An Empirical Test of the Consequences of Behavior- and Outcome-Based Sales Control Systems

Author(s): Richard L. Oliver and Erin Anderson

Source: Journal of Marketing, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), pp. 53-67
Published by: American Marketing Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1251916
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 RichardL.Oliver& ErinAnderson

An
EmpiricalTest of the
Consequencesof Behavior-
and Outcome-Based
Sales Control Systems
In a previous volume of this journal, the authors presented a behavior versus outcome sales control continuum
based on methods of monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating the salesperson's efforts and results.
They empirically test their propositions about how control system perceptions influence salespeople on a diverse
sample of sales representatives. They find that the predicted effects of control philosophy on affective and motiva-
tional states are generally supported whereas the effects on sales strategies or performance outcomes are not. Or-
ganizational culture differences are also observed.

The notion of a sales personnelgovernancestructure(con- results (outputs)but are expected to generate futureresults.
trol system) is a fairly recent phenomenon when com- Performanceevaluation on inputs is necessarily more sub-
pared with the role of elements of governance structure jective because the managermust decide if and to what de-
taken singly, such as the compensationplan, supervision,or gree inputs generate outputs. Moreover, inputs do not lend
evaluationprocedures.As stated in our previous work (An- themselves to objective measurement,because they are not
derson and Oliver 1987, hereafterA&O) a control system is always readily countable or observable.To enable the man-
"an organization'sset of proceduresfor monitoring,direct- ager to monitor, direct, and impose subjective judgments,
ing, evaluating,and compensatingits employees" (p. 76). In the company assumes risk throughreliance on salary.
this work, we proposed that control systems can be charac- We arguedthatoutputand behaviorcontrol are polarop-
terized as points along a continuumanchoredby two "alter-
posites and that managementmay elect to position its strat-
native" and polar managerial strategies labeled "outcome
egy at various levels between these extremes. We offered a
control"and "behaviorcontrol."In this formulation,an out-
propositionalinventorybased on the notion that the position
come-based control system involves relatively little man-
managementselects for a salesperson along the behavior-
agerial involvement with salespeople, reliance on straight- outcome continuumhas numerousmanageriallysignificant
forward,objective results measures (e.g., sales), and use of
consequencesin termsof the salesperson'saffect, cognition,
compensationmethodsthat shift risk to the salesperson(i.e., behavior, and performance.Here, we offer a test of these
commission or bonus).
In contrast, a behavior-basedcontrol system is typified propositions.We believe an attemptat empiricalverification
of the A&O frameworkis necessary to address the increas-
by high levels of supervisormonitoring,directionand inter-
vention in activities, and subjective and more complex ing level of discussion in the literature(e.g., Cravenset al.
methods of evaluating performance,typically centered on 1993; Jaworski 1988; Ouchi 1979) regardingthe merits of
alternativecontrol systems.
the salesperson'sjob inputs (e.g., personal qualities, activi-
ties, sales strategies).Inputsare not themselves indicatorsof
A Propositional Inventory:
Richard L.Oliveris theValereBlairPotterProfessorof Management,
The Natureand Consequences
OwenGraduate Schoolof Management, Vanderbilt ErinAn-
University. of Control Systems
dersonis Professor, INSEAD, France.
Fontainebleau, Theauthors grate- In this section, we offer a brief recapitulationof the A&O
fullyacknowledge thefinancial oftheManufacturers'
support Representa-
tives Educational ResearchFoundation and thankRichard propositionsand reasoning,referringthe readerto the orig-
(MRERF) inal source for details. The heart of our argumentis that
Bagozzi,theeditor,andthreeanonymous reviewers
forhelpfulsugges-
tions.ThefirstauthorthankstheDean'sFundforFacultyResearch ofthe sales management should present a coherent governance
OwenGraduate Schoolof Management forproviding
partialsupportfor structure(Williamson 1985) that signals to salespeople how
thisproject.
Thesecondauthor wasa visiting at theEuropean
professor they are expected to performtheirjobs. Because selling is a
Institute
forAdvanced Management Studies(EIASM, Brussels,Belgium)
andtheFacultes Universitaires relatively entrepreneurialand unstructuredfunction, man-
de Mons(FUCAM,
Catholiques Mons,Bel-
gium)whileworking onthisproject. agement must decide to what degree it will gain and exert
controlover sales employees (its agents) versus delegate au-

Journal of Marketing
Vol. 58 (October 1994), 53-67 Sales ControlSystems / 53

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thority to salespeople, while holding them accountablefor
the results of their actions.
We arguethat this choice is analogousto the verticalin-
tegrationdecision of where to locate along a continuuman-
chored by the options of make or buy (integrateor contract
out). Although make and buy are opposite philosophies, in-
termediate combinations, or "hybrid governance,"can be
created by adoptingintermediatelevels of ownership,mon-
itoring, direction, subjectiveevaluation,and results sharing.
In sales management,John and Weitz (1989) have appliedit
to the issue of what proportionof compensationshould be
delivered in fixed (salary) versus variable form (bonus/
commission).
The A&O argumentsalso addressthe sales management
domain but generalize beyond the compensationissue to in-
clude monitoring, directing, and evaluating.We argue that
these elements of governance structurework in concert to
send powerful signals to salespeople and serve to motivate
them to think, feel, believe, and behave in mannersconsis-
tent with each structure.Hence, we make the argumentthat
levels of monitoring and direction, as well as methods of
evaluatingand compensatingsalespeople, should be treated
as interrelateddecisions that collectively describe manage-
ment's control system. We furtherarguethatthe net effect of
control systems is perceivedby salespeople and is a critical
influence on theirjob-related cognitions, attitudes,and be-
haviors.This perspective,as illustratedin Figure 1, assumes
that diverse elements of control strategiescombine in a uni-
fied mannerto influence salespeople.
Although behavior and outcome control have similar
goals (i.e., that salespeople contributeprofitablyto the orga-
nization), they reflect very different managerial philoso-
phies. Outcome control is essentially a laissez-faire ap-
FIGURE 1
Operation of the Perceived Control System
Outcome Behavior
Control |
I Control
Strategies \ t Strategies
PerceivedControlSystem
i Affects
Cognitions Behavior
54 Journalof Marketing,October1994
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proach that assumes that salespeople are best able to deter-
mine their directionand level of effort and that the resulting
level and mix of sales will achieve the firm's goals. Outcome
control is administeredwith a "carrotand stick" remunera-
tion plan, such as straight commission compensation. As
such, environmentalrisk is shiftedfrom the firmto the sales-
person, because no financial commitment is made unless
and until sales occur (Basu et al. 1985). Simply put, out-
come control is a minimalistsystem of governingsalespeo-
ple wherein financial incentives keyed to observable out-
comes are substitutedfor active managementinvolvement.
In contrast,behavior control is, in some sense, a pater-
nalistic approachwherebymanagersdictatethat salespeople
providewhat they believe are "correct"inputsto achieve the
firm's goals. This allows for nonsales goals, such as account
maintenanceand service, to be pursued.A longer time per-
spective can be assumed because immediate results can be
balanced with long-term sales relationshipsand outcomes.
Straightsalaryis frequentlythe compensationplan of choice
with this philosophy, because it encourages salespeople to
accept as legitimate the authorityof management(John and
Weitz 1989), therebyencouragingcompliancewith manage-
rial directives. Simply put, behaviorcontrol is the philoso-
phy of empoweringmanagersto guide the way salespeople
carryout tasks, shiftingresponsibilityfor outcomes from the
salespersonto the managementof the firm.
We arguethatthese control systems have numerouscon-
sequences for the salesperson, which are presentedhere as
propositions in Table 1. Generally, the propositions are
based on the argumentthat behaviorallybased systems are
nurturant,providingguidance and feedback. Salespeople do
not have to "perform"in outputterms (e.g., show high cur-
rentsales) as long as they carefullyfollow the organization's
formula for success. Thus, this system can tolerate sales-
people with a risk-aversenature.Time can be takento learn
company products and procedures, as well as appropriate
sales techniques.A bad sales period in output terms can be
diagnosedwhile salarypaymentscontinue.The prototypical
salesperson in this system is, as a result, committed, satis-
fied, and a team player.
The outcome-controlsalesperson is quite the opposite.
Left on his or her own to succeed, this person is believed to
be motivatedby immediateself-interest.The firm'srole is to
providea productline to sell and commissions to reap in re-
turn.Those who are more risk-proneare thoughtto do well
in this organization.As a result, sales techniques may be
compromised as short-rungoals are pursued. Long-term
sales strategieswith uncertainoutcomes may be avoidedbe-
cause low commitmentto the firm can resultin a job change
before these strategiesbear fruit.The prototypicalsalesper-
son in this system is, as a result, a less-satisfied individual-
ist with little attachmentto one employer. Although exag-
gerated, these descriptions illustrate the extreme contrasts
implied by our earlierpropositions.
Although we suggest that managersmay select interme-
diate positions on the behavior-outcomecontinuum (e.g.,
moderate supervision and balanced salary/commission
plans), we also argue that combinations of opposing
philosophies (e.g., straightsalary but little supervision) are
 TABLE 1
Behavior Versus Outcome Control: Propositional Inventory
Managerlal Philosophy
Dimension Outcome < Behavior

