Behavior- and Outcome-Based Sales Control Systems: Evidence and Consequences of Pure-

Form and Hybrid Governance

Author(s): Richard L. Oliver and Erin Anderson
Source: The Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Fall, 1995),
pp. 1-15
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40471597
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 Behavior- and Outcome-Based Sales Control
Systems: Evidence and Consequences of
Pure-Form and Hybrid Governance
Richard L. Oliver and Erin Anderson

Anderson and Oliver (1987) presented a behavior vs. outcome sales control
taxonomy based on methods of monitoring salespersons' effort. Under an
outcome system, sales revenue is thought to be a sufficient criterion for sales
proficiency. Under a behavior system, the sales process itself is critical and
"input" monitoring activities are maximized. Oliver and Anderson (1994) tested
these differences on salesperson perceptions and found effects on affective and
cognitive consequences. This paper extends these findings and shows that, while
conventional behavior and outcome strategies appear to be operating in accord
with theory, evidence is found for an integrated or "hybrid" philosophy exhibiting
degrees of both. The incidence and nature of such strategies are discussed in
terms of their consequences and implications.

Anderson and Oliver (1987), hereafter A&O, pro-

Richard L. Oliver (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison) is
the Valere Blair Potter Professor of Management, Owen Gradu-
ate School of Management, Vanderbilt University. He researches
consumer and sales psychology with a special focus on customer
satisfaction, service quality, and sales behavior, and holds the
position of Fellow of the American Psychological Association for
his extensive writings on the psychology of the satisfaction
response. He is co-editor of Service Quality: New Directions in
Theory and Practice and has published articles in the Journal of
Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Personal
Selling & Sales Management, Journal of Consumer Research,
Psychology & Marketing, Behavioral Science, Journal of Eco-
nomic Psychology, Journal of Applied Psychology, Applied Psy-
chological Measurement, Psychometrika, Organizational Behav-
ior and Human Decision Processes, and others.
Erin Anderson (Ph.D., UCLA) is a Professor of Marketing at
INSEAD (The European Institute of Business Administration).
As Europe's first business school, INSEAD is located in
Fontainebleau, France. Anderson specializes in issues of vertical
integration and organizational control in sales and distribution.
She has published in a variety of journals, including Journal of
Marketing Research, Journal of Marketing, Management Sci-
ence, Marketing Science, and Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Electron-
ics Representatives Association (ERA) and the Manufacturers'
Representatives Educational Research Foundation (MRERF),
and thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for helpful
suggestions. The first author thanks the Dean's Fund for Faculty
Research of the Owen Graduate School of Management for
providing partial support for this project.
pose two "alternative" managerial strategies which
they label as "outcome control" and "behavior con-
trol" and position as end points on a control system
continuum. In their formulation, an outcome-based
control system involves relatively little monitoring
of salespeople, relatively little managerial direc-
tion or effort to direct salespeople, and straightfor-
ward, objective measures of results (e.g., sales). In
contrast, a behavior-based control system is typi-
fied by considerable monitoring of activities as well
as results, high levels of managerial direction and
intervention in activities, and subjective and more
complex methods of evaluating performance, typi-
cally centered around the salesperson's job inputs.
When compared to outcomes, inputs include per-
sonal qualities (e.g., aptitude), activities such as
new account generation, and sales strategies. They
are not themselves indicators of sales results (out-
comes) but are expected to generate results at a
later point in time. Performance evaluation on in-
puts is necessarily more subjective because the
manager must decide if and to what degree inputs
generate outcomes. Moreover, inputs do not lend
themselves to objective measurement, as they are
not always readily countable. This emphasis on in-

Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management,

Volume XV, Number 4 (Fall 1995).

