Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe

Author(s): John A. Armstrong

Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep., 1968), pp. 396-410
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1878147
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Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist
Variant in Eastern Europe

JohnA. Armstrong
University of Wisconsin

Collaboration,in the sense of co-operationbetween elements of the

populationof a defeated state and the representativesof the victorious
power, has been commonthroughouthistory.Even the more organized,
systematicforms of collaborationwhich one may call "collaborationism"
are frequentlyencountered,especially in European wars prior to the
French Revolution.With the rse of nationalismand concomitantmass
involvement,collaborationismacquireda more odious connotation.It
remained,however,for the Nazi conqueststo make the practicea mat-
ter for general execration.The sweeping German conquests provided
the potential for collaborationismon a scale unparalleledsince the
Napoleonicwars. Comparedto many aspects of World War II history,
however,the phenomenonof collaborationismhas receivedlittle critical
attention.A majorreason has been, no doubt, the painful implications
of collaborationismfor historians native to the country where it oc-
curred.For other scholars,a more decisive obstacle,perhaps,has been
the extreme complexityof the motives and forms of collaborationism.
Given the paucityof studies, one cannot hope at this stage to do more
than take a tentative step toward clarifyingthe problem,but even an
incompletetypologymaybe useful.
The complete ruthlessnessof Nazi ethnocentrismimplied contempt
for foreign social structuresand values which led to attemptsto manip-
ulate all elements of the defeated populations.As a result, collabora-
tion with the Nazis has frequentlybeen regardedas an indication of
the disintegrationof the social systems of the defeatedcountries.'Tak-
ing this position, many observershave compared naziism with com-
munismas an ideologicalmovementdistintegratingthe traditionalstate
system by appealing to latent social antagonisms.To the extent to
which Nazi supportersin defeatedstates really came from socially dis-
affectedelementsof their populations,this generalizationwould appear
1 During and immediately after the war, "fifth columns," real or imagined,
were often regarded as a parallel indication of social disintegration. For an
analysis of the exaggerations involved, in at least one case, in this view, see
Louis de Jong, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War (Chicago,
1956).
 Collaborationism in World War II 397
to be supported. On the other hand, when elements ethnically dif-
ferent from the dominant population provided the basis for collabora-
tionism, it resembles the form of aid to the enemy typical of the age
of nationalism since 1800.
As is usually the case in analysis of gross historical phenomena,
pure or ideal types are not encountered in practice. One can, however,
select polar types in which each of these forms of collaborationism is
clearly dominant. Collaborationism arising from social antagonisms
was, perhaps, most clearly apparent in Vichy France.2 The collabora-
tionist role of ethnic elements disaffected from the French national
majority was clearly insignificant. Personal ambitions and resentments
played, of course, a highly important part. For the most part, however,
these individual motives arose directly or indirectly from the social and
ideological conflicts which racked the French social system. The same
dominance of social and ideological motivations appears in collabora-
tionism in two of the other occupied countries of western Europe-
the Netherlands and Norway. In Belgium, persistent Flemish disaf-
fection for the dominant French culture constituted a major motiva-
tion for collaboration. Leaving aside the tangled question of the in-
fluence of the royal household in the Belgian brand of collaborationism,
however, one must stress that even in that country an important ele-
ment, headed by Leon Degrelle, was definitely motivated by social and
ideological considerations rather than by ethnic disaffection.
The situation in eastern Europe was very different. The number
of cases of collaborationism was much larger. Some instances, like the
Arrow Cross regime in Hungary in 1944-45, were dominated by social
and ideological motivations not drastically different from the predomi-
nant type of collaborationism in western Europe. It is worth noting
that most of these instances were in states which originally had been
allies rather than conquests of the Germans. In the latter states, the
dominant collaborationist element arose in ethnic groups which had
been in a subordinate position in the prewar political and social sys-
tems. On the surface, therefore, these instances of collaborationism
appear to cluster around the pole opposite to that identified by the
Vichy regime. More penetrating investigation suggests that the dichot-
omy was not quite so clear-that social and ideological motivations
as well as ethnic resentments were present. The ethnic element colors
2 The original version of this essay was presented at the American Historical

Associaticn at its December 1966 convention. I am very grateful both to fellow

participants in that program and to members of the audience for their com-
ments, which have enabled me to improve my presentation.
