Caste: Discrimination and Standardization

PROYASH SARKAR

Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Kolkata 700 032, E-mail:

proyash@rediffmail.com

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to discuss the complex interrelation of social discrimination, inequality and

difference, and by implication it also deals with the ethical concepts of equality and social justice. Social

discrimination in its multiple facets has appeared to be one of the greatest threats to social justice to the

marginalized lives and life forms of the present-day India. It also creates its own mechanisms of

vanquishing cultural otherness by propagating a particular life form and cultural homogeneity that

promotes ambitions and interests of certain groups. This paper deals with caste, as it was developed into a

system in the post-Rk-Vedic era. It also enquires into what Nietzsche would call a genealogy of the caste

system and tries to bring this theory to its logical consequence.

Before entering into the complex interrelation of the concepts associated with

‘difference’, ‘discrimination’ and ‘inequality’ a few words need to be said on these very

concepts in order to get rid of a number of controversies that are often produced by a

confused and partial understanding of the concepts central to a discourse. ‘Difference’

may be considered as a descriptive concept. ‘Discrimination’, in the present context,

stands for the act of deprivation of some persons or the members of a group of certain

rights that they deserve to enjoy. Roughly speaking, the term ‘inequality’, in the legal

procedure, means lack of equal opportunity to and equal treatment of the members of the

society. It also stands for difference of any sort, viz. biological, social, religious,

economic, cultural or otherwise, following a graded scale. According to The Concise

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Oxford Dictionary, it is ‘the lack of equality in magnitude, quality, rank, circumstances

etc.’1 I take ‘inequality’ in the latter sense in the present paper and use the term

‘discrimination’ in the former sense. So, ‘inequality’ unlike ‘difference’ is a value-loaded

term. A and B are unequal with respect to F if and only if they are different with respect

to F and either of them is better according to certain parameter, M, with respect to F.

It is hardly debatable that people have difference among themselves with regard

to various biological features like sex2, skin colour, height, colour of one’s hair or eyes

etc. One may also be different from others in such cultural factors as the gender that one

belongs to, the language that she speaks as a native speaker, the religion that she

practices, the type of music that she likes, and so on. We are often different by habit like

those relating to food, smoking, etc., sometimes it lies in sexual orientation; and

sometimes it is based on one’s ideologies and the lifestyle that one endorses. The

important point, however, is that these differences constitute a person’s identity. So they

are in no way unimportant. We cannot do away with them very easily.

Mere difference does not by itself produce inequality, nor does it tend to promote

discrimination. It follows from the principle of equality as social justice that two persons

may be different under different considerations, yet they can expect equal treatment

under all circumstances. Thus, mere difference can hardly justify social discrimination,

which has always relied upon the prior existence of inequality as something natural. It is

highly debatable as to whether inequality, even if it is spontaneous, can justify

discrimination. I, however, will not take up this issue in the present paper. Granted that

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inequality can be counted as a good reason for unequal treatment of the individuals of the

society who are thus unequal we will see whether this can provide any justification for

discrimination related to caste.3

Etymologically the term ‘caste’ was originated from the Portuguese term ‘casta’,

which literally means ‘lineage’ or ‘race’. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘caste’

as ‘Hindu hereditary class, with members socially equal, united in religion, and usualy

following same trades, having no social intercourse with persons of other castes’ and also

as ‘more or less exclusive social class’. In anthropology the term is used in its generic

sense to refer to any social group that is endogamous and the members of which usually

follow the same trades. Among such groups social interaction is often prevented by

various social norms prevailing in the society and social mobility among then is almost

nil. This term is often used to stand for two quite difference concepts of the classical

Indian literature that are variously used to refer to different types of social stratification,

namely, ‘varna’ and ‘jāti’. The etymological sense of this term goes quite close to the

sense in which it is used in anthropology. Taken in this sense the caste of a person is

quite similar to, if not identical with the Indian concept of jāti. Due to the lack of any

other suitable term in English to stand for ‘varna’, throughout this discussion we will use

it in the first of the senses given in The Concise Oxford Dictionary4 and take it to mean

varna rather than jāti. Though there is a lot of confusion about the translation of the term

‘varna’, as we have already noted, now that I have given my initial remarks about the

usage of this term in the context of this paper, there remains, I hope, little scope for any

further confusion about the usage of this term in the present context.

