FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 63202. April 9, 1985.]

DOLORES G. GOMEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Deogracias C. Contreras, Jr. for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; NOT LOOKED UPON WITH FAVOR
BUT MAY CREATE DOUBTS ON LIABILITY OF ACCUSED. — It is conceded that the State has the sovereign
right to prosecute criminal offenses under the full control of the fiscal and that the dismissal of criminal
cases by the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor.
However, it is also true that an affidavit of desistance may create serious doubts as to the liability of the
accused. At the very least, it calls for a second hard look at the records of the case and the basis for the
judgment of conviction. Jurisprudence on the effect of desistance notwithstanding, the affidavit should not
be peremptorily dismissed as a useless scrap of paper.

2. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS BINDING UPON THE
SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTIONS. — The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are binding upon this Court is subject to certain exceptions (Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. 61647, October 12, 1984). In Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage,
Inc. (97 SCRA 734), we held that this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of
said courts when — (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the
court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee. In the case at bar, the trial court and the respondent
Court of Appeals failed to consider some circumstances which negate the presence of conspiracy.

3. ID.; ID; CONSPIRACY; INTENTIONAL PARTICIPATION NOT ESTABLISHED. — The evidence presented by
the people to establish the presence of conspiracy is even murkier than the proof on the commission of the
crime itself. The factual findings of the respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court do not show the
participation of the petitioner in the events that followed after the pieces of jewelry were delivered to her
and her husband, Rodrigo. The records show that the only participation of the petitioner in the transaction
was when she and her husband received the pieces of jewelry from Belen Gomez Espiritu on November 10
and 21, 1973 at their residence. After the same were received, Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez took possession
of the said pieces of jewelry and disposed of them without the knowledge of the petitioner. Rodrigo and
Wilson Gomez alone absconded with the pieces of jewelry. As a matter of fact, the petitioner did not even
know the whereabouts of Rodrigo and Wilson who were then in possession of the said pieces of jewelry. The
participation of petitioner Dolores in the attempts to locate the missing brothers and to compel them to
return the jewelry to their sister is not proof of conspiracy in a crime. It was understandable why she was
involved in looking for her own husband at the behest of her sister-in-law. To establish conspiracy, there
must be evidence of intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose (People v. Agda, 111 SCRA 330). There is no evidence of such kind of
participation.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE NOT SUCCESSFULLY OVERCOME. — The evidence of the
prosecution fails to show that the petitioner knew the criminal intent of her husband Rodrigo and brother-in-
law Wilson Gomez. She was not even aware that Rodrigo went to Vietnam and that he brought with him
some of the pieces of jewelry. Dolores saw her husband Rodrigo and learned from the latter that he sold
some of the pieces of jewelry in Vietnam only when he returned to Manila. All these circumstances coupled
with the letter of Rodrigo dated January 8, 1974 addressed to the complainant Belen Gomez Espiritu and the
latter’s affidavit of desistance dated January 7, 1983 negate the existence of conspiracy involving the
petitioner. Without conspiracy, the petitioner cannot be held liable as she had no direct participation in the
commission of the crime charged. The presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner has not been
successfully overcome by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate
Court, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXX which found petitioner
Dolores Gomez guilty of the crime of ESTAFA. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The information charged the petitioner with estafa as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about and during the period comprised between November 20, 1973 and December 3, 1973,
both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Rodrigo Gomez and Wilson Gomez, brothers of Belen Espiritu, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Belen Espiritu in the following manner, to wit: the said accused received
in trust from the said Belen Espiritu on consignment basis four (4) pieces of jewelry, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"One (1) pinkish lady’s ring P45,000.00

"One (1) yellow onyx ring 4 k 25,000.00

"One (1) dominic ring 4,500.00

"One (1) dangling earring 45,000.00

with a total value of P119,000.00 with the understanding and under the express obligation on the part of the
said accused of selling the same on commission basis and turning over the proceeds of the sale thereof, is
sold, or of returning the said four (4) pieces of jewelry to said Belen Espiritu, if unable to sell the same
immediately upon demand; but the said accused, once in possession of the said four (4) pieces of jewelry
far from complying with her aforesaid obligation, and despite repeated demands made upon her to return
the aforesaid pieces of jewelry and/or pay the entire value of the same, failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to return the aforesaid pieces of jewelry, except the Dominic ring valued at P4,500.00, and instead,
with intent to defraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the abovedescribed pieces of jewelry to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Belen Espiritu in the total amount of P76,000.00, Philippine currency, that is the value of
one (1) pair of dangling earring in the amount of P45,000.00 plus the amount of P31,000.00 which said
Belen Espiritu paid in order to redeem the two (2) rings (the pinkish lady’s ring and the yellow ring 4k)
pledged by said accused to Jose Lontok and the Agencia de Empeños de Tambunting respectively.

"That Wilson and Rodrigo Gomez, being brothers of Belen Espiritu, are exempted from criminal liability for
the offense under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code." cralaw virtua1aw library

The facts adduced by the prosecution and accepted by the respondent court as basis for the judgment of
conviction are summarized as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Dolores Gomez is the wife of Rodrigo Gomez, who has a brother, Wilson Gomez, and a sister, Belen Gomez
Espiritu. Belen is the complainant, who initiated the filing of the charge of estafa against her sister-in-law,
Dolores. The main thrust of the defense is that, Accused should have been acquitted as Rodrigo and Wilson,
both surnamed Gomez, who are the brothers of Belen, were the only ones responsible for having taken the
pieces of jewelry in question.

