Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 7, No.

2, 2007

Identities in India:
Region, Nationality and
Nationalism - A Theoretical
Framework
Subhakanta Behera
Ministry of External Affairs, India

Abstract
Given the complexity of identity in India, where ethnicity alone can
only inadequately define constituent regional communities such as the
Oriyas, Bengalis, Tamils and Keralites, a regional perspective provides
a more useful analytical approach. In India, a territorially defined
region is the most inclusive segment, which has linguistic, historical
and socio-cultural connotations. Apart from the historical importance
of region, it has now taken many ethnic characteristics within its ambit.
While discussing the importance of ‘region’ in India, this article tries to
show the weakness of an ethnic perspective in defining the identity of
various language-based, but geographically confined, communities
of India. The article also tries to explore how regional identities can be
reconciled with a pan-Indian ideology. Perhaps in the post-modern
world, this is the greatest challenge that India has to grapple with, and
one that requires judicious policies and practices

I
The aim of this article is twofold: first, to provide a theoretical framework
for the study of identities among different communities in India, such as the
Oriyas, Bengalis, Tamils and Keralites; and second, to examine how a pan-
Indian entity can be reconciled with such ‘segmented’ identities. Given the
complexity of the Indian context, and the well-defined historical traditions
of its constituent regions, it is necessary to examine alternative frameworks
that may be used to study identities, and then suggest which is the most
viable and valid one for these communities. It must be remembered that
India is a conglomerate of segments whose diverse identities, based on
ethnicity, language, religion and region, are nevertheless united politically
into a territorial sovereignty (Khan 1992:29-30). This statement brings out
the essential nature of the Indian entity; that is, a multiplicity of identities

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within the rubric of a pan-Indian identity. But, compelled by various historical

forces, these diverse identities have given rise to broad regional identities.
In this typical situation, the epistemology of identity in India is constantly
redefined and restated, to provide space for overlapping identities and
affiliations, and for accommodating micro with macro. This article, while
taking into account the inherent problems in delimiting identity, also seeks to
explore how regional identities negotiate with the pan-Indian identity and
nationalism.

II
Identity can be conceptualised in two different ways: one, the essentialist
notion of identity as an inherent attribute, which an individual or group has
in and of itself, and which in a metaphoric sense is subject to growth and
decline, to health and sickness; or two, an interactional notion with identity
existing in the context of oppositions and relativities (Chapman et al. 1989:17).
But identity is always premised on a dichotomy of self and otherness, and
hence it only assumes meaning when it is contextualised within this
dichotomy. In other words, identity is divisive - a boundary that encapsulates
a group, community or even an individual in question. Boundaries are marked
because communities, groups and individuals interact in some way or another
with each other and remain distinct in the process of interaction. The inherent
essential attributes that form identity provide the resources for boundaries
so that people can ‘think themselves into difference.’ (Cohen 1985:117).
Thus, when we talk of identity, it at once implies certain essential attributes,
as well as a context of oppositions and relativities.

In the Indian context, the question of identity is problem-ridden because of

the variegated structure of the society and culture. Diversities based on
religion and caste, region, language and dialect, and cultural patterns have
created various configurations, each with its own overlapping identity. This
creates a methodological and analytical problem in theorising the existing
realities of India. The well-known Indian political scientist, Rasheeduddin
Khan (1992), demonstrated how identities of various ‘segments’, such as
language and dialect groups, religious communities, denominational sects,
sub-castes, ethnic formations and cultural patterns are still reconciled to a
unified Indian political identity. It is true that at a theoretical level, all these
‘segment’ identities are subsumed under the overarching ‘Indian’ identity,
but at an operational level one often finds conflict and tension between
local, community-based aspirations and consciousness, and pan-Indian ideals
and goals. But this array of segments can be generically divided under
‘ethnic’ and ‘regional’, thereby positing two alternatives for any identity

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discourse on such distinct and numerically vast communities as the Oriyas,

Bengalis, Telugus and Tamils. No doubt, these communities are disparate
ones, differentiated from each other primarily by ethnic considerations such
as language and cultural patterns. But because of their political nature,
however limited it may be, they have been transformed into nationalities.
With their transformation, ethnic criteria do not vanish, but are re-stated as
essential attributes of that particular nationality.