Controlsystem elements (classificationcriteria) Properties

Natureof supervision Looser Closer
Natureof evaluation Moreobjective Moresubjective
Compensationplan Higher% incentive Higher% fixed
Cognitions/capabilities Consequences
Product/companyknowledge Less More
Sales expertise/competence Less More
Affects/attitudes
Organizationalcommitment Less More
Acceptingof authority/direction Less More
Acceptingof cooperation/teamwork Less More
Acceptingof performancereviews Less More
Risk preference Seeking Averse
Motivation
Natureof motivation Higherextrinsic Higherintrinsic
Directionof motivation Priorityto self Priorityto agency/firm
Behavioralstrategy
Planning Less More
Call activity More Less
Sell/nonsell time ratio Higher Lower
Selling technique Closed ("Harder") Open ("Smarter")
Performance
Outputs Higher Lower
Inputs Lower Higher
Additionalpredictions
Job satisfaction Less More
Participativedecision-making Less More
Pay as a controlmechanism More Less
Organizationalculture:
Innovative Less More
Supportive Less More
Bureaucratic Less More

internallycontradictory.This is a normativeargument,how- Their perspective differs somewhat from that presented

ever. Our first proposition is that practice will conform to
prescription;that is, few if any managerswill create "incon-
sistent" combinations.At the same time, we acknowledge
that a control system is defined as the combination of su-
pervisory style (monitoring and direction), evaluation, and
compensation, regardlessof whether managementis "con-
sistent"by these normativecriteria.
An empiricaltest of the A&O propositionsrequiresthat
management philosophy be identified as to the degree to
which it is perceived as primarilybehavior-or outcome-con-
trol oriented.We develop a continuousindex from salespeo-
ple's perceptionsof the governancemodes underwhich they
work. Differences in the affective, cognitive, motivational,
and behavioral dimensions are then tested across reported
types of sales control systems.
Evidence for the A&O Framework
To date, only one published study addressesthe validity of
the sales control framework.In a sample of 144 sales man-
agers from a diverse set of industries, Cravens and col-
leagues (1993) tested several of the A&O propositions.
here, however,because they view managerialcontroland the
control implicit in the compensationscheme as independent
control mechanisms. Despite this difference, they find evi-
dence for one or the otherof the control mechanismsscored
in the direction of behavior control in determiningcompe-
tence, teamwork,risk aversion, intrinsic motivation,recog-
nition, planning, sales support,and customer orientation-
all in accord with the A&O propositions. Weaker support
and, in some cases, no supportwere found for behavioral
strategies.
Of interestis thatCravensand colleagues (1993) specif-
ically call for research that (1) controls for environmental
variation by "studying multiple sales organizationsin the
same industry"(p. 56) and (2) investigates the A&O phe-
nomenaat the level of the salesperson.In addition,they sug-
gest thatthe key relationshipsbe tested with the control sys-
tem defined as a "blend"of managementand compensation
control and not as isolated activities.
The present research answers this call. In addition to
studying sales control at the level of the salespersonwithin
multiplefirms in a single industry,we attemptto develop an

