MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS UTILITARIANISM/DEONTOLOGY INDEX Utilitarianism/Consequentalism Good UtilGood 1-8 Utillnevitable 9-12 Extinction comes first 13-17 A2 Rights outweigh 18-19 A2 Util is immoral/unethical 20-22 A2Util> Inequality 23-24 A2Util violates rules 25 ‘A2 Can't know all consequences 26-27 A2 Our impacts are happening 28 A2Can’t weigh life 29 Deontology Bad 30-31 A2Gewirth 32-42 A2Rawls 43-44 Deontology Good Deontology Good 45-50 Utilbad = 51-72 A2Util= Equality 73 A2 Extinction outweighs 74Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequential DeMougeot Scholars Cy) UTR Gonp Utilitarian frameworks can preserve the most important of rights. There is no need to cast your decision calculus as a totalitarian free- for-all. ‘alm x (Palmer, Richard, Professor. S.U.N.Y. Teaching Philosophy. March, 1992.) F the live: h th m, rsue one’s goal: free of coercion by other people, are all widely recognized requirements for attaining the greatest good, othe least harm for all people affected ies against violations of human rights, again: for life and ical aii artheid or slavery, or i-semiti re ven primarily the voices of d logists i moral wilder: Thi often ained voices of ilitarians decrying th that these actions lessen the good, and in th to socie that t! Fe, therefore, Morally wrong, They are morally wrong Because ther luce less than reatest re thi e | arm th whi hi fect, which are many Indeed, vost utilitarians firmly believe th: rights and justice critical components in the achievement of the greatest good ¢ the east harm for socety. Most utilitarians clearly recognize that respect for rights and con for justice are constitutive of atest Good, or tne least harm, for all people affected.MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 Utsav UTIL/DEONTOLOGY i UTiL Goop Deciding between which group to save depends on numbers to be moral- their framework is impossible because it’s too difficult to determine which action would be better. David Wasserman, Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, and Alan Strudler, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Director ofthe Ethics Program at the ‘Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 9["Can a Nonconsequentialist Count Lives?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31.1 p. Project Muse] am egg nd tin per to pe ht ‘ty son apintone Suppose that you atea member of the smaller group, You are told that your claim to ator ans onbhoeat Thlngs having inommensuzablevaluscarter toate mince Ona single te sc BUS ont oer nas oy SL paintsMEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTsAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY / Uti Goop Utilitarianism can accommodate both the greatest good and the greatest number- it doesn’t always have to sacrifice one group's happiness. David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 ["The Relation of Utilitarianism to Natural Law Theory” The Good Society 12.3 p. Project Muse] Instn t poe rion fr evry se uy po rena oti soak ‘evting thr ey downto ch is oh Tie al Tae Tae I pouch pathy on prt Bevo Pee ty ec ‘scone finds wy ofmprovig Ba of people tata droge bodily security, employment, ox twinetodsty to coveranin The shift rth nkntterowe mersdnacmustionteron ety ang omy ttn ns ey pg talking into account the distribution of consequénces for such ‘SUELOALES, winnie hea Acre no eel ung ene eee rgMean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars c/s) VT Geop Only utilitarian decisions are able to solve for extinction. Ratner, 1984, (Ratner, Leonard G. Professor. Law. University of Souther California. Law Center. “The Utlitarian imperative: . 723, Spring, 1984, Lexis ‘Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution.” The Hofstra Law Journal, 12 Hofstra L. Re Nexis.) Group dissatisfaction with need/want fulfillment erodes and modifies social organization. Community survival, therefore, is facil by fulfi for individuals of needs and of wan’ Vt not hinder n Ifillmen (Continued...) sut the ini ble f ea survival t! h natural jecti tin wit the allocations and rail each oroup. nao and Communities that discern the significance of that * pr can effectively acc dla “prioritize,” and eb ce, fi ent of individual ne d wants. naTSAV MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 U UtIL/DEONTOLOGY UTIL GooD Utilitarianism solves all their offense- it doesn’t mean that we should never consider their claims. David Braybrooke, Professor: ae and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 [Utilitariansim: restorations, repairs, renovations p. The census-notion, fnoreover, supplies an alternative interpretation © of Bentham’s Master idea tha ike We Gther Hea oie his K, ecisive and complete answer to the objec. fons #6 ulilitaranism hat I take up. The ideas belong to a Very Wier, Sf Se OF argument from the one that Shaw characerataly uses Shaw emphasizes and discounts the fantastic assumptions that gener, ate the objections. Discounting the objections as resting on mere fante, spec anctd sensible way to argue on these points; occasionally T myself argue in this style. Generally, however, I try for something different, something more trenchant than resulis like Shaw's, whice 222 Somewhat inconclusive. I try to show that even in principle, with fantastic assumptions in place, utilitarianism does Rot hese Weeehoech ‘snything substantia to.the objecgRS me, "Ait Hh censuses other new ideas decisive only be- cause they leave anything that can plausibly Be called “utlitarianinee a Go Rot think 0, The idess connect surprisingly closely wit the utilitay sm_of Bentham and his followers. Ie we regard the slo- 4 gan “The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number" sem 4 2fcaNY or anata seemmar pee RS should be impressed by the Thotion Has a Better claim than the calculus'to maki slos It does not lead Slbreaitowy a5 THE Gcuus coven SSL ‘ace of a choice between a icy that achieves the greatest sum of ‘SPINES and another pole Tar wivasees pene \dhere tthe slogan arly more than he did to the calculus. The pres, ance of the slogan in the literature nevertheless gives evidence & the implicit presence and operation of the census-notion. So do the ine tances of Bentham’s moving away from the combination of the sig, ian and the calculus when he is specially concerned with distribute onsideratons, Ve maa iMEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 Utsav UTIL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL Goop Utilitarianism isn’t static it can reform to maximize happiness. David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 [Utilitariansim: | Restorations, repairs, enovations p. 156-157] | How did utilitarianism accomplish anything in real disputes: it relied on the. concept-of utility? The distance of the concep! practice was present in the theory of BaRt aitaria the beginning: practice in policy malin ara Trans es vas [TRE sssumption that reform in mater sage ona compris eng en Daly w of factory work, and so forth ~ would bi STRESS oP EAA PTT Pa aT prong fr puter oe Near noni focer una oF rappiee eee eee Beas to be happy day by day shivering or ihe vain or snow or pe vite eed oa as eee uae case ae ie alr pe i re oder system of sewers, was an effective, robust, and fully Bi europe for uty of happinan asthe waltaey ond servant Sir Edwin Chadwick” perceived, London tenements wis anlkle-deep in lnuman excrement generated diseases that » the way of fulfilling anything like the Principle of Utility, to find a way of applying it. Again, the census-notion comes Chadwick's endeavours would not have been an unqualified d they created insanitary housing in other places (to which that he aimed to displace might have been diverted) or an satisfactory success if at the same time, without his doing, an er number of people came to be living in insanitary housing consequence of inadequately regulated capitalism. (did fa the-need to excrete on my illustrative List of Matters of Need ‘yas thinking of Chadwick’s endeavours; but his endeavours va nice historical firmation of the claim of excretion to fig- ust) VSP 7MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 Utsav UTIL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL Goop Util can combine the advantages and disadvantages of both frameworks to address human needs, David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 [Utilitariansim: .