398 John A. Armstrong
the social and ideological motivations to such an extent, however, that
the latter appear quite different from the typical western European
motives for collaborationism. In the following discussion the bulk of
the evidence will be derived from the Ukrainian collaborationist ex-
perience. As will become apparent, Ukrainian collaborationism comes
closest to being the polar case of predominance of ethnic motivation.
It is crucial to recognize that Ukrainian collaborationism was not an
isolated phenomenon, however, but part of a broader tendency in
wartime eastern Europe. Consequently, the analysis of the Ukrainian
case will be presented in a framework built on comparison with col-
laborationism in Croatia and Slovakia.
During World War II, politics in all three of these areas was
dominated by extremist nationalist parties which resembled the Fascist
and Nazi parties in many respects. One might be tempted to conclude
that collaborationism in the Ukraine, Croatia, and Slovakia, as in
western Europe, was based principally on ideological affinity. The
actual situation in the three eastern European lands was much more
complex. An obvious and fundamental difference between them and
western European occupied countries was that the eastern European
areas were not independent states before 1939; these areas had not
constituted independent states at any time in modern history.3 The
Ukrainian, Slovak, and Croat populations were at least marginally
distinct from neighboring ethnic groups, but elements of the latter were
politically dominant in the Ukraine, Slovakia, and Croatia. While one
cannot posit the rise of rebellious national consciousness as inevitable
when one ethnic group is dominated by another, such a development
has been the rule rather than the exception during the past century. In
fact, nationalism as a political movement developed in all three areas
during the late nineteenth century and was greatly accelerated by the
conditions at the end of World War I. The close relation between this
development and collaborationism is suggested by the fact that tenta-
tive co-operation between nationalist elements and German or Italian
representatives began at that time, though neither side could then be
remotely described as Fascist. The relation between Slovak nationalists
and Germany was not very important at that time, but even the mod-
erate Croat leader, Vladko Macek, relates how the Italian Military Mis-
sion in Croatia in 1919 helped him transmit an anti-Serbian petition
to the Paris Peace Conference.4 Collaboration between Germans and
Ukrainians of all political shadings during 1918 was, of course, a far more
3Efforts were made to establish a Ukrainian state in 1918-20, but it never
controlled more than a fraction of Ukrainian ethnic territory.
4Vladko Macek, In the Struggle for Freedom (New York, 1957), p. 82.
 Collaborotionism in World War II 399
important phenomenon.5 During the interwar period, moderate Croat
political groups continued to maintain contacts with Italy, though with
some circumspection and hesitancy.6 In Slovakia, the turn toward col-
laboration with Nazi Germany was more sudden and more intense; as
a result, some of the really democratic groups opposed the trend.7 In
the Ukraine, al! political elements (except Communists, if one leaves
aside official Nazi-Soviet collaboration) worked with the Nazis at some
time between 1939 and 1945.8 For the UNR (Ukrainian National
Republic) group, populist and socialist in origin, collaboration was
reluctant and restricted; nevertheless, it took place. The monarchists
were far more enthusiastic, though the Nazi regime scarcely recipro-
cated their affection. The Ukrainian Christian Democrats, the UNDO,
also collaborated reluctantly, largely in restricted administrative situa-
tions, but they did collaborate throughout the war. In all these instances,
collaboration was based on pragmatic grounds: the Germans and the
Italians were nearby; they were great powers; on the surface they seemed
to present no vital threat; and, above all, the Germans were against the
status quo which the moderate nationalists sought to upset.
The evidence that collaboration with Italy and Germany began
before fascism was a factor, and was engaged in by most political
elements in the "submerged" eastern European ethnic groups, strongly
supports the hypothesis that ethnic dissatisfaction, rather than social
and ideological motivations, was dominant there. Further support for
this hypothesis is provided by close analysis of the apparent ideological
affinities between Nazi ideology and the extreme nationalism politically
dominant in these groups.
In all three, the extreme nationalist ideology was developed before
the Nazis came to power in Germany. The Slovak extremists, in the
Slovak People's Party, began to develop a totalitarian ideology and
organization in the 1920's. From the beginning, they appear to have
been influenced strongly by Italian fascism but not by naziism. Prob-
ably they could not have prevailed over the conservative clerical wing
of the party without the example and support of the Nazis, however.9
5See especially John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution (Princeton,
N. J., 1952); and Hans Beyer, Die Mittelmnaechte und die Ukraine (Munich, 1956).
6 Jacob B. Hoptner, Ylugoslavia in Crisis (New York, 1962), pp. 140-41.
7 Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 88-96.
