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Kaylie Xia

Professor Estlund

PHIL 0560

30 September 2020

In the Republic, Plato puts forth his argument for epistocracy: “it is by virtue of its

smallest class…and the wisdom that resides therein, in the part which takes the lead and rules”

(428e). Plato rests his epistocratic argument upon the homology between soul and state: 

(1) The rational part of the soul should rule because it knows better than others

(2) Therefore, if one part of a whole knows better than others, it should rule

(3) Therefore, if one part of a state knows better than others, it should rule

(4) There is a small minority in the state that knows better than others

(5) Therefore, the small knowing minority should rule (lecture).

In this essay, I will problematize propositions (1), (2), and (3) to conclude that Plato’s argument

for epistocracy is unsuccessful. 

Proposition (1) is founded on the Platonic division between reason and appetite. Because

reason and appetite are two distinct parts of the soul, they are assigned with different motivations

and tasks: reason should control appetite who pursues bodily pleasure (lecture). Here, I propose

that Plato’s division of reason and appetite is unsuccessful; it is questionable whether there is a

real distinction between reason and appetite. In 436b, Plato states that “it is obvious that the same

thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect”, so something in the soul that bids it

to drink is different from something that forbids to drink (439c). A reconstruction of Plato’s

argument is as follows: “one thirsts to drink” takes the form “p desires to q” (call it A), and “the

man though thirsty refuses to drink” takes the form “p thinks it would be better not to q” or “p
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desires not to q” (call it B). Apparently, Plato is speaking as if A contradicts B so that he can

assign them to different parts of the soul. Nonetheless, A and B appear to be non-contradictory

since the negation or contradiction of A should be “p does not desire q” instead of B. Thus, A

and B need not be coming from different parts of the soul; instead, it is very likely that they

exemplify two types of appetites. For instance, George feels hungry when playing video games.

George desires to grab food, but he thinks it would be better not to grab food. What prohibits

George from grabbing food is not rational reasoning but another desire--the pursuit of pleasure in

winning video games. Therefore, Plato’s division of reason and appetite fails, so it follows that it

is unclear whether there is a part of the soul that really knows better than others, which calls into

question the whole epistocracy argument. 

Proposition (2) and (3) lie upon Plato’s soul-state analogy, for it is applying what has

been said about the soul to the state. I propose that this analogy is weak in two ways: it commits

a logical fallacy when put into the context of the discussion of justice, and the things being

compared in the analogy are not really alike. First, in 435e, Plato states that the high spirit of the

state is derived from individual citizens, hence it is plausible to infer that a state is just if and

only if its people are just. Plato believes that a just person is one in whom parts of the soul are in

harmony with one another. The three classes of citizens are analogous to the three parts of the

soul. The degree of harmony differs from class to class, with the workers possessing the least

harmonious souls. It follows that according to Plato’s soul-state analogy, only some people are

just, presumably the guardians. Thus, either Plato’s ideal state is not just, or his analogy is false.

This logical fallacy destabilizes the soul-state analogy. Second, the occupations which Plato uses

to compare with parts of the soul are dissimilar. It is not difficult to imagine workers who are

refrained from appetite. Discipline seems to be a critical condition for being a productive worker.
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Appetite or “always going for things” is not an accurate portrayal of all working class.

Auxiliaries are defenders of the state that have two contradictory aspects: loving allies and hating

enemies. Spirit, however, does not seem to hold this double-edged characteristic. Lastly,

guardians are responsible for both reasoning and ruling, the former is constructive and the later

executive. Despite executions such as defense and enforcement that auxiliaries will assist to

carry out, executions such as diplomacy have to be carried out by guardians themselves. In a

sense, guardians are intermeddling in affairs other than knowing or understanding, which is the

only job of the rational part of the soul. Thus, Plato’s soul-state analogy is problematized; the

epistocracy argument that rests on this analogy is also disrupted.