra ndoxovras Et Se^T'^°^^' ^‘‘ sort of people they are, not by their own free will,
one could neither blame the wrongdoers nor those
« am~^ y.vLar avT L %ri
-.0;). ScSodarj, r6 dK6\ov6oy J°o7Jy 7J who suffer wrong because they suffer it by dheir
agency. But if there is a necessity that they should
become wicked in this way,,brought about either by
the heavenly circuit or by the first principle deter­
«-r. »o.vX „^s,
mining the consequences that necessarily follow it,
then their being wicked in this way is natural. Bu
then surely, if it is the rational forming principle
itself which makes them wicked, things are unjust in
this way? But “ unwilling ” means that the error
is unwilling; and this does not do away with the
S^wyzer^BlXw.Md^IteuUe^^ ][; S'^n by Heniy fact that it is men themselves who act of themselves
The Laws passage is stating +u?®r here part the soul. Plotinus, no doubt, has the Platonic formula
Fn mind here; but what he is reaUy concerned with is not to
error because nobody who knew "'I°“gdoing i, maintain that wrongdoing is error but that the control and
dehberately choose the worst of evils'fo^rrnonalTabh ordering of all things by Providence still leaves room for
human moral responsibility.
76
77
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI. 2.
10 oVt airol nroiovai, 8,6. rovro Kal airol 6,uaprdvov
OJ.V 7] o68^ 6v 5X(os ^iMLprov p.fj adrol oi ttoiovutc
opres. T(J 8^ r^s dvdyKrjs o6k ^^aj9ev. dAA’ Sn
naPTojs. T8 8^ rrjs i>opas ody diare p.7]8^y U'
map dpar Kal ydp d iiu>9ep r6 nap. oiVcos &
VJ. (OS avTol ol noLovPTCS i^odXopro- &are oh
(IP avrols haPTia drL9ePTO 6p9pcono, o68' dv
a(jre^€Ls, el 9eol inoiovp. Nw 8^ nap' aircXv
rovro. Apxijs 8^ 8o9elar]s r6 i4>eirjs nepalpera,
ovp.napaXap.^apopApcop els d.KoXov9lav Kal rmv
oaai e,alp dpyal- dpyal 8^ Kal 6p9pcono,. Kcpovp-
rac yoOy np6s r6 KaX6 olKela <f>dae, Kal dpy^j adrr,
avre^ovcrios.
11. ndrepa 8i ,j>vaiKacs dpdyKais oiSrcos eKaara
Kac aKoXov9la,s Kal Snr, 8vpar6p KaXws; "H oH
o Ao'yos ravra ndpra no,el dpycop Kal
fiovXera, Ka, ra Xey6p.epa KaKd airds /card Ao'yo:;
■no,e, ov ^ovXdi^ePos ndpra dya96 eha,. &anep 6p
r,s re)^,r7]^ o6 ndpra rd' eV Vw dpaXiXois
ot/ro/s o68' o Xdyos ndpra 9eo6s elpydCero.
raj,ep 9eods. rd 8^ 8aip,opas. 8evrdpaP i>da,P.
elra ap9pconovs Kal Ca>a o6 cf>96pay. dAAd
Aoy« no,K,XiaP poepdp kyopr,. 8i, ddanep
oc ane,po, ypa,f„KiJs rixp-qs alr,a>Pra,. <hs oi KaXd
ra xp(op.ara naprayov. 6 8d dpa rd npoa^Kopra
78
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
but it is because they themselves do the deed that
they themselves err; if they were not themselves
the doers, they would not have erred at all. Rut as
for the necessity, this does not mean that it co^es m
from outside but only that it is umversally so. And
as for the heavenly circuit, it does not work so that
nothing is in our power; for if the All was external
to us, it would be just as its makers wished, so that,
if it was gods who made it, men, even impious ones,
would do nothing opposed to them. But as
[the power of free action] originates in men. ^
first principle, it accomplishes what follows unth the
incluLn in the chain of causation of all the principles
there are; but men, too, are principles; at any rate,
they are moved to noble actions by their own nature,
and this is an independent principle.
11. But are all individual things as they are y
natuiral necessities and causal sequences, and ex­
cellently disposed in every way that can be JN
but the rational forming principle makes all these
things as their sovereign, and wishes them to be as
they^are, and makes the things which are called bad
according to reason, because it does not ^«sh that all
should be good, just like a
make everything eyes in his picture; m the s^e
way the formative principle didnot make everything
gods but some gods, some spirits (a nature of the
fecond rank), then men and animals after them m
order not out of grudging meanness but by a reason
"nSung .11 the?ich?.l.ty otthe i„.elliglbl.
But we .re Bke people who know nothing .bout the
art of painting and criticise the painter because the
colours^are not beautiful everywhere, though he has
■79
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
iKdorco r6nw- Kal at -rrSXe^s hk oiK U
""T: " WcS^rar ^ e? 8/.a>
/^€^,4otro, ori i^r, ndvres -^pcoes iv air&, d^d Kal
- Sc o. .aAS. .?
Kai. €K rovTOjv ovfnrX-rjpovfievov.
^12. El odv airds 6 Xdyos ivapfidaas davrdv
eis^ vXr,v ravra elpydaaro rovro d,v otds eVr«-
a^op.ocos ToXs iidpemv, rov npd airov rovro
cvv.Ka, rovro rd ya^6f,,vov odrco yevdpLevov pX
av ea^c koXXu>v davrov dXXo. '0 S^ Ao'yoy 1
navrcov opolcvv Kal rraparrX-naUvv oiK dv iyiv.ro
Kai. ovros o rpdrros p.prrr6s- rrdvra 6vros Kard
H-^pos .Kaarov oAAo,. E.’ 8^ e"fco iavrov <IAA«
«a^yay^, o?o. ^vyds. Kal ip^daaro rrapd rXv
avrcov 4>vo,v .vappdaac ra> rroc^par, rrpd, rd
Oxyov rroXXas. nui, dpOio,; 'AXXd <l>ariov Kal
ra, ij^yas olov piprj airov etvac Kal p^ y.lpov,
/fctTct^cupt^e’tt' Ko/r ct^iav.
13. ’End oiSd iKeXvov dno^Xrjriov rdv Xdyov,
os ov rrpos to rrapov iKdarori i>rjac ^Xirrecv. dXXd
A.cExyQ:
* Cp. Plato, Republic IV 420(VD Tko •
Plato does not blame the painter for not ma4"g «WrS“ing
8o
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
really distributed the appropriate colours to every
place; ^ and cities are not composed of citizens with
equal rights, even those which have, good laws and
cLtitutions; or we are hke someone who censures a
play because all the characters m it are not heroes
I
hut there is a servant and a yokel who speaks in a
vulgar way; but the play is not a good « °ne
expels the inferior characters, because they too help
*^°12. K, then, the rational formative principle itself
has, by fitting itself into matter, done these worte,
being the thing that it is, unlike in its parts, and de­
riving its being this from the principle before it, then
this that has come into existence, since ^
into existence in this way, would have nothing else
nobler than itself. If the ’national formative pnn-
ciple had been composed of parts which were all ahke
and equal, it would not have come into existence and
rif it had] this manner of construction wo^d be
worthy of blame; since it is all tWngs, it is
in eviry part. But if it brought in other things
outside itself, souls for instance, and forced them,
against their own nature, to fit into its creation,
making many of them worse in doing, so, how is this
rightly done ? But we must say that the souls, too,
are i/a way parts of it, and it does not fit them m
by making them wotse but puts them in places ap­
propriate to them according to their worth.
^ 13 Then we must not discard that argument,
either, which says that the rational principle does not
’> Viiit for Tiaintine the eves ugly black instead of beautiful
Son So thTrSeels beftL placed here than where
Henry-Schwyzer placed it at 1. 6-6.
.81
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)
yo? ras np6adev Trepi6Sovs Kal aS to ue'Mnv look only at the present on each occasion but at the
CKCTre eKeWev rarreLv Xt’ . cycles of time before, and also at the future, s° as t
5 ew ^ ^ o.gia.v /cat U€TOLTi64i'iu d^ermine men’s worth from these, yd to change
€K
> / o€(T7T0T0JV TWV 7TOnrrf)*:if
, ^ -irpoaOev bovAovs notovvTa their ^sitions, making slaves out of those who wye
yevovro KaKoc SeaTro'rat, Kal 6'rt airots masters before, if they were bad "^^sters (and also
y, /cat « /ca/ccSj ixp-^aavro ^Xotirco, nivy^ras- because it is good for them this way), and, if men
xa, ayaOocs oiK da,i^,f,opov 1 yrdvyjcrl elmc-Kal have used wealth badly, making them poor (and for
^oyaa.ra, dStW St'/co,, the good, too, it is not without advantage to be poor),
^.otyam, a,5r5 8^ Sc/cat'ca. ^ Mr^xal Z andiusing those who have killed unjustly to be killed
in ?heh tufn, unjustly as fm as the doer of Ac deed^s
7T€iaop.evov avvayay^tv ds t6 air6 rw dmrvSelw concerned, but justly as far as cmicerns *e victi ,
^o.,aa.. d M ixp^, ydpZfaZ
and it brings that which is to suifer together to the
;^e pit with that which is fit and ready to execute
ZS^iB Z <^hu^dX<.Tov ci.
what that unjust killer is fated to endure. ’There
is certainly no accident in a man s becoming a slave,
llflZsZa' “-‘P^^’^Wat yJZZ nor is he taken prisoner in war by chance, ny is
outrage done on his body without due cauy, but he
yw7}, /ca fhaaaiievos yumt/ca eVat, Ti/a StaaPr! was once the doer of that which he yw suffms; and
OPe. /cai ^et'a 'ASpdar..a- aLZL^ a man who made away with his mother mil be made
S/a^. 'ASpaW oW /cai oW S,c^ awa^with by a son 4en he has byome a woman
’i^a Tc/c;tat>eaPat 84 8et rowt/'rw andle who has raped a woman will he a womy m
order to be raped. Hence comes, by dmy declary
r^ad.ac rr). dd ru>. SX<o. 4/c rc3. 6pco/,dl
tion the name Adrasteia; for this world-ordeys
truly Adrasteia [the Inescapable] and
^ yyy ^av/taoTT) ot) eV roty 0«'ot/ Id wonderful Udom.^ We must conclude that
«AAa /cai c5v d;. rt. Kara^poLTZ thlniversal order is for ever somethmg of this land
M-pc. ^t, .,d.ota., ora /car .V ZZtZZ. from the evidence of what we see in the All, how this
order extends to everything, even to the smdlest yd
' <£a.;,t^„po, oocid. the art is wonderful which appears, yt only m the
line beings but ako in the things which one might
oar„ation*of7h?matrioideori«^^^^
have supposed providence would have despised fm
their smallness, for example, the worlyanship which
produces wonders in rich variety in ordinary ammals.
82
V

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)

Cvocs ^ eavi^arovpyla Kal r6 ae'ym r,* I and the beauty of appearance which *
fruits and even the leaves of pl^ts, and their beau y
of flower which comes so effortlessly, and their
or. oi yrenoirjra. dnai Kat inaiarT''^' ^ deUcacy and variety, and that all this has not been
made once and come to an end but is ahvays being
made as the powers above move in different ways
over this worlA So the things which are cha,ngmg
change, not changing and taking new shapes without
due cause but in a way which is excellent and ap­
propriate to their making by divine powers. For all
that is divine makes according to its nature, but i
nature corresponds to its substance, and its substance
7T\ -V- a^rov oiolav oiala X
^ .0 .aAa. eV .ar. eVe,,«W a^.o/.X , in its workings; for if beauty and justice are not in it,
^U<CUOV
drj; OVV^Kcbertei
^^ 77’
‘ ' ^ »
-«->«.0.1-05
TO where could they be ? „„
14 The ordering of the universe, then, corresponds
with’Intellect in such a way that it exists without
rational planning,^ but exists so that if anyone could
r etW., oiVo. S^ dva. d>, - plan rationally as well as possible, he would wonder
It it because planning could not have found out an­
other way to make if, something of this is observed
even in individual natures, which come iirto being
continually more conformed to Intellect than they
could be hj an ordering which depended on rational
planning. With each, therefore, of the kinds of
things which continually come into existence it is
d rtc /xA amatr^at ror 77oto5yra Ao'yoy. not possible to blame the rational principle which
makes them, unless someone should
7;r7~ztn:::T^r-^^ ought to have come into existence just like
which have not come into existence, but
thing
ejern ,
existintr always in the same way both in the inj;elligible
Sd and in Ae world of sense, asking for a further
x’ara Tai5ra Dodds K--R2. ' » »
> xi-o . Kai avra codd. 1 Cp. note on ch. 1-. 1. 20-21.
84
85
 PLOTINUS: ENNTaD III. 2. ON PKOVIDENCE (I)
.A ri Ml. : addition of good, but not thinking the form gven to
each thing sufficient, for |«®tance, thinking that the
form given to this particular ammal is insufficient b
cause it has not horns as well, and not considering that
J dto. w S.. IS., .V .4, ^1(2 it was impossible for the formative principle not to
reach to all things, but that there must be lesser
16 S ' r 'll*! 6i’6 wa
things in the greater and parts in the \diole and that
Ihe/cannot be equal to the whole or they would not
be parts. In the world above evep. thing ^
things, but the things below are not each of Aem
all things. Even man, in so far as he is a part, is
T ‘ f* ”■; “■ ™- «.i 4«o „, s »j :rindifidual, not all. But if
X'; :r ““1,:°/: f—4 parts there is something else which is not a parL m
^rtue of this that thing below, too, is all. Pat man
in his individuality, in so far as he is an individual
being, cannot be required to be perfect .t° the point
of reaching the summit of virtue; for if he ffid he
wouirnoinger be a part. But there would cer­
-Ho^nra. - «„. yd, ,dAA,<,6 .S IA.6 ,o„t,1. tainly not be iny grudging by the whole if the part
did gain in beauty and order so as to make it of
ei2rT-7‘' a«i6,,„„„,
irreater worth; for it makes the whole more beautiful
when it has become of greater value by its gam m
... ^ beauty and order. For it becomes of this kind by
being^made like the whole and, so to speak, being

oT”' '‘r®" *■ “"'^' - «™- ilowd to be hke this and given such a pkce that in
the region of man, too, something may shine m him
j“^:»..<^.5 .r„ %:/r as thenars shine in the heaven of the g°^ ? a pl^je
from which there may be a perception of somefting
.€ KOI Te^ M^ujrcv y^w^ilvov, ,5 3 like a great and beautiful image of a god--whether m
»-»... «..d .1 living Sie or one made by the art of HeP^aestus-m
which there are stars flashing on the face, and in the
“ iXdlsfH^r^“oodr‘"’“‘’‘^-
8 41 <ei>(« Theiler, H-S: <Soi codd.
86
87
 xpJT
i
f
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI. 2. ON PEOVIDENCE. (I)

1 breast others, and a setting of stars placed ^vhere it

i5'’"sSthet'with individual things when they

»r='
fr>"^" ,«fi ~i 4’ S"Z
mmm

I
I
1. war with never a pans
I AoVcs oS >? '■“*-"“V “'
1> m /caAcS? €yeij^. Oj5 von
€K€ivos 6 Xoyos BovOei ai/1-
^ ^eyerai
^eyovaiv
aS/fi^MS3
I so disposed as to be than
ri^^V^’lTpIeZj^Tpar^ a^u"
S;S-S.^t-=S

and^dominate but was brought along so ^

15/car’ «,5tc5.- ;cai oiz/^rarroW Suld be in this state, or rather is
i. ndvTcos ovTtos. Tls oSy ^ w yei'e^ei
aKrjpdKrov iv ^dois Kai ^'^o^ep.ov tov to he as it is bY the rational principle. Ihe rauonai
"Hoilij / o,vdpcoTroi,s dvdvKn ■
-W ol
tlip nrinciole and those which, in tneir comn g

MT°-M=Picinus),H-S^- rioodd.
I ^ riss S’™ Jf%i:r,„sar?'.""‘™'" “ •*•
I

i- . The familiar quotation, repeated again and again by

Plotinus, from Plato, TheaeUtus 176A6.
88

I
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
Xpey Trap' aircbv. 7l ^^71^
•■•oAaySiJ.. »<a„ „V4,1 <rn„,, ^ T““ ™ f»i“
TtcrtJ/ aTToQenatc^ ^ ' V ^^TOS €K€l^ 7j Kai
*' a7TO(7ecreis* aco/xaros*, cSo-Tren
aS^'a- .oAA^ o.v7ev"/tt°r>
Cyni^sS^^rstoSuene^^^^^
BoiyethenesandTols on^Xfcp
finest example is Marcus Aurelius XIL 36
d^soriptiorof manias Go?s fov ^ 017’-
mmd (Laws VII. 803C-D ■ A - ^’ I)
90
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
killed them. And if, at the time when *ey had tq
depart, they had to depart in such a way that they
were useful to others, why do we have to inake
grievance out of their usefulness ? And what does it
Ster if, when they are eaten, they come alive
again as different animals ? It is like on the stage,
when the actor who has been murdered changes his
costume and comes on again in
But [in real life, not on the stage,] the ^
*'i sj . dead. If, then, death is a changing of body, like
changing of clothes on the stage, or, for some of us, a
putting off of body, like in the theatre the final exit
fn that performance, of an actor who will on *1 later
occasion come in again to play, what Wd there be
k terrible in a change of this kind, ot U'^nng
iSo e.3. other? It is f« belter than it they
had Lver come into existence at ror 4at »ay
there would be a barren absence of life and no pos
sUiility of a life which exists in something else; but as
H is a manifold life exists in the All and snakes all
thinffs and in its living embroiders a rich variety and
?oes not rest from ceaselessly making bea’Aiful and
:% t: shapely Uving toys.^ And when men, mortal as they
<=°““°nplaoe of
“or£5;\‘:;£:d»;Cd:"
’
external life which is is the religious
please him in
r.; ”S -ojtij
sr!HEES^“i»s?;s
it only affects his unimportant lower sell.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)

anovBA, d^dcra, ouW ,„-a.nces,adr b.ttl.s sho« .« h«™»

eavarov,^vovac. odS^, ehac. dnodv^aKuv
cerns are children ® ..ho die in wars and
e. .oXepo^, ,a. i, f^dxac, SMyov npoXa^vra, nothing terrible, and comes
tattle, anhc.jjt.orfy ^little »>*
40 Zr^V T‘
vras. Et 8 a<j.aipoivro Cdjvres xpr,udrcvv jn old age they g . „v._„ owav while they are
But if their property is taken y

P77a ovaw avroLs yeXoiav ehai rrjv Krnaiv

aja^pov^ airod, dXXco.- ^al ro^pi f t”'ertot“el: a: ha,e it
from them, tor ev deprived
aj>y,eecaca^nep 8 yUaOac
x^tpou rdj. 6edrpcv rat. aKr,v2,
rijs di>a,pda,co, J 1 r wTshould be spectators of murders, and all
^prco xpv Kac rovs <f>6vovs dedaBa, Kal ndvras "deaths, and takings SLe^
Bavarpvs Kac ^6Xe<ov dXc6aecs Kal dpnayd,,
p^raOeae^S navra Kac f^eraaxvf^aria.cs Kal 9pZ
really here in the events of our hte
KO.C ocfccyo^r^oKpiaecs. Kal ydp ivravda i.l within but the outside shadow of man w ^
pvpu y Pup ,Kdar^ oix V cjjvx'/,. aAA’
and moans and oarries on where men have in

pc OKrtvil rfj dXr, yfj ^oXXaxov

OKpvas nocr,aa,ae.cov TocaCra ydp ’dpya dvOpcLnov
ra Karo, „ac ra e^co pdva Cw elBdros Kal eV

S. Movw yap rep arrovdacep arrovdaareov eV

taking serious doings by those who
OTTOvdacocs rocsJpyoc, 6 8’ dtAAo. dvBpco^os
vacyvpv ^rro^a^erac hk Kal rd nalyvea rocs
onovSpec. oi^ ,l86ac Kal rocs adrocs odac
rracpcocs. Ec 8e rt. avpr.ac'Ccvc> adrocs rd rocavra a children’s game P'^^n/elen if Socrates, too,
npoc, ^tarco napaTreacho naiSwv nacSed rd rt^pl which he was dressed.^ And even
avrov arroQ^p^vos rraLyveov. Et’ 8^ 8^ koX rraZ 1 I.e. if he is kffled it is all part of the game, and the body

92
which he puts off is only a toy.
93
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD JII. 2. ON PKOVIDENCE (I)
^WKpdrrjs naiCe. Ec;cpc^T«. Aa 8^ T7%r:r.;fr««^

o^vpo^ra, "S tdZZl ?» |«;o o®‘o

■, T-aura Xiyerai, vws dv m
■novrjpM; Hoi} 8’ ci8wi'a • 'Auac^^ln -
rT,'^,« \ V ^^ ' ■^l^O.pTUX oe 7T0V,*
^ yap €ffTi /caAojj yivop,4vojv andvrcov dSiKelv
5 v70.owraj; Ka,.oSa//.ovej 8^ un3ustiy or er . ,,„;,ictlv ? And
p aiiapravo^ev p,r,^4 dScKolev; HcSy 8^ «" ‘““rfi”® “ho-w can ””a
we
ra p.ev Kara <j,vcnv. ra 84 ^apd <f>dmv <f>^aoa,v
eha,, rjov y^vaja^^o^v d-ndvrcov Kal SpcofxdZv kL otters agatast ™‘“™'■'*"*t„d h« could

Z rov ^o^ovp^ivov; Olot d ;Sn“hSVaj“ ™te

Kiat r;%t““ “*" ‘'Sfuf,

10 .o^ro Kal Kararpdyo^ra rod lo.rjro/

Aoyo. .a. cL. jKdrco, rocovrds LZ Zar.
Z rational forming pnn<np e rational
* .‘* ”rs» £li« ns ttJe tte^iald We might
?™n7perhaps '.UMeed jlofeven'rf

rS'53»c“oSUdeten£.„»^^^^^^^

rational princ^^ ^a ”3e» « -a-OJ I

rationality. All me, eve activity,
activity not in the way *at fire acts hn
a?A ^ e»^epy«a avr,?y, k&v p.-}, aloB^oLs ns napv
20™ „o, 08, 4;“2
<.„o5,, c8«, XtXiZZmh-o
:>y swlSSmiediatel, enr.aso.ed, that
94
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)
Se ear. ci, rijs ^vepyelas rrjs W
rjiv CcoTjv fxopcj^ovv bvvaij.iv7js Kal Kworiarjs oilrcos
ws p.op<j>ovv.^ 'H rolvvv h.ipye,a airijs reynKl
o^OTTep av o Spxoti^evos K.vorifievos etr,- 6 y^n
25 opxrjcrrrj, rfj o{!ra> rexvcKrj Cwfj a.5r.5. «ai
Vrexvr} aMv K.veZ Kal odrco KcveX. rij, Ccorj,
avry, rocav'ry, ov'ay,. Tavra p,^y oSv ill
yTjaeco rov olav 8el Kal ^y^ivovv
rjyeiaea.1 eveKa. "H/cwr roww oSro^ 6 X6yos (k
vov evos Ka(. Cwrjs fuag nX-jpovs ovros eKaripov
SOovK ear.. oJre oiVe vov, r.s- el, oJre point complete, nor ,t®a„ea give
^Kaaraxov rrX^prj, oiS^ ScSoX, eavr3., ot, 8.'§o.a..
oAo. re Ka, ^dvra. ’Avr.del, U dXX^Xo., rd pip.
ft t„tT eS» t£ p?rB against each other
Itself. But by o-enerates and maintains
andmakingthem.defic entitgenemt^^^^^
n
«a. TTOLrjaa, eVSea noXipov Kal pdyrj, adoraaw
war ®° j-or though it is at war with
Kai yevemv ecpydaaro Kal olSroj, eVriv el, rrd,, ei
e. eL',?.^ re.oVe.o. ydp eW<3 roly pip,^,
^oXepcov ovrco, eV eVr. Kal <f>lXov, d,anep dv ei
Spaparo, X6yo,- ely J rov Spdparo, iyojv eV
Sgthltr.Si. el— srdn»f K
avro> TToAAdy pdya,. Td piv oSv Spdpa rd
ous concordance, J ^he uLerse the
m-rjpeva otov el, plav dppovlav dye. adp4>cvvov
olov dy^a.v r^ ^5aa. rd). payopivcov ■no.odpe- S t=«nre STe
VO,- e/ce. Se e^ iv6, X6yov ^ rd). S.aarard). pdyv- rational „hl“ Results from eon-
40 coare pdXXov d. r.y rfj dppovia rfj eV payopiZ to. compare it to the { , enquire why there

eiKaaeLe.Ka. Cvr^oe. S.d r.' rd paydpeva eV roly

Aoyo.y. E. od. Kal ivravda d^d Kal ^apd Tro.ova. C—».? F^PeSo^ hlgh’and lo» note.

96
E
VOL. in.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)
Ao,o. .a. , and come together into a unity—being the propor-
SmaTkws of melody they come together into the
45 o.r« eAarro.. az3roi ^e>,, S^ h • SodyTself, whicl/is a/other greater law o Pro^
portion, while they are lesser ones and Part ^ “
Ae universe, too, we see the opposites, for instance,
Xe-black, hot-cold, and *00, wingedjmgless
A^^o. aAoyov. ^a.ra S^ cVA. rot? footless-footed, rational-irrational, but aH Pa^*^^
ThT^lf TXTrtsX^T“oK inXny pl^^^^^
2' -rr&v o^oXoyel e'a.ry .c3.
^Maxov ixaxo^vo,v. /card AoVoi- S^ vav
Tube All is4n accordance with its rational formative
pttin, and it is necessary-that this o- -mahve
Aoyo. eU. em cnlcraatv adro) 1 ««J olo. pattern should be one pattern made ^ °PP°!f
Lee it is opposition of this kind which gives it its
ova.a. rocavrr,s .Va.r.cda.o,. ^e/,o.W. Kal structure, and, we might say, Tnd
W « p .oXvs^^., odS’d. , .5. I
certainly, if it was not many it would not be all, ana
««5roV dart KaJ ^ would not therefore be rational P“ [of the um-
fiaXcara Sca</>ya eyavriwcris dortv dJare ct’ ^repov versel; but, since it is rational pattern i.t has distinc
oAco? ro Se erepo,. Trotrf. Kal ^dAtora dr^y^o.^, dM’
-ATjrro. |.e,o. .ot,Vt- tSor. a>." irepo.
Sent from enother, “ ™“ “e2t

Ler in the Wghest degree it tflfT^IsTtSlf

€VaVTia TTOLOt ^tvdl GdVTOV,
uaAAoJ^T’^ "r"™" ^oAd
the opposites, and will be complete if it "lakes itseii
lot oily into different things but into °PP°®'*® '
^oMo, ra nocovf.e.a no.-ja,c ivavria. oVco /.al 17. Since its nature corresponds to its P^
St.^«e jaa.XXov Kal ^rrov ^ J ^o'a/Io. o' ductive activity, the more it is differentiated the
more opposed Lll it make the things it makes, and
“‘Tp ° Aoyo. airov. cSore .oAd. ^SAAo.
TunTSse perceived by the senses is less of a umty
than its rational formative principle, so that it is
f^aXXop eKaar<p teat o' ipco, rov «V |v f^aXXov. Ire of a manifold and there is more opposition
in it and each individual in it has a S'®®’*®'.
" a«!r(j) Ap=, H-^2; airoiv oodd. h,i! .Td the.. » . pe.te. P»1o» f»' on.fic.Bon.
98 • 99
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
ro avra>v dyaOdv a^^edSoi^ra. ora. ^^apri Kal
^7 #eatj rov pipovs np6s r6 6\ov d,
avro o SoWra.. Oi^ra,. oS. ^ai ol dyadol Kal ot
canep ^apd rij, adrrj, r.>^, dpyov^.dyov
ra em.Tia-^ Kal airov t6 p.4v ri p,4pos dyaOdv,
TO Se KaKdv ^aoi^ev, Kal odrw KaXa>s €v«
Ka.ro. o^S^ .a.oJ ^V.. "H r.i ^4. KaKois c?m.
ovK a.acp.Xrac, dXX' ^ ^oVo. oV. .ap* |^.5rdi.
roiovToc. ^ AXXd hcos avyyucLf,ri rol, KaKol,, ,l
f^V «&<• TO rrjs <Tvyyvd>p.r,s Kal pi, 6 Xdyos Tro.a-
T-o... Se o' AoVoj pr,S4 avyyvdypovas i^l rot,
To.ooro.. e?.a.. >AAA’ .A p4. p4po, adroO
aya os avTjp, ro S4 ^AAo Troprjpds. Kal nXeico pipr,
•o ^ovr,p6s. ddanep iv Spdpaac rd pkv ra'rre. a.5rory
o ^oi7,rr,s. rots U xpijrai oSaiv '^Sr,- od ydp adrds
np^rayo.^ odB4 S.drepor odS4 rpiro. .o..r,
!f“,^foo. c'.<Ior.p ro^. ^poa4,Kovras Xdyovs
V^v an^SwKev eKdarcp e.V o r^rdyOai 84ov odrw
TO. ,sal lor. rdnos iKdarcp 6 p4v r<p dyaScd, 6 Bk
rep KaKj ^rpeVco.. 'E/caVepoj ooV .ard ej.Lv Kal
/cara ^yo. e.. e'/edrepo. .a2 rd. ^peVo.ra xo>pet
TO. ro™. lyco.. 5. eJAero. Efra i>94yyerae Kal
lOO
PROVIDENCE (I)
But those that love passionately often destroy the
objects of their passion, when they are perishable,-
in the pursuit of their own good; and the urgent
straining of the part towards the wTiole draws to
itself what it can. So, then, there are good men and
wicked men, like the opposed movements of a dancer
inspired by one and the same art; and we shall call
one part of his performance “ good ” and another
“ wicked,” and in this way it is a good performance.
But, then, the wicked are no longer wicked. No,
their being wicked is not done away with, only their
being like that does not originate with themselves.
But there might perhaps be some sympathy for the.
wicked, except that it is the rational formative prin­
ciple which is responsible for our sympathising or
not; and the rational principle does not make us
disposed to sympathise with people of this sort.
But if one part of it is a good man, and another a
villain—and villainous humanity forms the larger
class—it is like in the production of a play; the author
gives each actor a part, but makes use of their char­
acteristics which are there already. He does not
himself rank them as leading actor or second or
third, but gives each man suitable words and so
assigns him to the position which is proper to him
So there is a place for every man, one to fit the good
and one to fit the bad. Each kind of man, then goes
according to nature and the rational principle to Wie
place that suits him, and holds the position he has
chosen. There one speaks blasphemies and does
1 The dancer is a pantomimus, who represents different
characters, good and had, in the course of his one-man ballet
or mime, as Harder saw (op. his note ad loc.}.
lOI
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
77-otet o /iev dae^eXs Xoyovs Kal epya irovTjpwv,! 6 Se
ra evavria- ^aav ydp Kal 7rp6 rov SpdfMTOS ol
roiovroi vnoKpiral S^Sdvres iavrods rw Spdpuiri.
hv p.ev ovv rdis dvOpojmvois Spdpaaiv d uev
30 ^ocTjrrjs fcoKe rods Xdyov^, ol iyovai Trap’
avTcov KaL^ e$ adrwv rd re KaXws Kal r6 KaK&s
eKaaros—eari ydp Kal epyov auroi? pxrd rdj
p^aeis rov noi-qrov- h ru, dXqdearipcp TTot.’jpari,
o n pipowrai Kara p.epos dvOpcoTTOi TToirjriKrjv
eyovres <j>vmv, i/rvy-?! fiev iTroKplverai, d S’ iiroKpi-
35 verai Xa^ovoa rrapd rov -noi-qrov. dva-nep ol rijSe
VTTOKpLrai rd TTpoaojireia, r^v iadijra, rods KpoKw-
rovs /cat ra pdKTj, odrw Kal .Jwxn adr?, rds rdvas
ov Aa^ovaa dKrj- /card Xdyov Sd Kal aSrai- Kal
evapp.oaaii4v^ radras adpufxovos ylverai Kal avvi-
Vpart Kal rep Xdyoj \avrl-
40 elra ohv <j>eeyyeraA. rds ■npd^eis Kal rd dXXa, Saa
av ijw^^ Kara rpdTTov rdv iavrijs TTOiyjaeeev. edanep
riva Kai <I>s 6 <f>d6yyos Kal rd oxrjpxi Trap’
avTOV KoAov T] ataxpov Kal Kdapov TrpoaidrjKev,
<us boietev av, eis rd Troiyjpuj. r). irpoaOels rrjv dvrov
r^s epanrjs KdKr,v odk iTTolrjae.pidp rd Spapa IrepoV
45 7, otov y, avrds Sd dax^ipcvv ^dvTj, 6 SlTroLrjrXs
rov Spaparos anr^Trep^e /car’ d^lav drCpdaas Kal
rovro epyov ttoiu,v dya6o0 Kpirov, rdv Sk d^yayev
eis^ pei^ovs^ ripds Kal. el kyoi, irrl rd KaXXlev
papara.rovS ^epov, ei ttov etye yelpova, rovrov
50 rov rpoTTOv eeaeXdovaa els rdSe rd tt&v TTol-qpa
/cat pepos eavrrjv TrovqaapevT} rov Spdparos els
TTovrjpwv Theiler, H—S*; ttoiwv codd.
102
102
•ON PROVIDENCE (I)
crimes, the other speaks and acts the opposite; for
the actors, good and bad, existed before the play and
bring their own selves to it. Now in human plays
the author provides the words, butJhe “tors, each
and every one of thenf, are responsible by themselves
and from themselves for the good or bad acting ol
their parts—for there is action, too, which is their
business, following from the speeches writteii by the
author; but in the truer poetic creation, .which men
who have a poetic nature imitate in part, the sou
acts, receiving the part which it acts from the poet
creator; just as the actors here get their parts and
their costumes, the saffron robes and the rags, so the
soul, too, itself gets its fortunes, and not by random
chance; these fortunes, too, ate according to the
rational principle ; and by fitting these ?nto the pat­
tern it becomes in tune itself and puts itself into its
proper place in the play and the umversal rational
pattern; then it makes its actions sound out, we may
say, and everything else that a soul mig pr u
acLtding to its character, like a song. And as the
sound o/the voicp and the-gestures of the actor are
beautiful or ugly as he makes them, “d either adorn
the poet’s creation further, as one might ttank, or by
adding the badness of the actor s own do not
make the play other than what it was, but the actor
makes a grotesque exhibition of himself, a,nd the
author of the play sends him off in deserved <bsgrace,
behaving in this hke a good judge of acting, but pro
motes the good actor to higher rank and, if he has
any, to finer plays, but puts the bad actor into any
wome play that L has; in this way the soul coming
on the stage in this universal poetic creation and
103
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.
TO ^ T<1 /ca/ccSj dueu^yKa^^ .nap'
avrrjs Kai ev tt} eiWSw <7WTax0e?aa Kai ra dAAa
JWT(X Aa^oCaa
5t«a? T6 Kac aS RpSaecm 84 r. rok
v^OKp^rals aV .V roW ^ ^ have something extra, in that they act in a greater
/xerpov V7TOKpcvof.4vocs, Kai roC ^octjtov Travrdy
Tovrovs ■no.ovvros Kvpiovs. Kai Svvdfiecos oHans
pexCovo. en, ^oAAd .V.ax roVo,. rx/xd,
aTtpxaj opxfouax, ,.ard i rd avvemXap,^dueiv Kai
O.VTOVS rais rx/xais ^ai anglais, dppdCovros
^KaoTov Tonov rols 4je,acv, c5j avi^<l>covetv rdi rov
Travro? Xoycp, 4vapfioCofi4vov Kard SCktjv iKdarov
Tox? p.^pea, rols Scfo/xeVoxj, cScTTrep ;^opS^y e'/caWy
6X? TovoLKeLov Kai TrpoaijKovra tottov rarroaivm
Kara Xoyov r6v rov i>94yyea0a,, oVoxoV eVrxr adrfj
TO rrj, Svm^eo,. cxV rovro. Kai ydp eV ™ dAxL
65 ro npeno. xcax ro KaAoV, ex’ eVaaro. ox5 Sex rerdfera'x
feyyo^ KaKd iv ra, a/coV<p Kai ra, raprdpco-
^^av0a yap KaXdv r6 odrco <f,04yyea0ar Kai r6
rovro KaXdv, oiK ex’ Atvos^ dr^ eVaaro,. cxAA’
ex rov <f,0oyyov rov airov dcr<f,ep6/x,vos cwvreXd
exs- ixiav apfwviav ^orfiv Kai avros ^covdiv, iXdrrco
I *7“ Harder, H-S“: Kai codd.
Aims Sleeman, H-S: MBos codd.
104
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
making itself a part of the play, supplies of itself the
good or the bad in its acting; it is put in its proper
place on its entrance and receives everything except
itself and its own works, and so is given punishments
or rewards. But the actors [in the universal dramaj
space than that within the limits of a stage, and the
author makes them masters of the All, and they have a
greater possibility of going to many kinds °f places
Ld determining honours and dishonours, ® they
contribute themselves to their honours and dis­
honours; for each place is fitted to then characters
so as to be in tune with the rational principle of the
universe, since each individual is fitted m, accortog
to justice, in the parts of the universe designed td
receive him; just as each string is set m its own
proper place according to the rational pfoportion
which governs the sounding of notes, of whatever
quality its power of producing a note is.
fitness and beauty in the whole only if each individual
is stationed where he ought to be—the one who utters
evil sounds in darkness and Tartaruy for there to
make these sounds is beautiful; and this whole is
beautiful, not if each is Linus 1 but if each by contribut­
ing his own tound helps towards the perfection of a
single melody, himself, too, sounding the note of-
because it seems to fit the context better. The idea
is clearly that the universal melody fingers w o
make ho^ible noises, as well as good °n®^^2t-3oT S
AKall MSS,*^nd cp. Aeneas of Gaza. Theophrastus,
p. 23, Boiss.) may be fight.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)
70 Se Kal Kal dreXeardpav d,a7rep oi5S’ eV life but a lesser, worse, and more incomplete life;
4>cov^^,.ca, aXXd Kal iXdrra^y res oSaa Kal
ap.vSpa npos app.oviav rijs Trdcnjs odpeyyos avvreM
ore f^efeepearaej dp^.ia ds o^k tL peipr, J
aveaoe fMeu oe e^Ooyyoe ■ndvres, 6 U riXeos els e’/c
r.: *ft£ siTp»-pip..«f-'
XideS i.to p„« which »c 7*
75 Ka .a o' AoVc o' ef.. ,.e^edpelrl ot the pip« “,'ae
Se ovK ees eaa- SOe. Kal rod .avrd, complete, made up • ^ into parts
rational ° reason there ar&dif-
212'^ '
^vravda avp.^ae,^ee Kae rods rdnovs dvopeoiovs koX S.a »«ls®lhia arc not eju.l fit«thjw.y »to u»-
ras ^yas ov ras airds, oAA’ dvlaovs odaas koX
avoi^oeovs rovs ronovs eyodoas. olov Kard adpey-
yos 7j revos aXXov dpydvov dvopeoedrrjras, ev
ronoes [re^ rrpds dXXrjXa Seaef.dpovaev elae Kad'
XhSer S Sch'other an^n each P^^c® utter
^Kaorov ronov rd adreXv avp^edvoys koX roes
ronoes Kae rep oXep <f>eeyyopCdpas. Kal rd kukcos their o^ sounds ^^jp^ounding singing
avraes ev^KaXep Kard rd -nav Keiererae Kal rd napd S^fbealtdfuliy disposed from th^oint^^.^^^^^^^
Bne^vaev rep navre Kard ef,daeu Kal oidkv '^rrov

pXov oareo ef^deyyopevr], e^oTvep oihk 6 Sdueos

rroXeP, ee See Keee oXXt, yp^jadae elKdve. A« 2^p

ZSd«“”"^S h. well gove^cd
roorov e.jroXee-See Sk-^al dvdpednov roJrov

r„Ta .ceded [for other

dXxt iJ^Art'oo? ,/n,xal al pekv Kal Se'

am Aoyov yap Kae aSrae ra, Xdyep fadprj oSk laa, C.L Zd some became they were
” Tlay'm'rrS'afSl'e, me ..iqui p.«.
‘ re del. Theder,
?p6 107

I
 PLOTINtJS: ENNEAD III. 2.
e,re^7rep SUcTTr]aai>. Xp^ 8^ ivOv^i^tadaL Kal rd
5Se.r.^a .A rplra Kal r8 .ol, a^rol,
evepyeiv aei ^epeai ’AAAd 7rd\,v aS koX
w8e XeKreov- yoAAd ydp em7ro0« e.V oa^ve^av 6
Xoyos. Mr, ydp oi^kv Set eVetadye.v rocov'rov,
vnoKpiras.^ at a'AAo r. <f>ekyyovra, rj rd rov
^^otTjTov.warrep dreXovs nap' airov rov SpdpLaros
. ovros avroi aTTonXrjpovvres to eXXetnov Kal rov
nocrjoavros Std p.eaov Kevovs rroi-qaavros [tou?1 i
roTTOvs ^ r&v inoKpiriXv oiy inoKp,raiv iaop,k-
vwv aAAa jaepos rov noirjrov, Kal npoeiSdros a
fSeyJovrac. tv odrco rd Xocnd avvelpcov Kal rd
ocos re r,. Kal ydp rd ^v rtS navrl
Kac enof^va rot? /ca/cot? ru>v kpywv ol XdyoL Kal
Kara Xoyov- otov 4k ,xoixeias Kal alyp^addrov
aycvyrjs naiSes Kard <f>dpiv Kal ^eXrlovs dvSpes, el
rvyoi, KOI TTo'Aet? dXXai dp.elvovs rd>v nenope-n-
l^evcpv vrro avSpdiv novr,pu,v. Et’ oSv dronos X
e,caaycoyrj rwv ^vywv. at 2 rd novrjpd, at Sk rd
XPVora epyaaovrac-dnoarep'/,oopLev ydp r6v Xdyov
Kac Twv xP'n<^jkdv d^aipovvres adrov rd novvpd-^
rc KcoXve, Kac rp rcdv inoKpircvv kpya pjpr, rroieZv,
ioanep rov Spa/taro? e’«et, odrco Kal rov iv rdj
navri Xoyov, Kal ivravda Kal rd koXcos Kal rd
evavTLov, ware els eKaorov rwv inoKpirwv ovrw
25 nap avrov rov Xdyov, Saw reXecdrepov rovro rd
2 t del. Volkmann.
Sr) Kjrohhoff, H-S: Se oodd.
loS
ON PROVIDENCE (I)
as a consequence of their separation. But °ne must
insider tL, the second and third parts of the soul,
and the feet that soul is not always active in the same
+ Tliit ap-ain on the other side we must say
thJtooShe aV^ent still needs a great deal «ior«
Se it attains clearness. We ought certamly not
to introduce actors of a kind who say something
besides the words of the author, as if the play w^
hicomnlete in itself and they filled in what was want­
ed tb p writer had left blank spaces in the middle,
Forcertl* In tfe AllTe mW principles bring
into a connected whole the consequences and.resulte
which follow upon those deeds °
„„ rationally; for instance,from adultery, or ttie carry
ing off of a captive, children may come
nature and better men, it may happen, and othe
bftter cities than those sacked by wicked men. If,
t£n it is absurd to bring in souls, some of which do
the wicked deeds in the world, and some ,
for we shall deprive the rational principle of th g
d pd« too if we take the wicked ones away from it
S™”;! «ftom making the deeds of th. actom
parts^as they are of the play in our example, so aEo
Ke ratioLl principle in the universe, and at­
tributing good performance and the opposite to it, so
fhtSfw.y"tco.ne.J.e.ehln^W^^^^^^
tbP rational principle itself—and all the more in
proportion as^this play is more perfect, and every^
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)

Spd/^a Kal ndi^a Trap' aifov; ’AAAA t6 kuk6v

-rTovrjaai Iva rt; Kal al ijivxal Se oiSev en iv tw

iravTL oi eeiorepai, dAAa iiipri X6yov itaaai; Kal rational principle. An rational
^ olXSyoL TraWs itwyai, ^ Sid rl oi pikv tfaxai, ol
Se Adyot p.dfoi' navrds ^XV^ rivos ovros;
 ni. 3. (48) IIEPI nPONOIAS AEYTEPON III. 3. ON PROVIDENCE (II)
1- Tt' roLvw SoK€i nepl rodrcou; "H Kal r& 1 What, then, do we think about these questions ?
^ovrjpa Ka, r<i xpri^r6. X6yos ■n€pieiXr,<j,ev 6 Traj, Now the universal rational principle
good and evil things; evil things are parts of it too.
ov^l^epyj^ ^acjavra- oi y^p J Ao'yc. yevva
ravra. aXX o nas iari ro^rcov. Yvxrjs yip It is not that the universal
duces them but that it is the universal
them included. The rational principles are an
MV’? MW? Se hci4>opa ixoia-qs pidpq ir>i Xiyov activity of an universal soul, and their parts of sou
ml; but, as the one soul has differing parts, o
Lrrespondingly do the rational principles differ, with
ye^yara. Xvp<l,<^voL 8d at re ^vyal np6, Te re^E that the works also differ which are then
aXXqXas ra re dpya- mip^coya 8k oSrws. cbs eV k( ultimate products. The souls and the works are in
harmony 1th each other; “
avTw^, Kal ii kvavricov. ’E,c yip iv6s r,vos
oppqeevra^ rravru et, k. ovvipyera, ^iaem that a unity comes from them, even if it is a un y
produced from opposites. For all things sprung
amyAoy, coare Ka, 8,i<f,opa iK<f>ivra Kal ivavria Lm a unity come together^into J unity^by^natm^^
yevopeva To> his ehac awdXKeraL Spcos els av'u-
Scome Zto being as opposites they
ra^iy pea;.- &arrep yip ^al hiarcoy h
same, drawn together into a single
™ yevos} Kiv pixa^vra, kSLv 8iKucoatu dXX^Xovs
the fact that they come from a umty. J ,
KavJ>,Xove,Kojat kS.v ^rjXcp dvpwvra., Kal ri iXXa in the case of particular kinds of living creatures there
xae^ e. ye.q o^aaircos' Kal o.Voa ;caJ d.9pd,.ovs is one genus of horses, even if they fight and bite each
other Id are pugnacious and furiously jealous, and
eereor. ro.W niXe. .i^^a ri appllLi .11 th. “Se
ec8q ravra ecs e. r3 fyo. » yeVo,- dra Kal ri so certainly, men must be considered like this too.
coL" MaoKenna, Cilento, H-^»: Then, again, all these lands must
under tl one genus living creature , *en als
the things whidi are not living creatures must be
II2
II3
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 3.
m Cwa Kar' dBrj aS- dra ds « t6 fi-f, »■
etra^ o>ou, el ^ovXei, els to ehai- elra ds ro
nap^Xov r6 elvai. Kal ndXiv ini rodrw c’/cSrjW
20 Kara^acve Bcacpcov Kal aKtBvdp^evov rd iv dpcdv r&
em ndpra (fiOdvew Kal 6pov nepiXap,^dvew cjvvrd{ei
ws BiaKeKpifiivov iv elvai C^ov noXv eKdarov
TTparrovTos rcdv^ eV aircp rd Kard. <f,da<.v iavrpv iv
qvT<p rep dX(p Spws Svrds, olov nvpds p-d Kalovros.
25 ennov rd. tnnov ipya, dvOpcnoi 8i rd aired’v
eKaaroi neef,dKaae Kal Bedej^opa oi Bcd<f>opoi. itaj
enerai Kard rds <j>daeis Kal rd ipya Kal rd rd
ev Kai rd KaKcds.
2. Ai Si cyvvrvxlae oi Kipeairov ei, dKoXovdovai
be Ka^aSrac avp<f>educo roXs npd aircov Kal laac.
a.KoXoveiq.2 i^TrXeKeXaai. ZvpnXiKet Bi ndvra rd
VYodpevov cn)p<f,epopdajv redv if iKdrepa Kard
5 <f>vaw, otw iv qrparrjylais ■^ovpdov piv rov
ON PEOVIDENCE (II)
classed by their kinds, and then included in tke one
InS" non-living ”; then both together, if you hke,
S beTneludelin being; and
makes being possible. Then, having attached every
£fto thi!, go down again,.dividing and seeing the
iSSly r.ach4 .0 all Wnga »nd mdutog
to together in a single common order so that it
is a single multiplex Uving thing
and each of the things in it acts accordmg to its o^
nature while being all the same “
instance, fire burns, ^ ^oXton
Viclnno- to a horse, and individual men do tneir o
S5in i which
by nature, and different ' ac_
wLt is done, and living well or badly^ follows ac
cording to their
2 Chance natures. - are not responsible for the
circumstances

r&v avvreraypivwv. S by .h.

Bi rd nay npovola arparrjycKrj dpedar,
xac ras npd^ecs Kal rd nddr, Kal d Bet napeXyal.
oeru^ Kaenord Kal ^ Kal SnXa ndvra Kal prjxav^.
para, Kal Saa i^ airdjy avpnXeKopivcov npoeedpa-
seen, in order that this result may have room to b
10 rav. ha rd iK rodrojy aSp^atvoy ?XV X<^pav rov

' Twv Creuzer: rr/v oodd.

= Kirohhoff, H-S»: d^oXovSlat oodd
114
 1 ^

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3.

rffa. .3,
evfiT^Xa-yov -^apa rov arpaT'qyov, Kalroi e^codev
ooa e^eXXov Spaaecv ol ivavrloc. El ol6v re
xam apxecv rov arparonSov. d Bk Bi, 6
.5 rTriF"^"- ’■
rov ri Se ovk av avvTjpfwopdvov e'vrj;
rdBe f
. 'S ^ awriraKraL, Sri
€77«aoSco.3 ro crov
5 7a7!^V °■'Eotc
y ? ^Tjrei, TO /xei3, et eVt roi/ mv^aavra, d ns
ojiv, .aveveyK€Lv Bel rov noiov rov iv rots TiOeoiv
.^aarov^rrjv a.nav ^ ^^2 ,3 y,v6pevov air6- ^
oA«r OVK acnareov, &orrep oiBk irrl cj>vrZ
alaedverac, ^ i^l
avepa.no, ^yova,- rairdv yAp
I0yap .vravea ovre aird odre r6v no,.jaavra
^vXoya.s acncpeda. knl Bk dvOpcBno^v. Sn uA
xj^ov , rovro; El f.kv ydp, Sn iBdvaro roll
-xaX\,ov e,va,, ,, nap' airov npoar,64vros r,
ON PROVIDENCE (II)
well nlaced, and all things come in a well-planned
™ £“ the gener.l-ao.gh *l..t ** «
nlanned to do is out of his control. But it it was
possible for him to command the enetny
if he was really “ the great leader to whom all
things are subject, what would be unordered, wha
^ would not be fitted into his plan ?
1 Sunoose you say “ I have power to choose this or
that ” ?%ut the things that you will choose are in­
] cluded in the universal order, because your par is
SJo, i a mere casual interlude in the All but you are counted
L a^ust the person you are. But for what reason is
a mai the sor? of person he is ? There are two ques­
tions which the argument seeks to settle here, on ,
whether the blame should rest on the
.one,whodeternamed^^^^^^^
existence itself:- -thet. •- •’”>““ ““J "Sing
s.sS’nroipi'spSf.sS”
SXSS’S; i” n.l lllTmen^ to bW

' oAA’ S. Harder, H-S: dAAA codd.

in the case of men, becaiise man is not a better th g
1 Plato, Phaedrua 246E4
than he is? For if it is because he was able to b
Sethlng noble, than he is, it he able to add
same answer as Plato that thn chapter, gives the • .1 V. 7 til B presence of bad men in a divinely ordered uni-
dividual men, notTthek Maker buThe^r“ "I’°” “■ raised by the presence centuries of.
as elsewhere, a good deS ^ ^
, a gooa deal more conscious of the difficulties
• I 1.0 master. •
I17
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3. ON PKOVIDENCE (II)
ecs t6 KpeXrroy. air6s alrws iavr& 6 noc^^as- so„emng w ~ke W-df be^jhe »
«’ SJ f,-fj nap' airov, dXX' ^Sec i^o,e,v Trpoaelva,
oirft^Vu
15 Trapd. Tov yeuvr]rov. £ronos 6 t6 nX^ov dnacr^,
necessary tor it to con
rov Soedvros. &anep el Kal ini rcov dXXcov C4>wv ducer, then it is a animals
aTTaiToZ Kat r<vp 4>vra,v. Ae? ydp oi ^rjreZv. el
iXarrov S^Xov,-dXX' el ci. a^r3 aindpncos- oi yip
b"«e
navra laa e'§«. ^Ap' oiv p^rpd,aavros airov
ro5 8er. ndvra 'laa; OihapS>s-
them out wth the
‘ffwtS 1 SSg ”™t»m a ahugs to
oM ovroi Kard. <{>daLv etxe yevioBau 'Ak6Xov6os
yap oSros 6 AcJyo? dXXr}, dKdXovdog Si ijjvxn
This"; follows
ay vcp, vovs Si oi rodrcov „ h. dXXd ndvra-
soul ;;p^ h?/e but all things; but all things
TO. Si^ ndvra noXXd- noXXd Si Svra nal oi raird
but me m„y tW.
rd p.iv npiora. rd Si Sedrepa. rd Si Kal
25 T3 dy ipeXX,, ,t,a,. Ral roiwv Kal rd yevdpeva r„t,tome.etoud,.„d.omeoteucc».ivelow.^-*
tcpa oi yal p.6vov, dm ^yGv iXarrdaei^, otov in value too. Then. f “ifbut diminu*
e^yy -rjSri npoidvrcov. /O.yAp roC ^<iov Xdyos,.
Kav {yxos 5, iripa ijjvx-q. oiK iKelvr). d<f>’- -ijs 6^ &rprircipk\rthr^
Xoyos,. Kat 6 adp.iras oiros iXdrrcvv S-f, ytverai.
ensouled, is another soul, i^eiple
oydS<.v. els iXrjv, Kat rd yevdp^evov H airov formative P^ciple ^o“ies and tos who p^
becomes less as it hastens to matter, ana
30 .vSeearepov. S^coVe. oVov dcf>iarr,Ke rd yevd-
H^evov Kat 5p.ws iart daifia. Oi roiwv, el
idX. ao» not
Toiovrov rd yevdf^evov, Kat rd npd airov roJvrov
SVSt wS 1, bef«? It 1. .bo of ft.t kind-, tot
ii8
 T

i PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3. ON PROVIDENCE (II)

yap navr6s Kpelrrov rov yevopL4vov Kal it is better than all that has come .into being- and
III
atria? «ai /xaAAoi- eavfidcrac, Sri 4Bwk4 ti pier'
avro Kcd rS. t^vr, aSrov roiavra. Ei’ Bk ^al
nXeo^ .BivKeu ^ Saov Sxovai Kr^iaaaOai, Sri piaXXov mwmm
a^oBeKreov oiore KivBvvedeiv rf,u a'lriav in'i roSs
W-oa? iV.ai, .3 8^
€X€IV.
4.^ AnXov iikv ydp Svros rov dvepd,nov~\4yw ^r sin.ple-1 ™.n, simple i. .hj
Se anXov ojs rovro S nenoirjrai piSvov Svros Kal
! Kara ravra noiovvros Kal rrdaxovros-dnijv alrla
V Kara r^v en^rjaiv. &a-rr,p eVi rcov Ccicvv riov
aXXcov.^ Nw Se dvepcvnos p^Svov eV ^6ycp 6 KaKSs
E'r.:iS‘wh«r;.:s«tTr)S'o.hS
Kai rovro lacoseiXSycvs. Oi ydp p.6vov S rrenoir^-
Hi rai eoriv. aXX^ Sx» dp^v dXXrjv iXevdSpav oL » ”4,e.Vh,eh U
I
efto r7)s npovoias oSaav oiBk rov XSyov rov SXov SSLT.'S: w jh». w
ov yap anrjprrjrai eVeim roilro;,., dAA’ eViAWi
ra^ic/,eirr^ .01? x^Voai Kal 4, reX.la rrpSvoia
vidence ; ^hich connects the better
rovro- Kai Xoyos 6 [mSv noirjriKds, 6 Bk awd-nrcov
the things which have come into
ra Kpeirrco rots y.vopi4vois, KdKeiva -npSvoia -f, principles with the tm g -providence
av^eev,^ rj Se ano rijs dvco. 6 Srepos XSyos avvyjpi- being, and toose mgner p p another t>ro-

eKeivcp, ,al yiverai k^ dpuf>oiv ^av nXkypia

Kai rrpovtna rj naaa. 'Apx^v pkv oSv Syovaiv
aXXyv avOpcvnoi. oi -ndvres Bk rraaiv oh Syovai
15 XP<^vrai, oAX 01 ^v rfj krkpa, ol Sk rp .krkpa f} ■S-SSsSst;
rais ^repais raXs x^ipoai xpkovrai. Udpeiai Sk some use one principle, those higher
number of others, the worse ones. But those g
120 121
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3, ON PROVIDENCE (II)
'“rr r a aw.. „ principles are there, but not acting upon them, though
a^ovaa. yAp e.aaro. r6 iavrol Ltainly not inactive in themselves; for each one of
AAA e.. .ovrou. o,3« eV.pyou... alria ri.o, Zl them does its own work. But, someone might say,
what is’to blame for their not working on these men
when they are present? Or are they not Present
But we assert that they are present everywhere arid
J,, \ > , . xl OV TOVTOIC
“"'™? eVe/iyei. Aid ri' o& oAk nothing is deprived of them, Surely they are not
present in those people on whom they do not act.
Why, then, do they not act upon all, if these, too,
are parts of them?—I mean the principle of this
higher kind. As far as the other living creatures are
concerned, this prineiple is not their ow; as tor
men, it does not act on all of them. Is this then not
the only principle which does not act on a .
f”" ?>'“n- E-* rip V Cl<^a^Jro.aJ, why should it not be the only one ? But in those m
whom it is the only one, their life is conformed to it,
and the other forces only enter into it_ as tar as
»rzr.r' ^ necessity requires. For whether the man s constitu­
tion is of a kind to plunge him, so to speak, into
rt-1'^'" iX‘
troubled waters, or his lusts dominate him, it is ahke
necessary to say that the cause lies in the sub­
eWi /caFp^^a e’^ ^ <^PXfi o Ao'yoj, stratum. But ht first this would appear to mean that
the cause Is no more in the rational principle, but
or. ^acyro eK rov Xoyov ya-Ap^evov Kal Sv kItA rather in the matter, and the matter, not the rational
Tov Xoyov^ coare ^ HXr) KpaW,ae,, dra X
principle will be dominant, and the substrate in so
far as it is formed will come second to it. in tact,,
the substrate to the free principle is the rational
Lff”p‘.?£,TA“lSK3rp^^ form, and that which has come info existence trom
not between matter and snirit^or . ®j” •« for him the rational form and exists according to it; so that
between higher and lower seff-’ on ^y< "■nd soul, but the matter will not be dominant and'the formation
IV. 4 [28] 18; VI.4[22lT4ll7 <> [33] 2; come second.1 Further, one might refer the being
by the true, higher self in so far na exercised
xtselfindependent of the lower “ composite •> sTff^hTch of and dominafed by the order of the physical universe; op.
122 ^ II. 3 [52] 16. 17 ff.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3. ON PKOVIDENCE (II)
tMs or that kind of man to the previous life, as if the
rational principle became dim in comparison to that
rationa p p previous happemngs, as if
J ms <iae,mT€pa, yaop4y,s- , ■ r.o7l hS b.t it tviU ,hi„e out
fltain later And the rational principle must be
«^2rr/irxir; r S to conUin within itself the
fuitablf for'itSJl’ eliLrS'ng it
O.’i ' ' n ■. vA'qv Tj crvficicoyov evocuv
F^thfrationdpLdpW^^^^
aAAnc tt!c ,/ ^ ^^^xpiv€oea, olov
TT] ifjvxps yevofievrjs Kal erepoicodevro^ tov

«"7‘ “™ *“r ”' *•«’“■' I

«mil of an ox; so that the worse being is justly dea

r* Lt hU aid h. otlginaU, “f,
S-re,a^ .ai r>
Tori7"' rp^a .>Adrrco
T‘"^“ ^3
«V eV^acr.. Sgfl7.t“th. took tat .rtSings whioh at.
^ ^ ovp.7rXoK^ hk ^ npdsdXXo ..eo^nd and thitd cl„. to- a J»» o.t»e th„ *»=
50 ’ (^^KpaaCs ianv, irepov iP

^«ero ef eAarrov rA ^Xarrov Kal eW o«

=-l&*^5iS5
?So™n7l2 oordtoiniak a thiog’s bdog; but
y.ev^ro Kara ^vgiu t^v airov ^Xarrov, Kal et r6
Serio, Lamo ™ *«'>S7|'*£

w? KaKeiffev rjpr7jp.eu(ov rcoy e(j>e^ijs. ^

0. riuerai rolvvv ^ -npdvoia e’f clpy^y «V r/A«.
°“« iW oto- W dAAa'
above reaches from the beginning to the end, is no
^ Timaeus 42C 3. ~
124 125
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3. ON PROVIDENCE (II)

icpov e,, ^axarov dp^i], ^prZivov

^Kaarov to o.k^Zov ^^ovtos, rov fy^v ^JrLos t6
fs.««SSs
^v^PYovvros r, rov adrov Kai yrdaxovros rd La
avrcvo^a Tra^ara np6s aird re Kal yrpds r^v Umit still active in its ovm way and undergomg. e
ov^ r^,v .p6, dXXo. KaJ ,al oirZl “rielfwhlch .,e proper .6 it ^
^Xvy^vra odrcvs i^Odyiaro rd ^J^Wa. ri S nnhire and its co-ordination with anything
™ a.dZvea,\al eV
r^v 4>eoyyoyv anavrcvv ^al i,c rcdv Traeyjfxdrcov Kal
^jyV^ra>v j,ca rov Cd>ov otov <f>co,^ ,al

slSI&xSS
Se ano rov yecpovos dp^ap^dvr,, rd Sd inepdL
rP^o^a ^oy Td t^dv ydp cV .<3 kSo^S red
yr<p.rray Xoyo, Kal indp \6yov .ov, ydp Kal
?s:?i.iiis£=
pxn xo.ep.pp rd^ 8k kvrevOe. djSn SoL pku yidence; but it is tate oeginim g ^
20 a:T™‘ ^x^f^.yovoea, Kal daov eV ^vyj, KaOapS.
SiAsiSfSsrz'EsSS
f^pt^opevos o Aoyo? ovk loa-
dKdX^r' y
86ev oiS’ ta Troeei
T(J 8^ kvrevdev ^8^
SHSStSjHiS
CC 8pcpr, Oeoes <j>iXa- ydp OeoejyeX^s o' X6yo,

is comit in Se lower fate

Fato 9. 672F-5^B op Pseudo-Plutarch, Be
Vogel, Oree^ K) ^
126
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3. ON PEOVIDENCE (II)
^ jrpor^ocas. Sweyerat oSv Kai rd rotawa principle rtS’'ldnd^vhfch^cause our
CO. €pycov,„,„ocrirac Sk oi ■npovoia, aAAd y,v6pe.a too, these kind of “tions (the Ki
difficulties about providence, 1. . ^^ne
I Tr rA yei,6p.eva ^ nap' 6rovovv
faked «P “1 hL. happened,
Vj^ov rj a^yov, e? .. yp^ar6v.
^aX,v Kare^Xr^nrat npovoia. d,s ^avrayov Iperhv by providence but the thing human
whether they have " eEe, living or
Kparew Ka, /cerart^e/^eVco. ^al ScopPcia^ajs rvyya- action or of the action of is good,
lifeless, if anything which ^Tthat^e has
30 Z"' ofo. eV eVi
are taken up again by provi , ’j g ,^hich have
yieca? iodeLar^s Kara Tr/joVoia. rod ^cLov, yevoai- everywhere the mastery, and the things ^
rparinaros. ndiiv 0' ;rn?wrong are changed and -r-t^
Aoyof o Scot/cw. awd,rro. Kal avvdyot Kal 'udro body, where health is given by ? Idnd occurs,
U.in'g thing, »h.n a cut “ ;SU(,7„
xa. 6top0o.ro ro -Kovilaav. “nare rd eV6uem
e?.at, s,^ the directing rational P"h^*P and sets
joins it and closes the are con-
•xtrtay ov;f ,;;ro Trpo.ot'aj ■},vayKaapUvcov. dAA’ right the suffering part, bo tne e
Sincnces, but follow f,o»
aorto. c^vajdvrcov p.ky rots rrjs npovotas Kal
from ns (l.e. we cause thcnr), and we«e»otfa^^^^
anonpo.o.as,pyocs, rd Si by providence but we connect them, derived
^oyXrja^v Son,0eWco., dAAA Kard rXv cord, with the worfe of P’^XX to linl^up what
rco. .pa^a.rto. ^ .ar' a“AAo rt rto. .V ro) rravll. from providence, but are n°%Xvidence but do so
ftojS avrov Kara ydvocau Trenpaydros ^ ^enocyj^d- follows according to the will of pro
(according to the will of P‘£„t!wSh"tself
40 TO. rt e. ^/.t. ndOos. Od ydp rd adrd rroJnav
cording to somethiiig else in X"mu us in a wit not
rrpoaeXeou navrc. dXXd rd adrd npds dXXo Kal
is acting or producing some e everything
aAAo npos aAAo^ olo. Kal rd rijs ’EXdvrjs KdXXos [according Jthe will 0/provident when E
nys p^ev ro. Hapt. dXXo dpydCero. 'ISop^eveds does, not always PI°^X bfitlt produces .the same
e enaOev ov ro adrd- Kal dKdXaaros dKoXdarw encounters everything e s , ^^j^i^g-and a different
effect when-It encounters XSr.^as for instance,
‘ TOfiijs Creuzer, H-5: ro'A/x,y oodd.

