Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism

COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF BILINGUALISM
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COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF
BILINGUALISM
Edited by
ISTVAN KECSKES
State University of New York,
Albany, NY, USA
and
LILIANA ALBERTAZZI
Trento University,
Rovereto, Italy
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CONTENTS
Preface vii
Part 1 Structure and Components of the Bilingual

Cognitive System
Chapter 1. The Neurofunctional Components of the Bilingual

Cognitive System 3
Michel Paradis
Chapter 2. Synergic Concepts in the Bilingual Mind 29
Istvan Kecskes
Chapter 3. Matrix: Schematic Universals. How Many Minds
Does a Bilingual Have? 63
Liliana Albertazzi
Chapter 4. Grammatical Gender in the Bilingual Lexicon: A
Psycholinguistic Approach 99
Angeliki Salamoura
Chapter 5. Bilingualism and Cognitive Arithmetic 153
Elena Rusconi, Giovanni Galfano, and Remo Job
Chapter 6. The Role of Cross-Linguistic and Cross-Cultural
Experiences in Bilinguals’ Divergent Thinking 175
Anatoliy V. Kharkhurin
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vi CO N TEN TS
Part 2 Bilingual Language Processing

Chapter 7. Task and Context Effects in Bilingual Lexical
Processing 213
Ton Dijkstra
Chapter 8. Representation and Skill in Second Language
Learners and Proficient Bilinguals 237
Judith F. Kroll and Jared A. Linck
Chapter 9. Second Language Gender System Affects First
Language Gender Classification 271
Elena Andonova, Ani Gosheva, Armina Janyan,
and Jasmin Sadat Schaffai
Chapter 10. Beyond Language: Childhood Bilingualism
Enhances High-Level Cognitive Functions 301
Ágnes Melinda Kovács
Chapter 11. Cross-Linguistic and Cognitive Structures in
the Acquisition of WH-Questions in an
Indonesian-Italian Bilingual Child 325
Antonia Soriente
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PREFACE
Our everyday life is characterized by conscious purposiveness. Our

actions, from preparing lunch to designing an experiment, are directed
at goals. Anderson (1996) argued that this purposiveness reveals itself
partly in our conscious awareness, partly in the organization of our
thoughts and actions. Purposiveness involves a cognitive-functional
perspective, in which thought and action are considered in relation
to their functions in humans’ goal-oriented behavior. Language use
is goal-oriented: we intend to communicate something to someone
else. Research has demonstrated that a significant amount of cognitive
development results from the internalization of interpersonal commu-
nicative processes. Consequently, language research should be cognitive
research, and a cognitive theory of language appears to be the most suit-
able theoretical framework for bringing together psychology, linguistics,
and bi- and multilingualism. This volume presents the latest research on
cognitive aspects of bilingualism. Cognitive approaches to bilingualism
attempt to find out what happens if the interpersonal communicative
processes involve the use of two or more languages.
The basic assumptions of cognitive theories of language are related
to the ontology and the epistemology of human language. In cognitive
linguistic theories researchers take different approaches to the “out-
side world-→ perception-→ inside world” relationships. The two main
approaches are represented in the works of Langacker (1991, 1999) and
Jackendoff (1983, 2002). Langacker’s cognitive theory of language ana-
lyzes meaning only on the conceptual level. His claim that “meaning
reduces to conceptualization (mental experiences)” refers to the fact that
perception is part of the process of conceptualization, and if so, then
there are no clear boundaries between perception and interpretation.
vii
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viii PREFA CE
Langacker focuses on epistemology rather than ontology because for

him perception is incorporated in the conceptualization process. In his
theory there is little said about the outside world because he is mainly
interested in the process of conceptualization. Jackendoff makes a clear
distinction between real world and projected world, although he empha-
sizes that we have conscious access only to the projected world, which
is “the world as unconsciously organized by the mind.” Information
conveyed by language must be about the projected world. Most of the
chapters in this volume follow Jackendoff’s line, which is a good fit
to bi- and multilingual research because people with two or more lan-
guages may see the world from two perspectives, or from a synergic
perspective. Differences in the outside world usually result in differ-
ent projected worlds. Both the experimental results and the systematic
claims in this volume call for a weak form of Whorfianism.
In earlier research studies in bilingualism, the bilingual person and
the product of thinking were at the center of attention, while recent
trends have seemed to favor the process of thinking, focusing on lan-
guage recall, reaction time, information processing, and memorization
on the one hand, and social and conceptual development on the other. In
this volume some relatively new or less-researched issues will be added
to the well-known ones, such as gender systems in the bilingual mind,
context and task, synergic concepts, conceptual blending, the relation-
ship between lexical categorization and ontological categorization, and
others. Discussions on these issues are unified by a common endeavor
of the authors: to add something to the everlasting debate about the dif-
ferences and similarities between monolingual and bilingual language
development and use.
Although current research tends to conclude that there are no major
differences between monolinguals and bi- and multilinguals because
their language systems develop and are used in a similar way (e.g.,
Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz 2005; Paradis in this volume) researchers
do not stop looking for differences. Several chapters (Paradis, Kecskes,
Albertazzi, Kharkhurin, Kovacs) address this intriguing issue directly.
Recent findings that the efficiency of bilingual language acquisition is
fundamentally similar to monolingual language acquisition make one
think that, at least in the language domain, bilingualism does not seem
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PREFA CE ix
to alter the flow of normal language development. However, as Kovacs

says in this volume, even if the outcome seems to be similar, this does not
necessarily mean that the bilingual brain recruits the same mechanisms
in the same manner when processing two languages as the monolingual
brain operating one language. Mechanisms such as attention, inhibi-
tion, and selection might be used to a greater extent when dealing with
complex input from which bilinguals have to construct two different
systems.
Three chapters (Kecskes, Kharkhurin, Kovacs) provide evidence of
the capacity of bilinguals to perform blending operations among con-
cepts in L1 and L2, but it is questionable if there is a real process of
fusion. Some evidence refers to the fact that the concepts in L1 main-
tain their identity notwithstanding their being more easily translated,
associated, and synthesized in L2. A bilingual is easily able to build
up hierarchies of conceptualization, but the relative spaces do not fuse
together. Kecskes’ findings show that there is some kind of synergism
between existing L1-based knowledge and knowledge gained through
the L2. Receiving new information through L2, bilinguals may change
the conceptual domain attached to particular labels (words) and develop
what is called “synergic concepts.” However, further research is needed
to determine how exactly this process occurs, and what the outcomes of
this conceptual change are in the bilingual mind.
The chapters present both experimental data and systematic inquiries.
The book consists of two parts. In the first part, the chapters focus on
the structure and components of the bilingual cognitive system, while
chapters in the second part discuss issues concerning bilingual language
processing.
In the first part of the volume there are six chapters. Paradis argues
for a modular system of the bilingual mind. The neurofunctional sys-
tem underlying implicit linguistic competence contains one subsystem
for each language acquired by the speaker. Each subsystem contains its
own phonology, morphosyntax, semantics and lexicon. The language
subsystems, including their lexicons, are neurofunctionally distinct, but
not stored in separate cerebral areas. Rather, the neural circuits that
subserve them, while distinct, are intertwined within the same gross
anatomical area. Kecskes presents his hypothesis of synergic concepts
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that are the results of conceptual blending. According to his approach,

bilinguals get information about the same or similar concepts through
two language channels. Because they have a common underlying con-
ceptual base (CUCB) the blended information results in concepts that
are neither exactly equal to the corresponding L1 concept nor to the cor-
responding L2 concept. Synergic concepts are a group of concepts that
are lexicalized in both languages, but have a different socio-cultural load
in each language. Albertazzi’s chapter underlines the importance of the
ontological level of reality for linguistic research, which, in her opinion,
has been ignored to a particular extent in cognitive linguistics in recent
years. She emphasizes the structural differences among different kinds
of categories, distinguishing between general ontological categories and
regional ontological ones. The chapter shows that “recognizing” an item
does not mean, by default, applying a taxonomic category or a base cat-
egory. On that basis, a proposal is made for experiments to verify the
existence of presentative pathologies, that is, pathologies occurring at
the very basic format of representations. Salamoura’s study investigates
the nature of gender representations in the bilingual lexicon, and claims
that research on the organization of the bilingual lexicon points to an
L1–L2 integrated gender system in which cognates rely more on the L1
gender value than noncognates. The chapter also suggests that this inte-
grated gender system is not restricted to translation-equivalent nouns
only, but that any L1 and L2 nouns with the same gender value share
a gender representation in the bilingual lexicon. Rusconi, Galfano and
Job intended to frame the relationship between bilingualism and num-
ber processing into a novel perspective by reporting some of the most
recent empirical findings. They argue that a great deal of our knowledge
of numbers is traded, thought, and manipulated by means of language,
and seek an answer to the question of how essential verbal language is
to numerical knowledge itself. Kharkhurin’s study investigates a pos-
sible effect that bilingualism might have on creative abilities. Three
factors in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences of bilingual
individuals are examined: language proficiency, age of second lan-
guage acquisition, and experience and participation in two cultures.
The empirical study with Russian-English bilingual immigrants living
in the United States and English monolingual native speakers revealed
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PREFA CE xi
that cross-linguistic factors in bilinguals’ development had an influence

on their divergent thinking abilities, which is a necessary component
of creative thought. These findings suggest that although bilingualism
may lay the foundation of creative thinking it does not necessarily imply
being creative. To account for these findings, a cross-language transfer
is proposed as a cognitive mechanism facilitating divergent thinking in
bilinguals.
The second part contains five chapters. In the first chapter, Dijkstra
argues that it is quite common in psycholinguistics to ignore the effects
of task and context and talk about general models for particular domains
of language processing. Researchers have a tendency to speak about,
for instance, models of word recognition and parsing, as if performance
would not depend on the actual circumstance in which it occurs. His
chapter moves away from this tradition and examines the effects of task
and context on language processing. He proposes a bilingual word recog-
nition model that includes a system that explicitly takes into account
task and context aspects. He demonstrates that the extended model is
compatible not only with reaction time data, but also with data from
electrophysiological and neuro-imaging techniques. In their chapter,
Kroll and Linck examine the interplay of representation and skill in
both second language learners and proficient bilinguals. A particular
focus in their discussion concerns the implications of the finding that
the activity of the unintended language is not eliminated once individuals
achieve proficiency in the L2. Alarge body of recent research has demon-
strated that even highly proficient bilinguals cannot effectively switch
off the unintended language. There is evidence that aspects of both lan-
guages are active and potentially compete for selection. Although it
might be expected that the weaker L2 would be affected by the more
dominant L1 when learners are in early stages of L2 acquisition, the
observation of parallel language activity among the most proficient bilin-
guals suggests that L2 skill is not a simple matter of overcoming the
influence of L1.
In an empirical study, Andonova, Gosheva, Schaffai and Janyan
investigate the effect of the L2 gender system on L1 gender classifica-
tion. They seek answers to the following questions: Does the acquisition
of a second language in which grammatical gender demarcations do not
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xii PREFA CE
repeat those in a bilingual’s first language lead to a contradictory set of

expectations, hence less overall reliance on gender as a cue in linguistic
and non-linguistic processing, or does it modify their representations
of the grammatical items in their first language in line with the gender
system of the second language? More specifically, can the grammatical
system of L2 affect classification choices in L1 directly; that is, can the
availability of a gender-marking system on nouns in L2 bias bilinguals’
preference for masculine vs. feminine gender classifications in their L1
in a way that would show alignment with the grammar of their second
language?
Kovacs makes an attempt to shed light on the ways in which the experi-
ence of being exposed to more than one language very early in childhood
could influence the development of different cognitive abilities (with
special emphasis on executive control and theory of mind). She discusses
questions analogous to the ones that were asked when addressing the so-
called paradox of bilingual language acquisition (Petitto et al. 2001), but
she mainly focuses on socio-cognitive domains somewhat different from
language development. Soriente examines language development in a
bilingual child growing up with two typologically distinct languages –
Italian and Jakarta Indonesian. She presents a case study of unbalanced
bilingualism focusing on the development of WH-forms and concludes
that the dominance of the loose Indonesian syntactic pattern results in
a non-target word order in the construction of early WH-questions in
Italian. The study discusses how children recognize languages as sep-
arate systems and how they gradually develop the cognitive patterns
required for competence in separate though practically co-extensive
linguistic domains.
Istvan Kecskes and Liliana Albertazzi
REFEREN CES
Anderson, N. H. 1996. A functional theory of cognition. Mahwah: Erlbaum.

Gumperz, J., and Jenny Cook-Gumperz. 2005. Making space for bilingual communica-
tive practice. Intercultural Pragmatics, 2(1): 1–25.
Jackendoff, R. 1983. Semantics and Cognition. Cambridge: MIT.
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PREFA CE xiii
Jackendoff, R. 2002. Foundation of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Langacker, R. W. 1991. Concept, Image and Symbol, Berlin/New York: Mouton de
Gruyter.
Langacker, R. W. 1999. Grammar and Conceptualization. Berlin/New York: Mouton
de Gruyter.
Petitto, L. A., Katerelos, M., Levy, B. G., Gauna, K., Tetreault, K., and Ferraro, V.
2001. Bilingual signed and spoken language acquisition from birth: implications
for the mechanisms underlying early bilingual language acquisition. Journal of
Child Language, 28: 453–496.
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PART 1
STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS OF THE

BILINGUAL COGNITIVE SYSTEM
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CH A PTER 1
THE NEUROFUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS

OF THE BILINGUAL COGNITIVE SYSTEM
Michel Paradis
McGill University, Montreal
Abstract
The cognitive architecture of bilingual speakers contains at least four systems involved
in verbal communication (i.e., implicit linguistic competence, explicit metalinguistic
knowledge, pragmatic abilities and affect/motivation). The neurofunctional system that
subserves implicit linguistic competence contains as many subsystems as the speaker
has acquired languages. Each subsystem contains its phonology, morphology, syntax,
semantics and lexicon. These language subsystems are differentially connected to a
single conceptual system that groups conceptual features together in accordance with
the specific lexical semantic constraints of words in each language and the relevant
pragmatic circumstances at the time of their use (Paradis 2004).
Three main points will be discussed: (1) the distinction between the cerebral repre-
sentation of concepts on the one hand and of lexical semantics on the other; (2) the
representation of languages (including lexical semantics) as dissociable subsystems of
the neurofunctional language system, connected to a single common conceptual system;
and (3) the lack of qualitative difference between unilingual and bilingual brains in terms
of conceptual organization and processing (though the contents of the representations
may, and often do, differ). To paraphrase Kecskes and Papp (2000: 37), the main ques-
tion will be: To what extent are the two languages [neuro] functionally independent, and
to what extent do they constitute a single [neuro]functional system? Special emphasis
will be placed on the relationship between the linguistic and conceptual levels.
1. BA CK G RO U N D
1.1. Neurofunctional Components of the Verbal

Communication System
As described in greater detail in a neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism
(Paradis 2004), the native language (i.e., the grammar, what can
be described by linguists in terms of rules: phonology, morphol-
ogy, syntax and the lexicon) is acquired incidentally (i.e., by paying
3
I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 3–28.
© 2007 Springer.

4 MICH EL PA RA D IS
attention to something other than what is being internalized as linguistic

competence), is stored implicitly (i.e., remains opaque to introspec-
tion), and is used automatically (i.e., comprehension and production are
not consciously controlled). This implicit linguistic competence is sub-
served by procedural memory, which relies on neural structures in the
right cerebellum, left basal ganglia – in particular the neostriatum – and
perisylvian cortex (the classical language areas).
In addition, individuals are aware of the observable characteristics of
the manifestations of speech, including their own production, in partic-
ular the forms and default meanings of words. In other words, speakers
are conscious of the input to, and output from, implicit linguistic compe-
tence, but not of the internal structure and operation of that competence.
The knowledge emerging from these conscious observations is stored in
declarative memory, which relies on neural structures in the hippocam-
pal system, including the parahippocampal gyri and mesial temporal
lobes. Its use is consciously controlled and as such, involves the anterior
cingular cortex.
Learners of a foreign language who are not exposed to constant com-
munication with speakers of that language generally learn about the
structure of the language from books or in the formal environment of
a classroom. This learning, being conscious, is therefore subserved by
explicit (declarative) memory. Because implicit linguistic competence
is acquired only through frequent use of the language, foreign language
learners often have little occasion to acquire implicit linguistic compe-
tence in L2. With time, especially if they enter into frequent real-life
communication with speakers of that language, they may eventually
acquire some implicit linguistic competence, but they will most likely
continue to rely to a great extent on explicit metalinguistic knowledge.
Besides the grammar of their language, speakers acquire the ability
to infer intended meanings from the context in which utterances are
produced, whether it be literal (the meaning derived from the meanings
of words and the structure of the sentence, i.e., its semantic meaning),
figurative, metaphorical, or simply enhanced by the situational, social,
and discourse contexts. This is known as pragmatic ability. Each lan-
guage possesses some specific pragmatic cues in addition to general
pragmatic principles. Pragmatic ability is subserved by areas of the right
hemisphere (Van Lancker 1997).

T HE NE UR OFU N CTIO N A L CO M PO N EN TS 5
No one would ever say anything without the desire to communicate

a message. Motivation is at the root of every utterance. It has been
shown to have a considerable impact on the acquisition (Schumann
1998; Schumann et al. 2004) and attrition (Schmid 2002, 2004;
Pavlenko 2005) of languages. Moreover, the manifestations of affect are
closely related to certain forms in each language and language-specific
pragmatics. Motivation, and affect in general, are subserved by a cere-
bral mechanism involving the amygdala and the dopaminergic system
(Schumann & Wood 2004).
All these neurofunctional systems are independent of each other, sub-
served as they are by different cerebral structures, and can be doubly
dissociated by pathology. One system may serve as input to another, but
does not modify its internal structure. For instance, pragmatics does not
modify any part of the grammar; it only selects the elements of each
component of grammar (phonology, morphology, syntax and lexical
semantics) that optimally fit the intended meaning in the given context
of each utterance. Whereas implicit linguistic competence is susceptible
to impairment subsequent to damage to any of the cerebral structures
that sustain it (aphasia), explicit metalinguistic knowledge is susceptible
to impairment subsequent to damage to the hippocampal system (amne-
sia). Pragmatic abilities are selectively impaired by lesions in areas of the
right hemisphere (dyshyponoia). Damage to the limbic system, causing
lack of motivation, leads to loss of speech in the absence of impairment
to language per se (dynamic aphasia).
Each neurofunctional system is necessary but none is sufficient for
normal verbal communication. As we are about to see in more detail
below, all these systems are connected to a conceptual system where
thoughts originate before they are encoded into language for production
and where meanings are decoded into conceptual representations for the
comprehension of perceived utterances or written text.
1.2. Neurofunctional Components of the Bilingual

Cognitive System
First, a historical note: The three-store hypothesis considered here orig-
inates in the psycholinguistic studies of the seventies that investigated
whether the two languages of bilingual speakers are represented in two

memory stores or one (McCormack 1977). Typically, bilingual subjects

would be trained on a particular task in one language and then tested in
the other. If the results differed from the same-language control condi-
tion (i.e., practice in the other language did not facilitate performance),
they were interpreted as supporting the two-store hypothesis; if the
results were similar, they were interpreted as supporting the one-store
hypothesis. Experimental results were inconsistent, with some inter-
preted as supporting the one-store, and others the two-store option.
Kolers (1968) reported that his own findings were not consistent with
either hypothesis: the results were too similar to support the two-store
hypothesis but not sufficiently alike to support one common store. He
concluded that the actual situation of a bilingual person combines aspects
of both hypotheses. In order to solve this problem, Paradis (1978) pro-
posed to account for Kolers’ findings by postulating not one, not two,
but three stores: one for each language, and one common system con-
taining conceptual representations corresponding to both languages. The
two language stores were later considered to be represented as subsys-
tems of the language neurofunctional system (Paradis 1981). Lexical
semantic representations of L1 and L2 words differ and are stored sepa-
rately (each in its subsystem); conceptual representations corresponding
to L1 and L2 words are also at least partially different, but within a
common system.
Lexical items rarely have the same meanings as their translation
equivalents (Paradis 1997), besides having different syntactic connec-
tions within the language subsystem. Even when they have identical
meanings, the lexical meanings are redundantly represented in each
subsystem. Lexical items, including their meanings, are represented as
part of their respective language subsystem and the conceptual feature
groupings that correspond to the semantic constraints on lexical items
of each language are represented in a common conceptual system.
The three-store hypothesis holds that concepts are dissociable from
language: aphasics retain concepts, even those that were acquired
through language. Global aphasics behave intelligently; for example,
they may beat you at chess and solve algebraic equations. Linguistically
delimited concepts (i.e., English- or French-specific concepts), once
they have been acquired, are stored independently of the language that

shaped them, though they retain all their language-specific idiosyn-

crasies, and they remain available after the loss of language. Lexical
meaning representations differ from conceptual representations in that
the former are part of the language system, the latter, of the conceptual
system; hence, the three-store hypothesis. Unfortunately, there is some
confusion in the literature regarding the use of the terms semantic and
conceptual. Often the term conceptual refers to the lexical semantic
meaning and semantic refers to the conceptual level. Meaning repre-
sentations are often called “conceptual” representations because most
models do not distinguish between word meaning and concept (De Groot
2002; see Francis 2005 for a discussion of the confusion). But “the fact
that pinpointing the difference between semantic and conceptual knowl-
edge is tedious” (De Groot 2002: 48) should not cause us to ignore this
distinction, which is supported by clinical studies. Certain types of apha-
sia that affect lexical semantic representations do not necessarily affect
conceptual representations (Alajouanine & Lhermitte 1964; Lecours &
Joanette 1980; Marshall 1984; Gurd & Marshall 1993).
In the common conceptual system, conceptual features are grouped
together in accordance with the specific lexical semantic constraints on
words from each language and the relevant pragmatic circumstances
at the time of their use. To the extent that lexical constraints are sim-
ilar in the two languages, the same conceptual representations will be
activated; to the extent that they differ, so will their conceptual represen-
tations. The lexical semantic constraints may have the greatest impact
on language-derived conceptualization, though features of grammar also
convey specific conceptual representations (as emphasized by Pavlenko
1999, 2000).
Kecskes and Papp’s (2003) common underlying conceptual base
(CUCB) corresponds to Paradis’ third store, the nonlinguistic cognitive
system where conceptual features that conform to the lexical semantic
constraints of each language are grouped together. As in the three-
store hypothesis, it is in the CUCB that thoughts originate and are then
mapped onto linguistic signs to reach the surface through one of the lan-
guage channels. This is done directly: the perceived acoustic or graphic
characteristics of the words automatically access the corresponding con-
cepts, that is, an L1 or L2 concept depending on the word that has been

heard or seen, just as, in unilinguals, two different words will each evoke
their particular concepts (Paradis 2004).
1.3. The Subsystems Hypothesis

The neurofunctional system underlying implicit linguistic competence
contains one subsystem for each language acquired by the speaker. Each
subsystem contains its own phonology, morphosyntax, semantics and
lexicon.
The language subsystems, including their lexicons, are neurofunc-
tionally distinct, but not stored in separate cerebral areas. Rather, the
neural circuits that subserve them, while distinct, are intertwined within
the same gross anatomical area (Roux et al. 2004). The two languages
never form a common system at any level of structure or at any time in
development. At the phonological level, even when a person speaks L2
with a strong foreign accent, the phonemes of L2 are not the phonemes
of L1: even though the values, as represented in the speaker’s brain,
may be closer to L1 than to L2 values, the two systems are independent
and may be selectively impaired by pathology (Alajouanine et al. 1949).
The same goes for syntax, morphology and lexical semantics, no matter
how many features of L1 are found in the L2 system, or feature values
closer to L1 than is appropriate. In cases of full L1 values, the feature is
then redundantly represented in the L2 subsystem.
The subsystems hypothesis holds that the two language subsystems
are totally separated (i.e., no part of any subsystem shares an item with
another subsystem). If they can be said to share a feature; that is, a
feature of L1 that is identical to its counterpart in L2, either deviantly
or legitimately when the same parameter happens to be implemented in
both languages, it can only mean that the same feature is redundantly
represented in each respective subsystem. In this view, Cook’s (2003: 8)
partial integration Figure 1 may correspond to an abstract schematic
diagram of the meanings of words. But, though it may correspond to
representations at the extralinguistic neurofunctional conceptual level,
it does not correspond to the way any grammatical or lexical component
of two languages is represented in Paradis’ model of the bilingual brain,
with which it is presented as being compatible.

Language A Language B
Figure 1. Partial integration (after Cook’s [2003] Figure 1.3 B).
1.4. Redundancy of Representation in each Subsystem

From the perspective of a neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism, even
an interlanguage, or transitory grammar, to the extent that it is internal-
ized as implicit competence, is stored in the L2 subsystem in the same
way as a bona fide L2, and continues to change and develop within that
subsystem in the same way that any language develops. However, the
sequence of development may differ from the L1’s, and many L1 or
other deviant features may fossilize and remain part of the speaker’s L2
grammar. The “deviant” grammar is stored like any other grammar. The
nature of what is represented in the L2 implicit linguistic competence
subsystem is identical to that of any native language, namely parame-
ters of linguistic principles of the relevant sort (phonological, syntactic,
morphological, lexical semantic) – whether appropriate for the particu-
lar language or not. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that the brains
of bilingual speakers, whose L2 implicit grammar incorporates more
features identical to those of their L1 than to the grammar of L2 native
speakers, should in any way represent and/or process their languages
differently than the brains of speakers whose grammars legitimately
incorporate those features.
There is no reason for the brain to treat an illicit parameter differently
from a correct one. Two languages may legitimately contain the same
parametric instantiation of certain grammatical principles, while other
parameters differ. The actual number of similar features in two languages

is a mere historical accident and it changes over time. Let us consider a

concrete example. If the main clause of a sentence is in the future, then
clauses starting with when, in some languages, must use either (1) the
present tense (as in English) or (2) the future tense (as in French); in
other languages, one may (3) optionally use one or the other (as in
Greek). The brain will develop a subsystem for L2 in which any one of
these options is implemented. In some cases, it will actually correspond
to the correct form in that particular language, in others it will not.
Thus, let us assume that an English speaker acquires French imperfectly
and systematically uses the present instead of the future tense in the
“when” clause. That parameter will be inappropriately represented the
same way in both the French and English subsystems, just as it would be
legitimately represented in English and Italian. There is thus no reason to
suspect that a subsystem that contains an instance of static interference
from L1 should differ in its representation or processing from a system
that legitimately contains the same feature in both subsystems.
Cross-linguistic cognates are also quasi-redundantly represented in
each subsystem, for at least three reasons: (1) A particular word may
be available to a bilingual aphasic patient, but not its cognate in the
other language (the same argument that rules out the extended and the
tripartite systems – see Paradis 1981); (2) lexical meanings, as well as
pronunciations, are very rarely identical; and (3) lexical items and their
cognate translation equivalents have different intralingual connections
and often possess different syntactic characteristics. For example, the
verb “telephone” requires a direct object in English but an indirect object
in French; “information” is a mass noun in English, but a count noun in
French. At the conceptual level, the amount of overlapping features in
the conceptual representation, for cognate and noncognate translation
equivalents alike, will correspond to the actual degree of similarity in
meaning between a word and its translation equivalent.
2. T HE NAT UR E O F REPRESEN TATIO N S, TH EIR

OR GANIZ AT ION, ACQ U ISITIO N A N D U SE A RE THE SAME
Bilinguals have a conceptual base that is qualitatively identical to

that of unilinguals. Only the number of language-governed concepts

and their exact boundaries differ. Bilingual memory does not differ
in kind or in organizational principles from unilingual memory. It
can be said that “bilingual memory differs from monolingual mem-
ory to a great extent” (Kecskes & Papp 2003: 258) only with regard
to what is represented and processed, not how. The common concep-
tual base of bilinguals is identical in nature, organization, development
and use, to the unilingual conceptual base. It is simply bigger – at
least in most cases (a unilingual literature professor may have more
language-based concepts than a bilingual shepherd). The content of
representations may be impoverished and/or deviant with respect to
native speakers’ norms but it is stored and processed in the same way
as any “correct” language-governed concept. Therefore, the cognitive
functioning of bilinguals is identical to that of unilingual speakers.
If, by “cognitive functioning” one means the actual contents of the
ideas and values processed in the speaker’s mind, then the differ-
ence between the cognitive functioning of a unilingual and a bilingual
speaker is of the same kind as that between a native Hungarian speaker
and a native American English speaker: What they think may differ
but the principles that underlie the thinking and feeling processes are
the same.
As Kecskes and Papp (2003: 258) rightly assert, “Each language used
as an L1 of a community has a system of expectations and traditions.”
But unilinguals living in a bicultural environment also have two sets
of expectations and traditions for their native words and expressions,
depending on the context of their use. “Liberal” may be considered a
compliment in one group, an insult in another. Just as one can pre-
dict that a German speaker’s semantic boundaries of the word Freund
(an intimate friend) will change after living in California for 20 years,
where you introduce someone you have met at the bus stop 15 minutes
ago as “my friend Bill,” one can expect the notion of cold weather to
go through the same type of rearrangement when an English speaker
moves from northern Vermont to Florida. Under the influence of the
frequent use of the other language, concepts are modified in bilinguals
to include or exclude a feature or features (i.e., static interference)
in the same way that concepts are modified by new experience in
unilinguals.

2.1. Similarity in Nature

The nature of what is represented is the same whether concepts originate
in one language or a blend of two or more. The fact that a concept has
been derived from L2 semantic constraints does not alter its characteris-
tics: it is still made up of conceptual features, behaves in the same ways
when activated, and combines with other concepts to give rise to mental
representations.
The fact that L1- and L2-derived concepts are part of a CUCB does
not mean that translation equivalents have identical conceptual represen-
tations, in that the meanings of a word and of its translation equivalent
correspond to one and the same concept. Far from it. Concepts in one
language and their closest equivalents in another are rarely, if ever,
identical; they overlap but do not share exactly the same contents
(see Paradis 1997).
Note that we should distinguish between the linguistic concept (i.e.,
the complete conceptual representation corresponding to the lexical
semantics of an item) and the conceptual representation evoked by the
utterance of a word in context – those (and only those) relevant features
of the linguistic concept that are activated as restricted by the situation
and the linguistic context in which the word is uttered. Not all features
of a concept are activated whenever a word is used. What is activated
by any given use of the word is modulated by the various pragmatic
circumstances, the mental set, etc.; you never activate all the concep-
tual features associated with a given concept, only those relevant to the
situation. Thus, in some cases, when the differences are not relevant in
the context, the very same features may be activated when either an L1
word or its translation equivalent is used. For example, if on the tennis
court I say “pick up all the balls” or “ramasse toutes les balles,” balles
and balls refer to the same objects and the addressee will pick up all the
tennis balls that are on the court. But, if in the gym I say “apporte-moi
toutes les balles qui sont dans le placard,” the addressee will bring a
different set of objects than if I ask for “all the balls that are in the closet.”
In the latter case, basketballs and soccer balls will be brought along with
the small baseballs and tennis balls that would be brought following the
French request.

The same L1 word may activate different concepts depending on the

pragmatic situation. In a sarcastic remark, a word will be interpreted to
mean the opposite of its usual meaning. Moreover, unilinguals cannot
really be said to have, in contrast to bilinguals, a qualitatively different
“one-language-governed conceptual base” (Kecskes & Papp 2003: 249),
because many of the concepts in the CUCB do not correspond to a word
or expression in L1. This could be true only in a theory of radical lan-
guage determinism, in which no concept existed without a corresponding
word as its source. Yet, children clearly have many concepts long before
they acquire their first word. The unilinguals’ underlying conceptual
base is simply quantitatively smaller, since it has fewer possible featural
groupings that correspond to words.
2.2. Similarity in Organization

As proposed earlier, bilinguals have two independent language subsys-
tems, but both of them have access to the same underlying conceptual
base where conceptual meanings group together certain features that cor-
respond, say, to the word glass, another set, with considerable overlap,
that corresponds to the word goblet, and yet another, also with consid-
erable but not total overlap, that corresponds to the word verre. This
is what it means to have a common conceptual system, independent of
language and languages. The conceptual system is in a constant state of
flux as it incorporates new insights from experience and new meanings
for words (i.e., words that have different meanings in different contexts),
as well as meanings for new words in both L1 and L2.
Concepts of the two languages coexist and interact in the bilingual
individual’s CUCB (the third store) in the same way that different con-
cepts of the same language and those shaped by experience coexist and
interact in the unilingual conceptual system. The contents differ, not the
nature of the representations or the kind of cognitive functioning. With
different material, a bilingual speaker functions cognitively in the same
manner as a unilingual speaker. Note that no two unilinguals possess
identical concepts, either. The difference is one of degree; it concerns
only the content of representations (i.e., the specific combination of con-
ceptual features), not the way concepts are acquired, formed, used or

stored. In this respect, bilinguals differ from unilinguals no more than

unilingual English speakers differ from unilingual Spanish speakers.
L1 concepts are more easily modified by L2 concepts (and the
reverse), than grammatical elements are, because they are sustained
by declarative memory. The lexical semantic constraints on the use of
a word, and consequently its corresponding conceptual representation,
are generally known explicitly. For instance, one can demonstrate that
one knows the meaning of the word mug by identifying an actual object:
“Yes, this is a mug; no, this is not a mug.” Of course, there may be bor-
derline cases: “This is not quite a mug.” It is nevertheless perceived as
a mug-like cup or bowl and will be so described, for instance, when
trying to explain to friends back home the type of large breakfast cup
from which one drank one’s café au lait in France.
What is represented may differ from target-language native speakers’
representations but the principles of conceptual organization and pro-
cessing are the same. The content may be impoverished and/or deviant
with respect to native speakers’ norms, but it is stored and treated in the
same way as any bona fide language-specific concept.
The conceptual system is affected by a new language in the same way
as it is affected by the encounter with new L1 words and new real-world
experiences. L2 words activate a different set of conceptual features
than their L1 translation equivalents in the same way that L1 synonyms
do. In the bilingual conceptual system, the number of concepts changes;
their organization does not.
2.3. Similarity in Development

The way the conceptual base of a second language develops does not
differ qualitatively from the analogous process in the first language.
Unilingual individuals continuously increase their conceptual base as
they encounter new experiences and learn new words of their L1. The
experience of learning new L2 words with their corresponding concep-
tual representations is not different in kind. It simply adds new featural
groupings in the same way as learning new synonyms in the L1. There
is thus no need to postulate an additional conceptual system for L2 –
only an extended underlying conceptual base, extended in the same way
that the unilinguals’ conceptual base is extended over a lifetime, as our

knowledge of the world – and, to some extent, of our native language –

increases.
With prolonged language contact, concept boundaries may change
so that L1 words no longer activate their original conceptual meanings,
but incorporate some or all conceptual features of their L2 equivalents.
Semantic constraints on the use of L1 words become blurred. Faux-amis
from L2 will creep into L1; For example, an English speaker living in a
French environment will call a lecture a conference, or a less colloquial
calque will be used – the speaker will tell a friend that his flight was
annulled – rather than cancelled. This follows the same pattern as the
change in unilingual concept boundaries consequent to new experiences.
To speak of the emergence of the CUCB when the learner has reached
a certain threshold of L2 proficiency (Kecskes & Papp 2003: 250) might
imply that a new system is developed, when in fact it is the existing
conceptual system that gradually increases as boundaries of some L1
concepts start to gain and/or lose some features of previous L1-driven
concepts and new L2 concepts are formed. The CUCB cannot be an
additional “container” that would hold those L1 and L2 concepts whose
meanings start to overlap improperly. The common conceptual system
is a single system that contains unchanged L1 concepts, L1 concepts
modified by L2 contamination, native-like L2 concepts, and L2 concepts
modified by L1 contamination. All these combinations of conceptual
features are represented in the CUCB and behave in all respects in exactly
the same way any concept does.
At early stages of development, the concept that corresponds to the
L2 word may coincide with that of its L1 equivalent: the features that
correspond to the L2 word start off by being identical to those of the
corresponding L1 word. With time, the overlap ceases to be complete as
some features are deleted and others added to a concept that eventually
corresponds more closely to the actual native L2 conceptual represen-
tation of the L2 word. Thus, at first, the English speakers’ concept of
balle may totally correspond to that of ball (and this concept is activated
whether ball or balle is used), but as time goes by, the learner finds out
that balle is used only for balls small enough to be held in one hand,
and the feature [+small] is added to the L2 concept balle. The grouping
of conceptual features for ball and balle is no longer identical, and the

speaker learns the word ballon to refer to large balls. In a similar way,
for the native English toddler, there comes a time when doggie takes on
additional features and is no longer applicable to all four-legged animals,
and the word cat is learned. The reverse may also occur in both bilingual
and unilingual situations, when a new concept moves from the specific
(one’s own house pet) to general (all dogs).
Cook (2003) considers that the notion of the integration continuum
is compatible with Paradis’ neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism in
unifying both L1 and L2 within the same architecture of the mind, but
that it differs in extending the continuum to concepts, whereas the neu-
rolinguistic theory of bilingualism “has a single unvarying conceptual
system” (p. 11). In the proposed theory, the bilingual conceptual sys-
tem has indeed a single conceptual system, but it is not unvarying.
Like the unilingual conceptual system (and perhaps even to a greater
extent), it varies over time as new L2 concepts are incorporated. Again,
the variation is in the contents, not in the nature or processing, of the
representations. The process of development is the same.
2.4. Similarity in Processing

In the bilingual language processing device, both language channels
interact during production, resulting sometimes in mixing, switching,
modifications and temporary dominance of either language (Kecskes &
Papp 2000). Similarly, sociolinguistic and/or dialectal registers may
interact in unilingual processing. As Labov (1972) pointed out, there
are no single-style speakers. Every speaker encountered by his research
team showed a shift in some linguistic variables as the context changed.
Unilinguals switch registers when addressing different people in differ-
ent circumstances. Unilingual parents do not speak to their children at
bedtime in the same register as they speak to a judge in a courtroom.
A change of register involves a change in lexicon, morphosyntax and
even pronunciation – as does switching between languages. Unilinguals
can mix registers the way bilinguals mix languages for a number of pur-
poses, including jocularity. For example, a French person may say to
a friend: “Hier j’ai rencontré Danielle et nous papotâmes” (Yesterday
I met Danielle and we chatted). The verb papoter (familiar register) is
used in the simple past (literary formal register), resulting in the intended

comical effect. Unilinguals can suffer from interference between reg-

isters, inadvertently using a more frequently used familiar term in a
formal conversation. Unilinguals can paraphrase. Paraphrasing is a phe-
nomenon which does not differ in kind from translation, that is, saying
more or less the same thing with different words and/or morphosyntax,
even pronunciation. For example, baby or pet talk uses different intona-
tion, pitch frequencies, and even, on occasion, different phonemes from
speech to adults.
Cook (2002: 5) raises the objection that L1 paraphrasing seldom leads
to social roles such as acting as an intermediary between two other
people. In other words, circumstances are such that unilingual speakers
are not commonly placed in situations where they need to paraphrase
what one person said so that another may understand. Nevertheless,
parents often do translate adult speech that is addressed to their child by
strangers into motherese. Some bilinguals, on the other hand, are seldom
called upon to translate. They have little opportunity to do so, but they
could if necessary. This is the point: the functions of mixing, switching
and translating are available to unilinguals and bilinguals alike and some
bilinguals make more extensive use of these functions. The difference
is only in the actual frequency of use. Such frequency varies not only
among bilinguals but among unilinguals as well: day care attendants
need to paraphrase more often than people without children; lawyers
need to paraphrase a judge’s statement for the benefit of their clients.
There is no need to postulate a neurofunctional mechanism that would
sprout only in bilingual brains to fulfill a new function.
Another situation sometimes considered unique to bilinguals is that,
when the expectation is that Language A will be spoken but, in fact, it
turns out that Language B is being used, comprehension may be momen-
tarily blocked. In the same way, unilinguals sometimes fail to understand
what is said if they expect their interlocutor to speak about one thing
but in fact that person starts speaking about another. Mindset affects
comprehension in both unilinguals and bilinguals.
There is therefore no reason to expect that anything in the bilingual
brain should differ in kind from anything found in the unilingual brain.
The mechanisms for comprehension and production in the bilingual
brain do not need any additional component that is not already present

in the unilingual person’s brain. The only difference is the extent to

which unilinguals and some bilinguals make use of the various parts
of the verbal communication system, but all such parts are available to
bilinguals and unilinguals alike.
The neurofunctional system need not be organized differently depend-
ing on whether an individual speaks one or more languages. Between
different types of bilinguals and unilinguals, what changes is not the type
of mechanism that sustains implicit linguistic competence or conceptual
representations but the individual’s grammar; not the way in which the
two languages are represented, but what is represented; not the organi-
zation of the system but its contents. The same is true of the CUCB: its
nature and functioning principles are identical to those at work in the
unilingual conceptual system.
2.5. Similarity in Handling Cultural Values

Speakers may be aware of the different cultural values conveyed by each
language and may, within this set, choose to adopt those specific to one or
the other, or to compromise between the two, irrespective of the language
they use. This is a question of contents rather than organization into one
or two systems. Unilinguals may also choose implicitly or explicitly to
accept or reject the values conveyed by their language community.
For example, a French-English bilingual, even though a native
speaker of French, may nevertheless consider that the Anglo-Saxon way
of speaking in turns in a debate is preferable to the Latin way where all
participants speak at the same time. Speakers may select from the values
attached to each of their languages the ones they consider preferable,
or modify them somewhat. They may also choose to behave one way
in an L1 environment and another in an L2 environment, just as unilin-
guals adjust their behavior (linguistic or otherwise) to the company of
close friends and relatives on the one hand, and to more formal com-
pany on the other. Bilingual/bicultural speakers thus have three choices.
They may accept some of the traits of the other culture, choose a middle
ground between L1 and L2 cultures, or stick to their L1 values as embed-
ded in the connotations. Furthermore, they may have no preference, in
which case they may use the L1 and L2 words with their respective

language-specific connotations. There is no need to postulate a separate

conceptual store for each of these situations; not to mention the fact that
these behaviors are on a continuum, depending on a variety of circum-
stances. Nor does the conceptual system alter the way it acquires and
handles values.
To the extent that connotations are an integral part of the language-
specific meaning of a word, that is, are conventionalized and usually
listed in standard dictionaries, they are stored as part of the language
subsystem lexicon in the left hemisphere, and thus accessible to
right-hemisphere-damaged patients who have difficulty with non-
conventional connotations, figurative meanings and metaphors. Native
speakers will naturally use the words of their language with their stan-
dard meanings, including their conventional connotations. To the extent
that these connotations are absent from the conceptual system of L2
speakers of that language, there is interference in the same way as
with the names of concrete objects (e.g., the meanings of balle, poil,
chaise, chat vs. ball, hair, chair, cat). This simply means that the lex-
ical constraints and corresponding conceptual representations have an
impoverished content; the appropriate connotations are missing.
Different languages have coined specific conventional metaphors,
but the principle of a metaphor is independent of specific languages.
Here again, the only difference is a question of what specific mean-
ing is metaphorically attached to a specific expression in a particular
language. There is nothing fundamentally different about storing an
English-specific metaphor or a Russian-specific metaphor. Their trans-
lation into the other language may yield nothing but the literal meaning,
but English-Russian bilingual speakers are aware of the metaphorical
meaning of each. To the extent that speakers have not incorporated the
cultural aspects of a foreign language into their repertoire, they may
translate an L1 metaphor into the L2 language, and fail to communicate,
as one fails to communicate when a linguistic parameter has not been
internalized, reflecting static interference.
If bilingual speakers are uncomfortable with the particular conno-
tation of a word or expression in one of their languages, they will
simply avoid using it or use a non-offensive translation equivalent
(i.e., a word that, in the other language, does not have the unwanted

connotation). Unilingual speakers do the same: they avoid words that

they find offensive and use euphemisms or circumlocutions instead.
When affectively charged words and taboo words elicit a greater
autonomic activity (faster heartbeat, sweat) in speakers’ L1 than their L2
(Harris et al. 2003), it means that these words became associated with
particular emotions early in life and have remained so for a long time,
and links are therefore stronger than to their translation counterparts.
However, in the case of attrition of L1 after decades of life in an L2
environment, the L2 emotive associations may strengthen over time –
again, a quantitative difference that mirrors the variance in L1 situations.
Different individuals speaking the same language in the same cultural
environment will assign different emotive strengths to various words on
the basis of their own personal circumstances.
This in no way denies that different languages are bearers of dif-
ferent cognitive perspectives and different world views. Each of a
bilingual speaker’s languages affords him or her a specific perspective.
Both perspectives are acquired through communication in each lan-
guage environment, or consciously learned from instruction. This is not
incompatible with a CUCB: the bilingual individual simply has more
choices (a quantitative difference). Unilingual speakers will likewise
encounter different perspectives, and face the same choices, when they
share the experience of two groups at opposite ends of the sociocultural
and/or political spectrum – say, farm-hand paternal grandparents and
aristocratic maternal grandparents.
2.6. Apparent Caveat: Late Bilinguals

Late bilinguals differ from early bilinguals and unilinguals in the extent
to which they rely on implicit linguistic competence, metalinguistic
knowledge and pragmatics (Paradis 2004), but do not differ in terms of
the type of conceptual development, representation, or functioning. It
does not matter how the concepts get there, whether through language
(L1, L2) or through experience. Once a conceptual representation is
formed, its relevant parts are activated in the appropriate context.
Late bilingual speakers’ L2 conceptual representations differ from
those of native speakers of that language, but no two unilinguals

have identical conceptual representations either, whether quantita-

tively or content-wise. New L2 lexical constraints delimit new concept
boundaries and modify existing ones in the same way that new
experiences do, including learning new L1 words.
To the extent that metalinguistic knowledge is used to compensate for
gaps in implicit linguistic competence, late L2 learners will differ from
native speakers and early bilinguals in the degree to which the various
cognitive systems are used for second language verbal communication –
again, a possibly large, but still quantitative difference.
Besides their reduced implicit linguistic competence in the L2, speak-
ers may use metalinguistic knowledge in a controlled manner, thus
resorting to a different grammatical system subserved by an altogether
different cerebral mechanism. But at the conceptual level, since units of
meaning are explicit, they do not differ from unilinguals in the nature
of their representations or ways of processing. L2 words evoke their
corresponding concept just as synonyms (or any two words) in one
language do.
In early bilinguals, two subsystems form from the start (from the time
the child shows evidence of differentiating languages by using one with
one set of interlocutors, the other with another set). To the extent that late
bilinguals have internalized some implicit linguistic competence in L2,
they possess two subsystems, even if one is less extensive than the other.
At least at the beginning, and probably to some extent for the rest of their
lives, their L2 will differ from their L1 in that a different neurofunctional
system, subserving metalinguistic knowledge and relying on declarative
memory, subserved by different cerebral mechanisms, will also be used
to process L2. This mechanism is used in processing L1 as well but to a
lesser extent, and usually in more formal situations.
Whereas at no point and under no circumstances is there a single
neurofunctional system of implicit linguistic competence common to
both languages, even for those elements that happen to be identical
in the two languages and will be represented once in each language
subsystem, the opposite holds at the conceptual level. There is only
one common conceptual system for both languages, and it works in
accordance with the same principles in unilinguals and early or late
bilinguals.