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 Almost all studies in social stratification in India focus on and react against

discriminations that depend upon caste. The ethico-legal concept of justice is the guiding

motive of these studies. In an egalitarian democratic society equality is supposed to be

one basic social virtue that the society cannot deny to provide to its members if it wants

to remain a just society. We have a number of laws against different forms of

discriminations in our societies. Studies in the caste system of India try to unravel the

discriminations that, though ubiquitous, are otherwise invisible to a great extent.

Discrimination does not produce inequality; it rather presupposes that people are unequal.

The existence of gender discrimination in our society presupposes, though covertly, that

men and women are unequal in different respects. Similarly, caste based discriminations

presuppose that one’s having a caste makes her unequal to the people belonging to other

castes. I do not think that discrimination is the only widespread social injustice

standardization being another major form. The problem of standardization should be

distinguished from the problem of discrimination. Unlike discrimination, standardization

gives rise to inequality between the people who succeed to meet those standards and

those who fail. So, it is doubly unjust—it produces the inequality presupposed by the

discrimination that comes as a corollary of it.

The term ‘standardization’ is employed here in a technical sense. It involves a

selection, not necessarily conscious, of certain non-essential5 properties, from an array of

properties randomly present in a heterogeneous group of people, which promotes a

particular goal or a number of related goals by making them essential for the members of

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that group for belonging to a privileged sub-group. In this sense standardization is an

umbrella term covering a gamut of mechanism employed for social stratification.

It may be interesting to study those mechanisms. But what is more interesting is

to study the general goal/s of standardization. Standardization typically creates a

privileged sub-group within a heterogeneous society by eulogizing some non-natural

properties of that group projecting them as objective properties. It promotes a new value,

and consequently, discriminates between those who succeed and those who fail to attain

them. It involves an abstraction. Standardization is inexplicitly purposive in the sense that

it has always been developed, or sometimes devised, as a means for attaining some goal

of some group, not necessarily the purpose of the group that comprises those people who

succeed in attaining those standards.

Sometimes standardization serves the purpose of the successful group. In these

cases the groups that are otherwise dominant eulogize some of the non-essential

properties as essential for promoting or protecting its privileges. Perhaps, the most

striking example of this type of standardization is the caste system in India. Among the

four main castes of India, viz. brāhmana, ksatriya, vaiśya, and śūdra, the first one is the

most privileged. Originally, in the Rk-Vedic era, the difference between castes was not

hereditary. It was determined by one’s natural inclination or merit, and action. Perhaps,

the caste division in India is as old as the later Vedic era. In the Rk Veda there was a

single mention of the caste division. In the Purusa Sūkta of Chapter X (Daśama

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Mandala) of the Rk Veda we find only one verse dedicated to an explanation of the origin

of the caste division6:

Brahmano’sya mukhamāsīd vāhūrājanyah krtah/

Urū tadasya yadvaiśyah padbhyām śūdro ajāyata//--10/90/12

In this verse a supreme being was conceived from whose mouth the priest brāhmana was

produced, the warrior (rājanya/ksatriya) was produced from His arms, from His thighs

was produced the trader (vaiśya), and the fourth caste, i.e. the servent (śūdra) was

produced from His feet. There is a repercussion of this thesis in Manusmrti:

Lokānam tu vivrddhyartham mukhabāhūrūpādatah/

Brāhmanam ksatriyam vaiśyam śūdram ca niravartayat//1/31//

With a view to the development of the (three) regions 7, He brought into existence the

Brāhmana, the Ksatriya, the Vaiśya, and the Śūdra, from out of His mouth, arms, thighs

and feet (respectively).