Sales ControlSystem / 55

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index of sales control that incorporatescompensation as a
constituent component. Our approach,detailed in the fol-
lowing discussion, provides an alternativeperspectiveto the
measurementand testing of the A&O propositionsand per-
mits a comparison of results of our study with that of
Cravensand colleagues (1993).
Proposed Indicators of Governance Modes
We sought to develop an index of behavior and outcome
control. In pursuingthis task, the literatureon formativein-
dicators, as frequentlyused in social policy, was consulted.
This literatureis not widely cited in marketing, so some
backgroundinformationmay be helpful to the reader.
In common practice a latent construct is reflected in
manifest variables to which the construct gives rise. The
manifest variables are "reflective indicators" (Bagozzi
1984) or "effects indicators"(Bollen and Lennox 1991), so
called because the indicators are effects of the latent con-
struct. Hence, if the latent constructincreases, each indica-
tor should also increase. In contrast,the approachrequired
to test the A&O propositions is one of "causal"or "forma-
tive" indicators(Bollen and Lennox 1991; MacCallumand
Browne 1993; Pedhazurand Schmelkin 1991). The indica-
tors are formative in the sense that they are necessary but
separate conditions for the emergence of the construct.Be-
cause the indicators form the construct, ratherthan being
generatedby the construct,they need not be highly (or even
moderately)correlatedwith each other as would be the case
with effects indicators.
Within the A&O framework, this approach allows
for potential inconsistency in the degree of use of the indi-
cators. Thus, even if managersare inconsistent,their super-
visory style can still be characterizedas to a predominant
degree of behavior versus outcome control, and this degree
of behavior- or outcome-controldominance will influence
salespeople.
In the present context, we identified three defining ele-
ments of behavior- versus outcome-control sales philoso-
phies. Specifically, more behavior-oriented(outcome-ori-
ented) control systems have (1) a higher (lower) level of
managementinvolvement-that is, greater(lesser) supervi-
sion, direction, and contact between salespeople and their
managers, (2) more subjective (objective) evaluationmeth-
ods based on an emphasis of process behaviors over out-
come (e.g., "bottom-line")results, and (3) as an implemen-
tationprocedure,a greaterproportionof salary(commission
and bonus) in the pay package. Thus, the specific indicators
in our frameworkare measuresof the extent of supervision,
contact, and direction (i.e., manager involvement), subjec-
tive versus objective evaluationprocedures,and the percent-
age of salaryin the compensationplan. We attemptto repre-
sent this system of componentindicators,as describedin the
"Measures"section.
Proposed Consequences of Governance Modes
Our previous work proposed a series of control system ef-
fects on salespeople. As we view control systems on a con-
tinuum, the propositions are expressed as continuous hy-
potheses. Subsequently,we recap high points of our reason-
56 / Journalof Marketing,October1994
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ing briefly, referring the reader to the original article for
detail.
Cognitionsand capabilities. As a control system moves
closer to the behavior-controlpole, salespeople are thought
to be betterinformedabouttheircompany and productsand
have bettertraining.The reasoning is that salespeople have
the security of a salary base, and the encouragement-in-
deed pressure-of management to take the time to train,
learn, and experimentwith selling the productline. In con-
trast, outcome-control salespeople view time to train and
learn as time out of the field (with a high opportunitycost)
and are relatively unwilling to experimentwith new prod-
ucts and approachesbecause their reliance on commission
income pressuresthem to gain quick results.
Job affects and attitudes.The more a system approaches
behavior control, the more salespeople are thought to feel
committed(and grateful)to the employer who assumes risk
for them and gives them a more nurturantclimate (Eisen-
bergeret al. 1986). They are also consideredmore accepting
of management'spower, which is manifestedas greaterac-
ceptance of authority,performancereviews, and the man-
date to work in teams. Salespeople are thought to be more
risk averse in a behavior-controlsetting, which causes them
to preferthe security of a salary system coupled with heavy
direction.
Motivationaldirection. The luxury of financial security
(a guaranteedsalary) and the encouragementof manage-
ment to focus on behavior,with less concern for results, is
thought to permit and encourage salespeople to pursue in-
trinsic goals and consider their employer's well-being. In
contrast, salespeople operating closer to the outcome-con-
trolpole arecompensatedfor the risk they assumeby the op-
portunityto gain high levels of extrinsic rewards,a major
focus of such organizations.Given the relativelylow level of
day-to-daycontactwith and supportfrom management,they
may become more self orientedand less employer oriented.
Behaviors. Salespeople are thoughtto behave different-
ly depending on the control system they face. At the ex-
treme, outcome-control salespeople, left to their own de-
vices and pressuredto book ordersquickly, may neglect ac-
tivities with a long-termpayoff such as planningand spend-
ing time on nonselling activities. They may move more
quickly and decisively to close an orderand may "knockon
more doors,"motivatedby the prospect of more orders. In
contrast,when moving towardthe behavior-controlextreme,
salespeople are encouraged,trained,and permittedto take
more of a problem-solvingapproach;work smarter;rely on
expertiseappeals;and spend a greaterproportionof time on
planningand other nonselling activities.
Performance.Finally, we proposedthat each system ex-
cels at what it emphasizes-and sufferson those attributesit
treatsas being of secondaryimportance.Hence, all else con-
stant, salespeople working underbehaviorcontrol will out-
perform their outcome-controlcounterpartswhen "perfor-
mance" is measuredon inputs. The reverse is expected to
occur when performanceis assessed on outputs.
Other Predictions
Although not specifically hypothesized, several other pre-
dictions are evident from our prior work. For example, one
can infer from extensive findings on the correlatesof orga-
nizational commitment (Mathieu and Zajac 1990; Johnston
et al. 1990) and the discussion of the nurturantenvironment
of a behavior-controlphilosophy thatjob satisfactionshould
be higher in settings closer to behaviorcontrol. This would
derive from the more "considerate"aspect of behaviorcon-
trol, the more extensive supervisoryfeedback (Jaworskiand
Kohli 1991), and the reduced uncertaintyfacing the sales-
person in this same organization(Basu et al. 1985).
In addition,behaviorcontrolis more likely to involve the
salesperson in goal setting, particularlyfor nonsales goals.
This element of participativedecision makingshould further
distinguish the behavior- and outcome-control environ-
ments. In contrast, the sales representativeunder outcome
control may believe that the only "guidance"provided by
managementis channeledthroughthe pay system. Thus, we
predict that salespeople operating under behavior control
will see greater participativedecision making and put less
emphasis on compensationto guide salespersonbehaviors.
Lastly, differentlevels of control systems should reflect
differentorganizationalcultures.It is not possible to causal-
ly position cultureas antecedentor consequentto the control
philosophy, because the two may emerge jointly (Desh-
pande and Webster 1989). However, it is reasonableto ex-
pect that culture correlates will be evident (Wilkins and
Ouchi 1983). One frameworkthat may display such differ-
ences is based on Margerison(1979) and operationalizedby
Wallach (1983). Margerisonproposed three dimensions of
managerial culture-namely, innovativeness, supportive-
ness, and bureaucracy.We believe that these dimensions ef-
fectively tap importantelements of control system philoso-
phy in that a system closer to behavior control, because of
its nature,can display greaterinnovativenessover both man-
agementstyle and specificationof behavioralstrategy.In ad-
dition, it is naturally more supportive and, paradoxically,
more bureaucratic in its implementation. Consequently,
these organizationalculturedimensions are offered as illus-
trative and predictive of those likely to be found in early
studies of sales-controlphilosophies.
Method
Sample
Data were obtainedfrom salespeople employed by a diverse
set of independentlyowned and operatedsales agencies, re-
ferredto as manufacturers'representativesor "rep"firms, in
the electronic components industry.Electronic components
is a large and diverse industryof approximately2000 firms,
which is fortunatelycharacterizedby homogenousterminol-
ogy with regardto sales force issues. However, the product
lines carriedby these agencies were sufficientlydiverse that
the sales population could not be considered homogeneous
with regardto salespersonproductportfolios.This enhances
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the generalizabilityof the results and increases the opportu-
nity to observe multiple control systems.1
Managements of sales firms that are members of the
primarynationaltradeorganizationrepresentingthis indus-
try were invited to participate.Lettersof solicitationbearing
the tradeassociation'sendorsementand promisingindividu-
alized reports of the findings of a study of "compensation
practices"were sent to the managementsof 350 trade-asso-
ciation member firms selected by random sampling. Of
these, 299 (85%) expressed interestin participating.
Managers of interested firms were sent an instruction
packet. This packet included a numbered"manager'ssur-
vey" asking for classificationdata about the sales office and
three like-numberedsalespersonsurveys with separateindi-
vidualized postage-paid return envelopes. Managers were
asked to distributeall three surveys to reps in their firm. To
ensure variabilityin performance,managerswere instructed
to select one "above-averagerep,"one "mid-rangerep,"and
one "below-averagerep."2The performance designations
were embedded in the surveys and were not known to the
reps. To motivateparticipation,reps were guaranteedconfi-
dentialityand were given the chance to win one of five $100
prizes in a raffle of respondents.
Of the original 299 interestedfirms, 216 (72%) returned
their managementsurvey. An informal phone sampling of
nonrespondingmanagementsindicatedthat nonrespondents
either (1) believed that their operationdid not qualify as a
sales office (e.g., a consulting firm) or (2) were one-person
operations.Thus, of a theoreticalmaximumof 648 potential
rep respondents,356 surveys were received from 194 firms.
Follow-up notices mailed to the 22 participatingsales of-
fices with no rep respondentsrevealed that 8 were one-per-
son operations;the remainderdid not respondto the follow-
up.
When based on comparisonwith the managers'reports
of sales office size (i.e., accounting for sales force sizes of
less than three), the 356 surveys represented66% of dis-
tributedsurveys.3Of these, 347 provided complete data on
the control system classification criteria,a requirementfor
inclusion in the study. The average respondent was male
(92%), 39 years of age, and a college graduate(64%); had
been in sales for 12 years and the presentjob for 5.5 years;
and received $49,500 in total compensationin the past year.
Measures: Classification Criteria
As described subsequently,measures were either adapted
from past research or generatedfor this study. Preliminary
versions of the questionnairewere administeredto conve-
nience samples of sales reps at trade association functions.
Results were used to purify measuresand suggest appropri-
IThe manufacturers'representative,as a company, is paid by its princi-
pals (suppliers)on a commission basis. However,the employees (i.e., sales-
people) of the company are not necessarily paid on the same basis. Rather,
the rep firm's managementselects the compensation plan for individual
salespeople.
2Forsales offices with fewer thanthreereps, managerswere instructedto
use only the above or above and mid-rangesurvey packets.
3As expected, more surveys were received from above average produc-
ers (41%) than either mid-range(33%) or below average (26%) producers
due to the incidence of one- and two-rep sales offices.
Sales ControlSystem / 57
 TABLE 2
Factor Structure of the Behavior-ControVOutcome-Control
Index Classification Criteria
Variable/Factor SUPERa SUBINP NOTBL SALRY PAPINP OBJOUT
SUPER1a .546 - -
SUPER2 .684 - - - -
SUPER3 .546 -- -
SUPER4 .780 -
SUPER5 .559 - - -
SUPER6 .772 -- -
SUPER7 .793 - -
SUPER8 .730 - - -
NOTBL1 - - .491 - -
NOTBL2 - .753 - -
NOTBL3 -.784 - -
NOTBL4 - .754 - -
OBJOUT1 .- 744
OBJOUT2 - - .663
OBJOUT3 - - - .709
PAPINP1 - - .784
PAPINP2 .558
PAPINP3 - - .758
SUBINP1 - .811
SUBINP2 - .860
SUBINP3 - .806 -
SALRY1 - -.960 -
SALRY2 - - -.965 -
Cumulative
variance
explained (%) 24.5 36.1 44.8 53.2 59.3 64.0
aVariable referto the controlindexscale itemsinAppendix
abbreviations A.
Noneexceeded.355. Factorloadingsshownareaftervarimaxrotation.
Note:Crossloadingsomittedforclarity.