2.7. Similarity in how, Dissimilarity in what is Represented

It should be apparent by now that it is important to distinguish what is
represented (specific phoneme, morphosyntactic rule, lexical semantic
unit, concept) from the way in which it is represented (how the various
mechanisms underlying the representation and processing of the differ-
ent components of the verbal communication neurofunctional system
operate). What is represented may differ; how it is represented and
processed does not.
There is even a way in which we may consider that the representa-
tions themselves, at least at the phonological, phonotactic, lexical and
conceptual levels, differ only quantitatively from the unilingual norm.
At first glance, they appear qualitatively different. For example, Spanish
phonemes are not the same as Swedish phonemes; lexical semantic con-
straints on the use of a word are not the same as those on the use of its
translation equivalent and do not refer to exactly the same objects, prop-
erties or events. But the apparent qualitative difference is the result of
quantitative changes, changes that can be defined in terms of distance (in
millimeters), duration (in milliseconds) and amplitude (in decibels) for
sounds, and in terms of the number of meaningful features for concepts.
The vocal apparatus is the same for all human beings. Native speakers
of Oriya have the same vocal flaps, palate, lips, teeth and glottis as native
speakers of English. They make different uses of the available principles
of phonology – phonemes are more or less fronted, more or less labial,
more or less palatalized, more or less nasal – but the underlying mech-
anisms for producing language sounds are the same. In production, the
duration of vocal flap vibrations may vary, the proximity of the tongue
to the teeth or the palate may vary, the size of the opening of the lips may
vary, but all these differences are quantitative, measurable differences.
The same phonotactics are available to everyone at birth. Each lan-
guage to which children are exposed has its own set of phonotactic
constraints, which differ from those of others. Further degrees of differ-
ence are possible within the limits of the perceptual and motor systems
involved. Thus, when an L2 phonological feature is closer to L1 than
appropriate, or over time an L1 feature becomes more similar to L2 val-
ues through prolonged contact with L2, the modification (“interference”)

results in quantitative differences that give rise to a perceptible “foreign”

accent. The underlying mechanisms that sustain the representation, per-
ception and production of speech sounds are identical for these modified
bilingual features. The differences result from quantitative variations
in the use of these universally available devices. Even differences in
phonological representations (what is represented) may be considered
quantitative differences because they are the outcome of the inclusion
of more or fewer traits of the relevant kind.
The same argument applies to conceptual representations. Some con-
cepts are acquired or allowed to be instantiated through experience and
keep being modified by experience, that is, increasing or pruning the
meaningful domain covered by each concept. Some concepts will be
developed through linguistic delimitation (particular-language-driven
concepts). These may modify some of the concepts acquired through
experience by adding or subtracting meaningful features to constitute a
new meaningful representational unit (a new concept). Modifications of
this sort through exposure to two languages and/or two cultures are of
the same kind as the ones that occur in unilinguals. Hence here, as for
all other aspects of unidirectional or bidirectional interference, the dif-
ference is merely quantitative – more or fewer conceptual features enter
into the constitution of a concept to match the corresponding lexical
semantic constraints.
In syntax, the differences are not in terms of more or less of a particu-
lar element, but of the use of a different parameter of a given principle –
which again does not require the postulation of a bilingual-specific
mechanism. The brain treats the “wrong” parameter – wrong in this
particular language according to the current norm – in the same way as
it would treat the correct one. If the contact between two languages is
not just individual but societal, that parameter may in fact eventually
become the correct one for the particular language. Even if we wish
to consider representations as truly qualitatively different, they never-
theless do not differ in kind from unilingual representations in their
acquisition, organization, development and functioning.
The grammars of various languages differ from each other along a con-
tinuum of limited possibilities. Some of these differences are extensive,

others are minor. Some elements are almost identical in any two given
languages. Bilingual language subsystems do not contain anything dif-
ferent from this; there is nothing specific to bilinguals. Whether one or
both of the bilingual’s language subsystems does or does not contain
items that are identical to the corresponding native system does not
make them different in nature; some deviant elements in one language
are actually legitimate in others. Nothing sets apart the bilingual lan-
guage systems except their size and actual content, though this content
is of the same type and in most cases is quantitatively derived.
The underlying mechanisms that sustain the various representations
and their processing are the same in all individuals, whichever language
or languages they speak. The only difference, for speakers with imper-
fect competence in a second, third or fourth language, is the degree
of reliance on other systems within the verbal communicative system
(metalinguistic knowledge and pragmatics) in order to compensate for
an incomplete implicit linguistic competence system – but this does not
affect the conceptual system subserved by declarative memory.
A good analogy to clarify what is proposed here might be a computer
program – say, MS Word – that underlies the typing of a document.
The program is invariable, irrespective of the characteristics of the texts
that are produced with its help. Documents may be typed in English
or German, in 10- or 14-point characters, in Times or Courier font;
parts of the text may be italicized or bolded; the text may be faultless
or riddled with typos. Nevertheless, the Word program that sustains
all the documents is the same. You may or may not actually use much
italicization of characters or a lot of underlining, but these functions
are available to you and to any user of MS Word. The texts differ only
(quantitatively) in the extent of the use of the available options.
To push the analogy a step further, let us assume that you type a text
in German, your second language. You may systematically fail to use
upper case for the initial letter of certain common nouns. Note that both
upper and lower case are available and upper case is used to a certain
extent when typing English. This is usually considered a transfer error
(an interference) that leads to an inaccurate text from the viewpoint of
standard German orthography. But all these transfers, errors and mod-
ifications are quantitative variations made possible by the underlying

processing principles of MS Word, limited only by the nature of the

program.
There is little doubt that acquiring and using a second language is
a dynamic process in which transfer, both linguistic and conceptual,
occurs continuously between the two or more languages. However,
what is involved in this dynamic process of bidirectional transfer is not
the nature of linguistic and conceptual representation and processing.
Linguistic representations remain parametric variations of phonological,
morphological, syntactic and lexical semantic principles, and concepts
continue to function along the same principles of temporary groupings
of meaningful features, giving rise to thoughts. The contents of gram-
mars fluctuate, but the principles of grammar and conceptual processing
are not affected. The same systems continue to function in the same way,
albeit with different phonological features, morphosyntactic rules and
lexical items. The difference between a unilingual and a bilingual is
akin to that between a native speaker of English and a native speaker
of Farsi: they both possess a language system and a conceptual system
that function in accordance with grammatical structures, rules, processes
and conceptual representations, respectively. In each case, what is repre-
sented and processed differs, with English grammar and English-driven
concepts in one, Farsi grammar and Farsi-driven concepts in the other,
and non-linguistic concepts in both.
In this light, total separation and total integration (Cook 2003) can
only refer to the contents of representations, not to the language system
or any module of the language system or subsystems. Neurofunctionally,
total separation would correspond to the dual system and integration to
the extended system, both of which are rejected for empirical reasons in
favor of the subsystems hypothesis (Paradis 1981, 2004).
The grammatical and conceptual transfers consist of linguistic and
conceptual material, respectively. The identity of the material may
differ, but the nature of the material (phonological, morphological,
syntactic, semantic, conceptual) is not affected. There is not a single
function or cerebral mechanism available to bilinguals that is not also
available to unilinguals; the difference is one of degree of use of the
various mechanisms as well as the form of what is represented and
processed.

What is represented varies from native speaker to native speaker of the

same language in some respects (especially at the conceptual level), from
language to language, and from unilingual to multilingual individuals.
But the difference in the latter case is no greater and is of the same kind
as the difference between native speakers of Russian and of Chinese; it
is not specific to bilingualism.
3. CO N CLU SIO N
The language subsystems are connected to a single conceptual system

where conceptual features are grouped together in accordance with the
specific lexical semantic constraints of words in each language and the
relevant pragmatic circumstances at the time of their use.
The conceptual base of a bilingual speaker’s L2 differs only quanti-
tatively from that of L1: What is represented may differ from L2 native
speakers’ representations but the principles of conceptual organization
and processing are the same as those of L1. Phonological, morpho-
logical, syntactic, lexical and conceptual modifications due to another
language and/or cultural influence bear on the contents of bilingual
speakers’ relevant neurofunctional systems, not on how these contents
are developed, represented or processed. Even modifications in the
contents of representations are often the result of quantitative changes.
The bilingual’s CUCB is larger than a unilingual’s conceptual base,
but does not differ in its structure or modus operandi. At no level of
language or conceptual functioning is there anything in bilinguals that
would involve an entity that is not available to unilinguals. There is
therefore no need to assume the existence of any kind of cerebral function
or mechanism that is specific to bilingual individuals.
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57: 1–11.

CH A PTER 2
SYNERGIC CONCEPTS IN
THE BILINGUAL MIND
Istvan Kecskes
State University of New York, Albany
Abstract
This chapter seeks answer to the following questions: How does bilingualism modify
the concept-word symbiosis? How does the meaning structure (coresense, word-specific
semantic properties (WSP), culture-specific conceptual properties) change when a close
lexico-conceptual “equivalent” from another language is added to the existing con-
struct? First, I will discuss the theoretical foundation of synergic concepts from several
perspectives. Then, I will present a part of the results of two pilot studies whose goal
was to give some empirically founded answers (however preliminary) to the questions
above.
Synergism comes from the Greek word “synergos” meaning working together. It
refers to the interaction between two or more “things” when the combined effect is
greater than if you added the “things” on their own. This is a type of “when is one plus
one greater than two” effect, that is, an enhanced combined effect.
It is hypothesized that in the mind of bi- and multilingual speakers there are synergic
concepts that are the results of conceptual blending. Bilinguals get information about
the same or similar concepts through two language channels. Because they have a com-
mon underlying conceptual base (CUCB), the blended information results in concepts
that are neither exactly equal to the corresponding L1 concept nor to the correspond-
ing L2 concept. Depending on age, socio-cultural and psychological factors, and the
stage of cognitive and linguistic development of the individual, synergic concepts may
be more or less beneficial for his or her cognitive development. Restructuring existing
knowledge belonging to a particular label (word) in the L1 under the influence of new
knowledge gained through L2 is expected to have a positive effect on the overall cog-
nitive development, although this claim has not been fully proven yet. It is important
to emphasize that synergic concepts do not mean some kind of mixture of knowledge
and/or information. They are a group of concepts that are lexicalized in both languages
but may have a somewhat different socio-cultural load in each language. In the CUCB
of proficient bilinguals the two different socio-cultural loads are blended, which results
in a conceptual domain that is not equal to the content of the conceptual domain in either
language.
29
© 2007 Springer.

30 ISTVA N K ECSK ES
1. T HE ORETICA L BA CK G RO U N D
The idea of synergic concepts derives from a cognitive pragmatic

approach to bi- and multilingualism (Kecskes 2000) that assumes that
semantic and conceptual representations are distinct levels of mental
representation governed by the principles of two separate cognitive mod-
ules, the systems of linguistic and conceptual knowledge, respectively,
and that languages in the mind have a CUCB that operates each linguistic
system.
1.1. Two-Level Approach to Semantics

One of the main theoretical assumptions for synergic concepts is rooted
in a modified two-level approach to semantics. The two-level the-
ory assumes that there is an intra-linguistic level of abstract semantic
representations distinct from the extra-linguistic level of conceptual rep-
resentations (Bierwisch 1996, 1997). As opposed to this assumption, the
one-level theory, which is predominant in cognitive and computational
linguistics, considers semantic representations as part of the conceptual
system. Syntactic representations are directly mapped onto conceptual
structures, with no separate, intra-linguistic semantic level mediating
between the two kinds of representation (e.g., Jackendoff 1983). As a
consequence, there is no distinction in principle between genuine lin-
guistic knowledge about meanings and extra-linguistic, conceptually
encoded knowledge (Herweg 1992). The two-level theory of semantic
interpretation claims that the interpretation of a linguistic expression in
a specific context of use involves the construction of a conceptual rep-
resentation constrained by the semantic representation of the expression
(e.g., Bierwisch 1996, 1997; Bibok & Németh 2001).
Semantic and conceptual representations are distinct levels of mental
representation governed by the principles of two separate cognitive mod-
ules, the systems of linguistic and conceptual knowledge, respectively.
Herweg (1992) argued that semantic representations are structured con-
figurations of semantic units which, on the one hand, are determined
by the grammatical system of the language in question and, on the
other hand, are grounded in – or motivated by – the conceptual system.
Semantic representations are abstract representations of meaning in that

SYNE R GIC C ONCEPTS IN TH E BILIN G U A L MIN D 31
they are not identical with specific conceptual interpretations which an

expression may have in a certain context of use. Instead, they constrain
the range of possible conceptual interpretations which may be contex-
tually assigned to an expression. They do so by fixing general, abstract
conditions for admissible conceptual interpretations. For instance:
(1)
Ms. Brown began the book in January and completed it by September.
The publisher was delighted to get the manuscript so soon.
It is clear that Ms. Brown began writing the book and not reading it
based on the encyclopedic knowledge and context.
Conceptual representations are structured configurations of concep-
tual units, which are mental representations of certain aspects of the
external world (cf. Herweg 1992). In the semantic interpretation of a
linguistic expression in a given context of use, they serve as contextually
specified representations of meaning. These conceptual representations
are subject to the principles of the conceptual system, which mediates
between various cognitive systems (visual, auditive, motoric, moti-
vational, linguistic, etc.). They provide the level of integration of
extra-linguistic, conceptually encoded knowledge in the course of the
semantic interpretation of an expression. Thus, while semantic represen-
tations are the unique level on which the principles of compositionality
of meaning are operative, conceptual representations are the level on
which non-compositional processes of interpretation take place.
The two-level approach is important for synergic concepts because
it offers a theory which recognizes the relative independence of the
linguistic level from the conceptual level. This will help us explain
the dual language system and the relationship between word and
concept.
1.2. Dual Language

The concept of “dual language” was put forward as an alternative
to “interlanguage” (Kecskes 2003; Kecskes & Cuenca 2005). “Inter”
means “in between”; however, the language learner is not necessarily
“in between” something; rather, s/he is in the process of changing her/his

existing conceptual and linguistic systems by adding new information

which will result in qualitative changes in the original conceptual system
and the eventual emergence of a new linguistic system that is rooted in
one and the same conceptual system. The dual language approach is
an “intake” rather than an “input” approach. It tracks changes in the
conceptual system, and investigates what happens to the knowledge that
enters the CUCB through the two or more language channels, and how
this knowledge is put to work in the respective languages.
Rather than focusing on the target language features, the dual language
approach points to the process of language system construction as a result
of conceptual changes, bidirectional influence between languages, and
movements not only up but also down the developmental continuum.
While the languages are kept separate, thoughts originating in one and
the same conceptual system are fed into two different language channels.
This has a profound impact both on production and comprehension: what
we choose to say, how we choose to say something, how we understand
things said to us, and what we consider relevant and appropriate. The
fact that there is one CUCB that operates two or more different language
channels leads to the development of synergic concepts which combine
information coming through these language channels.
2. WO RD A N D CO N CEPT
2.1. Conceptual Development

First we will have to discuss the relation between words, concepts,
and the environment. It is the environment that we observe with our
senses. Based on these sensory observations we make primary concepts
to express and store what we sense. These primary concepts are usu-
ally concrete concepts that we develop through physical experience in
the first period of our life (0–7 years or so) and label them with words
that we hear in our environment. While our physical experience in the
environment helps us develop basic concrete concepts that evolve as
we grow older, language makes it possible for us to label these concepts
and talk about them when they are not physically present. Brooks (1978)
argued that the first-language learner:

Is likely initially to acquire a concept representation based

upon a particular instance. This may be the first instance
encountered by the learner, and thus it may not necessarily be
a “best” instance. Subsequent encounters with other instances
bring about changes that may alter the stored representation
of the concept toward the direction of typicality. However,
such changes will continue to depend upon the particular
instances and situations encountered by the learner.
Because the learner does not acquire the concept at the first encounter,
several other encounters with the same concept in various contexts should
follow until the concept is firmly established in the learner’s mind. Gagne
(1977: 99) claimed that “concrete concepts that are learned by young
children are often given fuller meaning and greater precision when they
are later brought to the formal level (as defined concepts) by learning
in school.” Thus concepts in the L1 are not learned; rather, they grow.
Conceptual content constantly changes under the influence of input and
the environment. For instance “dog” indicates a concept for an animal,
which has a tail and four legs, is a mammal, a domesticated animal,
etc. The important thing is that a concept does not indicate only a group
of sensations. Of course, we have sensations related to our concept of
“dog.” However, the concept is much more than just auditory and visual
sensations. We, for instance, cannot see that a certain dog is a mammal or
that it is domesticated. These properties do not exist in the environment;
they are part of our concept for “dog” that exists only in our mind.
Based on primary concrete concepts, we elaborate all other con-
cepts. As primary concepts usually develop through physical experience,
they are normally quite well defined. However, many concepts, mainly
abstract concepts derived from other concepts, are rather imprecise.
Because more steps of generalization and abstraction are involved, they
may become more and more blurred. In Piaget’s theory, the period from
about age ten or eleven on is considered the formal operations period
when genuinely abstract mental operations can be undertaken (e.g., the
ability to entertain hypothetical possibilities).
From the perspective of synergic concepts one of the most important
things in concept development is the fact that people have different

experiences with concepts. Consequently, words denoting concepts do

not mean the same for everybody even within a relatively homogenous
speech community. Many concepts that we develop, we have not learned
by ourselves. They are concepts created when we hear a new word and
receive some kind of explanation of the concept the word stands for.
Such concepts are usually quite fuzzy. The same word will be used by
different persons to label their own concepts. Any further abstractions
and generalizations based on these fuzzy concepts will be quite vague.
This problem appears to be even more serious in the case of bilingual
development when conceptual development in the L1 is interrupted at
a certain age, and input and production are shared by L2 and L1. As
a consequence, psychological and socio-cultural factors start to play a
decisive role in conceptual development. Several studies (cf. Birman &
Trickett 2001; Persky & Birman 2005) referred to the negative effects
that may accompany the process of acculturation. They may result in
conceptual changes that lead to a poorly developed conceptual system.
2.2. Types of Concepts

Kecskes and Papp (2000) and Kecskes (2003) argued that culture speci-
ficity is already present at the conceptual level. A significant number
of concepts are culture-specific and language-specific in the sense that
they are developed through one particular language channel. The CUCB
contains common concepts, culture-specific concepts, and synergic con-
cepts. In the bilingual memory there are many common concepts that
are attached to both cultures, and the difference between them occurs
only at the lexical level. English words such as “salt,” “water,” “ocean,”
and others usually have equivalents in most other languages. Culture-
specific concepts like “tapa” and “flamenco” in Spanish, or “scones”
and “pudding” in English, have a specific socio-cultural load attached to
them. These concepts are usually not lexicalized in the other language;
rather, they are borrowed when the L2 is used. The term synergic concept
denotes a unique group of bilingual concepts which are lexicalized in
both languages but have a different socio-cultural load in each language.
In the CUCB of proficient bilinguals the two different socio-cultural
loads are blended, which results in a conceptual domain that is not equal
to the content of the conceptual domain in either language. In order for

us to understand the development of synergic concepts we will need to

review the phrase “concept symbiosis.”
2.3. Stable or Dynamic?

As a result of the thought-word interaction in actual speech produc-
tion, thought usually undergoes several changes as it turns into speech.
During this process conceptual categories (concepts) are mapped on lin-
guistic categories (words). The problem is that there is no one-to-one
relationship between concepts and words. There have been long debates
about how much autonomy a lexical unit can have. Is it just a form
which reflects the conceptual system and is filled with meaning when
it is actually used? Or does a lexical unit have some kind of auton-
omy which allows for some consistency in its semantic content and a
two-way relationship of semantics with both the conceptual level and
the lexical level involved? Or from the perspective of the conceptual
system: should concepts be considered as stable mental representa-
tions, or are they flexible, temporary, context-dependent constructions
(cf. Lamberts & Shanks 1997: 3)?
The relative consistency view may be represented by Vygotsky’s
(1962) approach. He insisted that there is a unique symbiosis between
thought and word through meaning, which is the result of their interac-
tion. He quoted O. Mandelstam: “I have forgotten the word I intended
to say, and my thought, unembodied, returns to the realm of shadows.”
(Cited by Vygotsky 1962: 119). In other words, it is thought and word
through which conceptualization and verbal formulation are united, and
thought and word are amalgamated through word meaning. Vygotsky
emphasized that the relation between thought and word is a process,
“a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from
word to thought. Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into
existence through them” (Vygotsky 1962: 125). Since thought and word
are not cut from one pattern, there are more differences than similari-
ties between them. Speakers cannot put thoughts on words directly like
ready-made units because, as Vygotsky says, “the structure of speech
does not simply mirror the structure of thought” (Vygotsky 1962: 125).
Having reviewed the relevant literature, Smith and Samuelson (1997)
came to a different conclusion. They reported that the traditional search

for constant concepts has not been successful. Several studies (e.g., Malt
1994; Smith & Sloman 1994) have suggested that acts of categorization
are not simply repeated; they actually vary. Different tasks and contexts
appear to create different categories. Barsalou (1993) demonstrated that
individual acts of categorization do not necessarily require an already
represented concept. Based on these claims, Smith and Samuelson
(1997) suggested a unified account of category stability and variability
that is not built on the notion of fixed, represented concepts.
In this chapter the word – concept relationship is understood as fol-
lows. A word (label) is a symbol that pulls together all knowledge and
information that has been connected with the use of that label. It encodes
the history of the use of that label in various situational contexts. The
amount of this knowledge and information with its fuzzy boundaries
creates what we call a concept.
A concept is a construct that blends knowledge gained from actual
situational contexts in an individual-centered way. The reason why
concepts convey relatively similar information for a particular speech
community is that community members have had relatively similar expe-
riences with the given label in language use. As Vygotsky (1962: 83)
pointed out:
word meanings evolve. When a new word has been learned
by the child, its development is barely starting: the word at
first is a generalization of the most primitive type; as the
child’s intellect develops, it is replaced by generalizations of
a higher and higher type – a process that leads in the end to
the formation of true concepts.
3. C ON TEX TU A LITY TH EO RY
3.1. No Context-free Language

The development and use of synergic concepts in bilinguals’ speech
production and comprehension can be understood in the framework of
a contextuality theory that is built on the assumption that there is no
context-free language. In order to explain this we must go back to the
two-level approach to semantics, which claims the separation of the

linguistic level from the conceptual level. This is important for synergic
concepts because this distinction gives us the chance to explain the word
(linguistic level) – concept (conceptual level) relationship. However, as
I mentioned earlier, we must modify the two-level approach because
it represents a traditional, external perspective on context. It holds that
context modifies and/or specifies word meanings in one way or another.
Context is seen as a selector of lexical features because it activates
some of these features while leaving others in the background. This
approach has led to the idea of “underspecified word meaning” that
appears in several different contemporary linguistic theories, including
Bierwisch’s (1996, 1997) two-level conceptual semantics, Pustejovsky’s
(1995) theory of the generative lexicon, and Sperber and Wilson’s (1986,
1995) relevance theory. These approaches claim that the meaning of
the lexical units is underspecified and gets conceptual specification in
context. It is argued that the specification of word meaning in context is
accomplished by conceptual shift, which “shifts” the core meaning into
various conceptual fields, and by conceptual differentiation, which only
“differentiates” the core meaning within one and the same conceptual
domain, thereby yielding literal meanings. (e.g., Bierwisch 1996, 1997;
Bibok & Németh 2001).
The contextuality theory proposed here offers a more balanced
approach in which the lexical units also function like contexts. The
information encoded in a word is the result of contextual occurrences
of the given word, so, in a way, words comprise their prior contextual
use. As a consequence, when we utter a word it will create its own
context even if it is uttered without any “context” in the traditional
sense. The dynamic behavior of human speech implies a reciprocal
process between language and situational context. People attempt to
fit their language to a situation or context that their language, in turn,
helped to create in the first place (cf. Gee 1999). The dynamic relation-
ship of lexical units and situational context means that they mutually
define and depend on each other; they both create the world and are
created by it. Lexical units encode the history of their prior contextual
use. There are no meanings that are context-free because each lexi-
cal item is always implicitly indexed to a prior recurring context(s) of
reference.

The conventional sign (lexical unit) is reproduced or “copied,” not

discovered or invented anew by each producer-processor pair. Why
is that so? Because what is encoded in a word is world knowledge,
experience with the world, or abstraction based on this experience.
Kecskes (2003) argued that world knowledge is available to interlocu-
tors in two forms: as encapsulated in lexical items based on prior
encounters and experience and as provided by the actual situational
context framed by the given situation. Actual situational meaning
is the result of the interaction of the two sides of world knowl-
edge represented by the speaker and hearer, and the actual situational
context.
Violi (2000) claimed that our experience is developed through a reg-
ularity of recurrent and similar situations that we tend to identify with
given contexts. Standard (prior recurring) context can be defined as a
regular situation that we have repeated experience with, about which we
have expectations as to what will or will not happen, and on which we
rely to understand and predict how the world around us works. These
standard (prior recurring) contexts are usually triggered by certain lexi-
cal items. When someone hears the word “meeting” without any further
context it will still create a context in the mind. This context will be
about the most frequent, familiar and conventional event encoded in
the mind of that individual. When, for instance, I hear the word “meet-
ing,” what comes into my mind first is “faculty meeting,” which is a
specific instance of the type of event the word “meeting” encodes. But
another individual may think of something else because of different prior
experience.
3.2. Prior Experience

A word encodes the history of its use in various situational contexts.
This entails that a word comprises some kind of mental summary of its
occurrences in a hierarchical order that depends on frequency, familiar-
ity and conventionality. Why is this important for synergic concepts?
In L2 use, prior experience attached to a particular label significantly
differs from that of the native speakers. When we use a second language,
prior experience with an L2 word contains the limited prior experience

with the given label as in L2, and the prior experience with the lexical
equivalent of the given L2 label in L1. For instance:
(2)
“school” – “escuela”
When a native speaker of English learning Spanish acquires the word
“escuela” as a corresponding label to the concept symbolized by the
word “school” in his mind, s/he uses the conceptual load attached to the
English word “school” even when s/he speaks Spanish. This conceptual
load may comprise the following senses:
(a) We did not go to school yesterday.

(b) John works for the School of Education.
(c) Ivy league schools are very expensive.
(d) and others.
However, in the Spanish sense (c) is missing. The following conversation
illustrates this case:
(3)
American professor: So you say you went to school at Berkeley for three
semesters.
Spanish student: No, I went to the university at Berkeley.
This conversation shows where non-native speakers usually go wrong.
Lexical level equivalency does not mean conceptual level equivalency.
The conceptual load attached to the word “school” in English and the
equivalent lexical item “escuela” in Spanish is different. Not all senses
of the English word can be found in Spanish as well. Consequently, these
labels cannot function as translation equivalents in each case. This, how-
ever, does not mean that we need to develop a new concept for “escuela”
when we learn Spanish. Rather, what we need to do is reconceptualize,
that is, modify the content of the conceptual construct that we already
have for the English word “school” in order to accommodate the new
piece(s) of information. As a result we will have a synergic concept that
differs from the English concept denoted by the label “school” and the
Spanish concept denoted by the word “escuela.” This does not mean,
however, that we have a conceptual mix; rather it is a conceptual blend.

Blending (conceptual integration) is a general cognitive operation on

par with analogy, recursion, mental modeling, conceptual categoriza-
tion, and framing (Fauconnier & Turner 1998). It is dynamic, supple,
and active in the moment of thinking. It yields products that frequently
become entrenched in conceptual structure and grammar, and it often
performs new work on its previously entrenched products as inputs.
Through completion and elaboration, the blend develops structure not
provided by the inputs. Inferences, arguments, and ideas developed in
the blend can have an effect in cognition, leading us to modify the initial
inputs and to change our view of the corresponding situations. Synergic
concepts are conceptual blends that encode the history of their prior use
represented by two or more labels (words) in L1 and L2 production and
comprehension.
4. WH AT IS IN A WO RD ?
The dynamic model of meaning (DMM) was developed by Kecskes

(2003) to explain the content and structure of lexical units. It claims
that actual contextual meaning is constructed in the dynamic inter-
play of the conceptual system (relying on prior, encoded knowledge,
blending schemes, mapping, and other cognitive operations) and the
actual contextual operations triggered by the merging of lexical units and
extralinguistic situational elements in action. The DMM (see Figure 1)
demonstrates the two faces of word (lexical unit) meaning: coresense and
consense. Coresense is a denotational, diachronic, relatively constant,
and objective feature that reflects changes in the linguistic commu-
nity, while consense is actual, subjective, referential, connotational, and
changes according to situation and actual context. In the model, a lexical
item represents world knowledge based on prior contextual experience.
It is a blend of coresense (general world knowledge about the concept),
WSPs1 (the lexicalized part of world knowledge), and culture-specific
conceptual properties (the culture-specific part of world knowledge).
4.1. Coresense
Coresense is abstracted from possible contextual occurrences of the
word. It is neither conceptual nor lexical, but the interface between

Word-specific semantic properties (WSPs)

Lexical level
A
c
t.
s
i
Consense
t
[1]
C u
o a
r t
e Consense i
s [2] o
e n
n a
s l
Consense
e [n]
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
Conceptual level
Culture-specific conceptual properties (CSCPs)

Figure 1. The dynamic model of meaning.
the two levels. Coresense is not the sum of the most essential proper-
ties of the given category, but an abstraction from the most familiar,
regular, typical, and (generally, but not always) frequent uses of a
word. Coresense is not a pure linguistic phenomenon because it depends
on extralinguistic features such as familiarity, conventionality, and
frequency. It is an essential feature of the word that brings together
conceptual semantic and lexical semantic information.
Coresense has a unique relationship with the WSP and culture-specific
conceptual properties (CSCP). WSPs link the coresense to the lexical
level while CSCPs tie it to the conceptual level. CSCPs belong to

conceptual pragmatics, while WSPs are features of the word itself,

hence are a matter of lexico-semantics.
4.1.1. Culture-specific conceptual properties As noted above, CSCPs tie

coresense to the conceptual level. They are the basis for figurative mean-
ing and the development of WSPs. CSCPs can be revealed easily if we
compare words from different languages that show lexical equivalency
but differ as to their CSCPs. For instance, let us take the concept denoted
by the word “siesta” in Spanish and “nap” in English. “Nap,” for a native
speaker of American English, refers to some sleep in any part of the day.
“Siesta,” for a Spaniard, usually denotes the afternoon period from 1:00
to 4:00 when people have lunch and take a rest including some sleep.
The coresense of the two words is relatively the same, there is no WSP
attached to either; however, they differ in CSCPs.
Not all concepts have CSCPs. For instance, the concept denoted by the
English word “salt” has hardly any CSCP, nor do its lexical equivalents
in other languages.
CSCPs are very dynamic features of words and keep changing all the
time. They are sensitive to socio-cultural changes in the given language
community. CSCPs represent the cognitive base for word meaning and
are responsible for changes in the coresense of a word and its word
specific semantic properties. When CSCPs get fully lexicalized they
turn into word specific semantic properties. This is why native speakers
of English do not have to check with the conceptual system when they
use words such as “chicken out,” “kidnap,” “blackmail,” etc.
4.1.2. Word-specific semantic properties The term “word-specific seman-

tic properties” (WSP) was coined by Cruse (1992) to denote specific
properties that belong to the lexical rather than the conceptual level.
WSPs make it possible for speakers to have alternative lexical access
routes to a single concept: for instance, “run,” “dash,” and “rush”;
or “sleep,” “doze,” and “nap.” Cruse (1992: 291) argued that cogni-
tive synonyms map onto identical concepts. The meaning properties
that differentiate such cognitive synonyms as “give up,” “capitulate,”
“surrender,” and “chicken out” can be viewed as properties of the indi-
vidual lexical units, as distinct from properties of the common concept.

WSPs include such things as emotive coloring, stylistic value, and var-
ious kinds of contextual affinities (see Cruse 1990, for a more detailed
discussion of WSPs).
WSPs are the result of the recurrent use of words in particular contexts.
Originally, WSPs are the results of the interplay of the lexical unit and
context, and they are the best evidence for category stability and vari-
ability. They usually derive from metaphors or other figures of speech,
and over time they become conventionalized. Cruse (1992) argued that
words with WSPs can create a more emotive, more “colorful” context
than words without WSPs. Compare the following sentences:
(4)
Peter gave up the race. - - - - - - - - - - -> Peter chickened out of the race.
Bob repaired the car. - - - - - - - - - - - - -> Bob fixed the car.
It should be emphasized that WSPs (i.e., “semantic loads”), just like

CSCPs, are not mandatory features that attach to each lexical unit. There
are lexical units that have neither WSPs, nor CSCPs (such as, “division,”
“example,” “depart,” etc.). Actual context can suppress CSCPs but this
is hardly the case with WSPs when they are encoded in the word, such
as, “pass away,” “chicken out,” “dash,” and so forth.
4.2. Consense
Coresense should be distinguished from consense, which is the situated,
contextual meaning of a lexical unit. Coresense is the invariant, while
consense represents the possible variants. Consense realizes a particular
aspect or aspects of the coresense by uniting it with the appropriate WSP
and/or CSCP when the word is actually uttered in a particular situation.
Figure 1 demonstrates how coresense and consense fit within the
DMM. As the diagram shows, coresense is the interface between the
conceptual and lexical level. WSPs are links to the lexical level, while
CSCPs are ties to the conceptual level. Consenses are the variations
of coresense in context. The contextual interpretation of coresense
is expressed in a consense connected to other consenses to form an
utterance.

4.3. The L1 Word-concept Symbiosis Changes When

New Information is Added Through L2
When a Hungarian learns the English word “candy,” the most obvi-
ous lexical equivalent in Hungarian is “cukorka.” Merriam-Webster
Online gives the following definition to the concept denoted by the word
“candy” in English: 1: crystallized sugar formed by boiling down sugar
syrup, 2a: a confection made with sugar and often flavoring and filling,
b: a piece of such confection. The equivalent Hungarian word covers
these meanings. However, the English word has a CSCP that is missing
in the Hungarian word. The English word also comprises “chocolate.”
So if someone looks for “chocolate” in a supermarket s/he’d better use
the word “candy,” otherwise s/he will be directed to an aisle where bak-
ing chocolate is displayed. Consequently, a synergic concept in the mind
of an English-Hungarian bilingual should contain this CSCP.
The concept denoted by the word “kick off” comes from American
football as its dictionary definition shows in Merriam-Webster Online:
1: to start or resume play in football by a placekick.
The concept’s metaphorical domain covers the following meaning:
2a: to initiate proceedings, b: to start out : begin <the movie kicks off
with a bank robbery>
The CSCP comes out in the appropriate context. Compare:
(5)
(a) Bill kicked off the ball in the direction of the forward.
(b) The president kicked off the meeting with a short speech.
Learners of English usually have problems with this concept because the
lexical equivalents of the word “kick off” in other languages (Spanish,
Hungarian, Russian, etc.) lack the CSCP the word has in English; con-
sequently they cannot be used with the same metaphorical sense. A
well-developed synergic concept in the mind of a Hungarian learner of
English should have a different metaphorical domain for the English
word “kick off” and the Hungarian world “rúg.”
As discussed earlier, WSPs usually derive from metaphors or other
figures of speech, and over time they become conventionalized. They

can be considered frozen metaphors that always have the same color of
meaning no matter how the context changes. They usually derive from
CSCPs that become lexicalized as a result of frequent recurring use. The
English phrase “chicken out” is a good example. Its original meaning is
rooted in the belief that chickens are cowardly animals. The metaphor-
ical link between the source domain and target domain can be easily
made: “cowards are chickens.” However, this metaphorical meaning
is lexicalized to the extent that nowadays no native speaker of English
will think of a chicken when s/he uses the word “chicken out.” This
does not change the fact that the word form shows its etymology very
clearly. According to the Diccionario Espasa Concise (Espasa-Calpe:
Madrid 2000), the Spanish lexical equivalent to the word “chicken out”
is “acobardarse.” The Spanish word, of course, has nothing to do with
“chicken,” because in the Spanish culture that metaphor is not lexicalized
the way it is in English.
In the mind of an English – Spanish bilingual the synergic concept
[SURRENDER] may be represented by the following lexical items (not
a full list!):
(6)
English words: surrender, capitulate, give up, chicken out, quit
Spanish words: rendir, capitular, renunciar, acobardarse, achiquitar
It is not difficult to discover that some of the lexical routes are the same
or very similar because the words come from the same Latin root such
as “capitulate – capitular,” “surrender – rendir,” “quit – achiquitar.”
However, there is no match where the words have some WSPs such as
“give up,” “chicken out,” and “acobardarse.”
5. PILO T STU D IES2
Two pilot studies were conducted to investigate the nature of synergic

concepts and find out how the word – concept symbiosis is modified
when there are two languages and cultures represented in the mind. We
focused on changes in the conceptual content of certain concepts and the
structure of words denoting those concepts. It is important to note that
the studies have several flaws including the procedures, relatively small

number of subjects, selection of concepts, translation of L1 words into

English and others. However, they still have some significance because
they have helped us identify important features of the word – concept
symbiosis.
5.1. Pilot Study 1

In this study the primary focus was conceptual content. We wanted to
find out how conceptual content is modified if subjects live in different
socio-cultural environments.
5.1.1. Data collection Our subjects were adults of ages 25–45. We had
four groups and in each of them there were six females and six males:
Group A: Bilinguals with Chinese L1 and English L2, living in the U.S.
Group B: Bilinguals with Chinese L1 and English L2, living in China.
Group C: Native speakers of American English, living in the U.S.
Group D: Native speakers of Chinese (Mandarin), living in China.
Subjects received a list of eight words belonging to different parts of

speech in English: snack, night, welcome (noun), relax, wedding, ambi-
tion, honest, proud. Out of these words we focused on four labels
(snack; night; wedding; ambition) denoting concepts that exist both in
Chinese and American English culture. We did not tell our subjects that
we focused on concepts rather than words. We used the term “word”
consistently, both in the questionnaires and in conversations with the
subjects.
In each group subjects were expected to do the following tasks:
1. Explain in writing what the given word means to you.

2. Define whether the word denoting the concept has negative, positive
or neutral connotation for you.
3. Use the word representing the concept in two sample sentences of
your choice.
The words were given to each subject in English only, with the exception
of the Chinese monolingual group where they received the translation
equivalents of the English words in Chinese.

