157. Pimentel, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No.

161658, 11/3/08

Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it
mandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers
and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
with certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator
Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section
36(g) of the said law.
Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition
of additional qualification on candidates for Senator?

Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is
UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for
Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to
yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.

158. EO No. 198, June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER OF NOMINATION AND APPOINTMENT OF

SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WHEREAS, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, that: “The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector;”
WHEREAS, Section 7, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution states, “Until a law is passed, the
President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats
reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article VI of this
Constitution;”
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Sectoral Representatives. – There shall be twenty-five (25) sectoral representatives
to the House of Representatives.
Nine (9) sectors shall be represented in the House of Representatives, namely: (a) labor; (b)
peasant; (c) urban poor; (d) indigenous cultural communities; (e) women; (f) youth; (g) veterans;
(h) the elderly and (i) the disabled, whose representatives shall be appointed by the President
from the nominees of their respective sectors or of a member of the sector in the manner herein
provided.
SECTION 2. Scope of the Sectors. – The labor sector refers to the industrial labor group, which
includes all non-agricultural workers and employees.
The peasant sector covers the agricultural group, which includes all persons who personally and
physically till the land as their principal occupation, agricultural tenants and lessees, rural
workers and farm employees, owner-cultivators, settlers and small fishermen.
The urban poor sector includes the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas.
The indigenous cultural communities sector covers all ethnic groups and cultural communities.
The women sector shall cover all women.
The youth sector embraces persons not more than thirty-five years of age.
The veterans sector embraces persons recognized as such veterans by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
The elderly sector covers persons who are sixty-five years of age or over.
The sector of the disabled covers the physically and socially disabled.
SECTION 3. Nominations. – (a) Nominations of the sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives must be made by the organizations/s or aggroupment of members of the sectoral
groups defined in Section 2 hereof or by a member of the sector.
(b) All nominations shall be filed with the Office of the President not later than July 20, 1987.
(c) Nominations must be in writing and accompanied by the following supporting documents,
namely; (i) curriculum vitae of the nominee/s; (ii) an indication of the sector to be represented by
the nominee; (iii) an endorsement of the nominating group or individual; and (iv) such other
relevant materials as may help the appointing authority.
SECTION 4. Term. – The sectoral representatives appointed to the House of Representatives
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
SECTION 5. Vacancy. – In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in
the House of Representatives, the President shall fill the vacancy by appointing a representative
for such sector who shall serve for the unexpired term.
SECTION 6. Separability Clause. – Any portion or provision of this Executive Order that may
be deemed unconstitutional shall not have the effect of nullifying other portions or provisions
thereof as long as such remaining portions or provisions can still subsist and be given effect in
their entirety.
SECTION 7. Effectivity Clause. – This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty-seven.

159. On gerrymandering (CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763)

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No.
1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their
charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose
charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other
hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So, when COMELEC
added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf
of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned
the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the
regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further,
petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas
Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu
is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716
registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be
barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the
constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 
insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not
allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably
unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the
purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage,
and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy
of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that
“The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioner’s allegation of gerrymandering is
of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation,
division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or
barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973
Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of
Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their
regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show
whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social,
economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or
industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the
provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of
provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the
law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The
contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for
provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a
matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right
of suffrage.

IV. Election/ Term of Office V. Salaries VI. Privileges

160. Privilege from arrest (Martinez vs. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22)

FACTS: Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista were Constitutional Convention
delegates. Both Martinez1 and Baustista2 are facing criminal prosecutions. In view thereof, they
would like to invoke their alleged right to immunity of arrest. Their alleged right was based on
the Constitutional Convention Act, wherein, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary
immunities of a senator or a representative.
The Solicitor-General, on behalf of the judges, disputed that the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal cases.
ISSUE: whether or not criminal cases are included in immunity from arrest.
HELD: Petition DISMISSED

161. Freedom of Speech and Debate (Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863; Jimenez vs.
Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 & People vs. 324 SCRA 689; Chavez vs. JBC, GR No. 202242,
4/16/13; Pobre vs. Santiago, A.C. 7399, 8/25/09)
OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)
FACTS: In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of
bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a
special committee to investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the
Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly
behavior and thereby suspending him for 15 months.
ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutional
HELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed
RATIO: Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in
his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the
legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions, it does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his
words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof. The question of whether
Osmena’s speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction,
the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because no preliminary injunction was
issued, the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved
the suspension order

Jimenez V Cabangbang 17 SCRA 876

Facts: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of
its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of
an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly
three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that
the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president.
The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end.
The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then
filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because
he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the
privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace.
Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned
in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time, he, himself,
caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to
be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the
said communication is not absolutely privileged.