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 2 Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management
Table 1
Characteristics of Behavior- and Outcome-Based Sales Control Systems
Behavior Control
Structured Low to
Fixed compensation (salary) Variable compensation
Management monitors behavior Management monitors results
more than results more
Much supervision and many Little supervision and few managers
managers (low span of control) (high span of control)
Much contact with management Little contact with management
Much reporting Little
Performance evaluated subjectively Performance evaluated on a few
on many criteria observable results
Firm bears risk Salesperson
puts is fundamental to the strategy A&O refer to as
behavior control. Differences between a control sys-
tem which monitors behaviors as inputs versus one
monitoring outcomes only are highlighted in Table
1.
As discussed in A&O, a number of cognitive, af-
fective, and behavioral differences are predicted to
result from the two control philosophies. Generally,
behavior control governance (as opposed to outcome
control) should foster greater attention to company
and product knowledge, greater affect (e.g., satis-
faction, commitment) toward the firm and accep-
tance of company procedures, greater levels of in-
trinsic vs. extrinsic motivation, greater focus on
planning and prospecting behaviors as opposed to
selling, and lower (but higher quality) sales results.
The descriptions above illustrate the differences
one might expect to observe at the extreme. These
extremes might suggest that the two control sys-
tem philosophies are mutually exclusive in that the
respective elements cannot coexist within the same
sales organization. However, implicit in the A&O
propositions is the possibility that firms alterna-
tively may position themselves along the continuum
and selectively use elements of both systems. In
such a case, the cognitive, affective, and behavioral
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little structure
(commission, bonus)
than behavior
reporting
bears risk
consequences of management's strategy should vary
proportionately as the sales organization's philoso-
phy trends either toward behavior or outcome con-
trol. Thus, one would expect that the transition
from one form of control to the other would result in
fairly smooth changes in the consequences. For ex-
ample, A&O suggest that behavior control should
foster less extrinsic and more intrinsic motivation.
If this is so, then salespeople under more outcome
control would be expected to report more extrinsic
and less intrinsic motivation as management's con-
trol philosophy becomes more outcome control ori-
ented.
Oliver and Anderson (1994), hereafter O&A, have
recently tested their propositions using a diverse
group of sales representatives from a large number
of sales organizations (rep firms) in the electronics
components industry. Using their philosophical cri-
teria for the control system differences and empiri-
cal findings from scale validation, they constructed
an index of behavior to outcome control. This scale
was then used to judge individual salespeople as to
the degree of perceived behavior-outcome control
used by management, in the perspective of the re-
sponding salesperson. The index score was then
correlated with the predicted cognitive, affective,
 Fall
and behavioral consequences, also as reported by
the same salesperson. Generally, the predicted ef-
fects of control philosophy on selected affective and
motivational consequences were supported. How-
ever, counter to the hypothesized effects, the na-
ture of the control system did not appear to impact
sales strategies or aspects of performance.
Additionally, O&A contrasted their results with
those of Cravens et al. (1993), who also examined
elements of the A&O propositional inventory. Us-
ing different philosophical and methodological as-
sumptions, the Cravens et al. findings were gener-
ally in accord with those of O&A. Specifically, both
studies found associations between a behavior-based
supervisory style and affect, as well as acceptance
of company procedures. Further, Cravens et al. fo-
cused greater detail on performance outcomes and
found support for a greater range of performance
effects, particularly with respect to how effectively
the sales force uses inputs. Although they found no
direct effect of supervisory style on the more out-
come-oriented performance measures, they did de-
tect indirect effects.
Restricting discussion to the O&A findings, O&A
allow that their results are of a "modest order of
magnitude" and speculate that a potentially un-
known dimension or dimensions may be missing
from the index. Alternatively, they propose as a
"fascinating issue" the possibility that salespeople
are not facing control system elements which A&O
argue to be normatively correct. Indeed, while O&A
argue that behavior and outcome control are oppos-
ing philosophies and suggest that firms may locate
in intermediate positions on the behavior-outcome
continuum (e.g., moderate supervision and balanced
salary/commission plans), they do not entertain the
possibility of combinations of opposing philosophies
(e.g. straight salary but little supervision). In fact,
they argue that such opposing strategies are "inter-
nally contradictory," and go on to say that "few, if
any, managers will create 'inconsistent1 combina-
tions" (p. 55).
Other researchers, however, have proposed hy-
brid strategies. Jaworski (1988), for example, cites
evidence (e.g., Kim 1984; Porter, Lawler, and Hack-
man 1975; Terborg and Miller 1978) that behav-
ioral (process) and outcome control mechanisms are
effective when used in combination. He states (p.
31):
A reasonable set of questions, then, is to what
extent: (a) do sales organizations exhibit these
divergent control philosophies, and (b) do sales-
people within these organizations display the
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1995 3
cognitive, affective, and behavioral profiles im-
plied by the A&O propositions. No form of con-
trol exists in isolation. Rather, controls (may)
combine synergistically to influence the attain-
ment of a given objective... .
Additionally, Ouchi (1979; Ouchi and Maguire
1975) proposes that, under conditions of high and
low combinations of: (a) ability to measure outcomes
and (b) knowledge of the transformation process by
which inputs are converted to outcomes, four gover-
nance possibilities emerge. If measurement ability
is high and transformation knowledge is imperfect,
outcome control is recommended for the reason that,
if the optimal behavior patterns are unknown, be-
havior monitoring is wasteful. Alternatively, if
transformation knowledge is accurate and measure-
ment ability is low, then behavior control is recom-
mended using the same frame of logic. Moreover,
under ideal conditions of accurate knowledge and
high ability to measure outcomes, either form of
control and conceivably both are feasible and nei-
ther is a priori preferable. Under the fourth alter-
native of low ability and uncertain knowledge, a
"clan" structure is recommended, but is not consid-
ered further here as it is believed to be a relatively
rare occurrence (Ouchi 1979).
Although data on the frequencies of use of these
strategies are not abundant, the potential "inde-
pendence" of outcome and behavior control as sub-
stitutable or complementary approaches has been
tested in Ouchi and Maguire (1975). These authors
found that the correlation among perceptions of
behavior and outcome control received from man-
agement was 0.18, a significant but modest asso-
ciation. This suggests that the two control mecha-
nisms may be used concurrently, at least in the
Ouchi and Maguire context (retail department
stores).