"The evidence shows that on November 20, 1973, Rodrigo Gomez, husband of accused, went to the
residence of his sister Belen, in Angeles City because there was somebody in Manila interested in buying
some pieces of jewelry. Belen, together with Lourdes Balajadia and Rodrigo, went to the residence of
accused at 2275 P. Roman St., Sta. Ana, Manila. (Tsn., pp. 3-4, September 25, 1975).

"At the house of Rodrigo and Dolores Gomez and in the presence of Rodrigo and Lourdes, Belen delivered to
Dolores three pieces of jewelry: a 7 karat pink stone lady’s ring worth P45,000.00; a 4 karat onyx stone ring
worth P25,000.00; and a dominic ring worth P45,000.00. (Tsn., pp. 2-3, September 25, 1975).

"In the morning of November 21, 1973, Milagros Gomez, sister-in-law of Dolores, accompanied by Belen
Tiotuico, brought to her residence a pair of dangling earrings worth P45.000.00.

"The four pieces of jewelry were left with Dolores without any acknowledgment receipt as they were
relatives, under the condition that, if after two or three days, the jewelry would be sold, Milagros would give
Dolores and Rodolfo Punongbayan alias Willie Bakla P2,000.00 except for the dominic ring in which she
would give them P200.00; and if they could sell the jewelry for more than her price, the difference would
belong to them (Dolores and Rodolfo) but should they fail to sell the same, they would return the same.
(Tsn., pp. 6-10, September 25, 1975).

"On November 22, 1973, Belen reminded Dolores of their promise concerning the jewels and Dolores
requested more time to sell the same, to which Belen agreed.

"On November 23, 1975, Belen called up by long distance telephone, inquiring about any possible buyer.
Dolores answered that the jewels were not yet sold and that they were with Rodrigo in Laguna. (Tsn., p. 12,
September 25, 1975). On the same day when Belen called up again, Rodolfo told her that Dolores had
followed her husband to Laguna where the latter brought the jewelry.

"Sensing something was wrong after she again talked with Rodolfo in the evening of the same day, Belen
reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary in San Fernando, Pampanga, and asked them to look for
Dolores, Rodrigo, and Wilson.

"A week after the filing of the complaint, Rodrigo and Wilson were apprehended, both of whom promised to
return the jewelry to Belen. Wilson made a promise in writing, Exhibit A, while Rodrigo made a verbal
promise. (Tsn., pp. 15-16, September 16, 1975).

"Three days after, the dominic ring valued at P4,500.00 was returned to Belen by Wilson.
"In December 1973, Dolores told Belen that Rodrigo had two of the remaining unreturned pieces of jewelry.
And when Belen met her brother Wilson in Angeles City, he told her that he would tell her where the jewels
were pledged if she would not include him in the case. Wilson even gave her (Belen) a copy of the receipt
for P25,000.00 signed by Jose Lontok to whom the 7-karat pink stone ring had been pledged.

"When Belen tried to get the 7-karat pink stone ring from Jose Lontok in Ermita, Manila, he declined to give
her the jewelry pledged because, according to him, it was not the original receipt that was presented to him.
Belen told Jose that the jewelry pledged to him belonged to her. (Tsn., pp. 18-19, September 25, 1975).

"The next day, Belen returned to Jose to redeem the jewelry and told him she had merely asked Dolores to
sell it for her. Jose promised to give her the jewelry if Willie would come with her and bring the original
receipt. The next day when Willie and Belen came, she was able to recover the ring after paying Jose the
amount of P25,000.00. (Tsn., pp. 20-21, September 25, 1975).

"After Wilson had given Belen the receipt of Antonio Tambunting’s Pawnshop, as to the jewelry Dolores
pledged to guarantee payment of P6,000.00, and after she (Belen) executed an affidavit that she was the
real owner of the jewelry pledged, Belen was able to redeem it after paying the amount of P6,000.00. (tsn.,
pp. 22-23, September 25, 1975).

"As to the pair of dangling earrings, Belen was not able to recover the same and so she had to pay on
installments, the value thereof to Belen Tiotuico from whom she had received the jewelry. (Tsn., pp. 26-27,
September 25, 1975)." cralaw virtua1aw library

Dolores Gomez on the other hand denied any liability and pointed to Rodrigo Gomez, her husband as the
only person liable. The defense evidence is summarized as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"On December 3, 1973, at about noontime, Dolores Gomez and her husband Rodrigo Gomez were at their
residence at 2275 Paco Roman St., Sta. Ana, Manila, when her sister-in-law, Belen Gomez Espiritu, arrived
from Angeles City, Pampanga. On the verge of tears Belen told Dolores that she was in dire need of money.
As a sister-in-law, Dolores cannot help but ask her what help she can do for her. Belen then brought out a
ring a jewelry, and ask her and her husband Rodrigo if they can help her out to pawn the ring because she
had a postdated check she issued to somebody in Angeles City, and to cover up with the amount she wanted
the ring to be pawned. Belen talked over the matter with Rodrigo, Dolores’ husband, who was then present.
(Tsn., October 21, 1975, pp. 2-3).