Even the same doctrine has been advocated in the Gītā:

Cāturvarnyam mayā srst am gunakarma-bibhāgaśah—4/13

In this verse lord Krsna says that the four castes have been produced by him in

accordance with individual merit and action. Most Vedic scholars and historians of

ancient India maintain that in the Vedic period the caste was based on individual merit,

talent and profession. However, the Purusa Sūkta mentioned above may be a later

addition, since the language in which it was composed is more contemporary than the

language in which the other parts of the Rk were written. These scholars think that the

caste division was not there in the early Rk Vedic era. Two reasons have been cited for

this supposition. The first is the one we have just mentioned. That the Purusa Sūkta that

was mentioned above was a later addition to the Rk-Veda shows that the caste division

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was not there in the Rk Vedic era. Later on in the era of the smrti literatures this system

was fortified in India, as it was evident from Manusmrti. Yogīraj Basu, a Vedic scholar

writes, ‘In Rk-samhitā… there are indirect references to the custom of caste division

(varna vyavasthā). From these references the existence of the caste system in the society

can be proved. However, at that time there was no rigid caste division similar to that we

had subsequently. There was no strict compartmentalization among the different castes in

the era of Rk-samhitā.’8 Further he writes, ‘In the Vedic era caste of a person used to be

determined by his/her merit and not the other way round.’ 9 So, originally the ascription of

caste to a person was not according to her birth. Caste was a non-essential property,

though it was made hereditary later on. As we have seen the caste system was originally

made for merely a division of labour, and, perhaps, no discrimination was initially

involved in it. The division of labour was prior to the caste division. Subsequently, it was

made hereditary to secure the interests of the dominant class of the society. It was

standardized as if it were a natural property possessed by the members of the society

according to their heredity. The system became oppressive at the same time. Praśastapāda

writes, ‘the sacred duty of the fourth caste, i.e. śūdra, is to be dominated by the other

three castes….’10 A śūdra should not have any independence of the other three castes.

This is required for a virtuous life of a śūdra. Though Praśastapāda does not clearly

mention the caste system to be hereditary, yet his intention is unmistakable.11

In this respect Praśastapāda follows Manu, who was most eloquent about the

sanctity of the caste system in India. By the time of Manu the caste system succeeded in

spreading its roots throughout the subcontinent. Manu was the most successful compiler

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of the laws of the so-called Classical Indian religion (sanātana dharma). By this, the cart

had already been put before the horse. Rather than making the caste system dependent

upon the division of labour, as it was the case in the early Vedic era, the latter was made

to depend upon the former, and the caste system was standardized to be hereditary, i.e., to

be decided by birth. This standardization had gradually spread its roots in stratified Indian

societies in such a way that it started influencing the life of the monks (sannyāsin-s), who

are expectedly not to be affected by such divisions.12 In the earlier time this

standardization was not required as the social stratification was susceptible to social

mobility. So, this standardization was meant to serve certain purposes. Needless to say

that its purpose was to promote a particular power-structure that served the ambition of

the privileged castes, especially, the first two of them, and also to deprive the

marginalized from their social, economic, and religious rights. Caste was not naturally

related with birth. Thus, this standardization created a new range of differences, which

were originally not there in the system. The aim of this standardization was to promote

and sustain a discrimination produced by an oppressive system. It is noticeable that this

type of standardization serves the purposes of the group that promotes it and eulogizes

itself. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes, the interested party does not

eulogize themselves by way of standardization. It rather deifies another group by

standardizing certain properties present in them and adding a value to them.