ate structure.The perceptionsof salespeople about the con-
trol systems they face were measuredat the level of the in-
dividual so that salesperson-specific governance mecha-
nisms akin to the micro control systems explored by Ja-
worski and Maclnnis (1989) and Kohli (1989) would be
obtained.
Controlsystem classification criteria. The A&O frame-
work defines behavior-orientedsystems as having greater
managementinvolvement(i.e., supervision,contact, and di-
rection), more subjective evaluationmethods based on pro-
cess behaviors rather than outcome results, and a greater
proportionof salary in the pay package. As determinedby
analysis of the classification sections of the survey,these el-
ements were tappedby six scales thatwere combinedas for-
mative indicators of the control system. Scale items were
factor analyzed from slightly longer lists of items and
"trimmed"to reveal a stable structure.In all cases, scoring
was in the directionof behaviorcontrol (see AppendixA for
the final scales).
One section of the survey measuredsalespersonpercep-
tions of management'scontrol philosophy, as aided by the
typology of Buzzotta and Lefton (1982). Two factors
emerged: management involvement and reliance on out-
come evaluation.On the basis of the resultingitems in these
factors, greater managementinvolvement with salespeople
was measured with a traditionalLikert 7-point agree/dis-
agree scale tapping perceptions of extent of supervision
(SUPER, 8 items). The second scale, basing evaluationon
outcome results ratherthan process behaviors,was reversed
in meaning to conform to the behavior-control scoring
scheme. Assessed in Likertformat, it reflected the absence
of a "bottom-line"orientation(NOTBL,4 items).
To complement this overall assessment of management
philosophy,a section of the survey on criteriaused in evalu-
ation measuredthe degree to which reps reportedthat man-
agement collected various performance measures.4 Three
factorsemerged:(1) paperor call-relatedinputs (PAPINP,3
items), (2) subjective "effort/attitude"inputs (SUBINP, 3
items), and (3) objective outcome methods (e.g., sales),
scaled as to how much these outputmeasureswere not used
(OBJOUT,3 items). The thirdelement of the domainof con-
trol systems, proportionof fixed compensation, was mea-
sured with the previous and current year percentages of
salaryin the pay package.The resultingmeasureswere sub-
jected to a confirmatoryfactoranalysis to reveal a final "be-
havior-control" factor structure before constructing the
index.
Table 2 shows the factor structureof the six scales used
here as indicatorsof behaviorcontrol. All loadings exceed-
ed .5, with one marginalexception, and no cross loadings
exceeded .36. The six scales explained 64% of the variance
in the data set. This demonstrationof discriminantvalidity
4Items are abbreviatedfrom the extensive lists provided by Jackson,
Keith, and Schlacter(1983).