"Belen suggested to pawn the ring at Monte de Piedad Pawnshop because that is where some of the Angeles
City people who are engaged in jewelry business usually pawn their jewelry, (Id., p. 4) . . .

"At the Monte de Piedad, Dolores presented the ring. Monte de Piedad offered only P2,000 for the ring, but
the amount was not sufficient because Belen needed P5,000.00. So Dolores returned to the car and told
Belen about the offer. Belen then told Dolores that they look for another pawnshop which could give the
amount needed by Belen. (Id., p. 4) Belen suggested the Tambunting Pawnshop. Dolores and her husband
then went to the Tambunting Pawnshop at Raon Street, Quiapo, Manila, again leaving Belen in the car. The
Tambunting Pawnshop offered P6,000 for the ring, but deducted the interest for four months and service
fees. Inasmuch as her sister-in-law needed only P5,000, Dolores agreed to pawn the ring (Id., pp. 4-5).
Dolores received P6,000 from the pawnshop. The pawnshop ticket was issued to her. (Id., p. 6). Dolores and
Rodrigo returned to their car. Dolores handed the amount of P6,000 to Belen and the pawnshop ticket. They
then drove Belen to the Philippine Rabbit bus terminal in Rizal Avenue, Manila because Belen has the money
with her. (Id., p. 8).

"The next day, Belen came back to the residence of the Gomez spouses. She was trying to deal with her
brother Rodrigo Gomez, Dolores’ husband, concerning some jewelries. They had a full-day transaction. (Id.,
p. 9). Dolores saw Belen gave (sic) four (4) pieces of jewelry to her husband Rodrigo, Belen’s brother. (Id.,
p. 8). Petitioner had nothing to do with her husband’s transaction with her (sic) sister Belen. (Id., pp. 7-8).

"Once Rodrigo was with the jewelry, he had been with his brother Wilson. Belen knew this. (p. 11).
Apprehensive, Belen called up Dolores by phone asking where her husband could be found. Dolores
informed Belen that he went to Laguna in his kumpadre’s place. (Id., p. 9). Belen told her that if Rodrigo
would not be home that night, Dolores should better follow him up to Laguna. (Id., p. 9). The next day,
Dolores and her niece proceeded to Laguna, but her husband’s kumpadre told her that he (Rodrigo) did not
go there. (Id., p. 10). Dolores then returned to Manila. Arriving at her residence, Belen was calling her at
the phone from Angeles. She told Belen that she had just come from Laguna but her husband was not there.
She asked Belen why she was looking for her husband, and Belen answered it was because of the jewels
which she gave to Rodrigo and Rodrigo was with their brother Wilson in Angeles City.

"Dolores then proceeded to her mother-in-law’s place in Angeles City to find out whether her husband was
really with his brother Wilson. Belen was also there. Belen informed their mother that Wilson was under the
custody of the police in Angeles City. (Id., p. 11). So Dolores and Belen, with some policemen, went to the
police department in Angeles City. Wilson Gomez was brought out from the cell and was forced to make a
statement by the policemen and he was asked to bring out her husband and he made a promise to bring out
the jewels.

"After Wilson Gomez signed the written promise (Exh. 2), he was released. (Id., p. 13). Dolores and Wilson
went to Manila. It turned out, however, that Rodrigo was in Saigon. There was no communication between
Rodrigo and Dolores (Id., p. 14), although Rodrigo wrote his sister Belen while he was in Saigon regarding
their transaction . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

x           x           x

"Dolores saw her husband only when he returned to Manila from Saigon and while he was detained at the
NBI upon a charge of falsification of passports. Dolores talked personally to her husband and inquired about
the jewelry. He said that he brought the jewelries to Saigon and sold them there, and he don’t know what
happened with the money. (Id., p. 16)." cralaw virtua1aw library

x           x           x

On February 24, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Manila convicted Dolores Gomez of the crime of estafa
and directed the City Fiscal of Manila to file the appropriate information charging Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez
with estafa after conducting the required preliminary investigation. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dolores Gomez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
estafa, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information, and absent any attendant modifying circumstance, hereby sentences her to suffer
indeterminate prison term of from six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, the necessary penalties thereof, to
indemnify the offended party Belen Gomez Espiritu in the amount of P45,000, the value of the unrecovered
pair of dangling earrings, and P31,000, the amount spent to redeem the pink stone ring and onyx ring from
Jose Lontok and Agencia de Empeños de Antonio Tambunting, or a total of P73,000, without subsidiary
imprisonment, in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

"Upon the facts relative to the participation of Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez, the Court hereby directs the City
Fiscal of Manila to file the information charging them with the same offense of estafa charged against the
herein accused, after conducting the required preliminary investigation, if one has not been actually
conducted when the instant case was filed against the accused Dolorez Gomez, otherwise to proceed against
them without any further delay." cralaw virtua1aw library

On July 31, 1980, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads: chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, finding that the decision holding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, (sic) and the same being in
accordance with law and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against appellant." cralaw virtua1aw library

A motion for reconsideration filed by Dolores Gomez was denied by the respondent court in a resolution
dated October 19, 1982.