Most prevalent examples are the standardization through TV ads and beauty

pageants. A beauty pageant standardizes certain norms of beauty, mostly, female beauty,

and thus, initiates a difference between those who possess the properties eulogized by

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those norms and those who lack them. Apparently, it is a quite innocent thing to do. It

appears not to have any discriminatory intention behind it. However, if we probe deeper

we will see that it indirectly promotes a social discrimination, victims of which are those

who fail to stand those norms. You might have a different sense of beauty, yet gradually

tend to comply with those norms, and it is not an accidental thing to happen, rather, it is

part of a well-calculated move. It thus creates a new difference and then promotes

discrimination. This discrimination is not its ultimate goal. In this instance or in cases of

TV ads, where health, beauty, lifestyle, and even things and events like food, drinks,

festivity, etc. are standardized have one general motive behind them and that is

predominantly some commercial interest. Interestingly, the persons who are thus

eulogized are not the primary beneficiaries of this type of standardization. Though at

times they are also benefited by it as individuals, yet the system was not primarily

developed to serve their purpose. In such instances the beneficiaries remain mostly

invisible. This mechanism works in such a way that the discrimination that comes as a

corollary is hardly observable, and even if it is observable, the relation between it and the

said standardization is not evident. The promoters of this type of discrimination always

remain behind the curtain. This may be called Indirect Discrimination through

standardization, the former being an instance of Direct Discrimination through

standardization.

In its another form, indirect standardization works through some objects generally

associated with a group of people. The beneficiaries are the people who are associated

with those objects, or the people who exist at the epicenter of power of the social order

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where such standardization takes place, or both. It is not to say that in these cases the

objects are eulogized; rather, they work as marks of certain properties people tend to

associate with those who bear those marks. Actually, it is those other properties that are

eulogized. These external things and features are too weak to be taken as marks of those

supposed internal properties, which are to be eulogized. They act as marks only when

they are associated with an already existing social position. Here I am only discussing the

processes that have spontaneity to some extent. In extreme cases some external objects

can be imposed on a group of people as in case of monasteries, the monks or the nuns are

bound to wear certain dresses or to keep certain other objects with them. In India and in

many other parts of the world certain groups of people are supposed to wear particular

types of dresses. Say, for example, a teacher, or a politician should wear certain types of

dresses, in other words, there are certain unwritten dress codes. The society does not

always dictate as to what they should wear rather it imposes certain unwritten norms that

tend to decide what they are not allowed to wear. Any particular attire is utterly irrelevant

to these professions. This strategy of gaining social and political mileage would work if

you were a teacher or a politician. In such cases they will work as marks of wisdom or

compassionate nature. However, if you belong to a different trade this trick will not

work. If you are an engineer or an artiste you cannot prove yourself wise by wearing the

attire typically worn by a teacher. That is why I have urged that these marks are too weak

to work outside of a given context. A form of standardization works here. The incentives

range from social recognition, advertising the trade, selling of a concept (and ultimately

selling of a product) or covering up of one’s inabilities or inefficiencies as a performer in

her trade. And the sanctions are also varied ranging from a mere frowning by your peers,

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or a mild criticism, to a physical threat or the threat of getting fired from your job in

extreme cases. Interestingly, the threat comes from the peers’ group and incentives come

from others. This explains many things. These things are so internalized by the people of

the society where they exist that they tend to judge ability or inability of others by those

external marks. A social worker (political) should look like a social worker, a teacher

should look like a teacher, or, an executive should look like an executive. This is a

standardization of looks with the help of external things. This appears to be quite

innocent. However, as in other cases, this type of standardization is also meant for

discrimination, and, therefore, it produces distinction as a means. The aim of such

standardization is to gain social mileage, to make a group and the individuals belonging

to it clearly distinguishable from the rest of the society; and to project as if they are

virtuous in certain ways—they have certain properties that others lack. This shows how

discriminatory this standardization is.