Thus, the supportive but modest pattern of the
O&A results suggests that the transition from be-
havior to outcome control (or from outcome to be-
havior control), as tapped by their index, may not
cause the hypothesized consequences to respond in
linear fashion. This may be so because managers
may be violating the A&O normative prescriptions
in that intermediate positions on the O&A index
may actually reflect the use of opposing strategies
as contrasted with intermediate strategies.
To investigate this possibility, further examina-
tion of the O&A data using categorical (cluster)
analysis is undertaken here. Categorical analysis
is useful when it cannot be expected that a combi-
natorial index is linear in all of its component vari-
 4 Journal of Personal Selling & Salée Management
ables and the variable weightings or transforma-
tions are not known a priori. It allows for non-
unidimensionality in what would otherwise be a
single bipolar composite.
Two reasons for examining the nature of hybrid
governance are noteworthy. First, it would be in-
structive to see what form or "mix" of behavior and
outcome strategies are used by hybrid firms. Under
the assumption that firms using elements of seem-
ingly incompatible strategies have reached a work-
able equilibrium between emphasis on behaviors
and outcomes, it is not unreasonable to ask what
form such an equilibrium would take.
Second, the consequences of hybrid governance
can be examined and compared to those of behavior
and outcome-control firms. Does the dual use of
elements of both strategies combine to help or hinder
the firm's goals and in what ways? Answers to these
questions were pursued as described in the follow-
ing discussion.
Method
Sample
Data were obtained from sales representatives
employed by a diverse set of independently owned
and operated sales agencies in the electronic com-
ponents industry. A sales agency is an independent
company, analogous to an advertising agency or a
consulting firm. The Census Bureau labels such
companies "manufacturers' representatives" or
"manufacturers' agents" (see Anderson 1986). A
manufacturers' representative provides selling ser-
vices to manufacturers, and is compensated by com-
mission on sales, which becomes the first line of the
company's income statement (i.e., the bulk of its
revenue). From its income, the manufacturers' rep-
resentative (the company) must cover all expenses
relating primarily to personnel who, in turn, are
primarily salespeople. The company's owners (typi-
cally a handful of founders and top employee sales-
people, perhaps including a layer of professional
managers) direct the firm's affairs, making deci-
sions such as which manufacturers to represent,
which customers to pursue, and how to manage all
employees, including salespeople. One important
decision is how to pay salespeople in terms of level
of payment, form of payment, level of benefits, and
so forth. In particular, a manufacturer's represen-
tative as an entity is paid on commission, but the
organizational entity need not pay its own employ-
ees in the same fashion.
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The salespeople who participated in this study
were employed by sales agencies which represent a
cross section of the membership of a major elec-
tronic components trade association (Electronic Rep-
resentatives Association, or ERA). ERA members
are independent companies (manufacturers' rep-
resentatives) which sell electronic components
(broadly construed, as some are actually subsystems
that can become components of larger systems) to
business customers. The products may then be
resold or incorporated into another product. Both
the product lines and the customer base are broad
and diverse. The long gamut of products that con-
tain some electronics (i.e., electronic components)
goes into many different markets (e.g., communica-
tions, instrumentation, consumer products) and to
many types of buyers. Customers include original
equipment manufacturers, assembly houses, dis-
tributors, construction firms, and retailers.
Because the products and buying tasks vary
greatly, so does the nature of the purchasing unit
and purchasing process. While most sales tasks are
straight rebuys involving individual salespeople, a
manufacturers' representative in the electronic com-
ponents industry can encounter any type of selling
situation. For example, Céspedes (1992) addresses
the difficulty inherent in coordinating sales efforts
across multiple locations of a key account purchas-
ing many product lines. These difficulties can arise
not only for large manufacturers but for manufac-
turers' representatives as well.
While some writers continue to view manufactur-
ers' representatives as small companies that run
their sales forces in typical outcome-control fash-
ion, paying their employees straight commission,
offering minimal supervision, and incurring low
sales overhead (e.g., operating from the proverbial
office in the owner's garage), this characterization
may not be true today. In fact, there is no empirical
evidence to suggest that manufacturers' represen-
tatives as a group are so homogeneous, small, and
simple, and there is no theoretical reason why they
should be. These companies are sales forces, like
any other, and face all the decisions (organization,
compensation, supervision, evaluation, hiring, fir-
ing, training, and so forth) that other sales forces
encounter. The manufacturers' representative can
be thought of as a free-standing company which
concentrates on its core competence - selling - and
does not produce what it sells. The company can be
quite large and can involve a considerable infra-
structure in terms of management and support sys-
tems (e.g., information technology, clerical support,
 Fall
a corporate jet, a dedicated commercial office build-
ing). Hence, considerable variation in control sys-
tems used by manufacturers' representatives is to
be expected, an observation supported by the present
data.
This study used the O&A sample of 347 sales-
people with complete data on the control system
classification criteria. The average respondent was
male (92%) and 39 years of age, was a college gradu-
ate (64%), had been in sales for 12 years and the
present job for 5.5 years, and received $49,500 in
total compensation in the past year. Fourteen per-
cent of the sample were on full salary; 23% were on
full commission; all others were on combination
plans.
Data on the sales agencies represented by the
final sample of respondents showed that they were
diverse in a number of key firm variables. The manu-
facturers' representative may cover its market area
(say, a three-state region) with several geographi-
cally distinct sales offices. It is the salespeople in
these offices (i.e., the employees of the manufactur-
ers' representative) whom we studied. The average
number of sales offices per firm was three and
ranged from one to 19. The number of outside sales-
people employed by each firm averaged five in num-
ber and ranged from one to 53, while the number of
office personnel, including managers and staff,
ranged to 96. Each rep firm served an average of
fifteen principals, ranging from one to 40. Finally,
the average number of accounts handled by each
salesperson was 63, ranging from five to 300. This
level of heterogeneity in both salesperson charac-
teristics and firm data allows for a greater diversity
of governance strategies across salespeople than
would be evident for more structured industry
samples.
Measures
Control system classification criteria. A&O iden-
tified three characteristics of behavior vs. outcome
control sales philosophies. Specifically, more behav-
ior-oriented control systems have: (1) a higher ex-
tent of supervision and contact between salespeople
and their managers, and a supervisory style em-