5.1.2. Data analysis Data were analyzed from the following

perspectives:
1. Define the main aspects of concepts in each group.
2. Identify the common core (coresense) and CSCPs.
3. Define differences in understanding the concept in the different
groups.
[AMBITION]
CORESENSE: Drive to succeed, reach a goal or accomplish
something.
Culture-specific conceptual properties highlighted in the definitions and
sentences of different groups:
Monolingual English: social mobility, moving ahead
Monolingual Chinese: lofty ideas, hardship in society, buried in my
mind
Bilingual Chinese in the US: desire for success, eager to do, hardship
Bilingual Chinese in China: lofty aspiration, dream, great career
Definitions given by the subjects demonstrate that there is some dif-
ference in the culture-specific conceptual load attached to this word.
Americans usually consider “ambition” a positive thing, while for most
Chinese the word has negative connotations (Table 1). There is, how-
ever, something that we should take into account. In Chinese there are
two words for the English word “ambition”:
(7)
“ye xin” (used in derogatory meaning): a strong and wild desire to
succeed in something that is not considered positive.
Table 1. Ambition
Comparisons of connotations
12
No. of subjects
10
Positive
8
6 Neutral
4 Negative
2
0
MC BC BE ME
Ambition

“bao fu” (used positively): a strong desire for success, achievement,

power or wealth.
For the monolingual Chinese group we included only the Chinese word
with the positive connotation. In spite of this the monolingual group
mentioned mostly negative things in their definitions and sentences.
Bilingual Chinese learning English in China have the most positive
attitude to the concept. They seem to have modified their existing Chi-
nese concept reflected in the answers of the monolingual Chinese group.
It is interesting to note that bilingual Chinese living in the U.S. also show
some change in the original conceptual structure. They identify “ambi-
tion” with success but also see the negative aspects of the concept, as
their sentences and the table demonstrate.
[SNACK]
CORESENSE: Something light eaten between meals.
ME: treat or reward, make you fat
MC: girls, women have snacks, relieve hunger
BE in the U.S: relax and enjoy
BC in China: girls like snack, small food
Most subjects had a neutral attitude to the concept (Table 2). However,
the English monolingual group shows how people are divided about
the positive or negative effect of snack. It is interesting to note that in
Table 2. Snack
12
No. of subjects
10 Positive
8
Neutral
6
Negative
4
2
0
MC BC BE ME
Snack

the Chinese culture having snacks is associated with women. Both the
monolingual Chinese group and the bilingual Chinese group in China
noted this. However, the bilingual Chinese group living in the U.S.
highlighted mainly the positive side of snacking.
[WEDDING]
CORESENSE: Ceremony when two people are joined in marriage.
ME: Celebration (party), tradition, sacredness, expenses
MC: “enclosed city” (tie), giving money
BE: differences: banquet, red packet vs. rings, church
BC: differences, expenses
Just like in the other two examples there is some correlation between
the answers of the monolingual Chinese group and the bilingual Chinese
group living in China (Table 3). In the case of this concept the difference
between the two groups is minimal, which can be explained by the fact
that the word refers to a strongly conventionalized concept. The bilingual
Chinese in the U.S. have come closer to the monolingual English. They
highlighted mainly the ceremonial part of the concept.
5.2. Pilot Study 2

The second pilot study aimed to investigate the interplay between L2
and L1 in defining concepts. Words were given to students in English
Table 3. Wedding
12
No. of subjects
10
8 Positive
6
4 Neutral
2
0 Negative
MC BC BE ME
Wedding

sentences. Some of the words were given in their idiomatic use. For
instance:
(8)
After the accident Sarah decided to break up with Bob.
The police officer taught David a lesson.
Subjects were expected to read the English sentences very carefully and
write down a word or expression in their native tongue (L1) that comes
to their mind when they see the English word in that context. Two hours
later they were presented with the word selected in their L1. The subjects
were asked to write a sentence in their L1 using that particular word. We
sought answers to the following questions:
1. Will the subjects’ word selection in L1 be influenced by the heavily

biased English context? Will they choose a close lexical equivalent
in their L1 or rather they select a conceptual equivalent?
2. When subjects are presented with the L1 word selected earlier by
them, will that word create an L1 context for them, or they will
recall the English concept and come up with something similar to
that context?
5.2.1. Data collection The subjects were seventeen graduate students

with different L1s including Spanish, Korean, Chinese, Hindi and
Polish. They were all between ages 22 and 30 representing both genders.
Their level of English was above average because they all were enrolled
in a graduate class conducted in English. The following questionnaire
was used:
WHAT IS YOUR FIRST LANGUAGE? ………………………

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES CAREFULLY.
IN EACH SENTENCE THERE IS A WORD OR AN EXPRESSION
UNDERLINED.
PLEASE WRITE DOWN IN YOUR FIRST LANGUAGE THE WORD
OR EXPRESSION THAT COMES INTO YOUR MIND SEEING
THAT ENGLISH WORD IN THE SENTENCE.

Two hours later the subjects were presented with the L1 word they
selected: This is your word in L1. Please write a sentence in L1 with
this word.
5.2.2. Data analysis As in the first pilot study, subjects were given words
belonging to different parts of speech such as “credit,” “score,” “break
up,” “lesson,” “wipe out,” “nurse,” “cup,” “traffic.”
Some of the words were used in their metaphorical sense. There is no
space here to present all results so I will focus only on three concepts:
[score], [cup] and [lesson]. Subject responses in the tables will be given
in English. Although the translations were checked by several bilingual
speakers they may distort the original sense of the L1 word used by a
subject. Still, even these translations can give us some idea about how
bilingual speakers think about the given concepts.
[SCORE]
The sentence with this word “The game just started and there is no score
yet” was heavily biased for sport. We wanted to see whether speak-
ers of different languages would keep this sense of the word in their
responses.
It is clear from the responses given in Table 4 that the concept exists in
the cultures represented by the respondents. All sentences in the different
languages referred to the sport aspect of the concept, which means that
the subjects kept the sense in which the word was used in English. There
are only two exceptions: one Spanish and one Korean subject used the
concept in an educational sense. Differences occurred in the type of
sports the subjects associated the concept with. For instance, a Hindi
respondent referred to cricket scores, and a Pole mentioned football
(meaning “soccer”).
[CREDIT]
The sentence with this word “How many credits did you get?” (Table 5)
was neutral contextually. It could trigger basically any aspect of the
concept including education, sport or banking. The table shows that the
educational aspect prevailed across cultures. This may be due to the fact
that most of the respondents are or used to be students not long ago, so
they had this common prior experience.

52
Table 4. The game just started and there is no score yet

L1 Speaker 1 Speaker 2 Speaker 3 Speaker 4 Speaker 5
Spanish Word in L1: score Word in L1: points Word in L1: scoreboard Word in L1: points Word in L1: no response
Sentence in L1: Anais Sentence in L1: We Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: no
scored 3 points last don’t have enough point scoreboard of the game game finished with 13 response.
Sunday in basketball. required for the test yet. is not ready yet. points.
Korean Word in L1: points Word in L1: score Word in L1: score Word in L1: score Word in L1: score
gained Sentence in L1: I Sentence in L1: Our Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: Both
ISTVA N K ECSK ES
Sentence in L1: At the received a low grade for tennis team went up by many scores do they teams were not able to
Korean-Japanese physical education. 2 times what it was get? score.
soccer game, Koreans before.
gained one point and
won the game 1-0.
Chinese Word in L1: score/points Word in L1: score Word in L1: win points
Sentence in L1: In this Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: How
game, there is a big coach wasn’t satisfied much was the total
difference between the with the scores of the score of the game?
two scores. ball game.
Hindi Word in L1: number Word in L1: points
Sentence in L1: In what Sentence in L1: By how
number is the cricket many points did you
match? win?
Polish Word in L1: final score Word in L1: score a goal
Sentence in L1: We Sentence in L1: There is
could guess a game no score a football
score. game.
Table 5. How many credits did you get?
SYNE R GIC C ONCEPTS IN TH E BILIN G U A L MIN D

Spanish Word in L1: not given Word in L1: credits Word in L1: credits Word in L1: credits Word in L1:
Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: I need Sentence in L1: I have Sentence in L1: How credits/classes
credits at the university to get 64 credits to 49 credits at the many credits did you Sentence in L1: How
are very expensive. graduate as a chef. university. get last semester at the many classes are you
university? taking this semester?
Korean Word in L1: credits Word in L1: credits Word in L1: credit (as Word in L1: school Word in L1: school
Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: How in credit card) credits credits
many credits are you many credits are you Sentence in L1: You Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: I signed
taking this semester? taking? have to build your credit many credits have you up for 9 credits this
to get a credit card. taken so far? semester.
Chinese Word in L1: credit Word in L1: credit Word in L1: credits
Sentence in L1: I have Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: I have
completed all my many credits are you taken 12 credits.
credits. taking this semester?
Hindi Word in L1: not given Word in L1: number
Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: How
many points in this much marks did you
subject? get in your exam?
Polish Word in L1: credits Word in L1: bank credit
Sentence in L1: I got Sentence in L1: How
two credits for selling much money did the
a lot of newspapers. bank allow you to take?
53
[LESSON]
This word was used in its metaphorical sense in the following sentence:
“The police officer taught David a lesson.” (Table 6) Out of the seventeen
subjects, eight used the word in its literal sense, and the others tried to
keep the figurative sense used in the English sentence. In this case indi-
vidual learner differences play an important role because the figurative
use of the word depends mainly on the bilingual speaker’s familiarity
with this figurative sense. The absence or presence of a similar figurative
sense attached to the L1 lexical equivalent also was an important factor.
All Spanish speakers but one used an equivalent word in its literal sense,
while four out of five Korean subjects understood the figurative sense
of the word and attempted to reconceptualize it according to their L1.
6. D ISCU SSIO N
The results of the pilot studies demonstrated that the conceptual system
is, to some extent, affected by the new language. The content of existing
L1 concepts was modified when subjects lived in different socio-cultural
environments. Modification mainly occurred in the CSCPs. The second
pilot study showed that the L1 core conceptual content is strong even in
fluent bilinguals. It affects how bilingual speakers use synergic concepts,
and what aspects of the synergic concepts they highlight in language
production.
The use of synergic concepts and adjustments to the aspects of the con-
ceptual content depend on several socio-cultural and individual factors
that belong to conceptual socialization (Kecskes 2003). The develop-
ment of the CUCB goes together with conceptual socialization, which
refers to the transformation of the conceptual system that undergoes char-
acteristic changes to fit the functional needs of the new language and
culture. During the process of conceptual socialization the L1-dominated
conceptual base is being gradually restructured, making space for and
engaging with the new knowledge and information coming through the
second language channel. This leads to the gradual development of
a conscious awareness of how another culture is different from one’s
own culture, the ability to reflect upon this difference in language pro-
duction, and the development of an identity that is the reflection of

Table 6. The police officer taught David a lesson

SYNE R GIC C ONCEPTS IN TH E BILIN G U A L MIN D

Spanish Word in L1: lesson Word in L1: lesson Word in L1: lesion Word in L1: lesson Word in L1: to teach, to
Sentence in L1: Elizabeth Sentence in L1: My Sentence in L1: During Sentence in L1: I’ll educate
gave me a lesson yesterday brother takes tae the tennis game I got a help you learn the Sentence in L1: Juan’s
after school. kwon do lessons. leg injury [lesion]. lesson. mother punished him.
Korean Word in L1: to discipline, Word in L1: class, Word in L1: warning Word in L1: discipline Word in L1: lecture
teach a lesson lesson Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: That
Sentence in L1: You learn Sentence in L1: It is teacher gave him a police officer was teacher’s lecture was
to not play with matches something you learn warning. disciplining David. great.
only after burning through class
yourself. Only personal experience.
experience teaches you a
lesson.
Chinese Word in L1: give a lesson Word in L1: lessons Word in L1: give a
Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: The lesson
parents’ ideas about teacher gave a lesson Sentence in L1: That
educational opportunities to the whole class policeman is scolding
gives the child a good strictly. the pedestrian who
lesson. violated the law.
Hindi Word in L1: education Word in L1: to teach
Sentence in L1: Children a lesson
go to school to get an Sentence in L1: Good!
education. He learned his lesson.
Polish Word in L1: moral Word in L1: a lesson
lesson Sentence in L1: I have
Sentence in L1: This been taking an English
time I didn’t get a ticket, class lately.
55
I got a lesson.
the dual culture. Examples in the first pilot study demonstrated that
bilingual Chinese subjects modified their perception of the concepts
“ambition,” “snack,” and “wedding.” They were ready to amalgamate
American cultural information with existing Chinese understanding of
the concepts.
I use the term “conceptual socialization” to distinguish the pro-
cess from “language socialization,” (cf. Ochs 1988; Willett 1995;
Mitchell & Myles 1998) which has its roots in anthropological linguis-
tics. Language socialization research represented by a number of studies
(cf. Ochs & Schieffelin 1984; Ochs 1988; Willett 1995; Platt & Trudi
1997) emphasizes that language and culture are inseparable because they
are acquired together: each supports the development of the other. Ochs’
and Schieffelin’s work has focused on L1 development. There are very
few studies that extend the paradigm to second language acquisition (i.e.,
Willett 1995; Platt & Trudi 1997). Willett (1995) conducted a longitudi-
nal study with young classroom learners of ESL in an elementary school
with an international intake. Based on her results she argued that lan-
guage socialization is a complex process in which participants construct
and evaluate shared understandings through negotiation. This process
leads to changes not only in their identity but also in social practices.
Conceptual socialization broadens the scope of the paradigm of lan-
guage socialization, which has its main focus on language developmen-
tal issues. Conceptual socialization differs from language socialization
in that it emphasizes the primacy of mental processes in the symbiosis of
language and culture, and aims at explaining the bidirectional (or tri- or
x-directional) influence of the two or more languages in bi- and multi-
lingual development. The process of conceptual socialization is strongly
tied to the emergence of the CUCB that is responsible for the operation
of two language channels. New knowledge and new information are
processed through existing knowledge. The language learner can pick
up a word or a fixed expression as a functional unit based on observa-
tions of use. What s/he cannot pick up, however, is the “load,” the CSCP
that that expression may carry. This fact is crucial for the development
of synergic concepts. Conceptual socialization has two sides which are
inseparable: a skill side and a content side. They are two sides of one
and the same phenomenon. Synergic concepts are connected with the

content side. The skill side means that conceptual socialization will be
reflected in the actual language skills: structural well-formedness, lan-
guage manipulation, sentence structuring and lexical quality. Changes
in both sides are qualitative rather than quantitative. The skill side of the
conceptual socialization process is measurable (Kecskes & Papp 2000,
2003). Changes in the content side, however, can hardly be measured.
They are qualitative changes in the content of what the language learner
says and the way the language learner behaves in communication.
In the first pilot study bilingual Chinese speakers’ attitudes to con-
cepts such as “ambition,” “snack,” and “wedding” differed from that
of monolingual speakers. They used the concepts slightly differently in
their sentences as well. The second pilot study demonstrated that there
is no full correlation between language proficiency and conceptual flu-
ency. The dominance of L1 in the conceptual content of words was very
strong even in bilinguals with advanced language proficiency. Knowl-
edge may be blended and present in synergic concepts; however, it does
not mean it is used in a native-like way. This is where synergic concepts
are tied with conceptual socialization. Synergic concepts make it possi-
ble for speakers to sound native-like if they wish to, because they have
developed the conceptual knowledge native-like language use requires.
The question is whether they really want to sound native-like. This is,
however, another issue that I do not wish to discuss here.
7. CO N CLU SIO N
This chapter argued that in the mind of bi- and multilingual speakers
there are synergic concepts that are the results of conceptual blending.
Synergic concepts are notions that are lexicalized in both languages but
have a different socio-cultural load in each language. In the CUCB of
proficient bilinguals the two different socio-cultural loads are blended.
This may result in a conceptual domain that is not equal to the content
of the conceptual domain in either language.
The development of synergic concepts is the result of conceptual
blending which is the driving force of the development of any concepts.
Conceptual blending is not a bi- or multilingual phenomenon. It occurs in
the mind of monolingual speakers as well. However, there is significant

difference between monolingual and bilingual synergic concepts from

the perspective of what is actually blended. It was argued that words
encode prior experience. All information relevant to their use is blended
in the concept that is mapped on its label (word). What makes bilingual
and monolingual conceptual development different is the nature and con-
tent of information that is blended. In the case of monolinguals concepts
grow in the socio-cultural environment the given language community
has created for itself. Additional knowledge and information derives
from this socio-cultural environment, which usually results in a kind
of fusion of “old” and “new” incoming knowledge. This is, however,
not the case with bilingual concepts that are attached to a particular
label(s) in L1 and a particular close “equivalent” in L2, and represent
two different socio-cultural backgrounds and environments to different
extents. When we use a second language, prior experience with an L2
word contains the limited prior experience with the given label as in
L2, and the prior experience with the lexical equivalent of the given L2
label in L1. Because knowledge and information come from two differ-
ent socio-cultural backgrounds that often contradict rather than match
each other (different CSCPs) we can hardly speak about full fusion here.
Blending rarely results in fusion in bilingual concepts because the con-
stituents usually keep independence to some extent, which depends on
the exposure to the two languages and cultures.
Languages influence each other reciprocally. When we have a syner-
gic concept in the CUCB, no matter whether we use the L1 label(s) or
L2 label(s) that can denote that concept, we always have access to con-
ceptual information that differs to a particular extent both from the L1
concept and the L2 concept (see “school” vs. “escuela” example above.)
Paradis (in this volume) wrote about this phenomenon as follows: “With
prolonged language contact, concept boundaries may change so that L1
words no longer activate their original conceptual meanings, but incor-
porate some or all conceptual features of their L2 equivalents. Semantic
constraints on the use of L1 words become blurred. Faux-amis from L2
will creep into L1; For example, an English speaker living in a French
environment will call a lecture a conference …”
I argued that concepts encode contexts. Their boundaries are fuzzy
because blended information attached to them is in a constant state of

flux. The bilingual mind is exposed to more “pressure” in this respect

than the monolingual mind. Further research is needed to clarify the
processes that are responsible for the development and use of synergic
concepts.
N O TES
1. I am using Cruse’s (1992) term here.

2. I am much obliged to my students Saihua Xia, Jing Lei, Xiaojing Lee, Julia Coryell,
and Susan Nesbitt-Perez taking my doctoral seminar in the spring of 2005. They
helped me a lot with data collection.
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CH A PTER 3
MATRIX: SCHEMATIC UNIVERSALS.

HOW MANY MIN DS DOES A BILINGUAL HAVE?
Liliana Albertazzi
University of Trento, Italy
Abstract
None of the current reflection on language universals analyzes the categorial question
from the point of view of the ontological levels of reality. The levels of the cogni-
tive processing of information and its linguistic expression are sometimes discussed,
but not the ontological levels of reality, probably because of the “linguistic” ver-
sion of ontology as a simple theory of descriptions which predominated in the last
century. This chapter underlines the structural difference among different kinds of cat-
egories, avoiding the errors that may derive from imprecise delimitation of their roles.
As to ontological categories, the analysis emphasizes the difference between general
ontological categories and regional ontological ones. Finally, the chapter shows that
“recognizing” an item does not mean, by default, applying a taxonomic category or a
base category. On that basis, a proposal is made of experiments verifying the existence
of presentative pathologies, that is, pathologies occurring at the very base format of
representations.
1. POE T RY RESEM BLES PA IN TIN G S?
The relationship between ontology, categorization, and linguistic exp-

ression is still an open question. It requires the analysis of too many
variables relative to the dynamic nature of information, where a cer-
tain role, as a Kantian “regulatory idea,” is also performed by the
epistemological paradigm that predominates at a particular time.
The issue becomes even more complex when considered in light of
bilingualism or multilingualism, given that in this case account must be
taken of an additional variable. In fact, while it is already difficult to
analyze the connection between reference and conceptualization in the
case of a monolingual, it is even more so in that of a bi- or multilingual,
where the analyst must consider a variety of forms of conceptualization
63
© 2007 Springer.

64 L ILIA N A A LBERTA ZZI
sometimes in conflict with each other, and which may affect both the
reference and the conceptualization.
Moreover, this greater complexity cannot be explained by simply
adding additional categories. The conflict may come about at several
levels, for instance when growing up monolingual and then learning
a second or third language; learning implicitly and explicitly; being
brought up bilingual; acquiring different types of language, for exam-
ple, a spoken language and a sign language (on the development of
Creole sign languages see Pinker 1994; Golden-Meadow et al. 1995;
Emmorey 2004). The conflict may also concern different components of
bilingualism, like proficiency, fluency, forms of low and elite bilingual-
ism, individual pragmatic abilities, and emotional motivations. Finally,
the conflict may arise not only on aspects of conceptualization rela-
tive to specific grammatical bases (Pavlenko 1999) but even within an
alternative general paradigm, such as the ones underlying the Western
languages or the Asiatic languages (On this type of bilingualism see
Wei 1994; Noguchi & Fotos 2000; Shin & Milroy 2000; Mishina-Mori
2005), with the further variant of bilinguals who live, for example, in
highly industrialized Western contexts, or vice versa.
Analysis of bi- and multilingualism has a crucial problem to solve:
determining how conceptual representations are organized on the basis
of two or more conceptual systems with differing degrees of relational
complexity (Clark 2005). Put more concisely: is the mind of a bilin-
gual or multilingual different from the mind of a monolingual (On this
topic see De Groot et al. 1997. See also Hakuta 1986. On the effect of
L2 on L1 see specifically Kecskes & Papp 2000 and Kecskes in this
volume).
2. C AT E GORIZATIO N IN A SIA N A N D
W E ST E R N CU LTU RES A N D LA N G U A G ES
Recent studies in social psychology have sought to identify the

conceptual paradigms that underlie two different cultures: that of Asia
and that of the West. It seems that, while Westerners categorize accord-
ing to the classical Aristotelian procedure of membership in classes and
difference by genus and species, Asians rely on the concept of resonance

MAT R IX: SCH EMATIC U N IV ERSA LS 65
between social forms and self-understandings on the one hand and

the philosophical assumptions and scientific approaches on the other
(Munro 1985; Nisbett 2003: 27–28). The Tao Te Ching is expressly
contrary to the implausibility and defectiveness of the taxonomic cate-
gorization which obstinately distinguishes and restricts the meanings of
terms and attributes. The only valid ontological categorization for the
Asian mentality, in fact, seems to be that between part and whole which
is intrinsically bound up with the concept of relation.
Then, while Westerners distinguish and categorize mainly in terms
of objects, properties and shapes, Asians categorize mainly in terms of
stuff or continuity of matter – in other words, in terms of a generalized
holism which often retains ancient animistic elements profoundly rooted
in the Asian vision of the world (Nisbett 2003: 148).
The essential difference between the two cultures would therefore
reside in the categorization of the surrounding environment into objects
by Westerners, and into relations by Asians, and respectively into sets of
properties and qualitatively salient aspects. The difference is immedi-
ately apparent in Western and Asian languages (which may privilege
the use of nouns or verbs, or which mark generic nouns by syntax
or by contextual and pragmatic cues, etc.), in the manner in which
they are learned, and in the categorial attitudes that derive from them.
Experiments in developmental psychology with American and Chinese
children show the existence of a diverse preference in categorization.
For example, on the basis of the presentation of triplets like a cow, a
chicken, and a bunch of grass, Chiu found that theAmerican children pre-
ferred to group objects because they belonged to the taxonomic category
(cow, chicken), whereas Chinese children preferred to groups objects
on the basis of their thematic relationship (the cow eats the grass) (Chiu
1972; see also Norezayan et al. 2002; Nisbett 2003: 140–148). West-
ern children, for example, learn the meaning of a category expressed
in substantival form as a set of objects which share certain properties
denoted by the corresponding noun. This induces them to pay partic-
ular attention to individual features in order to form further categories
based on sets of similar properties. The same applies to the creation of
abstract objects from properties through the use of suffixes (“goodness,”
“happiness,” etc.). Asian children belatedly learn to categorize objects

because they are primarily oriented to categorizing relationships among

objects which have concrete properties and interact with circumstances
connected with the environment. In Asian languages, moreover, because
words have multiple meanings in more instances than words in Western
languages, the context is even more crucial for the understanding of
sentences.
The two types of categorization have considerable consequences in
logic, in linguistics (context, role and limits of the various types of defini-
tional or prototypical categorization, role of the principle of the excluded
third), in the experimental sciences (how to conceive an experiment and
how to interpret the data), and in multi-analysis (how to construct a
conceptual space which comprises the many potential points of view on
certain items of entities).
In principle, one might hypothesize that there may be consequences
not only for contents but also for the processes underlying the concep-
tualization of someone who speaks more than one language, especially
if the languages are of very different geographical and cultural prove-
nance, and which may configure entirely different “minds.” Verification
of this hypothesis, which obviously has a close bearing on one of the
central concerns of cognitive science, can be undertaken by inquiry of
various kinds: from science of the brain, to experimental analysis of
mental contents in the laboratory, to epistemological investigation.
There remains the structural aspect of a language consisting in the
pragmatics of communication, which applies to both monolinguals and
multilinguals. As Marty observed, referring to the “internal constructive
form” of a language:
No language explicitly expresses everything that we want
to communicate; each of them resembles a stenograph or a
sketch. There is always a certain difference, often a consid-
erable one, between on the one hand what the speaker thinks
and feels and the listener must equally think and feel, and on
the other, what is expressed (Marty 1976: 145).
Here I shall not deal with the functionalist aspects and the communica-
tive function of language (Bühler 1934; Vygotsky 1962). Rather, I shall
focus on forms of reference and designation (bezeichnen).

From a philosophical point of view, the question of categorization

highlighted by the above-mentioned research on the differences between
Western and Asiatic languages can be framed as follows:
1. Of the two prevalent modes (taxonomic and relational), only
one (the taxonomic mode) has ontological value, because it con-
cerns “objective” features of reality, while the other one does not.
This conception has dominated Western epistemology for several
centuries.
2. The two modes are simply points of view, local conceptualizations
without ontological value derived from the specific development
of a culture over time. In this sense, they are conceptual cate-
gories, lacking only historical-cultural reconstruction of the context
of origin. Comparison with other forms of categorization in other lan-
guages therefore relates to social and/or anthropological comparative
analysis, and their choice and/or use for pragmatic and functional
purposes.
3. Both modes are valid categorial options: they comprise a universal
(ontological) principle, and they hold at different levels of complex-
ity. In this case, their ontological “typicality” must be explained: if
the modes refer to different levels of reality, so that de jure one does
not exclude the other; in what terms does their ontological relevance
obtain de facto?
3. ISSU ES FO R D ISCU SSIO N
Between these extremes are the two conceptions dominant in linguistic

analysis: innatism and relativism (Dirven, Verspoor 1998: Chapter 6).
Regarding the innatist conception, the more natural forms of innatism
turn into Platonism, and rationalist and idealist variants of it (Prinz 2005:
688–689), but they may equally well merge with syntactic generativism
if they are referred to base capacities and structures (Chomsky 1981).
From this latter point of view, innatism – which first arose from phys-
iological studies after sparking renewed interest in the early stages of
cognitivism – is today of particular interest to the brain sciences (see
Jackendoff 2003: Chapter 4). The relativist theory instead emphasizes

that the structural diversity of languages is due to their different cultures

of provenance. Whorf writes:
We are thus induced to a new principle of relativity, which told
that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence
to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic
backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated
(Whorf 1956: 214).
Accepting this principle has important consequences, because:
It will be found that it is not possible to define “event, thing,
object, relationship” and so on, from nature, but that to define
them always involves a circuitous return to the grammati-
cal categories of the definer’s language (Whorf 1956: 215,
Emphasis added).
In other words, ontological categories do not exist. On careful consid-
eration, however, the matter is not so simple, for various reasons. First,
one must ask whether the relativist theory does not allow for ontological
reference even if it is not directly connected with physiology (consider
the third of the above categorization options). Second, the diversity of
linguistic forms may concern external forms like suffixes or prefixes:
as evident, for example, when there is a parallelism between the form
of the expression and the thought expressed (Mensch, des Menschen) or
when the same content is expressed in different ways (hominis/de Men-
schen). However, the diversity of linguistic forms also stems from inner
parameters of differentiation between reference and conceptualization.
This involves the so-called inner linguistic form (Marty 1976), which
holds in two ways: (i) in situations where there is no parallelism between
form of thought and the concept expressed, as in the case of impersonal
expressions, and aspect which concerns the word form: and (ii) in the
choice of different methods of designation, ranging from onomatopoeia
to metaphor.
The inner linguistic form is figural, because it uses images, mostly of
perceptive origin, as collateral representations (“wavering of judgment,”
“shaken persons,” “neither here nor there” or “keel” for ship) and thus
characterizes a prevalent mode of designation by a particular language

(Marty 1916–1920 II: 1–67). In those occurrences, the names arouse the
same concept, choosing different means to lead toward it. Briefly, the
images or the imaginative content can change, but the meaning (i.e., the
way in which the object is intended) does not. The internal linguistic
form of a linguistic sign is then a psychic component of the sign itself
(see Apresjan 1974; Violi 1997: 8.5.2).
When these modes of referring are lexicalized, they make desig-
nation possible without the original relationship having constantly to
be reiterated: this is the case of lexicalized metaphors, which do not
exist in all languages and may not have a shared meaning, therefore
cannot be “translated.” The problem of the inner linguistic form is con-
sequently of particular importance when two or more reference systems
interact – that is, in bi- and multilinguals – because meaning may be
activated at all these levels of inner and outer form of the two or more
languages.
The innatist and relativist theories have been put forward in several
variants and with differing degrees of radicalness. The problem is that
linguistic analysis sometimes combines innatist claims (the existence of
universal parameters) with relativist assumptions. In numerous authors,
universal structures of taxonomic categorization (variously understood
as necessary and sufficient conditions in componential semantics, lists of
distinctive classes, syntactic and/or formal structures) coexist with pro-
totypical universals that have little to do with them. This may be evidence
for the third ontological option in categorization, namely the ontological
value of different types of categorization and different ontological levels
of reality.
The same situation is apparent in Lakoff’s work, where image-
schemata (like “container”) are tied to perceptive invariants which are
prevalently visual/sensomotorial, and therefore universal, but ample
recognition is given to the anthropocentrism and cultural relativism of
the types of conceptualization, as in the case of the radial categorization
of the Dyrbal (Lakoff 1997: 6). However, as shown in categorization
of terms by multilingual speakers, the semantic categories conveyed
by word meanings do not all map in the same way onto the conceptual
categories in specific domains (containers, e.g.) (Clark 2005: 460–461).
Moreover, radial categories are actually a description of the semantic

organization of polysemic lexemes (i.e., linguistic categories), and not

categories in the prototypical sense (i.e., conceptual categories) (Kleiber
1990: 174; see Violi 1997: 6.12).
From a philosophical point of view, in addition to the innatism/
relativism option, the mind/language/reality relationship comprises a
further aspect, namely the direct or mediated relationship between lan-
guage and reference: that is, whether language refers directly to states
of affairs in the world (Wittgenstein’s hypothesis in the Tractatus) or
whether it must pass through the medium of conceptualization. If con-
ceptualization is viewed as the non-eliminable medium for reference,
the question arises as to whether the cognitive processes can be modi-
fied by the semantic contents of a language’s lexicon. This point, too, is
of obvious importance in the case of bi- and multilinguals.
Here, I shall not seek to furnish a definitive solution for the prob-
lem of the relation between reference, categorization, conceptualization
and linguistic expression. Rather, as a philosopher, I shall stress
certain categorial elements connected with the problem of language
universals. These are elements which I consider important for inter-
pretation of empirical linguistic data, and which may therefore also
assist analysis of more complex conceptual configurations, like those
of bi- and multilingualism. On the basis of a categorial restructuring
of the question, in the conclusions I shall also put forward a working
hypothesis.
My analysis, as opposed to a formalistic one, will be based on a cog-
nitive approach to natural language (Albertazzi 2000a) similar to the
theses of cognitive linguistics, but with some distinctions connected to
the categorial structure of the framework. I agree with the contention of
cognitive linguistics that the only strong argument in favor of universals
consists in identifying the structures of the world which are transposed
into natural language. However, in that area of inquiry, despite declara-
tions in favor of phenomenology, these invariants (e.g., image schemata)
are directly traced back to the material world and/or to the brain. My
hypothesis that the transposition occurs at a different level of organiza-
tion of information and that only indirectly can it be traced back to the
other levels mentioned, in this case, the existence of universals, springs
from a different conception of ontology.

4. AN ALT E R NAT IVE A PPRO A CH TO CATEG O RIZATIO N
4.1. Categories
I am aware that the linguist is specifically interested in the dynamics of
lexical areas in which categories are placed within a system, and the way
in which they oppose and boundary themselves according the constraints
imminent to the system itself. A scholar in bi- and multilingualism
is consequently interested in eventual superposition and interference
between the different configurations of semantic areas. Strictly speaking,
the problem of ontological categorization is a philosophical problem.
However, the two questions interrelate and my aim is to disentangle
some of the interrelated problems.
The current discussion on language universals fails to analyze the
categorial question from the point of view of the ontological levels of
reality. The levels of the cognitive processing of information and its
linguistic expression (Levinson 2003) are sometimes discussed, but not
the ontological levels of reality, probably because of the “linguistic”
version of ontology as a simple theory of descriptions which predom-
inated in the last century (Quine 1969; Putnam 1975; Bickerton 1981,
1984). In my analysis I shall stress the structural difference between cat-
egories, avoiding the errors that may derive from imprecise delimitation
of their roles. Moreover, I shall emphasize the difference between gen-
eral ontological categories and regional ontological ones. Finally, I shall
show that “recognizing” an item does not mean, by default, applying a
taxonomic category or a base category.
In the classical Aristotelian classification, the categories are univer-
sal classes of being which can be affirmed or predicated of any object.
They entail a pre-established organization like that by proximate genus
and specific difference (Categories 5: 2a). In the Aristotelian table of
categories, therefore, “category” has a twofold meaning: (i) that of the
genera of predication, the column of predicates expressing the same
meaning; and (ii) that of the summum genus, the predicate that defines
the common feature of each column. In the category “zebra,” for exam-
ple, the substance expresses what the thing is, the quality of how it is,
the time and space when and where it is, etc. The determination of a sub-
ject is predicated by an inherence relationship. The categories therefore

(i) are predicamenta, (ii) have “grammatical genesis,” and (iii) possess
“ontological value”.
As we have seen, the Aristotelian category has ontological value, but
it has subordinate features as well. The “logical” aspect of categories,
for example, resides in the fact that they are the highest predicates; and
the “linguistic” aspect resides in their grammatical genesis, that is, in
the fact that the predicates are extrapolated from propositions and then
analyzed in themselves or in their primary dimension. In short, starting
from Aristotle’s position, categories can be interpreted in three ways:
(1) categories with lexical terms (semantic interpretation) (Trendelen-
burg 1833);
(2) categories as concepts, supreme predicates (logical interpretation)
(Apel 1963);
(3) categories as real determinations (ontological interpretation)
(Bonitz 1853).
One may argue that the categories merely furnish the predicative frame-
work within which to locate certain predicates, a sort of location for
the species of the predication. In other words, the categories are points
of view with which to classify the concepts that distinguish between the
objects of thought, corresponding to which are various kinds of state-
ment (Zeller 1859: 68). In modern terms, a conception like this would
allow graded or partial category membership.
One may argue that analysis of the grammatical differences between
the categories shows that they are concepts, not forms of statements or
manners of predicating concepts. However, they are not concepts in the
sense of mere mental representations but instead in their relation to the
judgment, insofar as they are the predicate. They express logical rela-
tionships (Trendelenburg 1833). For example, the category of substance
has its grammatical genesis in the substantive, those of quantity and qual-
ity in the adjective, that of relation in comparison, those of where and
when in the adverbs of place and time, those of doing and undergoing
in the active and passive forms of verbs, that of posture in the perfect
tense (for intransitive verbs). However, not all parts of the discourse
(e.g., the article) have a correspondent category. Then, on the basis of
the same language diverse ontologies can be framed (think of Plato and

Aristotle). The reference of grammar to ontology, consequently, has to

be taken with caution.
Finally, one may consider the categories as real concepts, but deny
that they are merely predicates, or that the table of categories is designed
with merely logical and grammatical relations in mind. Categories, then,
are not definable either in relation to mental representations or on the
basis of logical-grammatical relationships as mere predicates (Bonitz
1853; Brentano 1975). This point of view affirms that the categories
are therefore the summa genera denoted by the term being (on), and
they provide us with orientation in the sphere of experiential data
by expressing simple concepts. In other words, the categories have
ontological value.
However, the three above-mentioned variations are partially com-
patible. Even when the third point of view, the ontological one, is
adopted, the other valences intrinsic in the concept of “category” imply
that considering the categories as points of view in the division of the
species, and/or taking them to be only locations for certain predicates,
may be a prevalently figural mode of expression. Additionally, in the
neo-Aristotelian framework given to the categories by Brentano, their
ontological and therefore universal value is primary (Brentano 1975).
The argument that the categories are general concepts with which a
mind and/or a language group represents its thoughts and judgments –
the concept of category with relativist value dominant in cognitive
science – therefore admits various levels of interpretation which should
not be lumped under a single heading. In other words, the fact that the
categories can also stand as a particular community’s points of view
does not exclude their ontological value.
The problem is distinguishing between universal categories which
hold for all the domains (like space, time, substance, accident, part,
whole) and categories which relate to specific domains (e.g., law, eco-
nomics, representation, etc.). Another problem is that of determining
what is meant by the universal character (and its extent) of the cate-
gories, doing so independently and alongside their relativist, local nature
as points of view relative to specific conceptualizations of languages.
Asecond point relevant to categorial analysis is the difference between
general ontological categories and regional ontological categories (to

use Husserl’s terminology): that is, those categories which concern par-
ticular domains of reality like the mind, language, society (Hartmann
1935; Husserl 1970, 1982; Poli 2002). In other words, the ambit of
linguistic reference comprises a general invariant categoriality which
concerns the existent as such, and a specific categoriality relative to
the realm of reference comprising the cognitive and social processes
that give rise to language. From this latter point of view the categories
are necessarily mixed, because they relate to categories of perceptive
type (e.g., sensory schemata functionally transposed into a language’s
cognitive grammar), of psychological type (figural contents, auxiliary
representations, and linguistically expressed mental contents), and of
social type (specific elaboration of the conceptualization and grammar
of languages reflecting cultural factors in the broad sense, which may
greatly differ). Consequently, there is no single meaning of “category”
but different senses of the term referring to its diverse valences.
When pronouncing in favor of an innatist or relativist account of
language, therefore, it is important to make use of the proper and non-
synonymous senses of the term “category.” This is of special importance
for analysis of conceptualization in bi- and multilinguals, and it may have
consequences on the cultural organization of a society which comprises
linguistic minorities.
As mentioned, one may also have to pronounce simultaneously in
favor of the universal and relativist value of the categories, but without
lapsing into contradiction. I will now clarify this point.
4.2. Reference
As Greenberg observed in his well-known papers on universals:
The problem of universals in the study of human language as

in that of human culture in general concerns the possibility
of generalizations which have their scope all languages or all
cultures. The question is whether underlying the diversities
which are observable with relative ease there exist valid gen-
eral principles. Such invariants would serve to specify, in a
precise manner, the notion of “human nature” whether in lan-
guage or in other aspects of human behaviour. They would, in

effect, on the lowest level correspond to the “empirical gener-

alization” of the natural sciences. On higher levels they might
be dignified by the name of laws. The search for universals,
therefore, coincides on this view with the search for laws of
human behaviour, in the present context more specifically
those of linguistic behaviour. (Greenberg 2005: 9)
The theories that have been advanced on the existence of universals
and specifically on the “mind/language/reality” relationship have varied
from a minimum/maximum of nominalism to a minimum/maximum of
realism. But the distinctive aspect of the question is that apparently
similar conclusions have been reached from very different ontological
premises. I will briefly review some crucial components of the question.
Boetius, in his commentary on Porphirius (Boethius 1906), for-
mulated the realist and conceptualist positions on “the question of
universals”:
1. Universals exist as, for example, the substantial form or common
nature of the things (realism). In this case, ontological universals
and semantic universals coincide: general names signify species or
genera.
2. Universals are abstractions, constructions of the mind (conceptual-
ism). Conceptualism is per se a semantic theory, not an ontological
theory of universals.
Specifically, conceptualism maintains that the mental representation of
a category consists of properties which are common and unique to the
items in the category; each property is therefore individually necessary
for category membership.
A third position between the above two is nominalism. This maintains
that:
1. There exist only individuals and individual events (i.e., species, sets,
general properties, etc. are not mind-independent).
2. Representations signify individuals (they refer to singular things)
determined by the place, space and part of matter that they occupy.
3. Universals are singular things, and they are such only by signification
(they are signs of several things).

4. Universals are not mental images, but signs.

5. Universals have an intentional structure; they are acts of intuitive
(i.e., non-conceptual) reference to an object (Formigari 2002: 4.5).
Briefly, universals are not realities as such, but ways of signifying. What
is sensorially given becomes intelligible through a process of construc-
tion due to the intentional reference. Generality, then, is not a mode of
being but a semantic feature (see Panaccio 2005).
In nominalism, therefore, conceptualizations are ontologically
founded on a specific entity, the individual existent bearing the repre-
sentation. In other words, it is only in the structure of the act of intuitive
reference – of which the individual is the existential bearer – that one
should seek an ontological foundation for the invariants of categoriza-
tion. All the rest depends on the context and on the generality of the
representation.
The problem is how the foundation of reference should be defined.
Because reference is structurally connected to individual existence, it
might be argued that it must be eminently “subjective” and situated, in
that it is tied to the contingency of the existent. A solution to the problem
has been offered by Brentano, who argues that:
1. The sole ontological foundation is given by the “who” that self-
represents an object of some kind but is also a psychophysical system
rather than a more complex individual (an Ego).
2. Although general, a representation follows structural modes of
information organization which are primarily temporal and struc-
tural, and secondarily contentual. They are neither substantial forms
nor concepts.
3. Consequently, generality is a feature of representation (not an
ontological characteristic); however, representation’s structure is
universal.
However, here an important change has been made to classical nomi-
nalism. The structure of the space/time of the intentional reference no
longer coincides with physical space/time: rather, it is the space/time of
consciousness, which emerges at the primary and secondary levels of
conceptualization and differs from the structures of the physical world

because it is figural in character. This notion has been well expressed

by Wertheimer when discussing the nature of perception:
I stand at the window and see a house, trees, sky. Theoreti-
cally I might say there were 327 brightnesses and nuances of
colour. Do I have 327? No. I have sky, house, and trees. It
is impossible to achieve “327” as such. And yet even though
such droll calculation were possible – and implied, say, for
the house 120, the trees 90, the sky 117 – I should at least
have this arrangement and division of the whole, and not,
say, 127 and 100; or 150 and 177. (Wertheimer 1938: 71)
The qualities of visual, acoustic, tactile, olfactory, and intermodal rep-
resentation of the phenomenal field are always somewhat sloppy, in
fact. As a consequence, they are not immediately codifiable in terms of
angular degrees or wavelengths of color. Nor are they immediately cod-
ifiable in terms of mathematical invariants, that is, primitives which do
not change in transformations; nor in terms of the non-accidental prop-
erties of the computational theory of vision. These measures can only
be used to define the stimulus. Instead, apprehended in representation,
are general qualities; these being the simple, essential structural char-
acteristics of the items observed pertaining to a perceptive space with
specific features. Additionally, these qualities have the marked tertiary
and emotional valence of affordances. For example, rather than the “sun”
as such, what we apprehend is “brightness,” “warmth,” “yellowness,”
etc. (see Metzger 1941; Cornelius 1990; Albertazzi 1995).
The characteristics of the space/time of representation can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. It is eminently “topological” (consider the deformations that occur in
so-called perceptual illusions) (Lipps 1879; Koffka 1935; Brentano
1988; Albertazzi 2006a), continuous and durational (James 1950).
2. It is qualitative: in fact perceptive phenomena have their own laws
of figural organization (Wertheimer 1938).
3. It has non-metric representational units in that it is made up of neither
points nor instants but a homogeneous coalescence of the spaces
of the various items, where all perceived things and processes are

located (see also James 1950 II: Chapter 4; Pöppel & Logothetis
1986; Pöppel 1994; Albertazzi 2002a).
Specifically, in what laboratory research calls the “time of presentness,”

that is, the time of the actual presentation, physical data are altered qual-
itatively, which means that the objects triggered by the stimuli undergo
structural reorganization. The complexity of this reorganization is well
exemplified, for example, by phenomena of temporal and spatial dislo-
cation (Benussi 1913; Vicario 1970; Albertazzi 1999), which show that
the phenomenal level is not reducible to the physical level, and that in
perception qualitative factors of grouping prevail over quantitative ones.
However, this conception does not fit easily with the merely psy-
chophysical account of perception still dominant in cognitive science.
The latter is a theory of measurement devices in its turn connected
to the empiricist/common sense view of the mind. According to this
account, which uses abstractions derived from the technology-shaped
refinement of common sense taxonomies (e.g., color terms), the percep-
tual system has to inform us about elementary physical quantities such
as energy of sounds, intensity and wavelength of light (see Berlin et al.
1969; Viswanath 2005; Regier et al. 2005). In this framework, therefore,
perception cannot but be simply parasitical on the stimulus.
Adopting one or the other conception, however, also has important
consequences for the relationship between reference, conceptualiza-
tion and language. Analyzing linguistic reference and conceptualization
within a psychophysical framework, in fact, requires that these phe-
nomena be considered only in relation to the underlying stimuli and/or
neuronal processing, so that it is almost impossible to account for the
specific qualitative nature of conceptualization and a cognitive space.
In contrast, if reference is mediated by a structure which presents cate-
gorial novelties with respect to the physical world, it naturally acquires
form through a (qualitative) content and finds expression in language
and other forms of communication (Brentano 1977). In other words, the
space/time of intentional reference is the matrix of conceptualization.
Even more importantly, as the base structure it is the same for all phe-
nomena, and is therefore universal. This, in short, is the conception at
the origin of Marty and Bühler’s theory of language.