58/ Journalof Marketing,October1994

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providesthe basis for operationallydefining a behavior-con-
trol index.
Because each salesperson faces a control system that is
the totality of its parts, we use a formative indicators ap-
proachto representthe rep's control system as consisting of
the six control system scales, two tappingmanagementphi-
losophy, threerepresentingreportsof managementbehavior,
and one of compensation reports.To accomplish this task,
items within each of the five supervision and evaluation
scales and the two annual percentagesof salary in the pay
plan were averagedinto single scores. Because we had no a
prioribasis for differentiallyweighting the componentsand
so as not to implicitly weight the six components,each was
convertedto its standardscore equivalent(mean = 0; stan-
darddeviation = 1) across respondents.In accordancewith
the literatureon formative indicators, these were added to
form an index of behavior control (versus outcome con-
trol-represented by lower scores). Using Nunnally's(1978,
p. 246-55) formula for combining linear combinations of
variables from differentdomains of content, this behavior-
control versus outcome-control index yielded a reliability
coefficient of .81.5
To assess the consistency of governance mode within
agencies, the control index scores within an agency were
correlatedacross agencies. Here, the agency is used as the
level of analysis. High correlationswould indicate consis-
tent governance across reps within an agency and low cor-
relationswould indicate rep-specific governance.This anal-
ysis could be performedfor only those agencies for which
surveys were received from two (n = 63) or three (n = 48)
reps. The correlationbetween index scores in the two-rep
agencies was .22 (p = n.s.) and those between scores in the
three-repagencies were .23, .25, and .28 (allp = n.s.). Thus,
althoughthere is some tendency for reps to shareconsistent
governance,the relationsare not significantand the correla-
tions are very modest.
Analysis of backgroundfactors was performedto dis-
cover sources of variationin the index scores. Inspectionof
informationon the rep's gender,age, education, sales expe-
rience, and currentjob experience revealed significant cor-
relations for age (r = -.11, p < .05) and currentjob tenure
(r = -.14, p < .01), suggesting thatyounger,less experienced
reps are put underbehaviorcontrol. Correlationswith agen-
cy data supplied by the sales managershowed largeragen-
cies engaging in less behaviorcontrol as follows: numberof
sales reps (r = -. 13, p < .05), supportstaff (r = -.24, p < .01),
managers (r = -.13, p < .05), and sales offices
(r = -.19, p < .01). Apparentlylarge rep firms are more im-
personaland distantin their dealings with reps, therebyfos-
tering a perceptionthat only outcomes matter.
5Note that this is not a coefficient alpha reliability estimate, which is
used when the items are from the same domain, but ratheris a differentes-
timate altogether. The apparent anomaly-that near independent scales
have high reliabilitywhen combined into an index-is due to the high reli-
abilities of the components. In fact, index componentscan be uncorrelated
and yield a high index reliability if their individual reliabilities are high.
This is so because perfectly reliable components will yield the same index
estimate on repeatedtrials. See Nunnally (1978) for a clear exposition of
these differentreliabilities.
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Measures: Consequences of the Governance
Mode
Measures of the hypothesized consequences of a behavior-
versus outcome-control philosophy are discussed subse-
quently. Each is described in Appendix A along with relia-
bility estimates. Scales developed expressly for this study
are reportedin full; others are noted as to their source.
Cognitions/capabilities. Product and company knowl-
edge is measuredin terms of informationneeds ("I need to
know more about...") on a 7-item scale designed around
Behrmanand Perreault's(1982) "technicalknowledge"per-
formance factor. In this context, the items measure knowl-
edge deficiencies and are thereforereversedfor use in this
scale. The 5-item sales expertise/competencescale is adapt-
ed from the Curryand colleagues (1986) work involvement
scale-the degree to which an employee is committed to
high standardsof occupational performance.We assume
that items tapping "perfectionism"and "professionalism"
indicate high levels of attention to expertise and
competence.
Affects/attitudes.The organizationalcommitment mea-
sure is a 7-item agree-disagreescale adaptedfrom that pro-
posed by Still (1983) andMowday,Steers, and Porter(1979)
and widely used by organizationtheorists,who find reliabil-
ity estimatesrangingfrom .82 to .93 (Randall 1990). Scales
measuring acceptance of authority/direction, coopera-
tion/teamwork, and performance reviews were written
specifically for this study.Consistingof three, five, and four
items, respectively, they measure how willingly the sales-
personaccepts managementauthorityand direction,cooper-
ates as part of a team, and welcomes performancereviews.
Lastly, the risk preferencemeasure is a 4-item Likert scale
about "takingchances"and fiscal conservatism.As adapted
from items in MacCrimmonand Wehrung(1985), it is gen-
eral in tone.
Motivation. Two dimensions of motivation are tapped.
The first is based on the internalversus external natureof
motivation(e.g., intrinsicversusextrinsic),and the second is
based on the object of the motivationaleffort (i.e., to place
serving oneself or one's agency/firmfirst). To measure the
first dimension, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation scales
were writtenfor this study.For the second, respondentswere
asked to allocate 100 points to their work-relatedeffort put
in to serve (1) principals,(2) agency, (3) customers,and (4)
oneself. Presumably,a firm-orientedmotivationalhierarchy
should reflect higherpercentagesallocatedto principalsand
agency, ratherthan to customersand self. The agency moti-
vation score is based on the points attributedto both agency
and principalsas a percentageof the total numberof points
(see AppendixA).
Behavioral strategy. Several dimensions of behavioral
sales strategyare measured:planning,call prospecting(new
account generation)as a percentageof work hours, selling
(includingnew accountgeneration)as a percentageof work
hours,and an "open"or "smarter"versus "closed"or "hard-
er" (Weitz, Sujan, and Sujan 1986; Spiro and Weitz 1990)
selling technique. Planning is measured with a four-item
scale used in Avila and Fern (1986). Prospecting(call activ-
Sales ControlSystem / 59
ity) and selling percentages are obtained in a self-report
fashion (explanation is provided in Appendix A). Selling
technique is measured using the Oliver and Weitz (1991)
motivation to work "hard"scale; the motivation to work
"smart"scale was writtenfor this study.
Performance. Performance outcomes are measured in
two forms and cross-validatedagainst the managerialper-
formance designation used in the distributionof surveys. A
relative measure is obtained by asking each salesperson to
rate his or her performance"comparedwith other reps in
your agency" on three summed self-reportperformancein-
dices (achieving agency sales goals, effort, and overall per-
formance)as well as on a percentilerankingof annualsales.
These self-reports were cross-validated against the sales
manager's designation of the rep as either above average,
average,or below average.Groupcomparisonsshowed con-
sistent differences between self-reportedperformanceand
manager's ratings of overall revenue-basedperformancein
the expected direction (F = 22.09, p < .001 for the summed
scale and F = 70.17, p < .001 for the percentile ranking),
thus providing convergent validity for the self-reportmea-
sures.6This lends confidence to other performancedata re-
portedby salespeople, as described subsequently.
Items from four Behrmanand Perreault(1982) job per-
formance scales that specifically tap sales outcomes and in-
puts and are measured on a "needs improvement"-"out-
standing"continuum,were used to provide furtherevidence
of effects on performance.The first of these sets of items
tappedthe outcomeperformancedimensionof meeting sales
and profit objectives, whereas the latter three categories-
keeping the company informed by providing paperwork
(gatheringinformation),using expense accountsresponsibly
(controllingexpenses), and communicatingeffectively with
customers through sales presentationskills-are not them-
selves results but may be expected to contributeto eventual
results.
Otherconsequencesof behaviorversus outcomecontrol.
Job satisfaction was measuredon an abbreviatedversion of
INDSALES (Churchill, Ford, and Walker 1974; Comer,
Machleit, and Lagace 1989), consisting of 13 items. The
participative decision-making measure is a 4-item scale
written for this study measuring the degree to which man-
agement considers the reps' inputs in decisions affecting
them. Based on the work of Deci and Ryan (1985), the mea-
sure of pay as a control mechanismis a 4-item scale tapping
the degree to which reps perceive pay as the sole mechanism
for rewardand punishment.
Our measure of organizationalculture is the three-part
organizational culture index (OCI) from Wallach (1983).
The OCI purportsto tap bureaucracy-the degree to which
authority is delineated in hierarchicalfashion and work is
organized and systematic; innovativeness-the degree to
which the environmentis stimulating(and hence stressful)
and encouragesrisk taking;and supportiveness-the degree
6This suggests that salesperson reportsare not biased upwardin a man-
ner that invalidates their usefulness and is consistent with Behrman and
Perreault(1982) and Churchill and colleagues (1985), who find that con-
traryto popularbelief, salespeople do not claim to be top performerswhen
they are not.
601 Journalof Marketing,October1994
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to which the environmentis harmonious and humanistic.
These dimensions figure prominentlyin discussions of or-
ganizationalclimate (O'Reilly 1989). This instrumentwas
selected because it was thought to reflect the rule-oriented
but innovative and supportive nature of behavior control
systems.
Table 3 shows the correlationmatrixof the independent
and classificationcriteriavariablesused in this study.These
correlationsprovide some evidence of discriminantvalidity
in that none is higher than .62 and most are in the .2 range.
Yet, appropriatecorrelations are high enough to suggest
convergent validity. For example, the two measures of re-
portedperformanceoutcomes (P and Q) correlatepositively
at .59. Nomological validity is also present. For example,
job satisfaction and organizationalcommitment should be
related(Mathieuand Zajac 1990); they do correlateat .44.
Comparison With the Work of Cravens and
Colleagues (1993)
The philosophical and methodologicaldetails of our study
can now be compared with those in the study by Cravens
and colleagues (1993) (see Table4). Withthe exception of a
common frameworkto guide hypothesisgeneration,the dif-
ferences between the two studies are noteworthyand will
provide substantiallydifferenttests of the A&O framework.
Results
Table5 shows the zero-ordercorrelationsbetween the index
of behaviorcontrol scores and the variableshypothesizedto
respond to a behavior-controlorientation.The table shows
that the correlationsare in the hypothesized direction and
are statisticallysignificantfor most predictionsinvolvingaf-
fective and motivationalconsequences. Moreover,the con-
trol system perceivedby the salespersonis also relatedin the
expected directionsto the innovativenessand supportiveness
dimensions of organizationalculture, satisfaction,and par-
ticipativedecision making and negatively to the use of pay
as a controlmechanism.Mixed resultswere obtainedfor the
two cognitive variablesand performance,in which only half
of the predictionswere supported.Contraryto expectations,
perceived control systems do not appear,for the most part,
to affect the salesperson'sbehavioralstrategy.
In terms of magnitudes,the largereffects show that be-
havior-controlphilosophies are related to commitment,ac-
ceptance of authority,teamworkand review, a lack of ex-
trinsic motivation,a greaterinterest in serving the agency,
participativedecision making, less use of pay as a control
mechanism, and an innovative and supportive culture.
Weakerresults in the hypothesizeddirectionwere found for
sales competence,job satisfaction,less risk-seekingpropen-
sity, selling smarter(but not harder),expense control, pre-
sentation planning, and a self-ranking of performance.
Nonetheless, these results do suggest that control systems
have an impacton a salesperson'sthoughtsand feelings and
certain behaviors. Behavioral strategy, however, does not
appearto be stronglyinfluencedby the natureof the control
system.
 TABLE 3
Correlation Matrix of Study Measures
Var A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W X Y
A 100 -03 -01 -08 -06 -11 05-08 -05 -11 -03 -01 05--05 -08 02 01 06 03 04-02 03-06 -11 -06
B 100 18 30 35 17 -11 35 -12 02 31 04 -06 28 24 28 19 27 28 14 29 35 11 -01
C 100 26 28 -01 -01 32 -37 11 13 03 -00 14 16 08 02 11 06 12 16 44 43 -22
D 100 48 26-11 17--09 04 28 06-03 21 11 05-00 05 16 21 24 26 28-06 31
E 100 19-09 26-15 05 30 00 00 20 21 15 07 14 25 24 30 34 19-02 30
F 100 -01 11 -02 -02 13 -04 -05 12 21 -02 -08 04 10 09 07 11 -02 11
G 100 05 01 03-08 05-10 12 10--00 02 06-13 -13 -06 05-01 09 1
H 100 -52 06 24 02-01 31 42 18 11 19 14 13 21 48 09-04
I 100 -10 -01 02 01 -19 -13 -08 00--06 -07 -11 -12 -44 -14 24 -2
J 100 -05 -01 -00 05 06 01 01 03-00 -03 02-04 13-05
K 100 09 07 30 21 21 08 19 34 23 21 25 03 09 21
L 100 -56 08 03--07 -03 -09 -02 12 04-02 07 01 -0
M 100 -07 -05 06 01 09 07-06 02 03-05 -04 -04
N 100 09 13 01 16 04 13 26 37 12-05
0 100 18 06 19 10 08 12 27 06 14
P 100 59 61 24 15 41 37 06 01
Q 100 51 06 00 22 14 06-00 04
R 100 17 12 55 32 08 05
S 100 30 24 16 05 07 1
T 100 31 13 01 -02
U 100 37 12-04
V 100 24 -15
W 100 -30
X 100 -0
y 1
Z
AA
AB
AC
AD
AE
AF
AG