phasizing process over results ("bottom-line") be-
haviors, (2) more subjective evaluation methods
based on an emphasis of process behaviors over
outcome results, and as an implementation proce-
dure (3) a greater proportion of salary (commission
and bonus) in the pay package. Elements (1) and (2)
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1995 5
were measured with two and three scales, respec-
tively, scored in the direction corresponding to be-
havior control. Element (3) was the self-reported
percent of salary in the salesperson's compensation
plan.
The two supervisory style scales measuring clas-
sification element (1) contained items tapping ex-
tent of supervision and an absence of a bottom line
orientation. The three evaluation scales represent-
ing element (2) contained items measuring infre-
quent outcome monitoring, process monitoring via
paperwork, and process monitoring via effort and
attitude evaluation. Further details are provided in
O&A.
To form a behavior control and outcome control
(BCOC) index (see Bollen and Lennox 1991;
MacCallum and Browne 1993), the two supervision
and three evaluation subscales were converted to z-
scores and additively combined with percentage of
salary in the pay plan (also a z-score) to form an
index of behavior control (versus outcome control -
represented by lower scores).
Hypothesized consequences. All measures of the
hypothesized consequences of a behavior vs. out-
come control philosophy are discussed in O&A. They
are used here without modification.
Analysis
A fe-means clustering approach was chosen be-
cause of the large sample size and because cluster
memberships were not known in advance. Ap-
proaches based on fe-means are iterative in that
many cluster center estimations are calculated, all
based on a pre-specified number (fe) of clusters, un-
til no cluster centroid can be found which improves
cluster separations. Using the z-scores from the
behavior control classification criteria as clustering
variables, k was varied from a low of two until
solutions containing less than 10% of the sample
size emerged. This sample size deterioration was
approached at a four cluster solution and occurred
rapidly at five clusters. Based also on interpreta-
tion and goodness of fit, the three cluster solution
was selected for further analysis. As noted, higher
order cluster solutions produced small sized addi-
tional clusters and only marginal reductions in the
error sums of squares function. All clustering vari-
ables contributed significantly to the cluster sepa-
rations at the .01 probability level by one-way
ANOVA.
 6 Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management
Results
To interpret the three cluster solution, the dis-
play of cluster means is reported in Table 2. Shown
are the BCOC index means, and the index compo-
nent means (the two supervision scales, the three
evaluation scales, and salary). The top half of the
Table reports the actual z-score means while the
bottom half shows the raw score scale means. These
latter data are not mean-adjusted.
Cluster 1 (26% of the sample) is shown to have all
of the characteristics of a behavior control philoso-
phy with the exception that respondents report that
their sales offices use less paperwork and call-re-
lated inputs than most. This first group reported
experiencing high levels of supervision, relatively
low emphasis on quantifiable results (sales, profits)
and a management mentality that stresses what
they do, not just the results they achieve. These
salespeople perceive that management pays close
attention to whether they display favorable job at-
titudes and whether they seem to be trying hard.
Salespeople in this group, on average, have the high-
est percentage of salary-dependency among the
three groups. This cluster will be referred to as
behavior control (1) or BC1.
Cluster 2 (39%) also shares the characteristics of
a behavior control firm except that these salespeople
perceive that management uses an above average
level of outcome evaluation methods. Supervision,
high levels of input evaluation, and average use of
salary in the plan mark this cluster. It appears that
the sales offices represented by this group are heavy
users of any and all evaluation methods, including
outputs, within a behavior control philosophy. This
cluster will be referred to as BC2. BC2 appears to
be a hybrid control system, somewhat closer to be-
havior than to outcome control and is distinguished
by its extensive use of multiple criteria, spanning
both inputs and outputs.
Finally, Cluster 3 (35%) appears to be an outcome
control cluster. The level of supervision is well be-
low average, a bottom-line orientation prevails, both
measures of input-related evaluations are below
average, and the percentage of salary in the plan is
lower than the other clusters. Unlike a "pure" out-
come control philosophy, however, output monitor-
ing appears less frequently than one would expect.
Nonetheless, this cluster will be designated as one
of outcome control (OC).
The raw scale scores mirror the pattern of ^-scores
except that actual levels of the representative vari-
ables are shown. For example, the attitude/effort
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evaluation mean scores tend to be higher than the
paperwork/call-related scores, which indicates that
all groups monitor attitude and effort to some ex-
tent. The percent of salary figures display wide
variance, a statistic masked in the standard score
data. The percent salary reports range from 46%
(Cluster 3) to 62% (Cluster 1), a pattern consistent
with the behavior vs. outcome control distinctions
made earlier.
Table 3 shows the cluster differences in the list of
consequent variables in O&A. In some sense, it is
analogous to Table 5 in O&A, where behavior con-
trol and outcome control are considered as polar
opposites on the same unidimensional continuum.
In many cases, the results in Table 3 are similar to
those of O&A. For example, the product/company
knowledge scale, which was not correlated with the
behavior-outcome control index, also did not reveal
significant differences across clusters. The findings
for the organizational commitment scale, however,
were consistent with predictions in both analyses.
Table 3 shows that the average commitment score
is indeed higher for behavior control groups and
highest of all for BC1, as the simple correlation of
0.27 suggested in O&A.
Generally, the cluster means provide an explana-
tion for the more modest levels of associations found
in the O&A correlational results. It appears that
both the BC1 and BC2 groups respond similarly to
many of the hypothesized consequences. Examples
are risk-seeking preference, extrinsic motivation,
selling smarter, and sales expense control. In many
cases, however, the BC2 group scores exceed those
of BC1. Examples are sales expertise, teamwork,
and job satisfaction. This latter pattern would tend
to reduce the zero-order correlational results be-
tween the behavior-outcome control index and vari-
ables more highly related to the BC2 group, as the
BC1 group scored marginally higher on the BCOC
index (Table 2).
To test for the similarity of BC1 and BC2 versus
OC (i.e., a stepped response function), F-tests of the
overall group differences and a test of the contrast
between the BC groups and the OC group are also
shown in Table 3. Generally, this contrast was sig-
nificant in all instances of a significant ANOVA
finding. Thus, it appears that variations in the two
behavior control philosophies as discovered here do
not change levels of the consequent variables as
much as the difference between behavior control
and outcome control.
To further understand the manner in which the
consequent variables respond to the BCOC index, a
 Fall 1995 7