Embedded in language, therefore, is a structural variety of semiotic

ontological components (reference to the object – given “intentionally,”
that is, mediated by the formal structures of consciousness) (Albertazzi
2005: Chapters 3, 4), conceptual components (reference to the con-
tent), and expressive components (reference to the lexical components).
Hence, conceptual meaning and lexical meaning are clearly distinct, so
that the frequent confusion between semantics and conceptualization is
avoided. Indeed, as demonstrated by recent experimental studies, some
forms of aphasia may affect the semantic representation of the lexicon
of a particular language without involving or damaging its conceptual
counterparts (De Groot 2002; Paradis, this volume). Additionally, it is
highly likely that there exist conceptual components which do not have
lexical counterparts, for various reasons including the following:
1. the reference to the object is given in plurivocal modes, direct or
indirect, and via the contents that the inner form of a language selects
for designation;
2. the existence of form of behavior definable as “wordless psychic
exchange” (Bühler 1934) which takes place in everyday contexts;
3. the pervasive tenor of a particular language (Bühler distinguishes
languages into impressionistic [Eskimo], categorial [Bantu], and
universal [European languages]).
However complex the grammar of intentional reference, what is saved
in the nominalist conception of natural language is the invariance of
the structure through which reference takes place – and therefore a
form, albeit a highly peculiar one, of realism. Indeed, one may speak
of “immanent realism” (Albertazzi 2005). Contrary to classical real-
ism, in this conception universals do not exist independently of the
subject, yet they are nevertheless invariant structures given by the way
in which information is organized at the psychic level. Universality is
therefore guaranteed by the structure of intentional reference, which is
experimentally analyzable and largely coincides with Fechner’s inner
psychophysics (Albertazzi 2005: Chapter 4). It has been the task of
Gestalt psychology – which derives from Brentanism – to furnish exper-
imental explanations of the nature of the intentional structure and the
origin of cognitive processes; first at the primary (perceptive) level, then

at the secondary level (inferences, hypotheses, deductions, memories,

problem solving, etc.).
It should be stressed that the analysis of linguistic conceptualization
from the point of view of a formal theory is not in contradiction with
the analysis of the phenomenon from the point of view of the underly-
ing levels of information organization. In other words, analysis of the
space/time structures of conceptualization does not deny the importance
of determining their counterparts at the level of stimuli or neurons. Sim-
ply, it does not reduce meaning to these structures that pertain to the
physical worlds; moreover, it does not consider the categories as such
to be modes of perception (see Neisser 1978: Chapter 4).
4.3. Patterns
The introduction of the psyche (I deliberately use the Aristotelian term
instead of “mind” because it is situated, that is, comprises a broader
array of phenomena) into the relation between linguistic expression and
ontological reference is nothing new. Consider twentieth-century lin-
guistics, from the physiologically based theories of Wundt (1904) and
Steinthal (1968) to the already-mentioned descriptive ones of Marty or
Bühler. The notion has assumed considerable importance in the devel-
opment of cognitive science after decades of dominance by rationalism
embedded in the first generations of AI and the logical-formal approach
to natural language.
The thesis of the conceptual character of semantics, in particular the
presence of conceptual universals embedded in the semantics of natu-
ral language has been sustained in cognitive science on very different
philosophical premises which have very different meanings from the
categorial point of view.
This thesis is put forward by representationalists like Fodor, mental-
ists like Johnson-Laird and Wierzbicka, and experientialists like Lakoff,
Langacker and Talmy. All of these have argued for the uniqueness
of the human mind reflected in the conceptual (Langacker 1990) pro-
cessing of languages; but also taking into account the relativity and/or
anthropomorphism of specific conceptual categories and forms of con-
strual developed by language communities. Evidently, the thesis of the
universality of some cognitive components and the thesis of linguistic

relativism are linked, but different authors have interpreted the relation-
ship between them in very different ways. The proponents of a lingua
mentalis, for example, cannot hold the same assumptions as the propo-
nents of experientialist theories. The assumptions of Wierzbicka, who
connects mental operations with grammatical structures, are very close
to those of a universal grammar and therefore presuppose the existence
of language universals common to all languages, suggesting the idea
of a lingua mentalis. Conversely, those of Lakoff relate to an experien-
tialist conception of the mind as embodied or rooted in sensomotorial
experience. In other words, this is more an Aristotelian psyche than a
Leibnizian or computational mind. The concept of “primitive” – even if
it shares the criticism of the concept of “naturalistic taxa” as the ordering
of items into a system of concepts – differs profoundly among authors:
for Wierzbicka (1996), for example, these are primitives similar to those
of componential semantics.
This point is crucial because, for example, cognitive semantics is
often criticized for adhering to a correspondence theory of mean-
ing (semantics as conceptual semantics). The criticism is directed at
Wierzbicka as well as Langacker and Lakoff, despite the considerable
differences between their positions; and above all despite the impor-
tance given to prototypical categorization (Rosch 1978) by each of them
(Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1990; Wierzbicka 1996) – where concepts
are functions of environmentally-based but subjectively characterized
experience (Lakoff & Johnson 1999).
As I have pointed out, however, if the foundation of the categorization
of schemata and image-schemata lies at the neuronal level, then the
criticism of psychophysical correspondence brought against cognitive
linguistics is entirely justified: conceptualization becomes a reflection
of the physical world’s properties according to the dictates of classical
psychophysical theory (see e.g., Zeki 1993; Pulvermüller 1999; Martin
2001). There is consequently a conflict inherent in cognitive linguistics
which must be resolved at categorial level.
Another point concerns the fact that analysis by cognitive semantics
has centered on spatial categorization (Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976;
Lyons 1977). Within the debate on the eminently spatial nature of lin-
guistic conceptualization, not only are the points of departure different,

but also the referents. For example, the referent for representationalist
theory is early research in artificial intelligence (the mind as a com-
puter), that for mentalist theory is a cultural Platonism (the idea of
semantic primitives), that for experientialist theory is Gestalt psychol-
ogy and, more generally, phenomenology (the experiential and bodily
basis of human categories) (Svorou 1994; Ungerer & Schmid 1996;
Heine 1997). An approximate grouping of theories conceals the differ-
ences between diverse approaches only apparently coming together in
the same “relativist theory” of spatial conceptualization.
Finally, one may agree that primitives can be identified in linguistic
categorization (Jackendoff 1983; Wierzbicka 1996; Lamb 1999) without
immediately attributing them either semantic or conceptual significance
– that is, without considering them to be a set of conceptual features rep-
resenting the properties of a category. Vice versa, by referring to the
Kantian notion of empirical concept, one considers them semiotic prim-
itives connected with perception. It is important to underline, however,
that the idea of empirical concepts in Kantian terms is not the same as
in British empiricism: the first are cognitive routes, the second are more
like mental images or inner models. Also, Kantian empirical concepts
are not immediately tied to action, so that the dichotomy between “rep-
resenting for thinking” and “representing for doing” does not apply to
them (see Prinz 2005).
Generally, when dealing with problems regarding conceptualization,
the questions to ask about space are still those raised by James: How
do we apprehend space? How is the system of real space and spatial
relations constructed, starting from infancy? (See also Clark 2004: 461.)
How do we perceive the third dimension? What role does cognition play
in the perception of space? (James 1950 II: Chapter XX).
Put in these terms, the question of primitives can be addressed by
adopting Eco’s distinction among Cognitive Type (CT), Nuclear Con-
tent (NC) and Molar Content (MC). A CT is a sort of procedural rule
for organizing multimedia perceptive experience. It comprises charac-
teristic notes or typical features and serves to identify occurrences of
primary-level entities (Eco 1997: Chapter 3, 3.3.1ff; Albertazzi 2004a).
In the first instance it can be compared to the base categories of cognitive
psychology (Rosch 1978) but only if its character as a procedural rather

than contentual procedural rule is preserved. In other words, an “apple”

or “banana” is not treated as a picture endowing a semantic content but
as a “type” (an item with a certain shape, size, texture, etc., which is
therefore edible). Primitives should be taken not as conceptual features
but as dynamic patterns anticipatory of a “type” (a similar position is
held in Desclés 1993). The meaning of schematic pattern, then, should
not be referred to the use of schema as in Hintzman (1986), which holds
an opposite point of view, that is, that objects are categorized along a
fixed set of features (see Treisman & Gelade 1980).
A CT apprehended in a schema is subjective in nature: for example,
that of “Rattus,” which instantiates the species Rodent, but for me may
be instantiated as “mouse” and for others as “rat.” Concepts are not
instantiated in the same way by everyone, as the Fregean theory would
maintain. Both these individual CTs, however, obey common structural
rules for the codification of perceptive forms, such as the “grouping”
of the parts of the whole according to similarity, or “good form” for
the unification of the item’s formal coherence. Therefore, at the basis
of the individual instantiation of a CT, there is always recognition of a
pattern which is as regular and symmetrical as possible. This pattern,
however, is schematic in nature: it is not an image/picture in the sense
commonly given to the term by cognitive semantics (Jackendoff 1992),
nor in its dictionary meaning à la Wierzbicka (1996: 340). It is the
processing of salient (i.e., qualitative, like a vivid color) features from
the point of view of the constitution of form. The procedural nature of
information processing is therefore the same for individuals speaking the
same language but with different CT access, and for bi- and multilingual
individuals.
Vice versa, the semantic primitive “Rattus,” on which we agree in lan-
guage, is the expressed nuclear content (NC) (Eco 1997: Ch. 3, 3.3.2),
the outcome of negotiation, in regard to which descriptive statements
can be collected in different languages (Wierzbicka 1996). It does not
necessarily coincide with my specific CT of “Rattus” (which may be
both a “rat” and a “laboratory mouse.” The meaning of NC is a way
out of Fodor’s idea that concepts are public, because in a nominalistic
framework even concepts have to undergo a sort of negotiation once
lexicalized.

There are then the changes of meaning that occur in the translation of
the same negotiated contents from one language to another (Eco 2003:
Chapter 4). The NC differs from the CT because it derives from the nego-
tiation of various individual CTs in a particular language community, so
that the public (i.e., semantic) meaning of the entity is collectively stan-
dardized (Eco 1997: 3.3.2.). The NC, which broadly corresponds to
the lexical meaning of a term, may obviously be more multi-faceted in
speakers of more than one language, because of their differing inner
linguistic forms, with the consequent constraints and feedbacks that the
facets of one language may exert on those of a different language. In
the case of bi- and multilinguals, it is of particular importance to ana-
lyze the NC because it indicates the set of specific facets that have been
negotiated and incorporated into the lexicon of a particular language.
This may concern both specific content/s and the mode/s of reference,
given that there may be different ways to encode and access knowledge.
It is in this, according to additive theories, that one of the advantages
of bilingualism or multilingualism consists, which give greater capacity
to distinguish between word and concept, and therefore greater flex-
ibility in the cognitive abilities underlying the formats of conceptual
networks.
Finally, the point of view of a particular language community is
expressed by another sort of information: MC (Eco 1997: Chapter 3,
3.3.3), which comprises highly diverse information items. Distinguish-
ing among CT, NC and MC may be useful for the analysis of how
different languages relate to their underlying concepts (Weinreich 1953).
Additionally, from this point of view lexical items rarely have the
same meaning as their translation equivalents (Paradis 1997). In short,
the conceptual contents negotiated in the semantics of the lexicon
may be qualitatively diverse, especially in the case of bi- and multi-
linguals, but not so the procedural rules for pattern recognition, which
are universal.
From a categorial point of view, paying attention to the subjec-
tive character of the CTs seems to support the hypotheses of classical
Ockhamist nominalism. But in fact it does not. Eco himself stresses the
presence of what Plato in the Phaedo called “nervatures” of being and
which no form of epistemological conventionalism can afford to ignore.

That which is universal, to use Arnheim’s expression, is the structural

skeleton of items – a skeleton also composed of a balance among not
immediately visible forces (like those toward the left and toward the
right which regulate the so-called “duck/rabbit” illusion; Arnheim 1954:
Chapter 2). The ineliminable difference between individual CTs – which
concerns geographical setting, imprinting, cultural evolution, religion,
social status, attitudes, etc. (and as such naturally plays a crucial role in
first language acquisition) – does not in itself rule out the existence of a
“universal schema” of, for example, “Rattus.” In other words, “Rattus”
has an approximate extension which is not shared precisely by all.
4.4. Schemata
A schema is structured on certain perceptive characteristics of the entity
in question. For example, it comprises secondary and tertiary figural
qualities and expressive movement . On this basis the schema of Rattus
is universal, even if it is intrinsically dynamic (constructed on the basis
of Abschattungen; Husserl 1982: Section 3, iii), and even if, because of
its structural instantiation in a CT, it is subjectively connoted in relation
to the individual who is its bearer in a particular setting and a particular
community.
However, the schema is not to be understood in the descriptive sense as
offering defining conceptual or lexical properties. Indeed, it maintains its
invariance until a certain topological deformation takes place in the type
itself. The extendedness (not “metric extension,” which relates to the
computational idea of schema as image/picture, silhouette or contour) of
the Rattus schema, for example, is not conceptually deformable beyond
certain limits, after which it assumes features pertaining to a “different
type” of item.
Defense of the existence of universals in the form of schematic uni-
versals should not be regarded as a weak defense, because it maintains
an ontological foundation (the structure of intentional reference at pri-
mary level) which forms its matrix. Subjective integrations, including
ratiomorphic categorizations such as anticipatory scheme, relation, and
abstraction, are structural components of the schema at the level of the
primary organization of information in the spatio-temporal qualitative

structure of the time of presentness which underlies pattern recog-

nition and as such is universal (Benussi 1923; Michotte et al.1962;
Fraisse 1963; Musatti 1964; Kanizsa 1991. Also see Albertazzi 2003).
There are then different degrees of the modes of cognitive integra-
tion (e.g., from seeing to thinking), inferences, judgments, etc., as
well as anthropological and social (relativist) cognitive integrations
which dynamically regulate their translation into NCs and MCs of more
extended knowledge, and into lexical items.
Considering the question from a holistic point of view, it is obvious
that if language acquisition (especially of the first language) is not con-
sidered to be a genetically transmitted capacity (under a reductionist
assumption), it is certainly connected to geographical, environmen-
tal and broadly cultural imprinting. This is to say, however, that
it is not possible to draw structural boundaries between the origi-
nal schemata and the language that expresses them conceptually and
grammatically.
When one considers a second or third language, the processes con-
nected with the CT and the NC become more complex, because they
involve dynamic transforming processes of conceptual and grammati-
cal translation – as demonstrated, for example, by studies on gender.
Yet, as mentioned, the procedural rules for pattern recognition remain
invariant.
In my view, the presence of language universals – one of the base
assumptions of cognitive semantics – should be downshifted from an
already amply-structured conceptual plane to a primary, intrinsically
dynamic, semiotic plane. Acting at this level are concrete universals of
perception (schemata or typical anticipations) (see Violi 1997: 6.13.2).
The relativist component instead consists in the innumerable operations
involved in the construction of meanings in diverse cultures which are
then incorporated into speech as grammatical or lexical structures.
Also, the assumption of universal ontological schemata should be
explained. The questions to be answered are the following. What are
the universal rules for constituting schemata? On what bases do they
operate: psychophysical for stimuli, physiological for neural elabora-
tion? And what is the basis for the qualitative appearance of an entity?
At present, the analysis of schemata has been conducted with particular

reference to sensomotorial schemata, and in relation to neuronal process-

ing (Lakoff et al. in press). Grounding the meaning structure of a schema
to a low level – for example that of the Rattus schema to a low level of
vision or neuronal motor perception – creates an almost unbridgeable
gap between this type of bottom-up component (generally understood
in cognitive science as being data-driven) and top-down ones (generally
understood as inferential components, past experience, etc.). This is
exactly the case of theories which, by positioning the nature of language
universals at the syntactic level in the neurons, are forced to attribute
“meaning” to intrinsically relativist components. The latter are distinct
from the syntax of the generative mechanism (structurally top-down)
based on mnestic traces and relative inferences. Therefore, conceptual
meaning can be nothing other than “inferential” and “culture-driven”
interpretation (Bunge 1980).
If the contribution of conceptualization to the relationship between
natural language and reality is considered undeniable, then the rela-
tionship must be explained on categorial bases, so that a dividing line
can be drawn between the possible presence of language universals and
the generally-accepted idea that language and thought closely parallel
one another and linguistic diversity is reflected in cognitive diversity
(Levinson 2003).
5. A WAY O U T A N D CO N CLU SIO N
To conclude, in accordance with the general paradigm of cognitive lin-

guistics, and in support of the idea that there are primary schemata in
conceptualization, the thesis argued in this chapter has been that the
connections between the forms of categorization which regulate the
meaning of perceptive situations and the linguistic renderings of those
same perceptions are governed by the formal invariants of the percep-
tive process; specifically, it has been claimed that the invariants of the
perceptive domain are conceptualized in accordance with the principles
of gestaltic organization. For example, it has been shown that there is
a strong correlation between Talmy’s Force Dynamics schema and the
perceptual structures ruling the meaning of prototypical verbs of move-
ment, confirming that causatives are related to that particular cognitive

scheme (see Albertazzi 2002c). The thesis is similar to the principle of

invariance proposed by Lakoff (1990) but differs from it in certain basic
respects. Specifically:
1. It considers the initial domain of reference to be the structures of

phenomenal perception (rather than the physical and/or neurophysio-
logical domain).
2. It emphasizes the importance of the dynamic nature of the actual
presentation.
Analysis of this type yields surprising results (Albertazzi 2002c),
and implies the existence of a natural semiosis of meaning, at least
regarding the primary level of the cognitive processes (see also Violi
1997; Eco 1997).
In light of these considerations, I suggest that conceptualization in

languages should be analyzed from a new perspective, as follows.
1. First, render conceptualization independent from direct reference

to neuronal activity or the psychophysics of stimuli, connecting it
instead, in foundational manner, to the figural, experiential, and
phenomenal level of intentional reference. Comparison should first
be made between phenomenal structures, and only subsequently of
the underlying physical structures evidencing their neurophysiolog-
ical correlates and the relationship with stimuli. Meaning, in fact, is
qualitative in nature.
2. Second, consider conceptualization in light of the diverse, subjec-
tively integrated, formats of representation.
My proposal is therefore that analysis should downshift from already-

structured forms of semantic conceptualization to the matrix which gives
origin to such conceptualization. The hypothesis, in fact, is that univer-
sals are rooted in the space/time of the actual presentation: that is, in
the unfolding processes, anticipatory, retentive and qualitative, of the
so-called time of presentness. This proposal has something in common
with Mandler’s idea of image-schemata (Mandler 1992), but intends to
analyze the microgranularity of the structure from the point of view of
its phenomenal genesis.

On this hypothesis, conceptualization has universal character at

the presentative level as recognition of perceptive items in a schema
(what has been called, by Arnheim, the “structural skeleton”). More
precisely, in the actual reference a particular item is generalized as
an item of a certain type, while at the same time the schema is par-
ticularized (Eco 1997: 153). Conceptualization is instead relativist
at the level of conceptual representation, and it involves a series of
further cognitive integrations, largely top-down, which merge into
the linguistically expressed content, and into a broader, encyclopedic
molar knowledge of items. This is the most relativistic component
of meaning, given that its contents are strictly cultural and heteroge-
neous. As such, it is a highly functional variable in the case of bi- and
multilingualism because it may activate networks of unpredictable
meanings.
Only experimental analysis can verify whether features invariant at
the level of the actual presentative structure are evident at the linguistic
level as well, in a sort of primary figural field of language (Bühler 1934;
Albertazzi 1995). Some work in that direction concerning synesthesia,
for example, is developing.
The fundamental problem is that the presentative structure – the base
format – is eminently temporal; an unfolding in an extendedness, how-
ever brief, and only on conclusion of this unfolding is it possible to
talk of a spatialized objectual content (Benussi 1922–1923). Looking
for universals at this level means looking for eminently temporal and
dynamic universals – or in other words, unfolding schematic universals.
It is no coincidence that, in organized languages, temporal terms derive
from spatial terms and not vice versa. This is because at the lexical level
information has already been organized contentually (i.e., spatially),
thus losing the intrinsic dynamism of the pattern (see Traugott 1978;
Clark & Clark 1979).
If it is not possible to bring out the unfolding of structure at the tem-
poral level, we must abandon the endeavor to prove the existence of
language universals unless we refer – as in formal semantics – to a
computational mind which zero-sets the qualitative dimensions to quan-
titative metrics. In contrast, if we are able to demonstrate a connection
between, for example, linguistic deficits and deficits in the matrix of the

generative, qualitative structure of semantics, the existence of language

universals may be proven.
Pathologies like anomie or aphasia are usually analyzed in relation to
mental content (On bilinguals see Sasanuma & Park 1995; Green 1998;
Roberts & Le Dorze 1998); or in relation to neuronal processing (see
Nilipour & Ashyeri 1989; Paradis & Goldblum 1989; Obler et al. 2000;
Green & Price 2001; Missina-Mori 2005). It would also be interesting
to verify the existence of presentative pathologies: for example, in situ-
ations where the temporal structure of the presentation – which usually
varies elastically according to the contents apprehended (Michotte 1963)
– is in some way set by rigid parameters: that is, it cannot expand or
contract owing to some sort of pathological fixedness of the speed of the
proto-attentive mechanisms. For this purpose, experiments could deter-
mine whether there is an excess or shortfall in the time taken to switch
from analytical to global vision; or in the time taken to switch from
two-dimensional to three-dimensional vision; or in the times of appar-
ent movement phenomena (like stereokinetic movements) that involve
the relationship between space/time microstructures, unfolding of the
phases and recognition, identification and the naming of objects per-
ceived in succession (Albertazzi 2004). As the fundamental situation
for the identification and prediction of the objects in our surrounding
environment, movement is in fact one of the main sources of the gen-
esis of meaning. Finally, experiments could focus on the structure of
individual CTs in mono-, bi- and multilinguals, especially regarding the
formation of metaphors and analogies.
The discovery of schematic universals at the level of primary semiosis
which regulate the way in which conceptual information is structured at
the primary level, before the construction of semantic contents, may be a
sound basis for discussion of language universals. Speakers of different
languages or different types of languages always share, at the foun-
dational level, a qualitative universal matrix, despite the presence of
even very different forms of conceptualization driven by the semantics
of those languages. The possibility of understanding and translating
meaning (on translation see Eco 2003) from one language to another
depends on this pre-linguistic matrix endowed with expressive quali-
ties (Violi 1997), which is not yet fully conceptual but is constitutively

completed by the structure’s subjective integrations. The originality of

the mode of conceptualization is also connected with the conceptual CTs
of the speakers of a particular language.
ACK N O WLED G MEN TS
I thank Irving Biederman, Istvan Kecskes, Lia Formigari, Roberto Poli

and Patrizia Violi for their fruitful comments on the text, and Ton Dijkstra
for having suggested some specialized literature while writing it.
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CH A PTER 4
GRAMMATICAL GENDER IN THE BILINGUAL

LEXICON: A
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC APPROACH
Angeliki Salamoura
University of Cambridge, UK
Abstract
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section is a general introduction to
grammatical gender from various perspectives. Section 2 reviews studies which compare
L2 with L1 gender processing; Section 3 discusses the role of the L1 gender informa-
tion during L2 gender processing; and Section 4 focuses on the (language-shared or
language-specific) nature of gender representation in the bilingual lexicon. After a brief
overview of the present study which investigates further the nature of gender represen-
tations in the bilingual lexicon (Section 5), Sections 6, 7 and 8 present in detail two
experiments on gender representation and discuss the experimental findings. Finally,
Section 9 draws together the present and previous evidence on the representation of
gender in the bilingual lexicon and gender processing in L2.
1. IN TRO D U CTIO N
Grammatical gender is one of the most complex and intriguing lin-

guistic categories. Hockett (1958: 231) defines genders as “classes of
nouns reflected in the behavior of associated words.” This definition
alludes to the two main aspects of the correct use of grammatical gender:
gender assignment, namely, the allocation of gender to nouns, and gen-
der agreement, the reflection of a noun’s (or agreement controller’s)
gender in the form of other lexical items.
For the purposes of this chapter, the term gender will refer to
grammatical gender only, which should be distinguished from natural/
biological gender, that is, nouns that take their gender according to the
sex of their referent. While both grammatical and natural/biological gen-
der might involve the same agreement processes, there is an important
99
© 2007 Springer.

100 ANG ELIK I SA LA M O U RA
difference between them regarding gender assignment. The value of nat-

ural gender is determined by the conceptual message of the utterance,
and more specifically, by the sex of a noun’s referent. The value of
grammatical gender, on the other hand, is an inherent property of a
noun (Levelt et al. 1999) and is stored and retrieved from the mental
lexicon.
Speakers of gender languages must retrieve gender information from
the mental lexicon and compute gender agreement fairly frequently dur-
ing the course of speech. Van Berkum (1997), for example, estimates
that in Dutch, a language with a moderate degree of gender agreement,
a speaker has to access gender information at least once every 10 sec.
Although the demanding processes of gender assignment and agreement
are fairly automatic and effortless for the native speakers of a language,
this is not exactly the case for second language (L2) learners. Arguably,
the correct use of grammatical gender is perhaps one of the harder lin-
guistic phenomena to be mastered by L2 learners (e.g., Rogers 1987;
Dewaele & Véronique 2001). Rogers (1987), for instance, presented
evidence showing that grammatical gender in L2 German is a persistent
problem even for advanced learners.
What are the possible sources of L2 learners’ difficulties with gender?
Do the difficulties stem from the possibility that gender processing by
L2 learners – as a number of other areas in L2 – is different from
gender processing by native speakers? For example, ERP research on
L2 sentence comprehension has shown that native speakers and L2
learners process the semantic aspects of sentences alike but processing
differences between the two groups emerge when it comes to the syn-
tactic component of sentences (e.g., Weber-Fox & Neville 1996; Hahne
2001). Is L2 gender processing similar to, or different from, L1 gender
processing?
Or do L1 gender values interfere when processing gender in L2? It
is now well-established that when bilinguals read, listen to or name
words in their L2, depending on the task, information from translation-
equivalent, semantically related, or orthographically and phonologically
related words in their L1 also become active (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 1998;
Hermans et al. 1998; van Heuven et al. 1998; Colomé 2001; Jared &

GR AMMAT IC AL GE N D ER IN TH E BILIN G U A L LEX ICO N 101
Kroll 2001; Jared & Szucs 2002). If this nonselective activation is not
restricted to semantic and word-form information only, but also extends
to gender information, then the processing of a word in one language
that requires access to its gender should be affected by the gender of its
translation-equivalent in the other language.
Finally, one natural question that follows from the above concerns
regards the nature of the mental representation of gender: Is there a com-
mon integrated gender system or are there two distinct gender systems in
the bilingual mental lexicon? Most findings on the organization of the
bilingual lexicon converge on the view that the conceptual/semantic
level is language-shared whereas the word-form level is language-
specific (e.g., Gerard & Scarborough 1989). This is the prevalent
approach that the majority of bilingual studies and models have adopted,
albeit with some variations, since the mid-eighties (e.g., Paradis 1985;
Perecman 1989; Kroll & Stewart 1994; Kroll & de Groot 1997). Up to
now, however, all discussion about the organization of the bilingual lexi-
con has revolved, with few exceptions, around the particulars of the rep-
resentation of a word at the conceptual/semantic and form levels, leaving
relatively untouched the issue of the representation of lexical-syntactic
information, such as grammatical gender, which makes up a word’s
“grammatical meaning.” Is gender information commonly represented
for L1 and L2 as a word’s semantic information, or is it represented
separately?
In spite of the significance of gender for speech well-formedness
and the apparent difficulties it poses for L2 learning and processing,
only fairly recently has psycholinguistic research begun to explore the
workings of gender processing in L2 and the nature of gender represen-
tations in the bilingual lexicon1 . The aim of this paper is to review recent
research on the above issues and to present new empirical evidence that
clarifies the nature of the mental representation of grammatical gender
in bilinguals/advanced L2 learners. I assume a broad definition of bilin-
gualism. Bilinguals are defined as all individuals who regularly use two
languages at any level of proficiency. Therefore, the terms bilinguals
and second language (L2) learners will be used interchangeably in this
paper, following established practice in the bilingual literature.

2. HOW DIFFEREN T IS L2 G EN D ER
PR OC E SSING FRO M L1 G EN D ER PRO CESSIN G ?
2.1. Behavioral Evidence

A number of behavioral studies that have investigated on-line gender
processing in L2 have focused on comparing L2 learners’ and native
speakers’ performance in a variety of linguistic contexts and tasks. Apart
from the finding that L2 learners’ performance falls short of that of the
native speakers, a number of other issues have been raised.
Holmes and Dejean de la Bâtie (1999) contrasted L2 learners and
native speakers of French with respect to their gender assignment skills
and their degree of reliance on gender-form regularities. They used a
gender monitoring2 and a grammaticality judgment task3 in the visual
modality with nouns whose ending was regular or exceptional for their
gender, and invented nouns consisting of a nonword stem and a real-
word ending. They found that both groups were faster and more accurate
in their responses to real nouns with regular rather than exceptional
endings. However, where L2 learners were faster and equally accurate
when responding to nonwords than nouns with regular endings, the
native speakers were slower and much less accurate with nonwords
than regular ending nouns. These findings indicate that L2 learners rely
more heavily on gender-form regularities and less on the lexical entry
of the noun itself to retrieve gender information.
Taraban and Kempe (1999) conducted a self-paced reading task with
L2 learners and native speakers of Russian to evaluate gender assign-
ment across phrases (in this case, between the subject NP and the VP).
The critical stimuli were sentences whose subject NP comprised either
gender-unambiguous or ambiguous nouns that were preceded either by a
gender-marked adjective or no adjective at all; the final reading window
in each sentence contained two different (gender-inflected) versions of
the main verb and participants had to choose the one that matched the
gender of the subject NP. Although both the L2 learners’ and the native
speakers’ reading and choice latencies on the main verb benefited from
the presence of a gender-marked adjective in the subject NP, only the L2
learners’ performance was slower and less accurate in the presence of a
gender-ambiguous subject noun. Again, this pattern of results indicates

the higher reliance of L2 learners, in comparison to native speakers, on

unambiguous, gender-marked forms to facilitate processing.
Bordag et al. (2006) showed that gender retrieval involves different
processes in L1 and L2. In a picture naming and grammaticality judg-
ment task, they found no differences in the processing of nouns with a
gender-typical, ambiguous and atypical ending in L1 German (Adj + N)
NPs. In contrast, the processing of gender-atypical NPs by English learn-
ers of German was slower and more error prone than the processing of
gender-ambiguous NPs which in turn was slower than the processing of
gender-typical NPs4 .
Finally, Guillelmon and Grosjean (2001), using a word repetition
task in which the auditory target noun followed a gender-congruent,
incongruent or neutral determiner + adjective sequence, found that both
the monolingual French speakers and early English-French bilinguals
demonstrated strong facilitatory and inhibitory effects. In contrast, late
English-French bilinguals were insensitive to either gender-congruent or
incongruent information in the preceding auditory context during word
recognition and repetition. (see Scherag et al. (2004) for similar results
in L2 German with an auditory lexical decision task [LDT]).
Without ignoring the differences in terms of materials, languages and
tasks among the previously discussed studies, their findings suggest
that, unlike native speakers, late L2 learners5 process gender features –
and more specifically, gender-form regularities – only when they have
to explicitly compute gender agreement (e.g., Holmes & Dejean de la
Bâtie 1999; Taraban & Kempe 1999), but not when speech processing
requires no gender information, such as repetition of single words (e.g.,
Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001; Scherag et al. 2004). This means that
a syntactic (gender) congruency check among the words of a phrase,
which occurs at the post-lexical stage of word recognition, may not be
obligatory for late L2 learners in contexts where no such checking is
absolutely necessary. In contrast, it appears to be obligatory for native
speakers. Nonetheless, when learners do process gender in L2, gender-
marking on the noun ending itself appears to be a very reliable cue
(Bordag et al. 2006). Finally, age of acquisition appears to be an impor-
tant factor since only early bilinguals exhibit native-like performance
(Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001).

2.2. Electrophysiological Evidence

Only a few studies to date have employed an ERP methodology to exam-
ine processing of grammatical gender in L2. Using a grammaticality
judgment task, Sabourin (2003; see also Sabourin 2001) investigated
the on-line processing of grammatical and ungrammatical sentences in
Dutch by German, Romance language, and English speaking learners.
The ungrammaticality of sentences consisted in violations of gender
agreement within definite or indefinite NPs, or between an antecedent
definite or indefinite NP and a relative pronoun.
Sabourin mainly based her conclusions on the ERP data from the
German group only, because only the German group’s accuracy scores
were significant in the on-line grammaticality judgment tasks. The
German group showed a P600 effect in all gender-mismatching con-
ditions, just like the native Dutch speakers. However, the P600 pattern
exhibited by Germans was different from that of the native speakers in
terms of timing and distribution. For example, the German P600 effect
had a very early onset and was present over more frontal electrodes (for
gender violations in definite and indefinite NPs), or had a more restricted
distribution and was more delayed (for gender violations between an
antecedent NP and a relative pronoun). Thus, Sabourin argued that the
ability to reach native-like performance while processing grammatical
gender in L2 is limited. Only the learner group whose L1 gender system
was very similar to that of the L2 approached a native-like pattern of
gender processing (German group), but this pattern was quantitatively
different from that of the native speakers.
Given that only the German group performed significantly in the
on-line judgment of gender agreement and only the German group
showed similar processing to that of the native speakers, Sabourin also
concluded that transfer plays a decisive role in the on-line processing
of grammatical gender in L2. More specifically, the mere existence of
the category “grammatical gender” in the L1 was not enough to lead
to native-like processing of this feature in L2 (as was the case for the
Romance group). Instead this ability was found to be dependent on the
presence of the same or very similar surface gender features between
L1 and L2 (as is the case between Dutch and German).

3. T HE R OL E O F TH E L1 G EN D ER SY STEM
IN T HE PRO CESSIN G O F L2 G EN D ER
The role of the L1 gender system has been investigated during gender
processing in L2 production, listening and visual word recognition, and
during gender assignment in L2. The main question was whether the
gender information of one language influences the processing or assign-
ment of gender in the other language. In all studies reported in this
section, apart from Paris and Weber (2005), the critical manipulation
concerned the relation between the gender of the target responses and
their translation in the other language. One segment of the target stimuli
shared gender with their translation equivalent nouns, while the rest had
a different gender from their translation.
Costa et al. (2003) tested four groups of highly proficient bilin-
guals. In three experiments, Croatian-Italian bilinguals named pictures
by means of gender-marked definite determiner + noun or definite
determiner + adjective + noun in their L2 (Italian). Naming latencies
were not affected by whether the Croatian translation of the Italian tar-
get responses had the same or different gender. The same result held
under conditions of speeded naming or mixed language naming (target
pictures were named in L2 and filler pictures in L1). In two further
similar tasks with target responses in the form of gender-marked def-
inite determiner + noun, Spanish-Catalan bilinguals named pictures
in their L1 (Spanish), and Catalan-Spanish, while Italian-French bilin-
guals named pictures in their L2 (Spanish and French respectively). The
findings were the same as those of the first groups of bilinguals: the
production of L2 gender-marked phrases was not influenced by the gen-
der values of their L1 translations and, likewise, the production of L1
phrases was not influenced by the gender values of their L2 translations.
Costa et al. (2003) claimed that, although their results do not distinguish
between a language-shared or language-separate gender system in the
bilingual lexicon, they suggest the autonomy of the L1 and L2 gen-
der systems in highly proficient bilinguals, regardless of the symmetry
between the two systems in terms of gender values and gender agree-
ment targets. Croatian, for example, has three gender values (masculine,
feminine, neuter) as opposed to Italian, which has only two (masculine,

feminine); all other language pairs used in the study have an equal num-
ber and type of gender values (masculine, feminine). Additionally, in
all Romance languages definite determiners are gender agreement tar-
gets in a determiner + noun NP, whereas Croatian has no determiners
and thus the corresponding NP does not require computation of gender
agreement.
These findings, however, cannot be considered conclusive with
respect to the role of the L1 gender system during L2 production for the
following reasons. First, all participants in the Costa et al. (2003) study
were highly proficient, almost balanced bilinguals. This proficiency is
evidenced by their L2 error rates, which were not significantly different
from those of the native speaker groups tested on the same material6 .
This low error rate is surprising for L2 production that involves retrieval
of grammatical gender since the difficulty of L2 learners, even advanced
L2 learners, with gender assignment and gender agreement in L2 is well
attested (Rogers 1984; Dewaele & Véronique 2001; Sabourin 2001,
2003). It may be the case therefore that the autonomy of gender systems
observed in this study is restricted to highly proficient, balanced bilin-
guals, whereas the influence of the L1 gender values is more pronounced
in less fluent, L1-dominant bilinguals.
Second, the failure to observe any effect from L1 may also be due
to the type of processes involved in determiner retrieval in the target
languages used in the study (Italian, Spanish, and French). In the L1
literature a gender-congruency effect has been reported in Dutch and
German with a picture-word interference task, that is, picture naming
with a gender-marked (Det + N) NP was faster in the presence of a
distractor word of the same gender (gender-congruent) than a distrac-
tor of a different gender (gender-incongruent) (Schriefers 1993; van
Berkum 1997; La Heij et al. 1998; Schriefers & Teruel 2000). This
effect was not obtained in Romance languages – Italian, Spanish, Catalan
and French (Costa et al. 1999; Miozzo & Caramazza 1999; Alario &
Caramazza 2002). A plausible explanation of this difference was pro-
vided by Miozzo and Caramazza (1999) in terms of early and late
selection languages. In Dutch and German the gender value of the head
noun is sufficient to fully determine the form of the appropriate def-
inite determiner. Thus, determiner selection in these languages takes

place early during NP production and can be subject to priming from

the gender value activated by a distractor word. By contrast, in Italian,
Spanish, Catalan and French, the gender value of the head noun does
not suffice to choose the appropriate definite determiner from the exist-
ing set of allomorphs. Phonological information about the onset of the
word following the determiner is also needed. Determiner selection in
these languages, therefore, occurs at a later stage during NP produc-
tion than in Dutch and German, namely, at the stage of phonological
phrase assembly. Miozzo and Caramazza (1999) argued that a gender-
congruency effect at the level of gender selection may also be present
in a language like Italian but it is rendered invisible because any com-
petition that may have arisen at the stage of gender selection (due to the
activation of a different gender feature by the distractor) will have been
resolved by the stage of determiner selection. Thus, determiner selection
in these languages takes place too late to be influenced by priming from a
distractor word.
Although there were no distractor words in the Costa et al. (2003)
study, there is a clear analogy between the two types of naming tasks.
The role of “distractor words” in the simple naming tasks performed by
bilinguals is assumed by the target noun’s translation in the non-response
language. These distractors are “internally set” by the structure of the
bilingual mental lexicon, following the widely accepted assumption that
a concept (in the form of a picture in this case) simultaneously activates
its lexical representations in both lexicons. In the same way, therefore,
that a gender-congruency effect is rendered invisible in L1, any acti-
vation of the gender of the L1 translation will have dissipated by the
time determiners are selected in L2 NP production; therefore, any influ-
ence of the L1 gender on naming latencies in L2 will not be possible
to detect.
Finally, the manifestation of an L1 gender effect might be further
hindered by the specific characteristics of the gender assignment sys-
tems of the target languages. Italian, Spanish and, to a much lesser
degree, French (Tucker et al. 1977; Holmes & Dejean de la Bâtie 1999)
have relatively transparent formal (phonological/morphological) prin-
ciples of gender assignment, that is, classification of nouns into gender
classes. Languages with such transparent gender attribution systems

might encourage superficial processing of L2 gender on the part of L2

learners: instead of retrieving a noun’s gender from the mental lexicon,
L2 learners might compute the gender and the corresponding determiner
by analogy to the noun’s ending, a much easier way to remember and
recover the apparently arbitrary information (Carroll 1989; Holmes &
Dejean de la Bâtie 1999). Since the majority of nouns used in the Costa
et al. (2003) study abide by the above typical rules of gender assignment,
the last possibility cannot be excluded and could explain the absence of
an effect.
Bordag (2003) had German low intermediate to low advanced learn-
ers of Czech name pictures in their L2 using either a single noun or a
gender-marked adjective + noun. For both types of phrases, response
latencies were slower and less accurate when the gender of the L2 noun
did not match the gender of its L1 translation equivalent. Bordag inter-
preted this effect as evidence of interference of L1 grammatical gender
during L2 NP production. This conclusion, however, is undermined
by the fact that the gender interference effect was obtained not only
during the production of gender-marked NPs but also during the pro-
duction of NPs that do not require computation of gender agreement,
that is, single nouns. Even more revealingly, the duration of the effect
generated by both types of phrases was similar (single nouns: 74 ms,
adjective + noun: 61 ms). There is strong evidence, however, from the
L1 literature that the production of bare nouns does not induce any
gender effect, suggesting that the processing of phrases that do not
require computation of gender agreement cannot benefit or be inhib-
ited by gender activation (La Heij et al. 1998). The presence of an
almost equal duration effect in both types of responses implies that apart
from L1 gender, other factors, such as the mixed presentation of single
noun and adjective + noun trials, may have contributed to the differ-
ent latencies between the L1–L2 gender-congruent and -incongruent
nouns.
Lemhöfer et al. (submitted) avoided the above dilemma by admin-
istering the naming of the baseline (single noun) and gender-marked
(definite determiner + noun) conditions in blocks. They, too, found
that German learners of Dutch were slower and less accurate when
producing L2 gender-marked NPs comprising L1 gender-incongruent

nouns than NPs comprising L1 gender-congruent nouns, relative to a

gender-unmarked baseline. This effect was obtained with phrases con-
taining both cognate and noncognate nouns. Lemhöfer et al. also used
the same material in a visual LDT to examine activation of L1 gender
information during L2 visual word recognition. They obtained the same
pattern of results as in L2 picture naming but only with NPs containing
cognates.
L2 listening also seems to be affected by L1 gender information.
In a series of as yet unpublished eye-tracking experiments, Paris and
Weber (2005; see also Paris & Weber 2004) had proficient L2 learners
listening to L2 auditory NPs consisting of a gender-marked definite
determiner and a noun while looking at four object pictures. They found
that learners did not use L2 gender information to reduce activation of
gender-mismatching word competitors during spoken-word recognition
in L2. Instead, they seemed to activate the gender of the L1 translation
of the phonological competitors and use this L1 gender information to
inappropriately restrict competitor activation during L2 listening. This
tendency held for both cognate and noncognate competitors.
Finally, the congruency of the L1 gender system with that of the L2
seems to affect gender assignment in L2 even off-line (Sabourin et al.
2006). In a paper-and-pencil gender assignment task, the accuracy scores
for German learners of Dutch were significantly higher for Dutch nouns
that had the same gender as their German translation than for nouns that
had a different gender. This tendency was particularly pronounced for
middle-frequency rather than high-frequency items. However, as this L1
gender influence was off-line, it may well reflect an (explicit) learning
strategy rather than implicit processing.
To summarize, research so far suggests that L1 gender information
is active and affects processing of gender-marked phrases during L2
production, comprehension and listening; it also appears to be active
and influence gender assignment in off-line tasks (Sabourin et al. 2006).
Furthermore, this activation of L1 gender appears to be modulated by
L2 proficiency level – it is not obtained with balanced bilinguals (Costa
et al. 2003) – as well as by word type and mode of language processing –
it is present only for cognate nouns in visual word recognition (Lemhöfer
et al. submitted).