S lhenShorong% ^ssolute man happens upon

jtz8
T
VOL. III.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3.
xaXos KaXa av,.neachv d'AAo. o' 8^ ocd^pco.
aWo yo, ad>4>pova ro^ovrov ^ ^p6s d^SXaarov
aXXo o adroV, 0 8’ d^o'Aaaro. ^p6, adrd. dAAo.
Kac Trapd p,^^, rov dKoXdarov r6 npaxdh oire
VTTonpovoia, ooVe «ard rd 8’ d;.d rov
aw<f>povos ^pyov oiy 6tt6 npovolas p4v. Src W
avrov, /card ^pS^oca^ 8e'- adp,/>covov ydp ra> X6yo>
ojan^p Kal S iycetvw, npd^^ev dv res adrdj npd^as
Kara Xdyov rdv rov larpov. Tovro ydp Kal 6
<^rpos rrapd rij, rdyv^, iSiSov ets re r6 dy.aIvov
re ro Kdp.ov. “0 8’ dv p^ dycac.ov no.fj,
avros re noieX Kal rrapd r^v ■npdvoi.av rov larpov
eipyaaaro.
6. Uddev odv Kal rd yelpco pdvreis TrpoXiyovai
Ko. e.. rrtv rov rravrds <f>opdv dpedvre, np6, raXs
aMats pavreiais npoXdyovm ravra; "H SrjXov Sri
r<p avprrerrXixeai rrdvra rd ivavria, olov rXv
^liop^vKal r^v vXr]v olov irrl CcSov ovvOdrov
ovros o ri r^v pop^v Kal rdv Xdyov deevpiov Kal rd
m^evpivov eecvpeX. Oi ydp eSaadrojs Hcpov
vor^rdv^ Kal l<^ov advderov BecopeX. dXXd Xdyov
rd) aweSrip popif>ovvra rd yelpcv. Zedov
Sv ovro. rov rravrd, o' rd eV adr^ y^.Speva
130
ON PROVIDENCE (II)
another, and both are beautiful, the effect is different
from what follows when one chaste beauty meets
done by the chaste man is not done by
because it is done by the man himself, J.®
according to providence; for it is in tune with the
Snallrinciple, just as, too, what a man might dor
tf promote his health would be his own action ac­
cording to the rational plan of his doctor. 'or
wh^i fhe doctor prescribed, from the
his skill, both in health and sickness. But wh^atevei
anyone does that is unhealthy, he does ^ himself
and it is an act which goes against the providence o
'^6 '^mat is the reason, then, that diviners foretell
the worse sort of actions, and by f *^“Xr
nf the heavens foretell these as well as ttleir otne
Lt^ned together, form and matter, for instance,
as for example, in the case of a living thing which 1
coUosite, one who in any way
forin and the rational principle also contemplates the
formed thing. For he does not contemplate an in-
tellfoible livfng thing and a composite hving thing m
the fame wayfbut in the composite he contemplates
is worse. Now, since the universe is a living tti g,
one who contemplates the things which come to be
1-31
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 3, ON providence (II)
in it contemplates at the same time ite j
npovoiav rr,v en avr^- rirarac ini ndvra 2l nrovidence which watches over it, this c y

biadeaeis Kpadeiaai, Ao'yw Kal dvdvKV

Me^ty/ieraf oSv BecopeZ Kal ScrivLJi r;rr»rnS4;iy‘^!’“‘S”-
15 ^'■^■Kpl'Vew piiv avr6^ ov SvWrat
povoiav Kat ro Kara npovoiav ycopls Kal aS ro
S what is according to providence elearly on the
rr,„ " ' a-vbpos rovro noieZv « aoiov one side and on the other the substrate and all that
ITirJ'r-«f-«?«.. <hx7r„X Ses to what results from it. This f"
Sidri P^vreojs ro is lot for a man, except a wise and g^^hke man. m
dior . oAAa ro or. ^oVov dnelv. Kal ^ re'vpr, one might say that “ a god aj°ne ‘iould toll
nrivileffe." ® In fact, it is not for the diviner to tell
?he “ because " but only the “ that his art is a
l^aMpp Be Karai,aprvpodar,s rrj, dopas Kal aV Jading of letters written in nature,® declaring an
fcos ayovar^s Ka, nplv nap' airoov /avijvac otol order fnd never deviating into disorder,
e/caoro. Kf. Saa. 2o^9ie>era. ydp .L Ura the heavenly which proclaims and bn ^ t
KdKe^arodrocs awreXolZ dp.a ZIZ light what each individual is like and all his ckarart«
sSs even before they appear in the People them­
26 oZZa^'''’ KoVoo, dmACyi'^ ^8^ selves For these things here below are earned along
<^^acpopra ra aXXa r<3 rerr,prjK6rr inelZal al with those things in heaven, and those m heaven
aAAo. I^av-r^a. r<3 dvaXdycp. Oi ydp iBei dnvp- riS to L lartl, .nd both together toto
7xf\ ™ cBfioiwaBai Si nZs to the consistency "“'“*‘.“8'““ uf “ to
a^fa a[,^yen7, Kal rovr’ dp tacos etn rd verse and by correspondence indicate the others to
Xeyofxepop ws avpexei rd ndpra dpaXoyta. "Eor. Ae observerl for other forms of divination, too, woA
ry coSespondence. For it would not have been right
^ woW/xETOi- del. Brehier, H-S?.- for all things to be cut off ^om each, other >ut jey
had to be made like each other, in some.way at least
krhaps this might be the meaning of the saying Aa
’ Plato, Timaeus 47E5-48A1
» Cp“n.t^52T7°'t6 341E3. cire5?ondence holds all things together.* And

‘ Cp. Timaeus 3103 and 3202. But Plato's a.aAoy.'a is Udathematical proportion ^^rofpSth^uSiT
attention to the mathematical side of Plato s thougnr.
132 1-33
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3. ON PROVIDENCE (II)
8e rocovro. ^ d.aXoyia. cSare ^al r6 x^tpov np6s I correspondence is ^er^ to^tL'^bSter, ^
TO xe^pov cos TO p^Arcoy np6s r6 ^iXriov, olov ds I lated to the worse as the better is
op,^,a npos Si^fMa Hal ttoXs npXs 770'Sa, ddrepov
^pos Oar^pov. Kai. d ^odXec. <L, dpe-dj np6s
bcKacoavyr,u koc Kada np6, dScdav. E.’ rotW.
'SsS’iiSsSzi
am oyta ev rep iravrl, Kal TTpoemelv evi- kuI d
noiee Se eKdva «V ravra, odruj Trocet, <Ls Kal rd
ev ^avr. a'AA^Aa, ddrepoy ya,.a ! each-other, “"^Lr-blt^that each thing in
Oa.repov-a,xa yap yevmrai-oAA’ cLs. fj -rriehvKev
eKaarov ootco Kal ndaxei t6 ■7rp6a4>opov els rXv
avTov <f>vaiv. Kal Sri rovro roiovrov, Kal rd this kind, this experience is ot this Kina
roiovrov rovro- oSroi ydp Kal XSyos els. *‘fS*S“7her^ bttte. fting., *».
7. Kaljn 8k rd ^eXrico, Kal rd xelpco. ’Et7€J
av eiT] ri yelpov eV TToXveSet p.^ Svros BeXrCo-
7TOJS
’‘“VStw rnd h™ coSd toe be mytog
w?, 7) no^s TO ^SXriov p-f, x^ipovos; ’'Qore oSk
s:?1?®toe“'e. eo. something wome? So one
airiareov to x^pov iv rep ^eXrlovi, dXXd aTToS^re'ov
TO ^eXreov, on eScoKev eavrov r& yei>ovi. "OAwj
8e ot avatpew a^iovvres rd x^pov eV rd) rravrl
avaipovai yovoiav air^v. Tlvos ydp Sarai; Od
yap 8-rj avrris oi8k rov ^eXrlovos- errel Kal r^v
av^ npovoiav dvopd^ovres npds rd Kdre^ Xiyopev.

lO^ac oAov rre^vra. llpSeiai 8k ^87] Sk radrvs

€Kaerra pevovejrjs iKelvqs kv8ov olov iK ^l^VS plois
earcoeryjs avrrjs eV adrrj- rd 8k ii-jvdyjaev els
=mfrMm
„e abolishing P'^SiS, no. rf tolt o, of the

'to
op!iv°'4[28]n“9ln^®®

134
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3. ON PROVIDENCE (II)

Ji,^,,p,a^,4vov dBa^Xov ^Kaarol i^dvov one bearing an image of that higher reality, but when
a^o Sid dXXcp dravOa 4j8-rj .’yWo
ra p.ev ^h^aU>v TrpowWa d, do
^oppoo eaxLCero‘Kal i^ixp,, olov kX^ScovKal S.Kpwv
Kac Kapn^v Kal ^riXXcov Kal rd p,d dd,
ra Se ey.rerp del, ol Kapnol Kalrd ^dXXa- Kal rd
ytvoneva dd dye rods tcov i^dvco Xdyovs eV
avrots olov pcKpd SdSpa ^ovXr,9ivra elvac, Kal d
20.eyevv^, ,rplv cf>eaprjva., rd iyyi,, dye'vva p^dvov.
la SiaKeva olov ra>v KXdScov i^Xrjpovro 4k tQv
av .K-^sJlCvs Kal adrcdv dXXov rpdnov neAvKd-
rwv. ei <bv Kal Inaoye rd S.Kpa rcov kX<ISwv, djs
€/c rov ttXtjoIov oleadai rd ndOos llvau fidvov rd
, dpxnv aS rd fid Inaax^, rd S4 nroduced by what is close to them; but m fact the
Str»<j “*“> "p“ r "SnT“S%x
e770t«, rf 84 dpx^ dv^pryfro Kal airnj. n6j>poj9ev
eS ShS'SS»eJtSe
p-ev.yap eX96vra dXXa rd yroiovvra ds dXXyfXa,
n wf 8p^4v n S“oT™ from . fe«ff orig‘“. »““J Te»
aXX-rjXovs Sfxoiot. yevdfievqi 4k rcov airwv dpfiTjhvres
rd)v neTTOvrfKorcov.
they originate from the same parents.

r The imagery in this sentence ^ and

perhaps Plotmus the spaced branches of
unplanned effect them advLely; these, too,
“rlf&e'ZV^rdTre ^mVccd by the growth-prmcrple

of the whole tree.

136 137
 ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT

well we may rise to its level in our next 1^®>

for his guardian (ch. 6).

III. 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN
SPIRIT Synopsis

Introductory Note
treatise is No. 16 in the chronological order: it was

necJT ^ to Romewas
it® siting [Ufecom
oh
ar^fide'f deliberately, vague) with
an moident which he records in ch. 10 of the Life An
Eg^tian priest offered to conjure up the guardk{ sniS
“ intelligible umverse (oh. 3). universal s j

tb« twi ^^Vemtitiom of his toe orTen wdth

the theology of spirits which is to be found in his Platonist
predecessors and successors (Proclus criticises Plotinus’s

pp. 686-385 Cousm, paras. 75-76 Westerink)

f““?? «» vri... .SSS
o^h» pi j n guardian spirits in the myths
X and Timaeus, and to inteiWet
TTfl^ “ version of Plato^m
^uni^e2^fchsT“^ fif i® a
niverse (chs. 3 and 6) containing many different I^vaIq
of real! y. on any one of which we mly cZTSe £ worid itlSbarks hr it-witoits-spirit as in a.ship, and the
principle, then, on the level above that on which we chnnan
to live, next above the principle which "sToSnlnS i s
m any particular life, is our “guardian spWt “rKflive the universe, partly on itself (ch. b).
140 I4I
 III. 4. (15) HEPI TOY EIAHXOTOS III. 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED
HMAS AAIMONOS guardian spirit 1

1 TKe expressions of some realities come into

existence wMe the realities f
moved but soul has been already said to be m
=p8.4:“ir. tz^i»j;4t motion when it generates the
is its expressed form and the power of growth which
extends aLo to plants.^ For soul has the power of
growth when it Lists in us, too, but it domnates it
because it is only a part; but when it comes to be in
nlants this power of growth,dominates because it has,
^?o ;S be«mf l»l.l«d. Doe. this po»e, of
10 etSonoutro 8^ LarJ- growthfthen, ptoduce nothing ? It
^eor^at npos to yevvijaav otov iKrpe<j>6ilevov oLm altoeether different from itself; for after it ^re is
no more life, but what is produced is lifeless, ^at is
it then? Just as everything which was produced
_CI?—^ aof^utv dmi Ei’
before .this was produced shapeless, but
S/T.! “J" ™f W A-
turning towards its producer and
r3to maturity L it> -
produced is not any more a form J

7^«™. x^oZ;i7Z7:iZ not alive—but absolute indefiniteness. For even it

LereTs indefiniteness in the things before it, it is
nevertheless indefiniteness within form; the thing
^ oJtom Kirchhoff: oSaa codd.
is not absolutely indefinite but only in relation to its
-Lrfj sSl'::, neS^^S but what we are dealing with now is
» The reCnceTJrnnJf ‘ ‘ • Lsolutely indefinite. When it is perfected it be
comes a body, receiving the form appropriate to
142 143
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT

^ooct^opov, iTToSoxfi ^ rov yew-^aavTos Kal iKdpi- potentiality, a receiver for the
^,ovov rovro iu ac6puirc ^ayarov L
aval €v eayaru) rov Kara}.
. f', 'P^XV '^o.aa entfieXeZrai rov ‘rirt.WnirorS.McM,
^“A:c7ra- al S' a^AAm

I ,,S,crcv. ^ eV eia« ^ eV aXItel in other ways. “ It traverses the whole

X^cp r)^ ev avrZpjZp 4>vr,^a. T6 yAp KpJlovv
universe in different forms at different times,
TO eavTcp rrp6a<l>opov rroi^Z, rS. S’ eSier in the perceptive form or the rational or m this
“ W-,- W- ’Ev ^vOpd^rr^ oi .para v3 growtWorm'. For the dominant part of it
ra ye^co, aMd av'vearcv o^Se' ye r6 .peZrrof deZ- mSes^the thing appropriate to itself^ but the o^h^
ear, yap .a, ravra ycSpav rtvd kyovra. ^,6 koX Twever SStopartslre nJt dLinant but they
ZrToxT'''°'' alae^aecos-
are also present; and in fact the better part does not

cutfre TTwra cn->.e/5yer, /cara M rS

Kpe^rrov ro oXov elSos dvdpconos. 'E^eXSovad Sd birrs. 1“^";'
o Tt rrep errXeovaae. rovro yiverai. MS d>edye,v
rrcrirs mrs**»
*
et -apos ro avoi, ha ds rd,v ataOrjriKXv
eTraKoXovdovvYes roZs f,a6r,roZs dScSXocs. p,!^Sslk Sat all Sgs S together but the whole form is
man £ tiS of S be'tter part. But when it goes
16
15
3 eScoScvv rfj ^iae, rov yewdv
Xcyveiats. dXX’ els rS voeplv .al out of the body it becomes what there was ^ost of
vovv .a, 6e6v ”Ooo, p,d oSv r6v dfopcoZ it Therefore one -must escape * to ttie upper
JVPV<^.a^, -rraXi^ avdpoiTToi. "Oao, SS d'^B-doei Irld S we may not sink to the level of sense-
P-ovov eCrjaav. fwa>- dXX' el p,'ev alad^aeis petd

^oSoxfi KirohhoSi imSoyi/v coM..

and &od. Those, then, who guarded the man in
r b.00™ agoib -n»se "1.0 j.v.d by
176A^m. Plato, TheaftdZ:
sense alone become ammaU; but it their sens
• The phrase is taken from SepvMic VII. 619B1-2. perceptions have been accompanied by passionate
144
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD HI. 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT
ev,AxS. rd S.yjta. koX ^ h,a<t>op^ ^ eV roJroiy r.5
biafopov Twv roiovTOiv -noteZ- Saoi Se uer
20 emdviMias Kal rrj^ ^Sovrjs rov intdvpu^vvros, rd
aKoXaora rwv Kal yaarplfiapya. El 81
aiadrjaei p.era rovrcop, dAAd vcjdela alad'^aecus
"Ig with «■»"?»*“
M€t avraiv Kal <j,vrd- f^Svov y8.p rovro ^ pAXiara
€V7]pyei TO 4,vtck6v. Kal airots p.eXirr, SevSpcoefj-
Tow SdjitAojUodaoi;? ^eV, KaOaplovs U rd
25 aAAa, ra cp8,Kd- rod. Sd dAo'ycor ^aa^Xias ak-
music but were in other ways respectable turn in
rovs,€i p,7]^ aXXT] KaKla napel-q- fiere<opoX6yovs 8d Wvds- kinss who ruled stupidly into eagles,
avev cf>povria,cos ds r6v oipavXv dd alpopUvovs d, rl;vtd „^ ofh„ vices: .sttoLmcrs who w«e
opveis p.erecopovs raZs irr'tjaeaiv. '0 8e rriv noXi- iwayl raising themselves to the sky mthout phdo-
dper^v clvdpconos- 6 S' fjrrov dperm Sc reflection turn into birds which fly high. The
mS who practised community virtue becomes a ma
30 TToX^T^Ki}^ fierdycov ^oXltckSv C<pov. p^dXcrra ^ rd
again; bu^ one who has a lesser share of it a cre^u
rocavra. ' S llvL in community, a bee or something of the
^ 3. Tls oSv Salfj,(ov; oKalJvTavda. TlsS^Oeds;
■n o evravOa.^ To ydp ivepyrjaav rovro eKaarov^ ^°3*’ Who, then, becomes a spirit ? He ^ho was one
ayei. are Kai dravda ■^yodp.evov. ^Ap' oSv rovrd here too. And who a god? Certain y e
one here For what worked in a man leads hi
[Ser death], since it was his ruler and guide heie
' cKaoTov AB Harder: eVoVou ERJ y Q.
astronomers, there is doubUhat he took PtiM
pMoiSSSX^i.TFE'tTr' ‘°’T. “ with his mastOT on this
VI. 7 [38] 6. 20 “• 301 On the differing opmions

there perhaps a disrespectful allusion here to the^for^ftV^

releasing an eagle from the imperial pyreT) and^'^SK b! and which Dr. Sohwyzer now considers necessa y.
146 147
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 4.
60-Tw o' Sat/xwv, ocxTrep C'ojvra elXijxei; "H ov,
5 dXX6.W6 7Tp6 airov- rovro ydp d<^iarr,Kev dpyovv',
ivepyel U r<5 p^r’ air6i>. KaJ el p.'ev t6 dvepyovv
^ maOrp-iKol, Kal 6 SaCpwv to XoyiKdv el Se
^ard rd X.oyiK6u ^(irjpev, o' haipcov rd iTr'ep rovro
e^ecrrw dpyds avyxcopwv rep epyaCopdvcp. ’OpBws
oSp Xdyerai ^p&s alp-e^aeadai. T6v\dp i^ep-
10 Kelpevov Kara rr^v Ccoriv atpodpeda.^ Atd ri odv
aoToy ayei; "H roy ^lorevaavra-ovk earw dyeiv,
dXXd 7Tp6 rov.p'ev dyeiv, 5re ^Cv, navadpevov §k
Tov dXXcp tTapaxcvpeiV rqv evepyeiav reevrj-
/foVa r^v adrov Kar' ivipyeiav '0 p^v
oSv dedXei dyhv Kal Kpar-^aas Cj] adrds dXXov Kal
IS airds excov SalpoPa-' el Sd papdvoiro rfj ^dypei rov
Xeipovos povs, exei iKeivo rrjv SIkt]v. Tavr-p Kal
o KaKos em ro xetpov ^piaavros npos rrjv opoiorpra
TOV ivepy/iaavros ev rfj ^cofj els Plopj-jpeiov. Et’
Sd ^neaeai Sdvairo r<p Salpovi rip dvoo airov, dveo
ylverai iKeivov Ifiov Kal 5 dyerai Kpelrrov
20 pipos airov iv Trpoaraala Oipevos Kal per' iKetvov
dXXov ews dVeo. "EaTTt ydp Kal TroXXd ^ ijjvxp Kal
navra Kal rd dvoj Kal rd Karco aS ,pexpi vdaps
note on title of this treatise.
Republic X. 617E1. s 107D7.
148
ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT
too. Is this, then, “ the spirit to whom Re was al­
lotted while he lived No, but that which is
before the working principle; for this presides 1 -
Sive over the mfn, but that which comes after it
acts. If the working principle f ^j^^l
have sense-perception, the spirit is the rational
principle; but if'we live by the rational principle,
the spirit is what is above this, presiding inactive
and giving its consent to *e prindple which worto.
So it is rightly said that we shall choose. ,
choose the principle which stands above us according
fom tL of'hfe. Why, then does the sgrft
“lead”® us? It is not possible.for the principle
wS led *e man m Me tol.ad “
only before, when the man lived; when he ceases to
live^ the principle must hand over its, activity to an-
Ser/»ce he ha. died in .''k'J
ponded to that spirit’s activity. This [other prm
ciplel, then, wants to lead, anid when it has become
dSnantdiVes itself and has itself, too, a different
spirit; but if it is weighed down by the force of its
bad character, this weighing down contams in itself
the penalty.. In this way, too, the wicked man,
since^the principle which worked in him
life has pressed hi* down to the Awards what
is like iteelf, enters into the life of a beast. Rut it a
man is able to follow the spirit which is above him,
he comes to be himself above, living that spirit s life,
and *ving the pre-eminence to that better part of
htoself to which'ke is being led;, and after that spj
he rises to another, until he reaches the heights.
For the soul is many things, and all bot^h
things above and the things below down to the limits
-149
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI. 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT
Kac -ea/xey eKacrros K6a(jLos vor,r6s. rols ah of all life and we are each one of us an intelligiWe
/carw avvanrovres r^Se, rots aVw Kal ro«
Koaf^ovra vorjr^ r<S dXAco nam
SvL’f; «»
KO.TW otov aiToppoiav iKelvov StSoWej ds to intelligible part above, but by its ®
kwtw. i^dXXov eV^pyeta^, i^duov o^k iXarrovpA are tied to the world below, gmng a kind of
from it to what is below, or rather an activity, by
4. ^Ap' oSv dd iu crci/xari roCro; "H od- idv which that intelligible part is not itself lessened.
4 Is this lower part, then, always in body. No,
yap arpay^iev, avv.niarp^eraL Kal rovro. Tl if we turn, this, too, turns with us to the "PP®™^
OW 7] TOV TTWTO?; 'ATToarijaeTai Kal to airm mat then, about the soul of the universe ? WilUte
K;] part leave the body when it tur^?JJ®’
rep eaxarep- oiS^ ydp ^Xd,v oiU Kar(x6e., it has not even inclined with ite
<^a yovar,, TTpy^rrirae r6 au^pea rov .oVoJ last depth; for it did not come or come do^ but as
it abidL the body of the universe attaches itself to it
Kae oTov KaraXap.n,rae. oiK ivoxXovv oihk^ 1 S wereymumined, not annoying the soul or
^^P^XO^ pep^as eV da,t>aXd rov Kdapeov K.epi- caiing it any worries, for the "aj
•7;„ What, has it then no kind of perception? Plato say ^
that it has no sight, because it has no ey^thmr,
lOoOK • iPu^mk-
10 oA „„s, 8,A„,<i„ „08J T-. uor ears nor nostrils either, obviously, nor tongue-
Well then, has it an immanent sensation as we av
Xlrgoes on indde ns > No, for thinp wlnd .ro
■XSo ^ 'npep.-noLs. OiU uniformly in accord with nature are qui^ /,^„,Sent
vBovr,. Uapearev ovv Kal r6 <j>vreK6v oi napdv Kal nleasure either. So the principle of growth is present
TO acaerjrLKov cooaoVcor. ’AAA,i n.pl p,kv rov SrSLt being present, «*1».“n
In the sme way. But we deal with the universe in
-o^..VoxAo0.o^a^ Muller, H-S^: o0« eW;,Aoo^eVoo 8^ codd.
for sharp
soulasarich*comp£xunitr^mbT'^f^°^f?^°*“"® put and keep man “ 1^ P ^odus sharply criticises this
and operating in ma^y^wIva S ““y l^^els borate hierarchy of oa Parmenides 134A
must not be separatedf ThVwas a ^’^^Pg^^hed but ?rm 948,^ “ed. Cousin 1864); see P. Henry Utats du
qmte unaooeptabie to the later Neo^pU'S'^® Texte de Plotin, pp. 220-221.
B Op. Timaeus 330.
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 4.
x6aixovii> dXXois- vvv Si Scjoy e^i^Wro ^ dnopi'a
avTov €i,prjTa(,.
5. d ixel alpetrai rov Saijxova Kal d tov
Pu>v, ^cos erv rivos xripiou; *H Kal ^ alpeais ixd
V ^eyop,^v7] rrjs irpoaipeoLv Kal SidOemv
xaOoAov Kai Travraxov aUrrerai. ’AAA’ d i
5 yoa^peo^s rfjs^ ^vxijs xvpla Kal rovro Kpard, S
ay npoxeipop^ exp p.4pos 4k tcov Trpo^e^icoaiyuv,
ovKen TO crwfMa airiov ovSevo^ KaKov avrco- el
yap yorepet rS Ttjs ijjvxps ^dos rov acopaTOs Kal
ro^r o ecAero Kal r6v Saipova. ^alv. oi,K
aMarrcra^ a,.o.8aIo. iyraWa ylyyerai
lOovS o <f>avXos. "Ap’ oSp Svpdpei iarlp eWpoy,
f^pyef Se yiyperai; Ti oSp, d <j>adXov acSparos
oro p8os yovSaios rdyoi, 6 Si rdpapria;. “H
Swyp, paXXop Kal ^ttop rd rijs ^vxps ixaripas
exarepa ra acoiyTa napixeadai. end Kal ai dAAai
e^coOep rvxai rpp oXpp irpoaLpeaw oi5/c iK^iBdCov-
5 CLP. Ora.^^8e Xeyprai, d>s Trpwrop ol KXfjpoi,
dra ra r^p -xapaSeiypara. f eV«ra
rais Tvxa^s f ^ xai <Ss 4x tcop Trapdprcop rods plovs,
1 Indira rats rJxa^s Creuzer, Bed locus nondnm sanatus.
. * Cp. Republic X. 620D8-E1
152
ON OUB ALLOTTED GUABDIAN SPIBIT
other treatises; no>v we have said as much about it as
^ T“f“hr.S’S;es i« g».,di.« sprit and
il k Me there In the other “
Still Tin this world] any power rf decision.
choice in the other world which Plato speaks of is
Sya riddling representarionot the soul
.ndkrmanent purpose and d-^-'f”; »“J
soul’s purpose is decisive, and that part of it dom
nates which lies ready to hand as the ’fesult of its
nrevious lives, the body is no longer respoMible foi
i mayaffeol the m». For >fJhe .o“l s
Character exists before the body, and has what it
chose, and, Plato says, does not
Qnirit^ then the good man does not come mt^
tLce here below, and neither does the worthless one.
rram then, one or the other Potentially [m the
other world] and does he become actually good or bad
Fin this world] ? What, then, if a man who is good m
SamSSpens to g'et a bad body, and a bad man
Ss the oSosite fortune? The powem of either
S of soul,"can, more or less, make their Wies of
either kind, since other external chances, too, can
not turn aside the whole purpose pf the soul , But
5W SSiXtts int’e ftws of
Se hves,i‘. then that they choose their lives from those
n^istakes in choosing -fe by
telligently virtuous: th^ ^ If‘?i,ramnles of lives ” and
plicit in Plato’s ,} “l“Sween the general
“ what tom the Ji;^“®f^/fortunes or misfortunes contained
fhtvfwatd Creuzer-s text - *Ws a^^mn,
Sit am not at all certain that this is the right solution.
153
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT
jard rd rd ^aAAov St'Soia: ra^ ,hvyah presented to them aecording to their characters,
IZ f7'' - «-cs. Plato gives the power of decision rather to the souls,
which adapt what is given to them to their own
Vy o ^avrdnaac. characters. For that this guardian spirit is not en­
20 o...., <n..s.se;..vo.-od8>
tirely outside but only in the sense that he is no
e, rpvxrjs nr^p, o^x S ^p^irepos hi\l bound to us, and is not active in us but is ours, to
-r a.ep^„o. rocoiSe speak in terms of soul, but not ours if we are con­
sidered as men of a particular kind who have a. Me
oIT which is subject to him, is shown by what is said in
e.’ diUcoc i “*' ^<^l4o^vlav, the Timaeus Z if the passage is taken in this way it
26 ° ‘T ^^onXrjpco. will contain no contradiction, but it would have some
disaccord if the spirit was understood otf.™'
ri: And the “ fulfiller of what one has chosen is also
in accord. For the spirit sits above us, ^nd^does no
let us go down much lower into evil, but that alone
acts in us which is under the spirit, not above him
or on a level with him; for it is impossible for the spirit
to become something else than [a being appropriate
6. Tt o^j/
.-wav
o' ffTTovSaXos; "H 6 rr?,
-H Oi. & ,v
R.\ '
,-J ;ri to thd place] where he is. 5 ti +1,^.
6. What, then, is the nobly good man. He is the
man who acts by his better part. He would not have
ZZ IZeZZfl^ been a good man if he had the guardian spirit as a
partner in his own activity. For intellect is active in
R ' ’ \ ‘ I'TTep i>ow • Et the good man. He is, then, himself a spirit or on the
TO OTTcp ..OW 3^ , ^^
level of a spirit, and his guardian spirit is God. is it,
H 8.a TO. eopv^o. r6u i. rij, ye.eW. then, even above intellect? If that which is above
intellect is his guardian spirit, why, then, is he not a
op,co? /cat -npo \6yov ^ /ctwjo-is « e.8oPe. man of noble goodness from the be^nning ? It is
because of the “ disturbance which comes from
birth.® But all the same, even before reason there
with the highe^'^part^of ow souT\h^e Sat/io,v is identified is ih him the inward movement which reaches out
“ Mepublfc X. 620EI ’ ^ '““ortal reason. towards its oivn. Does the spirit, then, always and
® Cp. Timaeus 43A6-^4B7. in every way accomplish its task successfully.
154 iSS
 10
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 4.

rooTois- rot? roiolahe roidSe oSaa

TovTov exeiv ^lov /cat ravrrjv -npoalpeaiv. '0
g^ot Sat^co. o5ro?. oV A^'yc/te., ^yaycoV A^ycrat
Y ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT

«? AtSov ov/ce'rt o' a/5rA? ^eWtr, c’Xv uA rdLri

eAjjrat TraAtr. II^A rot/ ttcS?,- TA dyayet.
€t? /cptatt. TO ct? rA «AtA ax^fia iXdJ L^. Sre*LXice of lives]? The leatRng to judg^
ar-oyW. o" etxe rrp6 ^"? yc.eWco?- Ta ment ieans that the spirit to the same fo
a- am. <P^? rA. r^~? LrZ

o^Se ^to? aorat? AAAA St'/o,. Tt' SA rat? «V

fw«a aco^ara .tatoAoat?; ^arrov ,5 Sa/acov
H TTo^po^y, ^ g, , M .
20 At' ;a. oJi
Se boaie. o( brutbs? . Is Ihei. e««r*“
at - f*' ■»?At^ ^ e;/ ^Aw rwi/ nXavwpUvoiv,

> XPl Y°’P oieaOai Kal KoapLov elvai

€v rj) ifwxr) 7)p,ojv fxr) p.6vov vorjrov, AAAa /cat
hms T7JS Koa^v 6^0,,Srj BtdeJ,v vevep,rjpAvris *e Sle 4l»» «“ >" «•' •“" " ‘C “t " oE EEE
?:etf.sr;“hro:af4’'E”ii™4ri,.otivit,
25«ara Sv.ap^c, Sca,f>6pov, A^oetSet? raJrat? rat?
S^at^/caJ rA? .ap» el.at /caJ .VA;,yctav here • 2 for’one must think that there is a umverse m
gfmt e/caon?? /ca2 dnaXXayelaas iK,Z ytW^at
-in'sr^Efotitss^rs
^ Cp. PAactfo 107D7-E4.
on Timaeus 41D652Dl°'J^^re^he Dem* i!-® Ebe mo™.g stos,* the P"'™’* '" Sty
making ofsouIswWch are to
to ^he“app^rSLte
tempta the disturbances and
“ Cp. Timaeus 41D4^7. 4 Cp. Tiwctews 38C-4;0B.
156 157
 Plotinus : ennead hi. 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT
■^pos aarpov ro r<S eVepy^'aa.r. .ai set free they come there to the star which'is in har­
mony with the character and power which lived an
Sat^on ye .r, avr<p rov'r^ xPV^^rac ^ r.z' worked in them; and each will have a god of this
ravpv r-jv Sv.apc.- a^enr^o. S^ rovro ^iXrJ. kind as its guardian Spirit, either the star itself or th
las: S efco y^emj ri,v ha.poviav i^,p. god set above this power; but this reqmres mme
accurate investigation^ But those
tn be outside have transcended the nature ot spirits
<ro> ro>Se r& 6para>, eW iarlv eV? and the w£,k destiny of birth, and altogether wha
av.avevexedor,s Kai rij, eV ^.Acyevewl' is in this visible world; as long as the soul is there, the
oi/atct?, lyv et Tt? Aeyot ravrrjv etmi rvjv irepl to.
substance in it which desires birth is taken up with it
if anyone should say that this substance is- the soul
(Toifiara yivop.ev7]v fiepiar^v mjp,7TX7]dvovaav
which has come to be am6ng bodies and is
multinlving and dividing itself with its bodies, he vnll
Se 0,3 f,ey^d,c- r6 y^p aM eV spealfcorrectly. Bufit is not divided quantitatively,
oAo,.^,ca. ndX,v IV- e’^ eVAj fcloo deJ for it is the same thing in all, a whole and again one,
and since this soul is in process of division m this way
40 I^^P^Coi^^vris odr<o,; dianep
many animals are always produced from one, as
happens also with plants, for this [the plant-soul],
Kai oVI ^1. ^,Voo;« J ?3
too,^is also divisible among bodies. And sometimes
-ptZat" V" --^^Povao. the soul remains in the same living tlung and give
[life to others], like the soul in plants; but sometimes
when it goes away it gives before it goes, as with
plants which have been pulled up or dead ammaE,
45 rfr 2ove/)yeIr S| 2
when from their corruption many are generated from
al^pZ.^'' one. And the soul-power from the All co-operates,
the particular power which is the same here too.
n^A^'' h V hxi ivTavda. ^ r6v airXv ^ But if the soul comes here again, it has either t
same or another guardian spirit according to the Me
^ <T0> KirohhofF, H-S.
® rriv del. Kirohhoff, H-S^. governs the sun is related to it as our soul is to our body, or
35 Its rthetCdiscussionsof the “ divis
8»r*“'SL‘vS"f J™ ss- £r.™i s +.v,B Boul. with reference to this passage of th

158
 PLOTINUS:, ENNEAD III. 4.. ON OUB ALLOTTED GUABDIAN SPIBIT
which it is going to make for itself. It embarks,
oSu rorh-ov rov Sa^o.o. !sa.ep dTen, with th!s spirit first of all in this nmverse as if m
a boat, then the nature which has the name of the
^ov&a ^ rov arpaKTov AeyO/xeV:, ^areVafa; “ Spindle ”1 takes it over and sete it, just as m
gan.p .. ,r. „.a eV. ne^^^ayo^ sS Lme seat of fortune. And as the circuit of
e rrjs nepi^opas coanep wetl^aro? r<5,. eVi rfy heaven, hke a wind, carries round the man sitting,
even moving about, on the ship, there occur many and
/oaV^.0. ^ ^ai yroAAaJ I!i
various sights and changes and incidents, ^nd. Ps
TToiKcXac yivovrai Kac diai Kal fierad^aecs Kal as in the® actual ship, [they i
ov^nr^l^ra Kal &a..p eV airfi ^rfj vrjl f, \Z moved either by the tossing of the ship or by himsel ,
This own impulse, whatever it inay be, which he
ocKe.a. rjv av ayo^ rep i^l ,ecby elJae rrapZZ has because he^is on the ship precisely “ ^^J^t
Tov rponov. Ov yAp 6,,ot<ps iv roli a;5rory For everyone is not moved and does n^
S^An T'J V iv^PY^l. Tiverae oh ahke in the same circumstances. ^fthTsamTS
Sea<l>opa 8ea<l>opocs ^ ck riov airwv fj SicCf,6pcov happen to different people as a ®"“hers
60 V ra avrA AXXoes, kAv^opZa different occurrences, or the same thing
Ten if the circumstances they encounter are dif­
60 TTooaTreaovra- roiovroKyAp ^ elixapp^'pr}.
ferent; for that is what destiny is hke.
1 Cp. Eepvblic X. 616C4 ff-

i6i
enne:a.d III. 5

III. 5. ON LOVE
Introductory Note
late treatise (No. 50 in Porphyry’s chronological
S th^ concerned more than any other in the Ennlds
with the aUegon^l mterpretation of myth, though with
Platomc rather than traditional myth: the story to which
lotmus devotes most of his attention is that of the birth
of Eros m the Symposium (203B ff.). Plotinus often al-
Kuit ° Platomc myths and interprets them
minctol™ f T" P^°«°P?ncal purposes. He explains the
prmoiples to be applied m the interpretation of myths in
the last chapter of this treatise (9. 24-29). But ha does
not seem to consider this kind of intellectual activity very
7 nnd is extremely casual aboSt
wbeto ^ 7 7^ “?c>Pretation. He does not really care
On^nn I>e represented as the daughter of
^ranos, Ktotos or Zeus (chs. 2 and 8), or identified with
, "7® (8. 22-23). He obyiously finds it dif-
Sh Xh inteiTiretation of tL Symposium
^ system, and his explanaX of
It (ch 6 ff.) IS sometimes obscure and confusing. Ploti-
lollows Plato closely m essentials (with an important
variation mentioned in the notes to ch. 1). The Phaedms
and tho Synvposium are reconciled by distinguishing tto
Love^who IS a god from the Love who is a daimoMch 4^
Synopsis
Is love a pd, a spirit, or an affection of the soul?
Discussion of love as an affection of the soul (ch. 1). Love
164
ON LOVE
as a god. Is he bom from or with Aphrodite? The two
Aphrodites, the heavenly one and the goddess of marriage;
the heavenly Aphrodite is the most divme kmd of soul and
?oS toe aWi^tc ^o- 2)- . ^ ^
Lntial reality; how he comes mto
soul’s seeing. The W Aphrotote is the soul °f the urn-
verse, and produces her own Love (ch. 3). Bach in
dividual soul has its own love, related to the ^iveraal
Love as individual souls are to universal ^ul: the higher
Z^ve is a god, the lower a spirit (ch. 4). The Itove who is
a spirit is not the physical universe, as some think (ch. 6).
Lterpretation of the myth of the birth of Love m the
Syt^osium: first, how spirits (daimones) Mfer from
heim subject to affections and passions through partici­
pating in intelligible matter (ch. 6). The parents '
Plmty is an tetelligible reality,
matter, indefinite and so giving unbounded desire to Love.
All spirits have this double origm: perverse loves, like
false Voughts, are not substantial reahties hut pMSive
affections .of the soul (ch. 7). Zeus and Aphroifr
Intellect and Soul (ch. 8). Plenty, his dru^enness^to
nectar, and the “ garden,” all repsent “ ‘Afferent wa;^
the glorifying outflow of Logoi from InteUect mto Soul.
Principles for toe interpretation of myths: then apphca-
tion to this one (ch. 9).
 ni. 6. (50) ITEPI EPQTOS
1. Hfpi ^pwros. TTSrepa OeSs ns f] Salficov f,
midos n rrjs ijjvxns. 7, 6 p.kv 6e6s ns ^ haipuov.
€ n KoX irddos, Kal tto16v n ^Kaarov^ imoK^aadai
aicov rds re rdjy dXXojv dvdpcLmov inwolas
Semdvras, Kal Baa, eV <j>,Xooo<f>[c^ iyi^ovro nepl
rodrcvv. Kal t^dXicfra Baa i7roXap.^dvev 6 dews
nXciTw. Ss Sri Kal TToXXd TToXXaxfj -rdiv Bavrov
TTepl Bpcoros Bypailrev Ss Si) od paSvov eV rals
hxo.ts eyyiyv6p.ev6v n ndOos etpr]Kev elvai, ciAA^
Kal Saipovd <fyr,acv airBv Kal rrepl yeviaecos aSrov
10 Sce^iiXeev, Bnojs Kal BQev Bari yeyevripBvos. He/iJ
pkv oBv roO rrddovs oB r6v Bpcora alncBpeda. Bn
eyyweraL ev hx^ts e^iepevais KaX<p nvi avprrXaKfj-
^ac, Kal d>s B, B^ols aBriq ^ p4v Ban napd
aoihovwv aircp rep KdXXei olKeitodivrwv, SB Kal
reXevrav BdeXei els alaypov nvos rrpa^iv, ovSels
15 dyvoel Srjrrov Bdev SB rBjv dpy^v e'yee BKdrepos, r6
evrevSev BneaKonelv Sid ef>cXoao<l>las rrpoa'6,Kei.
Apxh SB et ns deiro rrjv avrov kBXXovs rrpBrepov
i66
III. 5. ON LOVE
1 Our enquiry concerns love, whether it is a god or
a spirit or an afFectioh of the soui; or whether one
kind is a'god or spirit and another also an alFecUon,
and what sort of god or spirit or affection each oj toes®
is; it is worth while considering the ideas abou^t
which have occurred to the rest of mankind and all the
teachings of philosophy on this subject, and in parti­
cular all the opinions of that godhke man Plato, who
has, of course, written much about love in many places
in his works. He has said that love is not only an
affection occurring in souls but asserts that it is also
a spirit, and has described its origin, how and from
whL source it came to be. Now about therfection
of soul for which we make love responsible, there is
no one, I suppose, who'does not knqw that it occurs
in souls which desire to efhbrace some beauty, and
that this desire has two forms, one which comes from
the chaste who are akin to absolute beauty, and one
which waAts to find its fulfilment in the doing of some
ugly act; but it is appropriate to go on from there to a
philosophical consideration of the source from w^ch
Lchofthem originates. And if someone ^sumedthat
the origin of love was the longing for beauty itselt
which was there before in men’s souls, and their recog-
1 That is Love as a substantial superhuman reality, ft god
or aIpHt. wlmTs responsible for producing the affection of love
in the human soul.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5. ON LOVE
eyjac^ ^v^ats Spejiy Kal ^niyy<oaiv Kal ovyy4vaav
nition of it andHnship with it and T
ne^ that it is something of their own, he wonW ^t, I
think on the truth about its cause. For the ugly is
Tfi Tii £.X“Z°'
t'“ r'”%™ i8a.w; „;.i
^AeW, 0“ cWtiA eV rr5 rot? definite which is “ in the column of the good , but
the indefinite is ugly and belongs to the other co umm
And nature has its origin from above, from the Good
1"'’“! Tj 8A . S
26 T^c SrjXoy^Ti tov KaXov. "Orw S«' in something and is akin to it, he has an affinity also
/cai 3'™‘ ovyyeW,s. rorirov thKel^Toi ■with its images. But if anyone rejects this cause, he
npo, ras elK6ya,. El Se' r.j W™, Jir^e unable to say how and for what reasons the
atrwv ayeXoc oir^ t6 nddos ylverai ^aPsi’l, emotion of love occurs even.in those lovers who aim
aiTias^ oyx e^ei Xeyetv oiS’ eV airaiv rwy Sii

laxTlT-^ """"y i8o.AoMeV r^v c/>^a. teZLe, when it went, to create

sj;r^SE:“zr&'z»L.jhe^
below are content to have the beauty here below,
^oAoj< -^dp.arvv eV e.Wc J
the beauty which is present in images and bodfies,
o ^PX^tvttov aiiTois TTapeaTiv, I'ce the Irchetype-is not present to th^ jlud^ -
^ eoTW amor avroi? tov Kal rotJSe ^pav. KaJ etV responsible for their loving even this beauty nere
=» ^ &„w„ d,8 ,„58. 8A9L.V below And if they come from this beauty here
to the recollection of that ^’’‘^hetype, this ear*ly
«>»0W ™„ d8,jAs rovro 4a.vri(„a,. beauty still satisfies them^as au-image, ^"t rf they
d^not recollect, then, because they do not know
‘ ^/AalvTcuv Harder: ipdiruv codd. that is happening to them, they fancy this is the true

finity of ttesoul°to beauty UndTta°fi”t*“?