It is important here to discuss how an ethnic community transforms into a

nationality in a variegated situation like India. In other words, how does
ethnic identity give rise to a political identity? According to Paul Brass
(1991:22), nationality-formation is the process in which objective differences
between ethnic groups acquire increasingly subjective and symbolic
significance, are translated into a consciousness of, and a desire for, group
solidarity, and finally become the basis for successful political demands,
thereby claiming to be a nationality. At the stage of an ethnic community,
changes such as the creation of a language group or a community of believers
of a particular religious faith, and transformation of the ‘past’ into a ‘glorious
history’ take place. This is accompanied by a process in which various
attributes of identity, such as language and religion, increasingly assume
subjective and symbolic meanings thereby making them more relational than
personal or instrumental. This can be illustrated by drawing upon experience
from Orissa, one of the well-established ethnic nationalities in India. By the
end of the 19th century, the Oriya language had become an instrument of
Oriya cultural identity, prompting a collective linguistic experience while the
Jagannath cult1 became a rallying ground of unity and religious uniformity
(Behera 2002). When ethnic communities can ‘think themselves into
difference’, they try to achieve and maintain their group rights through
political action and political mobilisation. In so far as a community may
succeed by its own efforts, it has gone beyond ethnicity to establish itself as
a nationality (Brass 1991:23). Thus for Paul Brass, as and when an ethnic
community successfully uses political tactics to achieve its group rights, it
becomes a nationality with a political identity of its own.

But according to C.J.H. Hayes (1928), a nationality is primarily cultural and

only incidentally political. In his view, it is cultural because it is a group of
people who speak either the same language or closely related dialect, who
cherish common historical traditions, and who constitute or think they
constitute, a distinct cultural society. According to Hayes, it is incidentally
political because if it acquires political unity and sovereign independence, it
transforms itself into a ‘nation’ (Hayes 1928:5). From this, it is clear that for
Hayes (1928), nationality exists without any political content whereas for

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Brass (1991), nationality itself presupposes political content. Hayes’ (1928)

formulation of nationality also implies that a political, sovereign state can
embrace several nationalities in so far as all these remain essentially cultural
and devoid of any political character. However if any of them acquires
political unity and sovereign independence, it becomes a nation and establishes
a ‘nation-state’ (ibid.). This can be substantiated with examples from the
former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, countries that
disintegrated into independent states when their constituent nationalities
acquired political unity and sovereign independence. From Hayes’ (1928)
analysis, nationality emerges as an apolitical entity that may exist alongside
other nationalities within a sovereign independent state, and that only becomes
political when it acquires independence. On the other hand for Brass (1991),
political character is an inherent part of nationality. Brass (1991) is supported
by another scholar, Benzamin Akzin (1964:31) who, while asserting the
political nature of nationalities, declares that politically conscious ethnic groups
are nationalities as long as they have not become dominant in an independent
state. Thus for Akzin, a nationality is a political phenomenon in a limited
sense, but when it becomes dominant, it becomes a nation.

From the above discussion, it is evident that nationality is a coherent group

with a commonalty of experiences that binds the group members together
in exclusion to other groups. This commonalty of experiences is prompted
by their ethnicity, which implies cultural distinctions, common descent, religion
and language. But the concept of ‘ethnicity’ is not only highly debated but
also elusive because of its nature and multi-dimensionality.

Ethnicity can be viewed in two ways, primordialist and instrumentalist. The

primordialist view treats ethnicity as innate and ethnic community as an a
priori category with an existence of its own. The primordialist argues that
a person carries with him ‘attachments’ derived from place of birth, kinship
relationships, religion, language and social practices that are ‘natural’ for
him, ‘spiritual’ in character and that provide for an easy ‘affinity’ with other
peoples from the same background (Brass 1991:69). These ‘attachments’
constitute the ‘givens’ of human condition and are treated as fixed. On the
other hand, the instrumentalist or circumstantialist view holds that ethnicity
is something that can be manipulated, is situationally expressed and
subjectively defined (Rao 1989:38). In other words, for an instrumentalist,
ethnicity can be ‘created’ or called into existence by a variety of situations.
This presupposes the malleability and manipulative nature of ethnic criteria.