4. T HE R E PR E SEN TATIO N O F G RA M MATICA L

GE NDE R IN TH E BILIN G U A L LEX ICO N
Recently, one study focused on the organization of the bilingual lexicon

in relation to grammatical gender. Salamoura and Williams (in press)
investigated whether gender representations are shared or independent
in the lexicon of advanced L2 learners. In a translation task from Greek
(L1) to German (L2), nouns with the same gender in both languages
were translated faster than nouns with different genders when the L2
target utterance required computation of gender (adjective + noun). The
study also looked at the role of word-form similarities by using noncog-
nate and cognate nouns. The results of RTs did not differ for cognates
and noncognates. Unlike noncognates, however, gender-incongruent
cognates yielded more errors than gender-congruent cognates. These
findings were interpreted as evidence for a shared L1–L2 gender sys-
tem with cognates relying more heavily on the L1 gender value than
noncognates.
5. TH E PRESEN T STU D Y
While the previous studies investigated the role of the L1 gender infor-
mation during the processing of L2 gender in comprehension and
production (for L1-dominant bilinguals) and asked whether L1 and L2
have one shared or two independent gender systems, they did so by
looking only at cases of translation-equivalent L1 and L2 nouns. If,
however, there is an integrated L1 and L2 gender system – at least for
L1-dominant bilinguals – as previous studies seem to suggest, this sys-
tem will not be restricted to translation-equivalent words but encompass
all L1 and L2 nouns.
The present study will test for cross-language gender effects between
non translation-equivalent L1 and L2 nouns during comprehension and
production, that is, the activation and access of gender representations
during grammaticality judgment (Experiment 1) and picture naming
tasks (Experiment 2). If L1 and L2 have an integrated gender system,
accessing the gender of a noun in one language will subsequently affect
accessing the gender of a different noun with the same gender value in the

other language – even if the two nouns are not translation-equivalents

or semantically related. It will also investigate whether the common
L1–L2 gender representations are shared between comprehension and
production by testing for an effect of visual primes on picture naming
(Experiment 2).
Two different hypotheses were put to the test. The language-shared
gender hypothesis states that gender specifications, and therefore inher-
ent syntactic properties of words, are shared both within and across
languages among all L1 and L2 nouns and predicts a gender-congruency
effect both within and between languages for L1 and L2 nouns that are
neither translation-equivalent nor semantically related. That is, process-
ing of a target NP will be faster after processing a prime NP of the same
gender relative to a prime NP of a different gender. Across languages
this effect will be due to the activation of the same gender representa-
tion (e.g., masculine) in the between language (BLg) gender-congruent
(CON) condition (see Figure 1a), as opposed to the activation of two dif-
ferent gender representations (e.g., feminine and masculine) in the BLg
gender-incongruent (INC) condition (see Figure 1b). In the BLg CON
condition the target gender representation (e.g., masculine in Figure 1a)
receives simultaneous activation from two lemmas (the L2 target lemma
and the L1 gender-congruent prime), whereas in the BLg INC condition
the target gender receives activation from only one lemma (the L2 target
lemma in Figure 1b). The higher level of activation of the target gender
representation in the CON compared to the INC condition will result in
faster response latencies for the CON condition.
The language-independent gender hypothesis claims that gender
specifications are language-specific and predicts a gender-congruency
effect only within but not between languages. No BLg gender-
congruency effect is predicted as neither the gender-congruent nor the
gender-incongruent L1 prime will activate the target gender representa-
tion (see Figures 2a & 2b).
These two hypotheses were investigated for Greek (L1) advanced
learners of German (L2) who are L1-dominant. Although the main focus
of this study is the bilingual lexicon, both Experiment 1 and 2 also
incorporate an L1-only part to test the within-language predictions of
the two hypotheses.

Lemma level
Masc
er Gen
Gend der
′
Finger
“century” o der “finger”
Greek (L1) German (L2)
Figure 1a. Model of language-shared representations of gender information associated

with nouns at the lemma level in the bilingual lexicon (based on Levelt et al. 1999): An
example of gender-congruent L1 & L2 nouns.
Masc
Lemma level
Gen
r Fem der
Gende
′

Finger
der
“edition” “finger”
Figure 1b. Model of language-shared representations of gender information associated

with nouns at the lemma level in the bilingual lexicon (based on Levelt et al. 1999): An
example of gender-incongruent L1 & L2 nouns.
Lemma level
Masc Masc Gen

der der
Gen
′
Finger
o der
“century” “finger”
Figure 2a. Model of language-independent representations of gender information asso-

ciated with nouns at the lemma level in the bilingual lexicon (based on Levelt et al. 1999):
An example of gender-congruent L1 & L2 nouns.

Lemma level
Fem Masc
er Gen
d der
Gen
′

Finger
“edition” der
“finger”
Figure 2b. Model of language-independent representations of gender information asso-

ciated with nouns at the lemma level in the bilingual lexicon (based on Levelt et al. 1999):
An example of gender-incongruent L1 & L2 nouns.
6. PR OFIL E OF TH E BILIN G U A LS IN TH IS STU D Y
Twenty-six native Greek-speaking advanced learners of German took

part in Experiment 1 and another 26 in Experiment 2, none of whom
had participated in Experiment 1. Participants were either students
or graduates of the department of German Studies of the University
of Athens. All had an advanced level language certificate in German
(e.g., Kleines Deutsches Sprachdiplom from the Goethe Institute or
Abitur). [In the remainder of this section, numbers before the slash
refer to Experiment 1 and numbers after the slash to Experiment 2.]
On average they started learning German at the age of 10 (SD 5.1)/11
(SD 4.6) and had received 10 years (SD 3/SD 2.9) of formal instruction;
they had lived in a German-speaking country an average of 3.5/1.15
years (SD = 3.98/SD = 4.24); 14/16 reported learning German
through formal instruction and 12/10 through a combination of class-
room instruction and exposure to a German-speaking environment. All
but one spoke at least one other foreign language apart from German
(M = 1.46/M = 1.5) but none were balanced bilingual in any of them.
The participants scored a mean of 3.18(SD 0.42)/3.07 (SD 0.43) on a
self-assessment 4-point scale designed to measure L2 communicative
competence (Bachman & Palmer’s (1989) Method 2, Self-rating) and a
mean of 7.56 (SD 1.47)/7.12(SD 1.36) when asked to rate their com-
prehension in L2 on a 10-point scale (1 = very low . . . 10 = same as in
my native language).

7. E XPE R IME NT 1: G RA MMATICA LITY J U D G M EN TS
Experiment 1 focuses on the representation of grammatical gender dur-

ing language comprehension within and across languages. In particular,
it investigates whether gender features are shared within a language (L1)
and whether equivalent L1 and L2 gender features are also shared in the
bilingual lexicon between (non translation-equivalent or semantically
unrelated) L1 and L2 nouns during language comprehension. To that
end, an on-line grammaticality judgment task with definite determiner +
noun NPs was employed. Participants were presented with a continu-
ous stream of NPs. Prime NPs were the trials immediately preceding
target NPs and for both types of phrases participants had to perform a
grammaticality judgment; that is, they had to decide whether each NP
was grammatical or ungrammatical. The ungrammaticality in this case
comprised a gender agreement violation between determiner and noun.
Unlike the grammaticality judgment tasks used in previous stud-
ies (e.g., Bates et al. 1996; Akhutina et al. 2001), this task did not
compare responses between grammatical and ungrammatical phrases;
instead, it focused exclusively on the grammatical phrases and checked
for a gender-congruency effect, that is, whether judgment on an NP
accelerates following judgment on a gender-congruent relative to a
gender-incongruent NP. Since previous research has shown that L2
learners process gender information only when the local syntactic envi-
ronment necessitates it (Holmes & Dejean de la Bâtie 1999; Taraban &
Kempe 1999; Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001), a task involving explicit
computation of gender agreement, such as grammaticality judgments on
gender-marked NPs, was considered the most appropriate means to test
the representation of gender features in the bilingual lexicon.
The L1–L2 pair was Greek-German. Findings that only learners
whose L1 gender system resembled closely that of the L2 approached
native-like gender processing in L2 (Sabourin 2001, 2003) render Greek-
German an optimal language pair for observing possible cross-linguistic
gender effects. This is because both have a tri-partite gender system
(masculine, feminine and neuter) and require gender agreement between
determiner and noun (the type of NP to be tested in this and the following
experiment).

The task was divided into two blocks. In the within language block,
primes and targets were in L1 (Greek). In the between languages block,
primes were in L1 (Greek) and targets in L2 (German). In both Greek
and German the definite determiner and the noun of an NP must agree in
terms of grammatical gender, number and case. Number and case were
kept constant throughout the task (singular nominative). More impor-
tantly, a key manipulation in the material was that none of the nouns in
the German NPs had the same gender as its Greek translation (e.g., Wort
(“word”) is neuter while its Greek translation λέξη is feminine). This
procedure ensured that any effect obtained in the BLg block would not
be due to priming of the gender of the Greek translation of the target NP.
All L1 (Greek) primes and target NPs consisted of gender-opaque
nouns. Greek, unlike German, morphologically marks grammatical gen-
der on the noun ending. More specifically, nouns can be divided into two
categories. The first are nouns that have identical inflectional suffixes
across all three genders in the nominative singular (-oς is attached to
masculine, feminine, and neuter word forms). I will term these gender-
opaque nouns since grammatical gender cannot be recovered from the
word ending alone7 (see Bates et al. 1996 for a similar classification of
nouns in Italian). The second are nouns that have different inflectional
suffixes according to gender in the nominative singular. I will refer to
these as gender-transparent nouns.
This choice of gender-opaque NPs for Greek was made to deflect
claims that gender judgment with gender-transparent NPs can be a very
superficial process, a mere check between the definite determiner and
the noun ending without any access and retrieval of the gender feature
of the noun. For this reason, gender-opaque NPs, which require access
to the mental lexicon to retrieve gender information, were thought to
be more appropriate to use in a grammaticality judgment task in which
processing of gender is fairly explicit. Had the L2 NPs been gender-
transparent, it would have been possible for L2 learners to retreat to a
conscious strategy on L2 gender decision (“infer the grammatical gender
from the gender-transparent noun ending”).
If equivalent gender representations are shared among L1 and L2
nouns of the same gender, a cross-language gender-congruency effect
is expected. That is, activation of a gender representation via a NP in

one language will not dissipate immediately and will speed subsequent
processing of a NP in the other language that requires access to the same
gender as opposed to a different gender. If gender representations are not
shared between L1 and L2, then a gender-congruency effect is expected
within L1.
Finally, to investigate whether any priming effect obtained in this
paradigm derives from the repetition of the definite determiner form
between primes and targets, ungrammatical NPs were arranged into
pairs of “primes” and “targets,” and were controlled for determiner con-
gruency (whether the determiner was repeated or not between “primes”
and “targets”) and gender transparency of the noun ending. If repe-
tition of the definite determiner form is a determinant of priming in
this task, then priming should be obtained both with grammatical and
ungrammatical NPs.
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Material The critical materials were grammatical NPs compris-
ing a definite determiner and a noun. There was a within language (WLg)
block which contained 16 gender-opaque Greek (L1) target NPs (6 mas-
culine, 5 feminine and 5 neuter) and a between language (BLg) block
which contained 16 German (L2) NPs (6 masculine, 5 feminine and
5 neuter). Both blocks used the same primes: 32 grammatical gender-
opaque Greek (L1) NPs. The German NPs did not involve correlations
between phonological form and grammatical gender (Köpcke & Zubin
1984) as far as possible. The same also holds for the German material
used in the ungrammatical NPs.8 None of the nouns in the German NPs
had the same gender as its Greek translation to ensure that any effect
obtained in the BLg block would not be due to translation priming.
In the Gender-Congruent (CON) condition, each target NP was pre-
ceded by a prime NP with the same gender, and therefore the same
definite determiner, in the WLg block or its translation equivalent deter-
miner in the BLg block. In the Gender-Incongruent (INC) condition,
each target NP was preceded by a prime NP with a different gender
and hence a different definite determiner in the WLg block or a non-
translation equivalent determiner in the BLg block. Target NPs in the
WLg and BLg blocks were paired based on frequency, syllable and let-
ter length. In each block within each prime condition every prime NP

Table 1. Example set of grammatical prime and target material of

Experiment 1
occurred only once. An example set of grammatical target and prime

materials can be viewed in Table 1, while the Appendix provides the full
list of grammatical prime and target NPs of Experiment 1.
L1 and L2 target NPs were matched in terms of frequency of occur-
rence, syllable and letter length as far as possible (one-way ANOVAs:
Frequency: F(1, 30) = .01, p > .9; Syllables: F(1, 30) = 19.23,
p < .001; Letters: F(1, 30) = 10.28, p < .01). Likewise, prime NPs
were matched for syllable and letter length as far as possible across
the CON and INC experimental conditions (2 × 2 ANOVAs: Syllables:
all Fs(1, 60) < 2.23, p > .14; Letters: all Fs(1, 60) < .03, p > .86).
Table 2 presents the mean frequency and average length in syllables and
letters of the critical grammatical items for Experiment 1.
In addition, equal numbers of ungrammatical NPs were constructed
by combining nouns with a gender-incongruent definite determiner (e.g.,
derMASC FeuerNEUT “the fire”). None, however, of the nouns from the
grammatical NPs were used in the ungrammatical phrases. In all ungram-
matical NPs, the nouns were combined equally often with their two
incongruent definite determiners.
The experimental design of these ungrammatical NPs was the same
as that of the grammatical NPs since both were subjected to the same
statistical analyses. That is, ungrammatical NPs were also presented
in pairs of “targets” and “primes” in a WLg and a BLg block. In
the CON condition, each “target” NP was preceded by an ungram-
matical “prime” NP containing the same definite determiner in the

Table 2. Frequency and average length in syllables and letters of the critical
grammatical material of Experiment 1
Target nouns Prime nouns

L1 L2 CON INC
Frequency∗ 67.93 70.56 WLg BLg WLg BLg

Syllables 2.06 1.43 2.38 2.63 2.69 2.44
Letters 5.43 4.5 6.19 6.25 6.19 6.13
CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent, WLg = Within-Language, BLg =
Between-Languages.
∗ Number of occurrences per million, using the word form frequency estimate of the HNC (1999)
for the Greek stimuli and the German version of the CELEX Lexical Database (1998) for the
German stimuli.
WLg block or its translation equivalent determiner in the BLg block.

In the INC condition, each “target” NP was preceded by a “prime”
NP containing a different definite determiner in the WLg block or
a non-translation equivalent determiner in the BLg block. The defi-
nite determiner in the ungrammatical L2 NPs matched neither the L2
noun nor its Greek translation (e.g., derMASC FeuerNEUT = ϕωτιάFEM
“fire”) apart from two exceptions dieFEM HerzNEUT = καρδιάFEM
“heart”; dasNEUT BriefMASC = γράµµαNEUT “letter”). An example
set of ungrammatical “target” and “prime” material can be viewed in
Table 3, while the full list of ungrammatical material is provided in the
Appendix.
The nouns of the L1 and L2 “target” NPs were matched in terms of
frequency of occurrence and average length in syllables and letters as
far as possible (one-way ANOVAs: Frequency: F(1, 30) = .01, p > .9;
Syllables: F(1, 30) = 40.0, p < .001; Letters : F(1, 30) = 5.0,
p < .01). Similarly, the nouns of the “prime” NPs were tallied for length
in syllables and letters as closely as possible across the CON and INC
conditions (2 × 2 ANOVAs: Syllables: all Fs(1, 60) < 1.23, p > .27;
Letters: all Fs(1, 60) < .28, p > .59) (see Table 4). At the beginning of
each block an additional 12 NPs (6 grammatical and 6 ungrammatical)
served as practice material. In the BLg block half of the practice NPs
were in Greek and half in German.

Table 3. Example set of ungrammatical “prime” and “target” material of

Experiment 1
Table 4. Frequency and average length in syllables and letters of the critical
ungrammatical material of Experiment 1
Target nouns Prime nouns

L1 L2 CON INC
Frequency∗ 70.31 68.13 WLg BLg WLg BLg

Syllables 2.25 1.25 2.87 2.81 2.62 2.68
Letters 5.43 4.62 6.75 6.87 6.68 6.56
CON = Determiner-Congruent, INC = Determiner-Incongruent, WLg = Within-Language,
BLg = Between-Languages.
∗ Number of occurrences per million, using the word form frequency estimate of the HNC (1999)
for the Greek stimuli and the German version of the CELEX Lexical Database (1998) for the
German stimuli.
7.1.2. Design The experimental design was comprised of two factors,

with two levels each: language of target – prime pairs (within language
[WLg] vs. between languages [BLg]) and gender congruency of target –
prime pairs (Congruent [CON] vs. Incongruent [INC]). Both experi-
mental factors were within participants. Language was between items
and gender congruency was within items.
Two experimental lists were created. Each list consisted of a total
of 32 (16 L1 and 16 L2) grammatical target items and 32 (16 L1 and

16 L2) ungrammatical “target” items. There were two prime versions

(CON and INC) for each of the 32 grammatical and 32 ungrammatical
items and each list contained only one version. For each list, two further
sub-lists were created in which the order of the Language blocks was
rotated as follows: Sub-List 1: WLg block, BLg block; Sub-List 2:
BLg block, WLg block. This resulted in four experimental lists in total.
Each participant was tested on one of the four lists and both versions of
the 32 grammatical and 32 ungrammatical items were tested every two
participants. The order of grammatical and ungrammatical trials within
each list was individually randomized so that:
(a) no more than three successive pairs of prime-target trials belonged
to the same prime condition;
(b) each pair of grammatical prime and target NP and each pair of
ungrammatical “prime” and “target” NP occurred only once;
(c) targets did not have the same gender on more than three successive
pairs of trials.
In total each list contained 152 trials (32 grammatical target NPs, 32
grammatical prime NPs, 32 ungrammatical “target” NPs, 32 ungram-
matical “prime” NPs and 24 practice NPs).
7.1.3. Procedure Participants were seated in front of a 14-inch PC mon-

itor at a viewing distance of approximately 80 cm. The instructions were
presented on screen (in L1 in the WLg block and in L2 in the BLg block).
Participants had to press the GREEN button on a response box if they
thought a phrase was grammatically correct or the RED button if they
thought it was grammatically incorrect. (The dominant hand was always
used for the “grammatical” response.) Their response had to be as fast
and as accurate as possible. Each experimental trial started with the pre-
sentation of a fixation point (*) for 300 ms, followed by a NP which
stayed on screen until the participant’s response. The ITI was 1,000 ms.
All stimuli were presented in lowercase black letters against a white
background in their singular, nominative form. Response latencies were
measured to the nearest millisecond from the onset of each NP stimulus
using SuperLab.
At the end of the task participants were presented with a post-test list
containing all L2 nouns that had been used in the BLg block and were

asked to write down the correct L2 definite determiner for each noun.
This post-test questionnaire was used to determine which items had to
be removed from the data analysis, as explained in the results section
below. Each experimental session lasted approximately 30 min.
7.2. Results
Target response latencies that fell into any of the following categories
were excluded from the data analyses:
(i) latencies from trials on which the wrong button was pressed,
(ii) latencies from target trials that were “misprimed,” that is, preceded
by a prime trial on which the wrong button was pressed,
(iii) latencies longer than a preset time of 2.5 s,
(iv) latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations (SD) from
a participant’s or an item’s mean (outliers),
(v) latencies from L2 target trials on which the correct button was
pressed but the participant failed to produce the correct definite
determiner for the same L2 noun in a post-test “gender check-up”
questionnaire.
The same but separate analyses were performed for grammatical and
ungrammatical items.
7.2.1. Grammatical items Of all data points in the grammatical trials,

7.3% were identified as erroneous (1.56% in the WLg and 5.77% in the
BLg block) and 1.6% as long responses (0.4% in the WLg and 1.2%
in the BLg block) and were excluded from further analysis. Table 5
displays the mean response latency and the percentage of errors and
long responses for each prime condition in the grammatical trials. By-
participant and by-item analyses of variance were performed on mean
response latency and arcsine-transformed percentage of lost data for all
conditions.
For the response latencies, a 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg)
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Language (F1 (1, 25) =
38.96, MSe = 42870.8, p < .001; F2 (1, 30) = 54.71, MSe =
17112.7, p < .001) and a significant main effect of Gender Congru-
ency (F1 (1, 25) = 16.7, MSe = 6588.1, p < .001; F2 (1, 30) = 16.91,
MSe = 4219.1, p < .001). Their interaction did not reach significance

(both Fs < .392). The mean RTs in Table 5 show that participants were
faster at judging a target NP grammatical following a prime NP with the
same gender than one with a different gender, and they were also faster
at doing so in their L1 than L2 target responses.
ANOVAs were also run on the lost data. The significant results of
these analyses are reported below. A 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs.
BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Language in the
Total Lost (= Errors + Long Responses) data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 9.83,
MSe = .095, p < .01; F2 (1, 30) = 12.94, MSe = .045, p = .001)
and the Total Error data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 4.33, MSe = .065, p < .05;
F2 (1, 30) = 5.32, MSe = .034, p < .05), indicating that both the
overall lost and error data were more numerous in L2 than L1. Most
importantly, the gender-congruency effect was non-significant in all lost
data analyses, suggesting that the gender manipulation of primes did not
significantly affect the number of errors produced during grammaticality
judgment in L1 or L2. Similarly, the off-line errors in the post-test
“gender check-up” questionnaire (i.e., cases where participants failed
to produce the correct definite determiner for the critical L2 nouns)
Table 5. Results for the grammatical NPs of Experiment 1 (N = 26)
Within LG Between LG Difference
CON
RT 804 1071 267
SD 142 219
%Errora 1.4 11
%Longb 1 2.9
INC
RT 883 1122 239
SD 139 239
%Errora 4.8 12
%Longb 0.5 1.9
Difference 79 51
CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent, RT = mean Response Time
(in ms), SD = Standard Deviation.
a Mean percentage of total error data.
b Mean percentage of total long responses (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off
collapsed).

were not significantly more numerous in the BLg INC (9.1% ) than BLg
CON (7.2% ) condition (both Fs < .765). This finding implies that NPs
appearing in the INC conditions were not inherently more difficult than
those appearing in the CON conditions.
7.2.2. Ungrammatical items After application of the five data exclusion

criteria, one L2 item in the BLg block had more than 40% data points
missing in one experimental condition and was discarded. To ensure
exact comparability between the two blocks, the equivalent L1 item in
the WLg block was discarded as well. Of all data points in the remaining
items, 13.1% were identified as erroneous (2.7% in the WLg and 10.4%
in the BLg block) and 2.1% as long responses (0.7% in the WLg and
1.4% in the BLg block) and were excluded from further analysis. Table 6
displays the mean response latency and the percentage of errors and long
responses for each prime condition in the ungrammatical trials.
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Language (F1 (1, 25) =
Table 6. Results for the ungrammatical NPs of Experiment 1 (N = 26)
Within LG Between LG Difference
CON
RT 1035 1372 337
SD 159 333
%Errora 3.6 17.9
%Longb 1.5 2.1
INC
RT 1044 1345 301
SD 165 301
%Errora 7.2 23.6
%Longb 1 3.6
Difference 9 −27
CON = Determiner-Congruent, INC = Determiner-Incongruent, RT = mean Response
Time (in ms), SD = Standard Deviation.
a Mean percentage of total error data.
b Mean percentage of total long responses (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off
collapsed).

28.43, MSe = 93162.4, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 59.86, MSe =

19672.8, p < .001). The mean RTs in Table 6 show that participants
were faster at judging a target NP ungrammatical in L1 than L2. Neither
the main effect of Gender Congruency nor its interaction with Language
reached significance (all Fs < .682).
The pattern of results in the lost data analyses resembles that of the
grammatical items. A 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of Language in the Total Lost
(= Errors + Long Responses) data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 20.46, MSe =
.105, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 37.21, MSe = .034, p < .001) and the Total
Error data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 13.98, MSe = .098, p = .001; F2 (1, 28) =
18.55, MSe = .04, p < .001). In both cases the main effect of Gen-
der Congruency approached or reached significance in the participant
analysis (Total Lost data: F1 (1, 25) = 4.02, MSe = .034, p = .056;
Total Error data: F1 (1, 25) = 6.04, MSe = .027, p < .05) but not in the
item analysis (Total Lost data: F2 (1, 28) = 2.45, p > .12; Total Error
data: F2 (1, 28) = 21.73, p > .19). Simple contrasts between CON and
INC conditions in the participant analysis did not show any significant
differences (Total Lost data: all Fs < 2.79, p > .1; Total Error data: all
Fs < 3.48, p > .074).
The difference between the BLg CON (8.8% ) and BLg INC (12.3%)
conditions in terms of “wrong L2 determiner” errors in the post-test
“gender check-up” questionnaire approached but did not reach signif-
icance (F1 (1, 25) = 3.66, MSe = .02, p = .067; F2 (1, 14) = 3.17,
MSe = .016, p = .097).
In summary, as for the grammatical items, the total lost and error
data were more numerous in L2 than L1 for the ungrammatical items.
Additionally, the lack of any statistically significant difference between
CON and INC conditions in any of the (on- or off-line) analyses suggests
that NPs presented in the INC conditions were not more prone to error
than those presented in the CON conditions.
7.3. Discussion
The results demonstrate that a gender-congruency effect is obtained
within language (L1) and more importantly, between languages (L1-to-
L2) among L1 and L2 nouns that were neither translation-equivalents

nor semantically related. Judging the grammaticality of an L1 NP was

on average 79 ms faster following gender-congruent L1 prime NPs than
gender-incongruent ones. Judging the grammaticality of an L2 NP was
51 ms faster in the gender-congruent than – incongruent conditions.
The difference in the size of the effect between the two language condi-
tions did not reach significance. As expected for L1-dominant bilinguals,
the processing of L1 NPs (in terms of grammatical gender agreement
between determiner and noun) was clearly faster than that of the L2
NPs. The results are in line with the language-shared gender hypothesis,
which claims that gender specifications are shared within a language
but also between languages (cf. Figures 1a & 1b), at least in the case of
equivalent L1 and L2 gender specifications.
Moreover, the fact that no equivalence of word form held between
L1 prime NPs and L2 target NPs speaks against the localization of the
effect at the word-form level. The results support the view that the effect
takes place at the level of abstract gender features that are utilized dur-
ing the computation of gender agreement in language comprehension.
More importantly, these gender features appear to be shared within and
across languages by gender controllers and agreement targets wherever
possible.
Due to the nature of the task, we should address the possibility that
the effect obtained within and between languages might be the result
of either repetition priming of the determiner forms in the WLg CON
condition, or translation priming between the determiner forms in the
BLg CON condition. However, the fact that no such effect was observed
either within or between languages with the ungrammatical NPs which
were also preceded by “prime” NPs containing the same determiner
(WLg CON), a translation equivalent determiner (BLg CON) or a dif-
ferent determiner (WLg & BLg INC), excludes the aforementioned
possibility.
The cross-language priming could alternatively be viewed as
within-language priming resulting from a translation strategy. For
instance, being L1-dominant bilinguals, participants might have silently
translated L2 target NPs into L1 and computed gender agreement in L1.
This possibility can be excluded, however, because the L2 target NPs
had a different gender from their L1 translations in all conditions. Any

influence, therefore, from L1 translation would have affected all exper-

imental conditions equally and would not have resulted in a significant
effect of gender congruency.
Finally, one could also claim that the effects reflect the operation of a
gender-congruency check rather than activation of gender features, due
to the nature of the task employed. The grammaticality judgment task
has been argued to tap into post-lexical processes that entail a checking
mechanism which evaluates the gender congruency of an utterance’s
constituents (e.g., Bates, Pizzamiglio et al. 1996; Bates, Devescovi
et al. 1996). Gender information activated by an agreement target (an
adjective in this case) remains active until it is checked against the gen-
der information activated by an agreement controller (a noun). It is
unlikely that such a checking mechanism would operate differently (and
thus cause an effect) when applied to grammatical phrases that differ in
terms of gender only (i.e., masculine, feminine or neuter phrases). It is
more likely that it functions differently between grammatical (gender-
congruent) and ungrammatical (gender-incongruent) phrases so that the
latter take longer to be checked than the former.
In summary, Experiment 1 demonstrated the existence of a gender-
congruency effect both within (L1) and across languages (L1-to-L2) in
comprehension. Participants tended to be faster when judging phrases
of the same gender than when judging phrases of a different gender. This
tendency was independent of word form repetition (either the definite
determiner form or nominal inflection), both within and across lan-
guages. In addition, across languages this tendency held for semantically
unrelated L1 and L2 nouns. These findings strongly suggest that gen-
der features are activated during the comprehension of gender-marked
phrases and that nouns of the same gender draw on a common represen-
tation of their gender feature in the monolingual and bilingual lexicons.
8. E XPE R IMEN T 2: PICTU RE N A MIN G
Experiment 1 showed an L1-to-L2 gender-congruency effect in a

grammaticality judgment task, suggesting that the gender features
accessed during comprehension are shared between L1 and L2 nouns.
Experiment 2 extends this investigation further by testing whether

equivalent gender properties of semantically unrelated L1 and L2

nouns are shared or remain independent across languages and across
comprehension and production.
Despite possible processing disparities between comprehension and
production, the fact that communication takes place and speakers get
their message across to listeners implies that at some level comprehen-
sion and production draw on the same linguistic resources. Monsell
(1987) argued that while word recognition and production entail sep-
arate input and output phonological and orthographic lexicons, they
have a common “conceptual/functional” domain where the semantic
and syntactic properties of words are represented. Cutting (1997), for
instance, showed that word production and recognition share semantic
processes but employ different phonological processes. According to the
shared semantics-syntax hypothesis, as Bock and Griffin (2000) note,
one would expect comprehension and production tasks to yield different
results when they do not tap into semantic or syntactic processing but the
same results when they require activation of the semantic and syntactic
properties of words. If, therefore, comprehension and production draw
on the same lexical-syntactic information, then a gender-congruency
effect – equivalent to the one obtained in Experiment 1 – is also
anticipated in a production task, at least within L1.
Thus, Experiment 2 tested for a gender-congruency effect in L1
(Greek) and from L1 to L2 (German) using a picture-word interference
task. The picture-word interference task has long been used in L1 to
explore activation and representation of gender information. Schriefers
(1993), for example, had native Dutch speakers name pictures using a
gender-marked NP in Dutch (e.g., het NEUT groene bedNEUT “the green
bed”). The pictures were accompanied by visual distractor words which
speakers had to ignore. Although distractors were not overtly marked for
gender, naming latencies were significantly faster following a distractor
of the same gender as the target picture name than following a distrac-
tor of a different gender (the gender-congruency effect). These findings
show that nouns of the same gender access the same gender representa-
tions in L1. The gender-congruency effect has since been replicated and
explored further in a number of studies (van Berkum 1997; La Heij et al.
1998) and languages (e.g., German; Schriefers & Teruel 1999, 2000).

Experiment 2 was a bilingual version of the picture-word interference

task with a WLg block (distractors and picture naming in L1) and a BLg
block (distractors in L1 and picture naming in L2). If gender features
are shared between any L1 and L2 nouns in the bilingual lexicon (the
language-shared gender hypothesis), a BLg gender-congruency effect
is predicted with non translation-equivalent nouns. If there are two seg-
regated sets of gender features in the bilingual lexicon, one for the L1
and one for the L2 (the language-independent gender hypothesis), no
BLg gender-congruency effect is predicted.
8.1. Method
8.1.1. Material The critical material consisted of two types of stimuli:
pictures and distractor words. There was a W(ithin)-Lg block in which
distractor words and target pictures were presented and named respec-
tively in Greek (L1); and a B(etween)-Lg block in which distractor words
were presented in Greek and target pictures were named in German (L2).
The former block included 15 target pictures, corresponding to two- or
three-syllable Greek nouns, whereas the latter block included 15 target
pictures, corresponding to one-, two- or three-syllable German nouns. In
each block there were equal numbers of pictures of masculine, feminine,
or neuter nouns, that is, five of each gender. None of the picture names
were cognates in the two languages. In addition, none of the German
picture names had the same gender as its Greek translation (e.g., Fin-
ger [“finger”] is masculine whereas its Greek translation δάχτυλo is
neuter). This procedure ensured that any effect obtained in the BLg
block would not be due to priming of the gender of the Greek name of
the target pictures.
All Greek picture names were gender-transparent (e.g., κoυτί “box”)
except three masculine ones that ended in -oς/-óς. In the case of the
German picture names, correlations between phonological form and
grammatical gender were avoided as far as possible. Both blocks used
the same 30 Greek (L1) distractor words: 30 gender-transparent nouns
(10 of each gender) consisting of two- or three-syllables. Distractor
words and picture names were used in their nominative singular form.
The gender-transparent endings of the Greek picture names (masc. -άς,
-ης; fem. -ά; neut. -ι, -ί) were different from the gender-transparent

endings of the distractor nouns (masc. -ας, -άς; fem. -η; neut. -µα)10 .
Any effect obtained in the WLg block could not therefore be attributed
to priming of the surface form of the noun endings.
In every block each of the 15 pictures had three different versions,
one for each of the three distractor conditions. In the gender-congruent
(CON) condition, each picture was combined with a distractor noun
that had the same gender as the picture name. In the gender-incongruent
(INC) condition, each picture was combined with a distractor noun that
had a different gender from the picture name. In the Baseline condition,
each picture was combined with a string of 5 X (e.g., XXXXX). An
example set of target and distractor material can be viewed in Table 7,
and the full list of picture names and distractor words can be found in
the Appendix.
L1 and L2 picture names of the same gender in the WLg and
BLg blocks were paired based on frequency, syllable and letter length
(one-way ANOVAs: all Fs(1, 28) < 1.43, p > .24) as were the
L1 distractor nouns across the CON and INC experimental conditions
(one-way ANOVAs for frequency, number of syllables and letters: all
Fs(1, 28) < .75, p > .39). Each one of the L1–L2 picture pairs received
the same L1 distractor words in the CON and INC conditions. Table 8
presents the mean frequency, syllable and letter length of critical items
for Experiment 2. Pairs of picture names and distractors were never
Table 7. Example set of target and distractor material of Experiment 2

Table 8. Frequency, syllable and letter length of critical

material of Experiment 2
Target pictures Distractor words

L1 L2 CON INC
Frequency∗ 29.46 34.46 184.5 186.1

Syllable length 2.26 2.06 2.53 2.53
Letter length 5.33 5.66 5.33 5.53
CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent.
∗ Number of occurrences per million, using the word form frequency
estimate of the HNC (1999) for the Greek stimuli and the German version
of the CELEX Lexical Database (1998) for the German stimuli.
phonologically, semantically or associatively related. In each block an

additional eight pictures, six distractor words and two Baseline letter
strings (XXXXX) were selected to serve as practice material.
8.1.2. Design The experimental design was comprised of two factors,

each with two levels: Language of the target name – distractor (within
language [WLg] vs. between languages [BLg]) and Gender Congru-
ency of target name – distractor (Congruent [CON] vs. Incongruent
[INC]). Both experimental factors were within-participants. Language
was between-items and gender congruency was within-items. In addi-
tion there were two baseline conditions: a within language baseline and a
between languages baseline. The baseline conditions constitute a neutral
measure of production latencies when no distractor word is present.
Two experimental lists were created and the order of the language
blocks in each of them was rotated as follows: List 1: WLg block, BLg
block; List 2: BLg block, WLg block. Apart from this difference, both
lists comprised 90 target pictures: the 15 L1 target pictures in each of the
three within language conditions and the 15 L2 target pictures in each
of the three between languages conditions. The order of critical trials
within each list was individually randomized so that:
(a) no more than three successive trials belonged to the same distractor
condition;
(b) each combination of target – distractor/prime occurred only once;

(c) a target item (and its distractor/prime) was never preceded by a

semantically, associatively, or phonologically related trial;
(d) a target was not repeated within ten consecutive trials;
(e) targets did not have the same gender on more than three successive
trials.
In total each list contained 106 trials (90 target + 16 practice trials).
Every participant was tested on one of the two experimental lists which
were used equally often during the task. Thus, all participants saw all
three versions of the 30 (15 L1 and 15 L2) experimental pictures.
8.1.3. Procedure The task consisted of two blocks: a within language

and a between languages block. In turn, each block included two parts:
a presentation/training part and a naming part. In the within language
block instructions were given in L1 and stated that pictures should be
named in Greek, while in the between languages block instructions were
given in L2 and stated that pictures should be named in German. In the
presentation part, the instructions stated that participants should name
the pictures using an appropriate definite determiner and a noun, then
press the shift key and compare their response with the phrase that
appears on the picture. If their response differed, they were advised
to pay attention to the phrase on the screen as they had to use only
that name during the main experiment. This practice was necessary in
the between languages block to ensure that participants would be able to
access readily the target NP in the main experimental session afterwards.
To attain comparability of the results of the two blocks, this practice was
introduced in the within language block too.
In the naming segment, participants were instructed to name the
pictures on screen as quickly and as accurately as possible with a NP con-
sisting of a definite determiner and a noun, or to say “don’t remember”/
“don’t know”. They were reminded to use only the names they had seen
in the previous segment, ignoring any other words that might appear on
the monitor. They were also asked to avoid starting a NP with the deter-
miner without knowing what they would say next. Each experimental
trial started with the presentation of a fixation point (+) for 300 ms
followed by the picture and 100 ms later by the distractor word which

was superimposed on the picture. Picture and distractor word stayed on

the screen until the participant’s response. The SOA was +100 ms. The
choice of the SOA was based on a pilot study that employed SOAs of
0 ms and +100 ms and showed a priming effect only at the latter SOA.
The ITI was 2,000 ms. A short practice section consisting of eight trials
preceded the main experimental component.
The fixation point and the pictures were centered on the screen. The
distractor words were either centered on the screen or were presented
in slightly different positions around the fixation point to discourage
participants from ignoring distractors by fixing on one part of the picture
but the position of the distractors remained constant for each individual
picture though. All words were presented in lowercase letters and in
singular, nominative case form without their definite determiner. The
display size of the pictures was 8.78 × 6.16 cm. All stimuli appeared in
black on a white background.
Each experimental session was audio-recorded. From the recordings,
response latencies were measured manually on a speech editor11 to the
nearest millisecond from the onset of the target stimulus (picture). This
measurement was made possible by using a beep sound, which was
played simultaneously with the onset of each target stimulus and was
inaudible to participants as it was sent directly from the PC on which
the experiment was run to a tape recorder connected with the PC. Each
experimental session lasted approximately 45 min. All other aspects of
the procedure were identical to those of Experiment 1.
8.2. Results
Target response latencies that fell into any of the following categories
were discarded from the data analyses:
(i) latencies from trials on which the response produced was not the
designated one,
(ii) latencies from trials on which the response was “don’t remember”
or “don’t know”,
(iii) latencies from trials on which there was a pause between the two
words of the NP (disfluency) or a response was repaired,

(iv) latencies longer than 2.5 s,

(v) latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations (SD) from
a participant’s or an item’s mean (outliers).
Of all data points, 5.1% were identified as erroneous and 4% as long
responses and were excluded from further analysis. Table 9 displays
the mean response latency, standard deviation and percentage of errors
and long responses for each distractor condition. By-participant and by-
item analyses of variance were performed of mean response latency and
arcsine-transformed percentage of lost data for the WLg CON, WLg
INC, BLg CON and BLg INC conditions.
Table 9. Results for Experiment 2 (N = 26)
Within LG Between LG BLg-WLg Difference
Baseline
RT 658 846 188
SD 63 106
%Errora 1.5 6.6
%Longb 3.6 4.9
CON
RT 741 875 134
SD 71 120
%Errora 3.3 8.7
%Longb 3.6 5.4
INC
RT 783 920 137
SD 68 118
%Errora 3.9 6.9
%Longb 1.5 4.9
INC-CON
Difference 42 45
WLg = Within-Language, BLg = Between-Languages, CON = Gender-Congruent,
INC = Gender-Incongruent, RT = mean Response Time (in ms), SD = Standard
Deviation.
a Mean percentage of data lost due to error.
b Mean percentage of long responses (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off
collapsed).

ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Gender Congruency
(F1 (1, 25) = 39.39, MSe = 12123.3, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 23.19,
MSe = 1065.9, p < .001) and a significant main effect of Language
(F1 (1, 25) = 32.08, MSe = 1533.1, p < .000; F2 (1, 28) = 57.35,
MSe = 4356.3, p < .001). The interaction of the main factors did not
reach significance (both Fs < .16). The mean RTs in Table 9 show that
participants were faster at producing a target NP when the distractor
word was of the same gender than of a different gender, and they were
also faster when the target response was in their L1 than their L2.
In addition, both Table 9 and Figure 3 show that the CON-baseline and
INC-baseline differences are bigger in the WLg than BLg conditions and
a second set of ANOVAs examined this issue. The 2(WLg vs. BLg) ×
2(CON-baseline vs. INC-baseline) ANOVA confirmed the above.
It yielded a significant main effect of language (F1 (1, 25) = 8.47, MSe =
8450.1, p < .01; F2 (1, 28) = 14.37, MSe = 1343.5, p = .001), indicat-
ing that the CON and INC differences from the baseline were shorter BLg
than WLg. The main effect of gender congruency was also significant
140
120
Difference from the baseline
100
80 CON
60 INC
40
20
0
Within Lg Between Lg
Figure 3. Effect of the two main factors (Language & Gender Congruency) in
Experiment 2.

(F1 (1, 25) = 32.1, MSe = 1533.2, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 23.2,
MSe = 1065.9, p < .001), indicating that the INC-baseline differ-
ences were bigger than those of the CON-baseline both WLg and BLg,
that is, once again showing a WLg and BLg gender-congruency effect.
The interaction was non-significant (both Fs < .17, p > .6).
The significant results in the lost data analyses are reported below.
For the total lost (= errors + long responses) data rates, a 2(CON vs.
INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
language (F1 (1, 25) = 12.3, MSe = .048, p < .01; F2 (1, 28) = 7.34,
MSe = .039, p < .05). The main effect of gender congruency was sig-
nificant in the participant analysis (F1 (1, 25) = 4.38, MSe = .02, p =
.047) and non-significant in the item analysis (F2 (1, 28) = 1.23),
reflecting a tendency for participants (but not items) to produce more
“lost” responses in the CON than INC conditions in both the WLg and
BLg blocks. The interaction of the main factors did not reach signif-
icance (both Fs < .33). In the long response analysis (outliers and
responses over the 2.5 s cut-off collapsed) only the main effect of lan-
guage was significant (F1 (1, 25) = 8.52, MSe = .023, p < .01;
F2 (1, 28) = 9.71, MSe = .013, p < .01). For the total error rates,
a 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of language in the participant analysis (F1 (1, 25) = 7.27,
MSe = .048, p < .05) and a marginally significant effect in the item
analysis (F2 (1, 28) = 4.1, MSe = .038, p = .053). It also showed
a significant interaction of the main factors in the participant analysis
(F1 (1, 25) = 4.8, MSe = .012, p < .05) but not in the item analysis
(F2 (1, 28) = .069, p = .79). Simple contrasts in the participant data
showed a significant difference between the BLg CON (8.7%) and BLg
INC (6.9%) conditions (F1 (1, 25) = 8.19, MSe = .01, p < .01).
In summary, the effect of language was significant in all the lost
data categories in both participant and item analyses, indicating that
participants produced errors and long responses more frequently in L2
than L1. This is not surprising given that the participants’ L1 proficiency
surpassed that of their L2 (all were L1-dominant bilinguals). In addition,
participants were more likely to produce errors in naming a picture in
L2 (but not L1) when the distractor word was gender-congruent with the
picture name than when it was gender-incongruent.