8 Except as noted, my evidence concerning the Ukrainian situation is pre-
sented in Ukrainian Nationlalism (New York, 1963).
9 Lettrich, pp. 75, 96-97; Joseph A. Mikus, Slovakia: A Political History,
1918-1950 (Milwaukee, 1964), pp. 118-19. Both authors are Slovaks, but
Lettrich is strongly opposed to Slovak separation from Czechoslovakia, while
Mikus, while favoring the more moderate wing of the People's Party, rejects
the tie with Prague.
400 John A. Armstrong
The situation in Croatia was clearer. The Ustaga party was formed
in 1928 as an avowed conspiratorial and terrorist organization. Un-
doubtedly, the Italian Fascist model was influential, but Macedonian
and Albanian conspiratorial groups seem to have provided more im-
portant models.10 The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)
was constituted the following year.11
Like the extreme Slovak Populists and the Usta'sa, the OUN was
influenced by Italian fascism. Dmitro Dontsov fervently proclaimed his
admiration for Mussolini.12 But Dontsov, who occupied a uniquely
important place in the development of OUN ideology (although he
was never formally a member), is a man of unusually complex intel-
lectual descent. An East Ukrainian by origin, he was strongly attracted
by Marxism before World War 1.13 Quite possibly (although he harshly
rejected Russian populism) Dontsov was influenced by the conspira-
torial model of the Narodnaia Volia.14 By the late 1920's, however,
Dontsov rejected all of the "ideas of the nineteenth century," and
hailed a curious collection of "heroes," including Nietzsche, Bergson,
Georges Sorel, Kipling, Kitchener, and Theodore Roosevelt. Dontsov's
main intellectual inspiration at this period was drawn from Maurice
Barres and Charles Maurras. Roman Olynyk, the most systematic
student of Dontsov's ideas, goes so far as to speak of his "infatuation"
with the French writers of the Action Franqaise.15Even if one accepts
Ernst Nolte's view that the Action Francaise constituted the "first
epoch of Fascism," the relationship between the Action Francaise
and Italian fascism was at most only marginally significant when Dont-
sov embraced the French ideas.'6 At least as a start, it seems prefer-
able not to call the OUN's ideology "fascism" but to designate it
"integral nationalism," in accordance with Carlton Hayes's classifica-
tion of the Action Franqaise model. In any case, it is clear that the

10 Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat, 1941-

1945 (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 19.
11Though the OUN and the Ustasa were formally constituted at the end
of the 1920's, both were, to some degree, developments from earlier semi-
conspiratorialorganizationsamong their ethnic groups.
12 Dmitro Dontsov, De shukaty nashykh istorychlnykh tradytsii [Where To
Seek Our Historical Traditions] (2d ed.; Lvov, 1942).
13 Roman Olynyk, "Literary and Ideological Trends in the Literature of
Western Ukraine, 1919-1939" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Montreal, 1962),
p. 44.
141 have no direct evidence of this influence on Dontsov, but it was an
extremely common one among East Ukrainians of his generation. See, e.g., the
postwar emigre publication Narodnia Volia, 1949 et seq.
15 Olynyk, pp. 46-48.
16 Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Franqaise, Italian Fascism,
National Socialism (London, 1965).
 Collaborationism in World War II 401
relationship of the OUN to naziism was in no way one of affiliation
but, at the most, one of affinity. Ideological positions shared by the
two movements derived from remote, and often unrecognized, intel-
lectual sources. Since both naziism and integral nationalism are notori-
ously obscure and contradictory in their ideological positions, it is
extremely difficult to define these affinities. Their influence both in
stimulating and in limiting collaboration was so important, however,
that the affinitiesmust be traced at least schematically.
The great paradox in the relation between naziism and integral
nationalism arises from the fact that the basic affinity between the
movements is the ascription of absolute value to the nation. Every-
thing is to be subordinated to ethnocentrism, to the Nazi or integral
nationalist concept of national interest. No alternative human value or
moral scruple is to be considered. Obviously this constituted agreement
on a basic ideological principle, but just as obviously the agreement
afforded no basis for collaboration, for the principle meant that con-
flicting interests were to be served at all costs, rather than reconciled.