On December 29, 1982, the petitioner filed her second motion for reconsideration. Petitioner also filed a
supplemental second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial for the reception of newly discovered
evidence. The evidence consists of an affidavit of Belen Gomez Espiritu dated January 7, 1983 declaring
under oath that it was her brother who took the pieces of jewelry but had already paid the full amount
representing the value thereof. The affidavit states in part: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That I have been the complainant in a criminal case now on appeal to the Court of Appeals and docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 20886-CR, entitled ‘People of the Philippines v. Dolores Gomez’,

"That after reviewing the facts of this case, I have come to realize that it was really my brother, Rodrigo
Gomez, who converted to his personal use the pieces of jewelry subject of this case and that my sister-in-
law, Dolores Gomez, had nothing to do whatsoever with said jewels;

"That this is evidenced by the letter which my brother Rodrigo Gomez sent to me from Saigon dated January
8, 1974, quoted verbatim on page 3 of the second motion for reconsideration, . . . .

"That it is clear from the tenor of the aforequoted letter of my brother Rodrigo Gomez, husband of Dolores
Gomez, the defendant-appellant in the appealed case CA-G.R. No. 20886-CR; that he has been in
possession of the jewels;

"That in my complaint filed with the City Fiscal’s Office, I included both my brothers Rodrigo and Wilson,
together with my sister-in-law Dolores; however, my brothers were excluded and dropped from the charges
by reason of the provision of Art. 332 of the Revised Penal Code; while my sister-in-law was left and
charged;

"That my aforementioned brother, Rodrigo Gomez, has already made full restitution to me of the value of
the said pieces of jewels showing that it was not my sister-in-law who is to blame;

"That for the above reasons, I have no more interest in the further prosecution of the case because clearly,
it was not my sister-in-law who committed the acts complained of but my brother Rodrigo who was dropped
from the charges." cralaw virtua1aw library
 x           x           x

These motions however were denied by the respondent court in its resolution dated February 8, 1983.

The petitioner bases her petition on the following arguments found in her memorandum: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA DESPITE
THE FACT THAT AN AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE WAS EXECUTED BY THE OFFENDED PARTY EVEN AFTER
JUDGMENT WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RECANTATION OF COMPLAINANT BASED ON
THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE AS A NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH IS A GROUND FOR NEW
TRIAL.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRAISING MATERIAL AND CONCRETE EVIDENCE WHICH TEND
TO SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED HAD NOT INDEED ABSCONDED WITH THE JEWELRIES IN QUESTION SINCE
IN TRUTH AND IN FACT SHE HAS NOT IN ANY WAY TAKEN PART NOR BENEFITED FROM THE CRIME OR
TRANSACTION, AND THAT CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN — WHICH CONSTITUTE GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND FACT WARRANTING THE EXERCISE BY THIS HONORABLE COURT OF ITS
INHERENT SUPERVISORY AND EQUITY JURISDICTION TO PREVENT A MANIFEST AND PALPABLE
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.

IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO
TRY AND DECIDE THE CRIMINAL CASE AS THE SAME INVOLVES MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY.

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, HER GUILT NOT HAVING BEEN PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

Relative to the first alleged error, the petitioner submits that the affidavit of desistance shows that she did
not participate directly or indirectly in the commission of the crime charged, and that it was her estranged
husband who is solely criminally liable. Dolores Gomez also submits that the affidavit of desistance casts as
shadow of doubt as to the veracity and credibility of the prosecution’s evidence linking her to the crime
charged. chanrobles law library : red

The Solicitor General on the other hand contends that the affidavit of desistance of Dolores Gomez and the
fact that Rodrigo Gomez had already paid the amount swindled do not preclude the prosecution of the
petitioner because estafa is a public offense which may be prosecuted independently of the will of the
offended party.

We agree with the petitioner. It is conceded that the State has the sovereign right to prosecute criminal
offenses under the full control of the fiscal and that the dismissal of criminal cases by the execution of an
affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. However, it is also true that an
affidavit of desistance may create serious doubts as to the liability of the accused. At the very least, it calls
for a second hard look at the records of the case and the basis for the judgment of conviction. Jurisprudence
on the effect of desistance notwithstanding, the affidavit should not be peremptorily dismissed as a useless
scrap of paper. In People v. Pimentel (118 SCRA 695), we held that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Undeniably, affidavits of desistance are generally frowned upon by our courts for they make a mockery of
our judicial system. Thus, in People versus Manigbas (109 Phil. 469), where a new trial was sought on the
basis of a retraction, We ruled that —

"Unless there be special circumstances, which, coupled with a retraction of the witness, really raise doubts
as to the truth of the testimony given by him at trial and accepted by the trial judge, and only if such
testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction, so much so that its elimination would lead the trial
judge to a different conclusion, a new trial based on such retraction would not be justified. Otherwise, there
would never be an end to criminal litigation.’

"Such special circumstances exist in the case at bar. And, as already discussed, they engender serious
doubts as to the appellant’s guilt. Accordingly, due consideration must be afforded the complainant’s
affidavit of desistance." cralaw virtua1aw library

There are such special circumstances in the case at bar which raise reasonable doubts as to the culpability of
Dolores Gomez. The letter of Rodrigo Gomez (Exh. F and F-1) addressed to the complainant Belen Gomez
Espiritu indicates that there may be some truth to the contention of the petitioner about her sister-in-law
picking on her because she could not run after the guilty parties, her own brothers. Doubts are engendered
regarding the testimonies taken at the trial court. The letter was mentioned by complainant Belen Gomez
Espiritu in her testimony regarding the pair of dangling earrings. It shows that it was Rodrigo Gomez,
husband of Dolores, who was in possession of some of the pieces of jewelry and who appropriated the
proceeds thereof. The full text of the letter states that:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Jan 8. 1974 Saigon,

Vietnam

"Dear Ateng Belen,

"Try to understand my letter. You know I do not like to commit this but I lack time. You know I have plenty
of compromise and I do not like this to happen but time asks for it.