Primordialists and instrumentalists take two opposing views about the nature
of ethnicity – fixity or permanence, in the case of the former, and flexibility

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or malleability, for the latter. The primordialists’ conception of primordial

ties, such as kinship, religion, language and race, as fixed can be contested
as these ties may be changed or acquired. It is again Brass (1991) who has
shown how factors such as the language, religion and kinship of an individual
or a community are changeable and can be shifted in the course of social
and political movements (Brass 1991:70-72). Adoption of a language other
than one’s own mother tongue under historical compulsions, shifts in religious
practices under the influence of religious reformers, and even variation in
kinship relations testify to the flexible nature of ethnicity. In another study,
Ishtiaq Ahmed (1996:26) argues that the feeling of belonging together, of
sharing common symbols and a structure of discourse, is usually
multidimensional, that is, it is constituted by more than one so-called objective
characteristic, and hence ethnic identity is pliable. Multidimensionality in
this context refers to the possession of more than one objective criterion by
a particular group. For example, an Oriya can be a Hindu by religion, an
Oriya-speaker by linguistic consideration and a Brahmin by caste. This
overlap of criteria, while making ethnic identity multi-dimensional, is another
disadvantage in the study of ethnic identity itself. Multidimensionality makes
identity flexible, facilitating adjustment to varying situations and contexts
(Ahmed 1996:26).

The flexibility and multidimensionality of ethnicity prevents a valid analysis

of the identities of the various nationalities in India. For example, if a Bengali-
speaker, over the course of time, adopts Tamil as his language of expression
because of migration or any other reason, how can that Bengali’s ethnic
identity be explained? Similarly when linguistically different Oriyas, Bengalis,
Tamils and Telugus all profess themselves to be Hindus, how can their
ethnic identity be distinctly defined and compartmentalised in terms of
religion?

Apart from the problem of the flexibility and multidimensionality of ethnic

identity, any theorisation of the existing realities of India, in terms of ethnicity,
loses analytical validity due to the long history of region-specific composition.
In India, the most inclusive segment is the territorially–defined region.
Needless to say, each region has its own composition of ethnic and linguistic
groups, religious communities and land-based jatis (caste). Each region
also has its own specific pattern of economy, craft and trading practices,
local history, psychological make–up and behavioural patterns. Even pan-
Indian religious communities, such as Hindus and Muslims, have clear and
distinct regional variations, such as culture, language and dialect. According
to Khan (1992:31-32), in India, regions have defined and distinct socio-
cultural, historical, linguistic, economic and political connotations, and if they

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coincide with the state’s boundaries, they also assume juridical-administrative

connotations. He even goes to the extent of designating India as essentially
‘a multi-regional federation’ (ibid.).

In standard terms, a region is defined as ‘some portion of the surface of the

earth’, but in the academic literature on India the concept of region is much
broader. B.S.Cohn (1987:102) has classified four types of regions in India:
historical, linguistic, cultural and social-structural. An historical region is
one in which there are social myths and symbols, that are held by a significant
group of people within that area, regarding the relationship of these people
to their past and their geographic location; a linguistic region is one in which
there is a shared and recognised literary language, the standardized form of
which is known and identified by educated groups within that region; a
cultural region is one in which there are widely shared and recognised cultural
patterns of behaviour, particularly among the common people; and a social-
structural region is one in which there are associated structural variables,
such as caste and religious sect (Cohn 1987:102-104). Some regions can be
easily identified under a type, for example language-based states are examples
of linguistic regions, whereas the old Utkal and Magadha regions are historical
regions. Cohn’s (1987) perception of regions in India broadly corresponds
to the historically–evolved categories in the Indian subcontinent. Traditionally,
India has been divided into five zones: Madhyadesa (the Middle country),
Purvadesa or Prachya (the East), Dakshinapatha (the South), Aparanta
or Pratichaya (the West) and Uttarapatha or Udichya (the North). This
division has been described in the Dharmasutras, the Bhuvanakosas (the
gazetteer section of the Puranas) and in the Buddhist scriptures.
Interestingly, the provincial boundaries of the Mauryan Empire were
consistent with this earlier, regional division, and subsequently, whenever
there were regional states in India maintaining a balance of power for a
reasonably long time, they too generally conformed to these zones (Narang
1993:46).