People v Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of
House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of
a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.

Chavez vs. JBC, GR No. 202242, 4/16/13

FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the
JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers that both
houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent
and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both
houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one
representative from congress.
ISSUE: Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art
VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of
congress” should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.

Pobre V Santiago Aug. 25 2009

FACTS: JBC through public invitation publish the soon vacant position of Chief of Justice,
hence Santiago was one of the applicants but unfortunately informed by the JBC that only
incumbent associate justice would qualify the position. During her privilege speech on the
Congress to wit; “x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be
in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. xxx ANTERO J. POBRE in his
sworn letter/complaint invites the attention of the court and asks that disbarment proceedings or
other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
Issue: Does the disbarment proceeding and other disciplinary actions should be taken against the
senator?
Ruling: NO, because the delivery of speech was conducted while the Congress is in session and
therefore, she is covered with the state immunity provided in our Constitution Art. VI Sec.11 of
the Constitution. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. The disciplinary
actions fall under the Congress provided in The Rules of the Senate contains a provision on
Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance,
offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution. Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.
The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. Therefore, the disbarment case
proceeding was DISMISSED.

VII. Disqualifications/Other Inhibitions

162. Quinto vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, 12/1/09

FACTS: The court declared as unconstitutional the second provision in the third paragraph of sec
13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution
8679 that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
BACKGROUND: Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provision in the third paragraph of
sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.
Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
The second provision in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“
ISSUE: Whether or not the second provision in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66
of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution.
HELD: The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provision in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
RULING: These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective
officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

163. Liban vs. Gordon, GR No. 175352, 7/15/09

FACTS: Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with
this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate.
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in the
Constitution.
Petitioner filed this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or
controlled corporation.
RULING: The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the
thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC
Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to
membership in the PNRC for one year. PNRC is, thus, a privately owned, privately funded, and
privately run charitable organization.
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution.
However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation,
the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
164. Adaza vs. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431
FACTS: Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their
respective term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa
(BP) elections in 1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath
of office as the governor. Petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom,
claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP)
can exercise the functions of both simultaneously; and 2) whether or not a vice-governor who ran
for the position of MP but lost, can continue serving as vice governor and subsequently succeed
to the office of governor if said office is vacated.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the
BP may not hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder
thereof is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of
any restrictions on his holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere
private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or members of
Sanggunian or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be considered on forced
leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the
BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.

165. Punzalan vs. Mendoza, 140 SCRA 153

FACTS: Cicero Punsalan brings a petition for quo warranto and prohibition seeking the ouster of
Hon. Estelito P. Mendoza from the governorship of Pampanga. As Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan bets for the 1980 elections, Mendoza and Punsalan won for governor and vice-governor,
respectively. However, in the 1984 elections, the only KBL survivor placed fourth for the three
seats as representatives to the Batasan. Respondent, as KBL campaign manager, tendered his
resignation from the Governorship and his Cabinet post “effective at the President’s pleasure.”
Six weeks later, the President appointed him Minister of the Peace and concurrently Member of
the Batasan Pambansa. Subsequently, Mendoza again tendered his resignation and sent a letter to
the Minister of Local Government requesting that he be considered on leave of absence” while
the matter was “pending consideration by the president.” Punsalan then took his oath
as governor of Pampanga (not acting governor) relying on a press release of Bulletin Today7.
The following year, respondent unexpectedly appeared and occupied the office. Respondent
resigned from his Batasan membership which was accepted by the President two days later.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent did resign from the gubernatorial seat.
HELD: NO. The tender of resignation says that it was “effective at the pleasure of the President”
meaning it was not effective immediately. Acceptance was necessary. Implied acceptance by the
President of the tender of resignation by respondent cannot be held to have taken place as the
President shelved the same pursuant to a KBL caucus recommendation for respondent to
reassume the governorship. Based on an approved request from the Minister of Local
Government to go on leave, his failure to perform his duty for 5 months as governor cannot be
considered an abandonment of office.
166. Villegas vs. Legaspi, 113 SCRA 39
FACTS: In G.R. No. 53869, a complaint for annulment of the bank checks and damages was
filed by petitioner against private respondents before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. An
answer was filed by private respondents trough their counsel, Atty. Valencio Legaspi, a member
of the Batasang Pambansa. Petitioner “challenged” the appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi.
In. G.R. No. 51928, petitioner Reyes filed Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against N.V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Exelsior-De Maas and private
respondent Eustaquio Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior’s share in the International Pipe
Industries Corporation to Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for
Excelsior, which was questioned.
ISSUES: WON members of the Batasang Pambansa can appear as counsel before Court of First
Instance.
RULING: No. Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, reads, “No
member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any Court without appellate
jurisdiction….” Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen
Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as counsel, were acting in the exercise of original jurisdiction,
they must be held barred from appearing as counsel before said Courts in the two cases involved
herein.

167. Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31

Facts: In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International
Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival)
claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed a quo warranto case before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the
case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each
other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he
argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any
administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from
appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said
SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the
motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the
SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as
counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation
took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated
that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest –
which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get
himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done
indirectly.
NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank,
composition, or jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal
and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National
Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative
agencies, are included. (From https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/terms.asp, accessed
09/17/2014) Section 16

VIII. Sessions IX. Officers X. Quorum XI. Rules of Proceedings

168. Arroyo vs. De Venecia, GR No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed
to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to
a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented
is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.

XII. Discipline of Members

169. Santiago vs Sandiganbayan, GR No. 126055, April 19, 2001

Facts: Petitioner was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring “unqualified” aliens with
the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. Petitioner filed this case to enjoin Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the case, on the ground that it was intended solely to harass her as she was
then a presidential candidate. After her petition was dismissed, she then filed a motion for
inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena.
[A lot of procedural issues and controversies were discussed, but for the purpose of limiting this
digest to Criminal Law 1, the author did not include it.]
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of “qualified aliens” even though they had arrived in the Philippines
after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion
to quash the informations.
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the Information.
Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that: 1) she was a public officer; 2)
she approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984; 3) those aliens were disqualified; 4) she was cognizant of such fact; and 5)
she acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions;
thereby constituting the elements of the offense defined in Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.
It bears noting that the public prosecutors filed a total of 32 Informations against the petitioner
for the violation of such law.
Issue: How is the violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 committed?
Held: There are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
Issue #2:
Whether or not the filing of 32 Amended Informations against petitioner was proper.
Held #2: NO.
Only one crime was committed in petitioner’s case, and hence, there should only be one
Information to be filed against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or “continued crime”
and sometimes referred to as “continuous crime.” A delito continuado consists of several crimes
but in reality, there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator. See full text for the
discussion and examples of delito continuado as discussed by SC.
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single
criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under
the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act: (i)
committed by petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,
1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a
single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced in
verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word “aliens” in the
original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was
legalized.
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of
the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the
pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public prosecutors
manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a
single harm or injury.
SC ordered the Ombudsman to consolidated the 32 Amended Informations into one Information
charging only one offense.

170. Rep. Paredes vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The issues in this habeas corpus case are: (1) whether the arrest and detention of the petitioner
after a preliminary investigation that was conducted by the Tanodbayan without notice to him,
are valid, and (2) whether the crime charged against him has already prescribed.

On January 21, 1976, Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur,
applied for a free patent for Lot No. 3097-A, PLS-67, with an area of 1,391 square meters,
located beside the Washington Highway in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. His application was
favorably acted upon by the Land Inspector, Armando Luison. On May 11, 1976, OCT No. P-
8379 was issued to him (p. 19, Rollo).

Eight (8) years later, on June 27, 1984, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San
Francisco passed Resolution No. 40, requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del
Sur to assist it in recovering Lot No. 3097 from Attorney Paredes because the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site. The Sangguniang Bayan requested the provincial fiscal
to file a perjury charge against Attorney Paredes, Jr. (p. 15, Rollo). The resolution was approved
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (p. 16, Rollo). On March 28,1985, Civil Case No. 512, for
annulment of Attorney Paredes' title, was filed by the Republic in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Agusan del Sur (p. 17, Rollo).

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 512, Teofilo Gelacio, former vice-mayor of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, filed with the Tanodbayan on October 28, 1986, a criminal complaint
charging Attorney Paredes with having violated Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Attorney to
influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in
Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application. Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft
Law provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
persuaded, induced or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

On February 23, 1987, the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) referred the case to Fiscal Ernesto
Brocoy of Butuan City (TBP Case No. 86-03368) for preliminary investigation.