2SS “ ««S.'zrp£:
natural af-
L3sr^'S3fSf|
a Pythagorean term.
» Symposium 206C 4-6. 169
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5. ON LOVE
Kat a(L<^pooi.oSaiv dvafidprrjTOs « np6s t6 beauty If they remain chaste there is no error in
T7^0€ KoXoV ot/cetcoctc 'n ''t » ^ their intimacy with the beauty here ^
dLann-Zn K s e/CTTTCUaty
afiaprui K« ora, ^adap6s 6 rot? koXov se roZ fell away into sexual intercourse And ^e
epu>9. ayanrirdv r6 k6}0^os u6vov

rov aOavarov etmt d>s iv Qv-qray e’m^itat'a

L5«ith another desire of" being
ottror rjp aetyeret Kal d,Ucp rd \a\dv £rd
„ a mortal may," seeks the ^'“•*^"**,*.“7 of
/cat Kara Idjv andpe, Kal yewa eV /caAtS
everlasting and eternal; ^nd as he goes y
nature he® o«s and generates in

45 K^al ^ dlSuy, r3 .,c6rZ Z W kS

ra a.n a^y rocaCra TraWa. T<5 aiu oSv
ITIIJ Tw KaXid, rd
de^p^vov TToirjaai KaXdv re eWAet Trotetv ,5,7’
€voeia? Kac ovk avraoK^s' Kal e^'n-cn
^ V > oierai, ei ev /caAw yew-jaerai. Ot S’ dv
Y 7Tapavop<p KaL napd. ‘<j>dmv iBiXwoi yewav
r^s Kara <f.vmv nopdas Troirjadpevoi rdy dpyds
Y^yopevoi napa^opoi iK radrrjs olov dSov dxfah-
aavrey ^eetvrat yeaoVrey otire ^'pojra yroWey e’c4’ S
Wev avrotty oire^ e^^eat. yewyjaeco/odr/ypt^v
KaXXovs e,Kovos^ cure o" rt iarl KdXXos aird. ^AXX'
ovv ot re aayparcyyv KaX&v Kal Scd pX^cu ipcdvres
ort tcaAa ecrrt. epcSotv, ot re rS. X,ydp,,ofpcKrdv
S:ttToTetl rSe Zn point; those who love
clojy tSotee ofCofy *° foU°^
beautiful bodies, also with a view
in fact, rntroduo“d f has, course, love them ^--e ^ey
sharply between the pure love of beauwVh^ distmgmshing so so do those who love with the mixea lov
to generate and that which is mixed withes
..d»st“^“'r.E"g Plato all love up to the highest is essentially productive (op.
Kosiam 212A). In Plotinus It IS not.
170
 li
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON LOVE
I pra ha Kai r6 d.i. rocodro>.
we have spoken; they love women
60 df^eivovs- aa,<t>povova, akv petuate themselves but if the
a/M^co. AAA Kal to rfjSe /cdAAo? cre^ovmv ful they fail in their purpose [of generating
beautv^’l; but the first group [those who love with
apKov^e^oc. oc Sk Kd.eho, oVo. dvep.W,oeyjaav. out thought of self-perpetuation, with a P”® ^ove^
ovK aTLi^^ovaiv oihk tovto d>s di> Kal d-nori- beautvl are better; both are chaste But some
^ea(,a r, ov e^hov Kal TraLyvu^v. 05rot akv lovers even worship earthly beauty, and it is enough
vv -n^pi^ TO KaXov alaxpov dvev. ol hk Kal Sid t6 fortCfbut others, those who have recollected the
X
archetype, venerate that higher beauty too, and
do ho^4reat this earthly beauty, either, '"'i*
,^eais ex.i ei, KaKdv eWo,a.v ^oAAaV:,. respect, since they see in it the creation and play­
thing of that other. These ^ov^>^«V*'‘'’but rer^
cernid about beauty without any ugliness, but ther
are others who fall into ugliness and they too do so
E.te5be.u.y;fo.i.ftthcdesj,e»^g~dot«„
-oAAa^o„ Acj^poSiTyj, "EpcoTa Xkyc. Kal kpyov
involves the fall into evil. So much, then,
avTcp fai^KaXcdv re ^opov ^alSa>v Zal
affections of the soul [produced by lo'^e].
KIV7)TIK0V TCOP ijjvxcXv Tpds t6. eW KdXXos, kFj Kal 9 But the Love whom we ought to make the ma
^navieiP Trjp rjS^ yevof^dprip ^pos t6 e’/cei 6pp.-^v, nbtctff our philosophical discourse is the one whom
S only th^rS of mankind but those aEo who give
rovTOv ^aXiara 4,iXoaoifr,Tiov Kal Si, Kal
oaa ^^^OfXTToaup eiprjTai ^apaX-qnriov, eV ols of th. god., »d eopeoiolly .
??‘"«d“yShKSkf.■■ S«d-
OVK <:A<f>poSiT7,s ifnjah aMp y^piadai, dAA’ eV> i
10 n T^s Hev.'a. Kal tov r IX S&ghL ™,ld, or
nopcfv. Eot/ce Se o Adyo^ Kal -nepl Trjs 'A<f>poSL-
ry,5 anaipaeip ti ei-rreip. e?r’ oSp eVet^j e?re
p-^T eKeiP7]s yeyopdpai Adyerat 6 ’’Epcos. UpcHrop
______ ^ <*^4>pohlrTjs . . . ^> Kirchhoff.
i
^ Phaedrua 242D9. dtL whether Love is said tahave been born froin
* Phaedrus 2Q5C2-i. to’orS her. Ftet, to, »ho 1. Aphrodrto!
‘ Symposium 203B-O.
172 173
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI. 5
ow TiSTj^ A<f>po8iT7); Eha 7TW? ^ airfjs f,
avv avrr, r, rwa rponov r6v aMv r6
re ap.a Kac avu avrfj. Aiyo^ev rijv 'A<f>posl/m
dva, S.rrrjv rr^v fih oipavlav Oipavov ZyovX
eh<u, TTjv Se eK Acos Kai AicLvy^s. -rfjv rwv rfjhe
<}>a7TTO,xev7jv e^opov yafuov d/xrjropa iKeivnv
wxi eneKeiva. yafiwv. Src firjS’ eV odpayoj ydaoi.
jVy Se ovpavLav Xeyo^dvrjv e’« Kp6vov vov 6vro,
avayK-q ^vy-qv Oeiordrqv elvai e^s
a^ov aK-qparov aKrqpdrov fielvaoav dvw, d>s fi-q^l
piorrqvovaav rwa viroaramv Kal dpUroxov vXqs
ovaiav~odev avr^v rodrcp f,vlrrovro, r& d^ijropa
ejvai~^v Sq Ka. Oeou dv res SiKaicos. oiZipL
einoi a/UKTov ovaav /cat KaOapdv id' iavrvs
/cat OAno. are eayvov ko.0 eaar<J r& iyydOev, dre
30 Zd rrjs ISpv'aecos
SOnposroyev^aa. Uaviv 6V ,car^;^et. aW d9ev
ZlxZ "'^hprqp.ivq noXd peaXXov
q qXcos au exoe^ e'a.rot/ oVo. a,3rd. ^ep!xdp.nee
<p(x)S TO e^ avTov eis avrov avvqprqpeevov. ’E<f>etTO-
^ on Jjv <fime<us del. Volkmann, H-S.
m the speech of'pausankf
Xenophon’s Symposium viii, 9-10 SoTriLlf i ^ '*!
appear to take it ver3.serionsiyfan"ditKnoT^^^^^^^^^^
ON LOVE
I Next, we must ask how Love is either born froni.hei
^ or wth her, or in what way it apphesto
that he is at the same time from her and with he .
Now we say that Aphrodite is douWe, one, the
heavenly, w6 say is the “ daughter of Heaven, and
the other, the one “ born of Zeus and
charge of earthly marriages as their guardian, but that
other is “ motherless ” and above marriages, becaus
there are no marriages in heaven.^ The heavenly
one, since she is said to be the child of
he is Intellect, must be the most divine kind of soul,
springing directly from him, pure from the pure,
rLaini^ above, as neither wanting nor being able
to descend to the world here below, since it is not
according to her nature to come down, since she is a
separate^ reality and a substance without part m
mLer—for which reason they spoke of her "ddhngly
in this way, that she was ‘ ‘ motherless ; one would be
right in speaking of her as a goddess, not as ^
she is unmixed and remains pure by herself. For that
which derives its nature immediately from Intellect
is itself, too, pure, since it is strong in itself by
nearness since, too, Soul’s desire and its abiding-
rje are close to its’parent principle which is strong
Lough to hold it above; for which reason Soul ^^^^ch
is immediately dependent on ^^^tellect could not fa
away; it is much more firmly held than the sun
holds the light which shines out from himself around
him, which comes from him and is closely ^med to
him. Now since Aphrodite follows upon Kronos
in the development of his thought ^^“"tLove in the
posium. PlotLus finds it useful because it can be made
his distinction between higher and lower Soul.
17s
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5. ON LOVE
k1? nf ^arpl rov
„,, if you like, Ce t.Cer »«/»»";
J^.pOl'OV Ovpai'CO €V7)Pyy)(j4 TC 'rrr\Ar> * ' \
diieetei her .cavity to™*
36 <iKeicLer] Kal ipaaddac, "Epc^ra iy^wriaT^ aTk ,rith him, .nd iilled with ,Pf■'“*¥ ,1„? h™ slS
trTe'S.l^ % m.de . ,«i
noaraoiv Kai ovmav elpydoaro, Kal dfuf>co Zl
^Wi, Kac rj^ yeivap.4v7j Kal 6 KaX6s ^Epwj J
y^yevmx^vos vnoarams -n-pds dXXo /coAoC del
reray/.e.rj Kal r6 et.ac eV Wro, l;,o.aa Zr2
wanep nodov^os Kal nodoviMivov, S^OaXp^ds 6 rov
no9ovvro, rrap^oov p.h rep dp&vrZdC airov r'o
Sr '^P^'^Phoyv U airds Kal rrplv
Sfe»fr?iS
46 SpauT ’•V ^l^rrjplCeev pedv dKe&co r6
^ ■<^-0

3. TwoWait^ Se ehai Kal ovalav odalas

Aarrco p.ev rrjs rrocTjaaf^dvr,^, oSaau Spws.
amarecv ov rrpocrqKei. Kal yd.p ^ i^ivv
ovaca ^v yevo^ ^ ^. Ipd aL, [2
S .a. rrj, rcdv Svrepv o,5a.W J • 4. 4- ■Rnr that hiffber soul was, certainly,
opcpaa, o rrpwrri oioia, Kal a<f,6Spa dpcbaaP :|sie which ^

Zit Br4hier: ip^ar,.

attached toTy1rs'''Ld°"thdf\n
Eiithyphro 6A-B), Ws^maiiTreLon, how-
According to Hedod {Theogonv 188 ^ f'^^’Tretation.
Lt'rrArEsSS?Pi™“W shifts the parentage of Aphrodite her equivalent for
Sbttc^^uTo] 4). on Which Aphrodite as divine Soul

PI...
176
disiiw ?,^%S.£>s'Si5,VS must follow immediately.
177
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5.
Kai TTpcvrov ^v opafia airfj roDro Kal idipa
yos ayadov avrrjs Kal 6p^cja. Kal t6
opap.a TowvTov rjv, cbs ndpepyov TTO^etaBaL -rnv
0,av TO opojv, CO? rfi olov ^80^ Kal rdaec rrj
•Trpos avro Kai a^oSpoT^n rfjs ddas yewfjaal ri
■nap avTTjs a^wv avTfjs Kal rov opdparos. ’Ef
ovv TOO eyyovvry avvrdvcos nepl t6 dpcLp^vov
KO.L 6« TOO ocoo ajToppiovTo^ dnd rov dpojpivov
oppa nXyajOev. otov per etScvXov Spams, "Epcus
yevero raya nov Kal rijs 7rpoar]yoplas eWevBe,
ISyXXov avr^ yeyevrjpdvys, ore e’f Spdmeos rXv
yoaramv ,yee- ind rd ye nddos dnS rodrov
ao -rnv encowpiav,^ einep -npdrepov oioCa pX
oweas Kaeroi ro ye -ndOos « ipav » Xiyerae—Kal
eyep «epcos avrov Syee rovSe », d^Xus 8^ oSk
20 TO ^ "Epco?
rocovros av ee^. opyv Kai airos dvoj, dre oVaSoy
COO eKewr)s Kme^ eKeevrjs Hal Trap' eKeivrjs yeyevr,-
pevos Kai Bedjp dpKovpevos Beq.. XojpiaTnv 8e
eKeiprjv rrjv i(,vyr]p Xiyovres rXjv TrpeSreos eXXdp'nov-
oav rep ovpay, yy,arSv Kal rSv “EpcoTa tootoo
Kai oTt pdXiora oipavtav rXjv ibv^v
apiarop etvai ycopiarov opcos riBepeBa airo etvai—
^ wcuw^cWCreuzer, H-S: im$vpiav codd.
^ ’Epajs from Spams.
luminates''^®Ci®J u tl “• “Heavenly” because it “il-
178
ON LOVE
it looked towards it as to its own
in its looking, and the vision was of a land wtuen
made it impossible for the visionary to inake its gaze
Hecondar? activity; so that the soul by a kind of
LSt and intense concentration on the vision and
bv the nassion of its gazing generates something
from itsdf which is worthy of itself and of the vision.
So from the power which is intensely active about Jie
object of vision, and from a kind of outflow from that
obLct Love came to be as an eye filled with its
vision ’hke a seeing that has its image with it; and,
I su^ose! L narSe most likely came to him from
this ^because he derives his real existence from see­
ing’1 for the emotion of love, must take its nam
from him, on the assumption that a'^^^^ance is pri<^r
to non-substance-after all fo'
called “ falling in love —and if we say
Ss particular person possesses him,” but love would
lot be spoken rf without any Particular
The Love which belongs to the higher soul, then,
would be of this kind, himself, too, looking on high,
since he is that soul’s follower and *"\c
being from her and by her,
fo thollh we say, too, that .the best in us men is
” us,-nll the saLe we give it a separate existence.*
cends the material univeme altogether. th^^ameway the
op. the nearly contemporarj-
treatise V. 3 [49] 3.
179
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5. OK LOVE
s„ h. »».t e»Bt only th.ro
soul which IS pure abide .
„„, had fo h«. *,L flre eye of
°P^S€ojs Kai. a{n6s^ yevemu^Jn^ T - to be at once along mth it, ^n^
oe KoauLov oScra ■n S' y^'^H-evos. lou this soul, himself, too, j^o ^ ^ universe and
M -Aa.’#.;ri'^r„f2X7<oSU'’ becanae this “K. I-’=
is not only sonl or *™P P jj ’ ^ i„mediately ukes
in this universe, who himse , , possesses
iph..JA tl " «Ws ™ ; charge of marriages and, in so J
the desire for what is .
moves the souE of the 7^’^ far as it,

st?:rLr n-“^“
which he is ° t^come to^ remembrance of

T i°r ‘”72:4;:°'“”''
'T K *“.’:1S S4d4SJv£iov.
f' ^ SZ3,'‘”^l3*'’r;“™‘<>r'
tfn ««. ^ ToC foooT«ri,.’l’4*'’'°x’
JhfshSd the'uriversal soul and the^soul of the AU
€Kaarov vucov ov 'rrnAr^ ^' f > ^poJTa, 'q Sg
5 fwo£? diraai;. Kat Joct ^ oAAoiy have a real love, but not as'well? And is
Saifuov, ov 6amv ’ ^ ° ottos' ecmi' 0 the soul in gay, accompanies each
^ p , w ^ao-tv eKaarco avveneoGnL A ’ - 10,0thespm«h.A,^hoy“y;
eKaarov eowc • ' « jr^f^oai, o avrov of US, the 107®’*41 love which implants the desires
ra. eV£0„^.W
For this would be the! each individual soul;
eTzr£r°- “»r’' is?: appropriate to the natu corresponds to its
individual soul ™Xch a^ccords with-
e„ nature .nd “4";: faUrg, Let «a
Its value P"^P°^^versal soul has a umversal
grant, then, that particular
K: tut“?r't ? »t‘rtiiS"5s£g‘”.2.
..wX3Ji4rsr;
awTos- Creuzer: otSTTys" codd.
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 6. ON LOVE
r6u dv ovvetva, S’ aS Kal r6v are one i so the individual love, too, is related to the
Tarr- MevavZ^:;: "^„ersd love; so, then, the partial love accompanies
2 Siarsoul, knd that great Love accompanies
Kal ■Jravraxov airov- So unTversal soul, and the love in the All accoinpames
the All and is everywhere in it; and, again, this one
Sve becomes and is many loves, appearing eveiy^
wherrthat he wishes in the AH. taldng shape and
assuming appearances in its parts if wants to.
But must think that there are many Aphrodites
SZ"’io£’- “f ^ --oTS^ i fn the All, which have come into being m it as spmte
f^epei, TToMas eKewrjs e^voTnuevac n^n-A ’S'
"T"’ ■4™s4"

i’-”?”” <*f- ■>' /4,-. *:%.vr.r7x 2;

to the Good, and the love which belongs to

soul is a god, who always keeps the soul *
rr.nd but the love of the mixed soul is a spirit.

^y<^^~rS^\inZZ.7-tr:. SaT4
3 [2m IV. ^[8? VL^^SflL °"® IV. Love?S not a part of the universe, the Love that
whereV*Mlsl“g^°*'^ththe*^”® reconoaes the Phaedrus,
mon: and also keeps Plato’fins&tS™’ ?• “ “ <1^®-
. the
(which must disappear with sSft!t^ ?*T “ ‘I®«re &entyandPoVerty^th^^^^^
persists when tbe loyerZttJnft^^^ ^hioh
the beloTed. "® *° I"“ frmtion and union with
is foundlrK^s frtT ■ -1*°^® -diverse
roShCfri^lhis older allegorical interpretation of his

parents. .183
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III, 5. ON LOVE
rov kSoiiov T6v-iv aira> iK<f,i^vra "Epcora, TroAAd 5,,., "p 'S““ 'i2:l77i
"°;SsX™” -a s,lf-™W,b.th. .dn-lB th.t
fl,“ U« is ™i . god »d not s.lt-sufflc,.n. ta,
lO ovJeJ^°" °MoAoyov/.eVot, r<3 cJ.SpJ
lOovre 0eo„ ovre avrdpKovs. del U ivheovs elvL 1 ,-r, nePfl Then again it is necessary, if the
Etra a.ay.p dnep 6 Kdap^o, ic^rh i, ^.v^TZl uihvLe is composed of soul and body, and Aphrodite
is for Plato the soul of the universe, that Aphrodite
should be the most important part of L°ve, on rf i^
soul is the universe, as man s soul is man, that Love
must be Aphrodite. Then again, why should he, who
16 X™ P :<^\ ^fp<^7ros -f, dvOpLov
is a spirit, be the universe, but the other
it is obvious that they are of the same substance no
ovros p.evdaip.ayv ojv 6 Kdafios eWt, oi S’ a'AAot be the universe, themselves too ? And the ^ijers
Sa^i^ves^nXoy ydp Src e’^ oiaias
then would be nothing hut a conglomeration
ei^cv-ov KacavToc eaorrat; Kal 6 Kdafio, eWc spirits And how could a being who is called
20 “""J? Baip.6vcov. '0 sf e'^opos “^guardian of beautiful boys ” be the_ '^^f-se.^
20 KaXoiv -TTaiScov XeyOels elvcu ^ ^ And how would Plato’s “ bedless and shoeless
^Yr,- T
lo’ 6e
S' aarp<oTov
» ai/ O A-OCTUOS
Kal dyvndSrjroy Kal and “ houseless ” r fit this interpretation without
being mean and inharmonious?
ZTfZ7 ‘"® 6 But what, then, are we to say about Love and the
^6. AAAa rt Sij Aeyetv Trepi rov "Epcoros Kal account of his birth? It is obvious that we must
2s Y^vdaecos airov; AijXov Si) o"ti Set understand who Poverty is, and who
Aa^«. rt. ,, nevt'a Aai r^. o' U6po,, lal ^ how they will be appropriate parents “
obvious, too, that these must be appropriate for the
apixoaovcnv oSroi yom. t?mt airS. AijXov S4
5 ort Set rot. .lAAot. Sat)xoot ro,^;oo. t^p^t other spirits, assuming that spirits as spirits have one
etjep Set ^vmv ^Imt otJataP ^tttW Ka96 haip^oves
merely have the name in common. Let us, then,
understand how we distinguish gods from spiriM
Aa^co^tev rott-ot-^;, ^„re Stoptto^,^, 0,ot). Lttto'-
(even if we do often call spirits gods), at aiy rate on the
iccalons when we 'do speak of each kind of being as
^Imc, oAA orav ye rS ^repov. rd hk Lpov
• Symposium 203D 1*"2.
J.S4 185
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5. ON LOVE
10 X^ycofiev afnu,v elvai yivoc J s' ^ .
Sic^s ^it'^i.hor.ro.r o
E¥5'SSS-£*lrl

-£«?£SS.tos;;
V07)rt?i oaificov €V TO)
yoT^Tco ovO€ els /cat av iv Tt7i u-Arr,... -s! ‘
^ ,v
/cat evravda Oeol kh) a \> etcn
” lne?to Se int^^ “ “ ^here are
ton ” and the uriverse is, as we are used to
^:v a "S go“” ^ and each of the beings down to
say, a tmra goa,

26 yevouevns to «rii’ ' ' wa/^cu

/caJ o5ro. ti'A^c ’ -E‘Ta o,5 K<x0apoi when 1 ,„j„erse? Because the pure soul pro-
r t?dTnd we have affirmed already that its
gL-'T;i£XI“‘:s duces a g°°> „ then, first of all why are not
^°innirite love's > Then how does it happen that they,
all spirits loves . matter? Those are loves
*°ho Se produS by thi soul desiring the good and
the Middle Platonists takW up and ^1 SuSaSl the"^.ouls in the universe produce this
who defined the characteriatirs nf tk ‘^®^elopmg hie.ideas,
and worked out a re^L “‘®™®<liato being^
Plotinus follows in this chapter ° main lines » The phrase comes from Numenius (Test. 24.Leemans
186 Proolus, In Tim. 303, 27-304, 1).
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
STX. f- .^Se- 0/
Oe aAAoi Sai/Moves ano ilivyrjs uev k-n)
^avr6^, 8vvdu,ac
»»2sz[ Z4Zz‘:rzz^'7Fr^°£
^<o, Kal rlvos SXr,s (.erixova.v ■ o/v! S'
acj^ar^Kri,. ^ C&a a^V^rA eWa. S
o<.jw.ra npoaXa^^d.ovacv ddp^.a ^ ndZJlxx'
S« ye.p6r.po. Sui^opo. aL. ^:jZ2Zt
-P‘ .z^zzi zSd zZ
7 7
8ow( i5 Outrta TOW Sai^ovor «a^’5c.oi< Sa'
5T;&7”' ’ »r '«-ZTsl
izzzz!:n!:2 22. l-r f-
<hai tr/n° nAaVo,.
7 7^ ^°C°" Tov viKra-
pos OLVOV OV1TCO OVTOS d)C -nnA -' > a
cos vpo TOV aladrjrov
^ ov/iirkripovot Kal ovpSioikoOol Kirchhnff.
<nfvoiotKovQav codd. «oir,
ta. .™p... o, ,:jg„ MnSlS-“ °rs!
i38
ON LOVE
cnirit But the other spirits come, they, too, from
,L »,J of th. All.but «^P»du«dby .*«
to5
pleS^t^aml alon^'vith the AU govern individual
?Ws For the sZn\ of the All had to P>-°vxde ade­
quately for the All by producing powers *
those of spirits and beneficial to ite totahty.
how do they participate in matter, of ®-ny s°r
- Obviously not in bodily matter, or they ^h^be
’’““ffdteoFXTS lS“n.t«re mmt c«-
Si„X h.°fb.en SfTere.1 W««, to give a» »y
7 °
or hre is incmuc substance
!JmbiS!“^th body *nd onother
““’ji^rff‘co»bi»S' "s. 's t
sensible ? One must suppose an intelligible matter,
S oTder that a being wMch has a share in it may come
to this matter here of bodies by means o .
7 Srefore, too, in the story of the birth of Love
Pllto says that Plenty “ was d^nk mth «ec*ar^
wine did not yet exist,’ meamng that Love cam
> di .• „»«•« TT SQ Belief in these bodies was
IS amoig"onists of tiie 2nd eentury a.n. and later.
GVfnrXripovGav Kal
Ld may ulttoately derive fr°“jI°f\dOTius.^^^ ^
inLm“*stagrb;^een
rr:fthr“tt ^ ^
16. 189
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5. ON LOVE
6 4>riaeJs X '^Js f^’^^Xovorjs into existence before the world of se^e, and that
Poverty had intercourse with an intelligible nature,
!ot mereWith an image of the intelligible or an
(^v/u.fj,iyOei(rns
•■xZi 4 cos if y^f'OfJ.evrjs Kal
<’’->■ imagination derived from it, but she *ere m the
intelligible and united with it,.and bore the substance
o/iei'i; Se ri etvai »' o^yadov, (tavrev- of Love made from form and indefimteness, the m
fr-o,a. r^:Z6ar:Z rlZZZ defi^sfwhich the soul had before it attained the
Lod, while it was divining that there w^
Aoyo? o6u yeoSuevos iv oi, ;.
10 eVe'aet ,caj inoardaei davSpd U there by an indefinite, unlimited imagination. There
oi rAeo. oi8i Uavdo. i^nh
aopioTov Km ecpeaccos
\/ «> OyOV CKdVOV 'y€V€V7)LL^vnij rg^Tcom^ms^^^^^^
Aoyo? oStos nt’i ,^r,0 ' «^ flat ecm

15 nXr,pdiaerai icos L iyr, eV llS^SpSpirto

sf^;tYur/f
rational principle, since he has in
finite irrational, unbounded impuEe, for he will
peivavTOs iv Z ®S«’be ,Sfied.»long .n he h» to him the nrt^
airov dvaKpaeiv^ZZiZ^ dZT of the indefinite.' He depend on soul in soeh^w ]f
that he comes from it as his origin, but is a °
20 Tfj lavroO ^da,c- s!TZ'''°'' a rational principle which did not stay in itself but
^dXcv od ydp iy,, tZ Z was Sngled with indefiniteness-it ^as not .the
yo.p ex» ^Xrjpovaeat Scd r6 p,i, rational-principle itself which ^
that which came from it. An ^ nature;
‘ <^0 H-S“. “sting,” without resources in his o^ . ^
therefore, eyen when he attains his object he is with
“ Sees ag«n;' he cannot be saUsSed because

of the material ” element in if ^ ^ satisfied, because • Pfc.^ *“£.''olhor huid ■' olway. delta” *"4 al»ayl
else in the Enneada (it is of coufs?® l>®y°“'i anything
posium k to be inteWeted in
Bomething in common with the account *ft^ l‘°'''®ver,
m soul which produces time in III. 7 [46] H ” ovT€ Tuyxavwv, III* 8 [30] Hi 23- J.
191
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III, 5.
ON LOVE
the mixed thing cannot be; only that is truly satisfied
Shas alrefdy attained full satisfaction in its otm
'*i:i nature; but Love because of his intimate deficiency
ftophled to longing, and even it he » tot the
26 ^i/8etav S' °-mX°-^ov^ airS, Sid. r^v moment saliafied, he does not hold what he has
X" s»i A^’ To5
received, since his powerlessness comes from his
AcJ 8^ rai »5v t8 S»,p8„o„ TOiofcov VO»'t,» deficiency,! but his ability to provide for himself
froiD liis rational nature. * , i i
But one must consider tha^ the whole ^^ce o
^irits is like this and comes from parents of tlm
- S'&t? oS‘ Ld; for every spirit is able to provide hmself with
diat to which he is ordered, and impelled by desme
for it, and akin to Love iji this way too, and is hke
him too, in not being satisfied but impelled by desi
r™»‘r‘»5 »'«o. w suo.'-r"
si^S. *“S H for one of the partial things which he regards^
goods. For this reason we inust co^ider, too, tha
the love which good men in this world have is a love
for that which is simply and really good, not just any
kind of love; but that those who are ordered under
Mepo? Toy jvepyowros ev airols, d,vyfjs 0[ 8i
KaKt^v rats KaKats cWoSmic .V other spirits are ordered , under different ones at
chfferent times, leaving their love of the simply good
WV„ Wv.« "afcSlL^r inoperative, but acting under the control of other
spirits, whom they chose accortog to the ^spond-
a 2tT’ SdfoB. Of S cd ino- nart of that which is active m them, the soul.
t - ^pm-K Ka, mri , But those who are impelled by desire ^
have fettered all the loves in them with the e^l
■------------- °-MXo-vov Kirchhoff; eiirqxavov codd, H-S.
passions that have grown up m their ^
inldfag'^HaHerfc’' and other editors. they have fettered their right reason, which is inborn
in tLm, with the evil opinions whi^ have
SohTvyzer retain the mIs “® ^<=-)- Henry-
inhSmfacit Bnfftkto ^ them. So, then, the loves which are natural and
St t;rd?L:4rahi '^-“"yt'tySgi? according to nature are fair and good, and the
sendee requires; and in the allnsionlo^tmth it is Plenty who is npay^ia iip.rjX°-vov (1. 17)- (Hr. Schwyzer
now agrees.)
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5. ON LOVE
^Aarrovoj ^Aarro., d^av Kal 1 r.t n Ipsser soul are less in worth and power, but
loves f are more; both are real sub-
those [of a better s ^g^inst
stantial loves. But fPe.«t;nnti of the perverted
„t»,e, th«e .« P““™ “ “,Llo». of
ow< „o„„w owws„5 «o ™„i xl;t
aAAi ^Jia LI ir^«»:oS Le

w oAo,s W „h, dyWi w dd’e^ Jri

l;£i;“'glneS ^''t ^ “ ng
5 ^Aa OTO ,f . j.
accordance with the n substance, but the
™e, ^ ^ 5 things defined and hm ’ , . . produces
»• «^d oWfe, ,.w W dA,«,- LL° W
others [evils] are ^ passive affections;
from itself but are nothmg eke but^pa^^^^^^^
2‘ ™ <X<,W. Od P„v„. A, ^ they are like false thoug thoughts which
a. » W .„,Wv „W „„J ,„5,
« «a^ „ 8,r> „ai d. dW„,, ,t<!„S^

w dw&^-e„ JlsLiJZ
ruuv o epcos- Kac yap ai vo^Vay e?
«ara ovf,pe^r,K6s. u>an,p. d ro'Se rA
rpjcvo., SJo
Tpiycovov.
oW d.xZ
^
they are ^?* Ye?of thought] does not belong to us

- ZeJ^. 05 rA. A^y«, ds

^tariXdev o Il6pos. Kal ds 6 Krjnos oSros;

‘ « 8« Dodds, H-S“: ctSa codd.

Lxts 5 W'vris*!
it is in so far as it is ” Plato says
30°To2^5a“32'®’ ,«1oa W.. .
Symposium 203B 6-6.
194
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5. ON LOVE
'lyt It '1117 S. V?'-' *■ earden ? Now Aphrodite was for us the soul, and ^e
S'Lt Plenty w- the »«?“'
5 rideadai, rov Ata /cat ~ T
thino-q But what are we to make of these, Z-eus anu
8;t riJ^y:r:rL^ Sr|:;den? For we must -t Zeus
OivTac A^r i /P - . . ^ A.fpobi.Triv roxho since this is what we have made Aphroi . » ^eus
ro. Aii & cwtainly, we must take our
from Plato from the Phaedrus where he says that
aiJTOt; roi/roz/ t6v 6e6v JJ/in y Aeyovros Sridt a “ great leader,” ^ but elsewhere he say_s
rosr... fh- 5 tS; that Zeus is the third: ^ but he is clearer m
eV t<3 a
Z.a,/o, s,,' :lz:
r? / T
iTlTz -nvLK' ^V
he PiMus, when he -y«*at there is mZeu^^^ a
roval soul and a royal intellect. ® It, then, ^ei^ 1^
^ ,v r% ZllolttZtiZ a great intellect and soul and is
TO Kpurrov Set rdrre^r, Std re U IZ ^ ™ LfsL and we must rank him on the higher level,
^<.r,ov Kal r6 ySaatAt/cS. S^ kIi rH' for oilier reasons and particularly because _th
ju.ei' carat Kara, rov vovv ^ Se °
15 o^aa /cat e^ a.W«,T ' > ^ . A<f>poSiTr] airov

rcraWt t;n Aphrodite because of the beauty bnghtnes^and

K.i y^, ,t ....i
rarropLev ru>v 6ewv K-n-r/i >?'
' ^.ppevas
-as AW I ‘ -™', »ara, Teirof the female gods as being their souls, since
20 ovvovanc ^!V, ” ^ ^Kaarcp ijjvyns each intellect is accompanied by a soul, m this way,
too^Aphrodite wpuld be the s°ul of Zeus ; a^, again,
oriests and theologians bear witness to this inter
Setatiol who make Hera and Aphrodite one and the
Lme and call the star of Aphrodite in heaven the
of Hera.®
^ Phaedrus 246E4. . I. oh. 2 of «* pSt
Plotinus’s interpretation^ofPlato^is°°^ t foundations of This passage shows again h and^also how closely,
;sw
6 Cp. [Aristotle], De Mundo 392a 27 /a.
196 197
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 5.
^9. '0 oSv U6pos X6yos rcSv eV rw vo.rw Kal
VV Kai p.aXXov Kexvp.ivos Kal olov dnAcools nepl
^xnv dv yeVo.ro ;eaj eV T6 v^o 1 -
.„i o, .a,/a'AAoo".V al?
t/7 r3 T^A^^cioecoj!
■nXoyos ano Kpe.rrovos apyr}, n,a<hv ds iXdrrovl
A4poh,r-n Aeyera. y^yovivav, dopvds ds rSv k^Jv
;rr1""T‘ A.A. AoVc,
xj ra KaXXcvncapura airov rd napd rov vov
avrov ecs rr,v .pvyTjv iXOdvra dyXaiap^ara. "H rL
av ec^o .rjno, rod A.A. ^ rd dydA/xara adrod .aj
ra ayXacaj.ara; Tl S’ d. e?^ rd dyAa.Wra
avrov Kat ra ^oa^^^ara ^ o[ Xdyoc ol ^ap'
16 auro. poeVre., 'O^od Sd o.' Ao'yo. J nSpor.
evnop^a Kac 0 nXovros rcdv KaXdiv, eV e’4dwe.
vSt xac rovrd dor. .d f.,6de.v ra, vi^rap.. T.'
yapjeo.. v.Krap -r^ S rd ddov KOf^CCera.; Ko^.'fera.
TO V7T0pe^r)K0s vov X6yov vovs 8d iavrdv e'yet
^ ' ^Xripo^pivov Kirchhoff: -rXvpovv codd. H-^S.
as COTtrasted ^th™he relltr^^d e and Harder») which' tW Sfgg® L^^q^hiXthe free para-
198
ON LOVE
9 Plenty, then, since he is a national principle in
the intellisiWe world and in Intellect, and smce he is
state of being filled was brought about from outside.
fiTit Sd that which it filled^ with nectar in
the higher world be except a rational principle whic
£ ;Sk« from . Ugto oriP" *« *
this nrinciple is in Soul and comes from Intellect,
flmviL into his garden when Aphrodite is said to
bo„. ® And every g.rde„ la . gW »f
decoration of wealth; and the f
And what could his glories and adornments be^t
fhe rltional principles which flow from him? The
mtional principles all together are Plenty, *e plen
tudrand wealth of beauties, already
,1 +>iis is the being drunk with nectar. For wha
L ne4lr fofthe that which the divinity
LS And tLl which la on the l.vri beta
Intellect acquites letional principle; but Intellee
» I read here Kirchhoff’s uA^poiiucrov ,^y
::ls“to'’B°5;r'*It™Brpossible that .Appear may have
been a slip by Plotinus himself.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5.
ON LOVE
possesses itself in satiety and is not ^^nk mth the
X • O Se Xoyos vov yewrjim Kai viroaraois Lssession. For it does not possess anything trom
fiera vovv Kac oiK^rc airov diy, dXX' cV a”AAco. eV
Z K^loBai roVe Kd^,vo,,
! I ror, oSacv dnoarrjvac Xdy.rac.
Ay Se rov. f^ddovs, er^ep rovro Saovra., ,al J the time when it is said that Aphrodite came into
Wtfe^v 5 AeVo..., .„i Scacpet. dn’ pviQtPTice in tli6 rca.lm of being. .
But myths, if they are really S°ingJ°
o^^Ay. .oAAA oV... oVa, ra'fe. must sSrate in time the things of which they tdl,
5e V 8vvaf.eac S.,ardira, S.ov .at ol Xdyo. .at nod set^anart from each other many reahties whic
yevea^s rwv ayevv^ro^v nocovm, .at rd 6f,ov oVa
a.roc S.a.po€a., .at 8.S«W. SvWvra.
. vo-qaavrt rjSr] avyxcopovai avvaipeZv.
30 au.a.peae.-
'H Se iizr^4f
vnoaraaa .a. ad X6yc. ^Xrjpa>eetaa .at .aX^
which they have separated. Here is
K^o.9^Koa^rt9eZaa .at ,inopla, ^A^pa>0e?aa, S:Lr jf the mytl of Eros]: S-xl, w^ch - ^
dva, e.^ avrfi 6pav ^oAAd dyXaiapnra .at r&v Totellect and has come into existence from intellect,
anavrcv d.dvas, MpoStrrj ^eV eW rS and then again been filled with rationa ^
and itselfljlautiful, adorned with beauties and filled
o. Se^e. airfj Xdyoc ndvr.s einopia .at Yldpos
anorco^av^ pvevros ^ rov i.ec .eWpoj- rd S^ eV
-V7JJ ayXa^a^ara eS. 5. eV
Ay. Aeyera. .at ev'See. eW o' HSpo. of.
^TrX-qpwdyj Map-qi^ivos. Zw% S^ ^amV,,. .at I: 5'?“ ’ «|
it is said" that Plenty “ sleeps ’ *ere, weighed
' P«W Kirohhoff. H-^»: ^VeWej oodd. down ” by the principles with which he was

of th^ or/enLnr;" (,,,01 and ,0M to

cussions: op. VI. 7 [38J d6, ^
200 a Symposium 203i5 5-/.
201
 PWTINUS: ENNEAD III. 5. ON LOVE
And since life has appeared, and is
4.S°7 t the world of realities, the gods are said to fe^t
!rn Jthev are in a state of blessedness appropriate
Aet 6e owTco? weorr) oS,. J£ > > , to the word. And so this being. Love, h^ from ever­
lasting come into existence from the soul s ^spiratm^
!" ?' 7r "E/x-r. -E„, s- 2 towards the higher and the g°od> ^ ^

'^'l^hS'^fofctt^S il altogether

Aey.ra. ^ ^

.vT^v?- 7 ’ f“^f‘’>»'“»'»<-«A«iJ actiX directed towards the good,

yadov, €po)ra rovrov ovra 'H ' > and this is Love. But his mother is Poverty >
n.„-„. o-„ i,, ^ TA^lTn 7 SpjSonSngs «. tl... W1.1J <■ » “t 74
=« «v. ,.i f, JA, A,5,.^ Po^verty is “^^^"^^>b“e%r?nd;finit^^^^ of the

ISr^for^the good—for there is no sha.pe or ration^

,3. tr5A. “ t"T ™ £si?ssbr»f"-55

- r..;^.r* 77 7- f»° 4.:z

™, -e7; mSter for the form which is to come upon it. So

'fat baiucov oiroc err-r,„ > / -
)^^ , <JVTO£ eOTlV 6/f lltVYVC K-nft' X
eAAei^« dya^iS, eVt'erac Se', y.ye^rjf,,',o,.
good but aspires to it.
1 Symposium 203B 2.

202 203
 ON IMPASSIBILITY

he maintains, mere gl^oste of f ’ ^ ^jth the first

III. 6. ON THE IMPASSIBILITY OF Here again there is a ooimeort^ tno g
part of the treatise. ® ntial part of his
THINGS WITHOUT BODY
passibility °^.i^®°7the privacy and radical independence
Introductory Note general assertion of the prima v. responsible for such
of soul, his insistence that active m
Tms treatise is No. 26 in Porphyry’s chronological order
reality as there is m bodies; thisisfunda-
and never passive to j,ing^about man and how he
iSZiivi ™ ‘■“■"‘w i"*o two, n.
Hotinus was, rt seems, at this time
mental to his whole way
ought to live.
jnatter as radically
form,Crries with it the
much concerned with questions of psychology, and in the impassible, totally maffe d^by^^^^^^ ^ ^
tot part of the treatise (ehs. 1-5) he sets ouUoSrtJal
the soul IS not subject to affections or modifications Tn converse, that matter u the physical
to second part (Ohs. 6-19), he turns to eoSr a ve!? affect or capture form. An P .„rhere phantoms of
of impassibility, that of matter. The to
world as a world ^ tiong in a’non-existent mirror
form flit in and out lie “affect soul in any way.
Sto i?th T little oon-
nection mth each other. But tore is no doubt that
serves to emphasise its ^ compared and con-
Plotmus hnnsetf composed them as parts of a sS wS (Soul and matter are treatise.) Some readers
to™ “ the second (9.1). And trusted in the second end of the treatise,
tore IS more ejection between them than may appear may feel, by the tune ^ .i „ot only impassible but
that Plotinus has “falLtotto of e?en the idea
in Sfis Plotinus is primarily conceined^^th
m this treatise is to work out and display the imnlTca impossible; that i®’,, - concept without any oon-
of positive i®atter ” only a meaningless word,
tions of mco^oredity, to exclude from philosorfiy waysrf
speakmg and thmkmg about incorporeal things as suWeet tent at aU, has made g^d of his life (see
r^au7SrtLt“to““^ or^contaminitos wS But not only “ ^ Wkeitce Gome EviU I. 8 [61])
aSo^^ f (like the Stoic God the treatise On IfMate ^^tter, mainly
he insists on the ^ „^tivity and total incapacity
10T.0 • r1°^ I’eth Platonists and Aristotel-
aM, IS, of course, incorporeal. In the tot part where “
ptmus IS concerned to show that soul is^impassibk
h. to n» ArttotoliTCt tion of evil.
combating Stoic corporeahsm. But in to second part he Synopsis
^ers sharply from Aristotle and goes, as far as we can , ■ -uintv of soul. General statement of the
vmd hk “y earlier Platonists (and certainly be- A. The impassibdity ot sou j corporeal, cannot
y nd his own earher discussion of matter in II. 4 [12]) in position to be maintained: soul, being n p
2o6
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

g„dtaWof.gly«aof('*-W-
rejection of the theory that l;r+. ^ of vice: Lk» .™«llr “SrX?. no,
mony and disharmoi^ of the by form m any way at aU. receives n v
..ok p.rt "r°wiS*?" Zr anything else, be-u-^t .a
is meant by sw that m^ttor t
seeing reason: the passage from
virtue involves no intriLio aTt^T^f *° form.a^thatitis the^r^ep^ the falsity of matter
(oh. 2). Discussion of emotions • dist° ^ soul-parts oommg. fne gnos y ., formless mirror (ch.
body-element and the soul-element^®*^een the are like reflectiom m an images of real being
self, but is not moved or affecJd '*■ 13). Matter w ^ ^ „ £ £j^g Symposium, always beg-
The part of the soul subject to (eh. 3). S'fStkSfii »rs.r ~"y
opinions, mental images a^d b^3v tt between
form, and form is not j ‘^'^t’^rbances: soul is

by philosophical purification fiJ’ • then, is meant

fections? WakinlTtoe sL&itP^"* "f- and has its own power ^ deal with its W ,
big it from disSfrg meXl n^t nothing and has no power f^^^e
the thmgs below to thi“etS size comes with igl Matter like soul contains
A •• ¥«»'. loo. i. »m.- size, not true size (eta. 1^1^8). ^
all forms, but not aU *°g®*'2tbe7harm nor good. Matter
imchanging,^ Ih^g l^Sfiect '“>■ ,“’..'rtk« “ .‘“S, to it-Hw
hardness, aseressivo ,-x ®®®»®tanee, obstruction
«d m-: K Alhtag »d 1. only . P“"
affected. To think that hn.i- * “Ody, the more it is mother ^ £ t^e generatiw power of the losros;
^eam from which we should wlkruptoh“ fit w't”’ ®
3,0 ..oompnoy *k. 8““ ““
truly non-being, nothing but a vhoot ^ j ^ Matter is
pass through it are ghosts too-^^th *’ '^bich the sterility of matter (ch. 19).
not acted on (oh 7) TttV Jt-1 and it is
fected by their oplsites fnd af-
destruction: but matter k * ^ ^Section is the way to
thing is present LTto solThtvT^^^^^^ 8)’ a
sarily affect it: matter has no ** *t®oe®-
not affected by anything (ch 9)^^Tf “ therefore
or affected it would no“onS‘be
(eh. 10) Exegesis of TinZis 50 b-o Ii^w
m matter without altering it and makinf^b^Kd

2o8
 III. 6. (26) HEPI TH2 AHAGEIAS TON III. 6. ON THE IMPASSIBILITY
AEQMATON OE THINGS WITHOUT BODY

^ 1. Tay acaerjccs oi ^dOy] Xdyoi>res dva^ 1. We say that sense-perceptions

but activities and judgements ^ "X
7ra9w
e.epye.a. Sc oAAo
rr.pi yivopiivw, olov
yr.pl rraO^p^ro. to ad>aa
.<3.rt' 2
^ KpuT.ojs rradovs ovans_.S.l * tv??
r:
O^S^^ ^tto.. ,caJ cC,7fl > f ^^^>-pov~.,yoii.v woMd have to be yet another
t»rd fp^obii-ttHs
^/)w? ooSej. e;\^ei too Kpivoudpov "H .} W ”
^Afot, rr4rrove.v. '^Hv S’ A' ’ "' \
\ /
KaXovfi€i40)v ^ (hs
TVTTcoaeoyv, o/zo>s* Aeyetv /cat
6 rpono^ A)i, Tr^nt
^
10 V cS. irr.ar,rrrac. oWo, ««2
Ka. rodrw oiadip ycpc6aK.ip dv.v rov
rfr-r ° AoVo, ■fip.Zv ,.al from 4at has been supposed,! and ^ ™
^ /^r? o^o^aAero i rporral, Kal d)Zcd,a.m is also found in acts of thought; these, too, are
activities which are able to know wrthoutJ>emg
rv^ hx-n- ro^adrac,. oWa. a.' O.pp^pa.., 7al affected in any way; and m general ou
acopLdrw. Kal t6 rra9vrcK6v 7> ' iStion is not to subject the soul to changes and al­

.-5.. ™„tx/:44r::i terations of the same kind as heatings and noohng

Ses " And we ought to survey the part of the soul
Sch is said to be s4ject to affections, and consider
^ <;^°M«.^ricinns.H-S= fcoAa;8«v codd.
whether we shall grant this, too, to be unchangeable,
I. 141^nd 4M?'n.’ 65?’’ Velerum Fragmenta 2 This again is an aUusion to the Stoic view: cp. Stoic. Vet.

210 Fr. I. 234 and III. 469.

2II
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

Se rojv nporepcov ^ varepov, nepi zk “S Ae s^S"'"FSh'^wtrtS ptt"which

yip irpL7ZI7i :i7ir"r'°^- ?■=;
coL“bSot. that subject *«
«> ^pi atoepp,.^ rj^T- ' Mb?™» i .^Ja^e

Xv^ova^, L!?o ■n^op.ivris ml

„d Ranged by «™ry J»«^

fWo„. iloBij aSL ZSi7J,’

i“ jtogeS ‘‘“.rS

6rcpov,p Aeyo/zeW yCyv^ael'^Zp^a^v- 7l

without magnitude and to give it
SeSfoSis topo as to avoid^^^^^

S^SoW; Kai S^ ^ ^^-PrV^ e?.a. runtible without noticing tha rnimVier ®

yap.ep,
eV Tj ovaia
Apiepicu ^ Ao'yo)avTV<!
-^AAA m7,c->T 'a
W / ,
WewiTo
“riS’JsL?: r j'Str»”srx”'S^? tba.

/caJ ravra rd La - SS:.r=Jns »d».ffe*a®a£—^

0770 Twt^ awiMTWv fi€T€vr]peyp,^ya
■ik^f«dw'S.res“e.»=b»,d.»rfth»..h«e

. po.«»wiory.«.. “;£is; "S

ss27r.p“ .%&
Ian, From PMonism to nS.
of Plotinue, but

VI. 6 [23] 9. 13-14.

212 213
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
35 avTiK€iiM€VMs XrjTTTeov eKoara Kat Kar avaXoyiav „ opposed Se™,e »■> >“ »dTt
fieTevrjvey/xeva, /cat exovaav ovk /cat -ndaxov- somethtog 'ot possess end to being
<rav oi5 TTdaxeiv. KaJ Sans 6 r/soVoy rdiv TOiodrmv, in possessing them It d j ^.nd we must
affected by them 1 ® come about.
€maK€TTTeov.
2. IlpiaTov Se 77ept /ca/ctay /cat dper^g XeKreov, consider how happening -^Uout virtue and vice,
2. First we must explain about virtu
n yiyveTM Tore. Srav /ca/cta XeyryTai Trapetmi- ^TrwetsmU"ontrust‘‘ takeaway." as
Kai ydp d^aipeiv SeXv ^a/xev c5y rtKoy 6vros iv ?S‘.' stTor'e^; to the son! ^
avrij KO.KOV Kal ivOetvaL dperrjv kuI Koafirjaai ml
«„e. «»<lf*‘tor:Sto'^^ wSoh trTr. betotl
5 /ca^oy ep,iTOi.rjaai dvrl ataxov^ rov npoadev. *Ap’
oSv Xiyovres dperijv dppiovtav dvai, dvappoa-
Tiav U r^jv KaKiav, Xdyoip,ev dv Sd^av So- of harmony, should we P ^ 1 ^nd would
accords ivith the views of the ana^ts.^^
Kovaav Toty TzaAatoty /cat' rt -rrpds r6 Cvrodp-evov the statement contribute^ someth ^g^
ov fUKpov 6 Aoyoy dvdaeiev; Et ydp avvapp.oaeivTa value to our etch other is virtue,
p-€i> <j>doLv rd p.dp7, T7js ifsvxfjs npds dXXr]Xa dper^ mony of the parts of then there would be
10 avvappxioeevra Se /ca/cta, enaKrov ovSev and their disharmony, another
av ovSe erepcodev ylyvoiro, dXX’ eKaarov ^koi dv nothing brougM m ^>^0“ enter into the harmony
oUv iarw et’y dpp,oy^v ml oiK dv ^/cot eV rfj source, but each and remain in
jnst as it is, or
'disharmony, ^ec^^ Sstgln accord thing
4h it was;
each
avapnocrria toiovtov ov, otov ml xopevral xopevov-
rey ml avv^ovres ciAAr^Aoty, et’ ml ot airoi just as dancers dance anting m^
etat, ml pdvos rty dScuv rcdv dXXcov dSdvrojv other, even if it is noH J J others do
sing, and [sometimes]
15 /cat iKduTOv md' davrdv dSovros- od ydp pdvov
not, and each smgs ™ ^ g.^^g
Set avvaSeiv, dXXd ml emarov /caAwy to avrov
not only sing _ part beautifully by
aSovra olmia povatKfj- coore /cd/cet i7rl -njs together, must itere, too, in the
>pvxris appovlav etvai eKdarov pepovs to avT& his own personal art ot mus , jg
„„1 toefe is . h»»o„, ivhen
npoafjmv ttoiovvtos. Aet S^ Trpd rrjs dppovlas proper to it. It is certainly necessa y
. ThethoughthereistheBanieasinI^[l]1.26-30. Con-
» The Pythagoreans; cp. Plato, Phuedo 93C. W HI. 2 ^7] 17. 64 ff. (Boe notes o<i iocc.).
214
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6, ON IMPASSIBILITY
this harmony there should be another virtue of each
20 t" «„i W,
part and a vice of each before their disharmony with
T.W ^ am/,uooT/ae SXr. What is it then, by the presence of
Ix° kJxx which each part is evil ? Vice. And, again, y^
isenceofwhatisitgood? Virtue. Now perhaps
Te^^ht say that the vice of the reasoning part was
SlUgencl and unintelligence in the negative
2d would not be asserting the presence of
25 eVwcjiv 5 s/, O ^ ^/^evSet? So'^at
anything. But when false opinions are there in the
S (and this is what most of all produces vice), how
W.O. y^a.; TcJ ev^.o.cUs oil dXxZ 2 will one be able to assert that they have not come in
and that this part of the soul has not in this wa,y
ZZ t/s- blme deferent? And is not the spirited part in
emdvfiovv aKoXaarov uev ov oite n'X'X, a one state when it is cowardly and in another wh^en
<jw<...- 5 Vow Ji,‘’"'*'r®r it is brave ? And is not the desiring part when it is
“j—v „„4 ^°:zz f. s unrestrainedly lustful in one state, and in another
X.»T£ under couhol! Well, then, it 1.., been
eAracTojA eTraioi/ Xoyov dynaoaev Kn) ' affected Now we shall say in answer that when

;rl
oi axVfar.C6^^o., JIa’ i each part is in a state of virtue, it is active ^ccori g
to its real substantial being, by which each pa
listens to reason; r and the reasomng part receives
ore op<}. ^ Qomep yip ^ S,pcs Kal 8w<iu« oSaa Kal its reason from Intellect ^^d the other parte fmm the
reasoning part. Now listening to reason is like see
Inr not^rLiving a shape but seeing and existing
oA^ouoais. aM afia npoafjXde ttooc 8 r '
o-H. .ai j e>rLU!15^:1
Aoytfo^evo.. ovrco Trpis rip vom ^al 6pd Kal
actually when seeing takes place. For just as sig ,
which has both a potential and an actual existence,
rpmains essentially the same [when it is potential
V SvpafAcs rov rooro, ai,paytSol'Lsov a^efit i aJtual], and its actuality is not an
alierrtion but it simultaneously approaches what it
I ^ Vitringa, H-^2; codd.
has and is it in knowing it and knows without being
rrjv ovoiav del. Theder, B-S‘.
affected; in the same way, too, the reasoning par
fragments'*,^DK.Bl^anTl 12!^ Plotinus’s mind here: cp. related to Intellect and sees, and this is the powe
of intellection; there is no stamp impressed on it
216 217
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

40 ye.o/.eV^y, <iAA’ 5 elSe Kai ad oi^ l'y«. cV, but itSoJ:g“:t't

rep yevd>aK,cv. oUk Si ra, dnox.taL StTb^^e^iri; ,^..Wi.

Zefiv^adae Si Set, Sn Kal

"(7,76/5 eV Krjpai
rds pv^pas oiKaopUv.
iva-no-
in it from the seeing, like a shape
we exTsrbecLe things are
Ke^ipevo,v rtv&v iXiy^ro etvcu, dXXd rrjs iLvvijs
OVTCO r^v Svvafup iyeipdarjs, eSare Kal S p.^ iyu
« «... _ T. cl.; pi. a-M, ,,1. clrc ,««e, [of “““’4s “hen h not the .onl Metent
Kai varepov, ore pvrjpoyedei; i) jSov'Xee dXXyu; does not have.. Well, then is n ^ ^ gs,
before it remembeis in «*y.
ovKovy aXXoeco9etad ye. el „j r6 h
when it remembers. J
8vm/xea,j ee, evipyecav iXdetv dXXolcocnv Xe'yoe, ferent ? Very well, then, as lo g
aAA eartv ovSev -rrpoayevdpevov. dAA’ d^nep h that it is intrinsically ™ ,,n° alteration, but
rrej>VKvea rovro nocovaa. "OAco. yd;, al hipyeL
passage ^ is
50 Tcov avXo^v ovav.aXXoeovpiya:v ylvovrae- ^ Ma- In gelj r Inalisation. of
peiev av ^ aAAi iroXt, paXXov pevdvrcov, rl Si
naaxec^^ ro evepyovv rovro ridy pe6' {IX-ns. El Si tag til11^^^ »"»
avXovov Treeaerai, oSk iyec & pi^ei- &a^ep U much truer to say that tn y affected m
-T^s orfie^s jV^ dpdaecos ivepyodar^s rS ^davoy 6 they become actual and^Aat^b^^g^^^^
ofaXpo, earey. al Si So'^ac c5c7.6p dpdpara Ti actuahsation belmgh is going to be
But if & thing w ^ r^ovmanpnce I iv^t as in
SecAoV; nw. Si Kal dySpetoy; affected, it has no „S fn“lty i< »“«»' “
SeiXoy peyrep ^ pi^ Spay npis r6y Xdyoy f, a., case of sight, «hen *e ““B „„
^pos <f>avXoy oyra^ r6y Xdyoy dpay ^ dpydywy is the eye which is affected, a
ofseel M^rline'^S'Jllloob-
p „„wardly and
eXXec^eei, oloy airopia -q aadpdrqri SnXeoy acoparc-
then again brave ? it is i ^ .^hen it
“brr’o” mM‘br.11. i. i«
pute^& ‘‘T™sioL*t
IS in a bad state, or e its bodily weapons
too simple-minded view 0fCIea?thCtCn*'“'‘^ con-eoted the
it is hindeted from ita«on,

Fragm. II. 65-56 memoiy impossible: op. ^tom. Vet. ;!”S;S,-r£r*BT“a3‘"'

2I8 219
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

or it is not
only Ughtly to’nche , ^.j^cumstances there is no
oOovbefMLa aX{oiojmg oiSk ■jrd.eoc S' ’ T 5
posite happens. In And the desiring
Lln.io «"»•«“ “.“XroterwMi. cdli
p„t when It ^ by iBelf
^rvi •' unrestrained ^^^t, tor present to it,

,ai 8..^. .4 Tfr^^LTi and the other par they were present, to
whose funetion It would be^ifjheyw ^^^P^
master and direct it. , everything
,„dd be M™*’ r\”°Si“fooUnBT4«i

^poae^Krj ^ ^Xfj,
3. Ta? S’otW(7«y ,caUAAoT/)t<iaeij 7TWS ■ Kai Setd^^’vhtue’S.e 0P2^,»thet i„ either
W «„i i Leviliarre ll
Bu? what aSut Se so^" .
its own or ^^®“/®p£asures,^desires and
^€m, Ae, Sr, Kai rrep, Wrwv ^SSe StaAaSrf,/
Ort ya/j eyyiyvovrai dXXoiwaeis Kal a6oSon) feelings of grief and a S ’ P present in the soul
“ZAr '■’i f IJZ L^zz S.. o~ r*
and moving there. , . To deny
certainly make a dis^mction, m 1±J ^
^vrji-v O Ti ecTTi ro rperrop^evov. KivSvvedou^v Wo
that alterations in the facts,
of them, do occur \o contra^ct the obv
cog ei r^v X,yo,xev ipvOpiav ^ aS iv SypidJi
But when we accept ,hen we
it is that ppderstanding it in the same
^atir,, rrepi Se rr,v aXXr,v adaraaiv e’cm yvyv6- say this of goul blushes or turm
sort of way asrf 7 j^pppunt that these af-
pale again, not , .•. ^i^ ^,ut occur in
[i body].' But S.e .h™. 1. ib

gives ci»,:<£<7os as an ex^pl 3? S: “ “ r.5tolix«»=

wh.h one example is 8„X; tl IVa^r^fn::
something entirely bodily.
220 221
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
^AAA fxkv alaxwrj iv ifivxfj Sofm a,e “?'■ 'r*'™jth.Sy.°tS'£”?o«Hf‘ 'V.y
ohTa Se aS>t,a i^dZ roJo
oW axovarjj oVo^aa. .rXaMa
vno r„ o. .a. oi raMv d^xV ^rpd^ Zri ject to the soul and blood, which is easy
5ro af^a ,VK„vr,ro^ or,. Td re rov Xeyo(dr,ov body, is ‘=h^nged by w y be^nning is
hpov ev p.ev rr, r^oxfi V ^PXV. r6 S' d,xp6v to move. As tor wnat „„rnes from the blood
in the soul, the pale the happy,
avaxy^aar^os jov atf^aro, eiaco. Kal rrj, withdrawing '"^^bm. „4.„„,-es to sense-perception,
e TO TTjs^Siaxuaews rovro Kal eh ato0r,mv ^kov
^^pc TO aojj^a TO rrepl r?,, belongs to the body, „„„^n affection. And the
Kat TO rris Xvnri, oroadrcos. 'Enel Kal r6 rrjs belongs to the souUs no 1 ^ ^
€mdvf,ras enc^ r^s ifrvxijs rrjs dpxr)s odoTjs rov same is true ot pai . unperceived,
rirX"' t<j n/oexosu sUrtiDg-pomt remain . ^ j sense-perception
,. what eom» “"'Tat the soJ moves it-
knows. In fact, wtien y . . are not
avT^jv ev emdvtirars er, Xoyrafu>h, eV Sd^ars, oi
” liS “do"ti beeanse it is being *«ken
oaXeyoiiepy avrr)i, Xeyofiev ravra nocetv, dXX' d
Z:?by^». “ “ tiSTMetirofe!
avrris ycy,ea9ac rds Krvd,aer,. 'Enel Kal rS d
Kivrjyv Xeyovres o^k dXXoiov prd, iKdarov S'e from Itself. For when ot some-
ment, w. do ”»*"Z?yTe«ih part is »
ZZx fco^ oz5;c iiraraaa.
Ker^aXarov Se yavov d rds ivepyeCas Kal rds thing different, but the acti ^ g^f.
io,as Kar ras opi^y, oiK d)^ord,aer, avyxcopovr^r, natural bfe which doej no go activities and
ficientconclusi^^- rf 've
30 ric ^Woa^paytCo/xeVoo^ o^S^ Uves and amps imprinted on the soul or
S- (f>avra(jias w? ev Kr)p& rvndraeis, avyxoypyjreov memories are not stamp y wax, we must
navraxov ev nay roh Xeyoprdors nddear Kal mental pictures hke affections and move-
Kiv^aeai ryv <pvxi]v (uaavrojs eyeiv tw vnoKeiprevo, agree *bat ®veryw ere, j.gjjiains the same in
ments, as they are called, .^^^^ue and vice do not
Kai rp ovma Kar rpv dper^v Kal r^v Kadav aX
^s ro ^eXav Ky ro Xevdv nepl acopra yLyveadl substrate ^ and white or hot and cold

35 evr ap.4,aj nepc ndvO' SX<os rd ivavrla yLyveoBar Zrnirro”;:IteJSh.ppensi.aebody^

V
' c
 PLOTINUS': ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

^ 4. Ilept Se Tou Xeyofie'vov rns tbvyHs 4 But we must now'investigate that part of Ae
soui which is said to be subject to affections. 'We
^n^Ke^rriov. “H8,y .’Ipr^ra,
have, of course, already discussed this, in a way,
Ka, nepc rovrov cV oh n.pt rcov 7ra9^y dTrdurm in what we have said about all the affections tha
eXeyero rdiv nepl r6 0vf,o,cSh Kal r6 i^,9vaow occur in the spirited and desiring parts and how each
of them arises; ^ but all the sanle there is something
ywop^vcov Sttcos e/caara- /x^^. dXX eV. XeKriov
still to say about it, and we must first grasp whatever
Trep, airov npdirov Xa^dvras. S rc ttot^ t<5 0 t of Sg it is that the part bf the soul subject
kov t^s iPvxrjs Xdyerai, elvav. Adyerat S *dl«i i, .Id to be. It i. ..Id to »J
TJ-ept o rd Trd^T^ So/cet owlaTaffOai- ravra S’ iorlv to be that about which affections appear to gather,
the affections, that is, on which pleasure and pain
eW. /caJ A^th?. T<D^ vra^di. rd
follow. Some of the affections arise ^ the result o
em So^atj avviararac, cSs 6rav So^daas -ns onions, as when someone, being of the opinion that
^ieAA«^- reAet^ra;. ^ olr]9eh dya96v he will die, feels fear, or, thinking that soine good is
auT^ „ eaea^ai -d,a9fj, rrjs p,dv Sd^rjs iv dXXcp, rov going to come to him, is pleased; the opinion is m
Le |art, and the affection is stirred op m anoth*,
be 7ra9ovs Kivr,e4vr6s iv dXXcp- rd Se' iartv d>s but Lme of them are of a sort to take the lead and,
Wn°^ap.eva avra d-npoaipdrcos ipL-noielv eV rw tithoiit any act of choice, to produce
^e^UKo'ri So^dfet^ Sd^av. 'H p.kv SX, Sd^a in the part of the soul whose natural function it is to
h.,To?Sio». No»itto.,be.n..ldB.««b«oP7»
° S’ eV rrjs leaves the opining [part] unmoved, but the tear
6o$r,s 4>oPos eX9wv dvw9ev aS and rijs Sd^-rjs otov which originates from the opinion, comng down froip
avvemv riva TrapaaydSv r<3 Xeyop,iv<p rrjs d,vxfjs above, in its turn, from the opinion, A
kind of understanding to the part of the soul which
5 sa?d to fea^. -What does this ‘fear produce?
TapaxqvKai eK-^X-q^iv, ini 7rpooSoKOjp.ivw Disturbance and shock, they say,* over the evil whmh
xaK<p. On f^ii, oSv X, <f,avraaia iv ifsvxri, rj re is expeeted. It should, then, be ob™ to anyone
that the mental picture is in the soul, both the farst
^ At the end of oh. 2. TTT SRfil But he ihsiste on keeping the opinions and the
The Stoics; cp. Stoic* Vet* Frewm TTT t au*
chapter Plotinus is criticaUy revisinT^toio ^
rA,'Sn.xx” y““ •*«■> “ ~
S”S'SHSs“Fs~ affection of the soul.
??S
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
20 |v „8r,,
ovKm Sola, oAAa m/>i aS adroj dfivSpi oW S/lo
xac aveTUKpiTOs <f>avraala. otV rfj X^yo(iivr,
epepy«a Kad' 5 e'/^aara. j;; Aaosv far as it which resuto frlm
a^avraarwg. S^Aov tw yivoiro. To 8’ dj
without a mental ^ ’ disturbance in the body,
26 3"’^ t8 a&pa these mental image ipvel of nerception,
y<-vop.evrt^ o re rpd/xo, Kal 6 aeiapiXg rov aihp^rog
Ka<, ro ojxpov Kai ^ dSwa/x/a tov Xiyeiv. Oi ydp
^ ev r<p^ ^/wyiKip ^ipei ravra- fj acopiar^K^v
hao^ev avro ehai. air6 re ,t^ep na06v i raora,
Lall say that it is i^Sectfons would
ooS av er. ecy ro acS/xa ravra ^Uero rov -n4p.-rrovrog
30 -0 Sxd r8 .ard;^eo0a.
30 r^^^a^ex Kai e’^Waa^ax e'avroo. ’AAA* eVx no longer worked the send g
roorp, ro ^^poy rd ,ra0,?rt,e8r od adi^xa
/^er, eJSo? Se rt. -Ev % /cai r8 imevpovv
but a form. ” ^.,.4. ^Mch |ovems nutrition,
xat ro ye 0pe*rc,foV re /cai ai^rjriKXv Kal yewTjri^
Kov o earx pxfa /caj dpy^ rpC i7r,eviu,'vvrog Kal
36 ^aV«ou e Soo.. E?Sex 8^’ od8e.J Se? rrap.lvai
rm, ri oXivg nddog, dAA’ 4ary]KeWc piky air6.
rriv 8e vXy avrov iv rep W0ex ylyv.adai, drav
enters into gjirs^ the affection by its
yt^rai, eKeipov rfj Trapovaia KivoOvrog. Ov ydp so enter, and ^^®/®™3he growth-principle does
h ro c^vreKov. Srav <f,dr,, cf,derac, oi8\ Srav av%,
presence. _ growth, nor inerease when it
40 orav Kivfj, Kivetrai iKelv^v not grow when It causers g ;t causes motion,
rriv Kcvrjacv r]v kvv.c, dXX' 4j oiS' SXcog, ^ dXXog
* ™«3i'Kiroliho£F(^,a<erc<ttrriciniis),H-^: ™0oVo codd.