"Anytime it happened. I like to return one I promised for the two. Anyway, it happened already and I’m in
another country we share it 50%-50%.

"I have to know your answer at the earliest, time for I’ll be leaving for Iran on the 26th of January and I’ll
be waiting for your go signal. I want to give the one and how can you get this one.

"If you do not like I’ll pay you $200 dollars a month once I work in Iran.

"Write me before the 26th of January and my address 22/10 Cuxia Lungia, Phutho. The other one Asia Hotel
Bangkok because the visa is Thailand going to Iran. Do not tell Loleng that I’ll be going to Iran and work
there. And your decision is that only the two of us will know. Write me at once in Bangkok. Have patience in
me and waiting for your reply.

"Your brother"

This letter of Rodrigo Gomez is a declaration against his own interests under Rule 130, Sec. 32 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and should have been given weight.

The records likewise show that some of the pieces of jewelry were in the possession of Wilson Gomez,
another brother of the complainant, Belen Gomez Espiritu.

The factual findings of the Court of Appeals based on the prosecution evidence indicate: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) It was Rodrigo Gomez, petitioner’s husband who went to Angeles City to inform his complainant sister,
Belen, that there was a buyer of jewelries in Manila.

(2) Complainant Belen claims she turned over the jewelries to petitioner Dolores. Yet, her brother Rodrigo
was there allegedly merely looking on.

(3) When Belen inquired over the phone about the jewelries, she was told that Rodrigo had them with him in
Laguna.

(4) The two brothers — Rodrigo and Wilson, after being apprehended, promised to return the jewelry.

(5) It was Wilson who returned the dominic ring to Belen.

(6) In December, 1973, Dolores told Belen that Rodrigo had two of the unreturned jewelries with him.

(7) When Belen met her brother Wilson in Angeles City, he gave her a copy of a receipt for P25,000.00
signed by Jose Lontok to whom the 7-karat pink stone ring had been pledged.

(8) When Belen redeemed the ring from Lontok, she was in the company of her brother Wilson who pledged
the ring and secured the original receipt.

(9) Wilson was the one in possession of the pawnshop receipt. Wilson was the one who gave the receipt to
Belen.

There are other circumstances in the records strongly suggesting that the transactions were between Belen
and her two brothers and that the petitioner came into the picture only because she was the wife of one of
the brothers.

These circumstances coupled with the affidavit of desistance of the complainant which explicitly states that it
was her brother Rodrigo Gomez who was in possession of the pieces of jewelry; that he converted to his
personal use the said pieces of jewelry but had already made full restitution of their value to the
complainant; that Dolores Gomez had nothing to do whatsoever with said pieces of jewelry; and that it was
not Dolores Gomez who committed the acts complained of but Rodrigo Gomez, create doubts as to the
petitioner’s liability. It is to be noted that the veracity and authenticity of the affidavit of desistance and the
letter of Rodrigo Gomez dated January 8, 1974 have never been questioned. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Therefore, the petitioner should have been acquitted.

The respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court convicted the petitioner solely on the finding that there
was a conspiracy between her and Rodrigo and Wilson.

The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is
subject to certain exceptions (Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. 61647,
October 12, 1984). In Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734), we held that
this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts when - (1) the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee.

In the case at bar, the trial court and the respondent Court of Appeals failed to consider some circumstances
which negate the presence of conspiracy.

In People v. Palon (127 SCRA 529), states the proof needed to establish a conspiracy —

". . . that conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It cannot be based on mere
conjectures but must be established as a fact. The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is
necessary to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly
and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself (People v. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289)." cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the people to establish the presence of conspiracy is even
murkier than the proof on the commission of the crime itself. The factual findings of the respondent Court of
Appeals and the trial court do not show the participation of the petitioner in the events that followed after
the pieces of jewelry were delivered to her and her husband, Rodrigo. The records show that the only
participation of the petitioner in the transaction was when she and her husband received the pieces of
jewelry from Belen Gomez Espiritu on November 10 and 21, 1973 at their residence. After the same were
received, Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez took possession of the said pieces of jewelry and disposed of them
without the knowledge of the petitioner. Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez alone absconded with the pieces of
jewelry. As a matter of fact, the petitioner did not even know the whereabouts of Rodrigo and Wilson who
were then in possession of the said pieces of jewelry. The participation of petitioner Dolores in the attempts
to locate the missing brothers and to compel them to return the jewelry to their sister is not proof of
conspiracy in a crime. It was understandable why she was involved in looking for her own husband at the
behest of her sister-in-law.chanrobles law library

To establish conspiracy, there must be evidence of intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose (People v. Agda, 111 SCRA 330). There is no evidence
of such kind of participation.