Eastern European integral nationalists assumed that there would be
no conflict between German (or Italian) national interests and those
they envisaged for their own nations. Dontsov, for example, wrote
that Germany "never did anything against our national unity."'17 In
fact, specific conflicts arose as soon as collaboration began. The prewar
history of the Usta'sa is the story of the conflict between its deter-
mination to smash the Yugoslav state by any means and Mussolini's
and Hitler's schemes for using the Ustasa as a pawn alternately to
disrupt or blackmail the Yugoslav regime.'8 Even after the Axis cast
the die in favor of a "Ustasa state," they found integral nationalist
fanaticism a seriously disrupting influence. Probably all that prevented
the Germans from taking armed action to curb Ustasa excesses in
1941 was the necessity for withdrawal of German troops to the eastern
front.'9 The Germans cynically played off the Slovak integral national-
ists against the Hungarians and, after the Slovak rebellion of 1944,
reduced the latter to puppets. The most extreme conflict of interests
was in the Ukraine, where Hitler was determined to reduce the popu-
lation, at least in the eastern Ukraine, to serfdom. The OUN, on the
other hand, was determined at all costs to establish an all-Ukrainian
state. As a result, initial efforts of both branches of the OUN to col-
laborate ended in disillusion and bloody suppression of the integral
nationalists.
17 Dontsov, p. 84.
18Hory and Broszat, pp. 27 ff.
19Ibid., p. 97.
402 John A. Armstronig
It is notable that in all of these cases the obvious affinity in idoliz-
ing the nation in itself led to friction rather than to collaboration.
The failure of extreme nationalism to provide a basis for unity is ap-
parent in spite of the fact that affinity of ideologies went much further
than insistence on primacy of national interest, however.
The avowed organizational affinities are probably least important.
All three eastern European integral nationalist organizations were
avowedly based on the Fuehrerprinzip. In fact, all departed sharply
from the Nazi model in a curiously similar fashion. Whereas Adolf
Hitler was the undisputed master, the real motivating force of naziism,
the integral nationalist parties were marked by dispersion of authority.
Each had a "founder" who was dead, and therefore sanctified, by the
time World War II began: Evhen Konovalets for the OUN, Andrei
Hlinka for the Slovak Populists, and Josip Frank for the Usta'sa.20
Each had a relatively conservative leader who leaned toward hier-
archical rather than charismatic models of leadership: Andrei Melnik
for the OUN, Jozef Tiso for the Populists, and Slavko Kvaternik for
the Usta'sa. Sooner or later each conservative was overshadowed by a
fanatic rival employing personalist methods of leadership. Thus Kvater-
nik's attempt to establish the authority of the military within a "normal"
state framework was submerged by Ante Pavelic's emphasis on the
"Ustasa party-state" and the party militia, developments undoubtedly
popular among the party rank and file. Vojtech Tuka (who also
strongly favored a para-military organization) became the dominant
force in Slovakia. Stepan Bandera attracted the mass of active OUN
members to open revolt against Melnik's leadership. The forms of
internecine conflict varied widely. In no case, however, did they result
in a situation in which the party leader was at once founder, supreme
ideologue, charismatic leader, and absolute dictator, as in Germany.
While it is entirely possible that a supreme leader of an integral na-
tionalist movement would have caused more trouble for the Nazis, the
divisions among the nationalists tempted the Nazis to play off one
faction against another to achieve short-range objectives. Material col-
laboration was temporarily enhanced, but the prerequisites for longer-
term co-operation were undermined.
If ostensibly identical organizational principles failed to provide a
basis for collaboration, the superficially similar approaches of Nazis
and integral nationalists to, the question of national identity ultimately
resulted in severe strains on collaborationism. Nazi and integral na-
ationalist alike refused to accept the ethnic group as it was, but de-
20 Frank died long before the Ustasa was formed, but it honored him as its
spiritualforerunner;Slavko Kvaternikwas his son-in-law.
 Collaborationism in World War 11 403
manded that it conform to an ideal which they themselveshad con-
ceived. For all, the ideal nation was a racial concept. Hitler's efforts
to realize the ideal by physically eliminating "racially impure" ele-
ments and encouragingthe breedingof the "racialsupermen"are too
horrifyinglyclose to require recountinghere. Although (because of
the religiouspressuresalluded to below) the Slovak Populists did not
emphasize the biologically racial aspects of their ideology, Ustaga
and OUN spokesmen did not shrink from accepting explicit racism.