thi ^Bourand r
Ve^Frl^^ll dis^p. 16o"l2).“® ^^^aara in Stoic.
tl26 3 [27] 23. 40-42. 227
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

TP0770? Ki'VV^ews ^ ivepyeias. Avr^v {xkv oSv Set different kind an actMt^’ and
-rrjv Tov etSovs 4>vaiv ivipyeiav etvai Kal tv actual nature of the o proceeding
napovac^ noceTu olo. el ^ dpfu>vla ^ airrjs rdl p„duce by i» f'«in« Th“ pS >“'>)»»' '»
XopSas eKivei. Ecrrai roivw to TTadtiTiKOv tt6.6ovs from it plucked the the affection,
fM€v airiov 7] Trap’ airov yevop.hov rod Kiv-dparos affections, then, wil . ^ pj^rn it, from the
eitherbecausethemovemerAsta^tro
etc rrjs^ ^avraalas rrjs alaO-qriKTjs ^ Kal dvev
mental picture produ ^ to consider
<po.vT^i.as- eTTujKeTTriov U rovro. el rrjs So'^w even without P^Lgtiojr is produced by the
dV(x)u€v dp^aons* dVTo nJnm, ’ * / the question wheAer affection is p od^^
T' S' ^ ^ wowW
la Se atTta rov Kcinjaat. dvdXoyov rd> opinion starting from a higher 1 The
iLif «.y= »a« “‘"rSll pSyi:
50 TrXrrydvra Sid 776.605 Txpds rds
50 XopSa5 rov \6yoii ^yoi. Kai ydp KaKei oiy • rznizi S.S i« topx* “S'"
api^pa Trejrovdev 6XX’ ^ yopSf oi
av V XopSr], ei Kai o fiovaiKds i^odXero. u-X rrjs
apiMvias rovro Xeyovarjs. SptStntS ev.» if "je “■
5. Tl oSv xP'h Cvreiv 677067} rXjv ijivxXv e/c
f^oaoTlrias 770ieiv ^-,Sk tX,v dpx^jv JaxLav;
n e77el^ KOI rd-els airX,v irrl rov Xeyop.6vov
na67]riKov olov </>avra<7fm rd ^e^ijs 77667,(10 770iei, free from affections I ™ ^ j^qw since the meiital
rr,v rapaxr,v. kol avve^evKrai rfj rapoxv 7, rov image (so to call ) , F ffggtions produces the
vpoaSoKcop.evov kokov elKcdv, 776605 rd ‘roiovrov
which is said to be _^^j^gg ^nd the likeness of
Xeyo,,evov rj^iov 6 Xdyos SXivs 6<l>oipeTv koI pi, conaeqnent ^ectto^ t disturbance,
•5' ™ called an affection md
feio^oilS «> 0« -F "*•" “

^.broioiog,. .ho^d ™ t. ^dj. »r.e

when the soul “ for Plato himaeH)? His
which did not arise for the Stoi,
1 attainment of
solution, sketched in the soul. It is simply a
“ifr of “°wXg up ” fc^m musion, turning one’s attention
got 4e lowe3 cteehtrating it on the higher.
228
 ON IMPASSIBILITY
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
and not to allow it to -cur in *e soul, on the ^
eav eyyiyveadai ws yiyvofievov /^ev ovttw •ray
that if It does oeeur the souhs from
fvxfjs exoriaris eS, yiyvofjL^vov Si dnaScos^
but if it does not the ° the seding
laxovaris rov ahiov rov -nddovs rov irepl ainvv affections since the oause of the attept_^ _, ^
opaparos ovKeri iyyLyvofievov. oiov el' ns rds t(ov
oveiparcov ^avraoias dvaipeiv iOeXcjv eV iypr,y6paa in the soul, IS no longer p ’mental pictures
one who wanted to take y
T^v ipvxp^v Tr)v (f)avTaCop,evt]v miolr}, el^ rd ■nddri seen in dreams-were to bring t .
Aeyot TTeTTOL-nKivai, rd ohv dpdpara picturing them to that the
Tra0^p.ara Xeycov rijs ^Jvxrjs dlvai. "AXXd tLs v soul had caused the affections of the
KaOapois dvT^s i/jvxrjs elrj p,r^Sap,rj p^p,oXvafiivvs visions as if from nurification ” of the soul
7] TI TO X<^pi^€LV aVTTjV aTTO TOV (TWpLOTOS; 'H soul. But what could the pm^ficati^^^^.^.,
^ W eiT] KOTaXiTTelv p,6v7]v Kal uri be, if It had —t been tain purification would be
ration ” ^ from the body? ^ ^„t looking
S'l ^Xdnovaav p.-qS' aS
ooias aXXoTpias exovaav, oans o rpoVo? twv leaving it alone, an ■fiaving opinions which do
at something else or, agmn.havi^g^ Character of the
^ cLs e’ipr]Tai, p,7]T€ opav ra not belong to it^whatev said—and not
ecdwAa fj.7]Te airwv ipydCeadat ■ndd-q. El Si opinions, or the affections,
90 /cdrw, TrtS? ov seeing the images the other direction,
0 KaOapms^ Kal xu}pi(jp,6s ye irpos Trjs ipvxfjs Trjs them. But if tlmre is g below, it is
fiTjKeTL ev acop.aTi yi.yvop,evqs cos eKeivov elvai to the things above, away separation too,
Kac To^coanep <f,cos fi’ii 4v OoXepcp; KaiTOi dTraOis sur&ly (is it not.) , which is no longer in body
op.^s o Kai ev BoXepw. Tov Si TradrinKov ^ ph, when it is the act of y^t which
as if it belonged to it, and is being u 8 ^t
kaOapoLS -q eyepais iK t&v droVwv elSdoXoov Kal is not in turbid °Bscurity^ And^yJJ.^^.
25 fi7} opaais, TO Si xoipiCeadai tt} pi^ noXXij vevaei.
Kap Trj Tfepi TO /caVw p.^ <f^avTaota. El'^ S’ dv Kal which is in obscmi y re affections is, the
purification of the ^ images and not seeing
TO xwpil^eiv^avTo to cKeZva d<f>aipelv Sv tovto
waking up from I’^^PP^B ^g-gcted by not inelining
Xcopi^eTai, oTav pyj em nvevpuiTos OoXepov e/c them, and its separata . a mental picture
yaoTpipapylas Kal nX-qBavs ov kaOapcov ■§ aapKwv, much downwards and n § ^ could also
of the things Below. Bta aepara^^^g
airaOws Kirchhoff, H—S: a/nadovs codd. mean taMng -7;yJ^,\inSov“a vital breath
17-otoiT; ei’H-S*: noLot rj el xy: mietHjelw: mwtrjQ.
Sd'^om .nd sated »i.h top™ m«te.
^ Plato, Phaedo 670, 5-6.
430
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
but that in which it resides is so fine that it can ride
oAA’ ^ taxudv r6 eV S, tLs in' airov ix^tada^
V^^XV* “fi^itK^ieady been said that the intelli^ble
6. Ty niv 8^ oioiav rriv vo-qvr^v Trjv Kara to
eWos- anaaav rerayfiivrjv (8s dna9rj Set elmi reahty, w^ic from afi'ections. But since
Sotcetv ecprjrai. 'Enel Si Kal ^ S\r] eV rt rciv S-, U; is. one
aa(^(MT(ov, d Kal dXXov rpdnou. oKenriov ,cal
5 Ypi ravT7]s T(va rp6nov TroVepa c5y
Aeyerat^^Kat Kara ndvra rpem-j, ^ Kal radrnv Set
(^adrj ctmi oieadai, /cat ris 6 rponos rrjs dnaddas.
ilpcjnov SeX-qnriov ini rovro areXXofievois Kal tniS} toOj IS •j.'u r, 'Rnf as W6 addrcss
nepj,Tr)s <pyae(as airfjs Xeyovmv onoia ns. cos v freedom
rov ovros <^vais Kal ^ oiaUt Kal r6 e?mt o/5 radrv ourselves to ofbeing and substance
10 ej^et, w ot noXXol vopdl^ovaiv. "Ean ydp ri Sv
o Kai KttT aXTiOecav dv ns elnoi ov, ovrcos ov-
h” Ts'uvS’wHoh has nothing lacking 10
rovro Se eartv, 5 ndvrr) iarlv Sv rovro Si, cS
p.ydY anoararec rov eWt. TeAeW S^ So
ovSeoos Setrat tW adCoiro Kal dXXd Kal rots
IK SoKovoiv eimt tow So/cetv dvai. cause to the other tn g , ^ statement, it
15 Ut br, ravra opdws Xiyerac. dvdyKr, airS io ^cofj SnlcrSv be in life, and in perfect life; dr,

(hipassages in which Plotinus refers to Hs PUAono.1. V, P.f .^15

V I- f
he heE“w “ **'® ®^tence of S aS^uhSt^o affections and pMble in every.
IM ['S. Sfffi
Without qualities Oil j. ^ ,^n
way ”; op. Stoic briefly describes here is of
a The real being whio description of
AYeZ(c h ’ ®/ course his Second Hypostasis, Nous. ^ y_
it as at once being, *, ge^this part of the chapter
* That matter is bodiless was contemporarv PerinatctiV 6 [32] 1. lS*«‘ 24sk the famous passage,
doctime, clearly stated by Alexander of ApWifi^r th»
^teoductory section of 4 i)e Aniina (c^^^^^eciaUy^p 5 as a commentary on Pl^, oop
1^22 Bruns). Pre-Plotmmn Platonists prefewed tL^for-
'^°WTTT°’^ bodiless, but potentiaUy body"
(Albmus,..®tsai7oge VIII, p. 163, 6-7 Hermann; Apuletes,
rXs=s“.A“f-'-JiS:r«s;sWBS
252-
 Ill
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
Kat evjeXeia elmi- rj iXXelnov od fiaXXov Sv
VH-y oy ecrrai. Tovro Bk rovs Kal Trdvrrj <j>p6vr,ms. ;e.”S'v,S» m
copicTfxeyov dpa Kal ■nerrepaap.^vov Kal rrj
Svyape. ovSe. p^, oiBk roafjSe- in^X.lZ therefore be defined and b”^’"S!„" must
yap av. Alo Kai to ael Kal rd J>aadrcos Kal ri nothing t, othe„.i.e It
20 aSeKToy navros Kal oiS^y etV «,5to'- ei ydp ri its power be j it must be eternal
JTs?’ T“f’ " ^^'XOITO- TOVTO Si p'h 6v. would be defective. n anything,
and always the sam , for^if it received any-
it 5:1 , : oSy Sec Trap' and noting e different
aoroo ™ exoy ely r6 etyac- Kal 6po6 ndZa
thing, it be non-existent. But
xac ev -rrayra. Ec rodrocs dpl^opey r6 Sy-Sd
25 Vxo^ ^ovs. Kal Ccoi
25aMa rw om e^raKrA ravra Kal oAk (iP
WTOs) earac.Kal r6 pkv Sv d^cov Kal dvovy iarac.
S.7wr»Ja: » or bigl^f. ““fjSnet
o be pr, oy earcv aXy^Ochs ravra c5? iv rots
Xeipoai Seov^ ravra ehac Kal rots iaripois rov come from being, but would be extern^
f .t WToj; TO yap np6 rov Syros yop^ySv piv rodrwv it and (as coming SfelSs S deviid of in-
ets TO or,^ oy Seopevoy Si aM rov'rojv—el oSv exist, and being vnU be hfe
rocovrov ro ov, dvdyKrj p-^re re acopa adrS pdre ri tellect, and that these ought to exist in
these [lit. ,.nd »“'Se p.^tS.7rflg, for th.t
VTTOKeepevoy rocs aevpamv etvai, dXX' ehac rovrois inferior things aiM tho P , being but
ro elvai ro prj^oSaiv etyai.
;tto?e?o?fnler-
j exco^aroiv <l>dcrc, p-f, oSaa, ncos
Se^-7] vXrj e,f> Js ravra, 6pr, Kal rrirpoA. Kal naaa these’', .he being of
35 yrj arepea; Kac -rrdyra dyrLrvnp Kal rats nXrjyats
things which do not exist. ,. ^ matter
And how can moun-
eSSSfiSrSeS
»?S“55"“s=s."'^.-s;.s
on earth in its solidity?^
SrthS^ S^ofe reslstanee. „d eonrpel by their

^Elotinusmaypossibly be thinking hereofPlato’smatenal-

ists in Sophist 246A-B.
2J4;
 II

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON. IMPASSIBILITY

Aafojttem rd. TrAijrToVem 6iM\oyelv airwv rhv impacts the things struck by them,
pxLence. Suppose someone were to say . Wow
ovmav.^ El oSv r,s XiyoL- rd dXi^ovra
IJ-V dvrirvTTa fj.r)8' SXcos offer no resistance, and are not even visible, be exi
opyeva. ^al vovs, 6vra Kal Svtcos 5vra- tent and really existent? And among bourns, how
Ka, Srj Kal ini r^y ao^^drcoy /.aXXoy yij, iar<iJ,
iOro fMoXXov Kivodp.,vov Kal ip^ppMs ^rrov. Kal the element above be more real than tins . And ho
rovrov ro dva>; Kal Si, Kal r6 nvp c/>,vyoy ijSr, ^ five rbe the most real of all the elements] which
“Ltat^eplTof reaping f«mbodlly«a^
T7,v awfMaros cf>dmv; ’AAA* otp.ai, rd ,aiv ainapKi- Rut I thinkf the bodies, which are mo.re sufficient
dXvndrepa to themselves get less in the-way of the other things
TOis a^ois, rd Si ^apdrepa Kal yewSiarepa, Saco to tnemseives g heavier, more
eMiTTT] Kac mnrovra Kal alpeiv avrd ov Swd-
45 fieva. rcwra TrtWovra ind da6,yeias rfj Karadopa
KOI. vwBeca^ nXriyds ’E77ei Kal rd veKpd
Sr.= »aE;a“=^£^|£;
rcM ao)p4rctiv d-qSiarepa npoaneaecv, Kal rd Then tod, it is the dead ones among bodies which are
ojPobpa Tfjs nXTjyrjs Kal rd ^Xdnrecv iyei- rd S' ™”eSSri-Sd“oT md‘?or‘huS°r but
f^^riyovra rov Svros, oacp rodrov pcirearcv
avrols, edyapcrcdrepa rots niXas. "H Si kIvvols ensouled » be.ug.^ae.
50 cooTT./) o?aa eV ror^ acLpcaacv ijv Kal Zv hl^rSSd like a kind of Me in
maw iyovaa radrrjs p^XXdv ian rots -^rrov boffies, and keeps an image
acorns iyovaw, chs rrjs dnoX.dpecos rov Svros
«t being ..lu^ ~de ;he tMng
0 KaraXeinei p,aXXov rovro acdpn noiodayjs. Kai
€K rcdv Si Xeyop.ivcov naOrtpcdrcov pcaXXoy dv res
‘■doe ro p.SXXoy acdp.a p,aXXov ■aae'rjrdy 8v, yfju ^ StSU^ZSZie Sn“oZt tblg and^e
55 rA a'AAa, .d dAAa .ard rd. aid. AoW rd
Other elements in the same proportion, for the other
1 6 * 1Q otlier bodies, see relation to °*^®g ^d tTb^'^ar^to^the bodU^
. .tf4 I. 6 [1] 3. 19-26, where it is said to “hold the rank of form in c( Corrupteone 8. 336al8-sJU) ana 10 ud
236
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

yap <IAAa miveiai hiaipo^p,eva p,-}j koiXSovtos

p-riSevos^ els ev -naXiv, rp.-qeev ye-qp6v S.Trav are parted, it there
Xy-S sKdrepov del- cSaTrep rd aTrayopedovra rrj when ^ r; jult as with things of which
9SvcT€t, d ^iKpas ■nX'qyfjs yevofidv7]s odrws evJi stays separate tor e ’ whirhif thev receive a
60 0.5 7TenXr,KTa, Kai i,f>edp7j, odrp, Kal r<5 pdX,ara
aojfjM yevofievov <os pAXiara els to p,-q Sv ^kov
avaXapeiv air6 els t6 iv dadevel. HrcS/ia odv ai
„o.t neatly to non-bemg, “
PJ^Py Kat O(j>ohpal irXrjyal, dXXd noietv els
a.XX7]Xa-^ doyks 8e dadevel -TrpoamTTrov layvpdv
eart irpos eKelvo Kal pdj ov p,rj ovri. "4lsuSnaT„:io£L, thing againot t«.othaa]
66 Tavra plv oSv elpyjrac np6s rods eV rotj ac!>paa,
riOefj.eys rd Svra rfj rwv <heiap.d,v {Mpropla Kal iS „gun.e« agg
rms 8ia rrjs aladriaews ^avrdapaai ttLotw rfis ‘tfon,.tiSe:viS:»:«rpnsM„ga and
ydeias Xafi^dvovras. ot TrapairX’^aiov rots- dvei-
guarantee of ™ ^hich come by way of
pcorrovm ttolovoi ravra evepyetv vbptl^ovmv, d strikings ^nd the app dreaming,'
opcdmv etvai ivdtryia 6vra. Kai ydp r6 rijs sense-perception, they actually
70 aloBdi'aeo^s ^vyris iar,v ed8odo7]s- Saov ydp cV who think that the thmg activity
exist, when they ^^^e soul asleep; for it is
aajfiar, tjjvx^s. rovro eil8ei- \ S’ dXriBwd] iyp'jyop-
of sense-perception IS sleeps;
y aXrjBtpy dird ad,p.aros/ov perd acdparos. the part of the soul that is in the oony
avaaray. 'H pdv ydp fierd od>p,aros fierdaraols
clXXov els dXXop Snpop. otop Iripo^p
^ypLc^p- ^ S’ dXriB^s SXcos d^d rcdp ocop^drcop
76 a rijs <j>daecos ddra rijs ipavrlas rd ipaprlol
ecs ovacap ^yei. Maprvpet 8k Kal ^ yipea.s airwp
xai r, por, Kal ^ <f>6opd oi rijs rov Spros Adaecos
ovaa,
'S“: mulfoime back to «at.«, the nndc.lr
7. ’AAA’ enapireop ini re Trjp dXrjp r^p dnoKeipi-
239
238

\
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
V ra 1 ini rrj etv'ai Xeyifieva, i^ &v t6 re
/iij eipju avTTjv Kal to Trjs vXtjs dnaOes yvcoad'^af-
rai. Eari ^liv oSv daco/Mros. ineinep to owua
6 varepov Kal advderov Kal aMj /xct’ dXXov noid
awpa. OvTw yap rov dvoparos rervx'ijKe rov
avrov Kara to dawparov, on eKarepov rd re ov
V^re v'Xrj irepa rdiv acopdrcov. Owe 8^ iLvvh
ovaa odre vovs odre odre el8os odre X6yos
ovre TTepas—dneipia ydp—odre hyvapis—ri ydp
10/cai TTOifet;—dAAi ravra dnepeKTreaovaa ndvra
ovberrjv roffdyros rrpoa'qyoplav dp9d>s dv Sixoiro,
OP 8 dp elKorcos Xiyoiro. Kal ovy dyanep
ych motion is » oTbulk, a
KiPVOcs p-^ Sp ^ ardns p'}, dp. dXX’ dXr,6cpcis pd
truly not-being; it is a imag" % ^ 3tatic
OP, eiBcaXop Kal <f>dpraapa dyKov koH vnoardaews tendency towarj substantial
€<l>eacs Kal iarrjKd^ oiK ip ardaei Kal ddparov
without occurs when one is
5 Kad avro <f>evyop rd ^ovXopepop Idelp. Kal
escapes^y i^ok closely yoii cannot
orap ns prj iSj) yiypopepop, dreplaapn Si ody t K alw^presents opposite appearan^S on
opojpepoy, Kal rd'ipapr^ delicfy’ iavroO <f,apraC6- see it. it always
its-surface, y great, rr
small and l^s and more,
mo^ . deficient
pepop, pmpdp Kal piya Kal ^rrop Kal paXXop,
and supetabundant, a strength
€XXeinop re Kal inepiyop, elSojXop oi pivop oiS' main and cannot get away eiAer. for it h^ no g
O.V cjyedyeip Svpdpepop- oiSi ydp oiSi rovro taydec t„ ai,. si„» it >;f ”* XteL s*"“
20 are p-i, laydp napd pov AajSoV, dAA’ ip iXXeixjyec rov
ovros naprds yepopepop. Aid nap S dp inay-
yeXXrjrai iJsevSerai, Kdp piya <f>avrao6^, piKpop the same” as Vottmann’s rd. I translate, with some
^ ^ TO. Jypmg. efralsodd, "JX"B»d;op. n. 4111] 15.

‘ The etra of most MSS will not do here, as a rd is reanii^ ij: SStfSs if, f« “i-
He^ and Sohwyzer think that the ^ rd of a marginal note^ j
may represent a genume tradition and “means practically matter.
241
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
/coJi. ^rrSv iar,. Kal r6 6V airov h ftnoears great,'it is small, if more, it is less; ite ap-
SS being is not real, but a sort'of fleeting frivOl-
L • hence the things which seem to come to be m it

26.ffio.Aa
^X<f.V e!s^L17^Z iL^oO
aJe frivolities, nothing but
like something in a mirror which really exists in one
%TZt isfefleeted in another; ^t.seems to be
TilZ"'°'’TZZ‘J- “>>' ««i 8o«o0,
filled, and holds nothing; it is all seeming. _ ^ Im
ra TTavra. Ta 8. etaio'vra Kal l^i6vra r&v tinns of real beings pass into and out of it, gh
into a formless ghost, visible because of its formless-
30 LI" “ af^opcf,ov airrjs impcLpL^va. ^outy Lv
5,„ «e Jllh-like «»d feeble and li»™ ”
30 aadevr,
8o«e. Kat, avrepelSov
avrr,y, ^o..r 8^ oiK ^yovra-
o,58.A- dAA’
df^evrjy^ ydpLt58^
.Vovra ofo. sJ
Z nor does matter thrust against
through Without making a the
vharos 7, .1 e:. A.yoya.Ao, /cevoi yaop^Ay olo. or as if someone in a projeeted shapes in the
"wS?o?rsamLtS;f^^
y 7.^!t^°'" P'SV roMvra ■ny rd
evopaff,eya, pTa rd d<f>’ ddy ^Xdev et, ad-rdy\dy’
ZZ'"’ avror. Sdyapiy rcda ru>y nZ>Pdyri power'SvS frorSose Seh“^fnJ tbem^and,^as

vneXa§e- yyy S dXXcoy Syrcoy rdiy ip^day- iSi: KTeLS'^themf buL"g of

roZrZJ'“le°'Z°T ivopo^pivcy, ^dK

,p vBov, oyro, rov eyopcop.dyov Kal oiSapfj Zyoyro, ‘^'^rrfttotoSlprSiSdtt.'Lrt.lnl,,

^Oopojorrjra vrpA. rf nocrjaa,. 'AadJ, 8d J
?her«n“t”“,«k .ed^.1.., «ed felUn* i^o
fla ipnl-rrrov. ota iy dyeip^
dvf % daaey e’^ [fSsS%?Ss mLttrTaLLS though^^^

8 "nl eVop^..Ta.
8. ^OAcoj Se TO ,7aayov 8« rotoorov offiv
~.«'*‘tS’S‘S‘.lfeelea must be of
rat? eydyriais etvai Swdpeai Kal TroLdr-qai rcdy

* Tirmeua 60C 4-6.

242

\
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III, 6. ON -IMPASSIBILITY
r6 nda^e^v i,s.no,odvrcov. T.3 and rt\£»rige comes to toehTatS
yap evovri Oepp^ t] dXKoiwdL^ ^ rov iPiivovros

(,pa„o.„s. ««i 4AAo.iD„fc tomls to llie moistne» *” “i “ j, of

l^f'ov. orav ,K Oepi^ov rl,vxp6v ^ ^r,pov iyp6v „b.t»« is cht^a ■» “ b cU* aie
y^prat. Upvpel 8k Kal -f, X.yo/Hlyj JL, hot or moist instead ot d^. there is a
destruction of fire is evidence of this there^
^9opa yei^of^kvrjs ds arocx^Z dL-
change into the”matter; so that the affec-
TO yappp efdap^, 4,af,kv. oi^x ^ dXry d>are ml
10 vL ^’^ TJ'''7°T‘ ® V i>eopd- 686s 'l^oSo thi wWch it belongs to be destroyed,
tions belong to that wmc 6 destruction;
rap ppav -p srapa8oxki rov -rrddovs- ml
^edpeaBa., & Kal r6 .dax^.v. TXv Sk
nl «V ri ydp Kal sr&s;
n<^s ovv Xpvaa ev airp Oepiadryiras. ^xporrjras
IS El/“‘ ^ocdrrjras Kal radracs SowVen! when matter^eceives in
aX-Tj^deiaa Kai p avp^drovs airds kxovaa Kal
coldnesses, and t tiigm and holds
^ppapas dXX^p, od ydp her, of qualities, and « Lixed ,ur
p 8e fxey anoXrj^^Odaa Traaxovacov r&v them, so to speak, g qualities pr,e not
nprjTcoy ev rr, rrpos aXXrjXas dsr’ dXX^Xco^ udth each other (f “ the middle of^them,
ovr. avparrxe, m. aird, ; E.’ p,^ dpa k^S Is separate m It), camt, P t^em-when the
pjpa,rai avrwv navrdsraaiv cV dsroKevpivcv not be Itself aftect interaction-on each
qualities are affect y other > Unless, of
17y"\ -o.«^eV<p, adrd> „ ’.he, in ttf *e q».U«e«
^CLp dvTov otoovat, ‘ course, one is to put ^ . substrate iS
Jai ^Xx7'7X xal r6
jr/)^rov-ci5 0,3 KaO' kva rpdnov
vnapxe^, aXXap peu ,arcv otov perd rov srapelva.
V X^^pov 7] ^eXrcop 7ro,,tv iK.tvo p,rd rov rpkn^v,

Gorrnptione ®P- GenercUione et r^rr. 1^

?44
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
i„,lves change: this “"t at
TO S olov ^oc,,v ^eXr^ov ^ ^eZpov aVt/ rov ■ndax^l is observed in about improvement or
oCr;r"'~ -A^yero, .<5 S’ Ihv

7 '
Tdf) Trpoaaydyji, ^v9a ovre ri
. cos aXXo rc Troiijoai t6u Krjpdv dvac, Srav
09
^apr, ro W, o.Ve fe’.Z] X d^eX^^Xosl
re r„rSe3):r„ ..^^.h^^the w„
10 ro. TS 8^ ^ ^Qs oihk crylaros
a^occoacy nepc rS cf>corc^6p,evo, nocel. '0^£ bI something else whe tbe^shane is gone. And
Xc9ps ,/wxpos yevofj.evos rl -napd rrjs hxporr,ros are no deficiencies w produce an alteration
T^' S’ - ypap.p,^ Jd6oXl light, certainly, does not even produce
;f shape to *«,rL; rst ge,t»m .re c„ld,
XP^aros; OvSe Si) rS inZneSov. otfiai. ’AAAA stone becomes cold, v 1 ? And in what way
ness, since ‘f /b^lur ^MTot thlni
could aline be perhaps, the
napecvai ovSe to p.op^v ltepi6eZvai.. Et’ Se' «.
ffa. ra Karo^rpa Xiyoc Kal SXcos rd Scacf>ayfj M body ^^'derlymg^it „ot call presence
TO>v evopcofM^ucov elScdXcov pcrjSku ^rda^cv, o^k TpnWe” ? •>“P' " ’’rriltnoaVTeiT
ZTT' "7 EfficoAa ydp
Kac ra eu r^ vXr,. KacaUrr, p,aXXoo d-naddarLov
20 2 ra .aroirrpa. Eyypcko Si) e’. aL' L&"Tm‘tt:r rS'^s too, aisd ^atte, » still
eepp,orr)res rcac ^ <Pvxp6T7,res. dXX' o^k ahZ
Erie to affects -«
ppfiacvovaac-^ ro yap eepfia{y,a$ai dare Kavld
^X^erdae Trocorrjros ef SXXtjs ds dXXrjv r6 i„oKd- SSieS'SrrEfTSiS:
P^vov ayovcrrjs., Ema/cWov S^ rre}c rrjs ^rvypd-
25 S7L7°'" o.rrovaca Kal crr4pr,acs. 'zLxeZac €rf§?'^tr«E‘r.s

77^)/Wai avrcov rroirjoovat, fidXXop Sk al kvavriws

J
Wo US: «>S 1^(4. (is (.(U.(IsA:(Kctvo ExC So'
H <51. 'll I 1 Cp. Aristotle, Ue to. et dorr'. A.t 323b25^6.

3461
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
e.d> «a..r. For what coold f»g““ Kot^t
ness or colour to shape, o? a thi g^ ^
30a^r« eV rw
one thing to be in esence that with
another, -^h-t does
:ruS^;tranyan^^^^^^^^
j «.»' TTauoi, oAAa Toi,g evavTinic- .WA -
fLtd jeSfun-
Ttl.zzv^ t'^r' ™’
Sangefby other. fcy'an^op-
ri‘J«„f
" no opposition eouM n^t be a&ct^^^

mafter but “u^. allto^Sto 'But'thatwLh

xr-
"Lt-r

lifeias
^ jo.v„ ,nA„ i^r- &x oSrz
TO Stxoitim, Mi m,i j;\,. E.' Si ral .sio'sometUng^^TO. f““L»t Ite fro«

^ ^ del. KirchhofiF. S“ wSci 1. F“,XXtfSlft"rXtT«S

coStfe: 17^'^Znt^'-’ «3B^7. but the
Tm’S matter. But If this qu.Mj,
24.8- 249
 ' J'

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

awTj^ 1 ^ TTotoTrjs d.7Toarai7] KaraXmovad ri avrm

too. goes away
roy TTOtrjaai. dXXo du In fiaUou yLyvoiro r6 *e .es.lt of » S this ...y the
v^o/cei/^ewv Kai npocovaa tovtov t6v rpdnov more different. ^ other than matter,
aMo Tt 7] vXr] e^ai r6 iTroKelfxevov, TroXdrpoTrov substrate would becom i-g ^nd many shapes •,
6e /cat TToXveiBes- ware oi5S’ dv In ■jravSeyh something receive everything
10 yevoiro ep.7ToBt.ov ttoXXols roXs iTteiaiovai yiyvdpe-
so that It would not be aoje the'things
.. 1
vov, 7) redXT, oiKiri pivei- oiBk d<f>dapros roLvvv
ojore.e, Bel dX^v elvat., tZairep dpxij^ ^v, odrws
aet. bei avjTjv ecvai ttjv adr^v <hs to' ye oXXoiovadat
Aeyeiv ovk eariv ad^v dX-qv TTjpodvrcov. "ETretTa
de,^ ei^ oAo)^ TO aXXoLodpevov ttSv Bel pivov em
15 TOO avrov eiBovs dXXotovaOai, Kal Kard avpBeBv altered. Then again, if, g^me essentZl
Kora aXX^ od^KaB' adrd- el Bel pivetv t6 dXXotoi thing which is altered only acciden-
pevov Kai ov to pivov iarlv adrov rd irdayov, form m the alteration, altered must
Bvoiv Barepov ai/ayKTj, ?j dXXoiovpivTjv r^v dXvv tally, not intrinsically, that of it which remains
really remain, ^nd consequences must
20 cMoioyaBa,. Et SI ns Alyot pi) KaB’ Saov dZ which is affected, matter will be altered and
necessarily follow; eithe
oMoiovaBai.. TTpdjrov pkv Kard rC dXXoccdaerai.
ovx efet Xeyeiv. liretTa opoXoy^aei. Kal odrto rdv
vX^v av^v pi, dXXouyvoBa,. ”Qa7Tep ydp rols
oMois eibemv ovcav oi5/c dariv dXXoiovaBai Kard
TT^v ovaiay r^s odcrlas adroit iv tovtco odar,Si S?.£s^?'S
25pxnays,^e7TecB7, rd etvac rij dXr, e'arl rd eTvac d
For. i».t » otho« *h.n«. wtoA ««
vAr,, ovK eoTiv adr^v dXXoiovaBai KaB’ o n oAij ,lte.ed to their essential h“»S. matter. ,is
eariv, dUd piveiv, Kal ddairep iKel dvaXXolivrov being consists in , g f, possible tor It
avTo TO elSos, odrco Kal ivravBa dvaXXolcorov cslstlng precisely »s “atler, e ^ , (, „.sl
aVT7,V T7,V vXr,v. to "o ■‘>*“‘'1 S‘Lt!» to the ™Hf things tvhieh
avTTj Kirohhoff, H—S®: avrri codd. S'fcni'S.e to™ itself tons, remain ^tored. so
here too matter itself must remain unaltered.
* Op. Timaeus 60B7-8. 251
250
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

IL y9ev Kal r6y nXdrCova oilrco Siavoov'- u. ThU ■

lievovopd^s €,pr,K4va^ vop^l^co, rd S’ elai6vra
e^ovra ra. o.ro,.
^ur^eyai /cat c^temt ei^^/ceWt. dAAA ^ovX6p,vov
VIJ^S awetvai i-maT/iaavTas r<3 rpoVo; ™y
l^^raX-rjjecos. Kal /ctt^Swedet rS c^Tropov e’/cetvo t3 difficulty about how matter participates “
not what most of our predecessors thought it was,
Sr«’' MeraAa^^aVet e’/cet.o how the forms come into matted but rather
efmt o ot ^oXXoc cprjeyjaav rcS// ^rpS ^pto)v, rS ,rt3y For it r..lly does W"”***^
how when these forms are present to it, matter
av-^. O^TCoj ydp ^aiz/taarS:/ elmt 8o/c«, remains the same and is
lOrcr^ rco. d8co. ^ap6vrco. airij ^eWt ^ a:5^ still more so since the very forms which enter it are
a.a% adrw o5aa Kal .poair. airZ 2 affected by each other. But it is remarkable, too,
that Se-things which enter push out on each oc-
jraaxovr^v W dXX-jXa.,. ’AAAd /caj Ss^rtL thifgs which were there before thein, and
avra ra etcnovra e^a>e,lv rd TrpSrepa l/caora, /caj that being affected occurs in the composite thing,
elmt TO naOecu r<3 /caJ odS^ d// ^avrl Ind no “n every composite but only in that which
15 > >7'"^' - Sn ^poaeX96vros ^ has a need for something to come to it or
fern it and which has a%fect
a^a^ot/ro. /cat o aoarda.t d.ovat'a
something is not there, but is complete if
TH/os. reAeto,/ Se Trapooct'a. T^ S^ % odre rt
sent. But matter gains nothing . . . -
T^t, adT^, ot/Watt^ 7rpoaeX96vros nosition if anything whatever yomes to it, for it does
ft i. .t the time when some^.^
^ovovv- ov yap ycy,erac roVe 6' dart -npoaeX96vros, ”Ls, or become less when it .?«» ‘J
Xarrov aneX96vros- /teVt ydp 5 e’^ dp„,
20 SkJ° S " ^x^xoa^wOa^ rot, p.4v KSap^ov Kal remains what it was from the beginning. But as lor
beTnXautified and setin order, there could be a need
iews SeofMsvois eirj av ypeia, Kal 6 K6apo, S4 for i in those things which need decoraW and
ye,/otro av avjv f^raXXocciaeco,, otov ols -n,p,rl9e- ordering, and the beautifying and ordering coM
take pkce without alteration, as when we dress people
T2^ "‘’>1 o4p4vrov etvac, u? St if^meone is to be so beautified and set in
€t]cei aXXoico9ev o nporepov ataypov ^v /cat erepov*
oi[der that the beauty and order are a part of h
nature, there will be need- of an alteration in what
* Timaeua 50C4-5: op. oh. 7.
-2|3
252
 ON IMPASSIBILITY
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
■yevofievov eKeivo to KeKoaiMTjfxevov ovrw KaXov
alaxpov etvai. Et roLvvv alaxpa oSaa rj vXr] KaXfj
26 eyev€TO, o irporepov to)^ alaxpa elvai ovk€t
eariv coare ev tco ovroi KeKoapLrjcjOai. anoXet to
Sf Ste It t»ll .top betag matter.
ilXrjv elvai Kal pAXicrra, el /xij Kara. avfi^ePrjKos
al(JXP<^' S’ ovTcos alaxpa cos alamos’ elvai, ou8’
av pieTaXd^oi Koapiov, Kal el ovtco KaKTj cos KaKov
elvai, ovS' dv fieToXd^oi dyaBov- ware ovy ovtcos ft is bldness, it could have no part
30 ij p,eTdXr]iliis cos oiovTai ^ TraBovarjs, dXX' eTepos
TpoTTOS otov SoKeiv. "lacos 8e koI tovtov tov
TpOTTOV XvOlTO dv TO aTTOpOV, TTWS OVOa KaKT]
ej>loiTo dv TOV dyadov, cos pd] iMeToX-qipei dvoX-
Xvpievrjs o ■^v el yap tovtov tov Tponov r) Xeyopievr]
/xerdAij^i?, cos TTjv avTrjv pieveiv /X17 dXXoiovp,evr]v, ^hat it was before,Jor^f, ^
36 cos Xeyofiev, dXX' elvai del o eariv, ovk4ti Bavpiacrrov participation lyfAiskin^^ ^
y'lveTai to ttcos odaa kokt] pieTaXapi^dvei. Ou yap
e^laraTai eavrfjs, dXX' oti piev dvayKaiov eoTi
p,eTaXap,pdveiv dpirjyeTrrj pieToXapi^dvei ecos dv
se-ifaisli
Tcp elvai 6 eoTi Tpovcp pieTaX'qifiecds’ TTjpovvTi
LtSer ^plwpaLn kelps it whaUtit receives
40 avTTjV ov jSAdTTTerat et? to elvai Trapd tov ovtco
SiSovTOS, Kal KivSvvevei Sid tovto ovy ‘^ttov elvai
KaK-q, oTi del p,evei tovto o ecTi. MeraAa/i-
^dvovcra yap ovtcos Kal dXXoiovpievT] ovtcos vtto it is, so It M ”’f ,™*;Xprfcip.led and
TOV dyaBov 'ovk dv ^v rqv cf)V<Jiv KaK'q. "Clcrre ei “rteis^aitted ‘goJd
Tis Tqv vXqv Xeyei KaKijv, ovtcos dv dXqBevoi, ei
^ rta Kirohhoff; to oodd. H-S.
* olovrai Cizensis e corr: otov re codd.
shonid notte Spated toref“l tSore print and trana-.
I Henry-Schwyzer retain the MSS TO here and explain that
ro aiap^pd clvat is in opposition to o ijv TTporepov. But what late Kirohhoff’s correction rw.
matter was before was alaxp^f not alaxp^ elvai (this does 255
254
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
46 roO ayadov d-rradrj-X^yoi- rovro 8^ radrSv eVri t&
oAios OLTTadrj etvai.
12. ^ 0 Se ye UXarcuv rovro vocov irepl avrijs
/cat T?iv fMeroArji/jiv ovy cos ev viroKeiiiivco etSovs
yevo^ivov Kal ixopcj^iv StSoWoj cSare h aiivderov
yeveaBaL- avorpanevrcov Kal olov crvyKpadevrcov
5 /cat avimadovrcov ndepLevos. on p.rj ovrco Aeyet
TTapaarrijaai ^ov\6p.evos, Kal rroos av avr^ aTrad^s
ixevovaa eyoi ra etSij drraBovs fieraX^ipecos l^t)rcov'^
7Tapa^et.yp.a~dXkov rporrov oi ^dSiov StSa^at a
IMaXicrra yapovra acp^ei to vnoKelpcevov ravrov
etmt—^Treonj rroAXas drropias a-irevScov e<j> S
10 ^ovXerac Kal -irpoaen rrapaarijaai diXcov ro ev
rots aiaBrjrois Kevov ri]s VTToardaecos koX rrjv
Xcopav rov eiKoros oSaav ttoXX'^v. Trjv oSv vXrjv
o*;j^7?^aCTtv VTTodefievos rd nddr] iroieiv rols ipApyxois
acop,aau> oiiSev avrrjv eyovaav rovrcov rcdv rraOr]-
l^drcov ro fidvov ravrrjs [ravfr)v]^ ivSecKwrai
16 SjSovs ^XXoyiCeadai, cos ovBe irapd rcdv-tTxr^pLdrwv
eyec ro^ jtdaxeiv avrq Kal d.XXoiovcreai, Tot? fiev
yap aco/xaai rovrois erepov ax^p-aros erepov
ox?ifw. Bexoixevois rdxa dv ns dXXoLcocnv Aeyot
yCyveadai r^v rov axT]p.aros p.era^oXrjv opccowpLov
> ivrwv Olzemise corr., Kirohhoff: oodd., fi.-S.
* ravrrjv del. H-S.
considering here the whole passage
dealing with the thwd kind ” in the Timaeus (47&-630)
rather than a&y pdrtioular part of it. ^ Mr^^
256
ON IMPASSIBILITY
unaffected by the good; but this is the same as beirlg
totally incapable of being affected. ^
12^This is Plato’s thought about matter, he
does not suppose that its participation “
which a form becomes present in a substrate and
gives it shape so that one composite thing
existence, v^th form and substrate combined, and so
to speakmixed up and mutually affected ; he wants to
show that he does not mean this, and how matter
could remain unaffected and receive the f™
looking for an example of participation without
to explain what things precisely, when they are
present, keep the substrate unaltered, so raised
many difficulties in hurrying on to express what
wante, and, further, wishing to show the
of substantial being in the things of sei^e and the
great area which there is of mere .^PP®™^'
when he makes it his initial su^osition that matter
by its shapes produces the affections “
bodies he demonstrates its persistence, and enables
1st ;>rci;de Ct l. does not itsetf experience any
affection or alteration even from the shapes. For
one might perhaps say that alteration occurs in
these bodies which receive one shape after another,
meaning that the equivocal term, .alteration
2 Henrv-Schwyzer here keep the MSS fjToCaa. But it
whereas it makes exceUent sense to say that Pkrfo does, ana
isTsv t^ee how a scribe could have written ,?,Tovaa for
f'LuSkertLinfiuenceoftheimmediatelypreceffi^
T tWfore with Kirohhoff and other editors (moludmg Beutler-
Sohwyzernowagrees.^)
K
VOL. 111.
 PLO'TINCS: ENNEAD 'III. 6.
dAAotWir eWt Ae'ywv ^Xr,s x>i8^v
20 ay,,^a eyoua^s o:5S^ ,7c3? aV ns tXv rov
apiiaros OTToyaovv napovalav dXXoicoaiv elvat Koiu
Ofzojvv^ojs^ Ae'yoi; E'i ns odv ivravda t6 v6am
XpoiTj Kai ra aAAa v6p,cp XeyoL tw ttiv <idaiv r^p
v^OK,cf,eprjp f^yjSkp odrcos d>s vop^t^.ra,, oL
25 aP arenas ecr, rev X6yov. ’AXXd ndis eyec, d
li-nhero coff axrjtiara dpiaKei; ’AAA’ cyet evSaft.
rj vnoeems^ w? oJ6p re rfjs d-rradelas Kal rrjs otov
eibjvXwp ov rrapovrw hoKoverqs napovmas.
^Poryop ^n nepl rijs^ dnaOdas airrjs
so aT.T.I, TT^ avprjddacs rwv
'i » 30 opofiar^ em rA ndaxelp air^v <j>4p,ada., olov
orav [^■qpawoixevrjv] 1 rrjv avrriv nvpovpLivqv /cat
vypo.ivpp.^vr,v cpdv^v^,4vovs Kal rd 4^rjs « Kal rds
aepos /cat vSaros fiop^ds Sexop-dvrjv ». TA ydp
« /cat ra? aepos Kal iiSaros p.op<j>ds Sexop.4vr]p»
anai^^Xw,, f,evro «nvpovf,4prjv Kal iypaivofi4vr]v»,
36 ^Xopn,-^pr&H<f,opcl>ds hexopLivr,vy> oi rd f^(,opcf>cd-
trdai avr7]p. aXX dtvai rds p.op<j}ds <Ls elarjXdov.
TO re «7Tvpovfievr]p» od Kvplcos dprjadai, dXXd
fia^ov rrvpyivoixdvrjv oi ydp rd aird nvp yiveadai
Ka, nvpovaeaL- -in' dXXov ^kv ydp rd nvpovaea^,
ey <p Kal ro naoxeip- S S' aird p.4pos iarl nvpds
(ripaivoixipriv del. Page, H-S».
1 Democritus, fr. DK, B9.
« a gloss
258
1
ON IMPASSIBILITY
includes the sense of “ change of shape ”; since
+tpv has not shape or size, how could one say that
pi.Se of eh.p in tt ™
evL using the word in this equivocal sense? If,
S anyfne at this point should quote colour by
’ j cither things by convention, be
convention and other tnings y the wav
the imderlving nature has nothing in tne way
the forms if not even the statement that it nas
SL asThapes satisfies us ? But Plato’s suppositmn
doeTS least indicate as clearly as possible the in^-
passibility of matter and the seeming “
K Mnd of phantasms which are not really prese^,
W? must still make another FC^inary point
wi ••Wivtag tl*. .'“P“ “ “f 'T.Ta SS-
„v»y the torceet the “ being tet on fire on4 M
toned” and makes clear that in the phriwe re
ceiving shapes " Plato is not speaking .
hirfnfbeeS shaped bat that the sh^J JV aetem
thP wav in which they entered it, and that oeing
!et on fire ” is not used in its proper sense, but me^s
that matter has.become fire, for it is
thi.^ te bejirde &e and *o ^
ridais i.o“iiiii bdV?ffee«di but hou, »uld
SiSeh is itilt a pan of fire be set on fire i It
?S9
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

wws av iTvpoiro; Toiovrov yAp S.V e“-q, olov eX s--■‘I

Tov xaXKov rov dvBpidvra XiyoL n€<f>OLrr,Kdvai,
".IdV. 4 to to
et To^ nvp Sea Trjs iSXris Ae'yot KeycopyjK^vae Kai
yrpoaere yrvpdicrae "Ere, d X6yo, 6 yrpoaid^v. yr&s
av yrvpe^a^v; H d ayij/xa; ’AAAA t3 yrvpod-
^5^vovvyr ap4oev rjSr,. Hd)? oSu in’ ipedoev ai
a^^olv yevopAvov; "H, k^v tv ^ yevda^vov,
ovK ev aX^rjXoes rd nddrj ixdvrojv, dXXd np6s
ToX >.s “Sifd
to to tom^^to
™ ^Ap’ oSv dpi>ordpcov noeodvrL;
S»en»
H tfarepov darepov napexovros prj <f>vydv. ’AAA’
orav Seaepedp re acopa. n<os oi Kal aM) Se-^prjrae; but a common action on other thing ^
60 Kae nenovd^os iKdvov ra> Seripyjadae nu>s ol Kal both act. toiSedX.
avrq rcp avT(p rovrep nad-qpan nenovOev; "H ri
KCtiXveirvair^ Xoyep rovrep Kal <f>ddpae Xeyovras S?d bTbeirg divided.
yrevs fdapevros rov odparos o^k ^Oaprae; "Ere
affected with the very 'Argument from
Xeicreov roaovSe ydp elvae Kal piyedos dvae, r&
be p-rj peyede^ ovSe rd peyddovs nddr, iyylyveaOae
Kae oXevs Sr, rep pr, aeLpare pr,St rd aeiparos
TTaOr, yeyveadae- eoerre oaoe nae-qrrjv noeovere Kal
exevpa avyxevpeerevaav avrr,v dvae.
p. "Eti Se KaKdvo imar^erae avrovs rrpoanKee, object to
ne^S Xeyome ef>eyeev air^v rd dSos- nais ydp dv
XeOovs—ra rrepeXa^ovra avr-jv—Kal rrerpas ^vyoe;
sisHHSsr,
Ariawf the statue provide an example which
A^totle frequently uses in his discussions of matter and its
fomation: cp e.g Physics B.3 194b2 ff. The po4 which
Ictinus 18 makmg here is the absurdity of thiitog of the
SHSrr-ESSLFs
“i i wi w.

not© to ch. 6 above).

260 261
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY
encompass and contaimit? TKey will ^oU<yerf^y>
Ov yap ^ W W 8^
H-naova^v. El ydp ^ovA^jcrec airi}^ Bcl ri encomiw at som6 times and mot at
^hers For if it tries to escape by ite own wish, why
w/o aet; Ei 8^ dvdyKT) p^ivec, oiK eVrw- ore oUk otners. x „ j£ remains by
€v e,hev nvi iariv. *AAA<i rod r6 air6 etSos
a« caxeiv eKaarrjv dXrjv Cr)rr)rdov rf,v alriav. Kal
^ rotj e,awva, ^dXXou. n<3? oSv XdyeraL
.r'."’ IP ««'• Tovro U rl enter into it. In what way, then, is it said to y
av ei^ V ^Be-nore airij^ iicarafidv^v odrojs eyeiv to escape By its own nature, and always. Bu
ro elhos O.S p.riB4nore ^ o' „ yp^aovrac r& X, S„ Ihl. »e« except a..t it^ ftom
v<p^ avrcov Xeyofie'vcp oiy e^ovaiv ^ h'e irrohoyh SwpteLuon fliey wiU b«
Ka, rLOrjvrj^ yeviaeoys dudcryjs- el ydp Moyn
kat ri6r}pr], rj Se ye'vems ofAAo adrijs, rd 8d dXXoiod-
pevov evrfj yevioei, rrpd yevdoeoy^ oSaa elr} dp
KaiTTpo aXXouLaeois- ^ re ^dTroSoyn » «al ert «d
.'T'-dwV » rrjpetp ep ^ earip dTradr} oSaap, Kal rd ep cS
^Vy.LvdMPop iKaarop i>aprdCeraL Kal ndXip ■■ ; tfi jsr;E“«
eK,ieep eiecac Kal ydypap etpac Kal "edpap.
Sidt does “ that in which each thing appeam on Js
Pn c8, roW entrance, and again goes out •> / And
etScor Aeyovroj 0,5 rrdOos X4ye, rrepl iKeZpo. d)^d
"SeS wMch\a:Cn criticised as speaking
rporrop erepop ^r,re:. Tls oSp oSros; ’Enec8d
tne stareiueup „^
Xeyopeprjp radrrjp ^daip od8ip 8eX elpai rwp UtaKe s.;bs«at.,
pprojp, dXX’ dTraaap iK7re<f>evydpac r^v rcdp Sptcop
Se^ai-Srol“Jleh we at. “““f,
* Gp^Timaeus 4SE2.
T4S:nSrs."4S'.,i,r"‘“‘“
not S*" i“ Rato is dn6XXvra,. * Cp. Timaeus 62A8-B1.
b Cp. Timaeus 62B4r-6.
-262 263
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
ov^v Kai ^avr-q^ ^ripav~X6yo, y^p «ai
<h^rov.av airq,J, .IXqye acorrjpla^ld.dy.q
povov rco^ ovrcov dSeKrou ehac. dXxI
r. maa^cov. Kal rodrov dp,o,pov ds
o^.d.ac. Ofrco ydp ci, iripa ^dvrr,- ^
^Ibos Tt .coocK^vq p.er' i^dvov dXXo y,vLd
30o7s ™ e?.a. .aj ;,cipa
ovh,vos orov ovx] i^oSoyrj. ’AAAA Se? Kal dm6v-
T<^v rqv avrqv pev,,v Kal i^cdvrcoy d^nadq. Iva Kal
Tf 0«5;c dXqd^vdv odK dXqOd.
Ap ovv aXqdojs; Kal ncos, & pLqSa/acis dia.s
aXqe^ f,€rex€cv Sea r6 tf,evSos dvae.- ^Apa oh
«6wAa ro>r ei^opcofM^vcov Kal ^cos hope. iKdva;
Kai yap ee evTavda dviXoes rd ovra, odSkv dv
ovhvaxpovov ej^aveeq j&, ,0, ,V ala9qr^ dpeopek-
To ovv Kdronrpov ivravda Kal aird
oo8e,. ^eSos ov axno fiev ody Sparae- ISei ydp
avro nporepov Kad adrd dpaaSae- dAXd roeoOrdv
* Sroy oix Kirohhoff, H-^^.
ei optpTo H-S: evopwro codd.
opoTai Vitringa,H-S: AopSToi oodd.
generareSSThe'* text *° represent the probable
wishes to delete the MSS Aop<3tWH-S° ’ J^®r
*264^ Itt‘>^str^iZ‘^NlpUtmUm33)
ON IMPASSIBILITY
different-for those real beings are rational
and really real—it is necessary for it by this ifference
to guardlts o^vn proper self-preservation; ^ is neces­
sary for it not Only to be irreceptive
but^as well, if there is [in it] some imitation of them,
Jo haZno share in it which will really make it i s
own In this way it would be altogether different ,
oSTerwise, if it took any form to itself it would m
conjunction wth it become something else and won d
Se to be different and space for all thmg ^ the
receptacle of absolutely everything. But it must
main the same when the forms come into it and stay
unaffected when they leave it, so “T-
alwflvs be coniinff into it and leaving
tainly what comes into it comes as a phantasm, un-
me into the untrue. Doe. It. then, t™^ '
Sw could it, to that which i. “£.1^
bflvp'anv part in truth because it is taisenooa
Does it,Ven, come falsely into falsehood, and is
what happens very much like the way in w 1
images of the fa7es seen in a f^^or^yS^Zre
there as long as people look into it. r +-Up
Sw7n took away the real beings, none of the
things which we, now see in the world P®^°^
Se inse. would ever at any time “j";
the mirror itself is seen, for it, >
as certain. 265
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
rc ^dGx^c.^otdPxal 6 ^cor^CTdels A<f>av^s eV«
Kal rSTe.^Sri Kal dvev r6v ^cona9fjvai oix iojparo.
Touttj oSp ra p,kv iv rots Kar6Trrpois pi mareverat,
elvai ^ ^rrov. Sr, 6parai rd iv S iari Kal pivu
iS fiiv airo, TO. Se d-n-e'pxerai- iv Se rfj % oix
6pS.rat air^, oire ^xovda oire dvev iKclvo^v. Et’
S€ ye ^v pivecvrd d<f>’ <Lv TrXyjpovraL rd Kdronrpa
Kal aird p-^ iojparo. oiK dv pij ehai dXrjdivd
pmarT^ep rd iPopcipeva. El piv o5v iari r, iv
rots KardTTrpocs, xal iv rfj iXr, oiroj rd ala6r,rd
SOiaroj- el Si pfj iari, fjaivera^ Si elvai, KdKet
fjariov <j>alveaeaL ini rfjs vXrjs alrcojpivovs rrjs
<{>avrdaeojs rrjv rojv qvrojv irroaraaiv, ^s rd . piv
Svra dvrojs del peraXap/Sdve,. rd Si p-l, Svra pi,
S^Ois. inelnep oi Set oirojs ix^tv aird -d>S etxev
56 dv rov ovro)s-pr,.ovros, el fjv aird.
^14'. Tt oiv; Ml) ovcn,s oiSiv inearr, dv; *H
oiSi effiwAor Kardnrpov pi, Svros ij rivos rocov'rov.
To yap^ iv erepcp neijjvKds ylveaQai iKelvov pi,
o^os oiK dv yivoiro-. rovro ydp ,f,iais elKdvos ri
6 €V.erepcp. Et piv ydp ri dirpei dnd rCov noiovvrojv,
Kal^ dvev^ rov iv iripcp ^v dv. 'Enel Si pivel
€Keiva, el ip:<f>avraae'^aerai. iv dXXcp, Set rd dXXo
ON IMPASSIBILITY
the air islnvisibk even when it is illuminated, be­
cause it was unseen'without the illununa,tion.^ bo in
this way the images in min-ors are not
less beLved to be real, because that in
are is seen, and it remains but they S°
matter, it itself is not seen either when it h^ the
images or without them. But if it was possibk /or
the images with which the mirrors are filled to re­
main, and the mirrors themselves were not seen, we
shouldnotdisbelievethatthereflectionsseeninmirrors
were real. If, then, there really k something an
mirrors, let there really be objects of sense in ma,tter
in the same way; but if there is not,hut appears
to be something, then we must admit,
only appear on matter, and make the re^on for theiy
appearance the existence of the real beings,
Snce in which the .real beings always really
participate, but the beings wh/ch are
Lally; since they cannot be in the same state as
tLy Wd be if real beings did not really exist and
^^S.^Well, then, if matter did not exist, would
nothing come into existence ? No, and there would
teno fmage, either, if a mirror or something of the
Srt did not ^xist. For that whose nature is to cotae
into existence in something else would not come into
existence if that something else did > ^
this is the nature of an image, being somrt g
else. If, of course, something came away
productive powers, it would exist without being m
Lmething Le. But since these remain —ed
if an image of them is going to appear in another
thing; the^ other thing must exist, oifering a baSe to
® 267
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
elvat eSpav irapixov ru> oiK iXSovri, rfj S’ airov
■napovat^ Kal rfj r6Xp.r] Kal olov npoakiTriaei koX
Kal d-narrid'ev rrj oi
10 Ai7^et, Lva p.evrj ^ -nevLa. Kal del irpoaaiTTi. ’E77et
yap apTrafi vnearv], o' p.kr> fivdos ai^v Troiel
-npoaaiTovaav evheiKvdfievos ai-r^s 'rqv <f,dmv, 3n
ayaSov eprj^,. Alrec re o' rrpoaacrcou ody d
o 81S0VS. aAA ayana o n dv AdjSjj- cSore Kal rovro
ev8e,Kvvadai, co? 3repov r6 iv airfj cf^avraCdpievov.
10 lo^ re ovop.a w? oi ■nXrjpoviJ.dv-qs. To 8e ™
nop<p ovyylveoeat, oi r<p 6vri SrjXovprds iari
ovyyiveodai oil'e r& Kdpcp. dXXd rivi npdyaan
■€VfX7}xav(p- rovro Se eon rfj ao^ia rov iav-
raafiaros. ETrei yap oiy olov re rov 'ovros Trdvrr)
p.1? ^ereyeiv o n rrep ovcoaovv e$u) ov airov eariv
20 -avrr, yap ovros^ <ei’y> ^ ,.<i 6vra nocelv-ri
Oe iravrr) p,rj ov dfUKrov ru> ovri. 6avp,a to Yonua
yiyyerai, ttws [J-rj p,ereyov fiereyei,. Kal ■ttus olov
rrapa rrjs yeirvidaecos eV‘ re Kalnep rrj airov
(pvaei p,ev olov KoXXaadae dSvvarovv. 'AnoXiaBd-
25 vee ovv (is av drri ^oVeco? dXXorplas o iXa^ev dv,
olov rjX(vano rorrevv XeUvv Kal opLaX&v on af,
Hevee CKei, rovrep Kal e^avrdadrj eKeZ KaKeWev
* o/waf Harder, H-S: dW oodd.
* <€tr> Harder, H-S^.
Til liiteipretation of the beggar-woman Povertv in
matter {Symposium 203B ff.) as
matter is pre-Plotiman (see note to oh. 6 of III. 6 (601)
s^S differently in different places to suit his phao-'
sophieal purposes. In his full-length inteipretation o^he
268
ON IMPASSIBILITY
that which does not come to it;
ite nresence and its self-assertion and a kind ot beg
ging and its poverty makes a sort of
to grasp, and is cheated by not grasping, so that its
poverty may remain and it may be always begging
For since it is a rapacious thing, ^ (“ddstitute-
beggar woman to show its nature, *at it is d^tHut
of the good. And the beggar does not ask for what
the giver has but is satisfied with what he ge^. s
1 thatthis, too, shows thatwhat is imaged m matter is
shows that matter is not satisfied. And by its unm
-xrifli “ Heqource ” Plato makes clear that it is n
mted
TSTcmill i<!»l b“"g
Im thing, to “it. Witt the dp'™””'
apparition 1 Tor, since it is impossible for anything
X““” which i'n »y sort ot w.y ouB.tot.
to have altogether no share m being
natme of being, to work on beings-and since, on the
other hand the altogether non-existent cannot com
biSe tdth being, what happens is a ^
the non-participant participate, and how does it ha
something as if from being next door, although by
to owm nature it is incapable of being, so to speak,
s?uck on to it? What it might have grasped, then,
slips away from it as if from an alien nature, like
JcL from smooth flat surfaces; because it does no
stair there, by this very fact the illusion is created that
myth in III. 6. 6-9, Poverty L8 [aTli-^35^
in the verbal aUnsion (wpoCToiw) ^
tasmal, occurs only here.
269
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
etvai. El 8’ iieracrxovaa Kal ovrco Sefa/ie'ra
ojcjTTep ns d^ioX, KaraTroO^v S.v els aMjv t6
„ ^cuVerai, Sn /car67ro'0«,
30 epewev -q av-rq oiSkv he$apivq. dAA’ ^ma^otJaa
rqv TTpoaohov 1 wy eSpa dncjeovpevq Kal els to auro
Twi/ TTpomdvTwv KdKel piyvvpivwv dnoboxv. olou
oaa ^pos ■qhov 7rvp Cvrovvres Xa^elv loraoi Xeia,
rd Se Kal vXqpovvtes vSaros, tva Sie'Afe
KOiAvopevq iiro rov ev8ov evavriov -q ^Ao^ Ifco 8e
35 avviaraiTO. Vlverai oSv alrla rrjs yevdaews odrw
Kai fa ev avrf} awiardpeva tolovtov avvujTaTai
TpOTTOV.
^16. ’EttJ pkv odv Toiv t6 TTvp -^Xlov Treol
avra awayovrcov dre Trapd aladqrov nvpds
Xap^avovTOiv rijv nepl aird ytvopivqv i^axjiw t6
a^Lae-qrois jtvai Kal avrois vtrdpxei.- 8io Kal
faiverai, on e^co rd avviardpeva Kal e^e^qs Kal
6 irXqaiov Kal aTTrerai Kal vepara Svo- d S’ eirl
■J^s vXqs Xdyos dXXov exei rponov to e^w. *H ydp
erepdrqs Tqs ^daews dpKet oiSh> -niparos SittAoC
Seopevq, oAAa ttoXv paXXov navros neparos
aXXorpia 2 rq irepdriqri rrjs oialas Kal oiSapq
10 avyyevec^ t6 dpcyks ^xovaa- Kal rd ahcov rod
fieveiv. en airqs rovro, 6n pd, n rd elaidv.
‘ W.o>o8w Creuzer, H-S2; w/jo'oSov codd. ,
aAAoTpia.Kirchhoff. H-S: dAAorpi'ov wxy: ^orpwvii^v,, Q.
■^ is a striking example of the way in which Plotinus
uggests the true nature and relationship ofimmaterial realities
2JO.
ON IMPASSIBILITY'
it is there and comes from there. But if matter
really was participant and received being in the way
one thinks it does, what came to it would be swallowed
and sink into it. But as things are, it is appar^t
that it is not swallowed but matter remains the same
and receives nothing, but checks the approach as a
repellent base and a receptacle for the things winch
come to the same point and there mingle, it is hke
the polished objects which people get against sun
when they want to get fire (and they fill of them
with water), so that the ray, being hindered by the
resistance within, may not pass through, but be con­
centrated on the outside. So inatter becomes in Ais
way the cause of coming into
that are constructed in it are constructed m this way.
15 In the case of the things which collect around
them the fire from the sun,
liehtink up which occurs around them from a per,
cfptibll fire, they themselves have *e property o
beinff perceptible; therefore it is clear, too, that the
rays which Lme together on them
and next and close to them, and touch *em, and
there are two edges', but the formative prinaple on
rnSL" "islde in a dlffaranl nay. The difaence
of its nature is enough, with no need of a pair of edges,
but it is, rather, completely incompatible with any
sort of edge,! and owes its freedom from mixture with
inatter to the difference of its being and its
mStm r^md^ Li^her does that which
describe spiritual ommpresenoo in VI. 4 LaiaSJ /■
271
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