The importance of region in India also finds resonance in other scholastic

works. O.H.K.Spate (1957), for example, speaks about ‘perennial nuclear
regions’, which are always significant in the Indian historical geography.
He offers a number of examples, mentioning the Gandhara region in the
vale of Peshwar and Potwar, the Sapta Sindhu region narrowed down to
the Punjab, Kurukshetra or Sirhind, Delhi or Sutlej/Jumna Doab, Andhra –
the Telugu country, the Kalinga country in the Orissa region, among others
(Spate 1957:148-49). All these regions had structure lines of geography that
matched the structure lines of their political and social history. Many of
these names now survive in the regional consciousness of the Indian people.

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Another scholar, J.E. Schwartzberg (1992:259), sees regions as important

cultural categories in India, which are also manifested in the existence of
cultural productions like desadharmasastras, and performances involving
regional or desi musical and ritual forms, in contrast to marga or universal
forms.

Even in his recent work, ‘Origins of Nationality in South Asia’, where C.A.
Bayly (1998) speaks of pre-colonial patriotism, he is referring to regional
patriotism as antecedent to India’s nationalist movement. This becomes
clear in his discussion on the typology of Indian patriotism, where he speaks
of the existing sense of landespatriotismus – territorial patriotism (Bayly
1998:26-30).

From the above discussion, it is evident that region is the most inclusive
segment in India. Over a long period of time, each geographically-defined
region has developed specific differences that embody the fundamentals of
that region. Anybody, irrespective of his ethnic origin and affiliations, may
be referred to as belonging to a particular region if he or she shares with
others the common characteristics and historical experiences of that region.
In this case, ethnic identities get blurred. For example, Hindus and Christians
living in the Orissa region and sharing its common language and culture are
more justifiably treated as belonging to that region than as two separate
ethnic communities. It may not be wrong to say those original ethnic names
like Oriya and Bengali are now used to denote regional entities by the same
names; Oriya for the people living in the Orissa region, and Bengali for the
people living in the Bengal region.

Although a regional perspective has an analytical validity in the study of the

identity of nationalities such as Oriyas, Bengalis, Telugus, Tamils and Punjabis,
it cannot completely diminish the importance of ethnicity to these nationalities.
It is because the attachments most people develop in childhood or youth
have deep emotive significance and remain with them throughout their lives;
either consciously, in the persistence of such attachments in everyday
routines, or embedded in unconscious realms (Brass 1991:70).

A regional perspective has an edge over approaches that stress ethnic or

other identities, and provides a valid analytical tool to explain many socio-
religious, cultural and even political processes in the country. For example,
even though Vaishnavism is a historically-evolved, pan-Hindu movement,
how and under what regional circumstances was Jagannath Vaishnavised,
and not Vishnu or Sri Krishna, in the state of Orissa? And how did the
Jagannath cult, with Jagannath at the centre, become the presiding

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religious practice of Orissa? Similarly, regional identity can only explain