Fiscal Brocoy issued summons to Attorney Paredes, Jr. to appear at the preliminary investigation
of the case on August 29, 1987. However, the summons was served on November 19, 1987 upon
the INP Station Commander of San Francisco, instead of Atty. Paredes. The summons did not
reach Attorney Paredes. Nevertheless, without waiting for proof of service of the summons on
the accused, Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary examination of the complainant
and his witnesses. On August 29, 1988, the fiscal issued a resolution finding a prima facie case
of violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019 committed by the accused. The Fiscal's resolution was
approved by Tanodbayan Prosecutor Josephine Fernandez on June 26, 1989 (p. 22, Rollo).

Attorney Paredes filed a motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan's resolution. He assailed
the validity of the preliminary investigation that was conducted by Fiscal Brocoy without notice
to him (pp. 23-25, Rollo). His motion for reconsideration was denied.
In the local elections on January 18, 1988, Attorney Paredes was elected governor of Agusan del
Sur.

On May 20, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Sur rendered a decision in Civil Case
No. 512, annulling Governor Paredes' Free Patent No. (X-8) 1253 and his OCT No. P-8379 and
restoring the land "to the mass of public domain" (pp. 85-98, Rollo).

On August 28,1988, an information was filed against Governor Paredes in the Sandiganbayan
(Crim. Case No. 13800) and a warrant for his arrest, fixing bail of P20,000 for his provisional
liberty, was issued on August 30, 1989 and served upon him (p. 12, Rollo). He refused to post
bail in "protest against the injustice to him as Governor," (p. 68, Rollo). Consequently, he was
detained in the municipal jail of San Francisco.

On September 20, 1989, this petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife, Mrs. Eden
Paredes, against the Sandiganbayan. She alleged that the warrant for her husband's arrest was
void because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the
information against him had already prescribed.

In his return of the Writ, the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Sandiganbayan, agreed that
lack of notice to Governor Paredes of the preliminary investigation was "a fatal defect"
invalidating not only the preliminary investigation, but also the information prepared by the
Tanodbayan, and the warrant of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan (p. 54, Rollo). The Solicitor
General agreed with the petitioner's contention that the ten-year prescriptive period of the offense
under Section 11 of R.A. 3019, assuming it was committed on January 21, 1976, expired on
January 21, 1986. Although the prescriptive period was increased to fifteen (15) years under
Section 4, B.P. Blg. 195 of March 16, 1982, the Solicitor General opined that the new law may
not be applied retroactively to Paredes.

On the other hand, the Ombudsman argued that the Sandiganbayan was improperly made
respondent in this case because it does not have custody of Governor Paredes; that the lack of
preliminary investigation did not affect the validity of the information nor the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan; and, that the crime has not yet prescribed because the period of prescription
commences to run not on the day the crime was committed but on the day it was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code).

At the hearing of the petition of September 27, 1989, the Court directed the petitioner to implead
the Tanodbayan, through the Special Prosecutor, as well as the Ombudsman, as respondents. The
Clerk of Court was instructed to furnish them with copies of the petition and to require them to
answer within ten (10) days. The hearing of this case was reset on October 18, 1989 at 9:30
o'clock in the morning and provisional liberty was granted Governor Ceferino Paredes, Jr. on his
own recognizance pending the determination of the petition.

On October 6, 1989, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its comment on the petition
for habeas corpus. The Special Prosecutor argued that since Paredes was charged in the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Republic Act 3019, and as the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over that offense, it is authorized to issue a warrant for his arrest and a writ of habeas
corpus may not issue to free him from the custody of the law.

After careful deliberation over the petition and the comments thereon of the Solicitor General,
the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman/Tanodbayan, the Court finds insufficient merit in the
petition. The settled rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
has jurisdiction to do so (Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310; Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391;
Canary vs. Director of Prisons, 36 SCRA 39; Ventura vs. People, L-46576, November 6, 1978).

The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid because the
preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed. Those
circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The
absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective (People vs. Casiano, L-
15309, February 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1969). The remedy of the
accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary
investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of
dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a
preliminary investigation. Thus, did we rule in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349.

If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest,
and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for an investigation /
reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of
commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the
accused. So it is explicitly provided for by Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Ilagan was a reiteration of this Court's ruling in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 (1961) that:

The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If
there was no preliminary investigation and the defendant, before entering his plea, calls
the attention of the court to the absence of a preliminary investigation, the court, instead
of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to
conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation
may be conducted.