For the Ustagaleader Ante Pavelic, repugnantideas like the Yugoslav
concept were propagatedonly by "foreignblood."2' Dontsov scorned
objectionsto "zoologicalnationalism."22 An anonymousOUN spokes-
man wrote, "Nationalismis based on feelings, which are carried by
the racial blood."23
On the other hand, neither Nazis nor integral nationalists took
the logical step (if one can refer to logic in racist ideology) of relating
the eastern European nations to the broader Slavic entity. The Nazis
regardedthe East Ukrainiansas Untermenschenbut (after some hesita-
tion) accepted West Ukrainiansinto the Waffen SS and tacitly over-
looked the Slavic origins of the Slovaks and Croats. Contraryto all
historical or linguistic evidence, the Ustaga asserted that the Croats
were a "Gothic"people; the SS acquiescedin this interpretation,at
least to the extent of acceptingCroat recruits.24On the other hand,
the Slav nationalists showed little sympathy for one another. It is
true that the formationof the Slovak state served as a cerain stimulus
for the Ustagaand that the latterpermittedthe formationof a "Ukrain-
ian legion."25Each Slavic integralnationalistgroup, however, had at
least as strongties with geographicallydistant,non-Slavicmovements.26
The main emphasisof the integralnationalistswas, like Maurras',
on the unique nation in history. An explicit object of Dontsov's scorn
was the "nineteenth-century"theory of "Slav brotherhood."27For
Dontsov, there were "master nations" and "plebian nations." In a
given historicalperiod, a nation might fit in either category,depending
on its "psyche."Characteristically,Dontsov turned to Italy for evi-
dence to supporthis theory: at the time of the Adowa defeat, Italians
21 Hory and Broszat, p. 29.
22Dontsov, p. 49.
23"Sigma"in Nastup, Mar. 23, 1940.
24Hory and Broszat, pp. 29, 71.
25Nastup, July 12, 1941.
26The OUN had especially close ties with the Lithuanian government (and,
later, Lithuanian underground forces); the Ustaga had links with Spain and
Peron's Argentina. I have not been able to find evidence of Slovak ties of
comparable importance.
37Dontsov, p. 104.
404 John A. Armstrong
were inferior, but fascism had raised them to the ranks of the master
races.28 The Ukrainians had been a master race in the Cossack period
but by the nineteenth century had declined to plebian status. But na-
tional purification could restore them.29
For the eastern European integral nationalists, as for the Nazis,
the principal thrust of "national purification" consisted of the elimina-
tion of enemies who had contaminated or thwarted the "racial soul"
or "national psyche." At first sight, this essentially negative, destructive
characteristic seems to have been accompanied by a positive aspect,
the cult of "heroism." All of these movements had their martyrs, their
blood-soaked flags, their rituals of dedication. Ostensibly, these rituals
were designed to inculcate discipline and self-sacrifice; in fact, they
were essential corollaries of the idolatry of the nation. The emphasis
on "thinking with the blood" was aimed at undermining rationality
and insuring blind obedience and inevitably destroyed all traditional
moral scruples. It is at this point that the ambiguous position of the
integral nationalists, as compared to the Nazis, becomes most apparent.
Both types of movements rested on the idolatry of the ethnic group,
but for the Germans the separate identity of the group, a historical
nation, was scarcely in question. Each of the three eastern European
ethnic groups was, on the other hand, not quite sure of its identity. The
normal appeal to historical continuity was uncertain, for each had been
submerged for centuries in states identified with other ethnic groups.
The other accepted criterion for nationhood, a distinctive literary lan-
guage, was also somewhat in doubt. Slovaks and Ukrainians, though
speaking recognizably distinct Slavic tongues, always had to face the
contention that their tongues were dialects of Czech and Russian,
respectively, rather than full-fledged languages. The position of the
Croats was even more critical, for the only significant difference be-
tween their language and Serbian was orthographical. Under these
circumstances, integral nationalists in all three groups were compelled
to recognize what was, in fact, a basic element in the development of
ethnic distinctiveness in eastern Europe-religious peculiarity. The
real dividing line throughout modern history between Croats and Serbs
has been the division between Catholic and Orthodox. For the Slovaks,
the position was not quite so clear, but there is little doubt that their
alienation from the Czechs arose in large part from the dichotomy
between the Hussite and anticlerical traditions prevalent among the
Czech elite and the conservative clerical orientation of most Slovaks.