regional variations in terms of the recent growth of Hindu nationalism in
India. Because a region in India is not just a territorial space, but a physical
entity with specific linguistic, historical, cultural, social and structural patterns,
the apparent monolithic Hindu nationalism grew differently in different states.
This is clearly shown in Jaffrelot’s (1999) work on Kerala and Hansen’s
(1999) work in Maharastra. In the case of Orissa, Pralay Kanungo (2003),
has shown how the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangha (RSS), the
fountainhead of Hindutva, interacted and negotiated with the peculiarities
of Orissa, and forged Hindu nationalism. The presence of the Jagannath
cult was and is a major determinant of the growth of Hindu nationalism in
Orissa (Kanungo 2003). On the other hand, in Maharastra, the tradition of
Shivaji and Ganapati festivals played a crucial role in the rise of Hindu
nationalist ideology.
III
In this section of the article, we will see how regional identities are
accommodated within the rubric of Indian nationalism. But at the outset, it
must be made clear that although I will summarise general theories of
nationalism, a discussion about the definition and nature of Indian nationalism
is beyond the scope of this article. Nationalism is a political ideology and, as
defined in this context, geographically coterminous with nation-states.
Richard Handler (1988:6-8) writes that nationalism is an ideology about
individuated being and concerned with boundedness, continuity and
homogeneity encompassing diversity. Thus nationalism provides a distinct
identity to members of the nation-state in question, but the members
themselves may be diverse with separate identity markers. Depending on
whether a nation-state contains a single nationality or more, it becomes
either a mono-national state or a poly(multi)-national state. In a well-
documented study, Rudolph and Rudolph (1987:64) have shown how the
small kingdoms subjugated by the imperial power of the Indian subcontinent
ultimately gave rise to a modern multi-national Indian state. This is in contrast
to Western Europe, where regional kingdoms were transformed into absolute
monarchies and then modern mono-nation-states of Western Europe (ibid.).
Thus a nation-state can be either multi-national or mono-national, depending
on the historical processes involved in its formation.

India, being a multi-national nation-state, faces the problem of negotiating

between segmented identities or ‘consciousnesses’ and a pan-Indian
nationalism. How is micro accommodated by macro? Although many
scholars have tried to define nationalism and nation, I follow the definition
provided by Anthony Smith at the Warwick Debates on Nationalism:
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Nationalism is an ideological movement for the attainment

and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human
population some of whose members conceive it to constitute
an actual or potential nation. And a nation is a named human
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and
memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and
common rights and duties for all members.2

Smith’s definition of nationalism and nation differs from that of Ernest

Gellner, another authority on the subject and a major contributor to the
Warwick Debates. Though the scope of this article does not allow me to
delve into the polemic between Smith and Gellner on nationalism, it may be
observed that Gellner’s conception of nationalism as a primarily modern
phenomenon loses analytical validity in the Indian context.3 Smith’s ethno-
symbolic approach to nationalism, which emphasises earlier ethnic ties and
memories, explains the phenomenon of Indian nationalism with more
analytical validity.

In the Indian context, any definition of nationalism must address the problem
of diversity, especially the multi-national character of the Indian state, and
both Smith and Handler hint at managing diversity through nationalism.
Managing diversity and enforcing unity is the most daunting challenge before
the Indian nation-state.

When we speak of Indian nationalism, we refer to a pan-Indian phenomenon,

cutting across all regions and nationalities. It presupposes the existence of
an Indian nation that Smith would define as a ‘named human population
sharing a common history, ethnic ties and common memories, an historic
territory, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common rights and
duties for all members’. Though the term ‘India’ originated with reference
to the river Sindhu, it ultimately evolved to denote the population inhabiting
the country lying alongside and beyond that river. But the question is: how
far is India a political, cultural and civilizational reality coterminous with the
modern nation-state, in the face of a large number of distinctive political
and cultural identities? We have already highlighted the importance of region
in India, as well as India’s unity as a cultural and civilizational entity. In
addition, since 1947, India’s status as a multi-national nation-state has been
established. Thus, one can accept the enduring significance of the regions
of historical geography while at the same time asserting the reality of an all-
Indian civilization (Embree 1985:19). Similarly, Rasheeduddin Khan

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(1992:30), while recognising the fact that India is a historically evolved unified
civilisation, accepts India to be essentially a multi-regional federation. It
may be reiterated here that because of the existence of a civilizational
identity, India in modern times could evolve a unified political identity. The
former might facilitate the latter by forging a unified socio-cultural base
from which a common political identity could grow and mature. This
relationship could enhance unity and solidarity in India amidst difference
and multiple identities.