djroXarih- airrjs. air^i rov elaiSvfos- oAA’ enters ifffct anything from it, nor does it get anything
frfm whft comL into it; but it is like what happens
waTrep al Sd^ai Kal al <f,avTaalai eV i/ivxfj oi with opinions and mental pictures in the
KeKpavrai, dXX' d-neicn ^dXiv eVda-n; co? oScra o are not blended with it, but each one goes away
again as being what.it is alone, carrying nothing off
eWi p6vr] 4<f>dXKovaa oiS^ KaraXd-rrovaa,
g,TSt“„d k.rf»g nothing behtod, because .t
15 ipipvKro- Kal t6 oix drc eV.Veiro, koX not mixed with’soul; and bfeing- outside.does not
e<f> ^iariv oix dpdaei irepov. dAA’ o' Ao'yc? <jyrjaiv. mean that the form rests upon the matter, and that
EvTavda fi'ev oiv eiScoXov 6V ^ ^apraala ovk upon which it is, is not visibly other, but reason de­
clares that it is. ' Now in the soul the mental picture
ilUXov Tfjv 4>iaiv oi^s T7js ilwx^is. Kal-nep TroAAd ri piaSasm, while the nature of the soul is not
SoKoooa Kal 5^ dyec., xPVrac pkv phanLmal; and although the
avrfi oiS^v- ^rrov d>s iXr, dvdXoyop, oi p^ivro. many ways seems to lead the soul and take it wherever
S Ss to, the soul none the less uses it as if it w^
20,Kpvtl,e rats Trap' airijs eVepyeW rroXXdK^s matter or something hke it, and ‘^^fainly the mental
eiwdovnevr] oiSe inoi-qaev airr/v, oiS' et perd picture does not conceal it, since it is
by the activities springing from it, and if does not^
ndoTjs^XOop, KeKpi<f,Sa, Kal tl airi/p <f,aprdC€aeai-
even if it comes with all its pictorial power, make the
exeijdp eV airij epepyelas Kal Xoyovg haprlovs, soul to be completely concealed and to appear in a y
ols d77a)0etrat rd npoaidpra. 'H Si-daOepeardpa v^rto be the^pictLe itself, for the soul has-in it
activities and rational principles which are in op
yap ecrnp [^] i Swapiv noXXlp i/ivxrjs Kal
position, with which it repels ^
26 ^x^t oiSdp Tcop Sptojp oirl dXr,6k oir' a5 oIk^Top Lck it But matter—for it is much weakei, as far as
i}j€vhos-^iK exei 8e 8t' orbv <f>avrj iprjpla Trdprcop any exercise of power goes, than soul, and ^as none
She things that exist, neither a true one nor a
ovaa, dAAd ylperai pdp alria dAAot? tov <f>alpeaeai. falsity which is really its own—has nothing by means
oi 8ipara, 8i eto oi8d rovro, ci? «iyj, of wUch it can appear since it is destitution of every-
Silg, but it beSmcs tbe c.u,. for «•>>»
ePTavOa dXX' el mre iievpoi, airrjp Xoyos ^aOvs
their appearing but is not even able to say Here 1
ns ii dXXcop Sptojp. d)s apa iart ri dwoXeXbippdpop am ”; ^but if fame deep research should
SOndpTWP Twp Sptcop Kal r&p darepop 8o^dprwp and distinguish it from other existing things ^t
^Wld appear] that it is something abandoned by all
^ V del. Kirchhoff, H-S^. existing Aini knd by the things which come after

272 273

PLOTINUS:'ENNEAD HI. 6.
etvat, eXKOfMevov ek- Trdvra Kal aKdXovdovv d,s
oogai Kai aS ovk d.KoXovdovv.
ayaywv els oaov
avros TjOeXev inotiqaev air^v ^dya nap’ adrov r6
jueya nepidels avrfj oXk ovcrrj, rovro oiBk
™ '>'^P P«ya
Eav ow Ti? rovro d<f>iXr, r6 dhos. oiKir’ iarlv
ovbe ^awerat to vnoKelp.evov p,iya, dXX’ d ■Xv
ro yevop^vov piya dvOpivnos Kai Innos Kal pprd
TOO innov r6 piya rov Innov ineX96v, dneXOdvros
Tov innov ^<al to p4ya avrov dnepyerai. Et 8e
ns Xeyoi d>s o' tnnos ini peydXov rivds SyKov Kai
ToaooSe yiv,rai Kai pivei r6 piya, ijy4,aopev rd
10 rov^i^nnov peya, dXXd rd rov SyKov piya piv.iv
e/cet El pevroi 6 oyKos oSros nvp iariv t] yrj
aneXdovros rov nvpds rd rov nvpds dnipxerai ■8
TO piya. Od roivvv odSi rov aydparos
ovbe rov peyiOovs dnoXavaeiev dv ^ ovk 4k
■nvpds dXXo ri iarai, dXXd pivovaa nvp ov nvp
15 yevTjaerai. ’End Kai vvv roaadrr, yevopivn. dds
boKei-, oaov robe rd nav, H navaairo 6 ovpavds
Kai ra evrds ndvra] odv ndai l rodrois Kai rd
peyedos nav oix-qaerai dn’ adrrjs Kal at dXXai
brjAovpri opov noiorjjres, Kai KaraXei(f>e-^aerai
onep 7)v aciCovda odSiv rcdv npdrepov nepi adrXv
20 ovrcos ovrcov. Kairoi iv ots indpxei rd nenovdivai*
* ovv TTaoi Crenzer: ov/iram oodd.
274
I
:.ON IMPASSIBILITY
tliem that seem to exist, dragged into all things and
Corresponding to them as far as seemmg goes, and \k
again not [really] corresponding. f„^„tive
16 And further, when some rational f««»ative
nriEciple comes upon it and brings it to the size which
WincCple itself wishes, it makes it a size by im-
oosinff the size from itself on matter, which is not the
rSid does not in this way become it; for [if it
dTdl the size imposed on it would be [real] inagnitude.
If then, one were to take away this form, what under
li4 it neither is any longer nor appears a thing of
size, but if the thing of size which
man or a horse, and with the horse the size ot the
horse came upon the matter, when the horse goes
away its size goes too. But if someone were to say
tha/the basis of the horse is a mass of a certain size,
and the size remains, our answer is that what remains
in the matter is not the size of the horse but the size
of the mass. If, then, this m^s is fire °r
the fire soes away the size of fire (or °f earth) goes
awav too So, then, matter will not profit by either
shape or size; otherwise it will not be something else
after being fire, but will remain fire while becoming
something^which is not fire. Since, even now, when
matter, as it seems, has become so great that it is the
sizfitf this universe, if the heaven and all '«thm it
had a stop, with all these the magnitude; all of it,
would go away from matter and, obviously, all 1b
Xr qualities as well, and matter would be left
what it was and keep none of the
previously existed in it. Certainly, m the tmn£
which have the property of being affected by the
presence of certain other things, even when those
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
napovaia rcvwv. Kal d'neXeSvTcoi^ ^ari rt eVi eV
rm, Xa^ovacu- ^ U rols p-f, ^aOovacv oiKir^,
waTT^pem rov aepos <f>cor6s irepl airdv 6vros
a-^,\eovros rovrov. >E<Iv Se' rij 6avpAl:r,.
ovK Axov peyeOos peya iarat. S' oiK ^yov
25 e.ppory^ra 6,ppov Harai; od ykp r<5 airS\'o
dva, avrp Ka. peyide. ehac. et^ep Kal dvXov
peyeOos earcv, ojanep Kal dvXov ay^pa. Kal d
rripovpev r^v dXrjv, ^eraA#6i ndvra- Iv 8^ rwv
.a. r3 pdyeeo, 'Ev p^. oSv row acipaa.
30 avvdero^s ovacv ecrrc Kal piyeOos perd rdiu <IAAw.
ov prjp a^yiapdvov. eVetSi) eV acSparos X6yw
eyK€irai y, peyeOos- iv S'e rij iiXr, oiSk t6 oiK
atpMpiapevov ov yap ackpa..
17 OiS' aS pkyeOos air6 korai. EISo? ydp r<5
pey6os, a)^ oi SsKTiKov Kal Kad' avro Sk to
peyeOos [aAAa Kal ei ri pCprjpa avrckv Kal rovrov
AAA ^ovXera, ^ Keipevov
peya dvai, eSye row oTov i94Xovai pipdaQai
ecf>eaec avrov rj kcv^o,, rfj np6s aM r6 aircov
nados em.ccraada, ds dXXo. TA' oSu pkya iv
■npoobcp ^avrdaews 6iov ds aM Si) rovro r6
peya avvddv rro,rjaav rd piKpdvrTjs dXrjs. Tr^noir]-
‘ oAAa . . . flvai del. Kirchhoff, H-S.
o/oh]T2^27-7^!^^ “re “ repetition
traneiatL.®“ • “^e omitted in the
276
ON IMPASSIBILITY
other things have gone away there is something still
reSi^^ in the fhings which have received them;
buUrthigs which are not affected there is -tMng
koX
anv more, in the air', for instance, when light has been
in ft and gone away, But suppose someone wondered
how, without having ’»“g"itude,matter cou d be a jz ^
—well, how, without having heat, will it be hot. ^
certa nly it Is not the same thing for it to ex^t and to
e2t i/magmtude, g-nted that magmtude . im­
material, just as shape is .^hhigsToXl
to keep matter as matter, it will be all things Lomyj
by participation; but magnitude, too, is of all t
thiLs it^will be. So, then, m composite bodies
Sto matter not even this non-separated magmtude
r Nor aginl’X'bS'olo.eoragnitod., For
and magnitude is something which is by
Lt magnitude in this particular relation since
of St2 run^Mt towards this very size, has made
. Cp. the account of the °rigm of time in
^'^^nl^ftm'® EvenVSrTct (to our. way of thinking)
afom as that of size is for him a living active reality.
277
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD Til. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

kev avTo rfj Traparaaei ov •nXyjpovp.evov Sokuv it by extension, though it is not ^

€hai p4ya. T<J y^p ^^vSws piya. jo€r6 iariv, large. Por this is what false size is, >
t does not possess real size,.being stretched out to
orau r<p p.^ ^yew to p^ya etvac eKretvppevov npos it is extended by the stretching out. For,
i’rfaibSi produL upon other things, or the
eK^tvo -naparaefi rfj eWdoei. HotooVrcov ydp
Travrcov oVo^v ds rA dXXa fj r6 dXXo rf,v airwv
evoTTTpiaiv eKaar6v re r&v ttoiovvtcov <Ls aijo ■^v
tig principle ,hich i. 0“
15 /xe'ya, to' t£ nau i^dycos piya.. ^vyfjei ody to
e/^aoToo XSyoVper^ to' Tt p^ya, cloy Innov Kal
OTOvovy. aXXov, Kal t<J pkya^ aM- \al iyLyyero
naaa pd pe'ya npXs aMpeya iXXapnopdyj, Kal
eKaarr] polpa pdya ri- Kal 6pov ndyra i<f,ai-
yero iK ^ayrXs rov 6l'8oo<r, o5 t8 piya, Kal
eKaarov Kal oToy iraperdraro Kal npds irav Kal
■nayra, Kal iy dSei rovro dyayKaadetaa etyai Kal
0 er oyK<p, 5aoy d) Sdyapis TreTTolrjKe to ptjSey Sy
aM TTdyra dyai- otoy aircp rip </>aiyeaeac Kal r6 StSSififs
Xpiopa t6 ii oi xpd,paros Kal 7toi6t7}s 17 iyravda which' comes from that which is not
V od noidryiTOs eVye rf,y dpcoyvpiay rfjy dn’
€Kdyojy, Kal r6 piyeBos oi peyddovs fj dpcoyipov
26 pera$v 6ecapovpdyo)v eKeiycoy Kal avr^s rrjs vXr]s
Kal rov dSovs avrov. Kat <j>alyerac pdy, Sn
iKecOey, ^eiS^rai Sd, Sn oiK dari ri dy S ^aiyerai.
Meyediyerdi dKaara dXjcdpeya rfj Svydpet rcoy because they come from the hgh^^
appearance IS false beca ^ ^^^^
‘ y.iya Vitringa, H-S*: nh> oodd. r;Sutby"b1ini:Skwn out by the power of the

278
 T
PLOTINUS; ENNRAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY-

Kal x^pav iavroTs noio^vrcov, ^hc^rai forms which are visible in matter and make a pl^ce for
Se .jr. oi> pia^ ^Xr, r<J
dva. "EA.e. themselves, and they are drawn out ^
Se eKaarov Kara rrjv airov UvapLiv eV^ without violence because the universe exists ^7 “»t
S. .pdev. Kal r6 .ocov. p^ya i£, ter. Each form draws out by its own P^^r which it
has; and it has it from the higher tvorld. Andth^
ZvT°'"'''‘ ^l4o.vrdaeujs rov pdya Kal which makes matter large (as it seeins) comes from
rovro ean to ep^avraaOdu, r6 ivravda aiya- i the imaging in it of size, and that which is imaged
Sj vXrj, avayKdCera, avvOecv, 6pov -rroiaa Kal
in it is size in this world; and the
■navraxov rrapeyei eauri^V- ^Xt] ydp iari Kal is imaged is compelled to keep pace with it, artd sub
35 ro^ov Ka, oi rovrl- S iarL r. Trap' airov niits ifself to it all together and
hwarai yeveaQat Kac t6 havrLov 8,' dXXo Kal y^vd- matter and belongs to this size and is not this size,
I..VOV TO evavrroir oiS^ eVeW eWtv iorr, ydp dv. but what is nothing of itself can become *e opposite,
18. ^ Towvv vor^a^v peydXov ^yo^v. d airov X too, by means of something eEe, and when it has
become the opposite is not that either, foi i i w
Kac otov rrpos ro efco vrrd Svvdpecos <t>4po,ro, Xd^oi
av <f>vmv ovK ovaau ep rip poovptl. oi84 rt dyovLv Suppose that someone had a thought of size^
if his thought had power not only to exist in itself
eiSos oi.Se Ti 1^0? TOO peydXov. dXX' oi8d oiSevds
royi^aXXov. TJ dp Tro.rjaece Tadrr, rfj SvpdpZ but was taken outside, so to speak, by its P^^r, i
would take hold of a nature which did not exist in the
Oo;)^ 17T770V, ov poyp- ravra ydp dXXoi ^oi,7jaovaip. thinker and had no form and no trace of size, or of
ti. e,ret5^ napa peydXov Trarpds dpx^rar. oi tUnUng lt either. What, thee, would « make
vjrat TO oAAo xcop^aai pdya, rovro S’ i^ei wifli IhS power > Not a horse or an “1
10rocT“^r"°'' orlrco, eirvy^alrr
make these. Since it comes from ’
^Orov p^yaXov CVS aird piya dpac eV rol, a^ov the other thing cannot attain to size but mil have it
Tot °T 4>o-^vcaea, Xocrrdp eWt. imaged in it. ^Certainly, for a thing which h^ not
Wo S^ ecTT. eAAecVe^v .cai rS p.-f, i^l ^oXXd the good fortune to be so well endowed with size as
to be a size itself, what is left is to appear to ha^e
d-rroSaeTi ^ 0^87 size in its parts as much as is possible for it. But this
15 apcKpa, SyKv [rS] ^ ?oov er. rS rol p^ylZvdLZ means not being deficient, and not being scattered
^har ^,ydXov 6p, dAA* 6W mZZrfi, ^aJo, all over the place, and having
and not falling short in anything. Eor the image
of size, since it is an image of size, cannot endure to be
TOD KirchhofiF, H-S: re codd. equal still in a small mass, but in proportion as
® TO del. Muller, H-»S^
280 ^ 281
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6. ON IMPASSIBILITY

^KeLvov npoarjMlre 6<yOu ol6v re uirco f^^rk rov aspires to the hope of feaching [real] size, it advances
avveepvT6s dnoX,ci>-efjvac oi SwapC^^ov, Kal as far as it can with that which runs along with i^ and
ne'^ocriKe jiiya re i^etvo r6 p,'}, piya prj8’ oSra>
cannot be left behind, and gives
has not got it and does-not appear to have it, and to
So^ai Kai TO opdipevov eV oyKw piya.. 'H 8’ fh: £-"which appears in mass. But rnatter ah the
20 Mdrre^ r^)v airrjs 4>dmv dTroxpcopdvr, rov'rw same, keeps its own nature and makes th ®
si/e as a kind of garment, which it put on when it
y peydXcp^oTov dpcj^iiapari, 5 avvbpapovca air& ran with it as the size in its courae led it aW; but
aiT^v ^y^ dp-niox^To- 5 d 6 dp</>Uaas if what nut this garment on takes it off, matter re
ti.e sLe as i. U rfiuelf o. *ch
a^^XoiTO. p,vd ^d\,v f, olanep ^ap' adrrjs
the form present to it makes it.i Now the soul
W V ^yoadry,, Sao^ dv r6 napdv dSos air^v nocij. which holds the forms of real beings, and is itseff,
H p4u ye ilwx^i rd rdjv dvrwv dhyj ^yovaa dSos too a form, holds them all gathered together, and
25 ovaa Kal ai-d, dpov ndvra. ^yec Kal rov elZovs each individual form is gathered ^
and when it sees the forms of things pei cdived by
eKdarov dpov Svros aircp. rd re rcdv alaeTjrdiv senses as it were turning back towards it and p
€tS^ olov dvaarpicfyovTC, rrp6s air^v Kal yrpoocdvra proaching it, it does not endure to
their multiplicity, but sees them stripped of their
dpwaa oiK dvdxerai perd yr^dov^ S^xeadai. dX\’ mass; for it canLt-become anything else ^an what
anodepeva top SyKOP dpa- oi5 ydp Swarat aAAo rt it is. But matter, which has no
V S ioT, yepiadau 'H dX-r^ oidkp tyovaa r8 no activity, but is a shadow, waits passivjy ^ “d'l
whatever that which acts upon it wishes. So there
dpT^Kdynop, oi ydp dipyeiap, oioa dk OKcd Sf bSh that which proceeds from the rational
30 dpapipet naddp S tc dp iddXrj t6 yro^ijaop. To' ri nrinciple in the higher world has already a trace of
oip yrpo^dp iK Tov iKd Xdyov kyei t6v what Fs going to come into beingj for when the rationa
Sfcipfe is Lved in a sort of picture-m-akmg imag.
pdXXoPTos yep^aeadai- olop- ydp ip ^aPTaaia Ltion, either the movement which
€LK0PCKyj Ki.Poipepos o' Ao'yo? ^ Klpyjcns ^ dyrd division or, if it did remain one and the same, it
TOVTOV pepiapds ioTip- y^, d Taiyop dy] ip, ov8i would not be moved, but stay as it was; and matter
tooTls not able to harbour all things gathered
iKcpijdy]., dXXd piper ij re iXyj yrdpTa dpov cZanep
1 I adopt here with Beutler-Theiler and other editOTS the
realffwhth seems to me to give a better sense: Henry-
* CQ; ^ wxUS, H-S.
Schwyzer prefer ij.
•283
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
35 -q i(,vxq ov Svmrai eiaoc/a'aaaOai- ^ „ together, as soul is; if it could, it
iKdv^v ^ai-r/iv re cc5 Set rd irdvra hi^aadai,
/x^ a/xepw? Se 8e^aa6ai. Aet TotWv Traat toVoJ
o5aar iTTl -rrdvra air^v iXdelv Kal 77W dTraurrjaai
i<tu ■rrpds nav Bcdarq/xa dpKdaai. -oVt p.-f, KardXqnra,
40 ScaoTijfiaTL air^, dXX’ iKKecp^dvr, r& pidXXovn.
Hw? oSy oiK etaeXeXv h ri ^KciXvae rd dXXa, S.
oi>x otov re eV’ dXXqXois eimt; “H ovk’^^v
odS^p ^p&rov d S’ dpa, t6 tov navrds elSoj-
‘djarejdvra p.kv dfia. iu pidpec Sk 'iKaarov Cd>ov
yap {JXq fiepiaOetaa adv rip tov iiepiap^w- d
45 Se p,ij, ovK dv iydvero rt Tvapd tov Xoyov.
19. Ta p,ev §q eiaeXdovra els ttjv vXtjv warrep
fiqTepa dScKet ovSkv oj5S’ aS co^eAet. Ou8e ye
at TrXTjyal al tov'tcov Trpds u^tt^v, npds dXXqXa Se',
on al Svvdp,eis rrpSs rd evavna, oi np6s ri
5 viTOKeifieva, el p.'q ns (JVvet.Xqp.p,eva decopet tols
€776tc7tovo-f depfidv ydp eiravae to ifivxpdv Kal
fieXav TO XevKov rj ovyKpaBevra dXXrjv TroioTqTa e^
airiov iTTolqoe. Td Tra^oWa oSv rd KpaTqBdvTa.^
TO Se naOeiv avTots to p,q eWt onep ^aav. Kat
1 KpoTijflcVa Harder, H-S*: /tpo^cW oodd.
X Por the contrast here between soul which contains all
forms non-spatially and so undivided and matter, which must
neoMsanly r^ive them as dimensionalmnd divided, cp. II.
* Cp. Timaeus 62B4.
284
ON IMPASSIBILITY
belon^o tl^
hiffher world; it must certainly receive all things, but
not rLeive to undivided.^ It must then, since
it is a place for all things,^ come to all of them itself
id meet them and be sufficient for every dimension,
because it is not itself captured by dimei^ion but
lies open to that which is going to come to it How,
then,^when one particular form enters it, do^ it no
hinder the others, which cannot be [present in it]
Jie upon another? The answer is that there is no
first form, unless perhaps it is the form of the un
verse, so that all forms will be
each individual one in its own part, for the naatter
S a l^ing thing is divided alofig with the division
of 4e living thing; * otherwise there would be noth-
inff besides the forming principle.
19 The forms which enter into matter as the r
“ mother ” * do it no wtong, nor again do the;[ do t
anv ffood. Their-blows are not for it, but tor each
^fhefbecause their powers are directed towards
to opposites, not their substrates (^less °ne
siders these as included with the eritering ).
f V Tints a stop to heat and white to black, or
tLv are^mixed togetlier and make another qi^ality
out of themselves The things which ^re affected,
then, are the things which are overcome, and their
being affected consists in their not being what they
3 The universe is, of course, for Plotinus a single living
organism, so this is not ^ a^
th:n^e^C^r«a«^^
:SeSrUnr ^oes his best to explain it
away; see below. 285
 PLOTINOS: ENKEAD' III. 6.
e. U al nelae,, nepl ri a<iaara
Kara ras ^o,or^ras Kal r^s eVt^^ap-
Xf^o.s -rqs oAAptcoCTew? yivop^ivris, Xvopivcov 8^
ovaraa^wv rj^ avviovaa>v ^ pL€rar,depivo,v
Trapa ttju Kara cf>vcnv atiaracnv rX p,^„ ndd-n iv
rocs acvfmac, racs 84 ,/;vxaTs al yvd,aecs awr^aal-
vacs rcov adoSporepwv el 84
15 '"H
H 5:' yivoiaKovacv.
8e vXrj^ pevec- o^84v yXp dneXOdvros aiv
^jnovdejovjvxpov, rov 84 Oepf^ov dneXddvros'
W V^; ovre icXov airp olhe dXXdrpcou oVor.-
povow. Dare ocKecorepov avrij iTToSoyf, Kal
V^T V J^VJVP o^ov ecprjrac- ovSev ydp
VTV AM iolKaac p.ryrdpa aM,p Xdyecv
oaocKac ryp p,yjrepa rd$cv dXrjs np6s rd y,wcLpeva
fcovacv eyecv. w<r dnoSexopdvrjs pdvov, oihtv 84
yevv^va ScSodayjs- i-cr.l Kal Saoo a^aa
rov ycvop-evov sk rrjs rpo^fjs. El 84 SlScoacv t5
t^Tirrjp rc r& yevu^^ivcp, oi KaO' Saov dXrj, dXX'
OTi Kac dSos- fxovov ydp rd etSos y6vcp2. 8’
erepa ^vacs dyovos. JOdev, otpcac, Kal ot JdXac
Oocj>oc^ fMvarcKCPs Kac iu reX.racs alvcrrdpcvoc
pp.7]v 7TOCOVCTC rov dpxacov rd rrjs yeve'aecos
Wfova^c exovra rrpds ipyaaiav rdv yevvcdvra
ra €v acadrjaec brjXovvres elvac rdv vorjrdv Xoyov,
A 1 763^^45^ A (Aristotle De oL An.
i86 ^ 287
DN IMPASSIBILITY
w4re. And in beings endowed with soul the af
fections are in their bodies, when alteration takes
nlace according to their qualities and immanent
powers; and when the unions of their constituent
parts are dissolved, or when together or
Me changed against their natural constitution, it is
only knowledge of the more extreme changes which
reaches their associated souls; if the changes
extreme, they know nothing of them.
abides, for it was affected in no way when the cold
went away and the heat came to it; for neither of
them was in friendly association with it or alien to it.
So thal“ receptacle’’ and “ nurse ” are more proper
termsforit; but “ mother ” is only used m a manner of
speaking, for matter itself brings forth nothing.
tCe pfople seem to call it “ mother who claim
lhat the Lther holds the position of ^^^tter in re­
spect to her children, in that
sLd^ and contributes nothing to the children, smc
ail the body of the child which is- born, too, co^es
from the fooL But if the mother does ^contijute
something to the child, it. is not in so far as she
blit because she is also form, for only form
S?prodL offspring, but the other nature is sterile
It wL for this reason, I think, that the ancient sages,
speaking in riddles secretly and in the mystery rites,
make the ancient Hermes always have the organ of
generation ready for its work, revealing that the
fntelligible formative principle is the generator of th
tMngs^n the sense-world, but revealing, too, the
to his Loeb edition, p. xi ff.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.
TO S.yovov T7\s vX-qs ’fi.evoiicrt}s t6 aM del St,d
TOJV nepc airiiv dydva^v SqXovvres. Mrjrdpa ydp
navrcov
30 Kara ro^oiqaavres. Sf, odrcos
i7TOKelp.evov dpyi^v rl
Xa^dvres Kal Svoaa
rovro eef,evoc. Im SqXoXev S ^odXovra,. t6 np6s
rrjv p,T]Tepa aiy op,oiov ndvrq euSeiKwaOki OeXovres,
o T/)oW povXofidvocs dKp^picrrepol
Xafieiv KM itr, immXrjs Cvrovai. ndppwdev ah>,
ofMMs Se ^chs iBdvavro, iveSet^avro d>s dyovds re
KM oi8^ ndvTTj dqXvs. oAAd ToaouTOV p.kv drjXvs,
oaov iTToSd^aaeM. Saov Sk yevvav oiKiri, rep t6
TTpos avrqv KeycopyjKog -npog aii-qv p,ijre dfjXv
elvM, p,7]Te yewav Swaa0M, dmreTpLtjpLevov Be
40 naerqs rfjg rov yewav SwdfjLecos, ^ pAvep i^rdpyei
T(p fX€vovTi appevc.
1 ON IMPASSIBILITY
sterility of matter which always remains the same
through the eunuchs who accompany her [the Ureat
Motherl.i por when they make matter the niother ot
I all things, they apply this title to it taking it in the
sense of the principle which has the function of sub­
strate ; they give it this name in order to declare what
they wish, not wishing to make matter in every way
exactly like the mother; to those who want to know
more accurately in what way [it is a mother] and do
not make a merely superficial investigation, they
show, by a far-fetched analogy, but all the same as
best they could, that matter is sterile and not in
every way female but only female as far as receiving
goes, but no longer when it comes to generation;
they show this by making that which approaches it
neither female nor able to generate, but cut off from
all power of generation, which only that which re­
mains male has.

.•= allegorical interpretation of the ithyphallio Hermes round the Great Mother given here seems to have no parcel
Ln Hotinus^dr^s ifto M (Op. Lucretius II. 614-617 and
chs. 24-26 for other interpretations). It is so far-fetched
clmuto °”Sinal Stoic form, op. (as Plotinus admits, op. 1. 36 below) and so exactly adapted to
mV Qraecae Compendium; p. 23 16-22 Minus’s own distinctive doctrine of the absolute sterility of
Lang. The allegorical interpretation of the eunuchs who mr
matter that it may well be his own invention.

288 289
VOL. III. ^
 ENNEAD III. 7

a
 III. 1. ON ETERNITY AND TIME
Inlrodudory Note
This treatise is No. 46 in Porphyry’s chronological order.
It is one of the two major discussions of time m the
surviving works of ancient philosophers, other bemg
S h^AT^totle {Physics IV. 10-14. 217b-224a) which
Plotinus criticises in chs. 9 and ^-13- There
to have been any changes or developments of great im­
portance in Plia°sophical thought about tme beWeen
Aristotle and Plotinus. Though Stoic and Epicurean
views are dealt with in the critical part of the
7-10), Plotinus is mainly concerned with wa^ of
Ihout time which were already current m the earty Aca-
demv which linked time very closely with the movement
SCvens, and with Aristotle’s view of time as the
number or measure of motion. . .
As a Platonist, Plotinus bases his discussion of eteimty
and tLe " passage of the /37D-38B) where
Plato speaks of the making of time as a movmg image of
eternity ” It is this conception of time as the image
eS5 which is the starting-point of to own thought
about both. They are for li™
life the life of the divine Intellect and the life of Soul,
the’first part of the treatise (chs. 1-6) he develops to pr -
Jold tu^ption of eternity as “ the If®
that which exists and is in bemg, all ^g®^®%®'“^f8)’
completely without extension or mterval (ch. 3. 3^38),
which de^ly influenced Christian patristic and medieval
thought: ^cp. the classical definition of Boethius, wrfer-
miJbilis vitae tota sirrml et perfect fom Tfto
tione PUlosbphiae V. Prosa 6). And m oh. 11, one of
293
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI. 7.
Tff passages of philosophical es-
criticising the views of his predecessors on
STs The hrof^® idea of
It as the life of the soul m movement. This certainly
^uenced the thought of St. Augustine on time (cp^
especially Confessions XL 14-28), though the two dffier
iTter^ conceptions of soul. The
''e™o’^ed from Plotinus
Se r conceptions of eternity and
toe, because of then insistence on making both into sub-
stentive pmciples, divine beings with their own proper
£SoT SL 57“ ^lem^nts of
1 neology Prop. 63, with the commentary of E. R. Dodds).
Synopsis
eternity and
experience of both; but when we concen-
toe on this and try to arrive at full understanding of it
we meet difficulties which can be cleared up by aldose
and discriminating study of the opinions of to ancieffi
philosophers. We will begin with eternity of which time
oth7 though it would be possible also to go the
tor way, from image to archetype (ch. 1). What is
etermty? Not the inteUigible uniLse itself, nor to
rest in it (ch. 2). It is the life of that which exists com-
^etely and simultaneously, without before and .after
dTrktfoA Eternity and the wholeness of real being;
w« movement m tune are essential to the exil-
tence of thmgs Vhich come into being (ch. 4). We con-
emplate eternity by the eternal in ourselves; it is to self-
mMifestation of divmity, a total life (ch. 5). Eternity
and unity; it is to life of real being'around to W
always existmg reaUy means “ truly existing ”; that
which exists m toe is deficient in existence 6). We
“ eternity and in toe. What is
toe? Classification ofthe accounts ofearlier philosophers ■
?94
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
(i) time is movement, (ii) it is what is mowd, (iii) it is
something belonging to movement (ch. 7). E®futato of
(i) and (ii); time cannot be either all movement, or ordered
movement or the particular ordered movement of the
sphere of heaven, nor can it be the sphere itself Beffita-
tion of the Stoic form of (iii); time cannot be the distoce
covered by any movement, the movement of to umverse
included (oh. 8). Refutation of the Aristotelian form ^
(iii); time cannot be the number or measure of movemert
ch. 9). Brief refutation of the Epicurean form of (m);
time cannot be an accompaniment of movement (ch. 10).
Plotinus’s own view of the origin and nature of toe; it
is the life of the soul in the restless movement from one
thine-to another which characterises it when it separates
itself from the quiet unity of Intellect; the rniive^ is m
time because soul has put itself mto toe (ch. 11). It
soul turned back altogether to the mtelligible world and its
eternity, time would have a stop. How we measure toe
by regular recurrences in the movements of the i^erse.
How time and the movement of the universe m dffieren
ways measure each other (ch. 12). The universe is m toe
and shows time"; the Aristotelians have got the relationship
the wrong way round. Superiority of Plato s acooimt,
understood as meaning that time is the life of soul (ch. 13).
29S
 in. 7. (45) nEPI AIONOS KAI XPONOT
III. 7. ON ETERNITY AND TIME