This dichotomy was strengthened by the economic differences between
28 Ibid., pp. 101-2.
29 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
 Collaborationism in World War II 405
agrarian Slovakia and industrialized Bohemia to a degree which made
Slovak collaborationism resemble, to some extent, a conservative social
reaction, as in western Europe, rather than the typical eastern European
ethnic protest. In both cases, however, the predominance of integral
nationalism based, in the last analysis, on religious distinction led to
organizational and personal dilemmas, which contrasted sharply to the
thoroughgoing Nazi rejection of religion. From the narrow standpoint
of collaborationism, these dilemmas were a minor hindrance. Nazi
observers doubted that Slovakia could have a "Fuehrerstaat here with
parish priests as protagonists"30 but found that if permitted a little
self-deception the Slovak integral nationalists, the avowed defenders
of "Christ's Slovakia,"3' could be induced to co-operate in the most
extreme atrocities.32 On the whole, the Slovak Populists seem to have
required Nazi encouragement in scrapping all moral limitations, whereas
the Usta'sa appalled the Nazis themselves. Yet the Usta'sa regime, to an
even greater extent than the Bratislava regime, was based on an appeal
to religion, as its Easter 1941 proclamation shows:
By God's providence and the will of our great ally as well as the centuries-
old struggle of the Croatian people and the great readiness to sacrifice of
our leader Ante Pavelic . . . today before the resurrectionof the Son of
God, our independentstate of Croatiaalso arises.33
However timid the church hierarchies may have been in trying to curb
integral nationalist excesses, friction inevitably arose. It is significant
that the founder of the Slovak Populist party, Andrei Hlinka, was a
priest but also that he began his political career by open rebellion
against his bishop.34 The friction between Monsignor Jozef Tiso, nom-
inal head of the Slovak state, and the integral nationalist elements
among the Populists, if scarcely establishing Tiso's reputation for
courage or statesmanship, is undeniable. Though there is consider-
able evidence that clerics-especially Franciscans-were involved in
some of the worst Usta'sa atrocities, even lay Ustasa members had to
stifle their consciences, as indicated by the terrible self-condemnation:
"I am perfectly aware what is in store for me. For my past, present,
and future deeds I shall burn in hell, but at least I shall burn for
Croatia."35
One of the principal attractions of the Ukraine as a case study is
that the religious and social forces working for collaborationism were
30 Quoted by Mikus, p. 121.
31 Lettrich, P. 75.
32 Ibid., pp. 182 ff.; Mikus, pp. 97 ff.; Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the
European Jews (Chicago, 1961), pp. 459 ff.
33 Quoted in Hory and Broszat, p. 53.
34Lettrich, p. 68.
35 Quoted by Macek, p. 245.
406 John A. A rmstrong
not significant enough to complicate the effect of the ethnic factor
as much as in Slovakia and Croatia. If it had not been for the distinc-
tions between the Greek and Latin rites and regulations, the western
Ukrainians might have become Polonized in the nineteenth century.
The sociological base of integral nationalism was the Greek Catholic
population, with priests' sons extraordinarily prominent in the OUN.
Nevertheless, almost nine-tentlhs of the Ukrainian population was
Orthodox rather than Catholic in back'ground; so were many integral
nationalist leaders like Dontsov himself. It was impossible, therefore,
to base nationalism on religious distinctiveness, as Dontsov recognized
in contrasting the present to the "heroic age" of the Ukraine during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: "Religious belief, as presently
language, was the dividing line between nations. Then the religious
struggle was the national struggle, as now the linguistic struggle is."3"
But avoiding or muting the appeal to religious distinctiveness did
not release the OUN from the terrible moral dilemma inherent in the
adoption of an integral nationalist ideology. One way out was religious
indifference, or at least anticlericaiism, which was apparently strong
in the OUN ranks in the 1930's. Most rank-and-file members would not
overtly reject their religious upbringing, however, and the leaders did
not wish to repudiate religious support. In spite of his scorn for the
churches, Heinrich Himmler permitted Greek Catholic chaplains in the
SS Division Galicia, largely recruited by the OUN. In return the
church supported this form of armed collaborationism but continued
to stress the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." Sermons were
designed to warn Ukrainians against taking part in the slaughter of
Jews and also to prevent the fratricidal terrorism within the OUN.
In both cases, the church's moral influence was inadequate to prevent
flagrant crimes, whether instigated by the Germans or not, but strains
were apparent.
Insofar as the integral nationalists were prepared for ruthless action
against the Nazis' enemies, the basis for collaboration existed. Yet one
must distinguish between real and avowed attitudes even here. Nazi
and integral nationalist propaganda denounced a long series of common
ideological enemies. Plutocracy, Freemasonry, cosmopolitanism, liberal-
ism, democracy, and communism were called subversive of the national
ideal. To the extent to which integral nationalists really regarded such
ideas as their principal opponents, the collaborationist motivation
approaches that of reactionary western European movements which
worked with the Germans in order to overcome domestic enemies. In
fact, the degree to which the integral nationalist movements took these
3S Dontsov, p. 22.