Table 2
Cluster Centroids for the Three Cluster Solution

(1) (2) (3)

Control factor

Mean cluster Ζ scores

BCOC Index .291 .212 -.460

Extent of supervision .382 .448 -.797
Not bottom-line oriented .800 .141 -.766
Infrequent outcome monitoring .695 -.627 .183
Evaluation subjectivity
(paper/call related) -.672 .762 -.353
Evaluation subjectivity
(attitude/effort related) .306 .515 -.816
Salary in plan .233 .031 -.212

Raw scale scores*

Extent of supervision 5.402 5.482 3.994

Not bottom-line oriented 5.584 4.802 3.723
Infrequent outcome monitoring 3.733 2.436 3.231
Evaluation subjectivity
(paper/call related) 2.777 4.581 3.178
Evaluation subjectivity
(attitude/effort related) 5.956 6.157 4.878
Salary in plan (%)

'Based on 7- point scales (with the exception of salary)

Note: All cluster differences significant at ρ < .01 .

summary of the significant findings in Table 3 is
reported in Table 4. The first column shows the
instances where the BC1 group scored higher than
the BC2 group which, in turn, scored higher than
the OC group as a linear assumption would sug-
gest. The second column shows the instances where
the BC1 and BC2 groups were largely similar in
score, but were statistically greater than the OC
group. In effect, this column displays variables
where behavior control results in higher variable
levels than outcome control, as the A&O proposi-
tions would suggest. Finally, the last column shows
instances where the hybrid group scores higher than
both BC1 and OC. In some cases, the hybrid group
could be considered unique in that its score domi-
nated the other two groups (e.g., intrinsic motiva-
tion), while in others, it generated scores higher
than the BC1 group, but not statistically so.
The results show that the "linear" assumption is
not tenable. Only three variables (commitment, par-
ticipative decision making, and perceptions of pay
as controlling) met this criterion and, in all three
cases, scores for both BC1 and BC2 were statisti-
cally similar. Thus, although the BC1 scores were
higher than that of BC2, they were not sufficiently
so to rule out the step function assumptions.
In six cases (extrinsic motivation, direction of
motivation, selling smarter, controlling expenses,
satisfaction, and a supportive organizational cul-
ture), the step function findings fit the data best. In
the remainder of cases (nine in all), the hybrid group
scored higher than the OC and the BC1 groups,
although in five of these, the BC1 group could not
be considered statistically lower. Note that the three
critical performance variables (relative performance,
performance rank, and the pursuit of performance
goals) were best explained by the "hybrid high" ex-
planation.

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 8 Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management

Table 3
Cluster Means on the Hypothesized Consequences of Control Philosophy

Contrast
Cluster Cluster One-way 0,1.-2)

Cognitions/capabilities
Product/company knowledge 1 . BC1 3.68 2.95 0.53
2. BC2 3.36
3. OC 3.58
Sales expertise/competence 1.BC1 5.31 8.19b 3.70*
2. BC2 5.44
3. OC 5.05

Affects/attitudes
Organizational commitment 1.BC1 5.91 16.54" 5.74b
2. BC2 5.77
3.OC 5.19
Accepting of authority/direction 1.BC1 5.37 9.65" 4.02b
2. BC2 5.52
3. OC 5.04
Accepting of cooperation as part
of a sales team 1.BC1 5.61 6.86b 2.79o
2. BC2 5.82
3. OC 5.49
Accepting of performance
reviews 1.BC1 4.37 4.75" 2.05*
2. BC2 4.69
3. OC 4.26
Risk seeking preference 1 . BC1 3.76 0.83 -1 .28
2. BC2 3.77
3. OC 3.92

Motivation
Nature of motivation (Intrinsic) 1.BC1 4.79 7.69" 2.01·
2. BC2 5.22
3. OC 4.78
Nature of motivation (Extrinsic) 1 . BC1 2.98 9.45b -4.30"
2. BC2 2.96
3. OC 3.67
Direction of motivation (Agency) 1.BC1 0.45 3.97· 2.50a
2. BC2 0.47
3. OC 0.42

Behavioral strategy
Planning 1.BC1 4.70 3.92· 1.08
2. BC2 4.96
3. OC 4.73
Call activity (% of total time) 1.BC1 0.22 0.55 -0.61
2. BC2 0.24
3. OC 0.24
continued . . .

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 Fall 1995 9

Sell/non-sell time ratio (%) 1.BC1 0.50 0.20 0.39

2. BC2 0.51
3. OC 0.50
Selling technique ("Smarter") 1.BC1 5.35 3.23a 2.51·
2. BC2 5.36
3.OC 5.15
Selling technique ("Harder") 1.BC1 4.43 2.88 1.03
2. BC2 4.71
3. OC 4.45

Performance
Relative performance scale
(outcome) 1.BC1 6.69 5.45" 1.16
2. BC2 7.16
3. OC 6.77
Relative performance rank (outcome) 1 . BC1 3.47 7.76" -0.59
2. BC2 4.06
3. OC 3.84
Pursuing sales and profit (outcome) 1.BC1 4.34 15.07b 2.25a
2. BC2 4.97
3. OC 4.40
Information gathering (input) 1.BC1 4.93 2.35 1.30
2. BC2 5.17
3. OC 4.89
Sales expense control (input) 1 . BC1 5.85 2.21 2.07a
2. BC2 5.86
3. OC 5.67
Sales presentation planning (input) 1.BC1 5.37 15.42" 3.72"
2. BC2 5.80
3. OC 5.21
Job satisfaction 1.BC1 5.81 8.97" 3.94b
2. BC2 5.92
3. OC 5.53

Participative decision-making 1.BC1 5.16 48.72" 9.87"

2. BC2 5.01
3. OC 3.82

Pay as a control mechanism 1.BC1 2.79 13.27" -3.35"

2. BC2 3.43
3. OC 3.54

Organizational culture
Innovative 1.BC1 2.60 18.51" 5.13"
2. BC2 2.81
3. OC 2.36
Bureaucratic 1.BC1 1.75 3.27" 0.16
2. BC2 2.10
3.OC 1.91
Supportive 1.BC1 3.02 31.46" 7.93"
2. BC2 2.95

•p < .05, "p < .01

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 10 Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management

Table 4
Summary of Order Effects in the Between-Cluster Findings
(Significant Relationships Only)

Effect "Linear Effect Stepped Hybrid High

Dimension

Cognitions/capabilities
Sales expertise/competence * *

Affects/attitudes
Prganizational commitment * *
Accepting of authority/direction * *
Accepting of cooperation as part
of a sales team * *
Accepting of performance
reviews * *