But how may the apparent contradiction of a unified Indian civilization or

Indian reality and the enduring existence of distinct regional identities or
entities be reconciled? One cannot deny that in the making of an Indian
entity or civilization, many strands of regional cultures and patterns have
coalesced over a long historical period. The coalescence, however, does
not necessarily destroy regional identities, specificities and autonomy but
might instead harmonize them with other strands enriching a pan-Indian
identity. This becomes clear by discussing a few examples. The Jagannath
cult, a regional religious tradition of Orissa, has also been a part of the pan-
Indian religious-cultural repository. And that is why not only Oriya Hindus,
but also all Hindus of India, worship Lord Jagannath. Another example
can be drawn from the rich, highly systematized regional dance and music
traditions in India. Even though they developed and flourished under regional
conditions, they did not remain confined to particular regions. Instead, they
became part and parcel of the pan-Indian culture and civilization. Classical
dance forms, like Odissi originating from the Orissa region, Kuchipudi from
the state of Andhra and Bharatanatyam from Tamil Nadu, are all known as
‘Indian’ classical dances.

Both realities of India, the pan-Indian entity and regional identities, continue
to thrive with little conflict and tension. Arguably, it is their interdependence
that brings out what is quintessential India. This approach rejects Western
essentialism about the Indian entity, propounded by writers such as Henry
Yule, A.C. Burnell and John Strachey. While Yule and Burnell (1996:435)
deny the existence of an ‘Indian’ man, Strachey opines that ‘the first and
most essential thing to learn about India is that there is not and never was
an India, or even a country of India, possessing according to European
ideas, any sort of unity, physical, political, social and religious’ (Embree
1985:33). All these authors, by rejecting anything pan-Indian, view India as
fragmented and disunited – a standard essentialism about India. They fail to
see the existence of not only a civilizational unity, but also the quintessential
nature of India, formed by so many varieties and identities. However, such
essentialism about India by the West was part of the grand orientalising

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mission of the whole epistemology of India. But an alternative reading and

understanding of Indian history, as shown in the preceding pages, warns
against such essentialism. At the same time, the concept of a pan-Indian
identity or all-India ideology cannot be overstretched in the face of so many
competing regional identities.

Of late, there have emerged in India some divisive and destabilising

tendencies within the rubric of regions, resulting from the conflict and tension
between competing sub-regional identities. The basis of such problems has
invariably been ethnic considerations, resource availability and linguistic
exclusiveness. Minority ethnic groups have tried to assert their identity by
demanding statehood, or unqualified protection of their rights within the
Indian federation. The federal government has, by and large, succeeded in
accommodating their demands through dialogue, discussion and agreement.
Examples such as the Punjab, Gorkhaland, Jharkhand and Assam may be
cited here to illustrate this point.

Formed on the basis of linguistic considerations, the Punjabis’ demand for

the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973, for realisation
of their politico-economic and social aspirations, aimed to safeguard the
Sikh identity. Amongst some, the demand gradually culminated in the
Khalistan (the Land of Pure) movement, the call for a separate homeland
for Punjabi speakers. The extremist and militant elements in the Akali Dal
spearheaded the movement, but ultimately, during the late Rajiv Gandhi’s
premiership, peace initiatives were taken. The Rajiv-Longwal Accord of
July 1985 recognised the religious, territorial, and political demands of the
Sikhs, and in doing so this agreement facilitated the accommodation of Punjab
requests within the Indian federation, and encouraged the demise of the
Khalistan movement. Similarly, the Gorkhaland movement, which grew from
the demand of Nepalis living in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal for a
separate state, has been contained with a political solution. With a separate
identity as ‘Gorkhas’ and citing both on ethnic considerations and
development issues, the Nepalis of the Darjeeling hill tracts agitated for a
separate state under the banner of the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front.
But in 1988, the West Bengal government and the Central government
reached an accord with the Front for the establishment of an autonomous
hill district for the Gorkhas within the West Bengal jurisdiction. Accordingly
the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council came into existence with authority over
developmental programmes, including the protection of educational and
cultural rights. Although this has largely resolved the Gorkha problem, intra-
council tensions continue, and the council’s relations with the state
government have also at times been confrontational.