In the BLg block, error trials were also divided into: “wrong
determiner – L1 CON” signifying a wrong determiner congruent with
the gender of the L1 translation of the target L2 NP, and “wrong
determiner – L1 INC” signifying a wrong determiner incongruent with
the gender of the L1 translation of the target L2 NP. The effect of gender
congruency was not significant in the analyses of these two types of
error responses in the BLg block (both Fs < .66), showing that partic-
ipants were not likely to produce more “wrong determiner – L1 CON”
responses in an L1–L2 gender-congruent trial (2.8%) than in an L1–L2
gender-incongruent trial (2.6%). Note also that in this task all L2 target
nouns had a different gender from their L1 translations.
Finally, the mean proportion of “wrong determiner – L1 CON”
responses (35.8%) was not significantly different from that of “wrong
determiner – L1 INC” responses (37.3% ) across all conditions in the
BLg block as tested by a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (participants:
z = −.092, p > .9; items: z = −.357, p > .7). Together these
results confirm the effectiveness of the different gender manipulation
between L2 target names and their L1 translation because they indicate
that the gender of the L1 translation of the target picture either did not
affect performance or any effect was constant across all conditions. Oth-
erwise, one would have expected more “wrong determiner – L1 CON”
errors overall. The only source of the effect must therefore have been
the gender of the distractor word.
8.3. Discussion
The results show a gender-congruency effect within and, more impor-
tantly, across languages from L1 to L2 in oral production. Naming a
picture in L1 was on average 42 ms faster following L1 gender-congruent
distractor words compared to gender-incongruent ones. Similarly, nam-
ing a picture in L2 was on average 45 ms faster after L1 semantically
unrelated but gender-congruent than gender-incongruent distractors.
The difference between the gender-congruency effect in L1 and L2
naming was non-significant. In addition, as expected, picture naming
was faster in L1 than in L2 (in both gender-congruent and gender-
incongruent conditions) by L1-dominant bilinguals. These findings

are in line with the language-shared gender hypothesis which claims

that equivalent gender representations are shared between languages
(cf. Figures 1a & 1b). Furthermore, the present empirical evidence from
production concerning the representation of grammatical gender within
and across languages converges with that obtained in comprehension
(cf. Experiment 1).
Alternative explanations of the effect can be excluded. In particular,
this effect cannot be explained by assuming competition among free-
standing lexical items, such as determiners, during lexical selection
(Miozzo & Caramazza 1999) rather than activation of abstract gender
features. If it is assumed that there is cross-language lexical competition
(e.g., Hermans et al. 1998; Colomé 2001; Costa et al. 2003), this view
would predict no gender-congruency effect from L1 to L2. This absence
occurs because in the BLg CON condition two different determiner
forms will be activated and compete for selection (e.g., in Figures 1a &
2a the L1 masculine o from the L1 distractor and the L2 masculine der
from the L2 target noun) and two different forms will also be in the BLg
INC condition (e.g., in Figures 1b & 2b the L1 feminine η from the L1
distractor and the L2 masculine der). If it is assumed that there is no
cross-language lexical competition (Costa & Caramazza 1999; Costa
et al. 1999), the determiner-competition view again predicts no gender-
congruency effect from L1 to L2. The absence of a BLg effect in this
case would be due to lack of competition from L1 determiner forms in
either the CON or INC condition.
It is also unlikely that the cross-language effect is due to translation
priming from L1 to L2 determiner nodes12 for the following reasons.
First, if this were the case, one would expect more “wrong determiner”
errors in the BLg INC than CON condition simply because the gender
and determiner of L1 distractor word and L2 target noun were different
in the former but not in the latter case. The error analysis showed that
the difference was in the opposite direction to this prediction (BLg CON
6.2% vs. BLg INC 5.6%) and it was non-significant (both Fs < 2.4,
p > .13). Second, if the production of the L2 target determiner was
a direct translation of the L1 determiner form of the distractor word,
then one would expect that the majority of “wrong determiner” errors in
the BLg INC condition would be congruent with the determiner for the

L1 distractor word. Analysis of the “wrong determiner” errors in this

condition showed that this was not the case. Only 13 out of 22 “wrong
determiner” responses were translations of the definite determiner of the
L1 distractor word (χ 2 (1, N = 22) = .727, p > .39).
Comparing the WLg and BLg effect, a difference that needs to be
addressed is their relation to the baseline condition (cf. Figure 3). RTs in
both the CON and INC conditions relative to the baseline were slower
WLg than BLg. This effect did not interact with gender congruency,
suggesting that it is just a reflection of the presence or absence of a
distractor word. (The baseline is expected to be faster than the other
conditions because the baseline distractor (XXXXX) is not a word and
induces less processing than the distractor words in the CON and INC
conditions.)
This difference cannot be attributed to the fact that participants were
not activating the L1 distractor word or its gender in the BLg CON and
INC conditions in the same way that they were not activating a word
distractor or any gender in the BLg baseline condition. This could be
because they were able to “shut-off” L1 completely during L2 produc-
tion. Such an account, however, cannot explain the gender-congruency
effect obtained BLg. Had they been able to ignore the L1 distractors, no
significant difference should have been obtained between the BLg CON
and INC naming conditions either.
An explanation as to why the CON/INC conditions were closer to
the baseline BLg than WLg can be viewed in relation to the IC model’s
(Green 1998) account of language control during lexical access in bilin-
gual production. According to this model, language control is affected
by means of language task schemas, networks specifying the target lan-
guage and detailing the component processes of the target task. Such
schemas (e.g., word production schemas, translation schemas, etc.)
compete to control output from the lexico-semantic system and pri-
oritize the processing of stimuli (Green 1998: 69 & 77). In the present
task, the appropriate language task schema would be “picture naming
in L1” and “picture naming in L2” for the WLg and BLg blocks respec-
tively. Recall also that WLg and BLg trials were blocked (not mixed). In
this account, then, a picture-word interference task, much like a Stroop

task, elicits competition between a picture naming schema and a word

reading/naming schema. Participants must therefore ensure that they
are naming the picture rather than the distractor word. This is easier
when the distractor is in a non-target language because activated lem-
mas whose tags do not correspond to the target language are inhibited to
facilitate the target response. Consequently, the IC model predicts more
interference from a target language than non-target language distractor
because the language tag of the former matches one of the specifications
(target language) outlined by the target schema, and this pattern has been
experimentally observed13 (Ehri & Ryan 1980; Miller 1997). The fact
that distractors in the WLg block are in the target language and distrac-
tors in the BLg block are not can explain why the CON/INC conditions
are much slower than the baseline in the WLg block compared to the
BLg block. Although fully activating their information (therefore their
gender), the BLg distractors, belonging to the non-target language, inter-
fere less with picture naming than the WLg distractors. Additionally, if
gender nodes are shared between L1 and L2, as the present evidence
suggests, they might not bear language “tags” and could not be subject
to language control whether they have been activated by a target lan-
guage or a non-target language lemma. This would further explain why
gender features were fully processed in both the WLg and BLg block
resulting in the WLg and BLg gender-congruency effect.
Using picture naming, Experiment 2 showed a gender-congruency
effect both within (L1) and between languages (L1-to-L2). This find-
ing excludes the possibility that the BLg effect is due to determiner
competition across languages. Overall, the pattern of results suggests
that the L1 and L2 gender systems are not separate but interact in
the bilingual mental lexicon during language production. Nouns with
the same gender have a common representation of their gender feature
within but also across languages. The common L1 and L2 gender rep-
resentation in the bilingual lexicon pertains to all L1 and L2 nouns as
shown by the priming between semantically unrelated words. Finally,
these gender representations are shared between comprehension and
production as suggested by the priming of NP production by visual
distractor words.

9. CO N CLU SIO N S
Grammatical gender information opens up a new scope of investigation

in the study of the bilingual lexicon and the bilingual language system in
general. Although still in its infancy, psycholinguistic research on gram-
matical gender has unfolded interesting findings regarding the nature of
the bilingual lexicon. The empirical research reviewed in Sections 2,
3 and 4 shows that age of acquisition plays a role in L2 gender pro-
cessing as only early bilinguals appear to reach native-like performance
(Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001). Unlike early bilinguals, late L2 learn-
ers process gender features only when gender agreement needs to be
explicitly computed (Holmes & Dejean de la Bâtie 1999; Taraban &
Kempe 1999) but not when gender information is not necessary as in
single word production (Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001; Scherag et al.
2004). When, however, L2 learners do process gender, they heavily
rely on gender-marking on the noun forms (e.g., Bordag et al. 2005).
Evidence from ERP studies complements the behavioral findings in
showing that only L2 learners with an L1 gender system very simi-
lar to the L2 approach native-like performance in L2 gender processing
(e.g., German (L1) learners of Dutch (L2) as opposed to Romance lan-
guage (L1) and English (L1) learners, Sabourin 2001, 2003). It also
appears that when L1-dominant bilinguals listen to, read, or produce
gender-marked phrases in L2, L1 gender information is also activated
and affects L2 performance (Bordag 2003; Lemhöfer et al. submitted;
Paris & Weber 2004, 2005). But this does not appear to be the case for
balanced bilinguals (Costa et al. 2003). Finally, research on the orga-
nization of the bilingual lexicon points to an L1–L2 integrated gender
system in which cognates rely more on the L1 gender value than noncog-
nates (Salamoura & Williams in press). Furthermore, empirical evidence
presented in Sections 7 and 8 suggests that this integrated gender sys-
tem is not restricted to translation-equivalent nouns only but any L1 and
L2 nouns with the same gender value share a gender representation in
the bilingual lexicon. Last, this common L1–L2 gender system is also
shared between comprehension and production. Overall, it is hoped that
the present paper has reviewed evidence but also offered new empirical
findings as to why the study of gender information is a promising testing

ground for elucidating the representational and processing architecture

of the bilingual lexicon and the nature of L1–L2 interaction.
This research was supported by a doctoral Greek State Scholarship

(I.K.Y.) award. I would like to thank John N. Williams for fruitful
comments on an earlier version of this work and Marina Terkourafi
for proofreading parts of the manuscript.
N O TES
1. This delayed interest may partly be due to the fact that the bulk of psycholinguistic
research on L2 learning and processing is in English, a language that lacks
grammatical gender.
2. A gender monitoring task requires deciding on the gender of a word or a phrase.
3. A grammaticality judgment task entails judging whether a phrase, clause or sentence
is grammatically acceptable or not.
4. The only exception in this pattern were response times (RTs) in the naming task
which yielded no effect of noun ending.
5. Neither Holmes and Dejean de la Bâtie (1999) nor Taraban and Kempe (1999)
provide a language history of their L2 participants but their overall performance
(and particularly their error rates) indicates that they are most probably late rather
than early L2 learners.
6. In fact, the Catalan-Spanish bilinguals produced significantly fewer errors than the
native Spanish speakers in Experiment 4A.
7. The distinction between gender-transparent and -opaque nouns is based on their
inflectional suffix in the nominative singular only as this is the case and number in
which all critical nouns are used in the experiments of this study.
8. The only exceptions were two grammatical (Brille [‘glasses’], Kerze [‘candle’]) and
another two ungrammatical German NPs (Reise [‘journey’], Tasse [‘cup’]) which
presented a correlation between feminine gender and noun ending -e. These excep-
tions were unavoidable given that the L2 NPs had to be matched with the L1 NPs in
terms of frequency of occurrence, syllable and letter length as closely as possible.
9. These exceptions were unavoidable considering that L1 and L2 “target” NPs had
to be matched for frequency, syllable and letter length, in addition to the rest of
the restrictions in selecting the L2 nouns as well as the uneven distribution of the
three genders among nouns in the two languages (the order of gender frequency in
Greek was: neuter > feminine > masculine, whereas in German it was masculine >
feminine > neuter).

10. The only exception was one pair of picture name and distractor word (masc.: κoυβάς
“bucket” – βήχας “cough”).
11. The advantages of this method over the on-line measurement of latencies via a voice
key are discussed in detail by Morrison and Ellis (1995).
12. One way such priming could be effected is via lexical/translational links that are
assumed to exist between translation equivalent L1 and L2 lemmas/lexical nodes
(Kroll & Stewart, 1994). These links are stronger from L2 to L1 than vice versa in
L1-dominant bilinguals (ibid.).
13. For similar results in the bilingual Stroop task, see Preston and Lambert (1969) and
Chen and Ho (1986).
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A PPEN D IX
Critical items for Experiment 1

Grammatical NPs
Within-Language Block
Target NPs Prime NPs
g CON INC g
1. o καιρóς m o πóνoς τo χάoς n

(“the weather”) (“the pain”) (“the chaos”)
2. o λαιµóς m o σεισµóς τo δέoς n
(“the neck”) (“the earthquake”) (“the awe”)
3. o πάγoς m o τάϕoς τo κράνoς n
(“the ice”) (“the grave”) (“the helmet”)
4. o στóλoς m o άνεµoς η υδρóγειoς f
(“the fleet”) (“the wind”) (“the globe”)
5. o δεσµóς m o κóσµoς η πρóoδoς f
(“the bond”) (“the world”) (“the progress”)
6. o λóϕoς m o τρóµoς η έϕoδoς f
(“the hill”) (“the terror”) (“the assault”)
7. η oδóς f η κιβωτóς o νóµoς m
(“the street”) (“the ark”) (“the law”)
8. η ψήϕoς f η άνoδoς o oυρανóς m
(“the vote”) (“the ascension”) (“the sky”)
9. η άµµoς f η δoκóς τo βέλoς n
(“the sand”) (“the beam”) (“the arrow”)
10. η νóσoς f η διάµετρoς τo πέλαγoς n
(“the disease”) (“the diameter”) (“the open sea”)
11. η ήπειρoς f η παράγραϕoς τo γεγoνóς n
(“the continent”) (“the paragraph”) (“the event”)
12. τo άγχoς n τo µίσoς o τóπoς m
(“the stress”) (“the hatred”) (“the place”)
13. τo πλήθoς n τo τέυχoς o ύπνoς m
(“the crowd”) (“the issue”) (“the sleep”)
14. τo νέϕoς n τo κύρoς o πoταµóς m
(“the smog”) (“the authority”) (“the river”)
15. τo βάθoς n τo πάχoς η λεωϕóρoς f
(“the depth”) (“the fat”) (“the avenue”)
16. τo κέρδoς n τo θάρρoς η άβυσσoς f
(“the profit”) (“the courage”) (“the abyss”)
g =gender, CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent.

Between-Language Block
g CON INC g
1. das Ziel n τo χάoς o πóνoς m

(“the aim”) (“the chaos”) (“the pain”)
2. das Konto n τo δέoς o σεισµoς m
(“the account”) (“the awe”) (“the earthquake”)
3. der Ring m o τάϕoς τo κράνoς n
(“the ring”) (“the grave”) (“the helmet”)
4. die Brille f η υδρóγειoς o άνεµoς m
(“the glasses”) (“the globe”) (“the wind”)
5. die Milch f η πρóoδoς o κóσµoς m
(“the milk”) (“the progress”) (“the world”)
6. der Wein m o τρóµoς η έϕoδoς f
(“the wine”) (“the terror”) (“the assault”)
7. der Zug m o νóµoς η κιβωτóς f
(“the train”) (“the law”) (“the ark”)
8. der Tisch m o oνρανóς η άνoδoς f
(“the table”) (“the sky”) (“the ascension”)
9. die Kerze f η δoκóς τo βέλoς n
(“the candle”) (“the beam”) (“the arrow”)
10. das Kino n τo πέλαγoς η διάµετρoς f
(“the cinema”) (“the open sea”) (“the diameter”)
11. die Nummer f η παράγραϕoς τo γεγoνóς n
(“the number”) (“the paragraph”) (“the event”)
12. das Meer n τo µίσoς o τóπoς m
(“the sea”) (“the hatred”) (“the place”)
13. der Baum m o ύπνoς τo τεύχoς n
(“the tree”) (“the sleep”) (“the issue”)
14. der Apfel m o πoταµóς τo κύρoς n
(“the apple”) (“the river”) (“the authority”)
15. die Insel f η λεωϕóρoς τo πάχoς n
(“the island”) (“the avenue”) (“the fat”)
16. das Wort n τo θάρρoς η άβυσσoς f
(“the word”) (“the courage”) (“the abyss”)

Ungrammatical NPs
Within-Language Block
g∗∗ CON g INC g
1. η βαθµóς f/m η µέγεθoς f/n o σύγκλητoς m/f

(“the mark”) (“the size”) (“the senate”)
2. τo λύκoς n/m τo κάθoδoς n/f o πένθoς m/n
(“the wolf ”) (“the descent”) (“the mourning”)
3. η καπνóς f/m η µήκoς f/n o είσoδoς m/f
(“the smoke”) (“the length”) (“the entrance”)
4. τo διέξoδoς n/f τo θóρυβoς n/m η µέλoς f/n
(“the outlet”) (“the noise”) (“the member”)
5. τo πύργoς n/m τo θαλαµηγóς n/f η ξίϕoς f/n
(“the tower”) (“the yacht”) (“the sword”)
6. η ώµoς f/m η έδαϕoς f/n τo επωδóς n/f
(“the shoulder”) (“the ground”) (“the refrain”)
7. η λαóς f/m η óϕελoς f/n τo µέθoδoς n/f
(“the people”) (“the benefit”) (“the method”)
8. τo έξoδoς n/f τo θάνατoς n/m o σµήνoς m/n
(“the exit”) (“the death”) (“the swarm”)
9. o δίoδoς m/f o στέλεχoς m/n η κάµπoς f/m
(“the passage”) (“the stem”) (“the plain”)
10. τo σoρóς n/f τo βράχoς n/m η τέλoς f/n
(“the corpse”) (“the rock”) (“the end”)
11. τo σύνoδoς n/f τo óρoϕoς n/m o χρέoς m/n
(“the summit”) (“the floor”) (“the debt”)
12. o ύϕoς m/n o έπoς m/n η πλoύτoς f/m
(“the style”) (“the epic”) (“the wealth”)
13. η δάσoς f/n η χρóνoς f/m τo επέτειoς n/f
(“the forest”) (“the year/time”) (“the anniversary”)
14. ∗ o γένoς m/n o διάλεκτoς m/f τo παράδεισoς n/m
(“the race”) (“the dialect”) (“the paradise”)
15. o έθνoς m/n o περίoδoς m/f τo κίνδυνoς n/m
(“the nation”) (“the period”) (“the danger”)
16. o λάθoς m/n o πάρoδoς m/f η πóλεµoς f/m
(“the error”) (“the side street”) (“the war”)
∗ Items preceded by an asterisk were discarded from the analysis.
∗∗ The letter before the slash denotes the gender of the definite determiner whereas the letter after
the slash denotes the gender of the noun of the example NP.

Between-Languages Block
g∗∗ CON g INC g
1. der Bild m/n o σύγκλητoς m/f η µέγεθoς f/n

(“the picture”) (“the senate”) (“the size”)
2. der Boot m/n o πένθoς m/n τo κάθoδoς n/f
(“the boat”) (“the mourning”) (“the descent”)
3. der Reise m/f o είσoδoς m/f η µήκoς f/n
(“the journey”) (“the entrance”) (“the length”)
4. das Heirat n/f τo θóρυβoς n/m η µέλoς f/n
(“the wedding”) (“the noise”) (“the member”)
5. das Furcht n/f τo θαλαµηγóς n/f η ξίϕoς f/n
(“the fear”) (“the yacht”) (“the sword”)
6. die Hut f/m η έδαϕoς f/n τo επωδóς n/f
(“the hat”) (“the ground”) (“the refrain”)
7. die Arm f/m η óϕελoς f/n τo µέθoδoς n/f
(“the arm”) (“the benefit”) (“the method”)
8. das Brief n/m τo θάνατoς n/m o σµήνoς m/n
(“the letter”) (“the death”) (“the swarm”)
9. der Tasse m/f o στέλεχoς m/n η κάµπoς f/m
(“the cup”) (“the stem”) (“the plain”)
10. die Kreuz f/n η τέλoς f/n τo βράχoς n/m
(“the cross”) (“the end”) (“the rock”)
11. der Fabrik m/f o χρέoς m/n τo óρoϕoς n/m
(“the factory”) (“the debt”) (“the floor”)
12. der Feuer m/n o έπoς m/n η πλoύτoς f/m
(“the fire”) (“the epic”) (“the wealth”)
13. die Berg f/m η χρóνoς f/m τo επέτειoς n/f
(“the mountain”) (“the year/time”) (“the anniversary”)
14. ∗ das Rock n/m τo παράδεισoς n/m o διάλεκτoς m/f
(“the skirt”) (“the paradise”) (“the dialect”)
15. das Stuhl n/m τo κίνδυνoς n/m o περίoδoς m/f
(“the chair”) (“the danger”) (“the period”)
16. die Herz f/n η πóλεµoς f/m o πάρoδoς m/f
(“the heart”) (“the war”) (“the side street”)
∗ Items preceded by an asterisk were discarded from the analysis.
∗∗ The letter before the slash denotes the gender of the definite determiner whereas the letter after
the slash denotes the gender of the noun of the example NP.

Critical items for Experiment 2

Targets Distractor words
L1 Picture Names L2 Picture Names g CON INC g
ήλιoς Löwe m µήνας θέση f

(“sun”) (“lion”) (“month”) (“position”)
χάρτης Finger m αιώνας έκδoση f
(“map”) (“finger”) (“century”) (“edition”)
ϕάκελoς Schlüssel m αέρας ίδρυµα n
(“envelope”) (“key”) (“air”) (“institution”)
κoυβάς Mantel m βήχας πλήξη f
(“bucket”) (“coat”) (“cough”) (“boredom”)
ϕακóς Vogel m έρωτας έγκληµα n
(“torch”) (“bird”) (“love”) (“crime”)
πóρτα Blume f ένωση αγώνας m
(“door”) (“flower”) (“union”) (“match”)
σηµαία Zitrone f λάµΨη καυγάς m
(“flag”) (“lemon”) (“flash”) (“quarrel”)
σκάλα Hose f άνoιξη νóηµα n
(“ladder”) (“trousers”) (“spring”) (“meaning”)
τσάντα Flasche f άνεση θέαµα n
(“handbag”) (“bottle”) (“comfort”) (“show”)
λάµπα Gabel f σκέΨη χρώµα n
(“bulb”) (“fork”) (“thought”) (“colour”)
ϕίδι Sofa n κλάσµα µπελάς m
(“snake”) (“sofa”) (“fraction”) (“trouble”)
Ψάρι Herz n µάθηµα άξoνας m
(“fish”) (“heart”) (“lesson”) (“axis”)
ρoλóι Lineal n χρήµα δράση f
(“clock”) (“ruler”) (“money”) (“action”)
πoτήρι Motorrad n τέρµα βoρράς m
(“glass”) (“motorcycle”) (“finish/goal”) (“north”)
κoυτί Feuer n óνoµα πίεση f
(“box”) (“fire”) (“name”) (“pressure”)

CH A PTER 5
BILINGUALISM AND COGNITIVE ARITHMETIC
Elena Rusconi1 , Giovanni Galfano2 , and Remo Job3

1 University College, London
2 University of Padova, Padova
3 University of Trento, Rovereto
“He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense.”

John McCarthy, Computer scientist
Abstract
In this chapter we aim to give a taste of the current research in bilingualism and numerical
cognition. Far from being an exhaustive review, our chapter is intended to frame the
relationship between bilingualism and number processing into a novel perspective, by
reporting some of the most recent empirical findings. We will first introduce the topic by
focusing more generally on the link between language and number processing. A great
deal of our knowledge of numbers is traded, thought and manipulated by means of
language. But how essential is verbal language to numerical knowledge itself? Recent
studies have tentatively addressed the question by looking at numerical abilities in human
populations having a very poor lexicon for numbers. Their results will be briefly out-
lined before addressing the more specific issue of bilingualism. We will then turn to
the field of cognitive arithmetic, which has attracted most efforts and produced most of
the studies lying at the convergence between bilingualism and mathematical cognition.
As a general principle, basic experimental paradigms and effects that were originally
described with monolingual participants were employed to explore arithmetic compe-
tence in the first and second languages of bilingual participants. We will end by showing
how the introduction of novel experimental paradigms in the last few years promises to
challenge the conclusions drawn by previous studies.
1. L ANGUAGE IN N U M ERICA L CO G N ITIO N
It is widely agreed that the ability to represent numerical quantities

is not uniquely human. Evidence for number representations and
basic arithmetic reasoning has indeed been shown in non-human ani-
mals as well (e.g., Boysen & Capaldi 1993; Hauser et al. 2000).
153
© 2007 Springer.

154 E L EN A RU SCO N I ET A L.
More precisely, human and non-human animals are thought to share

a non-verbal representation of numbers having the distinctive feature of
scalar variability (with the possible exception of the first three or four
numbers; Trick & Pylyshyn 1994; but see Balakrishnan & Ashby 1992;
Cordes et al. 2001). In other words, in enumeration tasks, behavioral
accuracy gets proportionally worse as the target number increases, dis-
crimination between numerical quantities obeying a Weber–Fechner law
when based upon such non-verbal representation of number (Gallistel &
Gelman 2000). Scalar variability has been first shown in experiments
where animals (e.g., rats) were trained to press a lever a certain number
of times to get a food reward (e.g., Platt & Johnson 1971). The variabil-
ity in their behavioral approximation to the target number of presses was
proportional to the numerical quantity of the target, even for very small
numbers. When a similar procedure was adopted with humans (with-
out any food reward and under instructions to avoid verbal counting),
the results were strikingly similar to the animal model. Performance
in numerical approximation (i.e., in approaching the target number of
lever presses) was shown to be qualitatively different from performance
in estimating temporal intervals, which is a possible complication in non-
verbal counting procedures (Whalen et al. 1999); additionally, when the
strategical use of subvocal counting was prevented by concomitant artic-
ulatory suppression the results remained the same (Cordes et al. 2001).
This suggests that numerate individuals might have learned to map cul-
turally transmitted symbols onto non-verbal numerical representations
that still conserve their original scalar variability feature. Recent empiri-
cal evidence shows that children enter formal education with a starter kit
of numerical abilities enabling them to abstract numerosities from sets of
visual and auditory objects/events and perform approximate arithmeti-
cal operations before being formally taught their basic principles (Barth
et al. 2005). Interestingly, after extensive training chimps can learn to
associate symbols to sets of objects differing for just one unit, and to
perform ordinal judgments on those symbols even more efficiently than
human infants who received no training at all (e.g., Matsuzawa 1985;
Boysen & Berntson 1989). Addition abilities of visual Arabic numerals
were also reported by Olthof et al. (1997) in squirrel monkeys, which
were trained to choose on a display the numeral corresponding to the

B IL INGUAL ISM A N D CO G N ITIV E A RITH METIC 155
largest number of reward peanuts. When various arrays of numerals

were then presented on the same display, the trained animals tended to
choose the array with numerals having the largest sum.
There are, however, very substantial differences in numerical abilities
between humans and non-human animals. For example, children can
extend their representations well beyond the limits of counting proce-
dures (e.g., to the concepts of fractions and zero; see Gelman 1991).
They can use spoken and written language as flexible tools to repre-
sent and communicate exact numerosities. Mostly by means of spoken
language, children can learn by rote sets of arithmetical facts and
calculation procedures, which, along with numerical comprehension
abilities and the ability to decompose and transform numbers, lead
them to master simple and complex exact arithmetic (e.g., Ma 1999;
Kilpatrick et al. 2001).
The use of language is obviously one of the most distinctive char-
acteristics of human numerical cognition. Language and numerical
cognition appear to be intimately connected well before the beginning
of formal education, at least since when children start to master the
counting sequence, which normally occurs between the ages of 2 and 4
(Gelman & Gallistel 1978; Wynn 1990). Later on in the development,
cross-linguistic differences in the grammatical representation of num-
bers may even predict the relative salience of numerosity in processing
collections of objects (Athanasopoulos 2006). More precisely, speakers
of languages with grammatical number marking (e.g., English) judge
differences in the number of countable objects as more significant than
differences in the amount of non-countable substances, whereas speak-
ers of languages lacking grammatical number marking (e.g., Yucatec
or Japanese) do not. Also, speakers of languages lacking grammatical
number marking who learn a language with grammatical number mark-
ing proficiently judge differences in the number of countable objects as
more significant than differences in the amount of non-countable sub-
stances. That is, they behave similarly to native speakers of the language
with grammatical number marking (Athanasopoulos 2006; cf. Pavlenko
2005).
From a theoretical standpoint, the relationship between language
and numerical cognition could be instantiated in one of three different

forms: a strong version of the Whorfian hypothesis, which maintains

that language determines thought including numerical concepts, a weak
version of the Whorfian hypothesis maintaining that our thoughts about
numbers are influenced by the language we use, and a form of inverse
relation for which numerical cognition precedes language and is mapped
onto it. It is almost impossible to decide between these alternatives by
studying people who are raised in a culture with well-developed spoken
and written symbols for numbers. A language deprivation experiment,
where the presence or the absence of a linguistic means for numbers is
arbitrarily manipulated by the experimenter and assigned to two other-
wise equivalent human groups, might solve the question instead. Such
an experiment being ethically impossible, studies about numerical cog-
nition in cultures that are intrinsically limited in their ability to express
numbers can provide useful indications (e.g., Gordon 2004; Pica et al.
2004; Dehaene et al. 2006).
Gordon (2004) conducted a study on the Pirahã, an Amazonian tribe
of hunter-gatherers whose counting system is limited to the words cor-
responding to one, two and many. Having such a limited range of
expressions, one might expect them either to make a recursive use of
these terms to designate larger numerosities (e.g., two-and-one, to des-
ignate three, or two-and-two to designate four), which would signal
the presence of a concept for exact numerosities larger than one and
two, or to accomplish exact enumeration through alternative counting
systems (e.g., with fingers or body parts). However, they seem to use
neither verbal recursive expressions nor alternative counting systems.
Gordon found that the word for one was sometimes used to denote a small
numerosity of two or three, while the word for two always denoted a
larger numerosity than the word for one when natives used both words in
the same speech. In other words, their few expressions for numerosities
are not equivalent to those of Indo-European languages, because their
language does not assign a special status to oneness, which is by neces-
sity the basis of a true integer system. A series of experimental tasks was
then developed to test their numerical competence. In all of them, perfor-
mance was relatively accurate up to 2 or 3 items, but it was much more
variable beyond that range, showing on average a gradual decrease in
precision with increasing numerosity. This strongly resembles the analog

estimation ability that has also been found in pre-linguistic infants,

monkeys, birds, and rodents, which we mentioned at the beginning
of this section (see Dehaene 1997 and Butterworth 1999, for reviews).
Gordon’s conclusion was the following:
The Pirahã’s impoverished counting system limits their
ability to enumerate exact quantities. […] The present experi-
ments allow us to ask whether humans who are not exposed to
a number system can represent exact quantities for medium-
sized sets of four or five. The answer appears to be negative.
The Pirahã inherit just the abilities to exactly enumerate small
sets of less than three items if processing factors are not
unduly taxing. (Gordon 2004).
Otherwise stated, this would be a case in favor of incommensurability
between languages, because Pirahã’s language does not possess any pre-
cise label for the unit, which renders any translation of exact numerical
terms impossible, and in Gordon’s view this would be also a case in
favor of linguistic determinism (strong version of the Whorfian hypoth-
esis). It is, however, important to remember that quasi-experiments do
not allow such strong claims, because the levels of the independent vari-
able are not arbitrarily assigned by an experimenter and could therefore
be systematically dismissed by other characteristics of the sample. For
example, hunter-gatherers might use just approximate words because
they do not really need to communicate exact numbers (a requirement
that might have been introduced only after the transition from forag-
ing to farming, trading and agriculture; see Premack & Premack 2005),
and thus they only perform approximate matching or calculations in the
experimental tasks.
The absence of words for exact numerosities does not imply that
the very concept of exact numerosity is absent, as acknowledged, for
example, by Pica et al. (2004). In Pica et al.’s study, people from
another Amazonian tribe, the Mundurukú, were tested for their numer-
ical abilities. The experimental sample was divided into two groups:
a group of monolinguals (adults without and children with formal
education who spoke the Mundurukú language only) and a group of
bilinguals (adults and children who spoke the Mundurukú language

and also some Portuguese; some of whom had received education in

basic school topics). In the Mundurukú language fixed expressions
are available for numbers 1 to 5 only. Above 5, approximate quanti-
fiers are used such as “some” and “many,” or locutions referring to
the sum of body parts (e.g., “two hands”) with variable precision. No
evidence for a counting routine or a verbal counting sequence was
found, and with the exception of the words for 1 and 2, numerals
were used in relation to a range of approximate quantities rather than
to a precise number. Nonetheless, Mundurukú speakers were able to
perform almost like French controls in a numerosity comparison task
with large sets of dots (20–80) and approximate addition plus compar-
ison. Both Mundurukú and French participants showed the classical
distance effect (i.e., performance improved as the ratio between the
numerosities to be compared increased) in either task. When tested on
exact subtraction of small sets of dots, the monolingual Mundurukú
participants still seemed to rely on an approximate numerosity rep-
resentation, whereas the bilingual Mundurukú participants tended to
be slightly more accurate (but still far from perfection). In contrast,
the French controls performed almost at ceiling, showing that all the
Mundurukú used approximate representations to perform a task which
the French performed by exact calculation. The fact that bilinguals also
performed worse than French controls may suggest that the availabil-
ity of exact number words in the spoken language is not enough to
warrant the use of an exact approach to numerosity. Also, the fact
that monolinguals and bilinguals understood the arithmetic tasks (as
shown by their significant performance), and could carry them out on
the basis of an approximate numerosity representation, may suggest
that sophisticated numerical competence can be present without a fully
developed lexicon for numerosities. Perhaps, to be effectively used for
exact arithmetic, the lexicon requires a concomitant development of
counting routines, which would establish a one-to-one correspondence
between discrete objects and verbal numerals. Only through counting,
indeed, would a verbal numeral (or whatever other symbolic means –
e.g., fingers, toes and body parts) be permanently associated to a precise
quantity out of the initially approximate continuum (but see Gelman &
Butterworth 2005).

On the whole, these studies are certainly consistent with the

hypothesis that learning to represent numbers by some precise commu-
nicable notation (e.g., number words, body parts or numerals) might
facilitate the recognition of exact numerosities (Gelman & Gallistel
2004). They do not imply, instead, that exact numerical concepts cannot
exist without a verbal notation. It is suggested that whether the notational
system is acquired through counting routines, as opposed to simple expo-
sure, seems to be even more crucial than its mere availability for an effec-
tive use in performing exact arithmetic operations. Language, therefore,
seems to be a precious and useful tool for certain kinds of numeri-
cal manipulations but by no means it can be considered the trigger of
numerical concepts (or of Euclidean geometry; see Dehaene et al. 2006).
In the following section we will focus on adult simple arithmetic,
which is a sub-field of mathematical cognition in which the contribution
of language has been most often emphasized and has received a great
deal of attention.
2. B IL INGUAL ISM A N D SIM PLE A RITH M ETIC
The field of cognitive arithmetic has seen an exponential increase

of interest in recent years. Cognitive models of mental arithmetic
(see Campbell & Epp 2005, for a review) share the assumption that,
at least for those operations whose operands are represented by sin-
gle digits, educated adults retrieve solutions from stored knowledge
representations, generally labeled as arithmetic facts, although it has
been shown that this does not hold for all of the four basic arithmetic
operations. Specifically, addition problems are generally assumed to be
solved mainly by retrieving the result from a dedicated network-like
memory store (e.g., Ashcraft 1992), although fast counting strategies
or semantic manipulation would also be available (e.g., LeFevre et al.
1996). In contrast, subtraction would rely on semantic and procedural
knowledge based on the manipulation of quantities (e.g., Dehaene et al.
2004). As for multiplication, for which there is general agreement on
a dominant retrieval strategy (e.g., Stazyk et al. 1982; Dehaene et al.
2004) it has been proposed that simple facts are stored in an associa-
tive network that is similar to the networks for word representation, in

which the nodes are numbers instead of words and the links between
them represent arithmetical relations (Ashcraft 1992). Basically, it is
assumed that, upon presentation of a multiplication problem, activation
would automatically spread from activated operands to linked nodes,
such as the product (Collins & Loftus 1975). Finally, division may be
solved through the retrieval of multiplication facts (e.g., LeFevre &
Morris 1999; Rusconi et al. 2006a).
Several neuropsychological studies have shown that arithmetic
fact retrieval can be selectively damaged after brain injuries (e.g.,
McCloskey 1992), supporting the notion that arithmetic facts are likely
stored separately from either other semantic knowledge or other numeri-
cal skills. However, although a neuropsychological dissociation between
language-related abilities and arithmetic facts retrieval has been consis-
tently reported (e.g., Warrington 1982; Rossor et al. 1995; Butterworth
et al. 1996; Delazer et al. 2004), both behavioral and electrophysiolog-
ical evidence has been documented showing that similar mechanisms
may govern both the arithmetic lexicon (at least for multiplication) and
the word lexicon (e.g., McNeil & Warrington 1994; Niedeggen & Rösler
1999; Pesta et al. 2001; Galfano et al. 2004), thus supporting models for
cognitive arithmetic based on associative networks (e.g., Ashcraft 1992).
One critical issue in the domain of cognitive arithmetic is whether
language plays any role in the long-term-memory representation of arith-
metic facts. In this regard, McCloskey (1992) hypothesized that arith-
metic knowledge is stored in a single, amodal, notation-independent
abstract format, which can be accessed from various numerical formats
(e.g., Arabic, written verbal, spoken verbal) only after stimuli have been
transcoded into an abstract form by notation-specific modules. Follow-
ing this view, arithmetic fact retrieval occurs independently of surface
format and is inevitably associated with semantic processing of numbers.
An alternative view is represented by the Triple Code model proposed
by Dehaene and Cohen (1995; also see Dehaene et al. 2003), according
to which arithmetic facts (especially multiplication) would be learned by
rote and stored in memory as chains of verbal associations. Thus, in order
to retrieve the result of a simple fact, it is necessary to transcode numerical
stimuli into the language in which arithmetic was first learned (also see
Spelke & Tsivkin 2001). Finally, in the Encoding Complex model put

forward by (Campbell & Clark 1988; Campbell 1994), the possibility is

explicitly acknowledged that arithmetic may be embedded into as many
networks as the available surface codes for numbers, retrieval efficiency
depending on practice and familiarity with specific formats (Campbell
1994; Campbell & Epp 2004; also see Campbell 1998; Noël et al. 1998).
Various studies have tried to address the issue of language-specificity
in the storage of arithmetic facts by comparing the performance of mono-
linguals and bilinguals (in between-group designs), aimed to establish
whether bilinguals possess one or two distinct language-related memory
stores for arithmetic facts (see Noël & Fias 1998, for a review). However,
this approach has produced somewhat inconsistent results, likely due to
the adoption of different inclusion criteria for bilingual participants and
methodological procedures (cf. Mägiste 1980a, b; Geary et al. 1993).
A number of more recent studies have addressed the issue of language-
specificity in simple arithmetic following a different research approach,
aimed at measuring within-group differences in bilinguals possibly
emerging by requesting participants to perform cognitive arithmetic
tasks in their first or second language (L1 and L2). This line of research
is particularly important, in that it can throw some light on the nature
of arithmetic facts representation, possibly clarifying the question of
whether arithmetic facts are stored in an abstract format, as postulated
by McCloskey (1992), or in a verbal format, as posited by both the Triple
Code model (e.g., Dehaene & Cohen 1995) and the Encoding Complex
model (e.g., Campbell 1994). In addition, this approach can also eluci-
date whether bilingual participants possess a single arithmetic lexicon
or two separated lexicons, one related to L1 and the other related to L2.
Marsh and Maki (1976) asked participants to perform a visual arith-
metic production task with stimuli in Arabic format comprising single
addition (in the form of “a + b =?”) and multiple additions (e.g.,
“a + b + c =?,” “a + b + c + d =?”). Responses had to be pro-
nounced in either L1 or L2. Besides an advantage in performance for
responses given in L1, the results showed that reaction time (RT) was a
linear increasing function of the number of addition operations required,
with no differences in the slopes exhibited by the functions related
to responses given in L1 and L2. McClain and Shih Huang (1982)
confirmed and extended the results obtained by Marsh and Maki, by

presenting the problems in auditory (verbal) format. The lack of sig-

nificance of the interaction between language (L1 vs. L2) and number
of additions may be taken as tentative evidence in support of models
that posit the existence of a single memory store containing arithmetic
facts (Noël & Fias 1998). On the other hand, the main effect reported
by Marsh and Maki concerning the fact that the participants were faster
when they had to respond in L1 may also be interpreted as evidence
consistent with the Encoding Complex view (Campbell 1994).
More recently, Campbell et al. (1999) investigated the effects of
language format on several number-related tasks with Chinese-English
bilinguals. Stimuli were presented in either Arabic format or in Chinese
Mandarin symbols, and the participants were required to respond
verbally in either L1 (Chinese) or L2 (English). It was found that per-
formance in an arithmetic production task was significantly better when
response was given in L1. In addition, the results showed that this advan-
tage in performance was magnified when stimuli appeared as Mandarin
symbols. Campbell et al. (1999) attributed this and other format-related
effects to the use of different associative networks for numbers and
for arithmetic facts in the different languages and formats, and to the
different strength and efficiency of these associative networks that are
contingent on prior experience of the participants in using a specific
format for a particular task.
It is important to note here that there is not a one-to-one correspon-
dence between international Arabic and Chinese written symbols (and
numeral reading systems). Arabic relies on examining the positions of
digits as a means for identifying value (whether 1 represents 1 or 10 or
100); whereas Chinese symbols do not rely on place to establish value,
but include the values in the number formation instead. For example,
in Arabic, twenty-five is 25, but in Chinese it is the symbol for “two”
followed by the symbol for “ten” followed by the symbol for “five” or
“two tens and five.” Thus, the Chinese representation decomposes the
number, which may add to facility with numbers (Ho & Fuson 1998;
Ma 1999). So, when working in Arabic, Chinese individuals who are
used to Mandarin have the added cognitive load of using place for deter-
mining value rather than having it already structured in the numerical
representation itself.