Motivation
Nature of motivation (Intrinsic) *
Nature of motivation (Extrinsic) *a
Direction of motivation (Agency) *

Behavioral strategy
Planning *
Selling technique ("Smarter") *

Performance
Relative performance scale
(outcome) *
Relative performance rank (outcome) *
Pursuing sales and profit (outcome) *
Sales expense control (input) *
Sales presentation planning (input) *

Job satisfaction *

Participative decision-making * *

Pay as a control mechanism *a *a

Prganizational culture
Innovative * *
Bureaucratic *

•OC high for this variable

Discussion chotomy presented in A&O. The results also sug-

gest that intermediate positions between these two
The results presented here suggest that there philosophies may be taken to strike a balance be-
may indeed exist two basic philosophies of sales tween the organization's circumstances and its goals.
control which follow the behavior vs. outcome di- Moreover, the primary intermediate position found

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 Fall 1995
Table 5
The Three Control System Groups
Characteristic
Supervision High Very high Very low
Importance of attitude and effort
in evaluating performance High Very high Very low
Emphasis on quantitative results
in evaluating performance Low Very high High
Philosophy that results are more
important than behaviors Low Neither High
Importance of complete, accurate
paperwork Very
Average percent salary in annual
compensation
Size of group in sample 26% 39% 35%
here apparently does involve seemingly opposing
governance strategies. A summary of the charac-
teristics of the three governance modalities appears
in Table 5.
The results showed evidence for a relatively "pure-
form" behavior control group, as the A&O discus-
sion would predict. The description of this group
sounds much like one would expect from a behavior
control system, and indeed these salespeople, as a
group, score the highest on the behavior control
index. However, there is one exception to the hy-
pothesized behavior control profile, which may be
peculiar to the firm sample used here. Compared to
salespeople from the other two groups, those in
straight behavior control systems report their man-
agements pay minimal attention to paperwork. They
apparently perceive that management is not par-
ticularly concerned about whether their paperwork
(call reports and the like) is accurate, complete, and
timely. Salespeople may think that, in these sys-
tems, management relies more on its own subjec-
tive impressions of a salesperson's effort and atti-
tude rather than inferring these from the
salesperson's reports. One can only speculate that
this relative lack of emphasis on paperwork may be
an anomaly to this sample because logic would dic-
tate that behavior control systems should rely
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11
low High Low
62% 55% 46%
heavily on a "paper trail" to track their salespeople's
behavior.
Interestingly, salespeople in the "pure-form" out-
come control group perceive that management pays
some attention to whether they display favorable
job attitudes and whether they seem to be trying
hard, but this concern is less pronounced than in
the other two clusters. Additionally, this group
scores very low on the extent of supervision, high
on bottom-line orientation, and very low on subjec-
tive evaluation of attitude and effort. Salespeople
in this group, on average, derive 46 percent of their
annual income from salary, the lowest percentage
among the three groups.
Generally, this description sounds much like one
would expect from an outcome control system, and
indeed these salespeople, as a group, score the low-
est on the behavior control index. Again, however,
there is an exception. Compared to salespeople from
the other two groups, those in straight outcome
control systems reported that their managements
were somewhat concerned about whether their pa-
perwork is accurate, complete and timely.
Additionally, the outcome control group appears
to think that management is somewhat more con-
cerned about paperwork than in the straight be-
havior control group. This belies the common image
 12 Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management
that salespeople in outcome control systems don't
have to put "pen to paper" as long as they generate
results. Apparently, the firms in the sample using
outcome control ask for something of a paper trail
from their salespeople to compensate for their rela-
tive lack of direct observation. This, too, is a specu-
lation and is contrary to the profile of an outcome-
control group as defined by A&O. Researchers are
encouraged to probe into this "paperwork anomaly"
to further understand the meaning and significance
of this finding.
The existence of the large BC2 cluster would seem
to suggest that a large proportion of behavior con-
trol sales offices are employing hybrid evaluation
strategies. The data suggest that this "mix" of strat-
egies employs high levels of input and outcome moni-
toring. This appears to be behavior control with
greater emphasis on results than would be expected
from a "pure" behavior control sales office. It sug-
gests that management may believe that inputs
such as effort and attitude are the first require-
ments of sales results and that measurement of
outcomes is necessary to calibrate proper levels of
these inputs. Managements may wish to consider
this "heavy evaluation" strategy as a viable alter-
native to pure behavior control.
Thus, as in behavior control, salespeople in the
hybrid group reported experiencing high levels of
supervision and something of a management men-
tality that emphasizes what they do, not just the
results they gain. Also, as in behavior control, these
salespeople apparently think management stresses
attitude and effort heavily in evaluating perfor-
mance. Yet, as in outcome control, these salespeople
think management is highly concerned with their
quantifiable results. In fact, this group thinks man-
agement cares more about the results numbers than
do salespeople under straight outcome control.
Our explanation for this heavy emphasis on re-
sults in the hybrid group is that management may
perceive that they have a vested stake in the re-
sults, given the great amount of effort put into be-
havior monitoring. Thus, they may be overly sensi-
tive to the fruits of their efforts, expecting that
inputs should result in outcomes (sales). In the more
"laissez faire" culture of outcome control offices,
managers may view performance monitoring with
greater dispassion. Definitive conclusions on this
interpretation await further research.
In addition to the results emphasis, salespeople
in the hybrid system think their managers are
highly concerned that their paperwork be accurate,
complete and timely. In short, management is per-
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ceived to be making very heavy demands (proper
paperwork, good attitude and effort, good sales re-
sults) and to be supervising heavily in order to see
their demands met. Thus, support for Ouchi's (1979)
third governance mode corresponding to an appar-
ent understanding of transformation knowledge and
a perceived ability to measure outcomes accurately
is provided.
This hybrid group scores midrange on the behav-
ior control index, and salespeople in this cluster, on
average, derive 55 percent of their annual income