A = Product/company knowledge L = Call activityas a percentage of otheractivities W = Partici

B = Sales expertise/competence M= Ratio of selling/nonsellingtime X = Pay as
C = Organizationalcommitment N = Motivationto worksmarter Y = Innova
D = Acceptingof authority/direction 0 = Motivationto work harder Z = Bureau
(/3
0 E = Acceptingof cooperation/teamwork P = Relativeperformance AA = Suppor
F = Acceptingof performancereviews Q = Performancepercentile AB = Extento
(A3
co
G = Riskaversion R = Performanceon sales and profitobjectives AC = Absenc
0 AD = Infrequ
H = Intrinsicmotivation S = Gatheringinformation
I = Extrinsicmotivation T = Controllingexpenses AE = Use of
0
a_
(/3 J = Motivationto serve agency ratherthan self/customers U = Sales presentationskills AF = Use of
0 K = Amountof planning V = Job satisfaction AG= Percen
3r Note: Decimalsomitted;n = 347; minimumpairwise n = 318. Allcorrelationsof 11101or greater significantat p < .05
0)
Bo

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 TABLE 4 Discussion
Comparison of the Present Study to Cravens and The set of findings presentedhere providesearly supportfor
Colleagues' Study (1993) the behavior- versus outcome-control consequences pro-
Philosophical/ Cravens and posed in the A&O framework.Perceptions of a behavior-
Methodological The Present Colleagues control governance structureindeed appearto be related to
Detail Study (1993)
greateraffect and acceptanceamong reps, as well as to sug-
Controlsystem Twoorthogonal gest some tendency for more professional competence, in-
dimensionality Unidimensional dimensions trinsicmotivation,and attendanceto agency goals (at the ex-
Underlying pense of other goals). Outcome-controlperceptionsappear
controlfactors Six Two to coincide with bottom-lineand extrinsic motivation.
Unitof analysis Sales force The fairly consistentfindingthatbehaviorcontrolrelates
Salesperson
to greateraffect and acceptance of company proceduresis
Informant Salesperson 'Top level"sales consistent with the findings on a supportiveorganizational
executive
culture, a willingness to pursue agency as opposed to self
Reporting goals, and a more risk-averseorientation.In effect, behav-
perspective Descriptive Normative
ior-controlreps appearto respond to the more certain and
Firmsampling nurturantenvironmentof a behavior-controlsales office by
frame One industry Variousindustries
adheringto company policy, pursuingcompany goals, and
remainingcommittedto the firm.
TABLEE5
Correlations Between the Behavior-/Outcome-Co ntrol Index and Hypothesized Consequences
Behavior-Control
Dimension Prediction Correlation
Cognitions/capabilities
Product/companyknowledge More -.06
Sales expertise/competence More .15b
Affects/attitudes
Organizationalcommitment More .27c
Acceptingof authority/direction More .20
Acceptingof cooperationas partof a sales team More .18C
Acceptingof performancereviews More .17c
Risk seeking preference Less -.12a
Motivation
Natureof motivation MoreIntrinsic .04
Less Extrinsic -. 1 c
Directionof motivation Agency .20c
Behavioralstrategy
Planning More .03
Call activity Less .02
Sell/nonsell time ratio Less -.03
Selling technique "Smarter" .10a
"Harder" .05
Performance
Relativeperformancescale (outcome) Lower -.04
Relativeperformancerank(outcome) Lower -. 1 a
Meetingsales/profitgoals (outcome) Higher -.03
Informationgathering(input) Higher .06
Sales expense control(input) Higher .5b
Sales presentationplanning(input) Higher .11a
Job satisfaction More 13b
Participativedecision-making More .44c
Pay as a controlmechanism Less -.21c
Organizationalculture MoreInnovative .21c
MoreBureaucratic .02
MoreSupportive .34c
ap < .05, bp < .01, p < .001
One-tail tests are applied as the direction of effect is implied in the hypotheses.