1. Eternity and time, we say, are two different

ZZl r^fT Z'' a7S.o. erm. things, the one belonging to the sjJhere of the nature
Tovhexpovov nepi r6 y^v6pL,vov Kal ro'Se which lasts for ever, the other to that of becomiig
and of this universe; and at once, and as if by a fairly
TO 7rav,^ avroOev f,ev Kal c^oTrep raTs -rijs iwolas
continuous application of ohr concept of *5“’ ^
think that we have a clear and distinct experience of
them in our own souls, as we are always speaking of
Aeyo^e. re aeJ .ap' aWra oVo;.aW. them tod using their'names on every occasion. Ut
Ilei/jw^oi ,M7]v e,s enCcramu air&v livai Kal
course, when we try to concentrate on them and, so
«W .yyJs .,(K>„Ae.iv „iX.v .5 ^ to.speak, to get close to them, We find again that our
thoLht runs into difficulties; we consider the state­
ment of the ancient philosophers about the^ who
Aa^ovres em tovtcov avanavadp..voi Kal a^raoKes differ one from the other, and perhaps also different
'iZXZZx' epiorrjdevres to Zokovv interpretations of thfe same statements, and we set
e/cetTOt? Aeyeij/ aya^rjaavres d.aAXaTr6u€9a rov our tonds at rest about them-and think ifr sufficient
Cvrec. er. .e/,J a^rcS.. ^ if we are able, when we are asked, to
rco. apxa.<o, ^al p^Kapl<,v cf,doa6<f>L r6 dxJ, of the ancients, and so we are satisfied to be f^ed
from the need of further research about them. Now
we must consider that-some of *e Messed philoso­
a.' /ea. ovvea., roo'rco. yeVoiro, eV.a«e'- phers of aiicient times have found out truth,
^ao0a. .,oo,Ve.. KaJ .poVepo. L,l .o’.Xo,
Lt it is proper to investigate which of them have
attained it most completely,-and how we too could
reach an understanding about these things. And
first we should enquire about eternity, what sort of
further reflection leading to clearer ""dereWinf. It is. of
«mply to repeat their statenae^„te; ’they‘ ^ forlTm TeJ^f to course, Plato, here and elsewhere, who has attained tne
truth most completely ” (1. 15).
297-
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
Cr]T€tv, TL TTore vojii^ovat.v elvai avrov oi erepov
rov xpovov Tidein-es elvar yvcoaOevros yap rov
KCLTa^TO^ TrapaSeiyfia earwros /cat to rijs elKovos
avrov. ov St] ypovov Xiyovaw elvai, rax' dv aa<f>ks
20 yivoiTO. Et 8e ns npo rov rov auuva ^ectoao^ai
Tov xpo^ov Ss ian (j^avraad^t-r], yivoir' dv Kal
rovr(p^ evrevOev e/cei Kara dvdfivrjoav iXBovn &
dpa <l>ij.oluro 6 ypdvog Bedcjaadai,. emep o>io'r7?Ta
odros TTpos eKeXvov exoi.
^ 2. Ttm odv TTore ypv <t>dvai. rov aldiva elvai;
Apd ye T?iv voririiv air^v oialav, d>airep dv el
ns Xeyoi rov ypdvov rov avpiTravra ovpavov Kal
Kd<rp.ov elvai; Kai ydp ad Kal radrrjv r^v Sd^av
eaxov rivds, <f>aai, irepl rov xpdvov. 'Enel ydp
SaefMvorarov ri rov aiidva elvai ^avra^dpieda Kal
voovfiev, ae/j,vdrarov Se rd rrjs vorjrrjs <j)vaecos,
/cat ovK eariv eineiv 6 n aepivorepov dnorepovovv—
^ ^eTre/cetm ovSe rovro Karrjyop'rjreov—els
ravrdv dv ns ovnv avvdyoi. Kat ydp ad o re
Koafios o voiyros o -re aidiv nepieKriKd dpi^o) Kal
lOrcdv adridv. 'AXX' Srav rd irepa iv Oaripcp
Xeyojfiev—ev t<3 alcdvi—Keiadai, Kal Srav rd
alidviov Karrjyopcdfiev avrwv~fi pikv ydpp ifnjai,
rov napaSelyiaaros ^vms ervyxavev odaa aicdvios,
—dXXo rdv aidiva ndXiv ad Xeyopiev. elvai fxevroi
^ Cp. Plato, Timae.ua 37D7.
* The Pythagoreans: op. Aristotle, Phyaica A 10. 218bl-2,
298
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
thing those who make it different from time consider
it to be, for when we know that which holds the
position of archetype, it will perhaps become clear
how it is with its image, which the philosophers say
time is^ But if someone, before contemplating
eternity, should form a picture in his mind of what
time is, it would be possible for him, too, to go from
this world to the other by recollection and con­
template that of which time is a likeness, if time really
has a likeness to etetnity.
2 What sort of thing, then, ought we to say that
eternity is ? Should we say that it is the intelligible
substance itself, as if one were to say that time is
the whole heaven and uhiversal order? lor, so
people say, some philosophers have held just this
opinion about time.^ For, since we picture and think
of eternity as something most majestic, and toe
highest degree of majesty belongs to the intdligible
nature, and it is impossible to mention anything at
all which is more majestie—not even majesty can be
predicated of that which lies beyond it one could
in this way come to the concision that etermty and
the intelligible nature are one' and the same. ^ Then,
again, the ihtelhgible universe ^d eternity «e
both inclusive, and include the same thmgs. But
when we say that one set of things [the intelligible
realities] Ues in the other—in eternity—and when we
predicate eternal exisj;ence of the intelligible reah-
ties—for, Plato saiys, the nature of the archetype was
eternal ^—we are again making eternity something
with the comment of Simplicius (In PAy*. W. 10, p. 700,
19-20.)
» 2'imoew37D3.
29§
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
^ V w/Jetmt ^KelvT) 4>ayi4v.
5 lo 5e aeixvov eKarepov ^hai ravTorrjra ov SrjXot-
tffw? yap av Kal ru, erepcp avrwv -rrapa rov irepov
TO aeixvov ycvoiro. "H t€ Treptoy^ rw c6j
f^epcov eara, rip Si at&vi 6pov t6 SXov oiv <Ls
fiepos. oAA ort ndvra rd roiavra ota atc[>via Kar'
CIVTOV,
o-raW ^areov nyi^ e/cei toi'
atwm etmt, cooTrep ivravOa t6v ypdvov /card
lo-vriaLv 4,aa,v; AAA’ etVoVco? aV ri? rAv aldiva^
Q^aeierr^epa raMv rfj ardaei Myovres « oAy
anXcos.^ oAAa rij ardaei rfj rrepl t^v oialav. Et’
JV ordaei raindv, -apdirov p.iv o{,k
epovixev acwvcov rfjv ardaiv, d>anep oiSi t6v aldiva
aiwviov TO ydp alcLviov t6 /iere'yov al&vos.
ihneira rj Kivr,ais ■nws atdiviov; OSrco ydp dv
Ka, araacfxgv etr,. Elra lye. ^ rijs ardaecos
~ aorp ro dei; Adyo^^Sfod rd iv ypoVco,
on S'- ° - ^oovp,€v, orav to diSiov Xeycoaev. El
30 6e rji ovalas ardaet, ifco ndXiv aS rd dAAa
yevr] rov acdivos noc'jaoixev. Etra rdv atcdva oA
liovov ev araaei Set voelv, dAAd Kal iv ivi dra
Kai^ aSiac^arov. Iva rairdv ^ ypdvoj- A SI
araacs ovre f^v rov iv oire rd/v rov dSlaarLv
eye. ewocav ev adrjj ^ ardacs. Etra rov pkv
' ato'-a AP'' Creuzer, ^6vov A«ExyQL.
■ I motion here are the Platonic “ oateeories of the
mtelhgible world ”: op. V. 1 [10] 4; VI. 2 [43] “5
300
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
different, but are saying that it has- something
to do with the intelligible nature, or is in it, or is
present to it. That both are majestic does not make
their identity clear, for perhaps majesty might come
to one of them from the other. And as for inclusive­
ness, the intelligible world has it in the way in which
a whole includes its parts. But etermty includes the
whole all at once, not as a part, but in the sense^hat
all things which are of such a kind as to be eternal are
so by conforming to it.
But should eternity, perhaps, be said to corres­
pond to the rest there as people suy that time corres­
ponds to motion ? ^ But one might reasonably
enquire whether, when people say this, they mean
tiiat eternity is .the same as rest or, not simply as
rest, but as the rest which belongs to substance.
-Now if it is the same as rest, first of all we shall not
call rest eternal, juk as we do not call eternity eter­
nal, for the eternal is that which participates in
eternity. Then, how is motion to be something
eternal ? For, on this assumption, it would abo be at
rest. Then again, how does the idea of rest contain
in itself the “ always ” ? I mean, not the “ always
In time, but thekind of “ always ” we have m mind
when we are speaking of what is eternal. But it
eternity is the same as the rest-which belongs to
substance, then again, we'shall put the other kinds
of substance outside eternity. Then again, we rnust
think of eternity not only in terms of rest birt ot
unity; then, too, it must be thought of as without
extension or interval, thafit may not be the same «
time; but rest in -so far as it is rest, does not m^de
in itself the idea of one nor of the unextended. 1 hen
301
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
35 aicoms Kar^yopoO/xey to /xe'yetv ey iyL- /iere^ot
ay bvv ardaeM^, dAA’ ovk avrocxrdais etr].
3. Ti dvoSy eti] TOVTO, Kad' o roy KoapLov Travra
Toy iK€L aldiyioy Xiyopuey KpX dihioy dyai, Kal ri
-q dihioTrjs, e’Lre ravroy Kal ■q airrq to) alcayi, eiTe
W -adTijv o' alcLy; ^Apd ye i /ca0’ ey ti Set,
5 dAAd etc noXXdjy avyrjBpoiafxey-qy nyd voqoLV, •q
Kai (jivaiy elr STraKoXovdovaay rdls eKeZ eiVe
avyovaa.y etT eyopwfxdy-qy, ndyra 8e ravra eKeivqy
HMV fiey oSaay. jroXXd Se Svya[M€yrjy Kal iroXXd
ovaay; Kai o ye -rqv mW^y 8vydp,iy elaadp'qaas
Kara p,ey ToSt to otoy VTTOKeip,eyoy Aeyet ova lay,
etra Klyqaiy rovro, Kaff S Ca)rjy 6pa, eha
10 ardatv to ndyrq waavrcos, ddrepov Se Kal
ravroy. ^ ravra 6pt,ov ey, Ovrco Sq Kal avvdeis
lidXw aS els ey ofxoO (cocrre) 2 etvai ^crqy fiovqy, ey
rovrois r^y ereporqra avarelXas, Kal rqs evepyelas
TO dnav(^oy Kal to ravroy koX ovSeWe dAAo /cat
OVK e^ aXXov els dAAo ‘vdqaty q ^cjqy, dAAd to
15 diaavrcos Kal del dSiaard’tcos, ravra irdyra iSwy
aidiva et8ey I8d)y ^ayqy pLeyovaay ev rip avrw del
irapoy to -nay eyovaav, dAA’ ov yvv fiey Vo'Se,
avOts 8 erepoy, oAA’ dfxa rd vdyra, Kal ov vvy
I Spa ye Kirohhoff, Spa vap codd.
‘ IwoTcy Theiler.
'■ Timaeus 37D6.
’ The list of the “Platonic categories,” taken
from. Sophist 254D-E. For passages in which Plotinus ex-
.302
ON ETERNITY AND TIME'
again we predicate “ abiding in one ” of eternityV
so, then, it would participate in rest, but not be
absolute rest. r i.- -u «
3 What, then, would this be by reason of which we
call the whole universe There eternal and ever­
lasting, and what is everlastingness ? Is it the same
thing as, and identical with eternity, or is etermty
in conformity with it ? Should we then think of it as
an idea corresponding to some one thing, but
gathered together into a unity from many sources,
or even a nature either consequent upon toe beings
of that other world or existing along, with them or
perceived in them ? .Are all these beings that pature,
which is one, but has many powers and is many things .
And when one looks closely into this mamfold power,
then according as one sees it as a subject, a kind o
substrate, one calls it “ substance then one calls
it “ motion,” according as one sees it as hte, tnen
“ rest ” in so far as it is always in every way un­
changingly itself; “the other’’and “the same m
that these [diiferent] reahties are all together one.
So, too, one puts it all together again.into one, so
as to be only life, compressing the otherness in
these intelligible realities, and seeing the unceas­
ingness and self-identity of their activity, and that it
is never other and is tiot a thinking or hfe that goes
from one thhig to another but is always the selfsame
without extension or interval; se^ng all this one
sees eternity in seeing a life that abides in the same,
and always has the all present to it, not now this,
and then again that, but all things at once, and not
plains his application of themHo the intelligible world more
fully, see note on previous chapter.
303
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
^ev eT€/fa, a,v6is S .erepa, aAAd TeXos d[Mepes, otov
ev ar]p,€iq) o/mv Trdvrcov ovrcov Kal ovirore els
20 pvauv TTpoLOVTCDV, dXXd pidvovTOS iv T(p avTip ev
a.VT(p' Kcu ov p,rj p,eTa^dXXovros, dvros S’ ev rw
■napovTi ael, on ovhev avrov napT^Xdev ov8' aS
yevTjaerai, dAAd tovto direp eon, tovto /cat dvros •
ware etvav rov aitbva ov rd vnoKelpLevov, dXXd rd
avrov rov vTTOKeipievov otov eKXdpirrov Kara ryjv
26 [too] ^errayyeXXeraL rrepl rov pbrj fieXXovros,
a)^a jrjSr] ovros, ravforrjra, ws dpa ovrcos Kal
ovK aAAo)?’ rl yap dv Kal varepov avrdp yevoiro,
o p,rj vvv eari; M17S’ av varepov eaop,evov, o pvrj
earIV -jSr]' ovfe yap eariv, dcj>’ od els rd vvv
^Ketvo yap Tjv OVK aXXo, oAAd rovro, (dvre
30 p.eXXovros eaeaOai, o p,rj vvv eyei.. ’E^ dvdyK-qs
ovre ro ^v e^ei rrepl avro' rl yd,p eariv, o •^v
avrip /cat rrapeXrjXvdev; ovre rd earai' ri yd,p
,earai avrcp; A^eirrerat Srj ev rcp.etvai rovro drrep
eariv etvai. “0 oSv piyre ^v, pi-qre earai, dXX’
35 earl p,6vov, rovro eardjs eyov rd elvai rip pirj
liera^d^eiv els rd earai p,rjS’ av pierage^XrjKevai
eariv o aiiov, EtoeTat roiwv ■jy rrepl rd ov ev red
etvai Ciorj opiov rraaa Kal rrX-jprjs ddidarhros rrav-
Tovro, o 8^ ^rjrovfjiev, alidv.
4. OvK e^codev Se Set avpi^e^rjKevai vopii^eiv
roihov eKeivrj cjjvaei, dXX' e’/cettoj /cate^ eKelvrjs
/cat avv eKeivTj, Evopdrai yap evovaa rrap’
* rriv A®' Kirohhoff, H-S: ryv rov A“ExyQL.
^ Cp. Timaeus 37E6-38A2.
2°4
ON ETEENITY AND TIME
no-fr some things, and themagain others, but a part­
less completion, as if they were tato
point, and had not yet begun to go out and flow into
lines; it is something which abides m the same m
itself and does not fchange at all buT; is always-in the
present,-because nothing of it has passed away, nor
again is there anything to come into being, but that
which it is, it is-, so that eternity is not the substrate
but something which, as it were, shines out from the
substrate itself in respect of what is called its same­
ness, in speaking about the fact that it is no
to be but is already, that it is as it is a.nd not other­
wise, for what could come to be for it afterwards,
which it is not already ? Nor again mil it be after­
wards what it is not already. For there is nothing
starting from which it will arrive at the Fesei^t
moment, for that could be nothing else but what ^
rnowl. Nor is it going to be what it does not now
Lntain in itself. Necessarily there will be no was
about it, for what is there that w^ for it
passed away? Nor any “ will be, Z®*;
for it ? So there remains for it only to be m its being
just what it is. That, then, which was not, and mil
not be, but is only,t which has being which is static
by not changing to the will be,” nor ever ha^ng
'cLnged, this is eternity. The hfe, then, whic
belongs to that yvhich exists arid is in being, all to
gether and full, completely without extension or
interval, is that which we are looking for, etermty.
4 Bvft one must not think that eternity has come
to that [intelligible] nature accidentally, from o^ide,
but it is that nature, and from it and mth it. For
the nature of eternity is contemplated m the
3°S
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
nvTfjs, on Kal ra oAAa ■ndvra oaa Xeyo/jLev eVet
6 iwnipxovra. 6pwvns X4yop,ev iK rr}^ oiaia,
anavra Kal ai,v rfj ovala. Ta ydp v-pcorcos ovra
avvovra^ Set rols Tipdyrois Kal eV rot? TTpcSrot?
etmt- eVeJ Kal to KaX6v eV airols Kal a{nwv
Kal ^ dX'qQna eV avroZs. Kat rd p^v diairep eV
liip€i rov TravrXs dvros. rd S’ e’.. Travri, cZanep Kal
10 TO aX-qdojs twto nav oiK e’/c rcov pepdiv •^dpourp^-
vov,aXXd rd pdpr] yewrjaav avro, tva Kal radrn
maX-nOws^av Kal ^ dXy'0e,a Si od avp,^con'a
irpos aXXo eK€i, dXX' avrov eKaarov ovirep dXpeia.
Aet S^ rd nav rovro rd dXrjOiudv. drr^p eVrat rrav
OW-COS-, pr^ p6vov eXvai rrav ^ e’ffrt rd irdvra, dAAd
16 /cat rd nav oiircos d>s prjSevl iXXeineiu. Et’
rovro, oiS' iarai n aira>- et’ ydp iarac. iXXdnoy
T)v rovrw- oiK dpa irav. ITapd (f>vaw Si ri dv
adrcp yivoiro; Hda;^et ydp odSeV. Et’ odv pr^Siv
airy yiy.ro, oiSi piXXec oiSi eVat odS’ e’yeWro.
Tots piv oiv yevrjroTs, et’ d^Aots rd iarai, dre
€m/CTco/teVots del ed% indpxec p^ etvar rots
20 6e pr] Totodrots, et ^poadeirjs rd eWt, indpxeL
TO eppeiv e«. rfjs rov elvai iSpas- SfjXov ydp 5n
■qv airots rd elvai oi avp<l>vrov, et ytyvoiro iy r<p
1® 3' verbal reminiscence heVe of Pinto Ptc; i
24D2, but no real connection of thoughr ’ them, if they came to be in a state of putting
306
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
intelligible nature, existing in it as originated from it,
because we see all the other things, too, which we
say are There existing in it, and say that they all
come from its substance and are with its substance.
For the things which have primary existence must
have a common existence with the primaries and be
among them; since beauty, too, is among them and
originates from them, and truth is among them
And somtf of these are as if in a part of the ex^tent
whole, others in the whole, just as this which ^
really a whole has not been put together out of its
parts, but has produced its parts itself, orde^hat
it may truly be a whole in this way too. And There
the truth is not correspondence wth something else,
but really belongs to each individual thing of which
it is the truth. Now this true whole, if it really is a
whole, must not only be whole in the sense that it is
all things, but it must have its wholeness in such a way
that it is deficient in nothing. K *is is so, there is
nothing that is going to be for it, for if something
going to be, it was lacking to it before; so it was no
wholl But what could happen to it contrary to its
nature ? For it is not affected in any way. It, then,
nothing could happen to it, there is no postponement
of being, and it is not going to be, nor did it come to
be Now with things which have come to Be? if you
take away the “ will be ” what happens is that they
immediately cease to exist, ^ they are continually
acquiring being! Biit with things which are n^ of
this kind, if you add to them the will be, what
happens is t^t they fall from the seat of being,
Tor it is clear that their being was not connatural to
307
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
fMeXXew Kal yeveadai Kal eaeaQai els vcrrepov.
KivSvvevei yap rois ixev yevrjrots 7) ovala elvai to
25 eK rov dpyvs elvaC rrjs ykviaecos, fi^xp^Trep &v
eis^ eayarov^ TjKT) rov ypovov, ev S pL-qKer iarl-
^ovTo Sij TO eOTiv elvai. Kal, ei tis tovto ■jrapi-
^oiTo. ■fiXaTTcoa9ai 6 ^los- &OTe Kal t6 elvai.
Kal TvavTl Sei. els Sirep o9tcos Icrrai. At<5 Kal
OTTevSei.npos to p.eXXov elvai Kal OTrjvai ov OeXei
30 ^Xkov t6 .elvai aiTU> iv Tip ti dXXo Kal dXXo
TTOieiv Kal -Kiveiadai kvkXw e<j>iaei tivI oialas-
oiOTe elvai r)iuv evprjp.evov Kal to aiTiov Tfjs
Kiv^oeojs TTjs. oUtco 07Tev8oda7]s iirl t6 del elvai
(MdXXovfi. Tois Si ttpiLtois Kal piaKaplois
ovSe ^eals^ ioTi tov p-iXXovTos- ydp elm t6
oXov, Kal oTrep avTois olov d^eiXeTai Crjv eyovai
36 ,rav- djore qiSiv ,Cr]To€m. SiSti t6 piiXXov aiTois
ovSev eoriv ovS’ -dpa eKeivo, ev S to pieXXov. 'H
oSv TOV SvTOS TravreXijs oiala Kal SX-q, oiy q iv
Tois jMepeai p.6vov, dXXd Kal q ev tw pnjS' dv eTi
iOjXXeliPeiv Kal Td^pqSiv dv dv aiT^\poayevia9ai
ov yap pova.Ta ovra irdvra Set napeivai .tm
navTl Kal oX<p, oAAd Kal p-qSev tov -n-pre prj
Syros—av-rr) ^ Sid9e<jis airov Kal 4>dms 'elq dv
aicov aiojv ydp dnd tov d^l ovtos.*
* Por a fuller discussion of the^oirouldr motion of the uni
verse and its tsause, op. II. 2 [14].
308
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
being and having'come to be and goihg to be after­
wards. ior the substantial existence of things that
have come into being seems to be their existing from
their point of origin, their coming to be, until they
reach the end of their time, in which they cease to
exist; this is their “ is,” and if anyone takes this
away, their life-span is lessened, and so also their
being. And the universe, too, must have a future, m
moving towards which it " will be ” m this way.
This is why it, too, hastens towards what is going to
be, and does not want to'stand still, as it draws being
to itself in doing one thing after another and moving
in a circle in a sort of aspiration to substance, bo we
have found, incidentally, the cause of the movement
of the universe", which hastens m this wa.y to ever^
lasting existence by means of what is going to be.
But the primal, blessed beingS havd not even an
aspiration to what is going to be,
the whole, and they have all the hfe w^ch fe, so tO
speak, owed to them; so they seek nothing, because
tLre is nothing which is going to be for them, nor,
indeed, that in which what is going to be can develop.
So, then, the complete and whole sUbStence of tea y,
not that in the parts only but that which consists m
the impossibility of any future diminution "und the
fact that nothing non-existent could be added to 1^
for the all and whole must not only have all real beings
present in it, but must not have anything that is at
any time noh-existent-this state and^ nature of
complete reality would'be eternity; for_^
[aion] is derived from “ always existing^ [act 04
* For this derivation of alciv, cp, Aristotle, De Gaeh A.9.
279a25-28.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7. ON ETERNITY AND TIME
6. Touro S^, Srav rct>l TTpoa^aXchv rfj rfavv 6. But now, whenever,-concentrating the atteiRioh
of my soul on something, I am able to say tWs about
it, or rather to see it as a thing of such a kind that
^ p-rj ev Trepi avro oXws yeyovevai—el yap nothing at all about it has ever come into being—
for if it has, it is not always existing, or not always
V 7] acScov.^^t prj «ac i,oJ7rdpxo, aircp raad-nj existing as a whole—is it, therefore, already eterna ,
h^, j nujT^v nepl airov. oiVco 2 if there is not aEo in it a nature of such a kind as to
aM.. er., « WA.. .poa^Sa'Ac.., give an assurance about it that it will stay as it is
and never become different, so that, if you look
, €c p,7]Se d^laratrd ns airov rijs attentively at it again, you will find dt ^ it was f
eeas. aAAa cwvojv et^ rrjs <f>daecos dyaadds kIi What then, if one does not depart at all from one s
contemplation of it but stays in its company, wonder-
inff at its nature, and able to do so by a natural power
ov^apri, ^ opo^os Kal al<Lvu>s. rep h air& which never fails ? Surely one would be (would one
rov alQva Kal rd alcLvco, de^ae^os Si not?), oneself on the move towards etermty and
or T? --- -- - oZ. r6 5 never falling away from it at all, -that one might be
like it and eternal, contemplating eternity and the
anoKX..o. .V^pa. eternal by the eternal in oneself. If, then, what is in
15 > ^Saav -IjSr). od -KpoaXapdv odSk this state is' eternal and always existing, that which
TrpoaXap^avov rj npo^dpevo^. drj L dlScov does not fall away in any respect into another nature,
which has life which it possesses already ^ a whole,
pev TO ovTcos^ eyov, aiS^drrjs Sk ^ rocadrr] Kard- which has not received any addition and is not imw
an^ens rov v^pK,,^dvov adrov odaa Kal eV receiving ahy and “will not receive any, then that
vr<p, atojv Se to viroKeipevov p^rd rfjs roiadrvs which is in this state would be eternal, and eyerla^ing-
Karaaraaecos ep,/>cuvopdvr]s. ’'Odev a^lvd^ 6 aZl ness would be the corresponding condition ot the
substrate, existing from it and in it, and etermty the
Kai ravTov r<p 6e<p ^ ^^oia AeV«- Xiyei Sk
substrate with the corresponding condition appearing
in it. Hence eternity is a maj estic thing, and thought
eos ep<f,acva», Kac 7Tpo<j,alvcvv iavrdv olds ian declares it identical with the god;^ it declares it
ro eha^ co. arpepks Kal radrdv Kal odreos Kal r6 identical with this god [whom we have been describ-
ingl.X And eternity could be well described as a god
proclaiming and manifesting himself ^ he is, that is,
^ The god ie Intehect o. Real Being, the Second Hypostasis. as being which is unshakeable and self-identical, and
310 311
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7. ON ETEKNITY AND TIME
El S’ .V ttoAAcS:. air6v ralways] as it is, and firmly grounded in life. But if
ov S. eav,^dC.c.■ noXX& S we say that it is made up of many parte, th^e is no
5m Svva^cv anecpov end Kal r6 dnecpov r6 ai, need to be surprised, for each of the beings There is
25 x^o.tjo{ho KvpU^s, Src f^TjSiu airov many through its unending power, since endlessness,
too, is not having any possibility of failing, and
aneipop ySrj Tcp naaav etvac Kal p^yjS^p AvaXioKeiv eternity is endless in the strict and proper sense,
because it never expends anything of itself. And it
Tcp^p,rjnapeXr,Xveiva, f,r]S’ aS fM^XXe.v-^Sv
yap ovK avecy} naaa-eyyis etyj rov 6plC^6al someone were in this way to speak of eternity as a hte
which is here and now endless because it is total and
L^o yape^yis «r<p ndaav etvai Kal pmZkv dvaXl-
expends nothing of itself, since it has no past or
future—for if it had, it would not now be a total lite
kal roiavT-q <f,^ais oSrco nayKdXyj he would be near to defining it,)( [For that which
kac^acScOs nep, ro ip Kal dn' iKeipov Kal np6s comes next “ because it is total and expends nothing
ekjpo. ovSep eKfiaipovaa dn’ airov. p^ipovaa Sk would be an explanation of the phrase here and
oet nepi eKeiPo ;cai ep eKecpcp Kal fcSaa Kar’ iKeipo now endless.”] ^ • j ^
6kZT nA<£r...: 6. Now since the nature which is of this kind, al-
^Acoy KO.L paOeia yj, ypcop,rj Kal oiK SX^cos, rovro toekher beautiful and everlasting in this way, is
SJ° ip ipi, Ipa f,-k, f,6pop ^ around the One and comes from it and is directed
avros avTOP eis^ €P npos iavrip dycop, dXX’ I towards it, in no way going out from it but always
abiding around it and in it, and hving according to it;
-kep,ro ep rov optos ^wki chcrairws. rovro S s|
and since this was stated by Plato, as I think finely
10 ' at’wv elpai. TS ydp and with deep meaning and not to no purpose, in
rovro-Kat ovr<v [lepop Kal airi r6 p^pop 6 eW these words of his “ as eternity-remains m one,
^TiT 77a/j’ airy]s np6s iKetpo the intention of which is not merely that eternity
kat ep eKecpcp Kal oire ri etpac oire rd ^yjp brings itself into unity with relation to itself, but
il>€vSof^epy) eyot ap ro aldjp etpai. TS ydp dXndls that it is the life, always the same, of real being around
ehac^ eon ro oihinore fii, etpac oiS’ dxLs dvai- the One; this, then, is what we are seeking; and ^piding
like this is being eternity. For that which is this and
abides like this and abides what it is, an activity of hie
/tAgy Dodds :^e;>oyeodd., H-S: . . . ^Xva, del. Theiler.
abiding of itself directed to the One and in the One,
with no falsehood in its being or its Ufe, this would
possess the reality of eternity. For true being is
* Timaeua 376D. never not being, or being otherwise; and this is being
313
313
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7. ON ETERNITY AND TIME
always the same; and this is being without any
15 rr I) ’
ovS apa Scacrr^s oiS’ ^pod^ec,.
dS,a<l>6pco, difference. So it does not have any “ this and that ;
nor, therefore, will you be able to separate it out or
ovS, ^apar^ odS' dpa odS^ ^poVepo. adroO oi8^ unroll it or prolong it or stretch it; nor, then, Mn you
apprehend anything of it as before or after. If. then,
y v<jT€pov Xa^eiv ^xeis. El oSv Trpdrepov
varepo. jr.pl aird r6 S’ « p dXr,Lr7ol there is no before or after about it, but its is is
n.pc avro Ka. aird, Kal oirco 84^Src iarlu the truest thing about it, and itself, and this in the
sense that it is by its essence or its life, then again
^^ovaca r, rjp WA.v ^V« 4,p.lv rovro, S there has come to us what we are talking about,
8j Xeyo^e. o aldu. ddXiyco^,, .ai
eternity. But when we use the word “ always
zr s., ^p^co. i.z and say that it does not exist at one time but not at
aa^vecas] ^ Sec vo^.cv Xiyeodac- inel rd ye del another, we must be thought to be putting it this
way for our own sake; for the “ always was perhaps
jjXojacv^ rov^ d^Oaprov rrXavip S.v r^v ifnjxw els not being used in its strict sense, but, taken as ex­
e^racrir roi; vrAetovo? 4rc <Ls pc^ iJxe^vrds plaining the incorruptible, might mislead the soul
into imagining an expansion of something becoming
Aey«.. ^A;Ua cSa^ep rS oV dp.ov. S.opca rl more, and again, of something which is never going to
fail. It would perhaps have been better only to use the
ovacci errecSr) Kac r^v yiveacv oiaiav dvd^u^ov. word “ existing.” But, as “ existing ” is an adequate
oTlYn^T" " npoae4i.r^s roC del.
word for substance', since, however, people thought
Uv yap a^o fiev earcv ov, dXXo 84 rd del dv becoming was substance, they required the adtoion
^(T77ep ouS aAAo- ix'ev 4,cXdao<f>os, dXXo S^ 6 of“ always ” in order to understand [what existing
ftZli'
V ^poadrjKj rov dXr,dcvov iydvero.
i>cXoaoi>lav,
OSrco Jc r&
really meant]. For existing is not one thing and
always existing another, just as a philosopher is not
oyrc ro aec Kac r<3 cS/. ;; rS del, r^are Xiyeadlc one thing and the true philosopher another, but be­
aet Sco Xrjnreov rd del olov «dXTjOdjs cause there was such a thing as putting on a pretence
cov » XeyeaOac Kac avvacperiov rd del els dScdara- of philosophy, the addition of “ true w^ made.
rov Sv^a^cu^ ovSic, Seo^dvrj. oiSec^ds peed' S dS-n So,'toD, “ always ” is applied to “ existing, _ that is
“ aA ” to “ on," so that we say “ aet on {aion\, so
^X^'- 8e ro rrdv. ’ ^ '* the “always” must be taken as saying “truly
existing ”; it must be included in the undivided
* TO del. Volkmann.
* pr ao^m'as ut glossam ad -fifj^v del. Dodds, power which in no way needs anything beyond what
e/craatp Bury: e«^aat»'codd. it already possesses; but it possesses the whole.
3tS
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7. ON ETEENITY AND TIME
Uav oSv Kal Sv Kal Kara nav oiK ivheks Kai o{, The nature which is of this kind, then, is all,.dnd
ravrr, ^Xrjpes. dXXr, Sk ^ roca^rr, existent, and not deficient in its wholeness, and not
<Pvais. Jo yap ev xpovcb. k&v riXeiov fj, <hs SoKel, full at one point and deficient at another. For that
olov acofia n CKavou ^y-rj riXeiov, Se6fievov Kal which is in time, even if it is perfect, as it seems, in
Tov enecra. eXXeiTTOv rep yp6v(p, oS Secrac. dre the way in which a body which is adequate for a soul
is perfect, needs also time to come, being deficient in
ow eKeivcp ei TrapeCrj airip ,<ai avvOdot,, Sv
time, which it needs because it is with it, if time is
“n ""s' dv r^Xecov Xiyocro.
Urw Sevnapxe, p.r}Se rot? inetra SeXadav p.^e els present to and runs along with it, and so it is incom­
plete; and, existing in this way, it could only be
Xpovov aXXov p.ep.eTpr)p.ivov fx-^re t6v drreipov Kal
calledperfectby amere coincidence' ofname. But that
arreLpu^s jaoi^vov, tlAA’ 6^ep M etvat. rovro which has no need-of'tiihe to come, wMch is not me^
€^et, rovro eariv oS ^ eVota iiropiyeraL, S r6 sured by another time or by an unlimited tinm which
elmt ovK €K rovroaovSe. dXXd -np6 rov roaovSe. will be without end, but possesses what it ought to be,
hnpene yap avr<p p,r^U roaXpSe oVt ndvrr) this is what our thought stretches out to, that whose
n^evosj<f,a7rreaeai roaOvSe. ha p.^ ^ ^irod being does not come from a certain-extent [of timej,
tMepiaOeioa ro KaBap&s dpeph airov dviX-n, dXX’ but exists before extent [of tijneJ. For, since it is
Ko ^ dpepes Kal rfj oiala. To S’ not of any temporal extent itself, it was not right tor
60 «aya6os » ava<j>ipec els iwo.av rov Travrds it to have contact in any way with anything temporally
extended, so that.its life might not be divided into
arjpaivcvv rep e^Keiva rravrl rd pij d^rd xpdvov
parts and destroy its pure partlessness, but it im^t
rivos^^ ware prjSe rov Kdopov dpy-^v rtm xpovcK^v be partless ill life and substance. But Plato s He
eeX-r,4,evae rrjs aereas rov elvae airw rd npdrepov
was good ” 1 takes us back to the thought of the All
napexovarjs AM’ Spws Sr,Xcdaews rovro [the physical universe]; he indicates that by virtue
eiTTWv erat varepov Kal rodrep rw dvdpdfe d>s of the transcendent All it has no beginning in time ;
ovb^ avrov opdws rrav-rq Xeyopevov ini rwv rdv so that the universe, too, did not have a tempmal
Aeyopevov Kai voovpevov alwva elX-qxorwv. beginning because the cause of its being provides what
is prior to it.2 But all the same, after saying this for
the sake of explanation, he objects to this expression,
^ Timdeus 29E1.
too, afterwards, as not being entirely"cOrrectly used
must hare) but only m the cosmos
sense ofhas indeed
having a prior
a cause ” ffifasR*
it about things, which have a part in what we speak
Dodds in a letter to H.-R. Sehwyzer). ' ' and think of as eternity.®
*^**i®r abruptly, to {he descrin
tion of eternal being as “always” existig, and po^roS that Plato, too, objected to the use of expressions implying
duration in time when referring to it (cp. Timaeus 3711,).
316 317
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
^ 7. Taura^ offv Xeyo/xev S.pd ye fiaprvpovvres
erepoLs /cat a»? Trepl dXXoTpiojv rovs. Xoyovs
noiovi^eOa; Kai ■na>s; Tis ydp Siv odveavs ydvo.ro
M^rof,evois; Hw? 8’ dv ^axlsaip^eda rot?
aXXoTpiois; Aet dpa /cat rjp.iv perelvai rov alwvos.
AUajv xp6v^ oSac ttws; 'AXXd ttcos iv yp6vw
Kai nws ev aidivi ecrriv ehai, yvwa9elrj av evpediv-
ros rrporepov rov ypovov. Kat roivvv Kara^areov
rjpiv ef aiojvos em rrjv Cv^rjaiv rov xpdvov /cat
rov Xpovov- 6/cet pkv ydp ^v ^ rropeia rrp6s r6
avw, vvv Se Xeycopev rjd-q oi rrdvrrj Kara^dvres,
aAA ovrcos. ojonep Kari^rj ypdvos. El pkv Trepl
XPovov^ eiprjpivov prjSkv ■^v rots iraXaLots Kal
paKapiois dvSpdcnv, kyPW ™ aidivi e^ dpvrjs
crvveipavras r6 ^e^ijs 'Xiyeiv rd boKovvra Trepl
ar^ov. -neipcopevovs rfj evvoia hvrov ^v KeKrrjpeda
16 e^ppoCeiv rrjv Xeyopkvrjv if -fjpdiv Sd^av v€v
.d avayKatoy irporepov Xa^etv rd pdXiara d^icos
■Xoyov eiptjpiva crKojrovvras. ei rivi avrdiv avpdco-
vcos- x> >rap' ■^pdiv k$ei Xoyos. Tpiy^ 8’ Tacu?
Oiatfiereovrovs Xeyopevovs Trepl avrov Xoyovs rXv
TTpojrrjv^ "H^y“P KiVTjais rj Xeyopevij, rj rd kivov-
pevov Xeyoi av, 7} Kivtjcrecvs ri rov ypovov rd ydp
20 araaiv rj rd earrjKds Xj ardaews ri Xiyeiv rravrd-
the movement of the universe
AoB.Aamv^ important parts) _was eurrerit in the early
Academy; cp the Platonic -'Opot 4I1B: ypoVoj Wol
Kivrjai.s,.^eTpov ^opas; Aristotle, PhyHcs A 10, 2l4l-2- \hat
•It was the heavenly sphere (op. 1. 24^25) was a Pythagorean
318 - . . .
ON ETERNITY AND' TIME'
7 Are we, then, saying this as if we were giving
evidence on others’ behalf and talking about what is
not our own? How could we be? For what under­
standing could there be [of eternity] if we were not in
contact with it? But how could we be in contact
TOth what was not our own? We too, then, must
have a share in eternity. But how can we* when we
are in time ? But what it means to be in time and
what it means to be in eternity may become known
to us when we have discovered time. So, then, we
must go down from eternity to the enquiry into time,
and to time, for there our way led us upwards, but
now we must come down in our discourse, not al­
together, but in the way in which time canae down.
Now if the blessed men of ancient times had said
nothing about time, we should have to take etermty
as our starting-point and link up our subsequent ac­
count of time ivith it, stating what we think about it
and trying to make the opinion w« Express accord
with the hiterior awareness of time which we have;
but, as it is, we must first take the most important •
statements about it and consider whether our oivn
account will agree ivith any of them. Perhaps we
can, in the first instance, make a threefold division
of the accounts of time which have been given, for
either time is movement, as it is cdled, or one might
say that it is what is moved, or something belonging
•tb movement,! for to say that it is rest, or what is at
rest, or something helonging to rest, would be quite
view: op. note on oh. 2, and Pseudo-Plutaroh, Ptoo. I. 884P 5.
That it was something belonging td movement was held in
dfflerent senses by some Aoademios, Aristotle, Stoios and
Epioureahs: see notes below.
319
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
naai nopp^ rrjs ivvoias dv dr, rov xpdvov ovSaur}
rov avTov ovtos. Se klvtjctiv Xeyovrcov ol
p^v^aaav Kiv7,aiv dv Xiyoiev, ol -rljv rov TravrSs-
Ol be TO Ki.vodp.evov Xiyovres t?,v rov ■navrds dv
a<j>aipav Xeyoiev- ol b'e Kivdjoed>s ri ^ Sidarr,pa
25 K,^aews. oi Se pirpov, ol S' 5Xws rrapaKoXovOovv
avrr,- Kai. r, Trdarjs r, r^s reraypevrjs.
8 Klv7,aiv pkv oix ol6v re odre rds avprrdaas
Xap^avovTi. ^Kcvi^aeis Kat otov plav Ik rraacdv
TTOiowri, ovre tt,v reraypevTjv iv xpovo) ydp r,
Kiv^acs eKarepa -f, Xeyop4vr,~d S4 ri/ p^ il
. XPOf'V* '^°Xv pdXXov dv dnelr, rov xpdvos etvai—to?
onXXov ovros rov eV tS ^ Klvr,<ns, dXXov -™?
Kivrjaeojs avrrjs ovarjs. Kai oAAcov Xeyopdvcov Kal
AexOevTivv av dpKd rovro Kal Sri Klvr,ais pkv dv
Kai vavaaiTO Kal SiaXl-iroi, xpdvos Se ov. Ei’ Se
T^v rov rravros Kivr,aiv p^ SiaXelrreiv ns Xeyoi.
oA\a Kai avrr], einep rr,v rrepi^opav Xeyoi^ ev
10 xpovip^ rwi- Ktti avrr, rrepujiipoiro dv els to ai5rd,
ovK ev y TO -^piav^ r^warai. Kal 6 pkv dv elr,
'r,piavs, o Se SnrXdaios, Kivi^aecvs rov rravros
* Some Stoics: op. Stoic. Vet. Fr. II. 614.
SOQ-Sio'^^ Chrysippus): op. Stoic. Vet. Fr. II.
<m’ rfu ^f^de“iio up and developed by Aristotle:
op. ^Upoi 1.0. Aristotle, Physics A 10 ff.
Usen^Sr^"' ® ra 103.6; Waohsmuth =
T^-. 11- 609-610. It is only among
distmotion between all movement and ordered
movement (the movement of the universe) appears. Zeno
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
remote from our interior awareness of time, wliicli is
never in any way the same. Now of those who say
it is movement, some seem to mean that it is all
movement,1 others the movement of the universe;
those who say that it is what is moved seem to mean
that it is the sphere of the universe; those who say
that it is something belonging to movement, that it
is the distanee covered by the movement ^ or 1(others
of them) .the measure,® or (others again) that it is m
a general way a consequence of movement;^ and
either of all movement or oiily of ordered movement.®
8. It is not possible for it to be movement, whether
one'takes all movements together and makes a kind
of single movement out of them, or whether one takes
it as ordered movement, for what we call movement,
of either kind, is in time; but if soineone says that
it is not in time, then it would be still further from
being time, since that in which movement is, is some­
thing different from movement itself. And, though
other arguments can be brought, and have be^
brought, against this position, this one is enough,
and also that movement can stop altogether or be
interrupted, but time cannot. But, if someone says
that the movement of the universe is not interrupted,
this, too (if he means the circuit of the heavens), is in
a period of time; and it would go round to the same
point not in the time in which half its course was
finished, and one would be half, the other doume
time; each movement would be movement of the
said time was toctijs Kiir^aews Sidtmj/ia, Chrysippim that it was
Sidarruia rijs rov Koafiov mtojaeois (Stoic,
other Stoics simply that time was movement (Stoic. Vet. J!r.
II. 614).
321
VOL. III. M
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7. ON ETEKNITY AND TIME
iKo.r4pas. rrjs re els r<5 aM 4.tt6 rov universe, one going from the same place to the same
avTov^ Kal rrjs ds to ij/xtao rjKoiiirqs. Kat to
place again, and the other reaching the halt-way
point. And the statement that the movement of the
oivrarrjv Se Kal raxlarrjv Xeyeiv rriv r^s e$(x)ra.r7]s outermost sphere is the most vigorous and quickest
15 a<f>alpas Klvr,aw ^aprvpet rep Ao'yo), eis erepov is evidence for our argument that its movement is
KlvTjms aUrfjs Kal 6 xp6vos. Taxiar-q yAp naawv something different from time. For it is, obviously,
the quickest of all the spheres because it covers a
8rjXov6ri rep iXeirrovi ypovep r6 fietCov Kal r6 greater distance than the others, in fact, the greatest
distance, in less time; the others are slower because
ixeyearov Seeiarqpa dv4eiv rd. S’ clXXa ^paB4repa
they cover only a part of the distance [covered by the
rep ev TrXeiove av Kal peepos avrov. outermost sphere] in a longer time. If, then, time
20 El roLvvv p.qBk ^ Klvqois rrjs erejralpas 6 xp6vos, is not the movement of the sphere, it can hardly be
^Xo^j y av ^ aej^alpa aM,. ^ 4k rov Kwetadae the sphere itself, which was supposed to be time be­
cause it is in motion.
vrrevoqOq xpovos elvai. ' Is it, then, something belonging to movements
^Ap' oSv Kevrjereeis ri; El pekv Beeiejrqpea, rrpeorov If it is the distance covered by the movement, first,
this is not the game for all movement, not even uliiform
p^v oi rreierrjs Kivqaeevs to avro, o^Se rrjs movement, for movement is quicker and slower, even
26 Sp^eiBovs- Oarrov y6.p Kal ppaS4repov ^ Klvqeres movement in space. And both these distances
covered [by the quicker and the slower movement]
Kai q ev rorrep. Kat etev av ap^ev perpovpevai al would be measured by some one other thing, which
SCaareiaees ivl iripep. 5 So) 6pd6repov dv res elrroe would more correctly be called.time. Well then, oi
Xpovov. Eorepas Sq avrevv ro Sidarqpea xpdvos, which of the two of them is the distance covered time,
or rather of which of all the movements, which are
paXXov Be rlvos avrevv arrelpeav overeov; Et Se infinite in number ? But if it is the distance covered
rrjs reraypivqs. oi rreierqs pkv oiBk rrjs roiairqs- by the ordered movement, then_ not by all
30 rroXXal ydp aBrae- eBerre Kal rroXXol xp6voe dpa ordered movement, or by one particular °
ordered movement, for there are many of these;
eaovrai. Et Se rrjs rov navros BiAarqpa, et pev so that there will be many times at once. But it it
TO ev airfj rfj Kivqaei Biexcrrqpa, rl civ dXXo q 7;
is the distance covered by the movement 01 tb®
universe, if the distance in the movement itselt is
Kevqens av eeq; Tocn)Se pivrot.- ro Se roerdvBe meant, what would this be other than the move­
ment? The movement, certainly is quantitatively
322 323
 PLOTINUS^ ENNEAD III. "7.
Totho -^TOi t<3 TOTTcp, 5ti roaoffSe ov Sie^^Xde
'H-erprj9^aerac. Kal r6 Scdarrjpa roOro earac-
tovto oi xpoyos. aAAa t6ttos- ^ aj5ri) ^ KtvTjais
35 rp av.exela airrjs Kat r<J) p,-}) nre^avoOai,
oAA emXap^dveiv del, t6 SidoTTjpa ?$ei. ’AAAA
TOVTO^ t6 ttoAj) rrjs Kw^aeois S.v dyj- koX d pkv
■eis avTTju ns ^Xenaiv dno(f>aveXTai ttoXXtjv, dvoTrep
6? rij TToXi'rd deppdv Xiyoi, oiS’ iuravda
XPovos <f,avdTat oiS^ TTpoanlnTec. dXXd Kiurjacs
40 ndX,v Kai^ ^dXcu, djonepel {SScop pVov ndXcv Kal
wxA«.,^ Kal t6 eV adra> Sidarrjpa Oecvpodpevov.
Kat TO pkv -ndXiv Kal -rrdXiv darai dpid^ds, <v(nrep
vas ^ Tpids, TO Se Sidcrrrjpa rov oyKov. Ovtcvs
oSv Kal^ 7tX7]90S KivT^oecos d>s SsKds, 7j <Ls t6
€TTuj>aiv6i^vov rip otov oyKw rrjs KLvtjaecos Sid-
46 crrjpa, S oUk ^xei hvoiav xpovov, dXX' doTai rd
ToadvSe TOVTO y€v6pfvov eV xp6vrp, dj 6 xpovos
oiK^ korai -rravraxov, dXX' eV iiroKeipiucp rfj
Ki^crei, avp^alvet re irdXiv aS Klvrjcnv t6v xpdvov
^^yeiv oi ydp l^co adTTjs t6 ScdaTrjpa, dXXd
Kpo,s oiK d9p6a- t6 Sd d9p6a ds t6 d9p6ov
BO ev xpdvcp. T6 pd, d9p6ov tU SioiaeL rov d9p6cos-;
rj Tu> iv xpovtp, Sian, dj hiearoiaa Kivrjacs Kal to
Sidarripa air'qs oj5/c aird xpovos. dXX iv xp6v<p.
324
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
determined; but this definite quantity will either be
measured by the space, because the space which it h^
traversed is a certain amount of space, and this will
be the distance covered; but this is not time but
space; or the movement itself, by its continuity and
the fact that it does not stop at once but keeps on
for ever, will contain the distance. But this would be
the multiplicity of movement; and if one, looking at
movement, shows that it is multiple (as if one were to
say there was a great deal of heat), time will not aj^
pear or icome into one’s mind but movement which
keeps on coming again and again, just like water
flowing which keeps on coming again and again, and
the distance observed in it. And the again and
again ” will be a number, like the number two or
three, but distance belongs to magnitude. So the
amplitude of movement will be like the number ten
or the distance from end to end which appears on
what you might call the bulk of the movement, and
this does not contain our idea of time, but this definite
quantity will be something which came-to be in time;
otherwise time will not be everywhere but in move­
ment as its substrate, and we are back again at the
statement that time is movement, for the distance
covered is not outside movement but is movenient
which does not happen all at once; but the comparison
of movement which does not happen all at onc'e with
what is all at once [the instantaneous] can only be
made in time. In what way will the non-instantan-
edus differ from the instantaneous? By being in
time, so that movement which extends over a
distance, and the distance covered by it are not the
actual thing, time, but are in time. But if someone
325
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 7.
Ec 8e ro Scaa-njfia rijs X^yoL res yp6vov.
ov ro avr^s rrjs xeu^aecs. dXXA Lp’ S aLl
ST ovpnapaelZaa
eivep, re Se_ rouro ^ariv oiK elpy^rae. AijXov
yap, ore tout e^cu o ypovos. iv & yiyovev -f,
rPZ''’ ° Ao'yos!
60 TauTo;. otov et t.^ ipcorridels r[ iare yp6vos. Xiyoe
Seaar^pea eV yp6v<p. Tl oSu iarc rolo
eao-rpp.a o St) yp6vov KaXels r^s Kevjaecos
rov OLKeeov Beaa^paros e'^cu rce^peyos; Kal yip
X -TV t6 hedarruZ
65 Sto. ■'OooT“'
eaTai Ooov yap /ciueiTai ri, roaovrov dv arair,
«« oAAo. Kae^eeTwes au t8v ypoW f'^caT^pou rdl
Tov ehat, cas aXXov SrjXovort dp^oev ovra. Tl
ow eoTt Kae reva ^uW touto t6 Sidarrjpa;
W.p Tom^ov o;5y ol6u re- irrel Kal rovrd ye
€ga)(7er €GTLV,
9. ’Api0^8ff KLVTjaeojs ^ pirpov-^dXreov ydp
avveyovs odo-ps^as. OKerrrPv. IlpZrov
p^v ovv KaeevravOard rrdorjs dpoLcos dnop^riov.
coGTTep Kae ene rov SiaarT^paros -njs Kev-daecos, el
o-Pp-qaeie ryv araKrov Kal dvdypaXov; dj ris
ap^pos ^ perpov ^ Kara ri to pirpov; Et
rtp avrep eKarepav Kal SXcos- Traaav, raxeXav.
______ " <”''’^Xo0s,ovWjs JtaS: ovvexoJar,! codd.
AllXtbS® «n}<7C£«s, Physics
A XX. 219b2, y.erpoy.KeK^o,<os, 12. 221al) without dikinotion
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
were to say that the distance of movement is
time, not in the sense of the distance of movement
itself, but that in relation to which the movement has
its extension, as if it was running along with it, what
this is has not been stated. For it is obvious that
time is that in which the movement has occurred.
But this was what our discussion was trying to find
from the beginning, what time essentially is; since
this is like, in fact, the same as, an answer to the
question “ What is time ? ” which says that it is
distance of movement in time. What, then, is this
distance which you call time and put outside the
proper distance of the movement ? Then, again, on
^-^opos the other side, the person who puts the distance in
the movement itself, will be hopelessly perplexed
about where to put the interval of rest. For some­
thing eke could rest for the same space as soinething
was moved, and you would say that the time in each
case was the same, as being, obviously, dinerent
from both. What, then, is this distance, and what is
' its nature ? For it cannot be spatial, since this aho
lies outside movement. _
9. We must now enquire in what sense it is number
of movement or measure ^—for it is better to call it
measure of movement, since movement is continuous.
First of all, then, a doubt must arise here, too, about
its being the measure of all movement alike, just as
it did with the distance of movement, if there was
said to be a number or measure of all movement.
For how could one number disordered and irregular
movement ? What would its number or measure be,
or what its scale of measurement ? But if one uses
the same measure for both kinds of movement
327
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
■ ON ETERNITY AND TIME
fipaSeca, ,ara. 6 Kal r6 p^irpov rou>vro..
[regular and irregular] and in general fox' all move­
o^iov ei h^Kas ec7] f^erpovaa Kal Ittttovs xal ^ovs, ment, quick and slow, the number and measure will
^Ov ^ ro adr6 ^drpo. .al dyp^. be like the ten which counts both horses and cows,
or like the same measure for liquids and solids.
royro. ^drpov. rLvo^v eW. J yp6vo,
Now, if it is a measure of this kind, then it has been
^'■prav. op Kcvilaecov, air6, S ionv o{Sna> said what time is a measure of, that it is a measure
yvrap E. 8^ c5a.ep Se.dSo. X,^9.Corj, ,cd of movements, but we have not yet been told what it
is itself. But if, just as when one takes the ten even
ap ear. ,oeX, r6. dpc6p^6v. ^al r6 p^irpov without the horses it is possible to think of the num­
/.erpo. ear, r..<£, ^dv p.^^0. p^.rprj. ber, and the measure is a measure, with a certain
ovrco Se. e^e.. .ai r8. ypd.o. f^irpo. oVa- Z nature, even if it is not yet measuring, so time, too,
must have its own nature since it is a measure, and
p rocovrd. iorcu if iavrov olov dpcOf^ds. rl dv
if it is a thing of this kind on its own like number,
rovbe rov api6p.ov rov Kard ri^v SeKdSa 7} dXXov how can it differ from this number we were consider­
povovu Bux<f>ipot t^ovaB^Kov; E.’ 8^ avueyks pUrpov ing in the case of the ten, or from any other number
made up of abstract units ^ But if it is 'a continuous
ear. TToaor r. 6V (,irpov e'ora., otov r6 Tnjxvatov measure, then it will be a measure because it is of a
f^eyeOp. MeVe^o. ro^... eara., ofo. ypap,p^ certain size, like a length of one cubit. It will be a
owdeovaa BrjXovdri Kcv^ae,. ’AAA’ adrr} avvOi. magnitude, then, like a line which will obviously
run along with movement. But how will this line
opa 7TCOS perpT^a,, r6 S awBeX; TC ydp p^XXop running along measure that with which it runs?
oprepo.ov. 6drepov; Kal ^iXr.ov r'Ma. ^oX Why should" one of them measure the other rather
mWepo. 0.3. e’.rJ ^rday^s. dW fj awe.t. than the other the one ? And it is better and more
plausible to assume that it is not the measure of all
• aTv ' ^ ^ owdiovaa. movement but of the movement it runs along with.
AAA ovK ^codev Bel rd perpovv Xappdveiv oiBk But this must be something continuous, or the line
which runs with it will stop. But one ought not to
Xys. oAAa dp^v Klvrimv peperpr^pim^v. Kal r.' take what measures as something coming from outside
25 ro perpov. eW.; "H peperpr^pi^ pk. ^
or separate but to consider the measured movement
ecrra., pperpyjKds 8’ eW. piyeBos. Kal -nolov as a whole. And what wll the measurer be ? Move-
ment.will be measured, and the measurer will be mag­
aarw o ;,poVo. eW^; 'H Kivyja.s ^ peperprjpi.r,. nitude. -And which of them will be time? The
measured movement or the measxning magnitude?
328
329
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
V TO ^eyedo, ro ^f,,rprjcrav; ydp ^
earai 7) i^ixerp-qp,evrj {,tt6 tov p.€yidovs o' yp6vos,
30 V f^erprjaav. ^ r6 rip p^eyidei
30 xpriaaf^evoy. cooTrep rip np6s r6 ^erprjaa.
p V^S. eVi 1^, ^aWcu. rov'rco.
VTTodeadai, onep e,7T0(zev mdavcirepov dvai. r^v
ofxaXrjv Kcvriacv au,v ykp 6f,aX6rrjros Kal -npooL
/xtar -rrjsrov oXov ATropcLrepov r6 rov XSyov
35 TW 6ep.€V(p OTTOJOOVV fiirpov ywerai. Et s/sX
li^p.^rp-qixep Klvqois 6 xp6vos Kal Xtt6 rov TToaod
IJ^iierp-qp.ev-q ojcrnep r^v Ktvqaw, d I8et ueue-
rprjaea,, ovxc fc; airrj.JSec (.ep^erprjadaSdXX’
erepcp. ovroj^ avayK-q. ec^rep f^^pov <?AAo X
40 KLVTjais^TTap^ aVrjjv, Kac Sl6. roiro eSeXOviiev rov
crwexovs ^rpoy els pArpqmv avrrjs, rov airov
rpoTTov bei Kat. r<p neyidet, avrip p,4rpov, tv' 1^1 X 1
><<.vqacs. roaoyhe yeyevqp.ivov rov KaO' S p^.rpdrac
oaq. fierprjdr,. Kat o dpt$[i6s rov pLeyidovs earai
J^aWaprowTO? eWo? o' xpovos,
45 aXX ovro ^eyfos r6 avvOiov rfj KwX,a,u OXros
he r.s^avyy r, o yovMs; V, Snco, f,erpXoec
anopecv avayKq. ^d. k^v rt? 6^/08
Xpoyov evpyaei p^rpovvra. dAAA r6v roabvSe
Xpovov rovTo Se ov ravrov Xpovtp. "'Erepov yap
^ Tj Kirchli{5ff; ^rj wxy: ^ Q.
for him time 13 the measure of absolutely anv kind nf
ment (Physics A 14. 223a20ff.); though the most ™Xm
330
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
For either the> movement which is measured
by the magnitude will be time, or the magnitude
which measures, or what uses the magnitude, as one
uses the cubit to-measure how much the movement
is. But in all these cases one must assume (which we
said was more plausible), uniform movement, for
unless there is uniformity, and, besides that, the
movement is single, and a movement of the whole
thing,^ the way of proof becomes still more obstructed
for whoever holds that time is in any sense a measure.
But now, if time is a measured movement, and one
measured by quantity; just as the movement, if it
had to be measured, cOuld not bb measured by itself
but by something else, so it is necessary, if the move­
ment is to have another measure besides itself, and
this was the reason why we needed the continuous
measure for measuring it—in the same way there is
need of a measure for the magnitude itself, in order
that the movement, by the fixing at a certain length
of that by which it is measured as being a certain
length, may itself be measured. And the number of
the magnitude which accompanies the movement,
but not the magnitude which runs along with the
movement, will be that time which we were looking
for. But what could this be* except number made up
of abstract units ? And’here the problem must arise
of how this abstract number is going to measure.
Then, even if one does discover how it can, one will
not discover time measuring but a certain length of
time; and this is not the same thing as time. It is
movement, the circular movement of the heavens, is the
standard by which in fact we measure other movements and
time itself (223b).
331
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
one thing to say “ time ” and another to say “a
certain length of time”; for before saying “ a
roaoySe ear^.AAA’ 0' dpc0,^6^ J perpy'cras
certain length of time ” one ought to say what it is
o' xpSyo,, oC ^ 8eZ
that is of a certain length. But perhaps the number
^ Xap^^JdlJ^vos. which measures the movement from outside the
T« ow ooToj o apc0^oy, o^/c e?p^rat, Ss npd rov movement is time, like the ten which counted the
M. d,a.7p ^ S.J", “H horses taken apart from the horses. Well, then, in
TO?, OS Kara TO TTporepov, Kal varepov rrjs this version it has not been said what this number is
ZT""" ifierpr,a,y. ’AAA’ oSros 6 which is what it is before it begins to measure, like
the ten.i Perhaps it is the number which runs
Zt
,,r :
S,-Ao? oW
^pore/,ov «ai darepov
beside the movement and measures it by the se­
imrpo,v cere arjp.cecp cW' drepovy <IAAco rrdyLs quence of ‘' before- ” and “ after. ” ^ But it is not yet
clear what this number which measures by the
60 d "Earat oJi< o' xp6yos oSros sequence of ” before ” and . after is. And then,
^Oojeerpeoy r^y ,^oey r^ .porip^Ll iarlpZ
too, anyone who measures by “ before ” and “ after,”
either with a point or with anything else, will in
H ya/, TO rom^o:. TrpoVepo*- Sarepoy. otoy X any case be measuring according to time. So, then,
this time of theirs which measures movement by
« .>.0. ^ '"ri^LlZZTr^Ti “ before ” and “ after ” is bound to time and in
eontact with time in order to measure. For one
either takes “ before ” and “ after ” in a spatial
sense, like “ the beginning of the race-track,” or else
ucrn°- ■^porepov Kal vtjrepoy one must take them in a temporal sense. For in
general, “ before ” and “ after ” mean, “ before,”
^ oT o xpSyos. •'ETTcera Sid tL the time which stops at the “ now,” and “ after,” the
api0p,ov pey jrpoaycycyyjpdyov ctre Kard rA time which begins from the “ now.” Time, then, is
p^Herpr)(xcyoy cire Kard rd (icrpovy iari ydp ad^ something different from the number which measures
by “ before ” and “ after ” not only any kind of
^ aAAo Ai» aHud Ficinus, a'AAo H-S: dXXi A‘»ExvO
movement but even ordered movement. Then, why,
eon yap av H-S: eon yap av oodd.
when number is added to movement, either on the
^aS^srbsterarexLte ro/trth^th-"“"®v‘'r •" measured or the measuring side—for there is the
numbers: see VI. 6 [34J 5. ^ things which it * Aristotle defines time as dpi0pos Kivrjoeais Kara ro ■nporepov
Kal varepov {Physics A 4. 219b2—3).
332. 333
 PLOtiNUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
rovavTov Kal [lerpovvra Kal pLeix.eTprjiiivov etvai—
aAA’ oSu Sia rL apidpav p.kv yevop.4vov xpovos
earat, Kiv^aews 8e ovarjs Kal tov Trporepov Trdvrws
VTrdpxovTos nepi avTrjv Kal rov varepov ovk earat.
Xpovos; Qa-irep dv et ns Aeyot to p,eye9os p.ij
75 etvai oaov eanv, el p.-j ns to oaov earl rovro
Xa^oi. A^elpov 8e rov xpdvov ovros Kal Xeyopie-
vov TTW? dv rrepl avrdv dpidpios e’lrj; El p.-/i ns
dnoXa^djv iiipos n airov pierpoi, iv <S avpi^alvei
etvai Kal rrplv fierprjBrjvai. Aid rL Se ovk earai
rrplv Kal ijivyriv rrjv pierpovaav etvai; El pi-j ns
80 ^v ydveaiv ddrov Trapd tfivyris Xiyoi yiveadai.
Errei Sia ye to p,erpeiv odSapicos dvayKaiov etvai-
virapxei yap oaov earl, kov piij ns pierpfj. To Se
TW fieyeOei xPwdp.evov Trpos to pierp^aai^ rrtv
^hx^v dv ns Xiyoi- rovro S^ rL dv etr] npds
€woi(iv ")(p6vov ;
10. TS S^ irapaKoXoddiqp.a Xiyeiv rfjs Kiv-jaecvs,
ri TTore rovrd iariv oiK iari SiSdaKovros oiSi
eip^Ke rii^ rrplv elrreiv rL eon rovro to rrapaKoXov-
6ovv- iKeivo ydp dv taivs et-q 6 xpdvos. 'EmaKerr-
1°’' , rovro etre darepov
.eire dfia eire rrpdrepov, eirrep ri iari roiovrov
■tTapaKpXovd-t]p,a- ottms ydp dv Xey-qrai, ev xpovo)
Xeyerai. El rovro, iarai 6 xpdvos rTapaKoXoddqpa
Kivrjaecos ev xpovtp.
AAA erreihr] ov n p,rj eari ^rjrovpiev dXXd n
334
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
possibility that the same number could be both
measured and measuring—why should time result
from its presence, though when movement exists
and, certainly, has a “ before ” and after be­
longing to it, there will be no time? This is like
saying that a magnitude would not be the size
it is unless someone understood that it was that
size. But again, since time is, and is said to be,
unbounded, how could it have a number? Unless,
of course, someone took off a piece of it and measured
it, but time would be in ther piece before it was
measured, too. But why can time not exist before
the soul which measures it ? Unless perhaps one is
going to say that it originated from soul. But this
is not in any way necessary because of measuring it,
for it exists in its full length, even if no one measures
it. One might say that the soul is what uses magni­
tude to measure time; but how could this help us to
form the concept of time ?
10. As for calling it an accompaniment of move­
ment, this does not explain at all what it is, nor has
the statement any content before it is said what this
accompanying thing is, for perhaps just this might
turn out to be time. But we must consider whether
this accompaniment comes after movement, or at the
same time as it, or before it—if there is any kind of
accompaniment which comes before,, for whichever
may bej^aid, it is said to be in time. If this is so,
time will be an accompaniment of movement in time.
But, since we ate not trying to find what time is not
i' /iCTp'^croi.Kirchhoff, H-S: jierpr\aav oodd.
Ti Page, H-S“: eipijiccVai oodd.
33'S
 PLOTINUS: ENNE:A.D III. 7.
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
but what it is, and since a great deal has been said by
a great many of our predecessors on every theory of
its nature, and if one went through it all one would be
making a historical rather than a philosophical en­
quiry; and since we have already made a cursory
survey of some of their arguments, and it is possible
from what has been said already to refute the philoso­
pher who says that time is the measure of the move­
ment of the All by using all our arguments about the
measure of movement—for apart from the argmnent
from irregularity all the others, which we used against
them 1 too, will fit his case^it would be in order to
say what one ought to think time is.
11. We must take ourselves back to the disposition
which we said existed in eternity, to that quiet life,
all a single whole, still unbounded, altogether without
declination, resting in and” directed towards eternity.
Time did not yet exist, not at any rate for the beings
Mo|.aaj oif,ra, ro're oiVa? o,5« £Z\ of that world; we shall produce time by means of the
KaXoi, eiTTeiv tovto- n\y ” » to'ws' form and nature of what comes after. If, then, these
beings were at rest in themselves, one could hardly,
lO^oW. o',.c/eWi. perhaps, call on the Muses, who did not then yet
-A^yo.- S’ 5. .epi isZl, exist, to tell us “ how time first came out ”: * but
one might perhaps (even if the Muses did'exist then
ro .poVepo. S^ .o,.„ yen.,>a. Tre after all) ask time when it has .come into being to
tell us how it did come into being and appear. It
movement.°^* simply that time is the measure of miglit say sometliing like this about itself; that be-
fore, when it had not yet, in fact, produced this