from salary. Hence, in these hybrid systems, man-
agement insulates salespeople from some market
risk but still puts, on average, 45 percent of their
income at risk, thereby obliging salespeople to share
management's concern with turning in quantifiable
results.
Despite these differences, the hybrid group ap-
pears more closely aligned with the BC1 group than
with the OC group. This is apparent from the Table
4 results where more score "matches" were evident
for the two BC groups than for BC2 and OC. Even
when the BC2 group appeared unlike either BC1 or
OC, the BC2 scores were usually closer to those for
BC1 than for OC.
System Preferences
It may be that all three systems represent defen-
sible, coherent management philosophies and styles.
All three offer advantages and drawbacks. To date,
no evidence exists to suggest that one system is
inherently better than another. Each entails trade-
offs which are explored based on analysis of the
responses in this study.
It would be helpful to review Table 1 again, show-
ing the characteristics of outcome and behavior con-
trol. As management moves from right to left on
the continuum (from outcome control, toward be-
havior control), the thoughts, feelings and motiva-
tion of salespeople in each system differ. Bear in
mind that these are general tendencies, as there
are always specific exceptions. Discussion is re-
stricted to those variables which showed signifi-
cant differences, either in terms of BC1 vs. OC or in
terms of the BC1 and BC2 combination vs. that of
OC. It should also be emphasized that these find-
ings are specific to the present study and to the
particular study measures used to represent the
constructs in the A&O framework. Additional re-
search using different samples and
operationalizations will be needed to verify the con-
clusions drawn here.
 Fall 1995
As one moves left (to behavior control), sales-
people tend, on average, to possess higher levels of
sales expertise and competence than those on the
right. They are more accepting of authority and
direction (a compatible trait under behavior con-
trol), more willing to cooperate as part of a sales
team (less "lone wolf mentality), and more accept-
ing of performance reviews (both in terms of the
concept and the feedback from such reviews).
Note, however, that in all of these examples, the
pattern of results reflected the "stepped" response
function where the hybrid group actually scored
higher than the BC1 group. Thus, this profile may
be more illustrative of the more intense manage-
ment demands of this group. It may also be a func-
tion of experience; the hybrid group scored highest
on average years of sales experience. This may ex-
plain the greater level of sales competence and will-
ingness to cooperate with management reflected in
these study measures.
Also, the more one moves to the left, the more
salespeople feel committed (loyal) to their employ-
ers, and the more they are motivated to further the
company's interests, frequently to the point of mak-
ing tradeoffs to benefit their employers at the ex-
pense of their own interests and those of their cus-
tomers. In contrast, salespeople on the right are
less committed to their employers and, when mak-
ing trade-offs, may tend to more often favor their
own anchor their customers' interest over that of
their employers. This does not imply that outcome
control reps are not committed to management; it
means simply that they do not feel as loyal as do
the behavior control reps.
It was also observed that salespeople put a greater
emphasis on "working smarter" (devising and imple-
menting adaptive strategies, "diagnosing" the cus-
tomer) as management systems moved toward be-
havior control. This may be because salary systems
give salespeople the luxury of strategizing and in-
formation gathering, whereas commission systems
may force salespeople to move more quickly from
call to call.
Salespeople operating to the left (behavior con-
trol) report higher levels of job satisfaction with
their current job (the measure did not tap satisfac-
tion with the selling profession, per se). In contrast,
outcome controlled salespeople are less satisfied
with their current jobs than either BC group. This
pattern is similar to the commitment findings dis-
cussed earlier as it is known that satisfaction and
commitment are strongly related (Mathieu and
Zajac 1990).
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13
There are also differences in how salespeople per-
ceive their pay. Those toward the outcome control
side tend to see compensation as a lever manage-
ment uses to control them (which may foster re-
sentment). As the percentage of full commission
reps in the sample was modest (23%), it appears
that this form of control is exerted with the non-
commission elements of the pay package (e.g., bo-
nus). Alternatively, management may change the
commission structure by allocating lower commis-
sions to the easier-to-sell products in the line. In
contrast, those toward the behavior control side
tend to see compensation as providing feedback
about their performance and less as a way for man-
agement to control them, perhaps because salary
adjustments are typically made annually.
Respondents were also asked whether their firms
have a distinctive organization culture. In general,
salespeople closer to the behavior control side (BC1
and BC2) saw their companies as having a more
innovative atmosphere in which participative deci-
sion-making (versus top-down management) is more
prevalent. They also viewed their firms as warm,
nurturing and supportive. Interestingly, only re-
spondents reporting a hybrid system rated their
offices as more bureaucratic than the others. This
would appear to be consistent with the aduaT man-
agement style of this combination of control phi-
losophies.
The various differences observed here as one
moves from outcome to behavior control are consis-
tent with the A&O framework. By assuming risk
(via salary), offering considerable feedback, man-
agement contact and guidance, and holding sales-
people more accountable for behavior than results,
a management builds cooperation, teamwork and
loyalty. We note that these trends do not appear
solely at the behavior control extreme, but tend to
appear as one moves into the intermediate (hybrid)
positions. It is not until the outcome control ex-
treme is reached that they fall off markedly.
Highlights of the Hybrid Group
As noted, among the three control system groups,
there are several cases where the hybrid group
stands out as an exception to the previously stated
generalizations. Compared to straight outcome and
straight behavior groups, salespeople in the hybrid
group:
• are motivated by the intrinsic satisfaction of
doing a job well;
14 Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management
• spend a greater proportion of working time
on planning;
• do particularly well in terms of achieving
company sale^profit goals; and
• rate their offices as more bureaucratic.
Thus, there were substantial differences in how
well hybrid salespeople reported that they pursued
sales and profit objectives, met these same sales
and profit goals, and how well they did compared to
other salespeople in their firms. This may, in part,
be due to their greater efforts at planning and mak-
ing sales presentations. The role of intrinsic moti-