 Collaborationism in World War II 407
ideas seriously varied considerably. In tune with its clerical conserva-
tive tendency, the Slovak Populists were most sincere in attacking
liberalism, democracy, Freemasonry, and plutocracy-but nearly al-
ways identified these "evil" forces with Prague. The Usta'sa was far
less concerned with subversive ideas. Among the Ukrainian national-
ists, ideologues like Dontsov joined the attack on ideological enemies,
such as democracy, but chance remarks (even under Nazi censorship)
betrayed nationalist writers' admiration for Great Britain and the
United States.37
More remarkable, while all integral nationalists denounced Com-
munists, both Slovaks and Croats apparently experienced little diffi-
culty in opportunistic contact with them. The Slovak regime maintained
correct relations with the U.S.S.R. during the Nazi-Soviet pact. It is
said that the Minister of the Interior in Slovakia, Alexander Mach,
shut his eyes to Communist activity.38 Communism was not a serious
concern of the Ustasa until Tito's partisan activity became threatening.39
For the OUN, on the other hand, communism was always identified
with one of the two great enemies, as it could hardly fail to be if the
dream of Ukrainian independence under integral nationalist leadership
was to be realized. The struggle against world communism was fre-
quently referred to as a basis for collaboration with the Nazis and
Fascists.40 Disappointed as it was, however, the OUN found another
basis for collaboration when the Nazi-Soviet pact was published-the
common desire to destroy the Polish state. Even more significant is
the fact that Ukrainian integral nationalists constantly emphasized
that communism is merely the contemporary expression of Muscovite
oppression.
The above analysis points to ethnic rather than to ideological
enemies as the real concern of integral nationalism. Even ethnic enmity
was highly concentrated. It is true that integral nationalism, by de-
manding absolute allegiance to one's own ethnic group and interpreting
history as a struggle among nations, stimulated general ethnic antago-
ism. But the attitude of the eastern European nationalists toward the
Jews provides a clear indicator of the real concentration of ethnic
37See the remark by one A. Biloshits'kyi in the Zhitomir neswpaper Ukrayns'ke
Slovo (then controlled by the OUN) that, "just as in America there is one
automobile for every five persons, in the U.S.S.R. for every five persons there
is one shot, sentenced to prison, or banished to Siberia" (quoted in Krakivs'ki
Visti, Sept. 14, 1941, p. 3). For Dontsov's continued antipathy to democracy,
see Dukh naslhoi davyny [The Spirit of Our Past] (2d ed.; Munich and Montreal,
1951), pp. 6, 304.
38 Mikus, p. 181.
39 Hory and Broszat, p. 177.
40 Dontsov, p. 18.
408 John A. Armstrong
hatred. Anti-Semitism has been endemic in the Ukraine and Slovakia
and, to perhaps a lesser extent, in Croatia. Integral nationalist writings
confounded Jews with cosmopolitanism, plutocracy, democracy, bol-
shevism, and the other ideological enemies. Except for the OUN,
which was suppressed before it could offer more than verbal support
to Nazi attacks on the Jews, eastern European integral nationalist
groups participated heavily in anti-Semitic atrocities. Even in the
Ukraine, numerous young men, who can be presumed to have had
some exposure to integral nationalist doctrines, enlisted in German
auxiliary police units which carried out frightful attacks on Jews.4'
After breaking with the Germans, however, organized OUN forces
underground or in guerrilla units adopted attitudes toward the Jews
ranging from indifference to provision of refuges. The Ustasa had a
longer history of ambivalence toward the Jews. Its propaganda made
the rather far-fetched identification of "Jewry" and Belgrade, but from
the 1920's on a considerable number of Jewish intellectuals were asso-
ciated with the Usta'sa cause. While the Usta'sa had few scruples about
joining in Nazi atrocities against Jews in general, "its" Jews were
protected.42 Many in the Slovak Populist party, on the other hand,
did harbor scruples against mass execution of Jews. Anti-Semitism in
Slovakia, however, was more deeply rooted in the conservative Slovak
identification of Jews with the Czechs as an educated minority holding
the best posts and controlling the economy. For the Slovak integral
nationalists, Jews merely constituted an appendage of the principal
ethnic enemy, the Czechs. The real aim of the Slovak Populists was
to drive out Czechs as persons and as influences, regardless of the
cost.43 Since this aim coincided with Nazi determinationto reduce
the Czechs to helpless wards of the Reich, Populist-Nazi collaboration
was (apart from the religious complications described above) firm.