In Republic VIII. (546D8E1), Plato, about to des^be the

decaderroe of'the ideal states; says ^ jSouAa dicrwep''0/i^poj,
evv<oue6a -rats Movaais eiTrelv Tjptv mro>s bf) Trpwrov ordais efiireae;
from this, rather than directly from Homer, Plotinus s playful
variation is derived.
-336
337
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
iaripov iv r& oVt a.e,ra*ro
XJiovosovK <vv aXX ev iKdv<p Kal aMs ■^(jvyiau
16 TToXvnpdyfiovos Kal dpxeiv adrijs
l^povXop.evrjs Kal dvac airfjs Kal r6 nXdou rov
napoyro, Cvr,t, ^Xof.d.r]s lavrjBr) air^
eKLvrjer) S, Kac aM^, ^al els r6 eVeira del Kal t6
varepov Kat ov ravroy, dXX’ erepov eW' Prepay
Ktyovp.eyoi.^ P^^kSs tl rfjs nopelas ^ocrjadp^eyoc
accovos ^cKoya roy xpdyoy elpydapLeOa. ’£77^^ ydp
>hx^s ■?jy Tis hwaiiis oiy vovyos, to S’ e’«;«
op^eyoy ae. ^era^ipe.y els a'AAo ^ovXof,-dyr,s. r6
l^eyaOpooy avrfj Tray napetyaL o^k ^deXev cZanep
t /’"Wa-ros -^adxov i^eXlrrwy airdy 6 Xdyos
SceioSoy ecs noXv', cds olerac, no.eT, d^ayl^Jrd
25 vroAo f,ep,a,a&, Kal dyO' iyds dy aired oiK iy
avrep to ey Sanayedy els p,rjKos ■daOeviarepoy
^poe^y. ovre. ,al air^ ,6apeoy noJaa
aeadr^roy t,ep.yee iKelyov Keyoipeeyoy Klyriacy oi
rvy^eKee op^,ay Sd rrj iKel Kal dOiXovaay elKdya
eKewrjsdyae, npdiroy f,dy iavr^y iypdyeoaey dyrl
rov aievyos rovroy ■nov^aaaa- trreira U Kal red
yeyof^eyep eSeoKe SovXev'eey xpdyep, iy xpdyev airdy
^avra iroe-qejaaa etyai, rd.s roirov Sie^dSovs
anaeras ey avru, -nepiXa^ovaa- h i^dyr) ydp
KiSSiSrasSS
338
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
“ before ” or felt the need of the “ after,” it was at
rest with eternity in real being; it was not yet time,
but itself, too, kept quiet in that. But since there
was a restlessly active nature which wanted to control
itself and be on its own, and chose to seek for more
than its present state, this moved, and time moved
with it; and so, always moving on to the “ next a.nd
the " after,” and what is not the same, but one thing
after another, we 1 made a long s-tretch of our journey
and constructed time as an image of eternity. For
because soul had an unquiet power, which wanted to
keep on transferring what it saw there to something
eke, it did not want the whole to be present to it all
together; and, as from a quiet seed the formative
principle, unfolding itself, advances, as it thinks, to
largeness', but does away with the largeness by
division and, instead of keeping its unity in itseli,
squanders it outside itself and so goes forward to a
weaker extension; ^ in the same way Soul, maki^
the world of sense in imitation of that other world,
moving with a motion which is not that which exists
There, but like it, and intending to be an image of it,
first of all put itself into time, which it made instead
of eternity, and then handed over that which came
into being as a slave to time, by making the whole
of it exist in time and encompassing all its ways with
time. For since the world of sense moves in Soul-
significance of the first person in yew^eojiev above (1. 6);
but this may be simply the lecturer’s “ we.
2 One of the most vivid expressions m the hnnexms oi ine
deep and*constant conviction of Plotinus that the beginning
of a process of development is more perfect than the end, that
simplicity, concentration and rest is better than large-scale
expansion into a multiplicity of activities. ^
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
Kivo^li^vos~oi ydp Tis airov rovSe rov navr6s
TOTTOS7] ^vxr]~Kal ev ru> €Ketvr]s aS eKivetro
Xfopcp. T-qy yap evipyeiav airqs Trapexofx^vr,
t^r aXXqv, ,10' Iripav t:6X,v Le^S.
eyewa re pera rfjs evepyeias to Kal
avpTrpopei p,ra Siavolas dr^pas per’ dKetvqv rd,
jv ov8 p vvv CojT,^ opoca rfj 7rp6 airfjs. "Apa o^v
C^Tj aXXq Ka, TO «dAA7y» xpdvov dyev dXXov.
^taarams ow ^coijs xpdvov elye Kal to npooco del
Tr]s Ccoijs xpovov eVc del Kal d, irapeXOovoa Corf,
Xpovov exei napeXqXvOoTa. El oSv xpdvov ns
P-^rapanKfj d^
45 a,Uo)/ ^Mv Co)qu elvai, dp’ dv SokoZ n Xeyeiv; El
SAXov
yap au6v eori Cojrj ev ardaei Kal rip avrco Kal
(vaavTcos^ Kau direipos qSr), «VoW 8^ SeZ rov
aiwvos Tov xpdvov elvac, dtairep Kal rdSe tS nav
€^« TTpos eKeZvo, avrl pdv C<ofjs rrjs dKeZ dXXqv
dec Coyqv T-qv rrjaSe rrjs Svvdpeojs rrjs i/svxqs
b
60 cooTTep opoiwpov Xdy.eiv etvai Kal dvrl KiVT^aecos
voepas ijivxqs^ nvos pepovs Kivqmv. avrl Se
TavTorqros /cot rov diaavTcos Kal pevovros to pq
f^^^ov ivTlp airdp, dXXo Sd Kal dXXo evepyovv.
avn be adiaaraTov Kal evos elSwXov rov evos to
____________ ‘ V Pioihus: -j codd.
‘ The juxtaposition of avroC and toCSc rov ttovtos here is
ratremely odd. Kirohhoff and Dodds would read a<!r<S (so. rw
thlTZ'i '■ universe for Plato
than soul, which is an attractive emendation. Alternatively
340
ON ETEENITY AND TIME
there is no other place of it (this ui^iverse) 1 than Soul
__it moves also in the time of Soul. For as Soul pre­
sents one activity after another, and then again
another in ordered succession, it produces the suc­
cession along with activity, and goes on tnth another
thought coining after that which it had before, o
that which did not previously exist because dis­
cursive thought was not in action, tod Soul s present
life is not like that which came before it. So at the
same time the life is different and this Afferent
involves a different time. So the spreading out ot
life involves time; life’s continual progress involves
continuity of tinie, and life which is pas^nvolves
past time. So would it be sense to say that time
is the life of soul in a movement of passage from one
els way of Ufe to another ? Yes, for if eternity is hfe at
rest, unchanging and identical and already un­
bounded, and time must exist as an image
(in the same relation as that in which this stands
to the intelUgible All), then we must say that there
£ tete.d of the life There, ..other hf.
in a way of speaking, the same name m this
power of the soul, and instead of intelligible
Ltion that there is the motion of f of Soul,
and, instead of sameness and self-identity and
abiding, that which does not abide i^ Ae same but
toes one act after another, and, instead of that which
is one without distance or separation, an image of
341
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
eij aTT^po. ^pos r6 ^eirjs ad. dvri S^ iep6ov
oXov ro Kara p.4pos io6p,evov Kal dd dodLov
oXov OiiToi yap li^ra. r6 ^Srj o'Ao. Kal
aOpoov «ai a-n^,pov r^dr,. d dd 7rpoaKr<L-
l^evov dvai ev ry dvai- Kal ydp r<5 dvai odrco
TO ye^vov p^^aerai. Ad oi5/c 4^co6eu ri}^
>pvxrjs Xappavew t6v ypovov, <^cm€p odSk t 6v
aiwa eicei .fco roo oVo., oi5S’ av^ ^apaKoXodd^pa
ovS' varepov, (vanep ovS'
sKei., dXX'
icai enovra Kal avvdpra. dianep icdicei J epopcopevov
alcdp.
12. Noijaac 84 Sd Kal iurddep. ^ thing which is seen along.with it and exists in it and
avrri xpopoy ro roiodrov prjKos ^lov d pera^oXals
npoiov opa.Xals r, Kal dpolacs d^Vrl Trpocodaais.
avyexe, ro rrj, ev.pydas ^ov. 8^ ^dXcp rd>
oy<p avacrrpeiPac TToi-jaaipev rijv 8dvapiv radrriv
xac navaypy rov8e rov ^iov. Bu vvv drravarov
ovra Ky ov-rore X-j^ovra. oVi ^.vxrjs rwo, dd
ovc^S ear,V evepyeia. od ^pds aMjv oi8' d airrj
O.XX eP nocTjae. Kal yepiae,~d od dnodolpJa
fiV^en epepyovaap. dAAd ^avaapipr,p radrvp rXp
eppyy^ap Ka. .nyrpacf>d Kal rovro r6 pipos rrf,
’pvxTjs TTpos ro SKet Kal rop alcdpa Kal d ■^avyia
ap ere perd atd>pa drj; Ti S’ dp dXXo
/cat aXXo rrapr(x>p ep dl pewdpreop; Ti S’ dp
rrporepop; TL S’ dp vorepop ^ pdXXop;^ Iloi; S’
* fi^XXov Page, H-S': oodd.
342
ON ETEKNITY AND TIME
unity, that which is one in continuity; and instead of a
complete unbounded whole, a continuous unbounded
succession, and instead of a whole all together a whole
which is, and always will be, going to come into being
part by part. For this is the way in which it will
imitate that which is already a whole, already all
together and unbounded, by intending to be always
making an increase in its being, for this is how its
being will imitate the beifig of thd iiltelligible world.
But one must not conceive time as outside Soul, any
more than eternity There as outside real being. It is
not an accompaniment of Soul nor something that
comes after (any more than eternity There) but some-
with it, as eternity does There [with real being].
12. We must understand, too, from this that this
nature is time, the extent of life of this kind which
goes forward in even and uniform changes progress­
ing quietly, and which possesses continuity of
activity. Now if in our thought we were to make this
power turn back again, and put a stop to this life
which it now has without stop and never-ending,
because it is the activity of an always existing soul,
whose activity is Viot directed to itself or in itself,
but lies in making and production—if, then we were
to suppose that it was no longer active, but stopped
this activity, and that this part of the soul turned
back to the intelligible world and to eternity, and
rested quietly there, what would there still be except
eternity ? What would “ one thing after another
mean when all things remained in unity? ^at
sense would “ before ” still have, and what “ after
or “ future ” ? Where could the soul now fix its
343
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD'IH. 7. ON ETEKNITY AND TIME
els aAAo ^ eV <L ian - gaze on something other than that in which it is?
Sj op Wr^. d#o4,o. vio •;
Rather, it could not even fix its gaze on this, for it
XI'S “ '’®' /4«v« would have to stand away from it first in order to do
^ V> VKaJ
ov TTpioTcos VTTapxei- [vpoVosl iJ.
eV so. For the heavenly sphere itself would not be
.at ^ar.\al there, since its existence is not primary, for it exists
<^rr,. eKeLVTjs evepyovaris. Sar, ^ ardms airrjs and moves in time, and, if it comes to a stop we shall
measure the duration of its stop by the activity of
Et ow a^o^aaris i.elvrjs .at ^co9elar]s d^pZa^ soul, as long as soul is outside eternity. If, then,
Xpovos, SrjXo. 5rc ^ radrrjs dpx?i Irpds^ZZ when soul leaves this activity and returns to unity
time is abolished, it is clear that the beginning of this
><^aej.s .at oSros d^los r6. xpZ yLa. aTx
movement in this direction, and this form of the life
Kac ecprjra, a/xa rwSe rS> -navrl yeyoviva,, Src of soul, generates time. This is why it is said that
fvxn airdv ^erd rovde rod .aZs iy^Z time came into existence simultaneously with this
E.^ yap rn rocaryt ivepyela. .at ro'Se yeyJr,ra. universe,! because soul generated it along with this
25 TO ^ Vo., o' eV XpSuZeIH universe. For it is in activity of this kind that
Tis XeyoL xpovovs XeyeaSat air^ .at rds ribv this universe has come into being; and the activity is
aarpcov <f>opas. avap.v7]oeijrco. Src ravrd <f>y,ac time and the universe is in time. But if someone
wants to say that Plato als5 calls the courses of the
y.yoveva, ^po, S^Xcoacv .at Scop.af.6v ypdvov stars “ times ” he should remember that he says that
2^ ro xva ^ f.4rpov ivapyZ 'Let ydp oT.
they have come into existence for the declaring and
“ division of time,” ® and his “ that there might be an
Trap avrocs e.aarov airov pcipos dopdrov Svros obvious measure.” ® For since it was not possible
Kayv Xrf^ov .ac (.dXcara dpcdpcecv o6. etSdacv, for the soul to delimit time itself, or for men by them­
selves to measure each part of it since it was invisible
oywoca, <f,r]acv. dpcOpcov. Eld' Saov and ungraspable, particularly as they did not know
TO avaroXrfs .cs r6 ndXcv Xap.pdvovacv daov how to count, the god made day and night, by means
35 xpovov Scaa-nff.a. dp^Xov Svros rod rijs .l^aeJs of which, in virtue of their difference, it was possible
^<-Sovs prep enepecS6f.e6a. e^yeev .at olov Upi to grasp the idea of two, and from this Plato says,
came the concept of number.** * Then, by taking the
* Xpoms del. H-S. length of the interval between one sunrise and the
next, since the kind of movement on which we base
* Cp. Timaeus 38B6. ® Cp. Timaeus 3£C6.
our calculations is even, we can have an inteiwal of
* Cp. Timaeus 39B2. * _Cp. Epinomis 978D1-6. time of a certain length, and we use this kind of
344 345
 PLOTIN,US; ENNEAD III. 7.
XP^eda r^ roiovrw- p-erpa>-8e rov xpovov ov
yap 6 xpovosuiros perpov. IIwj yap civ kuI perpoT
Kai Tt, av Aeyot perpiZv tooovtov etvai, oaov eycu
ToaoVSe; Jis oSv 6 « e’yw »; "H KaO' Sv ^ p^rprjms.
40 OvKow wv, iva perpfj, Kai prj perpov; 'H oSv
KjvTjms ^ Tov TTavTos perpovpivrj Kara xpovov
earaL, Kai 6 ypovos ov pirpov earat Kiv-qaecvs Kara
ro- ri iariv, aAAd Kara avp^e^t^Kos a>v dAAo ri
rrporepov nape^ei, SijAwcrw rov ottoot] Kivrjcng.
Kai ^ Kivr,ais Sk Xyj^eetaa ^ pia eV roa^Se xp6vcp
TToXXaKis dpidpovpevT] elg evvoiav d^ei rov ottooos
46 napeXijXveev <Zare r-^v kIvtjolv Kai rrjv n^pi^opav
ei ris Xeyoi rponov rivd perpeiv rov xpdvov, Saov
oUv^ re. CO? 8-qXovaav ev r& avrrjs roawSe ro
roadvSe rov xpdvov, ovk ov Xa^eTv ovSe avveivai
pXXojs. oiK droTTos rrjs SrjXdaecvs. Td oSv perpod-
pevov^ vno rrjs irepi^opas-^ovro Se iari ro
60 SrjXovpevov—o xpdvos earat, oi yewriOels vno rrjs
rrep^opas, dAAd 8^Aco0ei?- Kai oSroi r6 pirpov
rrjs Ktvr]aeo)s ro perprjOev vno Kivrjaecos wpiapevrjs,
Kat perpovpevov vno ravrrjs dXXo ov avrrjs- enel
Kai el perpovv dXXo ^v, Kai ^ 1 perpovpevov erepov,
66 perpoipevov Si /card 2 avppe^rjKis. Kai odrcos Sv
eXeyero. co? el ro perpovpevov vno mjxews Xeyoi
^ § KirchhofiF, H-S^: el oodd.
“ Kara Kirohhoff, H-S®: Kai oodd.
346
ON ETEKNITY AND TIME
interval as a measure; ^ but a m'easure of time, for
time itself is not a measure. For how could it
measure, and what could it say while it was measur­
ing? “ This is as large as such and such a part of
myself? ” Who, then, is the “ I ” here ? Presum­
ably, that by which the measuring is being done.
Then surely, if it is going to measure, it is not a
measure ? So, then, it will be the movement of the
tiniverse which will be measured by time, and time
will not be a measure of movement essentially, but
it will incidentally, being something else first, afford
a clear indication of how long the movement is. And
by taking one movement in a certain length of time
and counting it again and again we shall arrive at
an idea of how much time has passed; so that if one
were to say that the movement and the heavenly
circuit in a way measure time, as far as possible, in
that the circuit shows by its extent the extent of time,
which it would not be possible to grasp or understand
otherwise, his explanation would not be out of place.
So what is measured by the circuit—that is, what is
shown—will be time, which is not produced by the
circuit but manifested; and so the measure of motion
is that which is measured by a limited motion, and
since it is measured by this, is other than it, since,
even if it was measuring it would be something else,
and in so far as it is measured it is different (but it is
[only] measured incidentally). This would have the
same meaning as if one said that what is measured
1 Here Plotinus uses some observations of Aristotle on the
way in which, in fact, we measure time as the basis of an argu­
ment against Aristotle’s own definition of time: op. Physics
A 12. 220bl3-221a9.
347
 PLOTtNUS; ENNEAD III, 7.
ris r<5 ixfye9os dvai S ri ttot' iarlv iKetvo
Aeycov, ixeyedos opiCofievos. Kal olov et ns ttiv
air^v oi Svvdfievos r& dSpiarov dvai
brjAojaat Aeyoi to iMerpovfievov vno tottov XaBdiv
yap roTTov ns, Su in^fjXBev ^ Klvrja^s, roaadrnv.
av elirev eivat, 000s o' tottos.
U Xp6vov oSv -fj TTepuf>opd 8t]XoX, eV cS a^TT].
6e avTov ypSvov p.r,Kin t<5 iv <S dXXd
npojTov avTov dvai 5s ianp, kv & rd SXXa
KweiTM Kal earrjKev 6p.aXcbs Kal TeraypL&xus. Kal
napa [xev nvos mayp.4vov ip,<j>alveadai Kal
yo<j>aweaeai-ds 4woiav, o5 p.hnoi yiveaBai, e?re
earwTOs elre Kwovixivov, fMaXXov fi4vroi kivov-
l^€yov ^p,aXXov ydp Kivet ds yvdpiaiv Kal /xerd-
Paaw 6771 Tov xpdvov 4, Kivr,ais dj^rep ^ ardais Kal
yvu>pip.curepov ro onoaov KeKivrjTai n rj oaov
10 eaT7)K€. Aid Kal Kiv^crews ^vdyBrjaav ds r6
6t776tv fierpov dvrl roD dmdv Kiv/,aei. p-eTpodp^vov,
eiTtt ■npoaBdvai. ri oV perpelrai Kal uA
Kara avp^e^rjKos 'ywopevov -nepL n avTov elmlv
Ka^ ravra iu7]XXayp4va>s. ’AAA’ tacos iKdvo, o5k
e^Uaypivcos. ^pds 84 od avvtepev, dXXd aadcos
IbXeyovrwv pdrpov /card tA perpodpevov oA/c
erp>xavopev rijs eKdvojv yvcdprjs. Atnov 84 rod
p-n avvUva, ■^pds, Sn rL 5v elre p^rpovv dre
perpovpevov o5k i87^Xovv^ 8id redo avyypappdrcoo
‘ c’87}AowH-S: eVSijAow A“Exy: eV8i7Ao5(n A®'.
348
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
by a cubit was the length, not saying what length
was in itself but simply determining how long it was,
and if one was not able to explain what movement
itself was’ because of its indefiniteness and said it
was whftt is measured by space, for one could take a
space through which the movement went and say
that the mesvement was as long as the space.
.13. The heavenly circuit, therefore, shows time,
in which it is. But time itself cannot have something
in which it is, but it must first of all be itself what it is,
that in which the other things move and stand sUll
evenly and regularly; it can be manifested to us by
something set in order, and exhibited to dur min^
so that we form a coneept of it, but it cannot be
brought into existence by the ordered thing, whether
it is at rest or in motion; but a thing in m^ion will
give a better idea of it, for motion more effectively
movk our minds to get to know time and to forni a
concept of it by analogy than rest, and it is easier
to know how long something has been moving than
how long it has stood still. This is why people were
brought to call time the measure of movement, in­
stead of saying that it was measured by inovement
and then adding what it is that is measured by move­
ment, and not only mentioning something which
applies incidenfally to a part of it, and getting that
the wrong way round. But perhaps they did no
get it the wrong way round but we do not under­
stand them, but, when they clearly meant mea­
sure ” in the sense of “ what is measured, we missed
the point of their thought. The reason why we do
not Lderstand is that they did not make clear what
it is that either measures or is measured in thei
349
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 7.
w? elS6m Kal ■^Kpoa/j.dvo^s aircoy ypdAovres. '0
20^e.o:. vnonvos jvv oiaLav a^ov elm., dAAA «V
SriXcoo-cvavroC rr,v 7repuj>opdv iXdxiardv r. dXrjidac
waa0ai,^ oW Kat oaoi. o' xpovos. T^v ueWot
o^atav aorou S^AcSca. 0e'Aco. <I^a o,5pLd)
yyovevai Kara napaSe.yfM alwvos /cafet’/coW
..TO or. p,n ;xeVe. ^^8’ o' xp6.o, rijs ^corj, oi
MJTO f ou.e.Z^ Kal av.rpdxer dp^a oo>.^
or. 7? To.aoT^ /caJ r6v oipavdv ndt,Z Kal
Ccorj ovpavov Ka, ypdvov ipydCerac. 'Emarpa-
<f>ei.ar]s ovv Ccops Tadrrjs e.V d SoW.ro. o'^oo
.a. ^poooj r-eTraora. eV r^ Ccofj d>u radrr) Kal
ovpavos i^v C<vr,u radryjv o^k iycov. El M r.j
-njcrhe p.^v r^j Kiv^a^cos r6 Trpdr^pov Kal t6
varyov Xap.^avajv ypovov Xiyoi-dvai ydp r.
rovroyijs S’ aXyjdyrdpas Kcv^aecos r6 npSrepov
.a. ro o.r.po. e^oo'a,,. Ae'yo. r. eW., drorr/ra-
TO? a. e.,?, yy,, a^Ao'xo; StSo:), ^>.0 rS
Urrpoyov y ,.ap’
yqaiv.y S.S00J rooro. Trap’ ^<r ;cai rS ■rrpdrepov
.at ro oarepoo TrpcSrtos iudarr) airovpyov oSar,s
Kac cSarrep rd. i.epyda, airrj, e'WaZ
* /card Kirohhoff, H-S2; codd.*
* Cp. Timaeus 39B-C.
350
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
writings, since they were writing for those who knew
and had heard their lectures. Plato, however, has
neither described the essential nature of time as
measuring nor as measured by something else, but
has said that, to show time, the heavenly circuit has
put a least part of itself in relation with a least part
of time, so that from this we can come to know the
quality and quantity of time.!- But when he wants
to deelare its essential nature he says that it came
into existence along with heaven'according to the /
pattern of eternity,® and as its moving image^
because time does not stand still since the life '"dth
which it keeps pace in its course does not stand still;
it comes into existenee with: heaven because this kind
of life makes heaven, too, and one life produces
heaven and time. So when this life if it could-—
turned back to unity, time would come to a stop wth
it, since it exists in this life, and so would, heaverf,
if it did not have this life. But if someone were to
take the " before ” and “ after ” of this movement
here and call it time—on the ground that this is
something real—but though the truer movement
[of soul] has a “ before ” and “ after,” were to deny
this any reality, he would be quite unreasonable, in
that he would be granting that soulless movement
has ” before ” and ” after and time accompanying
it, but denying this to the movement in imitation of
whieh this [soulless] movement has come into exis­
tence, to the movement from which before and
“ after ” first came into existence, since it is spontane­
ous and, as it generates its own individual activities.
® Timaeus 38B6—C2.
® Timaeus 37D4r-C7.
351

PLOTINUS*. ENNEAD III. 7.
yewcomjs, ovtco /cat to €(f>€^rjs, /cat ajtta' ttJ
40 yewrjaei, /cat rrjv fierd^acriv avrcov. Ata rt ovv
ravTTjv [JLev ttjv Kivqcjiv rrjV rov Travros dvdyoix,ev
€t? 'irepiox^v eKelvrjs /cat iv XP°^V ov^l Se
ye /cat ryu rys ^v^ys KLvyaiv ryv iv avry iv
Sie^oScp ovcrav diSico; "H ort to Trpo ravrys iarlv
auxjv ov av[iTrapadicov ovSe avp,7Tapare[viov aiiry.
46 Upcory ovv avry els p^povov /cat xpovov iyevvyae
/catovv ry ivepyela avrys ex^i. Ha)? oSv
rravraxov; "Ori, KO-Keivy ovSevos drearyKe rov
Koafiov pbipovs, oycrirep ovS' y iv ypXv ovZevds
ypLcov ^ pLepovs, Et Se Tt? iv ovx VTToardaei y iv
ovx vndp^ei rov xpdvov Xeyot, SyXovori i//ev8ecrdai
60 KaraOereoP,^ orav Xeyrj «yv » Kal « earai »•
ovrcv yap earai, Kal ^v, cbs rd iv <L Xeyet avrdv
eaebdai.- ’AAAct rrpos rovs roiovrovs dXXos rporros
Xdycov. E/ceti/o 8e ivdvp,eladai Set rrpos arraai
rots elpypLevois, <os, orcCv ns rov KivovpLevov
65 dvdpomov Xap,^dvy oaov rrpoeXyXvOe,^ Kal ryv
KLvyaiv Xapi^dvei day, /cat drav ryv Kivyaiv oTov
ryv Stct aKeXcdv, dpdrco * /cat to npo rys Kivyaecvs
ravrys ev avrcp lavyfia on roaovrov •^v, et ye irrl
roaovrov avvetxe ryv Kivyacv rov ad>p,aros. To
p,ev Sy au)p.a to Kivov/Mevov rov roaovSe xpdvov
60 dvd^et. irrl ryv Kivyaiv ryv roayvSe-—avry yap
alrla—/cat rov xpdvov ravrys, ravryv 8e im ryv
^/t(3v Kirchhoff, H-S*: i}/nii>wBJy: om.R.
® KaraBeriov nuno Schwyzer: /cal to Beov avrov co^d, H—S.
® irpoeX'^XvBe Kirchhoif, H-S®: TTpoaeXq Xv6e codd.
* opdroi Dodds, H—S*: opd rm codd.
352
ON ETERNITY AND TIME
so it generates their sueeession, and,
ffeneration, the transition from one of them to an
other' Why, then, do we trace back the origin o
^is movemlAt of the All to that which eneopp^ses
it and say that it is in time, but do not say that the
SordS ofsoul, which goes nn in it - everi^
moffression, is in time ? It is because what is before
the movement of soul ^^‘^Thriove-
run along with it or stretch out with it. This m
ment of soul was the first to enter time, and generated ^
time, and possesses it along with its [
^7o’t Sen^ SI any% of the U-yeme Just as
the soul in us is not absent from any part of us. Bu
Tsleone were to say that ti-e is in sometMng
insubstantial or unreal, it must be stated *at he 1,
telling an untruth whenever he says that he was
or “ i^ll be for he “ inll be ” and “ -jffet’*
same sense as that in which he says he mil b .
But against people like this we need another style
Sdes all that has been said, one must con-
issiiisi
observes the movement, tor instance,
observe
legs, 1
^
movement in the
nreceded this movement was of a
H
[
1
r. »“.sT5r—t ./.he ,ou,. .Boh »
N
VOL. III.
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD .III. 7.
'>Y i/jvxrjs KLVTjaw, rjns td' ifoti Sieiari]Kei. Trtv
ovv K,vncrtv rrjs >Pvx7js e.V ri; Els S yAp ideX^cr.c.
aScaararpv ^Sr,. Tovrp roivvv r6 ^pcl>rcos Kal
1° Sd od/ceVi to>-1
66 efet [toiJto toi'wv rd TrpcdrcosJ.a KaJ eVi r^y
Tov TravrXs cdaadrcoy. ^Ap" Kal eV
"H eV Tj7 TotaJr?? 7rd(77? Kal
ofzoeibojs ev -ndcrr) Kal al Traaai p.la. Aid od
bcaa^aaer^aera, 6 ypdvos- i^rel odd’ o' al<hv 6 Kar'
OAAO €V TOCS OpCO€tS€GC TTaOLV.
1 ivTw Dodds, H-S“: cV <J1 codd.
tovto . . . TTpcoTuis dol. KirohhofF, H-S.
354
ON ETEKNITY AND TIME
divided into equal intervals. To what, then, will the
movement of soul take us back ? Eor that to which
one will want to take it back is already without inter­
val. This, then [the movement of soul] is that which
od ydp exists primarily and in which the others are; but it
is not any more in anything, for it -will have nothing
to be in. And the same is true also of the Soul of the
All. Is time, then, also in us ? It is in every soul
of this kind, and in the same form in every one of
them, and all are one. So time will not be split up,
any more than eternity, which, in a different way, is
in all the [eternal] beings of the same form.
355
ENNEAD III. 8
 ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION

III. 8. ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
AND THE ONE
Introductory Note
^ chronological order) is in fact
the first part of a major work of Plotinus, including also
®®°tions of which
Porph;^ arbitrarily separated and placed in three dif-
ferent Enneads according to his own too rigidly systematic
principles of arrangement.i The doctrine of contemplation
which It contains is the veiy heart of the philosophy of
Plotmus He shows contemplation as the source and goal
f all action and production at every level: all life for him
IS essentiaUy contemplation. And in showing this he leads
f^ contemplative life
that of Nature, the last phase of Soul which is the im-
of ^owth, through Soul to share in
InteUect s contemplation of the One or Good, which he
aZ?^ ** of contemplation
the nest two parts into which Porph^ has
divided the work (V8 and V5) he develops hk taught
about first the beauty, and then the truth of Intellect
fu *0“ if fo the Good. In
the &st three chapters of II9 he sums up his thought about
the One, Intellect and Soul; then he adds a polemical
appendix, directed against Gnostic members of his circle
N^te to IlT' Introductory
Synopsis
Let us play with, the idea that all things contemplate,
even plants and the earth from which they grow (ch. 1).
How Nature makes things, and how contemplation under­
lies its Tnfl.king (chs. 2-3). Plotinus makes Nature speak
and comments on what it says, showing how its dreamlike
contemplation is the last and weakest, and how weak
contemplation leads to action (oh. 4). Contemplation,
action and production on the level of Soul, and in human
life (chs. 6-6). Contemplation is always the goal of action
(ch 7) The perfect identity of contemplation and object
contemplated in InteUect; aU life is a kind of thought and
the truest life is the truest thought, that of InteUect (ch. 8).
Why InteUect is many and not one, and being many can­
not be the fikst, but must have something beyond it, the
absolutely simple Good, which we know by iminediate
awareness of its presence to us (chs. 8-9). The Good is the
one productive power of all things (oh. 10). Intellect
needs the Good, always desiring it and always attaining;
but the Good needs nothing (oh. 11);

cI Neue Sohrift Plotins ” in Kleine

Schnflen (Beck, Munich, 1960), pp. 303-313. ^
358
 III. 8. (30) IlEPI OYSE'QS KAI
©EiiP’lAS KAI TOT ENOS
1. IlatCovTe? Sr? rrjv Trpdyrr^v Trplv imxeipeiv
aTTOvSaCeiv ei Xeyoiftev Trdvra Oewpias e<f>iea9ai.
^AeW, oi~p.6vov lAAoya
oMa Kai aAoya fwa Kal rrjv eV (f>vrois tf>vaiv Kat
TT]v ravra yewdiaav yrjv. Kal ndvra rvyxdveiv
s, r exovra, dX^a
de Kai^ dewpeZv Kal rvyxdveiv Kal rd ah
aA-qOws.^ra 8e }j,ip.r]aiv Kal ehova tovtov Aa/xSd-
vovra—apdv ris.dvdaxoiro r6 irapddo^ov rov
'^oyov; ^ H npos ^as avrov ywop.hov kwSwos
ovbeis ev t<3 nal^eiv rd avrtov yevrjaerat,. *Ap’
10 ovv real rj/xet? TraiCovres h r^ napdvn 6€a>povfi^v;
n Kai 7]jj.€is Kal ^rdvres daoi TraU^ovai rovro
voiovaiv rj rovrov^ ye ■naiCovaiv eijaipievoi. Kai
Kivhvvevei, eire ns rrais etre dv^p nal^ei anov-
1 V Tomov H-S»: Jj rovro A««=Exy: Kal rovrov Ficinus, Ap«.
•Piot^ “ reminiscence in this introduction of
gentlemen imagining
TOtSes wpco^Crai), and VII 803O-D (where
man is a playthmg of god and his highest and most Lrious
activity IS to play before him: for another reminiscenenf
this passa^ see III. 2 [47] 16). In any case, the tone of
humorous half-apology in which a doctrine which Plotinus
360
III. 8. ON NATURE AND
CONTEMPLATION AND THE ONE
1. Suppose we said, playing ^ at first before we set
out to be serious, that all things aspire to contempla­
tion, and direct their gaze to this end—not only
rational but irrational living things,^ and the power of
growth in plants, and the earth which brings them
forth—and that all attain to it as far as possible for
them in their natural state, but different things con­
template and attain their end in different ways, some
truly, aftd some only having an imitation and image
of this true end—could anyone endure the oddity of
this line of thought ? Well, as this discussion has
arisen among ourselves, there will be no risk in play­
ing with our own ideas. Then are we now contem­
plating as we play? Yes, we and all,who play are
doing this, or at any rate this is what they aspire to
as they play. And it,is likely that, whether a child
or a man is playing or being serious, one plays and
takes extremely seriously is introdueed is entirely in the spirit
6f Plato.
® Op. Aristotle, Nicoindchean Ethics K.2 1172bl0 (Eudoxus
thought that pleasure was the good because all things, rational
and irrational, aspired to it). Plotinus is taking Aristotle’s
coneeption oiOetapia (IC6 and K.7) as the storting-point of his
discussion, and is perhaps deliberately indieatihg by this
phrase that his own conception of it is much more universal
than Aristotle’s.
361
MMIIiMIliiii
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
hdCei, Oeujptas evsKev 6 fiev TraiCecv, 6 8e a-rrov-
SdCecv, Kal^ vpa^is ■ndaa. els Oeojpiav rrjv cnrovSrjv
16 exeiv, ■q fiev dvayKala Kal imnXeov r^v Becoplav
eXKovtja vpos to e^u>, q Se eKovcrios Xeyop,evr] eix
eXarrov p.4v, SpMS Se Kal avrrj 'e<f>ioet. Beojplas
yLvofievTj. ’AAAd ravra fxev varepov vvv Se
Xeyuifiev ^epl re yqs avrrjs Kal SevSpcov Kal oXtos
20 (f>tnwv tIs avToiv rj Becopla, Kal ndis rd nap'
avrrjs^ noLovp^va Kal yevvtop,eva enl Tqv rijs
Becoplas dvd^op.ev evepyeiay, Kal ttQs q <f>vais, rjv
a<f>avraaTov ^aai Kal aXoyov elvai, Becoplav re ev
avTq ^ TToiei Sia Becoplav noieX, qv ovk
exec, [/cat ttcSsJ.i
ivravBa ovre ndSes
ovre Ti opyavov enaKrov q crupc^vrov, vXqs Se Sei,
€<j> ^s TTOiqoei, Kat qv €veiSoiToieZ^ navTl nov
SijXov. AeZ Se Kal ro pcoxXedeiv d^eXeiv 4k rqs
ScftvcriKfjs TTOiqcjecos. Iloro? yap coBiccfios q rls
fMoxXela x/Jw/xara noiKiXa KalnavToSaira Kal
TTOtei; Eirei ovSe oi
KqpoTrXdaTai
KciponXciBai^^ ets ovs Sq Kai ^Xenovres cpqBqaav
Tqv rqs ^ycreCos ^Sqjxlovpyldv rocavrqv elvai,
* Kal i7(Sy del. Muller^ H-S®.
® eraSoTTotcI nunc'Henry et Sohwyzer: iv e?8« Troief oodd,'
H—o.
® ^ KopcmXdBai def. Muller, H-S®.
.. • Stoics used the terms ij>vois wfidvraaros and voepd Jitlms
to distmgmsh between “nature ” in the sense of the Ansto-
tehan growth-principle and in their own sense of the aU-
pervading divine reason: cp. Stoic. Vet. Fragm. II. 1016.
362
ON NATUKE AND CONTEMPLATION
the other is serious for the sake of contemplation,
and every action is a serious effort towards .contem­
plation; compulsory action drags contemplation
more towards the outer, world, and what we call
voluntary, less, but, all the same, voluntary actmn,
too, springs from the desire of contemplation. But
we ivill discuss this later: but now let us talk about
the earth itself, and trees, and plants in general,
and ask what their contemplation is, and how we can
relate what the earth makes and produces to ite
activity of contemplation, and how nature, which
people say has no power of forming mental images
or reasoning, has contemplation in itself and makes
what it makes by contemplation, which it does .not
have.
2. Well, then, it is clear, I suppose, to everyone
that there are no hands here or feet, and no inurn­
ment either acquired or of natural growth, but there
is nee'd of matter on which nature can work and
which it forms. But we must also exclude levering
from the operation of nature. For what kind ot
thrusting or levering can produce this rich variety 01
colours and shapes of every kind? ^ For the wax-
modellers—people have actually looked at them
and thought that nature’s workmanship was like
®Cu V 8 [31] 7. 10-11. and V. 9 [5] 6..22, 23. It is part of
Plotinus’s' consistent effort to eliminate materiahstio and
spatial conceptions from our ideas of spiritual existence and
activity that he insists frequently that soul and nature are
not to be thought of as forming the material world with han<te
and tools and machines. He seems to have in mind the sort
of crude Epicurean criticism of Plato which we find in Cicero
De Natura Deorum I. 8.19 quae molitio? quae ferramenta? qut
vectea ? quae machinae ?
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
Xpdfiara Svmvrai troielv fi-rj xptif^ara d?^ax66ev
€7TO.'yOVT€S ol? 7TOIOVGIV, AAAct ydp GXP'^V (JVV~
voovvras, (os Kat. ini rcov rds rixyo-S tos roiavras
fienovTwv, [on] i Set n eV avroXs p.ivw, Kad' o
p,ivov Sid xeipdiv noiijcrovaiv d avrwv epya, ini to
ToiovTov aveXdeiv rijs ^vaecos Kai aoTou? Kai
(Tweivai, (as jxeveiv Set Kai evTavda rfjv Svvapiiv
16 TT}v ov Sid x^f'PiXv noiovaav /cat naaav fiiveiv,
Ov yap St] Seirai rwv p,ev u>s [levovrcav, twv Se cos
Kivovfievcov—Tj yap vXrj to Kivovpcevov, avrrjs Se
ovSev Kivovp,€Vov^—ri iKeivo ovk ecrrai to kivovv
npCOTOJSt OvSg tj <j>VGlS TOVTOf dAAd TO aKlVTJTOV
to ev Tip oXca. 0 /tef Srj Xoyos, ^airj dv tis,
aKivrjTOS, avTTj Se aXXrj napd tov Xoyov /cat
20 Kivovp.ivrj. ’AAA’ et p,iv naaav cfyqaovai, /cat d
Xoyos- et Se rt avTrjs aKivrjTov, tovto Kai d
Xoyos. Kat yap elSos avrrjv Set etvai Kai ovk
e^ vXrjs Kai eiS'ovs' rt yap Set avTrj vXtjs deppiijs
rj xfwxpas ; 'H yap vnoKeijjievr) Kai Srjp.iovpyovpiivTj
vXtj TjKei TOVTO (j)epovaa, rj yiveTai Toiav-rrj rj pirj
26 noioTTjTa eyovaa Xoycadeiaa. Ov yap nvp Set
npoaeXdeiv, iva nvp rj vXrj yivrjTai, dXXd Xoyov
o Kai arjjieiov ov jiiKpov tov iv tois ^(pois Kai iv
Tois <f>VTois Tovs Xoyovs etvai tovs noiovvras Kai
Tfjv <f>vaiv etvai Xoyov, os noiei Xoyov dXXov
^ on del. Fioinus, H-S®.
364
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
theirs—cannot make colours unless they bring colours
from elsewhere to the things they make. But those
who make this comparison ought to hdve considered
also that even with those who practise crafts of this
kind there must be something in themselves, some­
thing which stays unmoved, according to which they
will make their works with their hands; they should
have brought their minds back to the same kind of
thing in nature, and understood that here, too, the
power, all of it, which makes without hands, must stay
unmoved. For it certainly has no need to have some
unmoving and some moving parts—matter is what
is in motion, and no part of nature is in motion—
otherwise its unmoving part will not be the primary
mover,mor will nature be this, but that which is un­
moved in the universe- as a whole. But someone
might say that the rational forming principle is un­
moved, but nature is different from the forming prin­
ciple and is in motion. But if they are going to say
that nature as a whole is in motion, then so will the
forming principle be; but if any part of it is un­
moved, this, too, will be the forming principle. In
fact, of course, nature must be a form, and not com­
posed of matter and form; for why should it need
hot or cold matter? For matter which underlies it
and is worked on by it comes to it bringing this [heat
or cold] or rather becomes of this quality (though it
has no quality itself) by being given form by a ra­
tional principle. For it is not fire which has to come
to matter in order that it may become fire, but a
forming principle; and this is a strong indication
that in animals and plants the forming principles are
the makers and nature is a forming principle, which
36s
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
yevvT]fj.a avTov SoWa jjLev ri rw viroKeiaevco,
30 ij.evdvTa S’ auroV. '0 ij,ev oSv Xoyos 6 Kara Av
fiop^v TTjv^ 6pajfj.evqv ecryaros ij'Sr; Kal vsKpos Kai
ovKSTi TToieXv Swarai a^ov, 6 Se Cojyj^ eyoDV 6 rov
TToiTjaavTos rr)v fwp^v dSeX^og d>v Kal avros T17V
avTTjv dwaficv Troiei iv r<3 yevofievip.
« ’^oidiv Kal ovTCo 'ttoicXv decopias tivos
av e^aTTTotTo; "H, el [levcov -noieZ Kal iv avrw
fJ.ev<ov Kal iari Xoyos. eiT] av avros Oecopla. 'H
l^ev ydp npa^Ls yivoir dv Kard Xoyov irepa oSaa
brjXovoTi rov Xoyov 6 puevroi Xoyos Kal avros 6
5 ^vojv rfj npd^ei Kal imarardiv oiK S.v el-q irpa^s.
Et ow TTpa^is dXXd- Xoyos, devipla- Kal ini
navros Xoyov d p.ev eayaros iK decopias Kal decdpia
ovrcos OJS re6eoiprip.ivos, 6 h'e np6 rodrov nas 6
fi€v aXXos aXXcos, 6 p,rj cos <f)vai,s dAAd ^vyri, d S’
ev ,f>daei. Kal ^ ,j>dacs. ^Apd ye Kal airds iK
10 decopcas; Udvrcos p.iy iK decopias. ’AAA’ el Kal
avros redecoprjKdis adrdv; dj.ncds; eari pciv ydp
anoreXeafia decopias Kal decopijaavrds rivos. ncos
S^ av-rq Jxei decopiav; Tdjv piiv S,) e’« Xdyov od/c
Xeyco 8’ ck Xdyov to aKorretadai nepl rcdv
15 €v avrfj. Aia ri ovv ^co-j ns odaa Kal Xoyos Kal
*h® variety of meaning which the
word Aoyos can have in Plotmus. The logical sublet of thi
sentence is Aoyoylft the special sense which it bften bears in
the combining the ideas of intelligence, intelli-
gibility and foimatiye activity, which I translate by “ rational
principle or rational formative principle”; it is a Advos
contemplation eV Adyo/in
the ordmary sense of reasoning,” " discursive thinking ”
366
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
makes another principle) its own product, which
gives something to the substrate, but stays unmoved
itself. This forming principle, then, which operates
in the visible shape, is the last, and is dead and no
longer able to make another, but that which has
life is the brother of that which makes the shape,
and has the same power itself, and makes in that
which comes into being.
3. How then, when it riiakes, and makes in this way,
can it attain to any sort of contemplation? If it
stays unmoved as it makes, and stays in itself, and is
a forming principle, it must itself be contemplation.
For action must take place according to a rational
principle, and is" obviously different from the prin­
ciple; but the principle itself, which accompanies and
supervises the action, cannot be action. If, then,
it is not action but rational principle, it is contemp­
lation; and in every rational principle its last and
lowest manifestation springs from contemplation,
and is contemplation in the sense of being con­
templated; but the manifestation of the principle
before this is universal, one part in a different way,
the part which is not nature but soul; the other is the
rational principle in nature, and is nature. Then is
this itself, too, the result of contemplation? Yes,
it is altogether the result of contemplation. But is
it so because it has itself contemplated itself, or how ?
For it is a result of contemplation, and something
has been contemplating. But how does this, nature,
possess contemplation ? It certainly does not have
the contemplation that comes from reasoning: ^ I
mean by “ reasoning ” the research into what it has
in itself. But why [should it not have it] when it is a
367
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
Svvafus ^oLovaa; oV. r<5 aKon,ca9al iarc r6
I^V^co H 8^ Kat Sti rovro Sri Svei
xai rroi,i. To oSv dpai airfj 5 ic,ri rovrS iari rS
TTOieiu avrf Kai Saov ^.arl rovrS iari rS ^oiovu.
Ecrri Se Oecopia Kai 9,cSp7,pa. XSyos ydp. Tco
vv e/mi 9ecx)pia Kai 9ewpr]pa Kai XSyos rovrco
Tt 'H rroi-r^ais dpa 9^copia
^varr,J>avrai- San ydp d^orSXeapia 9ewplas
fievovc^S 9,copias oSk clXXo ri rTpa^ayjs. ciAAd rw
€lv<xi u^copia. TTotT^aacnyff.
^4. Kat ei ns 8e avrriv epoiro nvos SvsKa noiei,
« TOO ^pojTWVTos i9iXoi inaUiu KalXiyeiv. etnoi
ar - ^ «. Exprjv pev ipwrap. dXXd avviivai Kai
avTov au^fi, coaTrep iydi aicoTTci Kai oSk eWiapai
SXeyeiy. Ti oSu avviSvai; "On rS y.v6pev6v ion
Oeapa epov. aiconcSoTjs^ Kai <f>Saei yevSpevov
Uecoprjjm. Kai poi yevopivr, eV 9^<opias rny diSl
-^v <f,vaiv Sxeiv <j>iXo9edpova virdpxeiv. Kat to
9.COPOVV pov 9ecfprjpa noiei, &a^,p oi yecopSrpai
0 9eiopovays^ Se, v<f>iaravrai al rw acopdrcov
ypappai coanep eKrriirrovaai. Kat poi to rrjs
IMTjrpos Kai rdiv yeivapSvcov vrrdpxei ird9os- Kai
ON NATURE' AND CONTEMPLATION
life and a rational principle and a power which makes ?
Is it because research means not yet possessing?
But nature possesses, and just because it possesses,
it also makes. Making, for it, means being what it is,
and its making power is coextensive with what it is.
But it is contepaplation and object of contemplation,
for it is a rational principle. So by being contempla­
tion and object of contemplation and rational prin*
ciple, it makes in so far as it is these things. So its
making has been revealed to us as contemplation,
for it is a result of contemplation, and the contempla­
tion stays unchanged and does not do anything else
but makes by being contemplation.
4. And if anyone were to ask nature why it makes,
if it cared to hear and answer the questioner it
would say; “ You ought not to ask, but to under­
stand in silence, you, too, juSt as I am silent and not
in the habit of talking. Understand what, then ?
That what comes into being is what I see in my silence,
an object of contemplation which comes to be
naturally, and that I, originating from this sort of
contemplation have a contemplative nature. And
my act of contemplation makes what it contemplates,
as the geometers draw their figures while they con­
template. But I do not draw, but as I-contemplate,
the lines which bound bodies come to be as if they fell
from my contemplation.^ What happens to me is
what happens to my mother and the beings that