__ Testorations. repairs, renovations p. 7] Y Theoretical attention to the process of making policies and with it to the Revisionary Process is wholly utilitarian, even if few utilitarian writers have seen the importance of giving it prime attention? For I suppose that champions of_utilitarianism would never have denied that applications of their theory would take place in save uve ome es cine adeaee sna : "process. In the process, as it is carried on in the real world, teteary ier ieory had fo come to terms with the claims of human needs; with the centti-notion in Rand, it can deat with tose Came chectively- Th = anys Te way, CRrough & the surrogates for questions about HUY TappTET BY questions about needs and questions about other matters less basic, that utilitarianism hhas had whatever effect it has had on real~ world policy-making. So T_ from utilities to needs" Moreover, I treat priority for meeting needs as a fo. rhich utilitarians tetas eninge mais en bane Theeughattas ToS ea ‘SONS; TPFeseMt a utilitarianism that remains true to Bentham’s Master- Idea, tet moral disputes about social policy should be settle tistical evidence about the consequences for human beings." \@- 7MEAN'GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTIL/DEONTOLOGY UTIL GooD Looking at the total damage is the only way people care the most. Renford Bambrough, Fellow of St. John’s College, 84 (Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism p. 45) (2) There are utilitarian reasons for being more seve 7 nit. For example, a REE coupe rom the police after an ely to make further attempts UTSAVMean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars aie: UTS. TrevrerASse All philosophies are based on utilitarianism, making it Ratner, 1984. ‘Ratner, Leonard G. Professor. Law. University of Southern California. Law Center. "The Utiitarian Imperative: ‘Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution.” The Hofstra Law Journal. 12 Hofstra L, Rev. 723. Spring, 1984, Lexis. Nexis.) orality, however transcendental, rest ultimately on utilitarian seltimaras e., on personel need/want fulfilment), pscnues tie who fashion such systems, like wh them, ir ow humanness, ‘The physically controllable acts of each individual are the choice of that individual, though all ‘of the consequences may not be foreseen or desired. Behavi ior choices are necessarily by the x1 fe bits, jitudes; th rns and need: ints ~~ ii by timate self ij -- of the individual. inevitable,MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY / UTILGOOD - TnEvcetagice Ufilitarian thought is inevitable and can adjust, David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 [Utilitariansim: . festorations, repairs, renovations p. 44] TIEis utterly implausible to suppose that the problem about conse- | “quences can be laid to rest in any such way when social policies - to be chosen by political communities ot associations ~ come up for dis- cussion. This is the second of the two issues brought up by Nietzsche and Butler. What is utilitarianism to do about consequences when it is led gon = IE CET eps oer it WHICBe in order to let received soctal polici&s, including rules with even these aig aepue Fe ceived rules of central moral importance will sometime quire ad- justment: The rule against Tomisde- veh that aapect of it that Butler refers to asleding eB con ‘fo condemn unprovoked violence, may require adjustment, given the prospect of alarming consequencés oo Seniy pow prope fe Garton of ot Cooney teenie continuing experience with the exception for self-defence, or argu: + mens for voluntary gufhanasia invoking the penful consequences of disallowing it. @* 10Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars (cite zetees UTR sNeurmere Utilitarian thought is inevitable because the human mind always defaults to it. Allison, 1990. ‘Allison, Lincoln. Professor. Political Philosophy. Warwick University. The Utilitarian Response. 1990.) ‘And yet, if an idea can be compared to a castle, thought we find a breached well, damaged foundetions and weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there stil remains a keep sometning central and defensible within Utitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it, Utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a cent in moral theorising ... (and) nas come to have a significant impact upon the ‘moral thinking of many laymen. THe simple Core Of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and » that the best ctions art mak as an do the alternatives, what utiitarianism always excludes, therefore, is any Idea about the rightness or , Wrongness of actions whichis not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, that i, prepared to reveal Truth and instructor) OF @ Convincing deduction of ethical prescriptions from pure reasons, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to judge actions eir con: e's i bringMEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSA’ UTIL/DEONTOLOGY : UTIL GOoD- It’s INEVITABLE Weighing ane impact another is inevitable. Nicholas Reacher, professor of philosophy at the University of Pittsburg, 83 [Risk A philosophical . Int ion. of Risk Eve 1d Mi tp. 9] © Risk_is_an incliminable part of human existence, We are ‘vulnerable creatures, living our lives within a sea of risks that sur- * rounds us on every side. The very environment we inhabit con- “Fronts us with major risks,? and so does virtually every action- choice we make. From the moment we gain a foothold on life, we have something fo Tose, The question in human action is never the indefinite one of whether to accept risk or not—the answer here is 4 foregone coticlusion. The question can only be whether to accept is-risk or that one. Action is always a matier oF balancing one risk off against another, of chancing one hazard or another,5 @& 1aMean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars Cy) EXTINCT ION Sly Even if you’re uncertain about the consequentialist framework, you must always act to prevent nuclear war, whatever the concessions might be. Schell, 1982, {(Schel, Jonathen. Writer. New Yorcer. The Fate of the Earth. 1982.) ‘To say that human extinction is 2 certainty would, of course, be @ mis-representation—-just as It would be ‘misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur atall, If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons, If they co Use all thelr weapons, the global effects, in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And ifthe effects are not moderate but extreme, the ‘ecosphiere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophicaly, These are all ‘Substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished In a nuclear holocaust, Or even that ‘extinction in @ holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency, Yet at the ‘same time we are compelied to admit that tere may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use al their ‘weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we are as yet unaware, may be severe, that the {ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and thet our species may be extinguished. We are left ' with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of inty. Ti fish to save eci e hi jo mi ir our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized, on the othe: hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to ‘admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-cestruction. When istenc clear ons wa Known, thous people erywhere in the w alized that if the owers ent inte -arms race the hui ech uld sooner or later e possibility of extinction, they also reaized that in the absence of international ‘agreements preventing it en arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the eneray in mass-~of "the basic power of the universe"---and of ‘means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that’ sense, the question of human extinction has been an the politcal agenda of the world ever since the flest auclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to Build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between ‘merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used ‘et any second, is not precisely knowable. But It is clear that at present, WII len' m yf explosi wer in existence, and i re bei ided day avi ‘ed inte on uncertainty, wnicn is wo say tne Zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk extincti a significan is c rically different fi and i urabh ter th her risk, and as we decisi e hi take signifi in ni 0 now, risk een ined within the frame of life: extinction woul rt e. Ti sents he it of pos abyss in whit human purposes would rown: time have ight to the possibil t limi ternal, ton me footing as that we run j ordin: uct affairs i icular transient om Man History. To employ a mathematical analogy, we can say that although exti ma’ ‘actional tak um vi 3Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Sch (Cy_) HUES gE OTNC OA aE necpgeeTeTpSeeeSPEPeee In other words, nce we thi hol ist might | to extincti 1@ hi n ri lambhi al if we Jame will be over, ither we in else will ev et an r ICE. Therefore, ‘although, scientifically speaking, there is ali the difference In the world between tie mere possibilty that 2 holocaust will bring about extinction ard the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but tw address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fete of the eartn and, with it, our own fate, we stand before 9 mystery, and in tampenng with the earth we tamper with @ mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should cispose us to wonder, ‘ur wonder should make us humble, cur humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence ‘and caution should lead us to act without celay to withdraw the threat we now pose to the earth and to ourselves,Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars Cy4_) ExtDverjon ol We can’t take the risk of evaluating rights when extinction is a pos: ity. Scarre, 1996, (Gcarre, Geoffrey. Lecurer. Philosophy. Durham University Utltaranism. 1996.) ilitarian thinking about killing seems, tren, most intutive'y acceptable to mani durin ic emer . When society's ve ival is in questi e niceties of normal th re to be di ble. Ei dical cannibalism might be s rable if er mi available to save in individual: who w. cial Jon's war effort. 1 bisck were designing the weapon whicn ‘would ensure his countr/s victory, and White were ts most brillant eneral, not only ther survival might depend ‘pon Green losing his kidneys. ities ma no les: bui : mimi ssa the chips are down e wi community,Mean Green Workshops Deontology /Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars Cate aaty. EXTINCTION Olu) No circumstance allows us to risk extinction. As a judge, it should be your overriding goal to avoid such deadly consequences. hell, 1982. (Schell, Jonathan. Writer. New Yorker. The Fate of the Earth. 1982.) ath of. eci mbl« death indivi fin if boundlessness, tts bianiness, ts removal beyond experience, and its tendency to batfie human thought ‘and feeling, yet 2s soon as one mentions the hope of survival the similarities are clearly at an end. For while Individual death is inevitable, extinction can be avoided; while every person must die, mankind can be saved. ‘Therefore, while reflection on death may lead to resignation and acceptance, reflection on. extinction must lead to exectty the opposite response: to arousal, rejection, dignation, and n. Extinction is not s in ontempl: itis something to rebel against. To point this out might seem like ‘ing the obvious if it were at e whole thi d's ion to the peril of e ion ha: None of nu: ss and inertia, s though extinction asi able as death i Even today, the offical response to the sickening reality before us is conditioned by @ grim fatalism, in which the hope of ridding the world of nuclear weapons, ang thus of surviving as a species, Is all but ruled cut of Consideration as “utopian” or “extreme” = as though it were “radical” merely to want to go on living and to want One's descendants to be bom. And yet if one gives up these aspirations one has given up on everything. AS 2 species, we have as yet done nothing to save ourselves. The slate of action Is blank. We have orgen zations for the Preservation of almost everything in life that we want Dut no organization for the preservation of mankind. People, ‘Seem to have decided that our collective will s too weak or flawed to rise to this occasion. They see the violence ‘hat has saturated human history, and conclude that to practice violence Is Innate in our species. They find the perennial hope that peace can be brought to the earth once and for all a delusion of the well-meaning who have refused to face the “harsh realities” of international Ife ~ the realities of self-interest, fear, hatred, and aggression. They have concluded thet these realities are eternal ones, and this conclusion defeats at the outset any hope of taking the actions necessary for survival. Looking at the historical record, they ask whst has changed %0 ove anyone confidence that humanity can break with its violent past and act with greater restraint. ‘The enswer of ‘course, is that everything has changed. To the old “harsh realities” of international Ife has been added the immeasurably harsher new reality of the peril of extinction. To the old truth that all men are brothers has been ‘added the inescapable new truth that not only on the moral but also on the physical plane the nation that practices aggression will itself die, This is the law of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence ~ the doctrine of "mutuel assured destruction” - whieh “assures” the destruction of the society of the attacker. And its also the law of che natural world, wich, in its own version of deterrence, supplements the oneness of mankind with a oneness of nature, and Guarantees that when the attack rises above a certain level the attacker will be engulfed in the general ruin of the global ecosphere. he obligation to honor life is nm \ddex sanction that if iin ation life will act be awi ‘om us, individuall lectively. of us will di: i the wi ‘ound us dying. Such impons bik man lit integri if the tert | creation, eanit ime, of his ind dev en whi ere on to conte! jon ai iri indi jow ai in th iti ‘ealm det a res m_evel As political a we latives bi deh the m1 2 wi like, we must he world sheMean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars — a) ExrInet on oly) Survival of the human species should be the overriding goal of any policymaker because it is the most ethical decision possible. Ratner, 1984. (Ratner, Leonard G, Professor. Law. University of Souther California. Law Center, “The Ubiitarian Imperative: ‘Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution.” The Hofstra Law Journal, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 723. Spring, 1984. Lexis Nexis.) The search for the ought is a search for the goals of human behavior. Underlying the ought of every goal is an implicit description of redicts the cons human: lian noncompliance with the ought, ns Human: the goals. nso ana the perceived accuracy of the description, along with the perceived value of thi redi jescription, influenc the choi thus. ‘The goal of enhanced human need/want fulfilment Implles that such enhanced fulllment is possible and will facttate long-run human existence. that facilitate hi isteni persistently chosen by most humans, because human structure and function have evolved and are evolving to faciitate such existence, The decisionmaking organism is structured to generally prefer survival, atthough some may trade long-term existence for short- {erm pleasure, and physiological mafuncion or traumatic experience may induce the preference of few for personal nonsunva.Inermerdate human goals change wit humsn structure end functon; LONG=FUN, h ih mains thi it human @@all as jong as there are humans.Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars Cs_) A2 Bouts Ayo Claims to value rights are too absolutist and self-contradictory. elzig, 1! (Steg, Tom. 1D. Cencidete. University of Pennsylvania, Unversty of Pennsylvania Law Review. U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, 1998. Lexis-Nexs,) If the latter is true, no more need be said to show that deontologicel norms do not exhaust morally. I the former is corect, because rights Caims may be overridden oniy when suibstantialy more gooe will osu Tradeoft Idea * - then t every situation will i ea true confi ights. De ining the r ion of these rights~ icts require that morality be supplemented with principles other than Fights. 1 this is corect, rights would perform relatively little theoretic work triggerii se princi: hat rinciples woul rly inve for resolving rights-conflicts w. jo the bulk of e wor! ight n. a notion do sit i ‘with the claim that deontology exhausts morality, tor the reasons already discussea.Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars CI) AX REGS oly Rights shouldn't be evaluated because they are too conflictual and inapplicable to public policy-making, making utilitarianism the best option. Hasn: (Hasnas, John. Assistant Professor, Ethics. Georgetown University, Nw. U.L. Rev. 900. 1995, Lexis-Nexis.) But concicer now that if the government js required to resolve conflicts of rights, it determine whi the intere: ing th conflicting rights is of greater moral significance, whet basis does the goverment have for making such value judgments? As we have previously seen, the only ethical th is ite and simple en: 2 as ical bolitical morality is utilitarianism. * The government i; rise Not of philosophers, but of practically-minded lawyers, economists, statisticians, and other social “scentsts WHO are nether trained in nor remiier win the vagaries of moral philosophy, whether poitician, bureaucrat, or judge, vrtvaly all Government officials have been trained that wnen their actions are not constrained by people's rights or other constitutional barriers, their duty is to produce the greatest good for the greatest number -to promote general utlity. Furthermore, because governmental decision-making must be capable of objective justification to the ture of the job simpl les an ich thi ies primaril N_a person’ tuitions. Therefore, aS a practical matter, the (932) only basis the government has for making comparative assessments of value is its judgment as to what wi t serve the common As remarked earier, for the government, utilitarian analysis is necessarily standard operating procedure. » ‘This means that. nment i: on fe a ct I right iding which of th: ing int re of relative importance, it will appeal to tne only basis for making comparative value judgments that is available to it, utilitarianism. Thus, this determination will be made on thi i ich interest i: roducti en mr icts of il ical Ive Il best pr. ial welfé : Consier the impliations of this, When there are no fundamental ights at stake, the governinent resolves conflicts among human interests on a utitarian basis by insttuting the poly that wil mst etfecuwely promote general Uy. The essen! purpose of fundamental nights anc the ting that makes tem moral sonleant tat they Drevent the government from interfering with te incerests they protec simply to increase genera uly. These Fights identify those human interests thet ae of special moral significance and, thus, are too important Yo bei to the mercy of the ordinary governmental processes of cost-benefit onalysis. But When fundamental rights conflict, as they can under the contemporary conception, the government will conflict on is of what will b enefici: society as a whole in other words, it will employ precisely the same decision it would if there wer ‘ights involve us, Wi i inflict, they no i le. Thi imply dri of consideration, aceMEAN'GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 Utsav Urit/DEONTOLOGY / A2 UTIL IS IMMORAL Utilitarianjsm still allows for adhering to morals as much as possible with the ultimate goal of the greatest happiness. David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 {"The Relation of Utilitarianism to Natural Law Theory” The Good Society 12.3 p. Project Muse] telling. rowan insane gn nines nny wh visting tel en ling wl aly ao ‘eiscualednama aps Wy gpf f Gtg wy thera wold routs sng sat omic png ang eto ‘hae of ur wich Deane tr erg eizde ene ging ey ballmed oat ka fttemnsvey emenen ooo ae tetehe ‘aly loger Te proms tat lane's you wl ret eam cng fbr trp soce eke eee Humes poof an inten ame ing ppt oe swig so lamces ca po aoMEAN'GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY UTIL Goop- A2 MORALITY Utilitarianism reduces the evaluation of consequences, making it the most moral framework, David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 "The Relation of Utilitarianism to Natural Law Theory” The Good Society 12.3 p. Project Muso] Comparative Census, (us we cules ene cgi for peop egierng increas peal tyes) Nata law ton het weal nie ade east ced wah nope akc ern nth prvi eri ig oug employment aen en forall the human beings (writen tengo affected should be ‘brought in to govern scion in rsa th actonsor law-making. Wit it insi Mis goal at in doingsomsiing congenial apie of ota nwt oma fit tata tinal ot es pr tng aMEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY UTIL Goop- A2 Ir’s UNETHICAL Utilitarianism can incorporate all of their ethics claims. David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 [Utilitariansim: . Eestorations, repairs. renovations p. 55] oo “TPeremptory values have often figured in objections to utilitarianism; they Figure in Some Of the objections taken up in separ the it book. Utilitarianism can fend off the objections, and that is the general line that I take with them. Alternatively, utilitarian doc- ; frine may be modified to objections by constraining b and consequences to suit, though the more ‘peremptory values that ate accepted from the objections and accom- : modated, the more one may wonder whether the theory-is still utili- taranism. True, one may define uiitrianiom 98 SRY Cries Soe that has a place ifr SU Tesort, after The Operation of various con- Stunts TOF Raving SECT urn on vavaton in such & melirative value as human welfare or happiness. ‘very few ethical doctrines ‘will not be versions of utilitaric though tere wil be ‘Il be some ~ the Jen Commandments or the Book of Leviticus — presented on the thec that what God demands sfc to costtate the content of ebce. 9 esMEAN'GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 Ursav UTIL/DEONTOLOGY ee / Uri Goon EQUALITY Only a utilitarian framework sees all humans as equal. David Wasserman, Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, and Alan Strudler, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Director of the Ethics Program at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 03{“Can a Nonconsequentialist Count Lives?” Philesophy & Public Affairs 31.1 p. Project Muse] esos Kamm and rms Scanlon have nents ALES inn ene toumber in conflict settings, The uy tytn gga aioe npn eae on aon of eel nk Bath ory i ‘DUMIBEL. Tir orgment opps to ave Kav qt nny bance eft ard nonce nee They charge the rescuer who refuses ction wil ‘Tent sano peer prose for neshng ila ly, Uh cr rete eet nc wey ht ch npr ae some ee ‘oetng cir foram end ea ‘evrfenio theatre a3MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY i UTIL GOOD - Ay EauaritY Utilitarianism is key to equality- when people know that they'll be protected, they won't be oppressed. David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 [Utilitariansim: | estorations, repairs, renovations p. 168] Utilitarianism recast cay t sense of equalit ‘directly - equality-in-meeting-needs, which means ect for ‘every Matter of Need the Minimum Standards of Provision Toi ev ; allowing (as [have pointed out earlier) for variation Sanat Boson TH persons. This is ani objective implied in the priority that ufilitarianism recast gives to meeting needs. Utilitarianism recast : also captures,with this sense of equality, a sense of equality: ascording-toswhich if people are not strictly equal in power, they arg still not that some of them can easily arrainge To — ‘oppress the others ~ forcing the others into servitide TOF example, of making fee with thé pers’ might I peopl are gnu of rovisions that come to them with equiality-in-meeting. ‘will not be 50 vulnerable to oppression. A pretty obvious trap, it'may be said, lies in the assumption that they will continue to be assured of provisions for their needs. For how can this assurance be obtained except under a government with effective police powers that it is ready to use against would-be oppressors in government or out of it? Democracy coines in again: only a democratic govern- ment, it may be argued, will use police powers this way, without repressing liberty on its,own behalf. But the points about equality- in-meeting-needs and the approach to equality in power resting on it while it exists are distinct from the point about arrangements to achieve and kéep these things. p Wo ayMEAN (GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UttL/DEONTOLOGY a A2 UTIL VIOLATES RULES Because full consideration is impossible, utilitarians have to defer to certain rules. David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 [Utitriansim: . Restorations, repairs, renovations p. 12] : = ‘Ket-utilitarians want to push as far as possible the application of the « Principle of Utility action by action, in calculations and choices that are unaffected by deference to moral rules, (I assume, to fix ideas, the principle as understood in Hedonic Act-Utlitarianism,) Act-utltar- Tans begin, at least, by hypothesizing that there are no possible cir- ‘cumstances in which the Principle of Uiilty, applied to single actions ‘with full consideration of everything that is at stake, ought to be to ‘any degree qualified in favour of heeding moral rules. Everything that is af stake includes the features of the circumstances contributed by previous actions and the influence that the actions now contemplated may have on future actions. Accord ditarianism, as I con- Ceive it full consideration is in practice impossible, so that even utli- tarlans by convicuon mustbind ‘in deference to rules. wUitarianism and ever that apply simply to make as sure as possible of utlitarian actions an« bicourage Counter uRiarian DBRS. Qe 25MEAN‘GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UISAV UtiIL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL GOOD- A2 CAN’T KNOW ALL CONSEQUENCES ‘We can predict some consequences- this is enough to justify action. David Braybrooke, Professor of Govemment and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, itariansim; __festorations, repairs, renovations p. 42-43) ‘\Wietzsche dismissed utilitarianism (hateful to him anyway as an ex- pression of British commercialism and petty-mindedness), because as eseasonably (but mistakenly) thought, it calls for knowing the truth about all the consequences of any ‘proposed Se WEEE TI Which TE TPS 0 hastily concluded, utilitarianism is.a ith no possibility of jentham’s innovating efforts and expec tations notwithstanding, In a Note of 1888, published with The Will fo Power, he says, ‘The value of an act must be measured by its conse- : quences, the utiltarians say ... But does one know the consequences? __ gHfethaps as far as five steps. Who could say what an act stimulates, ites, provokes against itself” As a stimulus? Perhaps as the ignition patk for an explosive?” efore utilitarianism was named, which was after Bentham wrote, before Bentham wrote, Bishop Butler, though he did not go so far fetzsche, had taken a sceptical view of consequentialism on simi in his Dissertation on the Nature of Viriue, he says, : JpaWe are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, "ysinjusice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, {Bigbstracted fom all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce san overbalance of happiness or misery .. {Moreover} though itis our [peusiness and our duty to endeavour, within the bounds of veracity and 10 contribute tothe ease, convenience and even cheerfulness and F-verson of our fellow-creatues, itis greatly uncertain, whether this, wvour will in particular instances produce an averbalance of happi- upon the whole; since so many and distant things must coune into And that which makes it our duty is, that there is some appear- ££) [ance that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to balance this, on 1 ahe contrary side; and also, that such benevolent endeavour isa cultiva- ‘Eoiption of that most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active principle avatbenevolence? there is a partial defence of utilitarianism in the latter part of 's remarks, it is a very weak one, so weak that it invites the tion about not knowing consequences all over again. It is true the partial defence harmonizes with the point often made on ‘of utilitarianism that, if we take received moral rules as consid- tions proven by long experience to be reliable if not infallible guides he best consequences, we do not have to inguire anew about conse- 26 in the instances to which they apply. As William Shaw re- s us and J.S. Mill said before him,’ we already know a good deal a quences for human beings of various acta 3 cee aeMEAN (GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY / UrtL Goop- A2 CAN’T KNOW ALL CONSEQUENCES Utilitarianism provides the best methods of choosing which consequences to prevent while taking every ‘consequence into consideration. . David Braybrooke, Professor of Government and Philosophy at Dalhousie University, 04 [Usilitariansim; testorations, repairs, renovations p. 50] rafter st toa view of policy-making that is serial and revision- ary and thus in accord with.real current I there are at Teast 2s =e eee jection about unmanageably many consequences. First, it must be ‘shown that utilitarianism, bi with reasonably if ways of selecting the consequences that are’ to be considered in evalu- at actions and policies. Second, it must be shown that utilitarianism: ; Boe he ineabe danee a consequences will have been identified). Synoptic use of the felicific calculus is of no help to utilitarianism in either connection. The strat- ~ egy of disjointed incrementalism, which I am about to describe, pro- Tirles as much help s, inthe nature of things, can he hoped for) p. Se a7MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL Goop- A2 CAN’T WEIGH LIFE ‘We can never fully weigh the value ofa life- this shouldn't prevent us from considering tisks and acting, Nicholas Rescher, professor of philosophy at the University of Pittsburg, 83 [Risk: A philosophical Introduction to the Theor Evalua Management p. 181] FF our inabili “ jue of a life"” need not im tational deliberation about the management of life-threateni . tisks, provided that it is possible with luck or ingenuity to set the 1h duestions up in an appropriately manageable form. An orthodox ¢ decision-theory approach that stands committed to the Sandatd 4 Teliance on quantitative measures, is— fortunately — not our only resource for rational deliberation. To say this is not, of course, fo —say the matter of risk-managemient falls outside of economics altogether, but only that the economics of the enterprise are bound to_be_subtle_and complex — and_fraught_with normatively evaluativ i ich is to'say political ones. > aqMEAN'GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UriL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL Goop- A2 OUR IMPACTS ARE HAPPENING Alllactions.are responses to perceptions- we have a greater obligation to mmethin, paekarerapee greater obligation to stop something larger that could Nicholas Rescher, professor of philosophy at the University of Pittsburg, 83 [Risk: A philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management p. 7] It deserves stress that although the risk of various outcomes is a Y; wholly objective, ontological issue of how things stand m The Tea world, the subjective side of risk is nevertheless unauoidabie when addressing the issue of the appraisal and management of risks. ~Whi wor to addi ves to real risks, we must recognize that this cam only be done by tackling perceived : risks, People have no alternative to reacting to situations as they ‘percetve them, (They will struggle to open the door even if a see tion of the opposite wall is, unbeknowst to them, made of papier mache.) ‘ve are interested in risk-handling as a part of the theory of (rational) human agency, we must address ourselves to per ceived, or at any rate unproblematically perceivable _risk. ea of risk management the subjective side OF the ‘patter mustfigure prominently. 1p Recher AgMean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars (s_) VENTELDGY BAD Consequentialists are not “slaves” of “utility maximization.” Only deontology justifies a strict set of rules which allow countless atrocities. Vuletii (Waletc, Mark 1. Master of Arts Degree. Philosophy. University of Illinois, “Deontological Objections to Consequentialisin.” 1994. http://w. nfice's.org/ibrary/modern/mark_vuletic/objection_to_consequentialism.html.) To reason (a), one may respond that i con: tial: ke Himself a maximiz: "then nte jist mal elf 12 of rul ere ‘fori in wi mith to utility maximization shi Ore inferi commit it te of al ist rul Sn m ere i: less on: ye tion aching it from ont jical viewpoint. in (a id we Ss sit I indisputable argument: showing 2 Non-consequentialist system of ethics to be the right SYSEEM as Kent tries to formulate - but judging from the Gepth of controversy in moral philosophy todey, it Seams re doubtful ch a mer sts, Reason (a) «is ignores the existence of rule-of-thumb-utilitarianism,» wich he coment o personal decson avai present The rule-of-thumb-utilitarian has 0 gran calc churn out a sheet ci i rtain of action, nor i fle ci collective utilitarian wisdom of the centuries, but te utimate decision as to whet course of action he takes - even Whil aining within the framewor! consequentialism - 's tne agents persona responsibilty.Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars Cs) Déesraecy Se Deontological frameworks are impossible to implement. Stelzig, 1998, {Stelzig, Tor. J.D. Candidate. University of Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. U. Pa. L. Rev. 90. 1998, Lexis-Nexis.) Given this structure, if rights are to have any practical meaning, the iable's refer be aiv stanti ten erwise, ill not _kni ich f. uld be giv rd will not know how to act properly. Given this structure, deo not ght ibly to exh Morality, The reason is that the word is virwally saturated with normativty. If deontological ims we tive Hi identifiable situation which morality applies would have to be governed by a separate » deontological maxim, normativty would be replete with trumping commends, governing even the most picayune stuations. This notion is implausible for at lest tivee reasons. SUCH a view raises an "epistemologi blem," a "conflic lem," ani ‘insufficiency problem." “Toke first the epistemological problem. Every vi jorality mi imately give unt of how it is that e to know is ri erwise im, ive mor: hysics is pointless if : epi ically im) ible.MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY UTIL GooD- A2 GEWIRTH Gewirth assumes that one principle can solve conflicts while still being moral- he’s wzong and fails to provide roof for his assertion. Marcus G. Singer, professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, 84 [Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism p.23) guzith adds: "Rational justification must hence be provided ata more- then a basis for resolving potential conflicts between them must icated, and this basis must itself be justified. The basis in question “{iculd function as the supreme principle” (12). ‘This rings him back to sis monistic presupposition. Bul the supposition that here WUSTDE PAs set down mainly out of habit. For Gewirth SaMEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL Goop- A2 GEWIRTH ‘The idea that a single principle can guide all moral action isn’t needed and is unpredictable. Morality is ‘dynamic and doesn’t need Gewirth’s theory. . _ Renford Bambrough, Fellow of St. John’s College, 84 [Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism p. 41-42] SES GE Soren cold be the asec wa PNT WEA ae ‘ S5dserong.A cul learns when to say Ts not Tan oF Thank you! of “{eouldn’t help it’ before meeting any conceivable can of supreme principle, as a child leams to count from one to twenty and . to multiply by three or seventeen before being INTO can didates Tor the role of Toundations or axtoms of artttmrettc——————— No explanation of facts or concepts of economics Could be given toa 3 “yerson who had no observation or experience of buying and selling, Beange and bar In giving such exelanatone fs aecessary to rly on an appeal to what a person alteady knows in being familiar with me ceaanal Morality, like arithmetic and commerce, is a going concern, find it cups oid Di ina llscies reer Gara before it can occur tous to ask where it comes from or where it may end: “Where do we find ourselves? In a series, of which we do not know the extremes, and believe that it has none. We wake, and find ourselves on a stair: there are stairs below us, which we seem to have ascended; | there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward and out of sight!” “The philosophical problems about morality arise from difficulties that we moet within mol, ae Just as philosophical problems about know! edge in general arise from difficulties that present themselves within nonphilosophical inquiries. Prichard pays attention to this parallel. This was to be expected of a philosopher who saw as clearly as Prichard did that both morality and inguiry generally are going concers. We startin s, It is not just that we cannot do philosophy until we are able to conduct nonphilosophical inquiries, but that in all inquiries, philosophical or nonphilosophical, we find ourselves, even at our ini- tiation, engaged in an enterprise which has no identifiable beginning. Be cc tf oa ace toees ca We eae and seeing that the stairs go upward and downward without ending. : ist monatey as 2 going concern when he wams-us-not-to expect simplidiy or tiiness in our Tare conceptions, For all we know, he says, our moral obligations may form | . orsimplicit ‘seeking a principle or definition from Which moral truths ce a ree ents This in Rim rot Him aga tof milliar species of moral philosophers: those who try to justify moral con- clusions by such a derivation, and those who seek only to articulate in a tidy criterion (Prichard’s own word, p. 14) the deliverances of some other source of moral enlightenment. Sj)-47. iMEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UtiL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL GoopD- A2 GEWIRTH Gewisth assumes that action is always voluntary and that there's only one way to act. D.D. Raphael, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the Imperial College of Science and Technology, 84 . [Gewirth‘s Ethical Rationalism p. 85-86] aim here is to persuade us that freedom and well-being are condiljons for acton-and so are logically connected with purpose, ‘Objects of which constitute an agent's conception of good. Gewirth reues that freedom and well-being are necessary conditions for action because an agent necessarily thinks of action as voluntary or free and because “he regards his capabilities of action as constituting his own ‘well-being as an agent” (60). Both segments of this argument have their , difficulties. 1. To say that an agent necessarily is action as voluntary or free would commonly betaken to express Seal in fresdon of chae- Dat to say that we aI Rave a ght te needom wo Tight Yo freedom would commonly be under- soe ear Tar ABOUT Socal Reem, Hebtiom from restrain by othe people on carrying OUT WHAT GRE chdbses to do. Gewirth deals with this matter on pages 31 and following, where he tries to show that the concept of voluntary or free or unforced choice takes in freedom from ‘coimpulsion By other persons a8 well as freedom from such causal Con: | ditions as Woul ‘one course of action. There is room for aufrene of pion here: [is ue that we spekofa gna that as ‘forcing’ the victim to do what the gunpen ‘wants, evert though the | unmpat does Teave the viet betwee Stenanives gunmpatt does Teave the victim with a choice between alfemmatives, one of them being extremely unpalatabie, It is certainly not reasonable to expect victims to choose this alternative and We MENT WET say, in Coainany peranee, Tat GR avin had finary parlance, that Such @ victim “had no choice, meaning no rea-. sonable choice. Is it correct to hold that the victim’s action is involun= tary—or (if there is a difference of nuance) not voluntary? I have my. doubts about this proposition but would accept that there is a case for | holding it. However, when Gewirth speaks of voluntariness or freedom. | as ‘seen cndiua tanita sins woul orm, 4 understood as rr ly i ym_of choice and not absence of duress (such as a gunma{s threat). The mere fact that we + can use the word ‘action’ when we speak of ‘action performed under urea" shows That the absence Of duness NOCH TeCCsSaTY COTO oom OF BEEDTE SO FA TOE HNIC One om apre-inety Gévirth doss, that since the concept of action presupposes voluntariness or freedom (of choice), Trallgws one fo proceed to an inference about a right to (social) freedom, freedom from restraint by other Peoples 34MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTIL/DEONTOLOGY UTIL Goop- A2 GEWIRTH Gewirth only uses normative knowledge for his theory- not morals, EM. Adams, Kenan Professor of Philosophy at UNC, 84 {Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism p. 13 si be argued that metaphysical truths presupposed by the prop- Land conceptual structure of knower-agents are of the world fositional and conceptual structure that presupposes the prop pistemic and thus of the word, But if Gewirth is correct, the Sr al and conceptual structure Tat presopposes the senial normative struct ie normative judgment, Hig intra normative sce o which is analytically true, is not of or f agents but is presupposed by UTSAVMEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL Goop- A2 GEWIRTH Gewirth’s theory is normalizing and prevents using moral knowledge as part of action. EM, Adams, Kenan Professor of Philasophy at UNC, 84 {Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism p. 11) ical form of the PGC, js committed (and recognizes that other fe likewise committed), on pain of inconsistency, to the judg- {iat he ought to zespect the generic rights of others as well as-his_ So What is added when an agent comes to recognize the assertoric GC as a logical truth? In what way, if any, is the subjective normative ure of an agent by moral knowledge a la johave no added practical import whatever. Each agent, it seems, exactly the same results (ie. accept the same normative judg nis pertaining to himself and to others) by remaining within the live structure of agency as he would by reasoning from the as- é PGC as a logical truth. So mozal knowledge, if Gewirth’s account ‘cortect, does not seem to Ge importants the ‘moral enterprise for, with or without moral knowledge, agents subscribe to the ong. Any accotnt of moral knowledge that renders it morally [uous must be suspect. The trouble, I think, lies in Gewirth’s of the normative structure of scion : 36MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UtiL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL GOoD- A2 GEWIRTH Gewirth’s theory lacks moral knowledge, making their framework immoral. EM. Adams, Kenan Professor of Philosophy at UNC, 84 [Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism p. 22) (Tam right, then Gewirth’s Principle of Generc Lonststencyjs an analytic myo) euthbesit Es 1 Mc dinciple and foundation of moral knowledge in the manner he claims. It is an analytic truth that revi a it moral know!- wedge is available to the agent through critical assessment of Mig experi- ences, attitudes, a mn ige ofthe agent, there would-net_be-the-snalytic moral truth of the bilowpher. Sp isi 37MEAN'GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 Utsav Uri/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL GoopD- A2 GEWIRTH Gewitth’s contradicting ideas of logic and morality proves that morality isn’t unique. ‘Marcus G. Singer, professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, 84 [Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism p.24) > On this point there is an apparent self-contradi i is that “the ‘Self-contradictic 4 ‘dence over all other justificatory criteria” (194). If this “logical criterion” takes precedence “over all other justificatory criteria,” then it must take precedence over moral criteria—supposing the moral criterion is distinct ie logical —and is hard then to see hx Jaim that “morality ~ has.a_unique status" (or that morality claims to have a unique status), by purporting “to set requirements that take precedence over all other modes of guiding action,’ can be made out.) 7 38MEAN\GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTIL/DEONTOLOGY UTSAV UTIL GOoD- A2 GEWIRTH Gewirth’s definition of morality fails at being neutral- this contradicts his theory. Marcus G. Singer, professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, .264 \ Consider finally Gewirth’s definition of what he calls the authoritatv jestion: “Why should one be moral, in the sense of accepting a5 sf ee obligatory for one’s actions the requirement. furthering or favorably considering the important interests of other per sons, especially when these conflict with one’s own interest?” (3). one has a concept of morality on which one is not obligated to furthé the interests of offers, or on which one is not obligated to further 1% interests of others when they conflict with one’s own interests, this wuestion, not arise—and in any case it is certainly nat an fibeeeaapa eee And it is especially surprising tha Gewirth refers to "personal egoism,” and “the extreme of nihilism: which maintains “that no interests are of any value,” in the very. nese paragraph; so he is not, apparently, attempting to rule these out a pral_theoy moralities or mor ies (as Rawls rales out egoism). Curiousli spool “moral criteria epitomized by . . . Nietzsche” et in Gewirth’s sense of ‘moral’ Nietzsche had no moral criteria. If Sanu Stange is becuse Gewstesehinior see $4 [Gewisth’s Ethical Rationaism 5GMEAN'GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UtiL/DEONTOLOGY Uti Goop- A2 GEWIRTH Gewirth’s normalizing theory is too restricting- the only way to act requires contradiction. Kai Nielsen, Professor of Philosophy at University of Calgary, 84 [Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism p. 63] not just for or © some pstson, ll unselfsh or caring pro-atttudes (bid. 26) Heike Kast, ;chieve a justification that any rational agent must ac even a chap Tike R. M. Hare, Gewirth seeks to establish a categorically “normatively binding set of requirements ‘He ties to give Us an unassailable grounding, a ground oes oe epem ore tar THTTCeE OF Tne eS OF ions people {togorical and determinate moral obligations (ibid., 29). This thatthe other postions do not even aspire to. Moreover ~MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY / Uti Goop- A2 GewirTH Gewirth fails to take other solutions into account, R. M. Hate, Professor Emeritus of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University and Professor of Philosophy at the . University of Florida, 84 [Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism p. 57 } is therefore time to examine, by way of a postscript, why it is that Geiwith gets himself into this trouble. The clue is to be found in the , iy pages of the book, where, after quite rightly proposing to argue - 2 tational morality on conceptual grounds ‘witha appeal ‘out in such phrases as “noncognitivists and other antirationalists’ i). Because he is unable to take seriously the idea that rationality in F nd therefore in prescripon might consist in something different om rational fact-finding, he thinks that he has, in order to establish rationality of moral thought, to discover in the wos facts or objects ee oe al fede Se GIMEAN'GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UtiL/DEONTOLOGY / UTIL Goop- A2 GEWIRTH Gewirth fails to adequately justify his theory- he fails to reduce his judgments to truths, EM. Adams, Kenan Professor of Philosophy at UNC, 84 {Gowirth’s Ethical Rationalism p. 8) [Atan cewrern’s noox Reason and Morality is important, for he has pro- Posed a new approach and a new solution to the problem of moral knowledge. Without admitting objective normative truths in the manner of the value realist, without reducing value jud, to factual state- ‘ments via naturlisic definition of value tein He pee cRissical ethicarmararaitst-and without holding that we can nonlogically ‘but comigibly derive noralive judemenis front purely Tacha infos. mation in the manner of some ““good-reasons” moral philosophers, Ge ‘wirth claims ta show that, contrary to emotivists and existentialists, there , ism so_that it is not possible for different persons To” uphold conflicting moral judgments without making some logical or ~ Cepia er TRE Torn ae Some aT or uth is What he als the Panagiegt Gn: Coates BCC ncly “Every agent ought to actin accord with he genes ee PR, ient ected by his acts] as well as of Rimepll” (152). He claims that this is an analytically true supreme principle of morality from which, ‘i in conjunction with relevant factual information, other moral judgments can be logically derived, \Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars (/_) A2 CAs Rawls’s theories are only meant as academic theories which can’t be bridged to policy debate. Griffin, 1994. (Grifin, Stephen, Assistant Professor. Tulane University, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 691. 1904. Lexis-Nexis.) while GuANeII coes not accuse Rawis of foundationaiism, he IS also UNCON ‘inced that of e Raw eo treatment of the to do with ordinary politics. ror cunnei, work that is essentially only a commentary on other academic work, comm thi n_ provide: occasion for further irrelev: om 2 heories never leave the boundaries of the university to confront politics on its own terms. Gunnell writes, for example, that "the anelyses of political concepts that began to appesr, and which culminated in RAWIS's study of justice, ‘were in many ways liluminating and useful, but they had little more to do with actual Nitti life an ua an st_meti ics te wit! ct ral 3." For Gunnell, is an is le bei n a ic ‘izine thi worl Hi : “the debate about liberalism, its end, its revival, Its idea of justice, and so on, is not really a debate about any political practice or belief." If ewe R Nozick, Dworkin, an erman a te te te jitics, it is onl kit displa or philos: ‘ized ideology."Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars (+/_) AZ Crus Rawis‘s theories of justice are an academic paradigm which lead to policy-making paraiysis. ‘iffin, 1994. (Gain, Stephen. Assistant Professor. Tulane University, 69 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 691, 1994 Lexis-Nexis.) Perhaps tne most common ericism of RAWIS inthe olticel science Iterature, ustrated by the quotation frm Gunnell above, is that nis theory has little or no relevance to the real world of Politics. Benjamin Barber is the leading theorist advancing this line of criticism. From Barber's perspective, Raw! rs ni er rincil that bi Nic itics, but ithe be ich a thi of princi Barber contends that due \e infil of ‘ies like wis's, "phil hh flourished ile politics has wilted" in the postwar eva. Political philosophy has led us awar i IS a ‘icipat fity in which we liberat ‘al incipk dre it wi in ‘act inquiry i 1Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougect Scholars Cs) VOsstolosy Cee> Deontology is the best option- it is the most moral and allows us to get the most value out of life. MCNAUGHTON AND RAWLING, 1998 {¢avid and piers, prof @ keele and w of missouri, ratio, on defending deontology, online: ebscO} First, we are duti: i tem from i lationshi, ties which I ows le specified individuals bec: the relationship in which I stand to them. instances of such relationships include those of parent to child, spouse to spouse, Tend o fiend, as wellas purely contractual relationship, such es those of promise to promisee, of debtor te lender. Why do these relationships generate agent-rlative reasons? Because IN) each Case the a 'Ss reason i act, ster the fi ds in thi: to another. the fact that Alex is Lee's child gives her a reason fo look after hl which (snot shared by anyone who is not aso Alex's parent. This is not to say hat we have no di be con ut th 2 of that we have no duty whatever to be concerned about the welfare of other people’s children, only that each of us has a distinct and special reason to be concerned about our own, second, there are constraints, which proscrive certain types of action, even if their performance, in @ particular circurnstance, would make the world somewhat “better’. Thus, it is generally thought that it is wrong to kill the innocent, torture people, lie or chi even otherwi: al. To hi tho is to reject direct- Nsequentialism. we need nat go so far as to claim that we should never do these things, no matter how dire the emergency; to think that we should not do these things just to make the World slightly better ‘overall is already to reject direct-act consequentialism. How do constraints generate agent-relative reasons? TO hold, le, that it is wrong to kil innocent, i: commit the view that I should not do or sanction such killings, even if by kiting an innocent myself might thereby reduce the total number of such killings. This thought is enshrined in the common moral intuition that one should not oneself sink to the level of the rist or criminal in mpins ism or crii The third area of ethical thought in which agent-reativity has a pice is inthe avaliabity of options. Direct=act always act so as to maximize the good. As the world is currently i jis would requi jake hu: ntinu ‘ifices. ave to ab; i int per: rojects if, ere th nly way to maximi: jood. Clear! ro} ily life have an importance for me which they have for no-one else - an portance out of proportion to their agent-neutral value. We do not generally think morality requires the continual sacrifice that direct-act conse: ‘ali lemands. S« can be doi e right thi ven if lives consider: weight im proje they stricth deserve in the consequentialist calculations. The first construal offers an instrumental justification of the constraint forbidding you to violate one even in order to prevent the violation of others. On this account, acceptance of rights in a soci to give people a sen: eir own we ind if vu UsMean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars cenaiytcaty Ew GX Lest ne's own that is intrinsi valuable. The general acceptance of the proposition that people have rights is a goal that we may have; we can strive, perhaps through institutions like Amnesty International or the UN, to make that acceptance more widespread. But the ultimate goal here is an increase in the perception of self-worth. There are various problems with this construal. First, we need an independent argument to circumvent the Cvc. If what matters is the general sense of selfworth that comes ‘from peopl iting invi ility, then wi mak acce! eas widespr: ossibl if that me: accepting it on ? Second, as Nagel rightly points out, this construal does not yield the conclusion that inviolability itself is intrinsically valuable, rather than the increased perception of self-worth engendered by its acceptance. On the second construal, it is inviolability that is intrinsically val B ognising inviolabilit enti misses a crucial intrinsic value. ontology incorporat is intrinsic value, and is @ preferable theory. This is a r adopting deoni S Our mor: fem.Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars (_/_) PEAaITeNIGY cov Deontology is the best moral opt importance. COTTINGHAM, 2000 ohn, professor of philosophy @ u of reading, Ethics, Place & Environment, caring at a distance, online: ebsco] n- resepcting human life is of upmost ‘A very different framework for assessment is provided by ‘deontological' or duty-based ethics, the chlef rival to ‘consequentialism among contemporary moral philosophers. The quiding vision here is the conicention of respect for persons Consequentialism prevents good human existence. COTTINGHAM, 2000 _Dohn, prtessr of philosophy @ u of reading Ets, Pace & Environment, caring ot stone, online: ebsco} Things are not, however, as simple for the consequentialist as this line of reasoning suggests. ror its ar.cbie tt, if everyone went around striving to maximise global utility, without any regard for the special ties that bind he 2) those cl to hi then the structures which m: fe Man existence--tne cose reatonships of fails, loved ones, friends and communties--WOuld everell LENE, This thought euggests an alternative, ‘indirect’ or “nstiutlonal form of consequentiaism: rather than trying to make all our actions maximise directly the general good on the planet, each of us should instead be allowed to alve preferential support to the institutional networks that are close at hand (Families, friendships and communities); fostering such partiality, so runs the argument, will n the Iong run serve the total good fer more effectively There are many questions raised by this stand-off between direct and indirect versions of consequentialism that cennot be resolved here; in particular, it's @ highly debatable empirical question, which turns on complex economic and psychological considerations, es to whether the fostering of preferential networks will as a matter of fact tend to maximise global ubiy, However, enough has perhaps been said to indicate that the consequentialist fr wort is not le ir unai ju answé th tion hether jalit th clos us i: rally justifiable (Cottingham, 1986).Mean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars Cerys) wT. Bae Consequentialism forces one to align themselves at a level equivalent to animals. LAFAVE may, 25, 2005. ISandy, Chair ofthe WC Philosophy Department since 1986. She holds @ Ph.D. in Philosophy from Claremont Graduate School, and a B. A. in Philosophy from Fordham University. *Kant’s Ethics." First consider what would motivate you if you had 8 Good Wil. You'd do your duty simply because It’s your duty. You wouldn't Expect a teward. You wouldn't expect to make yourself happy or give yourself pleasure. You'd want to Go your duty simply because i's your duty. tn other words, all consequences — eny pleasure or happiness that might result (OF any pam an riser {hat might be avoided) — are irrelevant. Duty is what makes you good; it's not what makes you (or anyone ele) happy. I's net What satisfies natura inclinations to attain pleasure or happiness. So part of having a Good Wil Is makng your mera’ cere without considering whether they would create happiness or pleasure, or avoid pal. Gonisider the same point enother way. You're a person. You're not an animal. Animas seek the tultilment of natural inclinations; they automatically seek natural goods because they can’t act any other way. But rational beings are more thea animal. Unlike animals, rational beings can reason; rational beings can contemplate mn etween hum: an it a : A ratonal being with a Good Will thus won't be @ consequentialist. Fora rational Being with 2 Good Will, the consequences won't matter in the determination of whether acts are moral er immoral. A Good Wills thus “punted, I has no inferior motives, sock as desire for pleasure, happiness, or self-interest,MEAN GREEN WORKSHOPS 2K6 UTSAV UTIL/DEONTOLOGY UTIL BAD: A2 UTIL= EQUALITY Uailitarianism fails in its attempt for equality- personalities of individuals are dissolved and they can easily be sacrificed, Jerome J. Shestack, former ambassador to the UN Commission on Human Rights and President of the merican Bar Association, 9§ [The Philosophic Foundation of Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly 20.2 p. Project Muse] Meow heme nce agepttippine owing ahaa rm gna don sd weet beeen Isreal vle tome gt Hcy dept Ee eptaton retest trian Doctrine, ‘nua, hdc efi made he tingencies, and therefore af tisk. >in men dunieediy scope eigenen OEE nt tet n engaging cons ce ny massing, ‘scores ppl nso Duthil pegs mtb mp oe cule ian cin, pn ard np ave re eo pl. Utilitarian, pe ad ap 4 beMean Green Workshops Deontology/Consequentialism DeMougeot Scholars (_/__) Az SenneriwW olw The risk of extinction justifies the State to kill some to save humanity. teb, 1992. (Kateb, George. Professor. Philosophy. Princeton University. The Inner Ocean. 1992.) EOF the state to override—that is, sacifce—a right of some so that others may keep it the situation must be cern! Tre in oy, SH in which the choice i sb n crificing a righ d I ight of all e stat: (or some other eromay kill'sonia Gi fiesanoee kilee), if the only y alternation is letting evervone die,” Tt is the rlaht to life which most prominently es ii kin ut desy e ons, 1 cannot see any resolution but to heed the percept that NUMDEFS COUNE, * Just as one may prefer saving one’s own life to saving that of, ‘another when both cannot be saved, soa thir perty—et us say, the state—cen (perhaps must) ' choose to save the greater number of lives anc ai the n when there is rw h for That choice does not mean tat th icrifi ii Fesist being saciiced. Tt FOMOWS, of course, that r= third party ts vouto risk or sacrifiea the of sser for the live the greater numb: rw herwise live, th rare al it wi resist being sacrficed,