In a subsequent study, Bernardo (2001) asked Filipino-English

bilinguals to perform an arithmetic verification task. His participants
were presented two addends and a probe number (the proposed result) in
sequence and then they had to respond manually as to whether the probe
was the sum of the two addends or not. Critical manipulations involved
the format of the addends and the probe number and the so-called split
effect (Ashcraft & Battaglia 1978), referring to the observation that RT
for trials in which the probe is incorrect decreases as the incorrect answer
is further away from the correct answer. Bernardo found that the partic-
ipants showed a decreasing efficiency of processing from digit format
to verbal-English (L2) to verbal-Filipino (L1). This result shows that
people are faster and more accurate in verifying arithmetic problems in
their preferred language for arithmetic (which is not necessarily L1),
especially when tests with both languages are performed in the same
experimental session. Additionally, a significant split effect was found
with numbers presented in both digit and verbal-English format, but
not with the verbal-Filipino format, suggesting that memory representa-
tions for addition facts may not be well developed in the Filipino code.
These results are consistent with Vaid and Menon’s (2000) analysis of
survey data showing that bilinguals’ language preferences for mental
arithmetic are strongly predicted by their language of elementary school
instruction, which is not always L1.
Frenck-Mestre and Vaid (1993) employed an arithmetic verification
task with English-French bilinguals responding to stimuli presented
in digit, verbal-English, and verbal-French format, and exploited the
so called associative confusion effect (Winkelman & Schmidt 1974)
to examine arithmetic-related associative processes in L1 and L2.
Basically, this phenomenon represents the first behavioral evidence
demonstrating the existence of associative processes in mental arith-
metic. When participants perform an arithmetic verification task with
simple addition and multiplication, in which they have to decide whether
a given equation is correct or not, RTs for false problems are higher when
the proposed answer is correct for the other operation (e.g., 4 + 3 = 12,
which is false for addition but true for 4 × 3 = 12) compared to when
it is not (e.g., 4 + 3 = 9, which is false for both 4 + 3 = 9 and
4 × 3 = 9). This associative confusion effect is generally interpreted

as evidence that the simple presentation of two single-digit operands

generates the activation of the arithmetically related nodes via asso-
ciative links in the network representing arithmetic facts. The most
important result obtained by Frenck-Mestre and Vaid (1993) refers to
the fact that, beside the main effect of presentation format, a significant
associative confusion effect was found when stimuli appeared in digit
format and in L1 format only. Based on these findings, Frenck-Mestre
and Vaid concluded that arithmetic facts retrieval and the automatic
spreading of activation within the network of arithmetic facts is crucially
language-dependent.
In this regard, however, it has been recently suggested that the associa-
tive confusion effect might not provide the most compelling measure of
automatic access to arithmetic facts representations, in that it is observed
when the participants are explicitly asked to perform arithmetic. Thus,
the associative confusion phenomenon can hardly be interpreted as a
purely automatic effect because it is contingent on the attentional control
settings defined by task requirements (see Galfano et al. 2003).
Even more important, it has been shown that the associative con-
fusion effect does not fulfill the so called “resistance to suppression”
criterion for automaticity (Zbrodoff & Logan 1986), and it can be abol-
ished by loading working memory under dual-task conditions (Rusconi
et al. 2004). Consistent with this analysis, Noël and Fias (1998) have
suggested that differences between languages in arithmetic performance
can be attributed to working memory rather than to access to arithmetic
facts. In addition, as we pointed out earlier, in the context of arith-
metic problem solving, people seem not to rely exclusively on direct
retrieval processes when performing addition (e.g., they may opt for
back-up strategies to reach an optimal performance; LeFevre et al. 1996;
Shrager & Siegler 1998). In light of these arguments, the use of indirect
tasks (i.e., tasks that do not require arithmetic knowledge) allows one
to study the automatic retrieval component in isolation (Rusconi et al.
2004; Rusconi et al. 2005; Rusconi et al. 2006b).
LeFevre et al. (1988) have developed a paradigm to test the pres-
ence of associative processes in mental arithmetic known as number
matching. Typically, the participants are shown two numerical stim-
uli in sequence. The first stimulus (the “cue”) is a short-lasting pair

of single- or double-digit numbers. The second stimulus consists of a

single- or double-digit number (the “probe”). The participants have to
perform a number-matching task, trying to establish whether the probe
is one of the previously presented numbers or not. LeFevre et al. (1988)
reported that RTs for rejecting non-matching probes were significantly
higher when the probes were the sum of the numbers in the cue com-
pared to when the probes were arithmetically neutral with respect to the
cue numbers. This interference effect was obtained both when a “+”
symbol was interposed between the numbers in the cue and when no
retrieval cue (the addition symbol) was present. Within this paradigm, it
can be reasonably argued that arithmetic is completely task-irrelevant, as
the task simply requires perceptual and numerical comprehension pro-
cesses (Campbell 1994). Thus, the interference effect is interpreted as
evidence that the mere presentation of two single digit numbers resulted
in stimulus-driven activation of the sum node via associative links in
the network representing arithmetic facts. As a consequence, rejecting a
non-matching probe activated via associative links would require more
processing compared to a non-matching neutral probe receiving little
or no activation. Galfano et al. (2003, 2004) and Rusconi et al. (2004)
have recently extended the interference effect to multiplication and to
the neighboring multiples of the product in the multiplication network.
Rusconi et al. (2006c) have employed a modified version of the number-
matching task to investigate the representation of arithmetically related
verbal numerals in the mother tongue and in L1 and L2 of bilingual
participants (see below). To reiterate, the advantage of this approach is
that interference in a number-matching task is much less sensitive to
working memory manipulations than the associative confusion effect.
Therefore, number-matching is an ideal measure of activation spreading
in long-term memory (Rusconi et al. 2004).
Rusconi et al. (2006c) focused on simple multiplication facts, as these
are widely assumed to be stored in memory as a consequence of rote
verbal learning (e.g., Dehaene et al. 2003). They tested whether the
interference effect that is found with Arabic numerals in a number-
matching task can be replicated in a word-matching task, in which
written number words instead of Arabic numerals are shown. Like in a
typical number-matching task, participants were not required to solve

arithmetic problems and no arithmetic sign was presented. The task was
simply to decide whether a target word (e.g., forty-two) was present or
not in the previous display where two cue words had been shown (e.g.,
six and seven), by pressing one of two response keys. The manipulation
is not trivial because verbal and Arabic numerals are not processed in a
similar way. Damian (2004), for example, showed that digits gain fast
access to numerical magnitude but not to lexical representations, where
number words gain fast access to their lexical codes but not to number
magnitude. By employing naming and magnitude judgment tasks, he
showed that the difference between Arabic and verbal numerals emerges
when notation is blocked (i.e., participants are shown numbers in one
format only within each block). Similarly, Fias et al. (2001) showed that
the activation of lexical codes from Arabic distractors occurs too slowly
to generate Stroop interference when participants are naming number
words, where Fias (2001) showed that the activation of number magni-
tude from a number word occurs too slowly to generate a SNARC effect
(which indexes access to number magnitude; Dehaene et al. 1993) in a
phoneme monitoring task.
Rusconi et al.’s (2006c) participants were highly proficient bilinguals
who were asked to fill in a questionnaire (adapted from Sholl 1996) to
assess their level of bilingualism and then to perform a word-matching
task both in L1 and in L2 (in separate blocks). Words were presented in
lower case both in the cue and in the target display. Neither active access
to number semantics nor translation of number words from one language
to another was necessary to perform the task. The word-matching task
could easily be performed by processing orthographic and lexical infor-
mation only. Unlike bilinguals tested with production and/or verification
tasks (see e.g., Bernardo 2001), these participants could get no advan-
tage from translating a pair of operands into their preferred language
for arithmetic (which was L1 for all of them), because they were not
required to solve any arithmetic problem, and a systematic translation
would probably slow down performance in the matching task.
To summarize their results, the effect of arithmetic relatedness was
found in a word-matching task. The presence of interference both in
L1 and in L2 for small size facts suggested that bilinguals possess mul-
tiple arithmeticons, at least for the easiest facts (see also Campbell &

Xue 2001); the use of an indirect task rendered it extremely unlikely that
participants intentionally translated both L1 and L2 cues into abstract
codes, retrieved their product and then translated it back into L1 or L2
(which is necessary to solve simple arithmetic problems according to
McCloskey 1992). In addition, verbal numerals gain faster access to the
lexical rather than to the number magnitude code (e.g., Damian 2004),
so a response could well be selected before activation could reach the
lexical representation of product numbers through a putative semantic
network (i.e., along the path: number words in the cue → their seman-
tic nodes → semantic node of their product → product number word).
In other words, arithmetic facts activation occurred even in a word-
matching task, where only lexical information was relevant. The effect
was larger for small than for large facts, in line with the hypothesis that
small facts are more likely to be learned by rote (Campbell et al. 1999;
Dehaene et al. 2003).
The novelty of Rusconi et al.’s (2006c) study consists of having
employed an indirect task to test for associative links between num-
ber words and having extended this paradigm to a sample of bilinguals.
It speaks directly to the issue of whether language plays any role in the
long-term-memory representation of number facts, which is one of the
major questions in simple arithmetic and is important both from a the-
oretical and an educational perspective. As already mentioned, both the
obligatory semantic mediation (McCloskey 1992) and the verbal cod-
ing (Dehaene et al. 2003) hypotheses assume the cognitive system stores
simple arithmetic facts in a single associative network (of either seman-
tic or lexical nodes), whereas the encoding-complex model (Campbell
1994) posits the possibility of as many associative networks as the avail-
able numerical formats. By employing an indirect task (i.e., a task which
does not require arithmetic fact retrieval – and in which fact retrieval
would actually interfere with performance), it was possible to probe
passive spreading of activation between arithmetically related nodes
without eliciting intentional transcoding and retrieval processes.
LeFevre et al. (1988) had already introduced number words as tar-
gets in a number-matching task, but the cue was always composed
of Arabic digits so that participants were forced to access an abstract
number representation to compare cues and targets (unless one assumes

there is a fast direct pathway between Arabic digits and written verbal
numerals). In Rusconi et al.’s (2006c) case, only written words were
presented and visual word form representations were sufficient to com-
ply with task demands. Their results showed that two written number
words are sufficient to activate the representation of the verbal numeral
indicating their product in the absence of any arithmetic cues. In turn,
this might be evidence of long-term associative links between lexi-
cal representations of number words in multiple languages, which, in
accordance with Campbell and Epp’s (2004) proposal, are limited to
small-size facts.
3. CO N CLU SIO N
At the beginning of this chapter, we introduced a distinction between

two qualitatively different ways of dealing with numbers: an “approxi-
mation” and an “exact” mode. Comparative and cultural anthropological
studies have suggested that non-human primates and humans who
belong to populations without any verbal counting system do, how-
ever, possess a number sense. They can carry out tasks requiring
numerosity discrimination abilities and their performance shows the
characteristic feature of scalar variability (i.e., discrimination obeys
the Weber-Fechner law). Literate humans, when asked to estimate
numerosities or to approximate the result of an arithmetic operation,
perform in a way that does not seem to be qualitatively different from
that of the above groups. Literate humans, however, are different from
the above groups for their distinctive ability to perform exact compu-
tations. The role of language in numerical processing is unique and
important because it facilitates the tasks to remember, manipulate and
express precise numerosities. Such a fundamental role likely originates
from its privileged relation, in our culture, with a counting routine. The
availability of a language for numbers is largely exploited in learning
and memorizing simple arithmetic facts. Precision and speed in every-
day numerical problems (e.g., in deciding whether some spare coins are
enough to buy a newspaper or in choosing a train to arrive on time at
the airport), which are so important for being able to live in our cul-
ture, pushes the cognitive system to build up a repertory of the most

frequent and simplest form of operations, which can thus be promptly

retrieved from memory instead of being calculated anew every time.
Being able to retrieve automatically and with efficiency those arithmetic
facts can free precious cognitive resources, allowing one to solve prob-
lems of increasing complexity. More than other domains of knowledge
and other branches of mathematical cognition, arithmetic is penetrable
by language, and possesses language-specific representations in long-
term memory (e.g., Spelke & Tsivkin 2001). Recent studies suggest
that L1 is not necessarily advantaged, because the language in which
training has occurred is what really counts – regardless of global pro-
ficiency. However, it has also been suggested that direct arithmetic
tests may not be sufficiently able to capture the arithmetical compe-
tence of an untrained language. According to self reports, bilinguals
tend to count and do arithmetic in just one of their languages, which
is usually the one in which they were taught arithmetic (this is also
true for the participants of Rusconi et al. 2006c). When, after having
received formal education in one language, people move to a different
linguistic community and remain there for a long time, they tend to
lose proficiency in L1. But even when L2 has become dominant, they
keep working out numbers and calculations in their original language
(Dehaene 1997).
However, our results suggest that the ability to function in a differ-
ent language environment and to solve arithmetic problems quickly and
efficiently in a new language should take advantage of existing lexical
associations that appear to be already established without any specific
training. This is particularly true in cases where performance in men-
tal arithmetic can be influenced by specific verbal formulations, such
as with differences in the order of units and decades (e.g., English,
Italian, French vs. German or Dutch; Brysbaert et al. 1998) or in the
regularity of number naming (e.g., English vs. Chinese; Zhang & Zhou
2003). The fact that bilinguals showed the interference effect during a
word matching task for small facts only (i.e., the effect was less perva-
sive in bilinguals’ L1 than in monolinguals) opens the possibility that
arithmetic knowledge takes a qualitatively different form – or relies
mostly on different codes – in proficient bilingual than in monolingual
individuals.

ACK N O WLED G M EN TS
Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by grants from

MIUR (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca) and
University of Trento to Remo Job, by a grant from University of
Padua to Giovanni Galfano, and by a post-doctoral fellowship from
the European Commission (MRTN – CT – 2003 – 504927 NUMBRA)
to Elena Rusconi. The authors wish to thank Brian Butterworth, Carlo
Umiltà, Rochel Gelman and Randy Gallistel, Ricardo Nemirovsky and
Rogers Hall for stimulating talks and discussions about numbers and
science.
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CH A PTER 6
THE ROLE O F CROSS-LINGUISTIC AND

CROSS-CULTURAL EXPERIENCES IN
BILINGUALS’ DIVERGENT THINKING
Anatoliy V. Kharkhurin
American University of Sharjah
Abstract
Research addressing the possible consequences of bilingualism for individuals’ creative
abilities has revealed a contradiction between experimental findings of bilinguals’ supe-
riority in creative tasks and real life observations of no significant relationship between
being bilingual and being creative. This chapter makes an attempt to resolve this con-
tradiction and investigates a possible effect that bilingualism might have on creative
abilities. Three factors in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences of bilingual
individuals are examined: language proficiency, age of second language acquisition, and
experience and participation in two cultures. The empirical study with Russian-English
bilingual immigrants living in the United States and English monolingual native speak-
ers revealed that cross-linguistic factors in bilinguals’ development had an influence on
their divergent thinking abilities, which is a necessary component of creative thought.
These findings suggest that although bilingualism may lay the foundation of creative
thinking it does not necessarily imply being creative. To account for these findings,
a cross-language transfer is proposed as a cognitive mechanism facilitating divergent
thinking in bilinguals. A specific architecture of bilingual memory in which two lexi-
cons are mutually linked to the shared conceptual system is theorized to facilitate the
functioning of the cross-language transfer.
The present study contributes to creativity research by examining the effect of bilin-
gualism on creative thinking. It will start out with a brief survey of existing literature
on the relationship between bilingualism and creativity and discuss an apparent con-
tradiction therein. Although it is suggested that bilinguals show greater performance
on creativity tests, we do not see outbursts of creativity among nationals of bilingual
countries. To account for this contradiction, the study will offer a perspective on the rela-
tionship between bilingualism and creativity, in which bilingualism facilitates divergent
thinking. Divergent thinking is assumed as a necessary but not sufficient trait of creative
behavior. Subsequently, it will present empirical findings indicating the factors in bilin-
gual development that may contribute to bilinguals’ superiority in divergent thinking.
The following discussion will outline a model of bilingual memory, whose structure
is suggested to facilitate cognitive processes underlying this trait. It will specifically
175
© 2007 Springer.

176 ANATO LIY V. K H A RK H U RIN
discuss the potential effect of bilinguals’ cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences

on their memory structure and interpret these effects within a proposed theoretical frame-
work. The conclusion will point to the ways in which research with bilingual individuals
may contribute to understanding the nature of divergent thinking and the cognitive
ramifications of bilingualism.
1. T HE R E L AT IONSHIPS BETWEEN BILIN G U A LISM A N D

C R E AT IVIT Y: AR E BILIN G U A LS TRU LY CREATIV E?
Throughout the history of human civilization, numerous attempts to

understand human creativity have been made. Interest in human cre-
ative capacity has never ceased and contemporary creativity researchers
are still debating the nature of creativity1 . Is the capacity for creative
thought limited to a certain class of gifted or especially talented people,
or is this creative capacity an essential property of normative human cog-
nition? The former view considers creative people as a minority capable
of genuine creative thinking, and thus creativity has little bearing on
the everyday cognitive activities of the general population. In this view,
geniuses use cognitive processes that are radically different from those
employed by most individuals in everyday problem solving. In contrast,
the latter, creative cognition, approach argues that geniuses use the pro-
cesses of normative human cognition (Ward et al. 1999). The “mundane”
cognitive functioning goes beyond the everyday human capacities and
satisfies the criteria of creative products: novelty and utility. However,
there is no doubt about the existence of individual differences in creativ-
ity. Some individuals produce more creative outcomes than others, and
a limited few achieve extreme levels of accomplishment (e.g., Simonton
1994; Eysenck 1995). Although the creative cognition approach admits
these differences, they can be understood in terms of variations in the
use of specifiable processes, and the richness and flexibility of stored
cognitive structures to which the processes are applied (Ward et al. 1997).
The creative cognition approach is widely used in cognitive research
on creativity. Most scientists converge on the notion that creative
thinking is a complex process that may include problem definition
and redefinition, divergent thinking, synthesis, reorganization, analy-
sis, and evaluation (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi 1976; Ochse 1990;

B IL INGUALS’ D IV ERG EN T TH IN K IN G 177
Lubart 1994, 2000; Sternberg & Lubart 1995; Sternberg 1999).

Therefore, the focus of the creativity research is on the nature of these
subprocesses and possible factors in individual development that may
facilitate these subprocesses.
A particular interest of creativity researchers constitutes the possible
contribution of bilingualism to creative thinking. In her seminal review
paper Ricciardelli (1992b) reported 24 studies examining the relation-
ship between bilingualism and creativity. Although the paper provides
mixed findings, it shows a clear tendency for bilinguals to outperform
their monolingual counterparts on various tests of creative thinking.
Interpreting these results, one is tempted to draw a conclusion which
assumes bilinguals’ superior creative abilities. However, this assump-
tion would be quite premature considering the real state of affairs in
bilingual countries (e.g., Belgium, Canada, Switzerland). In spite of
the fact that most nationals of these countries are bilingual, we do not
find a higher level of creativity in these countries compared to monolin-
gual countries. Rather, there seems to be no relationship between being
bilingual and being creative.
Several possible explanations can account for the contradiction
between empirical studies showing bilinguals’advantages in the creativ-
ity tests and real life observations showing no remarkable differences in
creative performance between bilingual and monolingual individuals.
First, most of the studies on the relationship between bilingualism
and creativity were conducted with children (see Ricciardelli 1992b).
Although these studies show an apparent gain of bilingual children over
their monolingual counterparts, it is entirely possible that the superior
creative abilities of the bilingual children do not persist into adulthood.
Indeed, virtually the only study done with college students (Lemmon &
Goggin 1989) shows no advantage for bilinguals on creativity tests.
Second, following example of Guilford and his colleagues (e.g.,
Christensen et al. 1960; Berger & Guilford 1969), most of the stud-
ies on the relationship between bilingualism and creativity use tests
of divergent thinking (DT) as a measure of creativity (see Ricciardelli
1992b). The choice of this test has been supported by a large body of
research, which provides evidence for the ability of DT tests to pre-
dict certain aspects of performance on creative problem-solving tasks

(e.g., Plucker & Renzulli 1999) and real-world creative achievement

(e.g., Mumford et al. 1998). However, there is a meaningful argument
that questions the validity of DT tests as a measure of creativity,
because there was remarkably little evidence showing a strong corre-
lation between highly creative people and high scores on the DT tests
(Barron & Harrington 1981). For example, some researchers argue that
the validity of DT tests may depend, in part, on the scoring procedures
being applied (e.g., Runco & Mraz 1992). Others claim that DT tests are
weakly related to other kinds of creativity ratings and therefore measure
only a small portion of creativity (e.g., Hocevar 1981). Still others ques-
tion the nature of DT tests as the measures of creativity at all. They argue
that what the DT tests really measure are other types of cognitive abilities
such as intelligence (e.g., Sternberg & O’Hara 1999). Thus, it is entirely
possible that mundane cognitive processing, which the DT tests might
measure, cannot predict eminent creative performance. In other words,
although bilinguals outperform monolinguals in experimental studies,
they do not show overall greater creative performance in real life.
Finally, note that in most of the studies on the relationship between
bilingualism and creativity, bilingual groups included immigrants who,
in addition to speaking two languages, were likely to experience and
participate in two cultures2 . This cultural element has been virtually
ignored in the study of the possible cognitive impact of bilingualism.
However, it is likely that in addition to the virtue of speaking two lan-
guages, bilinguals who experience and participate in two cultures may
benefit from the meta- and paralinguistic advantages of biculturalism
leading to an increase in their creative abilities. As Peal and Lambert
(1962) said over 40 years ago, a bilingual individual “whose wider
experiences in two cultures have given him advantages which a mono-
lingual does not enjoy. Intellectually his experience with two language
systems seems to have left him with a mental flexibility, a superior-
ity in concept formation, a more diversified set of mental abilities”
(p. 20). Although this theme has been brought up in some other studies
(e.g., Cummins & Gulutsan 1974; Okoh 1980; Francis 2000), it has not
received enough attention in the empirical research. Therefore, another
plausible explanation for the observation that the nationals of bilingual
countries do not show exceptional creative performance can be traced to

the fact that these individuals have acquired their languages in primarily
monocultural environment of the respective countries (e.g., Belgium,
Canada, and Switzerland). Thus, they cannot benefit from the potential
cognitive advantages of the cross-cultural experience. More generally,
it is entirely possible that the inconsistency in the findings in research
on cognitive impacts of bilingualism can be explained by a failure to
have controlled for this factor.
Altogether, there is an obvious discrepancy between the observation
of no remarkable differences between bilinguals’ and monolinguals’
creative performance in real life and the finding of significantly supe-
rior performance of bilinguals on creativity tests in laboratory settings.
In view of proposed explanations, although bilingualism might have
an influence on creativity, this influence seems to be indirect. That
is, bilingualism may encourage the use of certain cognitive processes
in a more efficient way, which paves the way for more sophisticated
cognitive processing. The latter may result in creative production in
some individuals, but other factors in their development (e.g., intelli-
gence, education, motivation, personal experience) may play a more
dominant role.
2. W HY MIG H T BILIN G U A LS H AV E
ADVANTAGE S IN DIV ERG EN T TH IN K IN G PERFO RMA N CE?
This chapter argues that bilingualism3 might contribute to individuals’

creative abilities, but its contribution is likely to be limited to an increase
in divergent thinking. This argument stems from the notion that bilin-
guals show greater cognitive abilities compared to their monolingual
counterparts. Although bilingualism researchers are still debating as to
whether the ability to speak more than one language is beneficial or
detrimental to an individual’s cognitive development (see Cook 1997
for an overview), a growing number of empirical studies (e.g., Peal &
Lambert 1962; Ricciardelli 1992a; Bialystok et al. 2004, 2005) show
that speaking two languages extends rather than diminishes the individ-
ual’s cognitive capacities. In addition, following the creative cognition
approach (Ward et al. 1999), creativity can be explained by enhanced
normative cognition. If bilingualism results in more elaborate cognitive

structures and/or functioning, then it follows that it should also facilitate

creativity.
Having stated this, the next question is what cognitive processes might
underlie creative thinking. During the past 50 years, a large number of
studies have explored the nature of the processes involved in creativity,
and a large class of models was proposed to describe these processes.
Most of these models seem to converge on the mechanism of the simulta-
neous activation of different, often unrelated, concepts or categories that
creates a new plane on which the original and novel ideas might be estab-
lished. For example, Rothenberg (1996) describes Janusian thinking as
ability for “actively conceiving multiple opposites or antitheses simul-
taneously” (p. 207). This concept is similar to another of Rothenberg’s
(1979) ideas, that of homospatial thinking, which “consists of actively
conceiving two or more discrete entities occupying the same space, a
conception leading to the articulation of new identities” (p. 7). Simi-
larly, Koestler (1968) introduces the concept of bisociation, which he
defines as an ability for “combining two hitherto unrelated cognitive
matrices in such a way that a new level is added to the hierarchy, which
contains the previously separate structures as its members” (p. 183).
Another model talks about remote associations, the ability of creative
individuals to build connections between unrelated ideas or objects
(Mednick 1962).
Although these models are relatively fuzzy and provide no clear
description of the subprocesses underlying creative thinking, they all
seem to emphasize the important property of creative thought, the ability
to establish distant associations that link concepts from distant cat-
egories. This communication between concepts is assumed to be an
unconscious process during which activation is propagated through-
out the conceptual network. These subprocesses resemble the kind of
divergent thinking that involves a broad search for information, estab-
lishing distant associations that link concepts from distant categories
and the generation of numerous novel alternative answers to problems
(Guilford 1967). Guilford saw divergent thinking ability as a major
component of creativity and associated it with four main characteris-
tics: fluency (the ability to rapidly produce a large number of ideas or
solutions to a problem); flexibility (the capacity to consider a variety

of approaches to a problem simultaneously); elaboration (the ability to

think through the details of an idea and carry it out); and originality (the
tendency to produce ideas different from those of most other people).
He contrasted divergent thinking with convergent thinking – the ability
to narrow all possible alternatives down to a single solution. Both diver-
gent and convergent thinking are necessary subprocesses that result in
creative performance. Therefore, creative thinking is assumed to be an
ability to initiate multiple cycles of divergent and convergent thinking,
creating an active, attention-demanding process that allows generation
of new, alternative solutions (Mumford et al. 1991).
Thus, although divergent thinking is identified as one of the major
components of creativity (Guilford 1967), other processes (e.g., syn-
thesis, reorganization, analysis, and evaluation) may be the essential
contributors to eminent creative performance. This study argues that
although bilingualism might contribute to an increase in creative abil-
ities, its contribution is limited to divergent thinking. The next section
discusses three factors in bilinguals’ development (proficiency in both
languages, age of acquisition of these languages, and experience with
cultural settings in which these languages are learned) that are hypoth-
esized to facilitate their divergent thinking abilities. However, other
factors in individual development (e.g., intelligence, education, motiva-
tion, and personal experience) not accounted for by bilingualism may be
necessary components for the ultimate creative production. The inabil-
ity to develop these factors to a greater extent may prevent bilinguals
from showing superior creative performance.
3. W HAT FA CTO RS IN BILIN G U A LS’

DE VE L OPME NT MIGH T IN FLU EN CE TH EIR D IV ERG EN T
TH IN K IN G ?
A large body of bilingualism research shows that bilinguals’ profi-

ciency in two languages and age of acquisition of these languages
(both assumed as cross-linguistic experience) as well as participation
and experience with two cultures in which these languages are acquired
(assumed as cross-cultural experience) have an impact on their cognitive
development.

A number of empirical studies suggest that bilinguals’ proficiency in

both languages can be a reliable predictor of their cognitive abilities
(e.g., Cummins 1976; Lemmon & Goggin 1989; Ricciardelli 1992a).
Similarly, studies with bilingual children show that the age of second
language (L2) acquisition can be an essential contributor to bilingual
children’s cognitive development (see Swain & Lapkin 1982). There-
fore, bilinguals’ cross-linguistic experience may be an important factor
facilitating their cognitive capacities that may result in an increase
in divergent thinking. The repeated switching from one language to
another and constantly dealing with two code systems (phonological,
grammatical, and lexical) may facilitate their dual linguistic perspective
(Lambert 1977). This may account for bilinguals’ greater metalinguis-
tic awareness, which presumably facilitates their cognitive flexibility
(Ianco-Worrall 1972; Bialystok 1988).
Furthermore, as contemporary research on conceptual representations
in bilingual memory shows, bilinguals may undergo conceptual changes
due to experience within different cultural and linguistic environments
(e.g., de Groot 2000; Paradis 2000; Pavlenko 2000). These researchers
argue that the conceptual system of individuals who acquire more than
one language inevitably undergoes adaptations that are influenced by
the cultural and social contexts in which these languages were learned.
Cultural knowledge (in the form of schemas and frames) modifies con-
ceptual representations and organizations in bilingual memory (Vaid
2000). New connotations, even entirely new meanings, may develop
through acculturation.
Thus, experience with two different cultures may cause modifications
in the bilingual conceptual system that reflects cross-cultural diversity
in conceptual representations. De Groot (2000) illustrates this with the
example of a turkey. The conceptual features of TURKEY in non-North
American culture-specific conceptual systems have no associations with
great festivities taking place only in North America. However, for
newcomers to North America, the concept THANKSGIVING devel-
ops over a series of Thanksgiving experiences and includes turkey as
an attribute of the festival. As a result, a conceptual representation
of a turkey may change over time as a function of experience with
the L2 culture. In particular, the conceptual representation of a turkey

may become extended once it includes additional celebration-related

features.
In turn, newly developed conceptual representations may allow bilin-
guals to see the same phenomenon from different perspectives. As a
number of scholars suggest, bilingual individuals who experience and
participate in two cultures may well perceive the world through the
amalgam of two different conceptual prisms and view events with a
wider range of enriched experiences (e.g., Cummins & Gulutsan 1974;
Okoh 1980). These enhanced conceptual representations may promote
cognitive flexibility, divergent thinking, and novel and creative ways of
encoding experience.
In addition, since different cultural commonalities may provide differ-
ent perspectives on the same phenomena (Ricciardelli 1992b), bilinguals
“may have a greater tolerance for ambiguity because they are com-
fortable with situations in which one basic idea may have different
nuances” (Lubart 1999, p. 344). Tolerance of ambiguity, in turn, is con-
sidered a valuable trait of divergent thinking, because unrelated, often
contradicting elements coexist during this process.
Finally, both cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences may
result in modifications in the structure of bilingual memory. The spe-
cific structure of bilingual memory may account for bilinguals’ “greater
diversity of associations to the same concept because it is situated in
two different linguistic conceptual networks” (Lubart 1999, p. 344).
The diversity of associations is assumed as a key property of diver-
gent thinking, which implies the ability to link unrelated concepts from
different categories.
Altogether, bilinguals’ cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences
seem to facilitate cognitive flexibility, tolerance of ambiguity, and diver-
sity of association. These cognitive processes may foster simultaneous
activation and elaboration of a multitude of often unrelated concepts,
that is, divergent thinking.
The following section presents an empirical study in which the rela-
tionship between bilingualism and divergent thinking is examined.
Three factors in bilingual development (language proficiency, age of
L2 acquisition, and rate of cross-cultural experience) are considered
as potential contributors to the increase in bilinguals’ performance on

DT tasks. Based on the findings of this study a theoretical framework is

proposed in which the specific structure of bilingual memory is argued to
facilitate cognitive processes that might result in an increase in divergent
thinking abilities.
4. E MPIRICA L EV ID EN CE O F
B IL INGUAL S’ PERFO RM A N CE O N D T TA SK
Several hypotheses were tested in this study. First, bilingualism has

an influence on divergent thinking, which should be manifested in
superior performance of bilingual participants over their monolingual
counterparts on the DT tasks. Second, cross-linguistic and cross-cultural
experiences influence bilinguals’ divergent thinking. It was expected
that the degree of language proficiency in both languages, the age of
acquisition of both languages, and the rate of experience with both cul-
tures in which bilinguals’ languages were acquired would have an effect
on bilinguals’ performance on DT tasks.
4.1. Participants
The participants were Brooklyn College psychology students who par-
ticipated for course credit. One hundred and three immigrants from the
former Soviet Union living in the US who claimed to speak Russian and
English (25 male and 78 female) aged between 16 and 39 (M = 21.57,
SD = 4.63) were selected for the experiment. All participants indicated
that Russian was their L1. They also reported to have various degrees of
experience with Russian and North American cultures. In addition, 52
American participants who reported being native monolingual English
speakers (21 male and 31 female) aged between 16 and 51 (M = 23.15,
SD = 8.58) were selected for the study.
4.2. Materials and Assessment Techniques

Divergent thinking abilities were assessed with the standard procedure
in the field, the Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA, Goff &
Torrance 2002), which measures verbal and non-verbal fluency (the
total number of relevant responses), flexibility (the number of different
categories of relevant responses), elaboration (the amount of detail in

the responses), and originality (the statistical rarity of responses). The

standard ATTA assessment consisted of four norm-referenced abilities
(fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality). Several procedures
were used to assess cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences in
bilingual participants. The age of acquisition of both languages was
obtained from a background questionnaire.
Language proficiency in English and Russian was assessed using a
modified version of the Picture Naming Test (PNT), in which partic-
ipants’ knowledge of each of these languages was evaluated by the
accuracy of participants’ responses to 120 pictures of simple objects,
a technique similar to that used by Lemmon and Goggin (1989). These
pictures, randomly selected from those scaled by Rossion and Pourtois
(2001), a revised version of Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980), were
arranged in a booklet with each page containing 30 pictures. Participants
had two minutes to provide the names for all 30 pictures on each page.
Each response was scored either 1 or 0, so that the maximum number
of points for picture naming in either language was 120. A list of appro-
priate labels in English and Russian was generated for each picture by
two independent native speakers for each language. If the participants’
label matched the corresponding item on the list, they scored 1 point,
otherwise, 0 points. A composite PNT score was computed as the sum
of participants’ performance on the English and Russian PNT with a
higher score indicating greater proficiency in both languages.
The cross-cultural experience was assessed by the cultural exposure
coefficient (CEC), which was computed by dividing the absolute value
of the difference between the number of years a participant lived in
Russia (obtained from the age of immigration) and the number of years
he or she lived in the US (obtained from the length of residence in the
US) by the participant’s age4 . This coefficient is similar to an index pre-
viously used by Tropp et al. (1999). Smaller coefficient values represent
the more balanced individuals’ cultural exposure, with 0 representing
equal exposure to both cultures. Larger values represent those with a
less balanced cultural exposure, with 1 representing monocultural indi-
viduals. In the same fashion, participants who were exposed to a new
culture earlier had a greater CEC value than those who were exposed to
a new culture later in life.

Altogether, each bilingual participant had three developmental scores:

age of L2 acquisition, composite PNT, and CEC.
4.3. Results
An ANOVA was performed with four norm-referenced DT measures
(fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality) as dependent vari-
ables and language group (monolingual vs. bilingual) as an independent
variable. The analysis showed that bilingual participants outperformed
their monolingual counterparts on the ATTA measures of fluency
(F(1, 154) = 7.61, p < .01), flexibility (F(1, 154) = 5.96, p < .05),
and elaboration (F(1, 154) = 2.16, p = .14), but there was no sig-
nificant difference in their performance on the measure of originality
(see Figure 1). This finding indicates that bilingualism has an impact on
the ability to rapidly produce a large number of ideas or solutions to a
problem (fluency), the capacity to consider a variety of approaches to
a problem simultaneously (flexibility), and to think through the details
of an idea and carry it out (elaboration). However, it does not have an
effect on the tendency to produce ideas different from those of most
other people (originality).
Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis was applied to the data
from the bilingual group to determine whether there was a direct rela-
tionship between the factors in the cross-linguistic and cross-cultural
experiences and the four traits of divergent thinking. Standard multi-
ple regressions were performed between the composite PNT score, age
of L2 acquisition, and CEC as independent variables and ATTA mea-
sures of fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality as the respective
dependent variables. The analysis revealed that the age of L2 acquisition
contributed significantly to prediction of bilinguals’ fluency and flexi-
bility scores (β=−.26, p < .01 and β=−.24, p < .05, respectively). The
negative correlation indicates that bilinguals who acquired L2 earlier in
life tended to show greater fluency and flexibility in divergent think-
ing. In addition, it was found that the composite PNT score contributed
significantly to prediction of participants’ elaboration score (β = .28,
p < .01). The positive correlation indicates that bilinguals who were
more proficient in both languages tended to show greater elaboration

(a) (b)
17.00 17.00
16.00 16.00
Flexibility
Fluency
15.00 15.00
14.00 14.00
13.00 13.00
Bilingual Monolingual Bilingual Monolingual
Language group Language group
(c) (d)
17.00 17.00
16.00 16.00
Elaboration
Originality
15.00 15.00
14.00 14.00
13.00 13.00
Bilingual Monolingual Bilingual Monolingual
Language group Language group
Figure 1. Bilingual and monolingual groups’ performance on the ATTA measures of

(a) fluency, (b) flexibiligy, (c) elaboration, and (d) originality with error bars repre-
senting 95% confidence interval (N = 155).
in divergent thinking. The CEC revealed no significant correlation with

any DT measure.
Altogether, the findings suggest that at least two factors in bilin-
gual development might have an impact on divergent thinking abilities.
Extensive cross-linguistic experience, as evidenced by early L2 acqui-
sition and high proficiency in both languages, tends to be positively

related to bilinguals’ performance on the divergent thinking traits that

require simultaneous activation of a large number of concepts from dif-
ferent categories and the ability to keep them active during the thought
process.
4.4. Bilingual = Creative

The findings of the study show that bilingualism has an effect on the
fluency, flexibility, and elaboration in divergent thinking, but has no
influence on the originality trait. Note that the first three measures
of the ATTA (fluency, flexibility, and elaboration) test the ability to
rapidly produce a large number of ideas or solutions to a problem, the
capacity to consider a variety of approaches to a problem simultane-
ously, and the ability to think through the details of an idea and carry
it out. In other words, they require the ability to activate a multitude
of unrelated concepts from different categories and work through con-
cepts already activated. In contrast, the last ATTA measure (originality)
probes the tendency to produce ideas different from those of most other
people. This ability to generate novel and unique ideas seems to account
for the divergent thinking trait that may directly contribute to genuine
creativity.
Logically, these four traits of divergent thinking are grouped together
as two types of creative behavior: the ability to generate and to elabo-
rate on various, often unrelated, ideas and the ability to extract novel
and unique ideas. The first type seems to represent characteristics of the
preparation stage of the creative process, that is, the ability to activate
a multitude of unrelated concepts and work through concepts already
activated. However, it does not imply that the ideas based on these con-
cepts should necessarily be original (i.e., satisfy the criteria of novelty)
and result in creative production. On the other hand, the second type of
creative behavior accounts for originality in thinking, that is, the ability
to produce innovative and useful ideas. This type therefore accounts
for the finalizing stage of the creative process. This study assumes that
the functions of the first category are basic cognitive processing (sim-
ilar to early cycle capacity in Mumford 2000) that, according to the
creative cognition approach (see Ward et al. 1999), paves the way for

more sophisticated cognitive processing (similar to Mumford’s late cycle

capacity) during which the original ideas may be extracted. Although
these two types of processing were seen as distinct cognitive capacities
(e.g., Guilford 1950), one might argue that the rate of idea generation
during the first stage should provide a larger pool of ideas to work
with thereby contributing to the production of more original outcomes
(Simonton 1998). However, other individual cognitive capacities (e.g.,
intelligence, education, motivation, and personal experience) might
play a dominant role here.
In other words, the findings support the notion that although bilin-
gualism might have an influence on creativity, it is rather indirect.
Bilingualism may encourage the use of certain cognitive processes in
a more efficient way, which paves the way for more sophisticated cog-
nitive processing. The latter, in turn, may result in creative production
in some individuals, but other factors in their development may over-
ride the effects of bilingual development. Thus, if bilingualism has any
contribution to the increase in creative abilities, its possible function is
to facilitate the basic cognitive processes responsible for generating a
multitude of unrelated ideas and to work through the ideas already gen-
erated; that is, it encourages certain cognitive processes that might be
responsible for an increase in simultaneous activation and processing of
a large number of unrelated concepts.
The limited contribution of bilingualism to creative thinking provides
an explanation for the contradiction between superior bilinguals’ perfor-
mance on the creativity tests in the laboratory settings and no systematic
difference in bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ performance in real life.
Most of the creativity tests employed in the studies on bilingualism
and creativity (see Ricciardelli 1992b) probed the skills needed to acti-
vate conceptual representations simultaneously and produce multiple
solutions to a problem, but not an ability to extract original solutions
out of this multitude. Bilinguals seem to have some predisposition for
creativity, but this predisposition must be supported by other factors
in individual development (such as intelligence, education, motivation,
personal experience, etc.) not related to bilingualism itself. Therefore,
the fact that an individual speaks more than one language does not imply
that he or she should be creative.