vation in this process undoubtedly plays a part. It
also appears that management plays an important
role in bringing these outcomes about.
One likely explanation for the higher reported
performance in the hybrid group is the
"overmanagement" suggested by the respondents.
Hybrid management involves careful attention to
all details of the selling process, its planning, ex-
ecution, and results. Salespeople in these firms may
feel overmanaged, but apparently this is likely to
pay off in performance if the self-reported results of
this study can be generalized.
An alternative explanation to the overmanage-
ment assumption is potentially more plausible. It
may be that a myriad of management strategies
are used in various offices such that each salesper-
son operates under a different set of managerial
guidelines. O&A provide evidence of this where they
find low and nonsignificant correlations between
BCOC scores in the same sales office (p.59). The
result of this "micro-management," whereby each
salesperson is treated individually by tailoring con-
trol systems to personal differences, is that any one
sales office may have a number of control systems
in place depending on the needs of its salespeople.
Thus, such managements would respond to the
motivational needs and experience of individual
salespeople, resulting in a form of control system
"segmentation."
Variation in the "Pure-Form"
Clusters
While the BC1 and OC clusters are described
here as pure form (for convenience), it is clear that
the results raise a number of questions as to how
"pure" these groups are. It has already been noted
that certain findings contradict prescription. In par-
ticular, the BC1 cluster uses less paper and call-
related monitoring than the others, and the OC
cluster uses less output monitoring than would be
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expected. Moreover, the percent of salary in these
groups does not approach the zero and 100% ex-
tremes as some might expect.
Our response to these inconsistencies is that: (1)
the managers themselves may use inconsistent gov-
ernance strategies through policy and inertia, as
we have proposed, (2) the BCOC index is a first
attempt at such a categorization tool and is in need
of further study and revision (e.g., the role of paper-
work should be examined further), and (3) the study
results are based on salespersons' perceptions and
may be subject to biases of interpretation. Thus,
our findings would seem to suggest "nearly pure-
form" groups that remain more heterogeneous than
would be predicted by theory. Researchers are en-
couraged to examine these variances for insights
into their sources.
Some Thoughts on Salesperson-
Control System Compatibility
How do salespeople in each of the three systems
come to differ from each other? Perhaps it is a
combination of selection (a deliberate choice to work
in each environment) and adaptation (changing
one's thoughts, feelings and motivation to fall into
line with the norms of the organization). Those
who cannot adapt (e.g., risk averse salespeople who
find themselves in outcome control systems) may
switch to other systems, voluntarily or otherwise,
or leave the selling profession. Those who stay
gradually adapt, though often unconsciously.
Salespeople are bound to find themselves, on oc-
casion, in a system that doesn't suit them and to
which they cannot adapt. The turnover that results
is healthy for both the employer and the salesper-
son. Sales organizations experiencing zero turn-
over may be either extraordinarily good at hiring
or too reluctant to make appropriate changes.
It would seem that many salespeople (especially
those who are inexperienced or those coming from
another industry) may not know their own prefer-
ences. As they discover their preferences, they face
the choice of switching employers, adapting, or leav-
ing selling. In working out their choices, they may
experience emotional upheaval, including periods
of recrimination (self and employer). Further, it
should be noted that salespeople's preferences can
change over time, perhaps provoking a job change
or a change of functions with the same employer.
This latter solution is an attractive option in team
selling environments where outcome risk is shared
among team members. Céspedes (1994) discusses
 Fall 1995
the elements of such systems in terms of sales task
stability. Risk averse salespeople may wish to shift
their efforts to those sales team activities with
greater stability (account maintenance, specifica-
tions and terms) or to product lines with more pre-
dictable demand characteristics. Task stability
would appear to argue for a behavior control ap-
proach as sales processes are more orderly and po-
tentially measurable.
Conclusion
It appears that the interrelated decisions about
salesperson supervision, evaluation and compensa-
tion can be arrayed on a continuum ranging from
behavior to outcome control. The system appears to
be somewhat non-linear, however, as behavior con-
trol apparently persists well into the mid-regions
where it begins to take on outcome control charac-
teristics. Contrary to the A&O predictions, the re-
sponse function appears to be neither linear nor
dichotomous. Rather, hybrid firms appear to be
adopting both control styles, taking them on in full
measure. This contrasts with a situation where
movement in one direction or another entails a com-
pensatory process.
If one were to speculate on the advisability of
using elements of both systems, it would only be
necessary to examine the characteristics of the hy-
brid group. This group appears both overmanaged
and micro-managed, although our interpretation
leads us to conclude that the former may be more
plausible. Here, management is concerned with all
elements of sales generation, including the process
itself and the results, on an individual basis. It
appears that such managements may actually be
over-involved in their jobs in that they may take
much personal responsibility for the outcomes of
their salespeople. The data, however, suggest that
there is much to be said for this approach. Sales-
people in hybrid offices report the highest levels of
many study variables including competence, the
affective variables including commitment, intrinsic
motivation, and many of the performance variables.
We stop short, however, of recommending this or
either of the more outcome or behavior oriented
systems, as numerous idiosyncratic variables will
moderate the effectiveness of any one control sys-
tem. In the end, management must find its own
equilibrium.
Thus, moving toward one end or the other of the
control system continuum changes the atmosphere
of the organization and influences how salespeople
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15
think and feel about their jobs. Perhaps the most
dramatic results occur when particular combina-
tions of behavior and outcome monitoring are
achieved. To a lesser extent, a firm's control system
also influences how salespeople act and how well
they perform. Further study is required to deter-
mine if other variations in control system philoso-
phy exist and what the consequences of such sys-
tems may be. Study should also proceed on varia-
tions of the hybrid system which optimize the sales
impact of rep organizations generally.
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