Furthermore, in People v. Drilon (123 SCRA 72), we held that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The mere presence of appellant at the scene when the crime was perpetrated by Drilon is not by itself
indicative of the existence of conspiracy between them. As this Court said in People v. Ybañez, (77 Phil.
664) ‘. . . the accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by
the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It is not enough that there
be a relation between the acts done by the principal or accomplice, it is, furthermore, necessary that the
latter, with knowledge of the former’s criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or material aid in the
consummation of the crime." cralaw virtua1aw library

The evidence of the prosecution fails to show that the petitioner knew the criminal intent of her husband
Rodrigo and brother-in-law Wilson Gomez. She was not even aware that Rodrigo went to Vietnam and that
he brought with him some of the pieces of jewelry. Dolores saw her husband Rodrigo and learned from the
latter that he sold some of the pieces of jewelry in Vietnam only when he returned to Manila.

All these circumstances coupled with the letter of Rodrigo dated January 8, 1974 addressed to the
complainant Belen Gomez Espiritu and the latter’s affidavit of desistance dated January 7, 1983 negate the
existence of conspiracy involving the petitioner.

Without conspiracy, the petitioner cannot be held liable as she had no direct participation in the commission
of the crime charged. The presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner has not been successfully
overcome by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged on grounds of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.

 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438
April 27, 1992
 
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON
ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF
THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF.
 
 
 

Section 1.  Statement of Policy. - It is the policy of the Senate to value

the dignity of every human being and guarantee full respect for human
rights.
 
Sec. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial
Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. - (a) Any person arrested detained
or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
 
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission
of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and
understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of
his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent
counsel by the investigating officer.
 
(c)  The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the
investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to
read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in
the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person,
otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
 
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a
valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him;
otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence
in any proceeding.
 
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation,
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his
counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
 
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall
be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate
family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by
him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by
any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The
person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiance or
fiancee, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild,
uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
 
As used this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of
issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
 
Sec. 3. Assisting Counsel. - Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those
directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary
investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.
 
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled
to the following fees:
 
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with light felonies;
 
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with less grave of grave felonies;
 
(c)  The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with a capital offense.
 
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality
where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such
municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal of
City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of
assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.
 
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the
investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.
 
Sec. 4. Penalty Clause. - (a) Any arresting public officer of employee, or
any investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice,
shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10)
years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall
also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously
convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a officer or employee or anyone
acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails
to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an
offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
 
(b) Any person who obstruct, persons or prohibits any lawyer, any member
of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen
by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from
visiting and conferring privately with him, of from examining and treating
him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or,
in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four
thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer
with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake
such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and
prevent his escape.
 
Sec. 5. Repealing Clause. - Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is
hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or
rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
 
Sec. 6.  Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines.
 
Approved: April 27, 1992
G.R. No. 221424

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ROBELYN CABANADA y ROSAURO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before Us for review is the August 29, 2014 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
1

HC No. 05585, which affirmed the Decision  dated April 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial
2

Court (RTC), Branch 214, Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-09-12269 finding accused-
appellant Robelyn Cabanada y Rosauro (Cabanada) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Theft.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Accused-appellant Cabanada was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft, the accusatory portion
of the Information reads:

That on or about the 13th day of April 2009, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, being then employed as
housemaid of complainant Catherine Victoria y Tulfo, with grave abuse of confidence and taking
advantage of the trust reposed upon her with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following to wit:

a) cash amounting to [₱]20,000.00;

b) one (1) Pierre Cardin lady's watch worth [₱]l0,000.00;

c) one (1) white gold ring with diamonds and white gold earring with diamonds worth [₱]90,000.00;

d) one (1) Technomarine lady's watch worth [₱]15,000.00;

e) one (1) Santa Barbara [lady's] watch worth [₱]6,000.00;

f) one (1) Relic lady's watch worth [₱]3,000.00;

g) one (1) pair of white gold with briliantitos earrings worth [₱]l0,000.00

h) assorted ATM cards

in the aggregate amount of [₱]154,000.00 belonging to one Catherine Victoria y Tulfo, without her
knowledge and consent, to her damage and prejudice in the aforementioned amount.

Contrary to law." 3

Cabanada pleaded not guilty at her arraignment. Subsequently, the trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution established that: at about 9:00 a.m. on April 12, 2009, an Easter Sunday, private
complainant Catherine Victoria (Catherine) and her family visited her mother in Bulacan. Cabanada
was left at the house since she was not feeling well and would rather clean the house. The family
returned at 9:30 p.m. of the same day. 4

On April 13, 2009, Catherine asked her husband Victor Victoria (Victor) for the ₱47,000.00 he was
supposed to give for their household expenses.  Victor went to his service vehicle to get the money
1âwphi1

he kept in the glove compartment, and was surprised that ₱20,000.00 was missing. When Victor
informed her, Catherine checked their room and discovered that several pieces of her jewelry were
also missing. She immediately called the Mandaluyong Police Station to report the incident. 5
In the course of the interview at the Victoria's residence, Cabanada admitted to PO2 Maximo
Cotoner, Jr. (PO2 Cotoner) that she took the money. She led them to her room and took a pouch
(white envelope) containing ₱16,000.00 cash. She also showed a white leather wallet containing the
missing master key of Victor's vehicle. Thereafter, Cabanada was brought at the Criminal
Investigation Unit (CIU) for further investigation. Cabanada apologized to Catherine, and admitted
that she still had some of the missing jewelry in her house at Panatag Compound, Welfareville,
Mandaluyong City. The police went to her house and recovered the Technomarine, Pierre Cardin,
Relic and Santa Barbara watches and a pair of earrings with diamonds placed in a tool box. 6