Here we should keep in mind that not all standardization is socially pernicious. A

business executive of a multi-national company is also expected to bear a particular look

in certain way, yet the way she presents herself does not produce any social

discrimination. In spite of the apparent similarity between the present instance and the

cases we were considering, they are quite different. The stipulation of the unwritten dress

code for the executive is not discriminatory as it is meant only for the business

community and not for the entire society. The looks that the Indian teacher or the

politician is supposed to bear is meant for the entire society, in the sense that a teacher

should look like a teacher even when she goes to the supermarket or for a dinner; an

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executive, however, is not supposed to bear the executive-look when she goes to the

market. This shows how these two types of standardization differ from each other and

how one is discriminatory while the others is not.

Now it is quite interesting to see why so much restriction has been imposed on

different castes to secure purity of blood. A huge number of injunctions have been

imposed on different social customs and institutions by Hindu law books and the people

who belonged to the epicenter of the power structure of the stratified caste-based Indian

society. Most notable among them are the institutions of marriage and those of education.

For example the laws with regard to the compatibility or incompatibility of one caste with

the others in respect of marriage are delineated in detail. Now the question is what is the

need for the articulation of such laws? If the caste division represents a ‘natural’

difference within the population, then no such imposition seems to be what is called for.

How many of us would like to have a system of prescriptive laws to protect the sanctity

of the rotational system of the planets or imperatives to prevent violation of the law of

gravity? This seems to be ridiculous on its face value. Could not the erudite ancient

‘seers’ realize that things governed by the laws of nature needed no protection of

imperatives imposed by human beings? In a different context Nivedita Menon writes, ‘[If

it] were so natural, it would not require such a vast network of controls to keep in

place.’13 This seems to be a knock down argument against the standardization of the caste

division in India; however, in spite of its prima facie appeal this argument is far less than

convincing. The analogy drawn here between the caste division and the law of gravitation

or the rotational orbit of the planets is a mismatch. In many cases we do interfere in the

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natural processes sometimes to protect the sanctity of it and sometimes to change its

course though always with some goal in mind, usually the goal of one’s own benefit or

the benefit of one’s own species. The technology of producing a new species by

hybridizing two different species was known long before the birth of modern Genetics.

These technologies have often been used to the benefit of humankind. People of many

parts of the world used to know the use of mules. Many other hybrid crops and animals

are produced to serve our purpose. So, the argument that what is natural cannot be

manipulated or controlled does not hold well. If something can be controlled then it is

subject to human volition. A natural corollary of this assumption is that moral

imperatives could be imposed on them. That is how restrictions have been imposed by

Governments of different countries of the world on human cloning.

When we want to prevent human cloning our main concern is not to let one

interfere with the constitution of the human species, rather than ensuring purity of blood.

The injunctions on the sexual practices of human species appear to aim at securing purity

of blood for certain species. It is rather a form of passive genetic engineering. Rather than

living the issue to nature the Ancient seers took it upon themselves to decide the

constitution and structure of the population by means of imposing injunctions on the

sexual activities of the members of the society. An extreme form of this maneuver was

witnessed during the Nazi regime in their experimentation with the German population

with an intention of producing a pure Arian German race. Just like the Brāhmana-s in

India they believed in the superiority of their own blood and fanatically attempted to

maintain and propagate its purity. Unlike the Indian system it was coercive and that is

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why it cannot be regarded as a form of standardization. This is not to say that there is no

coercion involved in standardization; however, standardization is not primarily a coercive

method. Standardization do also produce a selected group of people, but the chosen few

who enjoy the privileges of a stratified society are not the products of direct coercion.

Standardization appears to be a cleverer device for controlling the society; taken at its

face value it seems to be a democratic process as it is hardly visible in its oppressive

aspects. Unlike coercion standardization is a way of indirect control.