62 / Journalof Marketing,October1994

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 One of the strongestfindings in the study is that behav-
ior-control organizations enjoy more organizationalcom-
mitmentfrom their salespeople. This is consistent with data
from Eisenberger and colleagues (1986), who relate per-
ceived organizationalsupport to a reciprocal commitment
on the salesperson'spart,and with Michaels and colleagues
(1988), who show that a salesperson'sjob commitmentin-
creases with the level of formalizationin the sales force. The
reason is that formalization reduces role stress. Behavior-
controlorganizationsappearto be more formalizedthanout-
come-control systems, suggesting that these systems pro-
vide the salespersonmore role clarity and less role conflict.
The organizationalculturefindings clearly show thatbe-
havior-controlmanagerialstyles are perceived by salespeo-
ple as more innovativeand supportive,thoughnot necessar-
ily more bureaucratic.These findings are consistent with the
argumentthat perceivedcorporatecultureneed not be unre-
lated to a control system philosophy but can be used to "re-
inforce whatever approachis used and mitigate any of the
problems created by specific control system components"
(Lebas and Weigenstein 1986, p. 270).
Unfortunately,we were unable to demonstrateclear and
consistent effects on performanceor reportedtime alloca-
tion behaviors,given the measuresand methodsused here-
although specific types of input behaviors appear to be
linked to a behavior-controlphilosophy (e.g., sales expense
control). Recognizing that it is difficult to measuresuch ef-
fects in survey work, it may also be the case that no sub-
stantialperformanceeffects are warranted.As Churchilland
colleagues (1985) point out, it is unusualto see correlations
greaterthan .2 in absolute value between performanceand
any single performancepredictor.This suggests that perfor-
mance relationshipsare situation specific. This speculation
is consistent with Lusch and Jaworski(1991), who find, in
the context of managersof retail stores, thatcontrol systems
do not have direct effects on performance;these effects are
mediatedby interveningstates (e.g., job tension).
In some respects,the lack of behavioralstrategyandper-
formanceeffects is consistentwith otherliteratureon corpo-
rate culture (Saffold 1988). Notably, participativecultures
do not appearsystematicallymore productive,althoughthey
often exhibit higher employee satisfaction (Locke,
Schweiger, and Latham 1986). This is consistent with the
finding here that salespeople under behavior-controlsys-
tems are more satisfied with theirjobs and view their orga-
nizations as more participativeyet do not performat higher
levels than do salespeople in outcome-controlsystems.
To sum up at this point, the results presentedhere sug-
gest that behavior control is an "affect"strategythat corre-
lates with a more acceptingor receptivesales representative.
It might also foster greaterintrinsicmotivationas well as the
pursuitof agency goals unrelatedto personalgain or remu-
neration. Alternatively, outcome control is an uninvolved
strategy, one in which salespeople can be expected to be
more self oriented and less accepting of managerialdirec-
tion. For certain sales organizations,it may neverthelessbe
the best strategy in that outcome control demands lower
overheadthan does behaviorcontrol;hence, it may be more
robust to downturns and more profitable. Moreover, the
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highly motivatedindividualistwho flourishes in such orga-
nizationsmay be an excellent salespersonwho refuses to ac-
cept behaviorcontrol.
As noted previously,Cravensand colleagues (1993) ex-
amine the (separate)effects of supervisoryand compensa-
tion control and test sales managers' perceptions of what
salespersonbehaviorsare effective as a function of supervi-
sion methods and compensationplans. Although this varies
somewhat from the issues addressedin our previous work,
Cravens and colleagues imply that such effects follow as
normativederivationsfrom the A&O propositions.Although
the presentstudy and thatof Cravensand colleagues address
alternativesets of consequencesof behaviorversusoutcome
control, there is some overlap between the sets. Within this
overlap, the Cravensand colleagues findings are in accord,
in general, with the findings here.
Specifically,both studies find associationsbetween a be-
havior-basedsupervisory style (which is closer to our be-
havior-controlindex than is simple compensation)and how
importantit is perceivedto be that the sales force be profes-
sionally competent,team oriented,and intrinsicallymotivat-
ed. Moreover,Cravensand colleagues (1993) focus on per-
formanceoutcomes, examining these in more detail than is
done here. They find that behavior-basedsales forces per-
form better in terms of expense control and presentation
planning,which parallelsour findingsat the individuallevel.
However, Cravens and colleagues also examine and find
supportfor a greaterrange of performanceeffects, particu-
larly with respect to how effectively the sales force uses in-
puts. They find no direct effect of supervisorystyle on the
more outcome-orientedperformancemeasures(financialef-
fectiveness and achieving the firm's sales objectives),
though they do detect indirect effects. The lack of a direct
effect is consistent with the results presentedhere, leading
us to concurwith the Cravensand colleagues suggestionthat
performance effects be considered in a more contingent
fashion.
Limitations and Further Research Suggestions
In this early effort to investigate the behavior- versus out-
come-controlgovernanceprocess, several limitationsapply.
In particular,this study uses salespersonperceptionsof the
mechanisms operatingin their organizationsin one (albeit
broad)industry.Now that some empiricalevidence is avail-
able to suggest what the underlyingdimensions of the gov-
ernance are, researchersare encouragedto survey manager
reportsof the controlactivitiesthey use, so as to contrastthis
informationwith that provided by the reps under the man-
ager's supervision. Researchersshould also seek manager
perceptionsof theirsalespeople's attitudes,motivations,and
behaviorsor, at a more causal level, investigateparallel or-
ganizationsknown to employ specific control mechanisms.
Althoughseveralmeaningfulfindingsemergedfrom this
investigation, it is acknowledged that the overall level of
findings is of a modest order of magnitude. In part, this
could have resulted from use of the single frameworkwe
present. One next step would be to expand on the determi-
nants or "markers"of behaviorcontrol and outcome control
so that others can constructa richerand broaderconceptual
Sales ControlSystem /63
 structuresurroundingthe control concept. This may lead to
new dimensions not yet fully reflected in the descriptions
that we and others have provided.
A fascinatingissue for furtherresearchis the divergence
that can exist between a normatively correct governance
structure(i.e., where all elements are in balance) and what
managers may actually do. For example, Cravens and col-
leagues (1993) found that in managers'reportsof their com-
panys' control systems, compensationmethods were largely
independentof supervision styles. These findings are con-
sistent with the results of this study, which finds that many
salespeople are not facing control system elements com-
bined in the mannerthatwe argueto be normativelycorrect.
It is quite likely thatcontrol systems are not designed as sys-
tems but assembled and modified as pieces. The decision
makersmay well vary from decision to decision and may re-
spond to differentinformationsets, constraints,and internal
political pressures when tinkering with (or overhauling)
their control system elements. Our frameworkwould sug-
gest that inconsistent systems should confuse and demoral-
ize salespeople by virtue of sending inconsistent signals.
Thus, a researchagenda in the futurecould include discov-
ering what types of inconsistency are most common and
what effects they have on salespeople.
Anotherinterestingresearchissue is the questionof how
control systems come to have their effects. The process by
which the proposed consequences occur is likely to involve
a combination of self-selection (in which salespeople ini-
tially select specific job types), adaptation(in which sales-
people change to fit the system in which they find them-
selves), and relocation (in which salespeople change jobs
until they discover a compatible system). This, combined
with the inevitable changes that occur as salespeople
progress through career stages (Cron 1984), suggests that
managersmust be alert to what control system is appropri-
ate at what point in time for which salespeople. For exam-
ple, fledgling salespeople may preferbehaviorcontrol until
they become experienced and confident, at which point at
least some of them may have come to prefera greaterdegree
of freedomand may be willing to assume a greaterdegree of
risk with outcome control.
A related question addresses the type of salesperson
most effective in each system. It is to be expected that a
given governance mode or culture will not suit everyone.
For example, Kobergand Chusmir(1987) note thatcultures