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Another example of intra-regional conflict between the minority ethnic group

and the hegemonic majority group is the Jharkhand movement. Both in its form
and content, the movement for a separate Jharkhand state was a struggle for
autonomy by a ‘backward nationality’, the Adivasis, (tribes), within the Indian
federation. The tribes of the Jharkhand region, particularly those belonging to
the state of Bihar, were being pushed towards socio-economic backwardness
because of the lopsided development and industrialisation in the region. The
Jharkhand movement took definite political shape with the establishment of the
Jharkhand Party in 1950, and thereafter the demand for a separate state to
protect the ‘tribal’ identity became a full-blown political campaign. The movement
ultimately led to the formation of a separate Jharkhand state in 2000, when the
ruling Coalition at the Centre led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (the Indian
People’s Party) passed the Jharkhand Bill with the support of both Bihar’s
Rastriya Janata Dal (the National People’s Party) and the National Congress.
The Jharkhand movement is an example of where development and identity
had an interface.4

In north-eastern India, various ethnic groups have time and again risen in
insurrections to protect their identity, and safeguard their economic interests.
The case of Assam is very interesting as the majority ethnic group, the Assamese,
rose against non-Assamese or ‘foreigners’. The movement was headed by the
Asom Gana Parishad (the Assam People’s Association) which strongly advocated
for Assamese provincialism, and the exclusion of Bengalis and illegal migrants
from Bangladesh. Though the Parishad has ruled Assam more than once, it has
been outflanked by an armed movement of the Assamese Hindus, the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Yet, the problem in Assam, despite bouts of
violence, remains contained within the Indian federation.

For a multilingual and multinational country like India, the aspirations and
demands of minority groups cannot be ignored. The viability and strength of
a unified Indian identity depends on how they are accommodated within the
federal structure. The intra-regional tensions discussed above have not,
thus far, seemed to have had an adverse effect on the concept of a pan-
Indian identity, and by recognising and accommodating minority ethnic and
linguistic groups within the federal structure, the multinational character of
the Indian identity has been strengthened. More importantly, the viability of
already-established regions and states has remained intact, although intra-
regional tensions continue in some parts of India.

Thus the Indian nation and the Indian identity continues as a unified
civilizational identity with the multinational and multiregional character of
India contributing to the formation of this unified entity called ‘India’.

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Raseeduddin Khan (1992) compares the Indian situation with a bouquet of

flowers, suggesting that is an entity that contains and exhibits diverse
elements, each with its own individuality, yet these elements are ‘tied’
together as a single whole.

While this suggests a stable situation, in reality, the crux of this matter lies
in the consideration of how safe the Indian entity is. How far can Indian
nationalism withstand growing regional aspirations and consciousness?
This question arises due to the possibility of regions transforming
themselves into nations, thereby proclaiming they are independent, or at
least dominant in the federation. In this case, the Indian identity has to
change its connotation and be redefined. But can India afford such a
change?

Perhaps the biggest challenge to the Indian nation is how to sustain its
pan-Indian ideology and identity amidst demanding regional identities and
competing intra-regional forces. In other words, how can the indivisibility
of the Indian nation be maintained, if a region, defined by geography and
language, promotes its population to a ‘nation’, thereby claiming political
sovereignty? Or what happens if intra-regional forces turn secessionist
because they are not being justly treated by the federal government? But
as long as regions have populations that are considered ‘nationalities’, and
intra-regional forces are justly contained, they do not pose any challenge
to the integrity of the Indian nation, Indian identity and pan-Indian
ideology. But whether these tasks can be achieved depends on the
policies and practices of the federal government.

Notes
1
Jagannath cult is a regional Vaishnavite tradition in which Jagannath, Balabhadra and
Subhadra are worshipped.
2
The statement of Anthony Smith in the Warwick Debates on Nationalism, held on 24
October, 1995, may be found on the website: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/gellner/
Warwick.html
3
The statement of Ernest Gellner in the Warwick Debates may be found on the website:
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/gellner/Warwick2.html
4
On the Jharkhand movement, see, Prakas, Amit. 2001. Jharkhand: Politics of Development
and Identity. Hyderabad: Orient Longman.

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Subhakanta Behera received an M.A. in History, and an

M.Phil in International Studies from JNU, New Delhi. He
got his D.Phil. from Oxford University, UK, in Modern
History in 1999. His doctoral dissertation on Oriya identity
has been published (2002) from Delhi as a monograph under
the title, ‘Construction of an Identity Discourse: Oriya
Literature and the Jagannath Cult (1866-1936)’. Dr. Behera
writes on issues relating to identity, nationalism, Jagannath
cult and Orissa.

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