Without entering into the more intricate ethical issue of the right to manipulate the

constitution of the human species, we will discuss whether such a claim of manipulating

the constitution of population by means of controlling sexual activities of the members of

the society is compatible with the claim that caste is there in blood. Could not the Vadic

seers see that nature has developed its own device for preventing crossbreeding? It is true

that animals of two different but closely related species can produce offspring. However,

the offspring produced by two different species of animals is generally sterile. Such an

animal cannot in its turn have its own offspring. A mule or a hinny is generally sterile,

though there are a few reported instances of a female mule having an offspring with a

male donkey. Even if such information were available to the Brahmin pundits, who

appeared to be always vigilant against hybridization of the higher castes, especially

hybridization of certain forms, unless they were alarmists the number is too negligible to

have been the cause of any serious concern for them. This is perhaps, nature’s own way

of preventing manipulation of its order. Then, what was the need for injunctions as those

imposed by Manu and other law givers of ancient India? The need is evidently that of

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creating a chosen sub-group within the society. May it not be urged, then, that it is the

need for creating the myth of a pure blood that produced and sustained such claims?

I am, however, afraid that on a close scrutiny this argument will not suffice to

establish the point it seeks to prove. It is not in general true that nature prevents

development of new hybridized species. Though many new species of plants have been

created by the process of natural hybridization, yet such instances are scarce in the animal

kingdom. The lonicera fly, which is found in North America for the last 250 years, is

known to be one of the very few animal species resulted from natural hybridization.

Moreover, an animal crossed with another belonging to a species having a different

chromosome number tends to produce a sterile offspring, however animals having the

same genetic number but differing in other genetic codes can produce offspring that are

not sterile. If there is a treasured feature, viz. the colour of the fur, the length of the tail,

the height of the body, etcetera, in one of the animals subjected to such cross-

fertilization, then the new progeny runs the risk of losing it; again newer features could

also be added which might not always be cherished. In case of humans crossbreeding it

may result in losing such genetic features as the colour of the skin, colour of the eyes, or

the height that one has. Then why should not the Brahmins be worried about losing by

way of hybridization the intellectual gifts that they have as a caste? This shows that an

argument from biology in the line of this one cannot make a strong claim against

standardization of caste. In the context of ethics biology can prove almost nothing except

imposing certain negative constraints on our ethical principles. The reason is simply that

the following argument is invalid:

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 Premise: Natural biology instigates S to do A.

Conclusion: Therefore, S should never abstain from doing A.

This argument can stand only if we supplement it with an additional premise as the

following:

P1: Everybody should always do all that is instigated by natural biology.

P1 is an example of primitive ethical biologism. That this position is flawed is readily

observable and hardly needs support of any argument.14 I think all ethical arguments that

draw upon biology suffer from this or some similar fallacy unless they avert this risk by

arbitrarily making exceptions to P1 or some principle similar to it.

The term ‘natural’ is treacherously ambiguous in this context. When the term is

used in the context of certain sciences like physics, chemistry, geography or physiology,

it deals with certain laws and phenomena that are not results of human intervention, and

which are not subject to alteration. In the human context it is used to stand for that which

is instinctive, or impulsive and not cultured. If a property, F, is ‘natural’ in either if these

two senses, then one cannot be held responsible for having or not having F, for the simple

reason that having or not having F does not depend upon human volition. It is true that

one cannot be held responsible for having an instinct or some other psychological trait of

the mind like the Oedipus complex if that is not voluntarily chosen. The psychologist

tells us that having such features is beyond our control. If it were so, then it would be

foolish to impose moral injunctions upon them. But isn’t it true that if it were within our

control then we would have tried to get rid of the complexes even if it were ‘natural’ in

the second sense mentioned above? So, it is not in general true that no moral injunctions

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can be imposed on what is natural. Still the argument stands. No ethical conclusion can

be derived from a premise based on biology. Rather, from the fact that something is

determined by biology it follows that it is non-ethical, vis-à-vis unethical. Perhaps

Menon’s argument hinges on this point. Yet this does not imply that if something is non-

ethical it does not require to get controlled on ethical grounds. Such a thing may have

consequences that have moral implications. In that case it may appear to be our duty,

moral or otherwise, to prevent it. One may hardly be blamed for having a sickle cell

syndrome, yet it may be wise to try to develop a cure for it. Properties that exist in nature

are not subject to ethical judgment, yet they may come under the moral purview as soon

as we acquire the ability to manipulate and control them.