On the other hand, the defense narrated a different set of events. At around 9:00 a.m. on April 12,
2009, Cabanada went to Catherine's house to work as a stay-out housemaid, and left around 9:00
p.m. upon arrival of the Victoria family. On the same date, the plantsadora came around 9:00 a.m.
and left at 3:00 p.m. In the morning of April 13, 2009, Cabanada returned to the house to resume her
work. She was washing clothes at around 9:00 a.m. when Catherine called her and asked about the
missing items. She denied any knowledge of the same. The police came and asked her and her
sister Rose to board the police mobile. For half an hour, Catherine was talking with the police, while
Cabanada and her sister stayed in the mobile. Thereafter, they were brought to the police station,
and while in a small room, she was asked thrice if she mortgaged the missing jewelry, to which she
denied any knowledge. She was not assisted by a lawyer at the police station nor was allowed to call
her relatives.

The RTC found Cabanada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. It held that
the prosecution was able to establish the continuous series of events which undoubtedly point to
Cabanada as the perpetrator of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Robelyn Cabanada y Rosauro
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

SO ORDERED. 7

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Cabanada's admissions were
not obtained under custodial investigation as it was established that she was not yet arrested at that
time. The "uncounselled admissions" were given freely and spontaneously during a routine inquiry.
The CA considered the testimony of PO2 Cotoner that they contemplated that Cabanada might have
been covering for someone else. The fallo of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 8

Hence, the instant appeal was instituted.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation,  informed this Court of its intention not
9

to file a supplemental brief since its Brief  dated July 23, 2013 has exhaustively discussed and
10

refuted the issues in the case. For her part, Cabanada, through the Public Attorney's Office, asserted
that she adopts all her defenses and arguments in her Appellant's Brief, and asks for the said
Manifestation be considered as substantial compliance in lieu of supplemental brief. 11

Cabanada alleges that her alleged admissions cannot be considered as done in an ordinary manner,
spontaneously, fully and voluntarily as it was elicited through the questions of PO2 Cotoner. She
was patently treated as a suspect when she was being interviewed at the Victoria's residence. Thus,
her uncounselled admissions are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained without a valid
waiver on her part. 12

On the other hand, the OSG argues that although Cabanada's confession may have been obtained
through PO2 Cotoner's interview, the same was given freely and spontaneously during a routine
inquiry and not while she was under custodial investigation. She made the said admission in her
employer's residence wherein she was neither deprived of her liberty nor considered a suspect. The
OSG emphasizes that since the investigation had just begun, it was entirely within the authority and
discretion of the police officers to question any person within the household who could have related
any unusual events that occurred on the day the Victoria family went to Bulacan. 13
This Court finds the appeal partly meritorious.

Section 12, paragraphs 1and3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution provide that:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

The above provision in the Constitution embodies what jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda
rights." The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right
to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has
the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being
questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he
so desires.  The said rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State as
14

would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth.
15

The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Bill of Rights pertains to "custodial
investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers
begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. 16

This Court expounded in People v. Marra: 17

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It
is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. 18

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438 reinforced the constitutional mandate and expanded the definition of
custodial investigation.  This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police
1âwphi1

officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights.  The same pressures of a custodial setting exist in
19

this scenario. A portion of Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 reads:

SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
Officers. -

xxxx

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
20

Applying the foregoing, Cabanada was not under custodial investigation when she made the
confession, without counsel, to PO2 Cotoner that she took the missing ₱20,000.00. The prosecution
established that the confession was elicited during the initial interview of the police after Catherine
called to report the missing money and personal effects. The investigation was still a general inquiry
of the crime and has not focused on a particular suspect. Also, she admitted to the crime while at the
residence of her employer, thus, she was not yet taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her
freedom. As PO2 Cotoner's testified:

Q: Why did you start your interview with accused Robelyn Cabanada?

A: Because she's only the person left in that house during that time, ma'am.
Q: You said that you started interview with Robelyn Cabanada, what was her reaction if you can
remember when you started to interview her?

A: At first she was crying and later she was talking and talking and admitted that she was the one
who took the money, ma'am.

Q: How according to her were she able to get the money, you mentioned earlier that private
complainant in this case Catherine Victoria told you that she discovered [₱]20,000 out of
[₱]47,000.00 inside a white envelope which white envelope was inside her car. How did accused tell
you how she got the money?

A: She said that she also stole the master key of the car prior to that time she stole the money,
ma'am.

Q: When you were interviewing accused Ms. Robelyn Cabanada, who were present?

A: The complainant, ma' am.

Q: Aside from the complainant who else were present?

A: PO3 Rodel Samaniego, ma'am.

Q: How did complainant react when accused told you or related information that she knows the
stolen master key of the car, who open the same?

A: The complainant revealed that she lost the key several months ago, ma'am.

Q: What happened after this information was given to you?