The same rule was reiterated in the decision of this court in Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 85468, September 7, 1989.

The defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information should be pleaded in the
criminal action otherwise it would be deemed waived (U.S. vs. Serapio, 23 Phil. 584,
598 citing Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. 500; Domingo vs. Osorio, 7 Phil. 405; Maxilom vs.
Tabotabo, 9 Phil. 390; Harty vs. Luna, 13 Phil. 31; Sunico vs. Ramirez, 14 Phil. 500). It is a
proper ground for a motion to quash which should be filed before the arraignment of the accused
(Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 117, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; People vs. Castro, L-6407, July 29,
1954) for whether the crime may still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the
criminal case not in a special proceeding of habeas corpus.

All questions which may arise in the orderly course of a criminal prosecution are to be
determined by the court to whose jurisdiction the defendant has been subjected by the
law, and the fact that a defendant has a good and sufficient defense to a criminal charge
on which he is held will not entitle him to his discharge on habeas corpus. (12 R.C.L.
1206.) (Emphasis ours)

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition, the same is hereby denied. The accused,
Ceferino Paredes, Jr. should file a bail bond of P20,000, fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his
provisional liberty. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

171. Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863

Facts:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the
House making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of
this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate
the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his
charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should
not be punished by the House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground
that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving
petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A
House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:

Whether the House Resolution violated petitioners constitutionally granted parliamentary

immunity for speeches
Ruling: NO.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other
place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be
questioned in any other place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however
powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is
the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white
for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

XIII. Vacancies

172. Lozada vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 173. RA 6645, December 28, 1987
 
FACTS: Petition for mandamus to review the decision of the Commission on Elections
 
Petitioners Eulalio and Igot filed this petition as a representative suit for and on behalf of those
who wish to participate in the election, to compel COMELEC to call a special election to fill up
12 existing vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
The petition is based on Sec. 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which reads: “In case a
vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa 18 months or more before a regular election, the
[COMELEC] shall call a special election to be held within 60 days after the vacancy occurs to
elect the Member to serve the
unexpired term.”
 
Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City, and a transient voter
of Quezon City. He wants to run for the position in the Batasan. Igot alleges that as a taxpayer,
he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the
Constitution.

They allege that they are deeply concerned about their duties as citizens and they want to uphold
the Constitutional mandate; and that they filed the petition since the subject matters are of
profound and general interest.
 
COMELEC opposes the petition alleging that petitioners lack standing to file the petition
because they are not the proper parties to institute the action, the SC has no jurisdiction to
entertain the same, and that the Constitutional provision above cited does not apply to the Interim
Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUES: W/N have standing to sue?

 NO.
RULING: The Court held that petitioners may not file the instant petition as taxpayers, because
there is no allegation that tax money is being illegally spent. The act complained of is the
inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, which is allegedly its duty under Sec 5(2),
Art. VIII of the Constitution, and therefore, there is actually no expenditure of public funds
involved in the act complained of.
 
It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute,
involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.
 
What the instant case seeks is one that entails expenditure of public funds which may be illegal,
because it would be spent for a purpose that has no authority in the Constitution or a statute.
 
Petitioners also do not have standing to sue as voters, because they do not have the requisite
personal and substantial interest in the case such that they have or would sustain direct injury as
a result of the assailed act.
 
The alleged inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election to fill the vacant seats in the
Batasang Pambansa would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens.
 
The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC, as provided in the Constitution, is only to review by
certiorari the latter’s decision, orders, or rulings. In this case, there is no such decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC that is brought to the Court for review. It is not alleged that petitioners
asked COMELEC to perform its alleged duty, and that it had issued an order/resolution denying
such petition.
 
Further, the writ of mandamus cannot issue because there is no showing that COMELEC has
unlawfully refused or neglected to perform a ministerial duty.
  
The holding of special elections would entail huge expenditures of money that have to be
financed by the necessary appropriations, which is an act only the Batasang Pambansa can do.
 
The Court held that the provision cited by the petitioners applies only to the regular Batasang
Pambansa, and not the Interim one.
  
This is because of the Interim Batasang Pambansa’s composition, which is the members of the
Constitutional Convention, Congressmen, Senators, and the President and Vice-President. Thus,
even if there were vacancies therein, no province or legislative district would ever be without
representation, unlike in the Regular Batasang Pambansa.
  
Further, said provision is in the main body of the Constitution, and not in the Transitory
Provisions.

DISPOSITION: Petition DISMISSED