The same may be claimed about the caste division in India. Even if the castes

were determined by birth, and in that sense ‘natural’, yet, it might be urged that

manipulation by human intervention of the caste division was always possible. In that

case there is no absurdity involved in imposing injunctions on the sexual practices of

human beings to prevent dilution of the strict caste division existing in a society. The

more interesting question to ask is whether caste is biological, and the evidences that we

have in our hand proves beyond doubt that it is not. Even the supporters of the caste

division no more ground it on biology;15 they rather try to justify it by means of

arguments derived from social consequences, which, I think, are leagues behind of

proving the point they intend to prove.16 I found the argument in favour of the biological

bases of caste unsound and the arguments from dire social consequence against the

eradication of caste based division frivolous and motivated by vested interest. On the

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contrary, in this paper we have argued that the caste division is a consequence of

standardization that had a purpose behind it. Pointless to say that it has been successful in

serving the purpose to a great extent. It was the main pillar in the oppressive social and

economic structure of the highly stratified Indian society.

It is quite natural to expect natural differences to continue to exist, at least in the

short run, unless some human intervention intrudes the natural processes to change them.

Some social differences that are conducive to oppressive social structures survive

because of the support that they get from the economic and the political forces that

control the power structure of the society. A considerable amount of energy is spent often

by means of coercion to keep these system working. However, isn’t it quite surprising

that those who are the victims of these oppressive systems conform to it? They

themselves are often the main protagonists of the standards set by such standardization.

Different mechanisms surround all form of standardization. Standardization acts through

these mechanisms. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to point out a single mechanism

through which standardization works; it is often an amalgam of different things.

Sometimes people are indoctrinated, sometimes things are eulogized so that people get

attracted, sometimes there are coercive forces working stealthily behind it like those

exerted by frowning and social criticism. A huge amount of energy is spent in every

society on producing a considerable number of myths to sustain the standardized forms

and differences. We have argued in this paper that standardization induces artificial

differences within the society. These differences will be there till the discrimination is not

abolished. After the discrimination has disappeared there would remain no need for the

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difference and hence there would be none. To claim that it will remain even after the

discrimination has disappeared is to claim that you would need a saw even if you have

nothing to cut. For the purpose of standardization is served through discrimination. Social

mechanisms supporting standardization like those instantiated in myths, folklores etc. are

there because they have got the support and indulgence by the people at the center of the

power structure of the society. These mechanisms will keep on working till the support is

withdrawn. So, standardization-induced-differences can be expected to give way to a less

inequitable system if and when the purpose of this standardization or the discrimination

that serves this purpose will cease to exist. From the normative perspective we can say

that the goal is to remain different, or perhaps, more different than ever before, and still

remain caste-neutral. For, standardization of caste, as we have seen, stems from an

intention of subjugating the fourth caste as well as the outcastes.17

19
 1
NOTES AND REFERENCES

The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition, 1982.

2
For the present purpose we will ignore the debate as to whether any cultural factors lurk in the sexual differences among

man, woman, and the third sex. It is though an important debate I refrain from entering into it at present. I am not presuming

that what sex a person will have is in no way influenced by cultural factors. On the contrary, I think that our present

knowledge of genetics does not rule out the possibility that the sex of the fetus could to some extent be determined by

cultural factors, at least in some remotely causal way. However, the present state of the art is not as sophisticated as to

clinch this issue in favour of either of the sides.