are more appealing to some types of managersthan to oth-
ers. Similarly, O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell (1991)
demonstratethatculturesdiffer substantiallyin the degree of
appeal they hold for different individuals, with attendant
consequences in terms of job satisfaction, organizational
commitment,and turnover.
This line of reasoningunderliesCravensand colleagues'
study (1993), which takes the control system as given. How-
ever, ratherthan asking what salespeople operatingundera
control system would be like if they stay in the system,
Cravensand colleagues (1993) ask what a salespersonunder
each system should be like to be successful in the system.
Operatingat the level of a sales force (ratherthan a sales-
person), Cravens and colleagues (1993) find that many of
the A&O propositionsaboutwhat salespeople undervarious
64 / Journalof Marketing,October1994
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control systems are like coincide with managers' percep-
tions of what makes a successful salespersonunderdifferent
control regimes, particularly in the domains of affect,
knowledge, attitudes, and motivation. These findings are
consistent with the results of this study, which suggests that
the A&O propositions are more accurate when describing
affect, knowledge, attitudes,and motivation but less accu-
rate when describingbehavioror performance.
A reasonableextension of control system researchis the
effect of control on the customer's perceptionof the sales-
person's performance.This topic is not well representedin
the sales literature.One startingpoint is the frameworkof
Evans and Grant (1992), who investigate incentive effects
on customersatisfaction.To this end, we look forwardto ef-
forts to conceptualize and operationalize the governance
concept beyond the early test here. It is clear additional
progressawaits furtheranalysis.
APPENDIX A
Study Measures with Reliability Estimates
Behavior-Control/Outcome-ControlIndex Scale Items
Extentof supervision:SUPER (8 items, a = .856)
1. My supervisor makes sure everyone knows what to do
and how to do it.
2. Mysupervisorstays in close contact withme.
3. Myboss rarelyasks me forinformation on how I'mdoing.(R)
4. I don't have much contact with my company's manage-
ment. (R)
5. Managementhere stays very well informedof salespeo-
ple's activities.
6. I feel isolated frommanagement.(R)
7. I don'tget muchday-to-daycontactwithmanagement.(R)
8. We are subject to very littledirectionfromour company's
management.(R)
Absence of a bottom-lineorientation:NOTBL(4 items, a =
.762)
1. When managementrates my performance,they take a lot
of things into consideration.
2. Management decides who's good by looking strictlyat
each salesperson's bottomline. (R)
3. Onlytangibleresults matterto my manager.(R)
4. Mymanagerdoesn't care what I do as long as I produce.
(R)
Infrequentuse of objectiveoutcomes:OBJOUT(3 items, a =
.618)
Howheavilydo you thinkyourmanagerrelies on these kinds
of measures in evaluatingyourperformance?
1. Sales volume (R)
2. Marketpenetration(R).
3. Achievementof quota (R).
Use of paper inputs:PAPINP(3 items, a = .595)
1. Numberof calls.
2. Sales expense.
3. Qualityand completeness of call reports.
Use of subjectiveinputs:SUBINP(3 items, a = .843)
1. Attitude.
2. Ability.
3. Effort.
Percent salary in compensationplan: SALRY(2 items, a =
.962)
1. Present pay period.
2. Last pay period.
HypothesizedCon-sequences of Behavior/OutcomeControl Planning(4 items, a = .495)
All response scales are 1-7 (StronglyDisagree - Strongly FromAvilaand Fern (1986)
Agree) unless otherwise noted. Callactivity:prospects versus otheractivities
Product/companyknowledge(7 items, a = .781) In a typicalweek, how many hours do you put into the fol-
Adapted from Behrman and Perreault's(1982) "Technical lowingactivities?
Knowledge"performancefactor. Letters/phonecalls to prospects hrs per wk
Callingon prospects hrs per wk
Sales expertise/competence(5 items, a = .698)
Letters/phonecalls hrs per wk
Adaptedfromthe Curryet al. (1986) workinvolvementscale. Preparingpaperworkand reports
Organizationalcommitment(7 items, a = .837) to management hrs per wk
Adapted from Still (1983) and Mowday,Steers, and Porter Dealer (principal)meetings hrs per wk
(1979) Trainingmeetings hrs per wk
Callingon present accounts hrs per wk
Acceptingof authority/direction (3 items, a = .774) Service/installationcalls hrs per wk
1. When I'mgiven advice or instructions,I accept it willingly. hrs per wk
2. I generally accept the authorityof management in this Planning
Other hrs per wk
firm. Measure = (Hours on letters and phone calls to
3. I am quite receptiveto feedback I receive fromsuperiors.
prospects + Callingon prospects)/Totalhours worked
Acceptingof cooperation/teamwork (5 items, a = .748) Selling time/nonsellingtime (Use formatabove)
1. I am knownas a team playerwhen performingin groups. Measure= (Hoursspent on prospects + Hoursspent on let-
2. I always fulfillmy obligationsto others I workwith.
3. I am willingto do my partfor the good of the group. ters/phonecalls to present accounts + Calls on present ac-
4. Workingwithothers is a hassle I preferto avoid. (R) counts)/Totalhours worked
5. Teamworkis something I'vealways enjoyed doing. Selling smarter(5 items, a = .461)
1. I am always experimentingwithnew sales approaches.
Acceptingof performancereviews (4 items, a = .807) 2. There reallyisn't much to learn about selling. (R)
1. It is a definite plus to have a thoroughreviewof my per- 3. Selling requires that I put more thought into how I sell
formance by management. ratherthan more time.
2. 1 like my company to give me frequent, detailed perfor- 4. I believe the best salespeople are those who knowhow to
mance feedback. sell, not those who put in long hours.
3. I want to knowat all times what managementthinksof my 5. Everytime I lose an order,I analyze what went wrong in
performance. great detail.
4. I'mthe kindof person who needs lots of feedbackfrommy
boss. Selling harder(5 items, a = .757)
FromOliverand Weitz (1991)
Risk-seekingpreference (4 items, ao= .707)
Adaptedfromitems in MacCrimmonand Wehrung(1985) Relativeperformance(3 items, a = .862)
Response scale: 1-9 (Below Average-AboveAverage)
Intrinsicmotivation(6 items, a = .816) 1. Howwouldyou evaluate yourperformanceon youragen-
1. When I performwell, I knowit'sbecause of my own desire
cy's sales goals?
to achieve. 2. Comparedwith other salespeople workingfor your com-
2. I don't need a reason to sell; I sell because I want to.
pany,how wouldyou evaluate youreffort?
3. Becomingsuccessful in sales is somethingthat I want do 3. Comparedwith other salespeople workingfor your com-
for me.
pany,how wouldyou evaluate youroverallperformance?
4. If I were independentlywealthy, I would still sell for the
challenge of it. Sales performancepercentile
5. I wish I didn'thave to retiresomeday so I could always When you compareyourannualsales withthe sales of other
continue selling forthe pleasure of it. salespeople in youragency, are you in the...
6. I sell because I cherish the feeling of performinga useful 5 D Upper10%of all reps
service. 4 L] Upper1/3 of all reps
3 I Middle1/3 of all reps
Extrinsicmotivation(3 items, a = .826) 2 r Lower1/3 of all reps
1. If it weren'tforthe money, I would not be in a selling job. 1 I Lowest 10%of all reps
2. I sell because I get paid to sell.
3. After a long hard day, I realize that if it weren't for the Meetingsales and profitobjectives(7 items, a = .872)
money, I wouldn'tput up withthis job. From Behrman and Perreault's(1982) "Sales Objectives"
performancefactor.
Motivationto serve agency more than self/customers
As you know,representativesin sales organizationsmust di- Information gathering(4 items, a = .821)
vide their efforts across various activities.Please allocate AdaptedfromBehrmanand Perreault's(1982) "ProvidingIn-
100 points in the column below to reflectthe work-related formation" performancefactor.
effortyou put in to serve the principalsyou represent,the Sales expense control(6 items, a = .853)
agency you work for, your customers, and yourself (your Adapted from Behrman and Perreault's(1982) "Controlling
own needs). Expenses"performancefactor.
I divide my efforts likethis: Yourprincipal points
Youragency points Sales presentationplanning(5 items, a = .836)
Yourcustomers points Adapted from Behrmanand Perreault's(1982) "Sales Pre-
Yourself points sentations"performancefactor.
100 points Job satisfaction(13 items, a = .913)
Measure:(Principal+Agency)/Total Fromthe Comer, Machleit,and Lagace (1989) abbreviated

Sales ControlSystem / 65

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 version of INDSALES (Churchill, Ford, and Walker 1974)
Participative decision making (4 items, a = .754)
1. Decisions are made at the top around here. (R)
2. Salespeople and management tend to hammer out issues
together in this organization.
3. My boss actively seeks my ideas all the time.
4. Management makes decisions without much regard for
what salespeople think. (R)
Pay perceived as a control mechanism (4 items, a = .645)
1. The main reason for pay in this organization is to get me
to do what supervisors and managers want me to do.
2. I feel that the company uses pay to try to control every-
thing I do.
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