primary bodies in Timaetis 630-55C. But the intuHive spon­

taneity of the process here, as contrasted with the oaref"}
piotM ofT“ and deliberate mathematical planning in Blato s symbohcal
struotion of tho'regular solids which are the fi^e^Vthe. desoriptibn, brings out clearly an important difference m the
mentality of the two philosophers.
368 36?
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
yap^ iKelvoL elaiv e/c 'OecDptas Kat -fj yevecjis r} ip.rj
€Keivo)v ovUv TrpaidvTcov, dAA’ ovrcov /xeifoVwr
\oyojv Kal OeuipovvTcxiv avrovs eyw yeyevvr]p,ai.»
Ti odv ravra ^ovXerai; 'O? ■q p.kv Xeyopiivq
16 (^voLs xjjvxq oSaa, yevvqp,a t/ivyrjs Trporepas
Swarcirepov Cdyaqs, qavxf) eV iavrfi Oecoplav
eyovaa oi^p6s r6 dvw oOS’ ert TrpXs r6 Kdroi,
ardaa Se ev S earw, eV rf] avrrjs ardcrei Kal olov
avvaiadqaei, rfj avviaei ravrrj Kal avvaiad-qaei
20 TO ^p,eT avTTjv etSev cLs otov re avrrj Kal ovKeri,
e^rjrqaev aXXa 6ed>pqp,a d-iroTeXeaaaa dyXaov Kal
yapiev. Kat etre rt? ^ovXerai avveaiv riva q
aXaOqaw avrij StSoVat, ovy otav Xiyop.ev ini t&v
d)ao}v rqv aioSqaiv q rqv avvemv, dXX' otov erns
rijv Kaednvov^ rfj^ iypqyopdros npoaeiKdaete.
26 Qeajpovaa yap e€copqp.a avrqs dva-Traverai yevo-
fievov avrij 4k rov iv avrij Kal cjvv avrij fiiveiv
Kal Oewpqfui elvai- Kal dewpia dijio<f>os, dixvSporipa
Si. ’Eripor ydp avrijs els Biav ivapyeoripa, q 8e
ecSo)Xov deoiplas dXXqs. Tavrq Sq Kal to yevvqOev
VTT avrqs aadeves navrdTraaiv, on daOevovaa
30 0eco/)t'a daOevis BecLpqfia rroiel- inel Kal dvepomoL,
orav daBevqa^oiv els to Becopetv, oKidv deojplas
Kal Xoyov rqv npa$Lv noiovvrai. "On ydp p,q
Uavov avroLs to rijs decjplas vn doBevelas i/wxqs.
2 Schwyzer: roO ihvov oodd., H-S.
“ rj} H-b: rov wxUS: onj. C.
370
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
generated meA for they, too, derive from'contemp­
lation, and it is no action of theirs which brings about
my birth; they are greater rational principles, and
as they contemplate themselves I come to be.
What does this mean ? That what is called nature
is a soul, the offspring of a prior soul with a stronger
life; that it quietly holds eontemplation in itselt,
not directed upwards or even downwards, but at rest
in \^hat it is, in its own repose and a kind of self­
perception, and in this consciousness and se
perception it sees what comes after it, as far as it can,
and seeks no longer, but has accomplished a vision of
splendour and delight. If anyone wants to attribute
to it understanding or perception, it will not be the
understanding or perception we speak of in other
beings; it will be like eomparing the conseiousness of
someone fast asleep to the consciousness of someone
awake. Nature is at rest in contemplation ot
the vision of itself, a vision which comes to it worn
its abiding in and with itself and being itselt
a vision; and its contemplation is silent but some­
what blurred. Tor there is another, clearer tor
sight, and nature is the image of another con­
templation. For this reason what is produeed by
it is weak in every way, because a weak contempla­
tion produces a weak object. Men, too, when their
power of contemplation weakens, make action a
shadow of contemplation and reasoning. Because
contemplation is not enough for them, since their
souls are weak and they are not able to grasp the
i“mv mother ” = the higher soul: “the beings that
generated me ” = the Aoyoi in soul which are the immediate
expressions of the Forms in Intellect.
371
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
Xa^etv ov Bwdfj:evoL to deai^ia Uavcos /cat 8«i
rovTo ov irX7ipovfj,evoi, e^te^ei/ot Se aoro IBeiv, els
4,ipovTM, Iva. i'Scoatr, 8 p.'^ kc3 iZwavro.
Orav yovv ttomoi, Kal avrol 6pav ^ovXovrai
avro /cot Oewpelv /cat aladdveaOat. /cat rovs dXXovs,
-q ydOeois avrols d)s olov re Ttpa^is I’.
40 Uavraxov Sq dvevpqaopLev rqv rroiqmv /cat rqv
■npa^iv ^ dodeveiav Jewpias rj irapaKoXodOqpa-
aadeveiav pev, el pqSev ns e^ot perd to irpavOev,
TTapakoXoddqpa 8e', el e>t a“AAo 7rp6 rodrov
xpeiTTov TOO TTO^qeivros eecvpelv. rls ^ ydp Oecvpelv
.. ™ wAr?0twi/ Swdpevos irpoqyovpevws epyerat eirl
46 TO eidcvXov TOO dXfidwov; Maprvpovai Be Kal ol
ycodearepoi rwv TralB^v, ol rrpBs rds pa9d,aeis Kal
Ueojpias aBwdrcos eyovres eVi rds T€>a? /cat to?
epyamas Kara(f>epovrai.
! 5; AAAa Tfepi p,ev (jjvaecos elnovres ov rpo-trov
OewpLa ^ ydveais, ini r^v ijjvfcqv r^v npd radrqs
eAdovres^ Xeywpev, cBs q ravrqs dewpla Kal to
^^cXofiades Kal to l^qrqrmdv Kal q i$ &v eyvcoKei
o to6t? /cat TO nXqpes nenolqicev avrqv Oedipqpa
rrdv yevopAvqv dXXo decopq/ia rroiqaai- olov q
* ns et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: n A“Exy, H-S.
This distinction between the action which is a substitute
for contemplation and that which naturally issues from it is a
valuable one, and the description of the way in which weak-
ness in contemplation leads through dissatisfaction to sub-
sritute activities (11. 33-36) is a good piece of psychological
observation. Birt there is a certain confusion of thought
m the passage. There is no real reason why the kind of action
372
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
vision sufficiently, and therefore are not filled with it,
but still long to see it, they are carried ifito action,
so as to see what they cannot see with their intellect.
When they make something, then, it is because they
want to see their object themselves and also be-
eause they want others to be aware of it and con­
template it, when their project is reahsed in practice
as well as possible. Everywhere we shall find that
making and action are eithef a w’eakening or a con-
sequenee of eontemplation; ^ a weakening, if the
doer or maker had nothing in view beyond the thing
done, a consequence if he had another prior object of
contemplation better than what he made. For who,
if he is able to contemplate what is truly real will
deliberately go after its image ? The duller children,
too, are evidence of this, who are incapable of learn­
ing and contemplative studies and turn to crafts and
manual work.
5. But, now that we have said, in speaking ot
nature, in what way coming into being is contempla­
tion, we must go on to the soul prior to nature and
say how its contemplation, its love of learning and
spirit of enquiry, its birth-pangs from the knowledge
it attains and its fullness, make it, when it has iteelf
become all a vision, produce another vision; it is
which is a consequence of contemplation should imply any
weakness in the contemplation itself (however imperfectly it
may represent it); and the activity of nature in forming the
material world is an activity of this sort. But Plotinus is
so deeply convinced of the inferiority of the material world
that he has to represent the activity of soul in forming material
things as an activity of the lowest form of soul and due to rts
weakness in contemplation; hence the cbmparison with the
substitute activities of uncontemplative men.
373
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
rix^-n TToieX- Srav iKdarrj 7r\-/,pr,s iXXrjv olav
f^iKpav ^oc,X iv ^aiyvLcp^ UaXfia ^yovn
a-navrcov- aXX^s p-evroi ravra ^airep dfMvSpS, Kal
ov Sv^af^eva ^orjOeXp iavroXs B^dfuira Kal Oecp^-
f^ara- ^ ro npairov [t6 XoytariKdv] 2 oSv airrjs dvL
npos TO ae. 7rXr,podf.euov Kal iXXap,n6[MeJv adve,
eK€c ro 8e rr, rov p.eraXa^6vros TrpiLrr, p.eraXUei
lieraXaii^avov TTpoeim- (7Tp6eim}s
Cco^y- €t^epyeca<^ ydp navraxov <f>9dvei Kal oUk
earcv orov anoarard. Upocovaa pAvroL ia t6
^5^porepov [ro eavri^s TTpSoOev] pdpos^ oS KaraXi-
Aowe peveiv a-TToXinovoa ydp rcJ TTpSaOev o{,k4ti
farac navraxov aXX' eV d, reXevra pdvov. OiK
^aov de TO -npoLov rep pelvavre. E.’ oSv navraxov
ye.efae Kac p^ dvae oVoo p^ hipyLv
■njv av-^v aei re ro -rrpdrepov 4repov rov iaripov,
20 Ze ovne. ^P-ov ydp old. re npd decopias-dvdy^
aadevearepav pev eripav iripas etvae,- naaa. Sk
e^v coare Kard r^v dewplav npa^e.
hoKovaav etvae r^v dadeveardryjv decoplav et.ar
Theiler et nuno Henry et Schwyzer: naeSlei, codd.,
» ri Aoycart^p del. KirchhoflT et nuno Henry et Sohwvzer
» (TTpoeem) TheUer et nuno Henry et Sohw/zer
®* So^zer: = iemate whem it left it (in the intelligible world), /or if it left
“ TO iavTfjs npooBev, del, Dodds.
p. 109) agamst the received text here, though not ac^pted by
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
like the way in which art produces; when a parti­
cular art is complete, it produces a kind of another
httle art in a toy which possesses a trace of every­
thing in it. But, all the same, these visions, these
obiects of contemplation, are dim and helpless sorts
of things. The first part of soul, then, that which
is above and always filled and illunlinated by the
reahty above, remains Therfe; but another part,
participating by the first participation of the partici­
pant soes forth, for soul goes forth always, life
from life; for actuality reaches everywhere, and
there is no point where it faib. But in going forth
it lets its prior part remain where it left it, tor it it
abandoned what is before it, it would no longer be
everywhere, but only at the last point it reached.
But what goes forth is not equal to what remains.
' If, then, it must come to be everywhere, and there
must be nowhere without its activity; and it the
prior must always be different from that which comes
after; and if activity originates from contemplation
or action, and action did not exist at this st^e for
it xannot come before contemplation—theh all
activity of soul must be contemplation,-but one stage
weaker than another.. So what appears to be action
according to contemplation is really the weaker form
Henry-Sohwyzer, seems to me irrefutable. As the text
it makes Plotinus say that the soul allows its higher part to
ite Meher part the soul would lose its omnipresence (which it
does not do). This does not reaUy make sense. I therefore
follow Dodds in bracketing ri 4av^s TzpoaOev, as
' desisned to show that the priority is in the order oi
S not So-1 t6 .poodev (1. 16) can then refer, as it
should, to Intollect.
3:fS
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI. 8.
ofMoyeves yap act Set to yewd>p,evov_ etvai, dadevea-
repov p.^v rep i^ir-qXov Kara^aivov yiyveoOai..
26 Ai/,o<f,7)rl p,kv TTdvra, Sri prjSiu dp,4,avovs Kal
e.copids fj ^pd^ecos Sdrai, Kal ^vxn
8e^ decopovaa Kal rS oSreo decoprjaav dre i^wripoi
ml oix ^aadrojs r& TrpS aSrijs rS peer air^v
■noiei- ml e^evpla rfjv decopiav noiei. Kal ydp oSk
30 h^i^epas ■fjd^ojpla oSSi rS 6e<!,p7]p,a. Avd rovro
06 Kai Sia TOOToJi rzavraxov- ttov yap ovyi;
ETret Kal eV ■ndarf tfivyr} to avro. Ov yd'p
■nepiyiypuirrai fieyddee. Oi p.^^, eSaadreos ip
TOow, ware ovSe ip vaprl pipei tjjvxrjs opoiws.
Aio o rjpwxos roLs tmrois Si'Swaip dip etSep, ol Si
36 Aa^oWes SyXop Sri Spiyoipro dp eSp etSop- lAajSov
yap ov Trap. 'Opeyopepoi Si d npdrroiep, oS
opeyoprai epeKa irpdrrovaip. *Kp Si dewprjpa Kal
dewpia iKelVo.
^ 6. 'H dpA npdiis epeKa dewplas Kal dewp^paros-
ware Kal rots npdrrovaip -q dewplb. reXos, Kal
otop e'i ddei'as S p-i, ^SvPT^dqaap Xa^eip rovro
TtepnrXapwppfoi eXetp ^-qrpvai. Kai yap aS Srav
Srdxwaip oS ^odXoprai.S yepiaOai ijdiXqaap, oSy
* ? ToOro del. Kirohhoff et nuno Henry et Sdhwyter.
^ Oewpia has now^received its full extenainn of __
pmg far b^ond the Aristotelian conception from which tlS
treatise started. It is for Plotinus the 4ole St^ of «oS
3J6
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
of contemplation, for 'that which is produced must
always be of the same kind as its producer, but weaker
through losing its virtue as it comes down. All goes
on noiselessly, for there is no need of any obvious and
external'contemplation or action; it is soul which
contemplates, and makes that winch comes after it,
that which contemplates in a more e^rternal way and
not like that which precedes it; and contempla
tion makes contemplation. Contemplation and
vision have no limits.^ This 'is why soul makes
everywhere, for where does it not ? Since the same
vision is in every soul. For it is not spatially limited.
It is, of course, not present in the same way in every
soul, since it is not even fn a like way in every part of
the soul. That is why the charioteer gives the horses
a share of what he sees; ® and they in taking it
obviously would have desired what they saw, for they
did not get it all. And if in their longing they act,
they act for the sake of what they long for; and that
was vision and contemplation.
6. Action, then, is for the sake of cotitemplation
and vision, so that for men of action, tbo, contempla­
tion is the goal, and what they cannot get by going
straight to it, so to speak, they seek to .obtain by_
going round about. For, again, when they reach"
what they want, the thing which they wished to exist,
not so that they should not knovf it but so-that th€y
of which production is the inseparable other side: and for
Plotinus, as for Plato, nothing exists which is not the product
of soul’s activity. , , .
’ The ambrosia and nectar with which the charioteer feeds
his horses in the PhaedTus myth (247E&^) are interpreted as
the share which the lower parts of the soul can receive of the
divine vision of the higher.
371
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
Lva (MT) yvcbaw, aXX Iva yvwai’ /cat napov ihutaiv
ev SrjXov on Kelp,evov Oearov. ’Ettci /cat
dyaOoS yd-pw TTparrovai,- tovto Se ovy tva e^co
avrcov, ovS" tva p,ri eycoaiv, dXX’ tva eycoai rd e/c
TTJ? TTpdiecos dyaBov. Tovto Se ttov ; ’Ev ifivyi}.
10 'AveitaiXipev oSv ttuAiv rj irpa^ig els Bewpiav o
yap ev iPvyfj Xan^dvei. Xoycp ovarj, rl dv dXXo rj
Xdyos mwTTwv ety; Kat piaXXov, oaq> pLoXXov.
Tore yap /cat rfavylav dyei /cat ovSev ^■rjrei d>s
‘jrXrjpioBeiaa, Kai rj Becopia rj. ev rep TOMvnp rip
THCTTCV^IV €)(€LV 61(70) /CetTOt, Ko6 0CT(^ il'0.py€GT€pO,
16 j rrlans, rjavyairepa Kal rj Beojpia, fj jxaXXov els
ev dyei, Kal to yivdiaKov oaep ytt'coo/cet—^Sij ydp
arTOvSaareov—els ev rtp yveoaOevn epyerai. Et
ydp Sv'o, TO jiev aXXo, to 8e dXXo eWat- coare
otov rrapaKeiTai, Kal to SvnXovv tovto ovttcv
(pKeuoaev, otov OTav evovres Xoyoi ev i ipayp firjSev
20 ybtwcrt. Ato Set jir] e^cvBev t6v Xoyov elvai, dXX'
evwBrjvai rrj ipoyf) tov jiavBdvoVTOs, ecus dv
olKetov evprj. 'H jiev oSv ifjvxrj, OTav olKeicoBrj
Kat Si,aTedfj, ojicos rrpo<j>epei /cat rrpoyeiplCeTai—
oi5 ydp rTpcoTCVs etye—Kal KaTajjLavddvei, Kal rfj
rTpoyeipiaet, otov eTepa avTOv ylveTai, Kal Siavo-
25 ovjievr] ^Xerrei <Ls dXXo ov dXXo- KatToi /cat avTtj
Ao'yos ^v Kal otov vovs, dXX’ opwv dXXo. "Ban
^ Ao'yoi eV H-S: Acyotev Exy.
378
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
should know it and see it present in their soul, it is,
obviously, an object set there for contenaplation.
This is so, too, because they act for the sake of a
gooi; but this means, not that the good arising from
their action should be outside them, or that they
should not have it, but that they should have it.
But where do they have it? In their soul. So
action bends back again to contemplation, for what
someone receives in his soul, which is rational form—
what can it be oth'er than silent rational form ? And
more so, the more it is within the soul. For the soul
keeps quiet' then, and seeks nothing because it is
filled, and the contemplation which is there in a state
like this rests within because it is confident of pos­
session. And, in proportion as the confidence is
clearer, the contemplation is quieter, in that it unifies
more, and what knows, in so far as it knows—we must
be serious now—comes into unity with what is known.
For if they are two, the knowef will be one thiiig and
the known another, so that there is a sort of juxta­
position, and contemplation has not yet made this
pair akin to each other, as when rational principles
present in the soul do nothing. For this reason the
rational priflciple must hot.be .outside but muSt be
united with the soul of the learner, until it finds that
it is its own. The soul, then,’when it has become
akin to and disposed aCcordiiig to the rational prin­
ciple, still, all the same, utters and propounds it—
for it did not possess it primarily—and learns it
thoroughly and by its proposition becomes other than
it, and looks at it, considering it, hke one thing
looking at another; and yet soul, too, was a rational
principle and a sort of intellect, but an intellect seeing
379.
 PLOTINUS: ENNRAD III. 8.
yap oi, nX'jprjs. dAAd iXXdrrei -rrpd airrjs- Spa
[levroi Kal avr?) rjavxuis a ■npo<j>ipei. "A p.kv y^p
eS^ yo-/,veyKeu. oiK^ri. -npacj^ipei, S. U ■7rpo<f>ipei.
eAAtwei npo^epei els iTTlaKerjiiv KarapLavOdvovaa
o eyei^ ’Ev Se rot? npaKTiKols i^app.0Trei a ^yei
30 ToZs efw. Kat r<S p.ev fj,aXXov eyeiv rj -q (ftdais
^<^X<^LTipa, Kal TW irXiov eecop-qriK^ fiaXXov.
Se p,7j reXews i<f>ie/Mev7) p.a^Xov exeiv rrjv tov
0ecopT]6evros KaraptdOrjmv Kal Oeutpiav Trjv ei
emcjKetpeais. Kai diToXelTTovaa Se Kal iv dXXois
yivopevT], etr eTraviovaa iraXiv, decopet rip dnoXei-
36 ^devn airrjs fiiper j Se ardaa iv airfj ^rrov
Tovro TTOiei. Ato d anovSaios XeXoyiarai rjSr] Kal
ro Trap avrov -npos aXXov dno^alvei' irpos Se
airiv dtjjis. "HSt? ydp oSros npis t6 iv Kal np6s
TO jjcjvxov ov fiovov rd)v i^o), dXXd Kal npos avrov,
40 Kal ndvra eujo).
7. "On p.ev oSv ndvra rd re (is dXTjdios ovrd eV
Oecopias /cat de&pla, Kal rd e^ eKelvojv yev6p,eva
deaypovvrcav eKelvojv Kal aird ^ecvp’jp.ara, rd p.kv
aladi^aej. rd Si yvcdaei ^ Sd^r,, Kal al rrpd^eis rd
riXos exovcriv els yvwo-iv Kal ^ i,^eais yvcLaecos
6 Kal al yew^aeis and Oecoplas els dnoreXedrrjmv
* €v Theiler et nuno Henry et Schwyzer: ov codd., H-S.
380
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
something else. For it is not full, but has sonae-
thing wanting in relation to what comes before it;
yet it itself sees also quietly what it utters. For it
does not go on uttering what it has uttered well al­
ready, but what it utters, it utters because of its
deficiency, with a view to examining it, trying to learn
thoroughly what it possesses. But in men of action
the soul fits what it possesses to the things outside it.
And because the soul possesses its content more
completely it is quieter than nature, and because it
has a greater content it is more contemplative;
but because it does not have perfect possession it
•desires to learn more thoroughly wha^t it has con­
templated and gain sC fuller contemplation, which
comes from examining it. And when it leaves itself
and comes to be among other things, and then returns,
again, it contemplates with the part of itself it lett
behind; but the soul at'rest in itself does this less.
The truly good and wise man, therefore, has dready
finished reasoning when he declares what he has
in himself to another; but in relation to himself he is
vision For he is already turned to what is one, and
to the quiet which is not only of things outside but in
relation to himself, and all is within him.
7 That all things come from contemplation land are
contemplation, both the things‘which truly exist and
the things which come from them when they com
template and are themselves objects of contempla­
tion, some by sense-perception and some by know­
ledge or opinion; and that actions have their goal in
knowledge and their driving-force is desire of know­
ledge; and that the products of contemplation are
directed to the perfecting of another form and object
381
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
ej.Sovs^Kal eeojp-^ixaros dXXov, Kal oXws fMifiTjfiara
ovra eKaora rwv iroLodvrUiv eewp-^ixara Troiel Kal
etbir], Kai ot yiv6p,ei>ai VTToardaeis jtu/xijaei? 6vtojv
ovaat TToioOvra heUwai reXos 7roiovfj,eva ov rds
oiSk rd^, npd^ecs, dXXd r6 d-rroriXeap^a
10 ,va detopr^ep, Kal rovro Kal ai 8,avo7^aecs tSeXv
BeXovai Kal ctl rrporepov ai alo0-jaet,s. ats reXos
■q yvwais, Kal en npo rovrcvy rj ^varcs ro Oecop-qfjLa
TO ep airfj Kal r6v X6yov Trocet dXXov X6yov
anoreXovaa-^d pkv airdOev Xa^etv. rd S’
vn-epurjaev 6 X6yos-SfjX6v nov. ’E77ei KdKetvo
ISbJjXov, d)s duafKatov rwv TTpdrcov ev Oecopid
ovriov Kal rd dXXa Trdvra icjiUadai. rodrov, einep
reAo? dnaacp ^ dpy^. ’ETrel Kal. Brav rd l;q>a
yevva, oi XoyoL evdov ovres Kivovai, Kal eariv
20 evepyeia^ decoplas rovro Kal wSls rov ■noXXd
TTOieiy ei,8r] Kal ■noXXd decvpijpara Kal Xdywp nXi)-
pa,aai ^rdvra Kal otov del dewpecp- rd ydp ■no.elv
eivat rt el86s eari TTot,eiv, rovro 8e eari 'trdvra
TrXrjpcoorat Oeayplas. KaJ al dpuipriai 84. at re ip
rots yipopipois at re ip rots nparropipoLs.
Bechpovprwp elalp iK rov Becvp-qrov 7Tapa<f>opq.-
26 Kai o ye KaKOs rexpi-rqs eoiKep alaypd et8i]
f fundamental prmciples of Greek phUoso-
pineal thought, here given a special application. By
eeupia the end of all perception and action Plotinus abolishes®
between* deUberately, Aristotle’s distinction
between „paKnKr, and 0,u>pr,nj<^ 4mordpr, or Scdvo.a (op.
382
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
of contemplation; and that in general all active
things, which are representations, make objects
of contemplation and forms; and that the realities
which have come into existence, which are representa­
tions of real beings, show that their makers had as
thfeir goal in making, not makings or actions, but the
finished object of contemplation; and that this is
what processes of reasoning want to see, and, even
before them, acts of sense perception, whose goal is
knowledge; and that before them again nature makes-
the object of contemplation and the rational prin­
ciple in itself, perfecting another rational principle;
all these points are, I suppose, clear—some of them
were self-evident, and the discussion brought others
to mind. What follows, too, is clear; that it was
necessary, since the first principles were engaged in
contemplation, for all other things to aspire to this
state, granted that their originative principle is, tor
all things, the goal.^ For when living things, too,
produce, it is the rational principles -within which
move them, and this is an activity of contemplation,
the birthpain of creating many forms and many
things to contemplate and filling all things -with
rational principles, and a kind of endless contempla^
tion, for creating is bringing a form into being, and
this is filling all things with contemplation. And
failures, too, both in what comes into being and what
is done, are failures of contemplators who are de­
tracted from their object of contemplation; and the
bad workman is the sort of person who makes ugly
Nicomochean Ethics A.3, 1095a5; Z.2, 1139a21-M; K.IO,
1179a35ff.)» and. makes the whole life, not only of man but
the universe, philosophy in Aristotle s sense.
3S3
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.
TTOiovi'TC. Kat oi ipcovTes Se iSourcov Kai/ Trpos
etSos aTrevhovTCov.
8. Taura p,cv ovroi. Tij? Se Oecaptas dva^ai-
vovcrrjg e/c Trjs (fivaecjg im ipv)(r]v Kal djTO Taijrrjs
eig vow Kat, aei oLKeiorepcov twv decopiuiv yiyvofid-
v(ov Kal evovp,eva)v roTg Oecvpovat. Kal im rijs
5 oTTOvSaias ^vyrjs Trpos to avro rep vrroKeifievcp
lovTCov T(hv €yvoicrp.ivo)v a/re els vovv ffTrevSovreov,
em TOVTOV 8t]Xov6ti rjSrj ev djjL^co ovk OLKeiwcrei,
waTrep -im rrjs ^vx^s rrjs dplarrjs, dXX' ovaiq, Kal
rip ravrov to etvai Kal to voeZv etvai. Ov
yap en dXXo, to S’ oAAo" TrdXiv yap aS dXXo
10 earai, o oiKeri dXXo Kal dXXo, Aet oSv tovto
etvai ev ovtcos 'dpL^w tovto Se eari Bewpla ^aicra,
ov Oewprjpxi otov to ev dXXcp. To yap ev dXXcp
^cov Si eKeivo,^ ovk avro^cov. Ei oSv t^rjaerai ti
decop7]p,a Kal vorjpa. Set avTX>Co)^v etvai oi
(fiVTiK^v oiSe aladrjTiKTjv ot5Se iftvxiKTjv TTjv oAAtjv.
Noijcrei? piiv yap ttcos Kal dAA’ rj piev
16 <l>vTiKri vorjais, Se aiaOrjTiKT], ij Se tpvxi-Ki].
Ilws ovv voT^aeis; "On Xoyoi. Kai rraca ^coij
voTjals ns, dXXd dXXr] dXXrjs dpivSporepa, axmep
^ {<3>> Biexetvo, Dodds; J(3v ti, Kirohhoff H-S: {<Svn, Cr;
codices inter rt et ^wvrt non distinguunt.
1 Plotinus is here alluding to Parmenides fr. B3DK, which
he quotes accurately at V. 1 [10] 8. 17, and uses explicitly, as
he does here implicitly, in support of his doctrine that the
intelligible objects are not outside intellect.
384
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
forms. And lovei^, too, are among those .who see
and press on eagerly towards a form.
8. This, then, is so. But, as contemplation ascends
from nature to soul, arid soul to intelleet, and the
contemplations become always more intimate and
united to the contemplators, and* in the soul of the
good and wise man tlria objects known tend to become
identical with the knowing subject, since they are
pressing on towards intellect, it is clear that in in­
tellect both are one, not by becoming akin, as in the
best soul, but substantially, and because “ thinking
and being are the same.” ^ For there is not still one
thing arid another., for if there is, there will be some­
thing else again, which is not any more one thing and
another. So this must be something, where both are
really one. But "this' is living contemplation, not an
object of contemplation like that in something else.
For that which is in something else is alive because
of that other, not in-its own right.^ If, then, an ob­
ject pf contemplation and thought is to have life, it
must be hfe in its own right [absolute and un­
qualified life], not the life of growth or sense-per­
ception or that which belongs to the rest of the soul.
For the other lives are thoughts in a way, but one is a
growth-thought, one a sbnSe-thought, and one a
soul-thought. How, then, are they thoughts?
Because they are rational principles. And every
life is a thought, but one is dimmer than another,
just as life [has degrees of clarity and strength].
a Like E. R. Dodds (art. cit., p. lU) I can make no sense of
ixetm with the received text, and therefore follow him in
reading ?<3r St’ewtro for n ixeivo, which gives a good and
appropriate sense.
38s
VOL. III. o
 PLOTINUS-. ENNEAD III. 8.
Kal 'H 8e dvapyearepa- ^ avTrj real TTpeunj ^corj
Kal TTpunos VOV5 etj. Noijais oSv ij TTpwrrj
Kal ^(orj Sevrepa vorjais Sevrepa Kai rj eaxdrrj
20 ^corj iaxaTT] vorjais. Ilaora oSi' rov yci'ous’
rovTov Kal vorjcns. ’AAAd ^Mrjs p.h/ taws 8La<j>opds
Tax' “*' ^eyoiev ^ dvdpwTTot,, vo-qaewv Se ov Xiyovaiv,
aXkd rds /xev, to,? S’ ^oXws ov vo-qaets, dri oXws
TTjv ^wrjv o n irore iariv ov ^rjTOvaw. ’AAA’
26 eKetvo ye iTu.arjp.avTeov, otl TrdAtv aS 6 Xoyos
TTapepyov evSetKvvrac dewplas to jravra ovra. Et
toLvvv ij fwr) Tj dXqOeardrq voqaei l^wrj eerrtv,
avTT] Se ravTOV Tjj dXqBeardrr] vo'qaet,, rj dXrjOe-
ardrq voqais Cfj Kal rj dewpia Kal to Oewpqpxi to
TOiovTO ^wv Kal ^wrj Kal ev opLov to, Svo. "Ev
30 oSv ov TO, Svo ttws aS ttoXXo, tovto to ev; "H otl
ovx dewpei. ’E'jrci Kal orav to ev Oewpfj ovy
ws ev et 8e p,ij, ov ylveTai vovs. ’AAAd dp^dp,evos
ws ev ovx qp^aTO epLeivev, dXX’ eXaOev iaVTOV
TToXvs yev6p,evos, otov ^ePap7]p.evqs, Kal e^elXi^ev
35 avTOV -ndvTa exeiv deXwv—ws ^eXTiov ^v avTW
p,r] edeXijaai, tovto, SevTepov yap iyeveTo—otov
yap ■ kvkXos' e^eXi^as avrov yeyove Kal axyp-a
* evapyeorepa, Fioinus, H-S: ivep-yeofepa codd.
^ Xeyoiev Muller, H—S: Acyot/xev codd.
^ For the doctrine that Intellect in its contemplation of the
One necessarily sees it as^many and so becomes a multiplicity-
in-unity, cp. V. 3 [49] 11; VI. 7 [38] 15. The view, however,
-386
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
But this life is clearer; this is first life and first intellect
in one. So the first life is thought, and the second
life thought in the second degree, and the last life
thought in the last degree. All life, then, belongs to
this land and is thought. But perhaps men may
speak of different kinds of life, but do not speak of
different kinds of thought but say that some are
thoughts, but others not thoughts at all, because they
do not investigate at all what kind of thing life is.
But we must bring out this point, at any rate, that
again our discussion shows that all things are a by­
product of contemplation. If, then, the truest life is
life by thought, and is the same thing as the truest
thought, then the truest thought lives, and contemp­
lation, and the object of contemplation at this level,
is living and life, and the two together are one. So,
if the two are one, how is this one many ? Because
what it contemplates is not one. For when it con­
templates the One, it does not contemplate it as
one; ^ otherwise it would not become intellect. But
beginning as one it did not stay as it began, but,
without noticing it, became many, as if heavy [with
drunken sleep], and unrolled itself because it wanted
to possess everything—how much better it would
have been for it not to want this, for it became the
second!—for it became like a circle unrolling itself.
taken here of the generation of InteUeot as a fall due to the
desire for self-expression oh a lower plane (cp. 1. 34r-36) is
unusual for Plotinus in its pessimistio tone. Though In­
tellect is for him always inferior to the One he usually thinks
and speaks of it as altogether good and does not emphasise
that its generation is a fall or declension, as he does in speak­
ing of the generation of Soul from Intellect (op., e.g.. III.
7 [46] 11).
387
VOL. III. o2
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI. 8.
Kal eTTiTreSov Kal •7T€pC(f)epeia Kal kivrpov /cat
YpafipLal Kal -ta p,ev dvco, ra Se k<xtod- ^eXruo p,ev
odev, Y^lpcxi Se els o. To yap els ovk
40 TOiovTov otov TO d^’ oS Kal els o, ovS’ aS to d(f)'
oS Kal els o olov to d^’ ov p.6vov. Kat dXXcos Se
d VOWS’ ovy cvds rivos vovs, dAAd Kal nds' Trds 8e
5COV Kat, Trdvrcov. Aet oSv avrov irdvra ovra Kal
'iravTOiv Kal to ptepos avrov eyeiv irdv Kal Tidvra'
el Se /Liij, e^ei Ti, ptepos ov vow, Kal ovyKelaerat, e^
46 ov-vwv, Kal aa>p6s ns crvpLtjjopyjros earai dvaptevcw
ro yevetrOai vovs eK irdvrcav. Aid Kal a/TTeipos
OVT03S ’Kal, el TI, aTr' avrov, ovk rjXdrrojrai, ovre
ro dTT* avrov, on Trdvra Kal avro, .ovre eKelvos 6
oS on pur] avvOeais ^v eK pioplcov.
9. O^TOS puev ovv roiovros' Sio ov Trptvros, dAAd
Set eivat to eneKeiva avrov, oSrrep ol
rrpoadev Xoyoi, TTpSnov puev, on ttAtj^os evos
varepov Kal dpidptos Se oSros, dpcOptov Se dpyv]
5 Kal rov roiovrov ro ovrcos ^ ev Kal ovros vovs Kal
vorjrov afia, ojcttc ovo afxa. ejL 0€ ovo, 0€l to
TTpo rov Svo AajSeiv. Tt oSv; Nows jxovov; ’AAAd
iravfl v<p avveCevKrai ro vorjrov el oSv Set purj
avve^ev^dai ro vorjrov, owSe vovs earai,. Et oSv
purj vovs, dAA’ eK<l>ev^erai, rd Svo, ro rrpdrepov rcdv
^ etff o Do^ds, H—: d<^* Sv codd.
* ovTw^ Kirchhoff; ourtuy C5odd.
* Cp. Plato, Republic 509B9.
388
ON NATUEE AND CONTEMPLATION
shape and surface and circumference and centre and
radii, some parts above and some below. "Die better
is the “ whence,” the worse the “ whither.’’^ For the
“ whither ” is not of the same kind as the “ whenc6-
and-whither,” nor, again, the “ whence-and-whither ”
the same kind as the “ whence ” by itself. And, to
put it another way, Intellect is not the intellect of one
individual, but is universal; and being universal, is
the Intellect of all things. So, if it is universal and
of all things, its part must possess everything and all
things: otherivise it will have a part which is not
intellect, and ■will be composed of non-intellects, and
will be a heap casually put together waiting to become
an intellect made up of all things. Therefore, too, it
is unbounded in this way and, if anything comes from
it, there is no diminution, neither of what comes
from it, because it, too, is all things, nor of that from
which it comes, because it is not something made out
of pieces put together.
9. This, then, is what Intellect is like: and lor
tys reason it is not tHe first, but what is beyond it
must exist (that to which our discussion has been
leading), first of all, because multiplicity comes after
unity; and Intellect is a number, but the principle
of number, of this kind of number too, is that which is
really one; and it is intellect and intelligible at one,
so that it is two things at once. But if it is two, one
must understand what comes before the two. What,
is it, then? Intellect only? But with every in­
tellect its intelligible is coupled; if, then, it must nbt
have its intelligible coupled with it, it mil not be
intellect. If, then it is not intellect, and is going to
get out beyond the two, that which comes before
389
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8..
10 Svo TOVT(ov eVe/cetm voC etvai. Ti ow KioXvec to
voTjTov aiiTO eirai; "H ort /cat to vot]t6v avveCevKro
T(S rw. Et ovv fj.’^re vovs votjtov e’lrj, ri av
eX-n; ’E^ OV O I'OV^ KCLl TO (JW 0,VT(p VOTJTOV
<l>7]ao[j,€v. Tt ovv Tovro Kal ttoIov ri avro <f>av-
raae-qaoiieda; Kat y^p aS rj voovv earat.
avorjTov Tt. Noow pev ovv. vovs, dvorjrov Se
16 dyvo'Qarei /cat iavro- diare Tt aepvov; OoSe yap.
et Xeyoipev to dyaOov elvai Kal d-n-XovoTarov etvai,
SfjXov Tt /cat craves- ipovpev to dXrjOes Xeyovres,
eojs av prj eyojpev em Tt epetSovres rrjv Sidvoiav
Xeyopev. Kat yap av rfjs yvioaecos Std vov tcov
aXXojv yivopevTjs Kal rip va) vovv yivcoarKeiv
20 Bvvapevcov VTrep^e^rjKos rovro T171/ vov ^vaiv rtvi
av dXtoKoiro im^oXfj d9p6a; Ilpoy ov Set a-qprjvai,
OTTIOS otov T€, Tip €V 7jp.IV OpoLlp ifiT^aOpeV, "^EoTt
yap Tt /cat Trap rjpiv dvTov- ^ ovk eoTiv, ottov prj
eoTiv, ois €CTTt peTeyeiv avTov. To yap iravTayov
26 irapov aTrjaas 1 ottovovv to Svvdpevov eyeiv eyeis
eKeWev wanep el <f>ojv7js KaTeyovcnqs eprjpLav ^ /cat
peTa T7j^^ epTjpias /cat avOpcoirovs ev otojovv tov
eprjpov OTijuas ovs ttjv <f)0)V7jv Kopiei Traaav /cat
av ov TTaoav. Tt ovv eoTiv d KopiovpeOa vovv
TiapaoTTjaapevoi; "H Set tov vovv otov els tovttIoco
TO ^codd.: T(o Kirchhoff, H—S®: jrapov or^aas Theiler:
■mpaoTijoas codd., H-S^. to yap navraxov irapov orijaas nuno
Henry et Schwyzer.
390
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
these two must be beyond intellect. What then,
prevents it from being the intelligible ? The fact
that the intelligible also is coupled with intellect.
If, then, it is neither intellect nor intelligible, what
can it be ? We shall assert that it is that from which
Intellect and the intelligible with it come. What,
then, is this, and what'kind of thing shall we imagine
it to be ? For certainly it will be either a thinking
being or something unthinking. Well, if it is think­
ing it will be an intellect, but if it is unthinking, it
will be ignorant even of itself; so what will be
grand about it? For “even if we say that it is the
Good and absolutely simple, we shall not be saying
anything clear and distinct, even though we are
speaking the truth, as long as we do not have any­
thing on which to base our reasoning when we speak.
For, again, since knowledge of other things comes to
us from intellect, and we are able to know intellect
by intellect, by what sort of simple intuition could
one grasp this which transcends the nature of in­
tellect ? We shall say to the person to whom we
have to explain how this is possible, that it is by the
likeness in ourselves. For there is something of it in
us too; or rather there is nowhere where it is not, in
the things which can participate in it. For, wherever
you are, it is from this that you have that which is
everywhere present, by setting to it that which can
have it; just as if there was a voice filling an empty
space, or with the empty space, men too, and by
setting yourself to listen at any point in the empty
space, you will receive the whole voice, and yet not
the whole. What is it, then, which we shall receive
when we set our intellect to it ? Rather, the intellect
391
 1
PLOTINUS: ENNLAD III. 8.
30 (xva/^ojpeiv/cat otov eavTov d<f>evTa tols els omcrOev
avTOV diKj>lorofiov ovra, /cd/cet[va],^ el ediXot,
eKeivo opdv, p/r) Travra vovv etvai. “EaTt pev yap
avros TTpdyrrj, evepyeia oScra ev Sie^oSw rwv
TtavTUiv Sie^oStp 8e ov rfj Sie^iovarj, dXXd rfj
Sie^eXdovcrrj. Etirep oSv /cat iari Kal Sie^oSds
36 ecTTt /cat iravra a/cpt^caj /cat oi5j^ oXocryepdis eyei—
aTeXa)s yap av /cat ahiapdpdyrcos eyoi—e/c tivos
aXXov avTov elvai, d ovkIti ev Sie^oScp, dXXd dpyTj
Sie^dSov K'al dpyr] ^cvrjs /cat dpxrj vov Kal ru)v
40 TTavrwv. Ov yap dpyri rd irdvra, dAA’ e^ dpyfjs
ra TTavra, avTT] Se ovKen rd vavra ovSe rt tiov
TTavTOjv, Lva yewrjori rd Trdvra, /cat tva prj TrXrjdos
7), aAAa Tov trX'qdovs apyq’ t'ov ydp yevvrjdevTOS
■navrayop rd yevvodv dirXovarepov. Et’ oSv rovro
vovv eyevvrjaev, aTrXovarepov vov Set avrd etvai,.
46 Et Se TLs otoCro avrd rd ev Kal rd Trdvra etvai,
rjroi Kad ev eKaarov rcvv rravrcov eKeivo earai rj
opov TTavra, Et pev ovv dpov rfavra avvrjdpoi-
apeva, varepov earai r&v rravroiv el Se irporepov
rwv Trdvrcvv, dXXa pev rd Trdvra, dXXo Se avrd
earai rdiv Trdvrcvv el Se dpa Kal avrd Kal rd
60 Trdvra, ovk dpyr) earai. Act Se avrd dpyrjv etvai
1 KaKcilCirchhoff, H-S*: ra/ceiTO codd.: f/c<i/c«ra H-S«.
^ Plotinus could hardly make it clearer than he does in this
passage that he is not a pantheist. He is arguing here either
against the Stoics, for whom the visible universe was both the
totality of being and the supreme unity and .divinity, or against
392
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
must return, so to speak, backwards, and give itself
up, in a way, to what lies behind it (for it faces in
both directions); and there, if it wishes to see that
First Principle, it must not be altogether intellect.
For it is the first life, since it is an activity manifest
in the way of outgoing of all things; outgoing not in
the sense that it is now in process of going out but
that it has gone out. If, then, it is life and outgoing
and holds all things distinctly and not in a vag^e
general way—for [in the latter case] it would hold
them imperfectly and inarticulately—it must itselt
derive from something else, which is no more in the
way of outgoing, but is the origin of outgoing, anfi the
origin of life and the origin of intellect and all things.
For all things [together, the totality of- being] are
not an origin, but they came from an origin, and this
is no more all things, or one of them; ^ [if it is, it will
not be of such a kind] that it can generate all things,
and not be a multiplicity, but the origin of inultiph-
citv; for that which generates is always simpler than
that which is generated. If this, then, gen^ated
Intellect, it must be simpler than Intellect. Rut it
anyone should think that the One itself is also all
things, then either it will be each one taken separately
or all of them together. If-then, it is all of them
collected together, it will be posterior to all things;
but if it is prior to all things, all things will be other
than it, and it ivill be other than all things, but if it
and all things are simultaneous, then it will not be an
origin. But it must be an origin, and exist betore
Platonists who accepted the identification f
being with Intellect, but did not see the need for the trans-
cendent One.
393

PLOTINUS; ENNEAO III. 8.
Kal etv’ai irpo •ndvrcov, tva ^ fier' avro Kal rd
Trdvra. To Se KaO’ CKacrroy rcoy Travrcov Trpu>TOv
fj,ev TO avTo earat oriovv orcpovp, eveira opiov
■navra, Kal ovhev SiaKpivet. Kat ovrcos ovSev tu>v
TTavTWv, dAAd vpo rd)v -irdvTcov.
10. Ti 8tj ov; Avvapis Twv irdvrcov. pr]
ovarjs ov8' dv rd irdvra, ovh' dv vovs ij
TTpo)T7] Kat TTaca. To Se virep TTjv ^corjv airiov
ov yap -q rrjs C^^rjs evepyeia rd Trdvra
ovaa TTpoiTTj, dAA’ oiOTrep TTpoyod^Zoa airq otov
6 €K TTTjyqs. Notjcto;' ydp irrjyrjj^ dpxqv dXXrjv
ovK eyovaav, Sovaay Se TTOTapoZs Trdaav ^ avrrp’,
•ovK dvaXwOeZaav toZs TrorapoZs, dXXd pevovoav
avrqv -qavxois, rods Se e^ avTT]s TrpoeXqXvOoras
TTpiv aXXov dXXrj peZv opov avvovras eVi, ■qSq Se
oiov eKaarovs elSoras ol d(f>qaovcnv avruiv rd
10 pevpara' 7] ^corjv (f>VTOv peylarov Scd ttovtoj
eX6ovaav npxrjs pevovarjs Kal oil aKeSaadelarjs
nepl Ttdv avrfjs otov iv pLZ^r) t^pvpevrjs. Atirr]
‘roiwv rrapeaxe pev’Tqv Trdaav ^oirjv rw <f)VT<p rrjv
ttoXXtjv, epeive Se avrq ov iroXXrj oSaa, dAA* dpxq
rijs TToXXijs. Kal Oavpa ovSev. "H Kal davpa,
TTcus TO TrXijOos rrjs fcoij? e’| ov TrX'jdovs qv, Kal
15 OVK Tjv TO TrXijOos, el pi/ to Trpo tov trXqOovs 'qv o
prj, TrXijOos ■qv. Ov ydp pepU^erat, els to rrav -q
^ woffavMraset nunc Henry et Soh-wyzer: jraffivcodd., H-S.
^ For the application of the word Svvafus to the One as prin^
oiple of all things, op, IV. 8 [6] 6. 11, and VI. 9 [9] 6.’36. It
should not be misunderstood as moaning “ potentiality ” in the
394
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
all things, in order that all things, too, may exist
after it. But as for its being each one taken separ­
ately, first, any one of them will be the same as any
other, then all will be confounded together and there
will be no distinction [between them]. And so it is
not one of all things, but is before all things.
10. What is it, then ? The productive power of all
things; 1 if it did not exist, neither would all tWngs,
nor would Intellect be the first and universal lite.
But what is above life is cause of life; for the activity /
of life, which is all things, is not first, but itself flows
out, so to speak, as if from a spring. For think of a
spring which has no other origin, but gives Ihe whole
of itself to rivers, and is not used up by the rivers bu
remains itself at rest, but the rivers that rise froin it,
before each of them flows in a different direction,
remain for a while all together, though each of them
knows, in a way, the direction in which it is going to
let its stream flow; or of the life of a huge plant,
which goes through the whole of it while its origin
remains and is not dispersed over the whole, since it
is, as it were, firmly settled in the root. So this
origin gives to the plant its whole life in its multipli­
city, but remains itself not multiple but the origin
of the multiple life. And this is no wonder. Or, yes,
it is a wonder how the multiplicity of life came from
what is not multiplicity, and the multiplicity would
not have existed, if what was not multiplicity had
not existed before the multiplicity. For the origin
is not divided up into the All, for if it were divided up
Aristotelian sense: it is rather (as translated here) ‘ ‘
power,” supremely active, not passive, a formlessness pro-
ductive of forms, not a formlessness which submits to forms.
395

PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 8.,
ap^rj' 'p,epi(j6eZaa, y^p arraiAecrev av /cai to ttcxv,
Kal ov8’ av eri yivoiro 'p,rj p,evovar]s rijs apxfjs
e^’ eavrijs 'iripas ovarjs- Aio Kai rj avaycoyrj
20 Travra^oo €^* :ev. Kat €(j> ckolutov p,€V tc
o dvd^eiS/ Kal roSe tt&v els ev to Trpo avrov,
ovy dvXcos €i>, ecos ns em to dirXd>s ev eXdrj-
TOVTO Se ovKeri eir’ dXXo. AAA et p,ev to tov
tj)VTOv ev—-TOVTO 8e Kal ij dpx^ ij p,evovaa /cat to
tcoovev Kal to ^Itvy^s ev Kal to tov Travros-ev
25 Xap.^avoi, Aa/xj8dvet eKaaTayov to SvvaTWTaTOv
Kal TOT Tipuov" el 8e to t<3v */caT aXt]6eiav ovtojv
ev, TTjv dpx^v Kal TTTjyy^v /cat Svvapxv, Xap^^avoi,
dmarq(jop,ev Kal to p-rjSev VTTOvoijcrop,ev; ”H eori
p,€V TO p.7jSeV TOVTOJV WV eOTlV dpx'q, TOtOVTO p,eVTOl,
otov, jLtTjSevos avTOV KaTrjyopelaOai Svvapevov, prj
30 ovTOS, p-Tj bvaias, pr) C^ijs, to v-nep navTa avTd>v
etvai. El Se d<f>eXd)v to elvai Xap^dvois, Oavpa e^eis-
kat jSaAoJv Trpos avTo Kal Tvycvv evTOS ^ avTov
dvanavcrdpevos' crvvvoei paXXov Trj Tpoa^oXfi owets,
avvopwv Se to peya avrov toXs per’ avro 8t avro
35 ovmv.j
’Tl. "Eti 8e /cat cS8e- enel yap d vovs eariv
oijjis Tis /cat oifiis dpdioa, Svvapis earai els
evepyeiav iXdovaa. "EoTat toIvvv to pev vXrj, to
Se etSos avTov—[ofov /cat rj Kar evepyeiav opacns]^—
‘ ivTos avrov H-S®: iv rots avrov codd., H-S^: ivros aavrov
Dodds.
2 oiov . . ■ opaois ael. Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer.
39§
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
it would destroy the All too; and the All could not
any more come into being if the origin did not remain
by itself, different from i*- i°
back everywhere to one. And m each and eveiy
€V, €C?
thing the^ is some one to which you ^race it
back, and this in every case to the one before i ,
which is not simply one, until we come to the simp y
one; but this cannot be traced back to something
else But if we take the one of the plant—this is its
abiding origin—and the one of the animal and the
one of Ae soul and the one of the
taking hi each case what is most powerful and really
valuable in it; but if we take the owe of beings
wWch truly exist, their origin and spring and pro
dative power, shall we lose faith and think of it as
nothing ? It is certainly none of the things of which
“t is origin; it is of such a kind, though nothing can
be predated of it, not being, not substance, not
life, as to be above all of these things. But if you
grasp it by taking away being from it, you will be
. filled wiA wonder. And, throwing yourself upon it
Ld coming to rest within it, understand it more
and more Intimately, knowing it Xt
seeing its greatness by the things which exist after
00„,id„ it thi, «ay for state
Intellect is a kind of sight, and a sight which is
seeing, it will be a potency which has come into
act So there will be a distinction of matter and
foSn in it, but the matter will be [the kind that
1 TV, A rpueated avv- in this sentence defies translatiOT: it
Oita. O".bo«
whteh spring from it and the contemplating mind.
397

PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 8.
5 vXt] Se iv vorjTots' eTTeh /cat rj Spams ij /cot’
evepyeiav Sittov ex^t' Trplv yovv tSeif •^v ev. To
oSv €V Svo yiyove /cat to Svo ev. p.ev oSv
opdaei ri irXijpcijms irapd rou alaOrjTOV /cat olov
reXelioais, Ttj Be rov vov otpei_ to dyaOov to
vXtjpovv. Et jydp avros ro dyadov, Tt eSei dpav
10 rj evepyeiv oAco?; Ta p,ev yap dXXa Trepl to
dyadov /cat Bid to dyadov exei rrjv evepyeiav, to
8^ dyadov ovBevds Beirai- Bid ovBev ecrnv avrip
^ avro. Odey^dfievos ovv to dyadov p/rjBev eri
•npoavoei' edv yap Tt 'TTpoadfjs, (p TrpoaedriKas
OTiovv, evBee^ voiijcreis. Ato oi/Se to voeiv, iva pirj
16 /cat aXXo, /cat TTon^arjs Bvo, vovv /cat dyadov. *0
piev ydp vovs rov dyadov, to S’ dyadov ov Beirai
eKelvov odev /cat rvyxdvcov rov dyadov dyadoeiBes
yLverai /cat reXeiovrai irapd rov dyadov, rov piev
eiBovs .rov err' avrcp irapd rov dyadov -qKovros
ayadoeiBrj iroiovvros. Oiov Be, evopdrai eir’ avrcp
20 Xyyos rov dyadov-, roiovrov rd dpyervirov evvoeiv
■irpoaiQKei rd dXrjdivdv ekeivov evdvpirjdevra ik rov eiri
rep vcp eirideovros "xyovs. To piev oSv eir’ avrov i^vos
avrov rep vm opwvri eScokev eyeiv everre ev piev
rep vep rj eefiems /cat e^iepievos del /cat det rvyydvevv,
ekei(vos') ^ 8e ovte eefjiepievos—rlvos ydp;—
26 ovre rvyxdvcov ovBe ydp e<f>Uro. Ov roLvvv
* CKcI^TOy) Theiler et nuno Henry et Schwyzer: oodd.,
H-S.
ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION
exists in] the intelligible world ; i since' actual
seeing, too, has a*doubleness in it, it was,‘Certainly,
one before seeing. So the one has become two
and the two one. For seeing, then, fulfilment and
a kind of completion comes from the object per­
ceived, but it is the Good which brings fulfilment to
the sight of Intellect. For if it was itself the .Good,
why would it have to see, or to be active at all ? For
other things have their activity about the Good and
because of the Good, but the Good needs nothing;
therefore it has nothing but itself. Therefore, when
you have said “ The Good ” do not add anything to
it in your mind, for if you add anything, you will make
it deficient by whatever you have added. Therefore
you must not even add thinking, in order that you
may not add something other than it and make two,
intellect and good. For Intellect needs the Good,
but the Good does not need it; hence, too, when it
attains the Good it becomes conformed to the Good *
and is completed by the Good, since the form which
comes upon it from the Good conforms it to the Good.
A trace of the Good is seen in it, and it is in the hke-
ness'of this that one-should conceive its true arche­
type, forming an idea of it in oneself from the trace
of it which plays upon Intellect. The Good, there­
fore has given the trace of itself on Intellect to In­
tellect to have by seeing, so that in Intellect there is
desire, and it is always desiring and always attaining,
but the Good is not desiring—for-what could it
desire?—or attaining, for it did not desire [to
attain anything]. So it is not even Intellect.
1 Tor matter in the intelligible world, op. II. 4 [12] 3-5.
® Cp. Be^uhlic 609A3.
399
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8. ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION

ov8e vovs. "E^effis yap Kal iv rovrca Kal avwevais For in Intellect there is desire and a movement
Trpos .TO clSoff avTOV, Too Sij vov KaXov ovtos f<ai,
to convergence with its form. Intellect is, cer­
tainly, beautiful, and the most beautiful of all,
-irdvT&v KaXXiarov, iv <^coti Kadap& Kal avyij its place is in pure light and pure radiance ^ and it
KaOapa Keip,evov Kal rrjv rG>v ovtwv TrepiXa^ovTOS includes the nature of real beings; this beautiful
<f)vaiv, Kal 6 KaXos o^ros Koap,os oKid Kal universe of ours is a shadow and image of it; and it
eiKctiv, Kal iv Trdcrrj dyXaiq. Keip.evov, on /xijSev has its place in all glory, because there is nothing
unintelligent or dark or unmeasured in it, and it
30 dvoTjTov jLiTjSe aKOTeivov /:w)S
ap,€Tpov ev avT<p,
lives a blessed hfe; so wondrf would possess him * /
CdivTOS I^oirpr pMKapiav, 6dp,^os p-ev dv ej^ot rov who saw this too, and, as he should, entered it and
ISdvra Kal tovtov Kal coj ypy els avrov elaSvvra became one with it. As certainly, one who looks up
Kal avTW^ yevdpevoy eva. 'Qs Srj 6'dva^Xetjjas to the sky and sees the light of the stars thinks of
their maker and seeks him, so the man who h^
els Tov ovpavov Kal to 'tu>v darpcDV <f>eyyos iScbv
contemplated the intelligible world and observed it
36 TOV -trov^aavTa ivdvpelrai Kal ^■r]Tet,
ovtu) xpt] Kai
closely and wondered at it must seek its maker, too,
rov vorjTOV Koapov os ideduaro Kai evetSe Kai
and enquire who it is who has brought into being
idavpaae tov KaKeivov TTOir]Trjv rls dpa 6 toioCtov something like this, and how, he who produced a
VTTOOTTjo'as ^TjTetv, ['^ 7701?] ® 7] TTOJS, o TOiovTOV vaiSa son like Intellect, a beautiful boy filled full from
yevvyaas vovv, Kopov KaXov Kai Trap avrov himself.® He is most certainly neither Intellect
nor fullness, but before Intellect and fullness. For
yevopevov Kopov. Ildi'Twf toi ovre vovs eKeivos Intellect and fullness came after him; they needed
40 dvT-e Kdpos, dAAd
Kal irpo vov Kal Kopov perd yap to come into their fulfilment and intelligence, they
avTov vovs Kal Kopos, 8et]devTa Kai KeKopeadai Kai are near to that which needs nothing and has no
vevoTjKevai' d ttXtjoIov pey eon rov avev8eovs Kai necessity to think, but have true fulfilment and true
TOV voeiv ouSev Seopevov, TiXi^pcoaiv Se aXijdivTjv thinking, because they have them at first hand. But
that which is before them neither needs nor has; or
Kal vdrjcriv eyei, on TrpwTWS ^X^'"
avTCJv ovre Beirai ovre ^ ovk dv to dyadov •^v. it would not be the Good.

1 Phaedrus 250C4. . . f 77-„j ttt

^ avTcp Dodds, H-S®: aOroO codd. s An oddly inappropriate verbal remimaoenoe of Ut<M iff.
® ^ 7TOU del. Dodds, H—S®. 342® There is an iintranslateablo word-play here on /c(5po? (hoy)
and Kopos (satiety, fulness).

461
400
ENKEAD III. 9
 VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
terms of a single Intellect and Soul? (Note 1). We mjt
unite ourselves as subjects of study are umted m one dis­
cipline and direct our united selves to the higher world
(Note 2). Universal Soul is not in place and uninoymg;
but individuals move and change, in a sense, and m so
doing make their bodily images (Note 3). The One is
Ill, 9. VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS everywhere and nowhere (Note 4). The soul is matter m
rela^ to Intellect (Note 6). InteUect at r?st exBte
Introductory Note before our self-thinking (Note 6). The
This odd little collection, of notes (No. 13 in Porphyry’s ^notion and rest, and transcends thmkmg (Note U- ^
chronological order, but the numbering must be quite and potency in compounded and uncompounded bemgs /
arbitrary: the notes are unlikely all to have been written (Note 8). The Good does not think, and is not conscious
at about the same time), which Porphyry found among his 'of itself (Note 9).
master’s papers and put together to make a ninth “ trea­
tise” to complete his Third Bnnead, on the whole adds little
to our understanding of the thought of Plotinus. They
are quite disconnected, and each of them deals with a point
discussed more fully elsewhere in the Enneads. The first
and longest is, however, of some interest. In it we find
Plotinus reflecting on a problem much discussed in his
school, that of the relationship of Intellect to the Forms,
which arises in the interpretation of Timaeus 39E. 7-9.
And in the course of his discussion of it (1.16 ff.) he appears
to be considering with some sympathetic interest the pos­
sibility of a subdivision of Intellect very like that which is
reported to have been taught by Amelius,'^ and which
he decisively rejects in his treatise Against the Onostics: *
he certainly does not, however, commit himself to this,
and at the end of the note seems to be puttiug forward
his usual view that there are three, and only three, hypo­
stases without subdivisions.

Synopsis
The correct interpretation of Timaeus 39E. 7-9: does it
require a subdivision of Intellect, or can we interpret it in

1 Proolus, In Tim. I. 306.1-3. » II. 9 [33] 1.25 ff.

404

III. 9. (13) EmSKETEIS AIAOOPOI
1. Not}?, opa eyovads ISeas ey r<p o
iari f(Sov etra SieyorjOt], cf>r](jly, 6 SrjfMiovpyos,
a d yovs opa ey T<p o eoTi ^cpoy, Kai ToSe to
nay exeiy. OvKovy (j>7)ai,y etyai ra et8rj npo
6 rov yov, oyra Se avra yoetv roy yovy; TlpcuToy
oSy eK€wo, Xdyot) Se to Catov, ^rjrqrdoy el p.rj yovs,
dAA’ erepoy yov- to yap 9ed>p.eyov yovs- to rolyvy
C<poy avTO ov yovs, aXXa yorjroy avro ^-qaop,ey Kal
Toy yovy e^oj ^ijoo/t,ev avrov d opa exeiy- EiStoAa
dpa Kal ov raX-rjOrj exei, el eKei rdXTjBij. ’E/eei
10 yap Kal rrjv dX-jdeidy ^aiy elyai ey rip oyri, oS
avro eKaaroy. "H, /cdv erepoy. eKarepoy, ov xotpk
aXXrjXcjy, dAA’ ^ pioyoy tm erepa. ’'E77etTa ov8ey
KcoXvei dffov enl rip XeyopAyip ey ehai dpufjco,
hiaipovpieva Se rfj vo^cret, einep pioyoy cos dy ro
piey voTjroy, ro Se yoovy- o yap KaOopa ov <j)'i^<jiy
ey erepip ndyrcos, dAA’ ey avrip rip ey avrw ro
I Timaeua 39E, 7-9.
• This view, which Plotinus here and elsewhere consistently
opposes, was at one time held by Porphyry (cp. Life, oh. 18,11,
and Proclus, In Tim. I. 322. 22-4). It differs from that of
406
III." 9. VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
1. “ Intellect,” Plato says, “ sees the Ideas exist-
ina: in the real living creature ” then, he says, e
Miker planned that, what Intellect sees m the real
living creature, this universe too should have.
Does he, then, say that the Fonm exist already
before Intellect, and that Intellect thii^ them when
they [already] exist? First of all, then, we must
investigate that reality (I mean the living ^eaturJ,
to see if it is not Intellect, but something other than
Intellect: for that which contemplates it is intel­
lect; so we shall say that the living feature is not
Intellect, but intelligible, and that Intellect has what
it sees outside itself.^ So, then, it has images and
not true realities, if the true realities are there [in
the living creature]. ’For there, Plato says, ^ trut
too, in rwl being, where each and eve^
itself is.3 Now, even if the two are different from
each other, they are not separate from each other
except in so far as they are different. Further, there
is nothing in the statement agaii^t both being one
but distinguished by thought, though only m the
sense that one is intelligible object, the o**®’’
telligent subject; for Plato does n<rt say ^^at jhat it
sees is in something absolutely different, but in it.
Longinus, who made the Forms not only outside, but posterior
to, the Demiurge (ProolM, he.).
“ Cp. Fhaedrus 247C-E.

PLOTINUS; ENNEAD III. 9.
16 vorjTOV e^eiv. *
*H to [i,ev votjtov ovSev KCuXuei Kal
vovv elvai iv ardaei Kal ivoTrjri, Kal 'qavxla, ttjv
8e rov vov ^vaiv tov opwvros eKeivov rov vovv
Tov iv avTCp ivipyeidv nva aTr’ eKeivov,'6p^
eKeivov opcovra Se eKeivov otov [eKeivov] ^ elvai vovv
eKeivov, oti voei eKeivov voovvra Be eKeivov ,Kal
20 avTOv vovv Kal votjtov aAAcoj etvai rw p,ep,ip,rja9ai.
Tovto oSv eoTi ro ” SiavorjOev," d eKei opa, ev rwSe
T(S Koapup.TTOirjaai l^ipcvv yevr) rearaapa, l^oKei ye
p/r^v TO Biavoovp-evov emKeKpvpipievcvs erepov eKei-
vcvv rdiv SvD TTOieiv. “AAAoiy Se Sd^ei rd rpia ev
etvai, To-C^ov avro d eariv, 6 vovs, to Siavoov-
25 pievov. ’'H, d)07rep ev Tro)Aois, TrpoTeivwv dXdoiS,
d Be dXXcos voei rpia etvai. Kal rd p,ev Bvo
eipTjrai, to Be Tpirov Tt, o Bievoijdr] tov 6pd>p,eva
VTTo TOV vov ev Tip ^(pip Keipieva avro ipydaaadai
Kal TTOiijoai Kal fiepiaai ; "H BvvaTov'TpoTTOV p.ev
dX\ov jov vovv etvai tov piepiaavTa, Tpo-iroy Be
30 eTepov tov piepiaavTa piri tov vovv etvai- p-ev
yap -nap' avrov to, pepiaOevTa, avTOV etvai tov
pepiaavTa, ^ 8’ avTos dpepioTos pevei, rd 8 dw
aiiTOV eoTi rd pepiadevTa—Tavra Be ean ijivyai—
tliv)(7]v etvai Trjv pepiaaaav els TroAAds ipvxds. Aid
* fKilvov del. VolkAatm, H-S*.
1 This may be a misinterpretation, or careless reading, of
t'imams 3007-8.
* Timaeus 39E10-40A2. The “fojir kinds” arer gods,
408
VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
in that it has the intelUgible object in itselL^ Or
there is nothing against [this solution], the in
SSble obiecti Sao Wlecl .t ret .nd m
which sees that intellect which remain wthin itselt
is an activity proceeding from it, which sees tha
Fstaticl intellect; and by seeing that intellect it is in
a wav the intellect of that intellect, because it thinks
if but that tWnking intelleet itself too is intelligent
'i'bieolStaf'lil'll' object ta .
Litation This, then, is that which planned to
make in this universe four kinds
tures ® which it sees in the intelhgible. Plato seems,
nevertheless, to be making, obscurely, the
Principle something other than those two But to
others^it will seem that the three are one, the living
creature which exists in itself, the intellect, and the
planning principle. Just as in many other questions,
different people understand being three
Sent w?ys because they formulate the proWem
differently^ We have dealt with the two, but what is
Sfe tLd! which “ planned ” itself to construct and
make and divide into parts the things
Sect iShe living create ? Now it is possible that
in one way it may be Intellect that divides, but in
another wly the divider may not be Intellect, fw
Sso far as the things divided into parts come from
It it i?iSf the'divider, but in so far as it remains
^divided itself, and it is the things which coi^rom
I which are divided-and these are
Soul which makes the division into many souls. Thi
birds, fishes and land animals one kind for each of the ele-
ments, fire, air, water and earth.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. ?.
Kai Tov rpLrov elvai’ rov iiepiap-ov Kal ev T(p
36 rpiTCp, OTi Sievo'qdr], o ov vov epyov—Siduoia—
dAAd ^vyijs pLepiarrjv ivepyeiav exovarjs h> p,epiaTfj
(j>vaei.,
2. Otov yap puas imarijp/rjs Trjs oXr]s 6 p,epiap,6s
els rd QeoipripMTa rd KadeKaara ov OKeSaaOelcrrjs
odSe KaraKeppuiria9el(rr]s, eyei 8e eKaarov 8vvdp,ei,
TO oXov, ov TO avTo dpyrj /cat reAo?, /cat ovtco ypr]
6 vapaaKevdCei-v airrov, cos rds dpyds rds iv avrco
/cat TeXi] etvai Kal oXa Kal Trdvra els to Tijs
<f>vae(os dpiOTOV 6 yev6p,ev6s eoTW eKeV tovtco
ydp Tcp dploTCp avTov, oTav eyri, dtpeTai eKelvov.
3. H Trdaa fj^vyri ovSapcov eyeveTO ovSe ijXdev
ovSe ydp •^v onov dAAd to awpca yeiTOvfjaav
pceTeXapev dvTrjs' 8td ovk ev tw crcopcaTi ovS’ 6
,nXdTCov ^rjal ttov, dAAd to awpa els avnju. At
5 8’ dAAat eyovow odev^dvo ydp ^vy^s—/cat els d,
Kal KaTeXdetv jcal p,eTeXdeZv oBev Kal dveXOeXv.
'H 8’ det dvco ev <S Tre<f>vKev elvai i/'wxT
e^e^Tjs TO TTOV, otov TO TrXr]alov ^ to v^’ •^Xlcp.
‘ Plotinus is here" very freely interpreting Timaeua 35A.
Porphry held that Soul was the Demiurge, and believed that
this interpretation agreed with that of Plotinus (Proclus, In
Tim. 1 306. 32-307, 2); this passage gives him some support,
and, though elsewhere (II. 3 [62] 18. 16, and V. 9 [6] 3. 26)
Plotinus identifies the Demiurge with InteUeot, he makes it
clear that it is Soul which actually makes the visible universe.
Intellect is only “the true demiurge and maker ” in the sense
that it supplies Soul with the forms according to which it
makes.
* Cp. Tinmens 36D9-E1.
410
VAKIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
is the reason why Plato also says that the division
belongs to the third and is in the third, because it
“planned,” this—planning—is not the work ot
Intellect, but of Soul, which has a divided activity in
a divided nature.^ , , . n 1 •__*
2. Just as one discipline which is a whole is not
scattered or broken into pieces by th^e division into
the single subjects of study, but each of these con­
tains potentially the whole, which has the same
principle abd goal; in the same way, too, a man must/
prepare himself so that the principles m Inni are also
his goals, and each as a whole and all together are
directed to the best of his nature; when he has
become this, he is there [in the higher for
with this best of Wm, when he possesses it, he will
grasp that [higher reality].
3 Universal Soul did not come to be anywheie m
come to any place, for there was no place; but the
body came near to it and participated in it; for this
reason Plato, too, does not say anywhere that it s
in the body, but that the body was put into it. but
the other souls have somewhere they come *0“
for they come from [universal] Soul and somewhere
to go to, and a going down and going about: con-
seqLntly als'o a going up. But the
is always above, where it is natural for it to be. that
which Lmes next to it is the All [the physical uni­
verse! both the. immediately neighbouring part and
Tat whLh is beneath the sun.3 The partial soul,
» This extremely puzzling remark may possibly be meant to
exeludX“fs?atialieaningof“ above ’
that all parts of the universe, the lower as well as the upper,
are “ next ” to soul.
411

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 9.
Owriferai //.ev o5v rj fiepiKfj irpos to irpo avrijs
^epopAim]—ovTt yap ivrvyxdvei—els Se to p-er’
avTTjv els TO prj 6v. 'Tovro 8e TTOteX, orav Ttpos
10 avrqv TTpos avrrjv yap ^ovXopevt] to per' avrrjv
TTOieZ. etScoAov avrrjs, to prj 6v, otov Kevep^arovaa
Kat dopioTorepa yivopevr]' /cat tovtov to etScoAov
TO dopiOTOv TTavTTj (jKOTeivov dXoyov yap /cat
dvoTjTOV TTavTq Kal voXv tov ovtos aTToaraTOVv.
16 Et? 8e TO pera^v ecrnv ev t<3' olKeicp, rtaXw 8e
ISovaa olov Bevrepa irpoa^oX^ to eXBcoXov ep6p<j>03ae
Kal Tjadetaa epyerai els avro.
4. Ilais o5v e^ evos nXrjBos; "Oti -Travtayov'
ov yap ecrnv ovov ov. IIctvTa oSv •nX'qpoi- ttoXXol
oSv, pdXXov 8e TTavra yjBT]. Avro pev yap el
povov TTavraxov, avro dv '^v to. .Travra' irrei Be
Kal ovBapov, Ta Travra ylverai pev Be' avrov, on
6 Travrayov eKeivos, erepa 8e avrov, on avros
ovBapov. Aid n ovv ovk avros povov Travrayov
Kal aS. TTpds rovrep Kal ovBapov; "On Bet Ttpo
■ndvTCOv ev etvai. YlXrjpovv oSv 8et avrov Kal
TTOietv irdvra, ovk etvai rd Trdvra, a Ttoiei.
6. ^vyrjv avrrjV Bet ujcmep oipiv etvai,
dpardv Be avrfj rdv vovv etvai, ddpiarov Trplv IBetv,
Tre^vKvtav Be voetv vXyv oSv Trpds vovv.
6. Noouvre? avrovs §Xerropev BrjXovori voovaav
<f)vaiv, y ifievBoipeda dv rd voetv. El ovv voovpev
412
VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
then, is illuminated-when it goes towards that which
is before it—for then it meets reality—but when it
goes towards what comes after it, it goes towards
non-existence. But it does this, when it goes to­
wards itself, for, mshing to be directed towards it­
self it makes an image of itself, the non-existent, as
if walking on emptine^ and becoming more inde­
finite; and the indefinite image of this is every way
dark; for it is altogether without reason and un­
intelligent and stands far removed from reality. Up
to the time between it is in its own world, but when it
looks at the image again, as it were directing’its
attention to it a second time, it forms it and goes into
it rejoicing.
4. How their does multiplicity come from one.-'
Because it is everywhere, for there is nowhere where
it is not. Therefore it fills all things; so it is many,
or rather it is already all. Now if it itself were only
everywhere, it would itself be all things; but since
it is also nowhere, all things come into being through
him, because he is everywhere, but are other than
him, because he is nowhere. Why, then, is he not
only everywhere, and is also, besides being every­
where, nowhere ? Because there must be one before
all things. Therefore he must fill all things and make
all things, not be all the things he makes.
5 The' soul itself must be like sight, aftd what it
sees must be Intellect; before it sees it is indeter­
minate, but naturally adapted to intellection: so
it is matter in relation to intellect.
6. When we are thinking ourselves we are, ob­
viously, looking at a thinking nature, or our statement
that there is'thinking would be false. If, then, we
413

PLOTINUS; ENlpAD III. 9.
/cat iavToiis voov[jiev, voepai^ oSaav <f)vtnv voovfiev
•npo apa rrjs vo-qaecos ravrqs aAAij earl voqms
otov -qavxos. Kat ovalas Srj voquis /cat Ct^rjs
6 voTjcns'
ware rrpo ravrrj^ rrjs ^(arjs 'Kat ovaws
dX\-q ovaia xal C^rj. Tavra dpa elSev, oaa
ivepyeiai. Et Se voes at ivepyeiai at Kara, ro voielv
ovrais eavrovs, ro vo-qrov rjpi,eis ol ovrws. 'H 8e
voqais qKivrwv rqv elK6va.<j>epeL.
7. To p.ev rrpwrov SwajJ.ls ian Kwqaews /cat
ardaews, ware erreKeiva rovrwv ro 8e hevrepov
earqKe re Kat Kivelrai rrepl eKelvo- Kat vovs 8e
rrepl ro 8evrepov ctAAo yap ov rrpos dXXo eyei
rrjv voqaiV) ro Se ev voqaiv ovk cyet, AtTrAoi/t/
6 8e TO vooCv, Kav ^ avrov vofj, Kat eAAtwe?, on ev rw
voetv lyet to eS, ovk ev rfj'vrroardaei.
8. To evepyeLa rravrl rw eK Svvap.ews eis
evepyeiav o eari raiirov aet, ews ov •q- ware Kat,
ro reXeiov Kat rols awjiaaw irrapyei, otov rw
rrvpL' dAA ov Svvarat aet eZvat, OTt p.e0 vXqs p
5 S’ dv davvderov- ov evepyela q, del eanv. "Ean
Se ro avro,evepyela ov Svva/J.ec kot aXXo etval,
9. ’AAA’ ov voet^ TO rrpwrov erreKeiva ovtoj*® o
8e vovs rd ovra, koi eort Kivqais evravda koi
ardais. Ilept oo8ev yap avro ro rrpwrov, rd dXXa
^ Kav H-S: icat codd,
2 vo€L Inge, H-S: 0€ol wxy.
® ovTos Vitringa, H-S: vvres wxy.
I i
VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
I
think, and think ourselves, we think a nature which
is thinking; then before this thinking there is an­
other which is, so to speak, at rest. And there is,
certainly, a thinking of substance and a thinking of
Ufe; so that before this life and substance there is
another substance and hfe. These, then, aU the
things which are activities saw. But if the activities
engaged in thinking themselves in this way are in­
telligences, then bur real selves are their intelligible /
object. But their thinking brings [only] the image /
of it. ■ j,. j
7. The First is the power which causes motion and
rest, so that it is beyond them; but the Second is at
rest and also in motion around the First; and In­
tellect is in the sphere of the Second,^ for it is one
thing and has its thought directed to another, but
the One does not have thought. So that which
tbinb« is double, even if it thinks itself, arid defective,
because it has its good in its thinking, not in its being.
8. Being in act is, for everything which passes from
potency to act, that which is always the same as long
as the thing exists; so that completion exists for
bodies too, fire, for instance; but they cannot always
exist, because they are compounded_mth matter;
but that which is uncompounded and in act always
.exists. But it is possible for the Same thing which is
in act to be in potency im another respect.
9. But the First beyond being does not think;
Intellect is the real beings, and there is movement
here and rest. The First itself is not related to any­
thing, but the other things are related to it, staying
1 Cp. Plato, Second Letter 312E3.
415

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 9.
Se 176/31 avTo avaTrav6[JLeva eaT-ijKe Kal Kiveirai- rj
y^p kIvt^ois €(j>€Gts, TO Se ouSevoff e^teTctt* tivos yo,p
6 TO ye aKporaTOV; Ou voei oSv ovSe eavTO; H ^
eyei iavro, Kal voeZv oXcos Aeyerai; *H to) eyeiv
iavTo ov voelv Aeyerai, dAAa -npos- to Trpwrov
jSAeVeiv. "Ectti Se TrpwTrj evepyeia /cat airq r]
voTjais. Etoux/ avTT] ■npoi-rq, odSe/uav Set •nporepav.
To oSv TTapeyov ravTrjv eire'/cetva ravrqs’ oiare
10 Seurepa 7} vorjais /ter’ eKeivo. OvSe yap to
TTpcorcos CT6/Lti3ov 1J v6t]ais‘ ovKow ovSe Trdcra, dXX
7j rov dyadov' eTre'/cetm dpa voijcjecos rdyaOov.
’AAA’ 013 TTapaKoXovO'qaei avrcp. Tt oSy 17 irapa-
KoXovOrjois avT(p; ’Ayadov ovros ^ ov; Ei p,ev
yap ovTOS, ■^'Sij e’tJTt irpo ttj? TTapaKoXovdn^aews
16 rdya^ov et S’ 17 TTapaKoXovOrjais Trotet, oi5/c ctv etr/
irpo TavT7j9 TO dyaOov coot^ ouS avTTj ec/Tat 7177
oSaa dyaOov. Tt oSv; OdSe ; H Ci/i/ p-€v ov
XeKTeov, e’tTrep Se, ^wrjv StScocrt. To Se Trapa-
jioXovdovv eavTcp Kal to voovv avTO SevTepov
TtapaKoXovdcZ yap, ‘iva tt} evepyeia Tavrrj avv^
20 ai3Td. Aet oSv, el KaTapiavBdvei avTO, dKaTapdOrj-
Tov .TeTiiyT/KeVai elvai avTov /cat T-rj avTov <j>vaei
eXXnres etvai, 777 Se. vo-qaei TeXeiovadai. To apa
KaTavoelv e^aipeTeov rj yap npoaOi^Kri a<j>aipeaiv
•/cat'lAAen/av irotet.
416
VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
around it in their rest, and moving around it, for
movement is desire, but it desires nothing, for what
could it desire, it which is the highest ? Does it not,
then, even think itself? Is it not said in a general
way to think in that it possesses itself? It is not by
possessing itself that anything is said to think, but by
looking at the First. But thinldng itself is also the
first actuahty. If, then, this is the first, there is no
need of anything before it. That, then, which
produces this is beyond it, so thinking is second after
that. For thinking is also not the primarily vener­
able; all thinking is certainly not venerable, only
thinking about the Good, so the Good is beyond
thinking. But the Good will not be conscious of it­
self. What, then, would its consciousness of itself
be ? A consciousness of itself as being good or not ?
Well, then, if it is of itself as being good, the Good
exists already before the consciousness; but if the
consciousness makes it good, the Good would not
exist before it, so that the consciousness itself would
not exist, since it is of the Good. What then? Is
it not alive either ? No, it cannot be said to live,
but if it can, [only in the sense that] it gives life.
That which is conscious of itself and thinks itself
comes second, for it is conscious of itself in order that
in this actuality of consciousness it may understand
itself. Therefore, if it becomes acquainted mth it­
self, it must have been unacquainted with itself and
deficient in its own nature, and is completed by its
thinking. So, then, thinking must be excluded from
the Good, for the addition causes ditninution and
defeet.
417

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