The Usta'sa was even more single-minded in its concentration on the
main enemy, the Serbs. But circumstances were different. Whereas
Czech officials, teachers, and merchants could, as urban elements, be
deported, it was harder to uproot the centuries-old Serb villages of
Bosnia and Slavonia. Yet integral nationalism demanded an ethnically
"pure" greater Croatia. Genocide, in the most literal sense of the
term, was the Usta'sa "final" solution.44 After destroying the Yugoslav
41 As one of many examples, see Nuremberg trial document NO-1061 (Mid-
west Interlibrary Center collection), listing hundreds of members of the "Trav-
niky" battalion (engaged in the Warsaw Ghetto suppression) with obviously
Ukrainian names.
42 Hory and Broszat, p. 89; Hilberg, pp. 457-58.
43 Lettrich, pp. 142 ff.; cf. Mikus' statistics (p. 108) on the elimination of
Czech teachers.
 Collaborationismin World War 11 409
regime, however, the Nazis retained no special animus against the
Serbs, who produced a considerablecollaborationistelement. Apart
from this consideration,the extremeUstasa attacks on the Serbs were
bound to create chaos detrimentalto the German war effort. As a
result, Ustas'a-Nazicollaboration,though maintaineduntil the end of
the war,was uneasy.
As indicated previously, Nazi-OUN collaboration was vitiated
from the start by Hitler's determinationto treat the Ukraine as a
colony of serfs. In spite of the systematicdecimationof OUN activists
by Nazi executionsquads,however,the OUN returnedto collaboration-
ism as soon as it could be directed against the main enemies. The
Ukrainianintegralnationalistsituationwas peculiarin that there were
two enemiesof almost equal significance-the Poles and the Russians.
Even before 1939, 80 per cent of the Ukrainianswere under Soviet
(or, in OUN eyes, Muscovite) domination.'This situation dictated a
concentrationon the enemy from Moscow, a concentrationencouraged
by prominentEast Ukrainianfigureslike Dontsov. On the other hand,
nearly all the active leaders and most of the OUN rank and file were
West Ukrainians,who had grownup fightingPoles. As a result,the OUN
was a faithful German auxiliary in the Polish campaign of 1939.
Later, OUN units took advantageof the unsettled conditions in the
occupied territoriesto carry out attacks on Polish villages designed
to destroyor drive out Polish enclaveson what was consideredUkrain-
ian territory. Since these atrocities, like the Ustaga excesses, were
potentialthreats to the war effort, they constitutedan additionalbar-
rier to collaboration.45So did ruthless OUN attacks on Russian ele-
ments in the East Ukrainiancities in the autumn of 1941. In both
cases the Nazis preferred to play off the scorned Slavic elements
against each other, rather than to risk giving the Ukrainiansa free
hand. In spite of all this, when the Nazi regime offeredto collaborate
with Ukrainians again, the OUN agreed. Hatred of the Nazis was
undiminished,but the desire to fight the principal enemy, the Rus-
sians, proved more intense. As a result, the more moderatewing of
the OUN overtly aided in recruitingthe Waffen SS Division Galicia,
and the extreme wing at least acquiesced in the recruitment.After
the Soviet reconquest of Volhynia and Galicia, OUN-led guerrillas
there co-operatedas much as possiblewith the Wehrmacht.
In sum, the basic motivation for eastern European integral na-
tionalist collaborationismwas ethnic. For the integralnationalists,the
44Hory and Broszat, pp. 93 ff.; Stephen Clissold, Whirlwind: An Account
of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power (New York, 1949), pp. 13, 93 ff.
45On February 28, 1942, e.g., the German organ, Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung,
recordedthe death sentence given a Ukrainianfor killing a Pole.
410 John A. Armstrong
war was another phase of a generations-oldstruggle against the
dominantethnic groups, and the Nazis were unsatisfactorybut indis-
pensableallies in this struggle.Whatmade the WorldWar II situation
fundamentallydifferentfrom earlier examples of collaborationismin
easternEuropewas the dominance,in both the local submergedethnic
groups and among their great-power allies, of movements which
preached and practiced utter unscmpulousnessin the service of na-
tional idols.