3
What I would say about the discrimination based upon caste could also apply to the gender discrimination. In this paper,

however, I shall not take up the latter issue due to space constraint.
4
The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition, 1982.
5
This should not imply that I am accepting essentialism about something or anything at all. One may wonder as to how one

can provide a definition of standardization in terms of certain non-essential properties that are turned into essential

properties for the members of a group for belonging to a preferred sub-group. One way how this can be done is by claiming

that all properties of that group are non-essential, though a selective few of them are only claimed to be essential for the

members of that preferred sub-group. This does not subscribe the present author to the distinction between the essential and

the non-essential properties, nor does it imply the view that all-properties are non-essential. It is neutral on this issue, and

hence, the present author is free to remain non-committal on it, at least in the context of the present paper. What the

definition implies is merely the fact that it is the people who indulge in standardization claim that there is indeed such a

distinction between these two types of properties.

6
This does not imply that there is no other mention of the castes in the Rk Veda. Though there was no mention of śūdra in

it, there is clear mention of the other three. However, the verses in which we find mention of the castes are not primarily

dedicated to establish this division. See Rk Veda Samhitā—8/11/5-6.These are just some occasional mention of the castes,

where the names of the castes refer to one’s merit rather than her caste. See Rk Veda Samhitā—7/64/2.
7
The three regions are the terrestrial, the celestial and the subterranean. See Manubhāsya of Medhātithi on Manusmrti,

Vol. 3, translated by Ganganath Jha, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1999, p.74.

8
Basu, Y., 1993, Veder Parichay, Pharma K. L. M., Calcutta, (in Bengali), p.219. Translation mine.
9
Ibid, p. 219. Translation mine.
10
Śūdrasya pūrva-varna-pāratantram-amantrikāśca kryāh--Praśastapāda, Padārthadharmasamgraha, ed. Durgādhara Jhā,

Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1997, p.669.

11
Ibid. pp. 667-9.
12
‘…[T]he varna and āśrama continued to plague the Indian society, rooted as it was in the Vedic tradition, as sannyāsa

was not only a recognized aśrama within the scheme, but many of the sects amongst the sannyāsīs could only be those who

were Brahmins earlier in the social order. Not only this, the earlier ‘caste’ of the person who became a sannyāsī continued

to cling to him and ‘place’ him to some extent in the discriminatory, hierarchical order of the sādhus themselves.’—Daya

Krishna, ‘Vedic Śākhās: The Root of the Caste System in Indian Society’ p. 25 (it is an unpublished paper privately

received from the author).

13
Nivedita Menon, 2004, ‘India: Section 377: How Natural is Normal?’, South Asia Citizen’s Web, Issue 01/01/2004 at

http://www.sacw.net/SexualityMinorities/nivedita01Jan2004.html

A Bengali translation of this paper was published in Svakanthe, 3rd year, Vol. 2
14
This may also remind us of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy. Moore’s construal of the fallacy appears to have drawn upon the

fact/value dichotomy. In the present context, however, no such dichotomy is presumed.

15
Hirendranath Dutta, however, argues that the caste division could be partially based on birth (biology). There are certain

features hardwired in human nature. These are passed on to the next generation by the earlier generation. So, the esteemed

qualities of a Brāhmana can be expected only in the offspring of a Brāhmana. As he writes, ‘we look for the pedigree of a

dog, a horse, an ox, then what is our fault if we look for the pedigree of a human being?’-- Hirendranath Dutta, Manur

Barnashramdharma (in Bengali), Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 1970, p. 88 (translation mine).

16
Here I am not going to enter into this debate. It involves a separate issue and needs a different approach of treatment.
17
This paper was first presented at a weekly Seminar group in Kolkata informally called the ‘Friday Group’. I express my

indebtedness to all members of the group, namely, Professor Tara Chatterjee, Professor Kalipada Baksi, Dr.

Madhabendranath Mitra, Professor Pushpa Mishra, Professor Shefali Miotra, Professor Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay,

Professor Amita Chatterjee, Dr. Kumar Mitra and Dr. Jhuma Chakraborty, for their invaluable comments and suggestions. I

do also extend my sincere thanks to Professor Daya Krishna for sending me a copy of his paper entitled ‘Vedic Śākhās: The

Root of the Caste System in Indian Society’ and also for his comments on an earlier draft of the paper that helped me

improve it further.