A: Together the complainant the accused led us in her room and in a cabinet she took from there the
white envelope which consists of [₱]16,000.00 and after that she also get the leather wallet which
contained the master key of the car which she stole several months ago, ma'am.

xxx 21

The records of the case reveal that Cabanada was brought to the CIU office for further investigation
after she admitted the crime and after Catherine expressed her desire to pursue the case against
her. However, prosecution witness PO2 Cotoner admitted that Cabanada was not apprised of her
constitutional rights. He insisted that their investigation has not yet concluded and that the accused
was not yet arrested. Thus, in his direct testimony:

PROSEC. LALUCES:

xxxx

Q: How did the complainant react when the accused actually presented this [₱]16,000.00 as well as
the leather wallet which the wallet (sic) contained the key of the car?

A: She was so angry and she told us that she would pursue the case and we brought the accused to
our office together with the complainant, ma'am.

Q: For what purpose?

A: For further investigation, ma'am.

Q: After bringing the accused to the CIU for further investigation as you said, what happened next?

A: The accused continued talking, talking, crying and afterwards she told us that there were more
pieces of jewelry in their house at Panatag Compound Welfareville, Mandaluyong City, ma'am.

Q: Where did she actually tell you this?

A: Inside our office, ma' am.

Q: Which particular part of your office, was she already inside the detention cell?

A: No, ma'am, office of our chief, ma'am.

xxxx 22

Q: The accused practically admitted to you while she was still in the house of Catherine Victoria who
having taken the cash belonging to the complainant and reported to you by said Catherine Victoria.
Why did you not give her the rights at that time she made the admission so that she can secure the
services of counsel?

A: Because at that time she was not arrested yet, ma'am.

Q: Why did you not arrest her at that time when she practically admitted to you of this thing?

A: Because we thought that the accused was covering up for someone we have not yet finished our
investigation, ma'am.

Q: You have not concluded your investigation?

A: Yes, ma'am.

xxx 23

This Court elucidated that the Miranda rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the
pressure of custodial setting.  In the case of Luz v. People  citing Berkemer v. McCarty,  it was
24 25 26

explained that:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or
trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by
the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual's will to resist," and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact,
whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-
custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons
suspected of felonies. 27

The circumstances surrounding Cabanada's appearance before the police station falls within the
definition of custodial investigation. Despite the claim that she was not considered as a suspect at
that time, the fact remains that she confessed to having committed the crime and was able to
produce the money from her room. The investigation, therefore, ceased to be a general inquiry even
if they contemplated that she was covering for someone.

The subsequent confession of Cabanada at the CIU office can be considered as having been done
in a custodial setting because (1) after admitting the crime, Cabanada was brought to the police
station for further investigation; (2) the alleged confession happened in the office of the chief; (3)
PO2 Cotoner was present during Cabanada's apology and admission to Catherine. The compelling
pressures of custodial setting were present when the accused was brought to the police station
along with Catherine.

In People v. Javar,  it was ruled that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional
28

provision, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it
becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given.  Cabanada's confession without counsel at the police station, which led to the
29

recovery of the other items at her house, is inadmissible.

Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of Cabanada's admission made in CIU does not necessarily entitle
her to a verdict of acquittal. Her admission during the general inquiry is still admissible.
Theft is qualified under Article 310 of the RPC, when it is, among others, committed with grave
abuse of confidence, thus:

ART. 310. Qualified Theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)

The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner's consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 30

The following circumstances are established during the trial: Victor, who had the habit of leaving
valuables inside his car, left ₱47,000.00 in the glove compartment; he hid the car keys in the filing
cabinet; Catherine's car keys were missing since 2005; Cabanada worked as Victoria's housemaid
for several years; she has unrestricted access to all parts of the house including the master
bedroom; on April 12, 2009, she was left alone at the house when the family went to Bulacan;
the plantsadora, who only reported for work every Sunday, had no access to the house and the car;
Cabanada was alone from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. after the plantsadora left at 3:00 p.m.; the next
day, on April 13, 2009, Victor discovered that the money was missing; and there was no sign of
forced entry or of an intruder entering the house. In addition to the said circumstances, Cabanada
admitted to the police in the presence of Catherine that she stole the money and led them to her
room where they recovered the ₱l6,0000.00 cash and white leather wallet containing the master key
of Victor's car.

The above circumstances and Cabanada's admission, coupled with presentation of the money,
albeit less than the missing amount, establish the presence of the element of unlawful taking. The
fact that the money was taken without authority and consent of Victor and Catherine, and that the
taking was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon
things, were also proven during the trial. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is
presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.  The taking was also clearly done with
31

grave abuse of confidence. Cabanada was working as a housemaid of the Victoria family since
2002.32

From the foregoing, a modification is called for as regards the imposable penalty. Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article," while Article 309 of the
RPC states:

Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The case of Cruz v. People  is instructive as to the proper penalty for qualified theft if the value of
33

the property stolen is more than ₱12,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00. Thus:

x x x In this case, the amount stolen was ₱15,000.00. Two degrees higher than prision
mayor minimum and medium is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its minimum period or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years
and 8 months. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance in the commission of the
offense, the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of 16 years, 5
months and 11 days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days. The minimum penalty imposed by the RTC
is correct. However, the maximum period imposed by R TC should be increased to 16 years, 5
months and 11 days. 34

In this case, the value of the property stolen is ₱20,000.00. Applying the above pronouncement,
Cabanada should be sentenced to suffer the penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05585, affirming the
Decision dated April 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City in Criminal
Case No. MC-09-12269, which found accused-appellant Robelyn Cabanada y Rosauro guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICIATION. Cabanada is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of Ten (10) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Sixteen (16) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice