"The Tiger of Malaya" and led to the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill calling the ignominious

fall of Singapore to Japan the "worst disaster" and "largest capitulation" in British military history.
[3]
 Yamashita was assigned to defend the Philippines from the advancing Allied forces later in the
war, and while unable to prevent the Allied advance, he was able to hold on to part of Luzon until
after the formal Surrender of Japan in August 1945.
After the war, Yamashita was tried for war crimes committed by troops under his command during
the Japanese defense of the occupied Philippines in 1944. In a controversial trial, Yamashita was
found guilty of his troops' atrocities even though there was no evidence that he approved or even
knew of them, and indeed many of the atrocities were committed by troops not actually under his
command. Yamashita was sentenced to death and executed by hanging in 1946. The ruling against
Yamashita – holding the commander responsible for subordinates' war crimes as long as the
commander did not attempt to discover and stop them from occurring – came to be known as
the Yamashita standard.

Contents

 1Biography
o 1.1Early military career
o 1.2World War II
 1.2.1Malaya and Singapore
 1.2.2Manchukuo
 1.2.3Philippines
 2Trial
o 2.1Execution
o 2.2Enduring legal legacy
 3See also
 4Notes
 5References
 6External links

Biography[edit]
Yamashita was the second son of a local doctor in Osugi, a village in what is now part
of Ōtoyo, Kōchi Prefecture, Shikoku. He attended military preparatory schools in his youth.

Early military career[edit]

In November 1905 Yamashita graduated from the 18th class of the Imperial Japanese Army
Academy.[4] He was ranked 16th out of 920 cadets.[5] In December 1908 he was promoted to
lieutenant and fought against the German Empire[citation needed] in World War I in Shandong, China in
1914.[citation needed] In May 1916 he was promoted to captain. He attended the 28th class of the Army War
College, graduating sixth in his class in 1916. The same year, he married Hisako Nagayama,
daughter of retired Gen. Nagayama. Yamashita became an expert on Germany, serving as
assistant military attaché at Bern and Berlin from 1919 to 1922. [citation needed]
In February 1922, he was promoted to major. He twice served in the Military Affairs Bureau of the
War Ministry responsible for the Ugaki Army Reduction Program, aimed at reforming the Japanese
army by streamlining its organisation despite facing fierce opposition from factions within the Army. [5]
In 1922, upon his return to Japan, Major Yamashita served in the Imperial Headquarters and the
Staff College, receiving promotion to lieutenant-colonel in August 1925. While posted to the Imperial
Japanese Army General Staff, Yamashita unsuccessfully promoted a military reduction plan. Despite
his ability, Yamashita fell into disfavor as a result of his involvement with political factions within the
Japanese military.[citation needed]
As a leading member of the "Imperial Way" group, he became a rival to Hideki Tojo and other
members of the "Control Faction". In 1927 Yamashita was posted to Vienna, Austria, as a military
attaché until 1930. He was then promoted to the rank of colonel. In 1930 Col. Yamashita was given
command of the elite 3rd Imperial Infantry Regiment. (Imperial Guards Division). He was promoted
to major-general in August 1934.[citation needed]
After the February 26 Incident of 1936, he fell into disfavor with Emperor Hirohito due to his appeal
for leniency toward rebel officers involved in the attempted coup. He realized that he had lost the
trust of the Emperor and decided to resign from the Army—a decision that his superiors dissuaded
him from carrying out. He was eventually relegated to a post in Korea, being given command of a
brigade. Akashi Yoji argued in his article "General Yamashita Tomoyuki: Commander of the Twenty-
Fifth Army" that his time in Korea gave him the chance to reflect on his conduct during the 1936
coup and at the same time study Zen Buddhism, something which caused him to mellow in
character yet instilled a high level of discipline.[5]
Yamashita was promoted to lieutenant-general in November 1937. He insisted that Japan should
end the conflict with China and keep peaceful relations with the United States and Great Britain, but
he was ignored and subsequently assigned to an unimportant post in the Kwantung Army.[citation needed]
From 1938 to 1940, he was assigned to command the IJA 4th Division which saw some action in
northern China against insurgents fighting the occupying Japanese armies. In December 1940
Yamashita was sent on a six-month clandestine military mission to Germany and Italy, where he met
with Adolf Hitler on 16 June 1941 in Berlin as well as Benito Mussolini.[6]
Throughout his time in the military, Yamashita had consistently urged the implementation of his
proposals, which included "streamlining the air arm, to mechanize the Army, to integrate control of
the armed forces in a defense ministry coordinated by a chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, to create a
paratroop corps and to employ effective propaganda". [5]
Such strategies caused much friction between himself and Gen. Hideki Tojo, the war minister, who
was not keen on implementing these proposals.[citation needed]

World War II[edit]

Malaya and Singapore[edit]
Main articles: Malayan Campaign and Battle of Singapore

General Tomoyuki Yamashita lead a successful assault of Japanese troops on Malaya

Lt. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita (seated, center) insists upon the unconditional surrender of Singapore as Lt.
Gen. Percival, seated between his officers, demurs (photo from Imperial War Museum)
On 6 November 1941 Lt. Gen. Yamashita was put in command of the Twenty-Fifth Army. It was his
belief that victory in Malaya would be successful only if his troops could make an amphibious landing
—something that was dependent on whether he would have enough air and naval support to provide
a good landing site.
On 8 December he launched an invasion of Malaya from bases in French Indochina. Yamashita
remarked that only a "driving charge" would ensure victory in Malaya. This is because the Japanese
force was about one-third as large as the opposing British forces in Malaya and Singapore. The plan
was to conquer Malaya and Singapore in the shortest time possible in order to overcome any
numerical disadvantage, as well as to minimize any potential losses from a long, drawn-out battle.
The Malayan campaign concluded with the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, in which
Yamashita's 30,000 front-line soldiers captured 80,000 British, Indian and Australian troops, the
largest surrender of British-led personnel in history. He became known as the "Tiger of Malaya".
The campaign and the subsequent Japanese occupation of Singapore included war
crimes committed against captive Allied personnel and civilians, such as the Alexandra
Hospital and Sook Ching massacres. Yamashita's culpability for these events remains a matter of
controversy as some argued that he had failed to prevent them. The order to execute 50,000
Chinese came, according to postwar testimony, from senior officers within Yamashita's Operations
staff. Yamashita's troops had fought in China, where it was customary to conduct massacres to
subdue the population.[7][8] Major Ōnishi Satoru, one of the accused in the postwar trial, affirmed that
he acted under a specific order issued from General Headquarters, that read, '[D]ue to the fact that
the army is advancing fast and in order to preserve peace behind us it is essential to massacre as
many Chinese as possible who appear in any way to have anti-Japanese feelings.' [9]
Yamashita later apologized to the few survivors of the 650 bayoneted or shot, and had some
soldiers caught looting in the aftermath of the slaughter executed. [10] Akashi Yoji claims that this
would have been in line with Yamashita's personality and belief. According to him, the first orders
given by Yamashita to the soldiers was "no looting; no rape; no arson", and that any soldier
committing such acts would be severely punished and his superior held accountable. [5]
Nevertheless, Yamashita's warnings to his troops were generally not heeded, and wanton acts of
violence were reported.[citation needed] In his article, Yoji argued that the main issue was that despite being
an excellent tactician and leader, his personal ideals constantly placed him at odds with the General
Staff and War Ministry. His humane treatment of prisoners of war as well as British leaders was
something the other officers had difficulty coming to terms with. [citation needed]