4.5. Bilingual Developmental Factors Influencing

Divergent Thinking
This study also shows that cross-linguistic experience has a positive
effect on bilinguals’ divergent thinking performance. In contrast, cross-
cultural experience reveals no significant effect on this ability. The
following subsections present a detailed discussion of the effects of the
age of L2 acquisition and language proficiency on bilinguals’ divergent
thinking abilities. They are followed by somewhat speculative expla-
nations for the finding of no effect of the cross-cultural experience on
divergent thinking.
4.5.1. The effect of the age of L2 acquisition on divergent thinking The data
above provides evidence that the age at which L2 was acquired relates
to the ability to establish links between unrelated concepts from distant
categories (fluency and flexibility in divergent thinking). The negative
correlation indicates that individuals who acquired L2 at a younger age
show greater divergent thinking abilities. This finding corresponds with
the reports of bilingual children’s performance in the immersion pro-
grams (Swain & Lapkin 1982). A number of studies conducted in the
1970s with students in an early French immersion program in Toronto
and Ottawa (Canada) showed that the age of entering the program could
be an essential factor in bilingual children’s cognitive development. In
the same fashion, other studies reported an age-related decline in encod-
ing new information (Craik & Jennings 1992) and decrease in working
memory capacity (Kharkhurin et al. 2001), cognitive processing speed,
and attention (Kemper 1992).
A possible explanation for these findings could be the notion that the
changes in bilingual memory modulated by early acquisition of both
languages may result in certain cognitive advantages. As predicted by
Lenneberg’s (1967) critical period hypothesis, if L2 acquisition occurs
before the age of puberty, it will be relatively fast, successful and quali-
tatively similar to first language (L1). He relates these advantages to the
fact that language learning occurs before lateralization is complete. The
brain at an early age is still flexible and therefore allows more detailed
analysis of incoming linguistic information, which may result in a greater
level of attainment in language acquisition (see Newport 1990, “less is

more” hypothesis, for a similar view). Later on, as the person matures
and learns various cognitive strategies, this early advantage may be lost.
The studies with connectionist networks provide evidence for the mat-
uration hypothesis. For example, Elman (1993) demonstrated that the
training of a recurrent connectionist network with complex grammati-
cal rules fails if the model is fully formed and equipped with adult-like
capacity from the onset. However, learning is successful if the model
initially has a restricted child-like capacity that gradually matures into
an adult-like one.
4.5.2. The effect of language proficiency on divergent thinking The results

of the present study also show that language proficiency in both English
and Russian positively correlates with the ability to keep concepts active
during the thought process (elaboration in divergent thinking). This indi-
cates that bilinguals with high proficiency in both languages are more
successful in concept processing than their less proficient counterparts.
This finding is in line with a number of studies on children showing
proficient bilinguals’ superiority on various DT tasks (e.g., Ricciardelli
1992a). These studies converge on the idea formulated in the threshold
theory (Cummins 1976) arguing that bilinguals need to achieve high
levels of linguistic proficiency in both of their languages before bilin-
gualism can promote cognitive advantages. For example, Ricciardelli
tested this theory with Italian-English bilingual and English monolingual
children. She found that only bilingual children highly proficient in both
Italian and English showed superior divergent thinking abilities. Those
bilinguals who had low proficiency in either one or both languages did
not show any significant difference from the monolinguals.
4.5.3. The effect of cross-cultural experience on divergent thinking In

addition to the influence of the cross-linguistic experience on divergent
thinking, a possible impact of cross-cultural experience was examined.
It was hypothesized that the experience and participation in two cultures
that often accompany language acquisition may have a facilitating effect
on the development of bilinguals’ conceptual system, which in turn may
encourage divergent thinking. The obtained results, however, failed to
support this hypothesis: there was no significant correlation between

the degree of cross-cultural experience (as assessed by the CEC) and

bilinguals’ divergent thinking performance. The most obvious interpre-
tation of this finding is that cross-cultural experience is not related to
divergent thinking abilities at all. However, for the sake of potential
development for the bilingualism/biculturalism research, it is plausi-
ble to consider this issue in more detail. Several alternative, although
not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations can be advanced for
the finding of no significant correlation between the cross-cultural
experience and divergent thinking.
4.6. The CEC is Not a Sensitive Measure of Cross

Cultural Experience
First, the CEC used in this study as a measure of cross-cultural experi-
ence could be insensitive to variations in the cross-cultural environment
and its psychological ramifications that might have an influence on
individuals’ divergent thinking. It is a well known problem in the psy-
chological research on biculturalism: cross-cultural experience is not
only extremely difficult to define, but even more difficult to measure and
relate to the individual’s cognitive functioning (Francis 2000). Although
the CEC has some redeeming features, it seems to be somewhat sim-
plistic in that mere exposure to a culture does not necessarily reflect the
psychological implications of that exposure. For example, as Tropp et al.
(1999) noted, some individuals may live in the US throughout their lives
without feeling a strong connection to it and may, in turn, be less likely to
embrace North American cultural norms and expectations. Conversely,
some recent immigrants may identify strongly with the prevailing US
norms and standards and may therefore attempt to integrate aspects of
North American culture into their daily lives. Therefore, it might be
plausible for future research to introduce a more sensitive measure of
cross-cultural exposure that reflects the psychological ramifications of
the bicultural experience.
4.7. Bicultural Experience is Subcultural in Fact

If there is indeed a relationship between the degree of cross-cultural
experience and individuals’ cognitive and divergent thinking abilities,

the specificity of cultural experience of participants in this study may

have prevented them from showing this effect. A number of studies argue
that bilinguals undergo conceptual changes due to experience within
different cultural and linguistic environments (e.g., de Groot 2000;
Kecskes & Papp 2000; Pavlenko 2000). Kecskes (2003; in this volume)
hypothesized that in the mind of bi- and multilingual speakers there are
synergic concepts that are the results of conceptual blending. Accord-
ing to his definition “synergic concepts are a group of concepts that are
lexicalised in both languages but have a different socio-cultural load in
each language.”
The present study hypothesizes that these conceptual changes may
result in increased cognitive flexibility and divergent thinking abilities
due to, for example, the internalization of new concepts and conver-
gence and restructuring of these concepts. This hypothesis was based on
the assumption that bicultural individuals acquire the values and norms
of the new as well as the original culture. In the “turkey” example pre-
sented above, the conceptual representation of a turkey may expand since
it includes additional features related to the experience of celebration.
The expanded conceptual system was supposed to facilitate individuals’
perception of a variety of events from different culture-specific perspec-
tives, and therefore to increase their cognitive flexibility and divergent
thinking abilities.
However, it is entirely possible that the participants in this study who
were assumed to have a bicultural experience had in fact a subcultural
one5 . That is, they might have developed perspectives that were dis-
tanced from the source culture and yet differed from the culture of the
country of their current residence (Ervin-Tripp 2000). Due to a vari-
ety of negative effects that were found to accompany the process of
acculturation (see Birman & Trickett 2001), the subcultural experience
could result in the attrition of the essential knowledge of the original
country, and at the same time the inability to fully acquire the knowl-
edge of a new culture. In other words, it could be speculated that due
to the subcultural experience, participants in this study underwent those
conceptual changes that resulted in a poorly developed conceptual sys-
tem. This notion is supported by Pavlenko’s (2000) model of conceptual
development, in which the interaction of two languages and cultures

may result in conceptual changes that may include the internalization of

new concepts, convergence of the concepts and restructuring, but at the
same time, attrition and/or substitution of previously learned concepts
by new ones and a shift from one conceptual domain to another. The
conceptual changes of the latter types could result in the inability of
bilingual participants in this study to develop their conceptual system
to a greater extent. This, in turn, could eliminate any significant cor-
relation between their cross-cultural experience and divergent thinking
performance. Therefore, future research should control for the history
of acculturation of bilingual individuals, namely for the sociocultural
environment in which they reside.
4.8. The Limitations of Cross-Cultural Differences in
this Study
Finally, it is entirely possible that certain aspects of North American
and Russian cultures are too similar to initiate remarkable conceptual
changes that may result in an increase in divergent thinking. Both of these
cultures have their roots in Western civilization. Therefore, there might
be too few fundamental distinctions in the North American and Russian
cultural settings to develop alternative perspectives on the same phe-
nomena. Thus, it might be reasonable for the future research to consider
more distant cultures that developed in completely different traditions
(e.g., Western and Eastern).
5. B IL ING U A L MEM O RY M O D EL
This study demonstrates bilinguals’ superiority over monolinguals in

fluency, flexibility, and elaboration in divergent thinking. These traits
represent the ability to activate a multitude of unrelated concepts from
different categories and work through concepts already activated. This
study also shows that bilinguals’ extensive experience with two lan-
guages facilitates this ability. To account for these findings, this chapter
presents a theoretical framework in which the increase in divergent
thinking results from enhanced spreading activation between concep-
tual and lexical representations in bilingual memory. In this framework,
bilinguals’ proficiency in both languages and their age of acquisition

of these languages are theorized to modify the structure of bilingual

memory. Modified bilingual memory may subsequently facilitate bilin-
guals’ superiority in divergent thinking performance.
5.1. The Structure of Bilingual Memory
One of the central issues in psycholinguistic studies of bilingual memory
evolves around the levels of representation of bilinguals’ languages and
their underlying concepts (see Kroll & Tokowicz 2005 for an overview).
The present study employs the distributed lexical/conceptual feature
model (see Kroll & de Groot 1997 for a detailed description of the
model) to explain the facilitation effect of the specific structure of bilin-
gual memory on divergent thinking. The model consists of a language
independent (shared) conceptual feature level, a language non-specific
(shared) lexical feature level, and a language specific lemma level that
mediates between activation of lexical and conceptual features. Thus,
this chapter assumes that bilingual memory is a dynamic system with
three levels of representation: a conceptual features level that consists
of representations of meaning, a lexical features level that does not
include word meanings, but only aspects of word form, and a language
specific lexical-semantic level that mediates the word forms and their
meanings. The spreading activation is seen as a communication mech-
anism between all three levels. The conceptual features level contains
distributed conceptual features, the lexical-semantic level contains lan-
guage specific lemmas, and the lexical features level contains distributed
lexical features (aspects of word form)6 . Note that throughout the follow-
ing discussion, the terms lexicon and lexical refer to the lexical-semantic
system, which consists of language specific units and more generally
to bilinguals’ two languages, whereas the term lexical features refers
to specific lexical features system that contains only the aspects of
word form.
5.2. Association Routes in Bilingual Memory
Several assumptions pertinent to the discussion of cognitive mechanisms
facilitating divergent thinking in bilinguals follow from the proposed
model of bilingual memory. As mentioned above, divergent thinking
refers to the ability to activate and simultaneously process a large number

of unrelated ideas and access concepts from distant categories (Guilford

1967). This property of divergent thinking may benefit from a greater
diversity of associations to the same concept (Lubart 1999). This study
suggests that bilinguals’ ability to activate a larger span of associations
compared to their monolingual counterparts can be explained by the
functioning of the spreading activation mechanism. This mechanism
may assist bilinguals in simultaneously activating a set of unrelated
concepts to a greater extent than monolinguals are able to activate them.
The distributed nature of bilingual memory may facilitate the dispersion
of activation throughout the conceptual network.
Intuitively speaking, associations in monolingual memory can be
established due to the distributed nature of the conceptual system. The
same conceptual features may be a part of the representation of differ-
ent concepts. For example, the concept CAT shares a set of conceptual
features with the concept DOG (e.g., “4 paws,” “tail,” “animal,” etc.).
The activation of the conceptual representation of a dog may result in
a partial activation of the conceptual representation of a cat, as shown
in semantic priming studies (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt 1971). These
two concepts however, differ in some essential features that are unique
for each (e.g., the “bark” feature for the DOG, and the “meow” fea-
ture for the CAT). Due to the distributed nature of conceptual system,
these features can activate other conceptual representations (e.g., the
“bark” feature can send partial activation to the conceptual represen-
tation of a fox) and additional associations can be formed. However,
the activated concepts are likely to be members of the same or simi-
lar categories (as the concepts DOG and FOX in the previous example
are the members of a category [animal]). Only people with exceptional
associative thinking abilities may relate concepts that lie beyond the
category boundaries. Various factors in individuals’ development (such
as intelligence, education, personal experience, etc.) may stimulate this
processing.
Associative thinking is an inherent property of both bilingual and
monolingual conceptual memory. However, in addition to an inge-
nious capacity to form associations due to the distributed nature of the
conceptual network, bilinguals may benefit from structural and/or pro-
cedural changes in their memory, which result from cross-linguistic

and cross-cultural factors in their development. The modified bilingual

memory is theorized to permit broad language-mediated concept acti-
vation. That is, activation flow on the conceptual level, mediated by
the lexical level, establishes the links between more distant conceptual
units that cannot be readily activated in the monolingual conceptual
network. The activation of distant concepts in turn may result in
launching more distant associations, the process underlying divergent
thinking.
6. L E M MA A N D WO RD FO RM
ME DIAT E D CRO SS-LA N G U A G E TRA N SFER
This chapter proposes that experience with two languages may

enhance the lexical-conceptual routes in bilingual memory, which facil-
itates cross-language transfer. The latter occurs due to the mutual
activation of language units representing translation equivalents in bilin-
guals’ languages. Cross-language transfer may assist the spreading
activation in the conceptual network and therefore result in a greater
span of associations in the bilingual conceptual system compared to
the monolingual one. Kecskes and Papp (2000) spoke about a similar
phenomenon that they called “bidirectional transfer.”
The notion of cross-language transfer is based on the theory that com-
munication between translation equivalents in bilinguals’ languages is
concept mediated (see Kroll & de Groot 1997, for a discussion). Follow-
ing the concept-mediated model, the translation equivalents in L1 and
L2 lexicons activate each other through the corresponding conceptual
units. For example, the word “cat” in English and its German translation
“die Katze” share the same set of conceptual units (such as “4 paws,”
“a tail,” “an animal,” “a meow,” etc.) that mediate between lexical units
in these two lexicons. A bilingual variant of primed lexical decision
tasks supports this notion by showing that semantically related words in
different languages prime each other (e.g., Zeelenberg & Pecher 2003;
Kroll & Tokowicz 2005).
The present study goes one step further and suggests that once acti-
vated, these lexical units may send partial activation to the conceptual
representations of objects, events, etc. that are lexically related to

the given ones. In the framework of the distributed lexical/conceptual

feature model, this activation can take place on two levels of processing:
the lexical-semantic level, on which conceptual representations sharing
the same lemmas can be activated (e.g., the figurative meaning of the
word “cat” as in “cat burglar” in English, or the figurative meaning of
the word “Katze” as in “die Katze im Sack kaufen” /to buy a pig in a poke/
in German); and the lexical features level, on which conceptual repre-
sentations sharing the same word forms can be activated (e.g., “marker”
in English and “marka” /stamp/ in Russian).
6.1. Lemma-Mediated Activation

The lemma-mediated activation is believed to work as follows. A word
in L1 activates corresponding lemmas in the L1 lexicon, which in turn,
activate the corresponding conceptual features. The conceptual features
send partial activation back to the L2 lexicon, which activates the corre-
sponding L2 lemmas. These lemmas, once activated, may send partial
activation to the conceptual features representing concepts that share
this lemma with the target word.
In the cat/Katze example, the presentation of the English word “cat”
to English-German bilinguals activates a lemma {cat} in the English lex-
icon (see Figure 2). This lemma in turn sends activation to conceptual
features that represent the literal meaning of a cat; additionally, it may
send a partial activation to the conceptual representation of the alterna-
tive meaning of the lemma {cat} such as the one in the “cat burglar.”
Thus, the conceptual representation of BURGLAR is activated.
At the same time, the conceptual representation of a cat sends par-
tial activation back to the lemma level in the German lexicon thereby
activating the lemma {Katze}. This lemma, once activated, may in turn
send partial activation to the conceptual representation of the additional
meaning of the lemma {Katze} such as the one in “die Katze im Sack
kaufen.” Accordingly, the latter may send partial activation back to the
lemma level in the English lexicon thereby activating a set of lemmas
corresponding to the idiom “to buy a pig in a poke,” an English transla-
tion equivalent to the German expression. Therefore, among the others,
the lemma {pig} is activated and in turn triggers its corresponding con-
ceptual features. As a result, a large pattern of conceptual representations
is activated that allows simultaneous exploration of unrelated concepts

Conceptual features level
(4)
(6)
(7) (2)
(8) (5)
L1 (3) L2
pig buy poke cat kaufen Katze Sack
Lemma level
to buy a pig in a poke (1)
die KatzeimSack kaufen
“cat”
Lexical features level

(a)
“cat”
(1)
{cat}
(2) (3)
CAT CAT BURGLAR

(5)
{Katze}
(6)
(4)
TO BUY A PIG IN A POKE

“Die KatzeimSack kaufen”
(7)
{pig}
(8)
PIG BURGLAR
Figure 2. Illustration of a lemma mediated spreading activation underlying cross-language transfer. Schematic
representation of (a) a fragment of bilingual memory structure, and (b) the information flow in bilingual memory.
Bilingual memory consists of the distributed lexical features level, language specific lemma level, and distributed
conceptual features level. The presentation of the English word “cat” activates a lemma cat in the English lexicon
(1) This lemma in turn activates conceptual features that represent the literal meaning of a cat (2) as well as
the conceptual representation of the additional meaning of the lemma cat such as the one in the “cat burglar”
(3) Thereby the conceptual representation of BURGLAR is activated (4) At the same time, the conceptual
representation of a cat sends partial activation back to the lemma level in German lexicon thereby activating a
lemma Katze (5) This lemma sends partial activation to the conceptual representation of the additional meaning
of the lemma Katze such as the one in “die Katze im Sack kaufen” (6) Accordingly, the latter sends partial
activation back to the lemma level in English lexicon thereby activating a set of lemmas corresponding to the
idiom “to buy a pig in a poke.” Therefore, among the others, a lemma pig is activated (7) and in turn, triggers its
corresponding conceptual features (8).
(such as BURGLAR and PIG) from distant categories (such as [crime]

and [animal]). It is important to note, however, that this schema is rather
speculative and requires empirical investigation.

6.2. Word Form-Mediated Activation

Furthermore, this study proposes that lemma-mediated cross-language
transfer is facilitated by lexical features level activation. Words that share
the same word forms (e.g., orthographic, phonological) may activate
each other in the same way that words with similar lexical properties acti-
vate each other in the monolingual memory (e.g., Allopenna et al. 1998).
This assumption was inspired by the findings of eye-tracking studies
showing that cross-linguistic homophones tend to activate each other
(e.g., Marian & Spivey 2003). Marian and her colleagues recorded the
eye movements of Russian-English bilinguals while giving them instruc-
tions in one language (e.g., “Podnimi marku” /Pick up the stamp/ ). The
recording showed that while participants’ eyes focused on the stamp
they also looked briefly at the objects with a phonologically similar
name in another language (e.g., a marker, /flomaster/ in Russian). Sim-
ilar results were obtained in research on cross-linguistic orthographic
priming with French-English bilinguals (Bijeljac-Babic et al. 1997). In
the lexical decision task, orthographically related words in French and
English tended to inhibit each other, indicating that printed strings of
letters can simultaneously activate lexical representations in each of the
bilingual’s languages.
Thus, semantically unrelated words in bilingual lexicons can activate
each other if they share similar lexical features. This assumption accords
with the distributed lexical/conceptual feature model that presumes a
set of distributed lexical features shared by both lexicons. Common
lexical features can send the activation to the lemmas in different lan-
guages thereby initiating the lemma-mediated cross-language transfer.
For example, the oral presentation of the English word “marker” to
English-Russian bilinguals may activate a set of phonological features
that are present in both “marker” and “marka.” These features there-
fore activate the lemma {marker} in the English lexicon and the lemma
{stamp} in the Russian lexicon. These lemmas in turn activate the
conceptual representations of the marker and the stamp, which appear
to be unrelated in a monolingual lexicon. As a result, concepts from
distant unrelated categories are activated, which may promote diver-
gent thinking in bilinguals to a greater extent than in their monolingual
counterparts.

7. T HE E FFECTS O F CRO SS-LIN G U ISTIC

E XPE R IE NC E ON D IV ERG EN T TH IN K IN G IN TH E
FR AME W OR K OF TH E BILIN G U A L MEM O RY M O D EL
In the framework of bilingual memory proposed in this study,

cross-linguistic experience is theorized to have an influence on the
lexical-conceptual routes by establishing stronger and more efficient
connections between conceptual and lexical representations. The fol-
lowing subsections discuss the possible influence of the age of L2
acquisition and language proficiency on the communication routes
between these representations. More efficient communication in bilin-
gual memory may promote a greater activation flow that simultane-
ously activates concepts from distant categories and therefore may
result in superior divergent thinking performance. Note, however,
that these assumptions are speculative and require extensive empirical
investigation.
7.1. Age of L2 Acquisition
Individuals who acquired both of their languages early in life may
develop a greater sensitivity to underlying concepts and more refined
connections between lexical and conceptual representations. If bilin-
guals acquired both of their languages early and underwent an equal
development in both languages, they might be able to establish equally
strong direct links from both lexicons to the conceptual system. These
links can be reinforced by a constant exposure to both languages in
combination with frequent language switching. Thus, bilinguals who
acquired their languages early in life would have two equally developed
lexical systems connected to a shared conceptual one. This presumably
fosters cross-language transfer by providing fast routing of informational
exchange between both lexicons and the concepts.
On the other hand, individuals who acquired their L2 later in life
first establish the links between their L1 lexicon and their conceptual
system. During L2 learning they initially access the meanings for L2
words through L1 and only later become able to conceptually mediate
L2 directly. The shift from reliance on L1 to direct conceptual processing
of L2 may result in creating an asymmetry in lexical access (see Kroll &
de Groot 1997). Late bilinguals would have more lexical-conceptual

connections from L1 than from L2, and the strength of these links
would be different for first and second languages. Due to lexical access
asymmetry, more conceptual features can be accessed through L1 than
through L2. Since the vast majority of the conceptual system in late
bilinguals was established during L1 acquisition, and since L2 lexical
features were mapped to the conceptual features through the L1 lexical-
conceptual route, there might be fewer shared conceptual features that
have direct links from both lexicons in the memory of individuals who
acquired L2 later in life. This may result in a less efficient cross-language
transfer, and consequently in poorer divergent thinking performance.
Indeed, this study shows that bilinguals who acquired L2 earlier in life
outperformed those who acquired L2 later on the fluency and flexibility
ATTA measures.
7.2. Language Proficiency

The influence of the age of L2 acquisition on modifications in bilingual
memory can theoretically be complimented by the effect of language
proficiency. If the age of L2 acquisition may determine the directions
of lexical-conceptual routes, the proficiency in L1 and L2 may deter-
mine the strength of connections between the lexical and conceptual
systems. The degree of linguistic skills may influence the intensity of
lexical access: greater language proficiency may result in establish-
ing stronger and more elaborate links to the conceptual system. As
a result, more concepts become readily available for cross-language
transfer. Following this assumption, bilinguals who attained high exper-
tise in both languages would have stronger and more efficient links
between lexical and conceptual levels then those who were not able to
develop any of their languages to a high degree. Thus, bilinguals highly
proficient in both languages would employ the cross-language transfer
mechanism more effectively and therefore may show greater divergent
thinking performance compared to their less proficient counterparts.
The present study supports this theory by showing that bilinguals with
higher composite PNT score scored higher on the elaboration ATTA
measure.
Altogether, both factors in cross-linguistic experience are theorized
to influence connections between lexical and conceptual representations

in bilingual memory. Early bilinguals may develop equally elaborated

direct links between the L1 and L2 lexicons and the conceptual system,
whereas late bilinguals are likely to develop an asymmetrical system, in
which L1 mediated route is more elaborated than L2 mediated one. In
the same fashion, bilinguals with greater expertise in both languages
would establish stronger links between the L1 and L2 lexicons and
the conceptual system compared to their less linguistically proficient
counterparts. The highly developed lexical-conceptual routes may facil-
itate the cross-language transfer, which in turn, as proposed above, may
promote divergent thinking.
8. CO N CLU SIO N
In this chapter several research questions pertinent to the influence of

bilingual development on individuals’ divergent thinking abilities were
explored. First, bilingual participants were found to outperform their
monolingual counterparts in fluency, flexibility, and elaboration, but not
in originality in divergent thinking. These findings provide an explana-
tion for the apparent contradiction between bilinguals’ superiority over
monolinguals on creativity tests in the lab setting and no performance
differences between the representatives of these two groups in real life
creativity. This study claims that being bilingual does not necessary
imply being creative. Bilinguals’ advantage was found for the diver-
gent thinking traits that refer to simultaneous activation and elaboration
of multiple unrelated concepts from distinct categories, but not for the
trait that deals with the ability to extract unique and original solutions.
Thus, the positive effect of bilingualism on creative abilities is likely
to be limited to basic cognitive processing, which lays the founda-
tion of more sophisticated processing during which truly creative ideas
may be extracted. The effectiveness of the latter cognitive processes,
however, might be influenced by various developmental factors differ-
ent from bilingualism (e.g., intelligence, education, motivation, personal
experience).
Second, the cross-language transfer is proposed as a cognitive
mechanism underlying divergent thinking. A specific architecture of
bilingual memory in which two lexicons are mutually linked to the

conceptual system is argued to facilitate this process. Due to elaborative

cross-language transfer, different concepts from unrelated categories
can be activated simultaneously, which may account for bilinguals’
greater performance on fluency, flexibility, and elaboration in diver-
gent thinking. Two factors in bilingual development are proposed to
facilitate cross-language transfer. The age of L2 acquisition might deter-
mine the way bilinguals’ two lexicons are connected to their conceptual
system. Language proficiency might enrich the links between bilin-
guals’ lexicons and their conceptual system. Together, these factors
of cross-linguistic experience are assumed to play an important role
in establishing an elaborated lexical-conceptual system in bilingual
memory that is theorized to facilitate the cross-language transfer assist-
ing divergent thinking. However, this claim warrants further empirical
investigation.
Third, although no significant correlation was found between bilin-
guals’ cross-cultural experience and their divergent thinking perfor-
mance, several particularly important directions for future research into
bilingualism could be advanced. Bilingualism should be studied not
only in the context of individuals’ linguistic abilities, but also in a
sociocultural context. The psychological ramifications of living in two
cultures on an individual’s behavior and reflections on the impact of
cross-cultural experience on the conceptual system open a new line of
research on biculturalism that should bring together the efforts of cogni-
tive and social psychologists. Moreover, disregarding the joint operation
of these factors puts research outside the mainstream of psychologi-
cal investigation. Furthermore, in studying the psychological effects
of cross-cultural experience, one should carefully examine the time
and circumstances of this experience. In addition, the peculiarities of the
cultures to which an individual is exposed should be taken into account.
In this regard, a question that needs to be answered is what cultural
cues might have an effect on the conceptual changes that presumably
influence the individual’s cognitive development.
Finally, the findings of this study also lend indirect support to the
creative cognition approach (Ward et al. 1999). On one side, bilinguals
seem to utilize the same cognitive mechanisms of concept formation
and lexical access that are used by all people. On the other, they tend

to show greater divergent thinking abilities. Thus, the various uses of

mundane cognitive functioning may result in superior divergent thinking
performance.
Altogether, this study emphasizes the importance of bilingual educa-
tion. Most of the policy debates over bilingual education have turned
on issues relating to implementation, assessment and whether existing
programs provide appropriate job training. Lost in much of the often-
angry disputes (e.g., the “Unz Initiative” – Prop. 227 in California) is
a central question: Does bilingual education have a particular and mea-
surable impact on cognitive functioning? This study provides a hint of
the contribution of bilingualism to cognitive development in children. In
particular, cross-linguistic and cross-cultural factors in bilingual educa-
tion might be beneficial for individuals’ cognitive growth and creative
abilities. With the latter, the idea that a high level of creative perfor-
mance can be stimulated by reinforcing the same cognitive functions
that are used in everyday activities suggests the importance of encour-
aging creative factors in education (Schank & Clearly 1995). In this
direction, the methodologies of bilingual education should be studied
with the potential to look into educational programs that are oriented
towards creativity.
AC KN O WLED G EM EN TS
The research reported in this article was supported by a grant from

the National Science Foundation (No. BCS-0414013). Many thanks to
Aneta Pavlenko for her comments on the draft version of this article and
to Istvan Kecskes and Liliana Albertazzi for advice and their thorough
editing of the volume. I also thank Edward Carlstedt for the proofreading
of the earlier draft of this article.
N O TES
1. One of the widely used definitions of creativity indicates that this is an ability to
produce work that is novel (i.e., original or unexpected), appropriate (i.e., useful or
meets task constraints; e.g., Sternberg & Lubart 1995), and can be “put to some use”
(Martindale 1989, p. 211).

2. The term “culture” has numerous overlapping meanings that sometimes are
misleading and provide unclear definitions. Traditional associations with the word
“culture” refer to the art, knowledge, and sophistication gained through exposure to
the art exemplars as well as to the artistic and literary heritage of a particular nation.
In this work, culture reflects social and anthropological aspects of human behavior.
It is defined as a set of beliefs, moral norms, customs, practice, and social behavior
of a particular nation or group of people whose shared beliefs and practices identify
the particular place, class, or time to which they belong.
3. The present study defines bilingualism in the broadest possible terms including indi-
viduals who are fluent in at least two languages, individuals who actively use, or
attempt to use, more than one language, even if they have not achieved fluency in
the second language (Kroll & de Groot 1997).
4. The CEC was introduced to account for a strong argument in acculturation literature
that the age of arrival and the length of residence in a new country are conceptu-
ally different and have different implications for immigrants of different ages (e.g.,
Birman & Trickett 2001). Individuals who were exposed to different cultures early
or late in life may develop perceptual differences of L1 and L2 cultural values,
which might be rooted in variations in their cognitive functioning. The present study
assumes that it is prudent to measure the length and the age of individuals’ exposure
to both cultures since the frequency and recency of exposure to different cultural
settings may have impact on the cognitive system.
5. Note that they were overwhelmingly immigrants from the former Soviet Union resid-
ing in Brooklyn, and therefore might have been influenced by the pervasive Russian
immigrant community of Brooklyn.
6. The distributed nature of the lexical features presumes that the same word forms
can be shared by words in each language. For example, a word “marker” in English
shares phonological features with a Russian word “marka” /stamp/. This is a particu-
larly important notion for understanding a phenomenon of a cross-language transfer
as discussed below in a section on the word form mediated association routes in
bilingual memory.
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PART 2
BILINGUAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING

CH A PTER 7
TASK AND CONTEXT EFFECTS IN BILINGUAL

LEXICAL PROCESSING
Ton Dijkstra
Nijmegen Institute for Cognition and Information, Nijmegen
Abstract
All language users are aware of the ambiguity of words and the role that context plays
to reduce this ambiguity. For instance, a word like “bank” will have a different mean-
ing when one is talking about cash flow or about water flow. Thus, which semantic
representation is ultimately derived from the lexicon must somehow be affected by con-
text information. It is also clear that the task at hand must affect the type of lexical
information that is selected for use. When one must name a word, its pronunciation
or phonology needs to be retrieved, whereas allocating the object named to a semantic
category requires a response based on word meaning. Although these facts are obvious
to anyone, it is quite common in psycholinguistics to ignore the effects of task and
context and talk about general models for particular domains of language processing.
Researchers have a tendency to speak about, for instance, models of word recognition
and parsing, as if performance would not depend on the actual circumstance in which
it occurs. Fortunately, there is an increasing interest in the effects of task demands and
different types of context on language processing. In this chapter, we consider this issue
for the domain of bilingual word recognition.
In the first part of the chapter, I describe a model for bilingual word recognition
that gives only a rudimentary account of context and task effects. To demonstrate that
this will not do, a number of reaction time studies are discussed next, showing the
effects of different types of context on bilingual lexical processing. It will become
evident that different types of context may affect word recognition in different ways.
Later, in the second part of the chapter, the proposed bilingual word recognition model
is therefore extended to include a system that explicitly takes into account task and
context aspects. Finally, I will illustrate that the extended model is compatible not only
with reaction time data, but also with data from electrophysiological and neuroimaging
techniques.
213
© 2007 Springer.

214 TO N D IJ K STRA
1. T HE L AN G U A G E U SER FRA MEWO RK
Simply put, psycholinguists consider the processes of understanding

and producing language in terms of computations that transform mental
representations of different kinds. For instance, after entering the ear, an
input speech signal is represented as a phonetic/phonological represen-
tation of sounds. Next, in a number of steps this phonetic/phonological
representation of the utterance is recoded into a meaning representa-
tion. In order to do so, knowledge about language (e.g., syntactic rules)
and the world needs to be retrieved from long-term memory, temporary
products of processing need to be stored in a working memory, and the
whole process must be monitored to detect possible derailments in an
early stage. This requires cognitive control and the investment of atten-
tional capacity. In all, language processing requires a number of complex
components. The Language User Framework (Dijkstra & Kempen 1984,
1993; Dijkstra & De Smedt 1996) gives a functional analysis of the most
important subprocesses that must be involved in monolingual and bilin-
gual language processing. One of its basic assumptions is that language
processing can be considered as a globally modular process with locally
interactive components.
As Figure 1 shows, the Language User Framework contains a number
of structural and processing components that all play a role in language
processing. First, it is concerned with structural units, such as repre-
sentations (e.g., phonemes and words) and rules (e.g., morphosyntax),
stored in Long Term Memory (LTM). Second, it must consist of process-
ing components (“machines” or devices) that are dedicated to perform
specific linguistic operations (e.g., parsing) on these representations and
rules. Not indicated in the figure, but very important nevertheless, are
components subserving working memory to temporally store interme-
diate products, and components involving cognitive control, attention,
and monitoring that are concerned with the allocation of mental effort
and checking procedures.
2. PART 1: TH E BIA M O D EL
The Language User Framework in Figure 1 is too general to be con-

sidered a model of language processing. Zooming in on a component,

TASK AN D CO N TEX T EFFECTS 215
Discourse comprehension Discourse planning
Conceptual system
Conceptual Grammatical
Sentence parser encoder
memory
Formulator
Syntax
Phonological
Word recognizer encoder
Lexicon &
morphology
Phonology Articulator,
Signal recognizer
motor control
Knowledge
sources
Figure 1. The language user framework.
such as the word recognition system, requires a specification of the pro-

cesses executed by that component; in other words a model of that
component’s processing. In 1998, we extended a model for mono-
lingual word recognition called the Interactive Activation (IA) model
(McClelland & Rumelhart 1981) to the bilingual domain. The result-
ing bilingual model was called the Bilingual Interactive Activation or
BIA model (Grainger & Dijkstra 1992; Dijkstra & Van Heuven 1998;
Van Heuven et al. 1998). Both the IA and BIA models are computa-
tional models (i.e., they are implemented on the computer) of a localist
connectionist type.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the BIA model consists of four levels of
representations corresponding to letter features, letters, words, and lan-
guage membership. It assumes that the recognition of a word proceeds
by deriving the characteristics of the letters in different positions in the
words from LTM, activating the letter units they form and then the word
candidates these letters make up. Next, language membership informa-
tion may become active and, at the same time, activated word units may
send activation back to their constituent letters. Thus, word recognition

Dutch English
Language
Dutch English
Word words words
pos 1 pos 4
Letter
pos 2 pos 3
pos 1 pos 4
Feature
pos 2 pos 3
Visual input
Figure 2. The bilingual interactive activation (BIA) model.

is seen as a dynamic process with a kind of resonance between word

and letter level in lexical memory (i.e., the mental lexicon). Although
this model is considered to be a localist connectionist network, it may
be noted that information about words is not only stored in the word
nodes themselves (symbolically), but also in their constituent letters
(subsymbolically and in a distributed way).
The BIA model is a model for bilingual word recognition, because
the lexical information can consist of words from several languages,
and because each word unit is connected to a language node, which is
a kind of tag indicating the word’s language membership. Note that the
model does not require any special mechanism to account for bilingual
word recognition relative to monolingual processing (cf. Paradis 2004).
In other words, apart from adding second-language (L2) words and
language membership information, no special provisions are asked for.
This view has two immediate consequences, one for lexical structure
and the other for lexical processing
– The mental lexicon of bilinguals is integrated; that is, there is
no qualitative distinction between words of one language or the
other (assuming, of course, that the same orthography is used in
the input);
– When a particular input is processed, the model initially does not
make any distinction between words from the first or second lan-
guage. This language nonselective lexical access arises because word
recognition is an automatic process in which language membership
information becomes active only after word candidates have been
activated.
The BIA model has been used to simulate or mimic bilingual word
recognition for different types of items. These types are “standard”
words that exist in only one language of the bilingual and have a low
or high frequency of usage in that language (e.g., the English words
BLIGHT and BRIGHT); “standard” words that have different numbers
of similar words (neighbors) within the same or another language (e.g.,
LYNX vs. WALK); and “special” words that have the same orthographic
form across languages (interlingual homographs, such as ROOM, mean-
ing “cream” in Dutch) or the same phonological form across languages

(interlingual homophones, such as COW, sounding like the Dutch word

KOU, meaning “cold”). Because the BIA model represents only the
orthographic characteristics of words, it was not suited to simulate the
recognition of translation equivalents with more or less similar (ortho-
graphic) forms (e.g., cognates, such as TOMATO and TOMAAT). In
this paper, we will consider especially how late Dutch-English bilin-
guals (in particular, students) process interlingual homographs and
cognates.
In spite of the restrictions on the stimulus materials the model can
cope with, it has had some impact on views of bilingual word recogni-
tion, because as an implemented (or computational) model, it has some
real advantages relative to a merely verbal model. First of all, it provides
an explicit well-specified theoretical framework. Second, the obligation
to make a computer model actually work provides an inherent test of the
completeness, consistency, and coherence of the theoretical framework
underlying the model, because it makes the modeler aware of gaps and
flaws in theoretical reasoning. Third, a model allows the derivation of
quantitative predictions, even for interactions between several indepen-
dent variables at the same time. Such predictions are impossible to make
by a “model” that is only verbally specified.
On the other hand, the implementation of a model may lead to relative
inflexibility or oversimplification of viewpoints. This is especially true
with respect to task and context effects, which are often underspecified
anyway. Because empirical data patterns may be quite sensitive to con-
text factors and task demands, models not only need components for
representations and processes, but also a “task account” and a “context
account.”
2.1. Types of Context
Note that context is a rather broad term that can be used for many dif-
ferent aspects of language processing. In this chapter, we will consider
effects of the following types of context on bilingual word recogni-
tion: (1) The lexical items from the same or another language similar
to the target word (e.g., the Dutch reading of an English target word
that is a Dutch-English homograph); (2) Stimulus list composition
(e.g., whether the list contains items from one or from two languages);

(3) Task demands (e.g., whether the task is lexical decision or naming);
(4) Lexical items (primes) preceding the item in question (target); (5) The
preceding sentence; (6) The instruction the participant received. In
every-day language comprehension, many of these context types (and
others) are present that may affect the recognition of words. In the fol-
lowing sections, we will give a compact review of experimental studies
(mostly done in our lab) with respect to such context effects on the
recognition of interlingual homographs and cognates.
2.2. Interlingual Homographs (IHs)

As explained above, an interlingual homograph is a word that is
orthographically identical but semantically different across languages.
Examples of Dutch-English interlingual homographs are ROOM
(meaning “cream”), ANGEL (meaning “sting”), and LIST (meaning
“trick”). Interestingly enough, Dutch-English bilinguals seldom notice
that there is something “special” about song titles like “White Room”
by the pop group Cream, “Angel Eyes” by Sting, and the film title
“Schindler’s List” by Spielberg.
Several studies have shown that the result patterns obtained for inter-
lingual homograph processing depend on stimulus list composition and
task demands. For instance, Dijkstra et al. (1998b) had Dutch-English
bilinguals perform three variants of the lexical decision task: an English
lexical decision task with IHs, but without exclusively Dutch words; an
English lexical decision with IHs and Dutch words (the latter requiring
a “no” response); and a generalized lexical decision task with IHs and
Dutch words, in which both English and Dutch words required a “yes”
response. Among the stimulus materials were IHs of four different fre-
quency categories: HFE–HFD (BAD), HFE–LFD (LIST), LFE–HFE
(BOOM), and LFE–LFD (SMART). Other items included were one-
language matched English controls, nonwords derived from English
words, and, in Experiments 2 and 3, exclusively Dutch words. The
result patterns in the three experiments were quite different for the IHs
relative to their matched purely English controls. The first experiment
led to about the same reaction times for IHs and English controls, while
the second led to inhibition and the third to facilitation. The conclusion
on the basis of this study was that, assuming a similar underlying lexical

process in the three experiments (language nonselective access and

parallel activation of both readings of the IHs), differences in task
demands can lead to a clear modulation of the actual performance
patterns.
A later study by Schulpen et al. (2003) showed that the lexical retrieval
process and the task/decision processes associated with these variants of
the lexical decision task are established relatively early in L2 learning
and do not qualitatively change over the next couple of years. The authors
conducted the same three experiments with four different proficiency
groups (but with three frequency categories, excluding the LFD–LFD
category) of Dutch-English bilinguals: 15-year-old high school students,
17-year-old high school students, students of psychology, and Ph.D.
students/university researchers. All result patterns were very similar
across proficiency groups for Experiments 2 and 3; only for Experiment
1, there was some change in result patterns across proficiency groups.
Several conclusions can be drawn on the basis of this study. First, there
were systematic effects of list composition and task demands in the
three different variants of the lexical decision task. Furthermore, word
recognition processes and task demands were applied in an analogous
fashion by bilinguals varying widely in age (15–45) and L2 proficiency.
Finally, the automatization of L2 processing apparently took place at
an earlier stage of L2 proficiency, and the observed degree of cognitive
control in lexical decision was limited.
The importance of stimulus list composition and instruction for IH
effects was further demonstrated by Dijkstra et al. (2000a). Dutch-
English bilinguals performed an English lexical decision task in which
they were instructed to say “no” to Dutch words; however, Dutch words
were in fact presented only in the second half of the experiment. Two
opposing predictions were formulated. If top-down effects based on
expectations were strong, the information in the instruction that IHs
would be presented should be an important determinant of the response
pattern. In this case, the RTs to IHs should be the same in both halves of
the experiment (like Dijkstra et al. 1998a, Experiment 1). However, if
bottom-up effects on stimulus list composition were predominant, the RT
patterns should differ between the two halves of the experiment. The evi-
dence clearly favored the second prediction. Stimulus list composition

and not instruction determined the presence of the inhibition effect. It

was not present in the first half of the experiment, but arose immediately
upon presentation of the first Dutch item.
Stimulus list composition was also varied in several studies investi-
gating the effects of cross-linguistic phonological (P) similarity in IHs.
These studies involved interlingual homophones, that is, items that have
phonological overlap across languages, such as COW (English) and
KOU (Dutch). Dijkstra et al. (1999) systematically manipulated the
between-language overlap of orthography, phonology, and semantics.
In an English lexical decision task, effects of orthographic and semantic
similarity across languages led to facilitation relative to purely English
control words, while phonological overlap led to inhibition.
In a follow-up study, Lemhöfer and Dijkstra (2004) examined the role
of task demands by comparing the results in language-specific English
and generalized Dutch-English lexical decision tasks. The result pat-
terns indicated that responses to IHs are based on the fastest available
of the two codes (L1 or L2) appropriate for the task at hand. In the
generalized lexical decision task, the fastest available code that can
be used for responding is the Dutch (L1) orthographic code. How-
ever, in the language-specific English (L2) lexical decision task, the
response cannot be made before the English code is accessed and its
language membership is verified. The observed result pattern can be
explained by assuming that the time-course of word identification was
different for Dutch (faster for L1) and English (slower for L2). Sim-
ilarly, phonological effects also appeared to be most prominent when
they became available early in a language that could not be used for
responding (e.g., when L2 was the target language). On the whole,
recent studies (including, e.g., the work by Jared) support the view that
task demands, stimulus list composition, and L2 proficiency may affect
the presence/absence of phonological effects, and even their direction
(facilitatory or inhibitory). A complicating factor in the available studies
is that the interlingual homophones are matched one by one to control
items using a native speaker’s (L1) database. However, the conditions
are perhaps not comparable in terms of the subjective L2 frequencies
for bilinguals (we often do not know how the L2 word frequency for the
bilingual differs from the L1 frequency for a native speaker) and, given

the limitations in the number of items that can be found in a language,

the conditions may further differ in terms of their item’ frequency
distributions.
A study by Dijkstra et al. (in preparation) also observed strong effects
of the type of task that is performed on cross-linguistic effects. These
authors manipulated the degree of cross-linguistic orthographic (O)
similarity in cognates. Examples of cognate pairs with an increasing
cross-linguistic form overlap are Dutch-English cognate pairs like
COLOR-KLEUR, WHEEL-WIEL, HOPE-HOOP, BAKER-
BAKKER, and ALARM-ALARM. Dutch-English bilinguals performed
either a progressive demasking task or an English lexical decision task
including these items or one-language control words. In progressive
demasking (PDM), the participant must identify a target word when
its presentation is alternated with that of a mask. Mask presentation
time decreases while target presentation time increases. In lexical deci-
sion, the participant decides if a presented letter string is an existing
word or not. The results were quite different for the two tasks, even
though the tasks usually correlate about 0.90 in many other studies
(e.g., Dijkstra et al. 1999). In the progressive demasking task, no clear
differences in reaction times were found between cognates varying in
cross-linguistic similarity, and all RTs differed nonsignificantly from
those to matched English controls. Instead, in the English lexical deci-
sion task, reaction time differences did occur between cognates and
controls, which increased with the similarity between the two cognate
members. The largest effects (of about 40 ms) were found for identical
cognates. The explanation for the different results in the two tasks can be
sought in the different task demands. In PDM, the item must be uniquely
identified, which implies that cross-linguistic similarity may help and
hinder the response at the same time. In English lexical decision, in
contrast, the participant’s response can be based on global activation in
the lexicon. Thus, cross-linguistic similarity or any link between the two
cognate representations helps to facilitate the response.
As a conclusion, it appears that even the strong effects of cognates are
task dependent. Thus, to fully understand bilingual lexical processing,
the relationship between the language processing system and contex-
tual factors such as task demands must be clarified. Because the size,

direction, and type of effects may depend on the specific contextual

factor involved, developing a systematic and testable account of different
types of contexts is indispensable.
In the second part of this chapter, we describe an extension of the
BIA model that incorporates the effects of task and context. Next,
some studies that have tested how this “BIA+ model” might be imple-
mented in the brain are reported. The chapter ends with some general
conclusions/perspectives for future research.
3. PART II: TH E BIA + MO D EL
From a general point of view, there are two ways in which contex-
tual factors may affect language processing. One possibility is that the
effects of context cannot be considered apart from the process of lexical
activation. In other words, bilingual processing varies qualitatively and
quantitatively due to strong interactions with many different types of
contextual factors. If this dynamic situation were the case, the best we
might do as experimenters analyzing language processing would be to
make an ordered list of more and less important factors in various cir-
cumstances. Fortunately, however, it appears that there is more stability
to lexical processing than an extremely interactive view would predict.
Some context factors (e.g., the type of task performed) have systematic
effects on processing, which can be isolated from the underlying pro-
cesses and representations. In line with this latter position, the BIA+
model assumes that there is a lexical system subserving processes that
remain relatively unaffected in different contexts and task situations, and
a decision system that uses the output of the lexical processing system
in accordance with the task at hand.
Thus, the BIA+ model extends the earlier BIA model (described
above) by adding a task/decision system that uses lexical activation
in accordance with task and context (Figure 3). As a consequence,
observed response patterns will vary systematically across experimen-
tal conditions. The BIA+ model differs from the BIA model also in
terms of its representations. It incorporates orthographic, phonologi-
cal, and semantic representations that are assumed to interact within the

Task schema
· Specific processing steps for task in hand

· Receives continuous input from the
identification system
· Decision criteria determine when a
response is made based on relevant
codes
Identification system
L1/L2 Semantics
Language nodes
Lexical orthography Lexical phonology
Sublexical orthography Sublexical phonology
Figure 3. The bilingual interactive activation + (BIA+) model.
language processing system. Because lexical representations are inte-

grated within syntactic representations in sentence comprehension, the
linguistic context of a target word is assumed to affect lexical processing
as well. However, the task/decision system (and non-linguistic contex-
tual factors) cannot directly modulate the activation of L1 and L2 words.
Observed performance patterns will vary with changes in the types of
activated codes that are used to perform the task at hand, and depend on
the settings of response criteria (e.g., fast responding with high risk of
error, or slow accurate responding).
Additionally, the BIA+ model assumes that there is no top-down effect
of the task on lexical activation. An alternative view would be that

suppression of non-target language activation occurs when such

suppression would be beneficial in a task situation. In that case, such sup-
pression should become visible in RTs relative to a similar task situation
where no suppression is needed. However, so far there is little evidence
in support of this view, as the studies reviewed above attest. According
to IH studies, no top-down suppression of the non-target reading of an
IH occurred. Similarly, Dutch effects of phonological similarity were
present even in exclusively English lexical decision tasks. Furthermore,
English control items were not affected by changes in stimulus list com-
position or task demands, even though one would expect them to be if the
relative activation of words from different languages changes with the
task situation. In the experiment with two halves (Dijkstra et al. 2000a),
English control items had almost the same RT in the two parts (581 ms in
part 1 vs. 592 ms in part 2). Similarly, the control conditions in the three
experiments by Dijkstra et al. (1998b) had nearly the same RTs across
very different task situations (maximum 15 ms difference), just like the
control conditions in De Groot et al. (2000). Finally, the results of mixed
and pure PDM experiments correlated 0.98 for English and Dutch tar-
gets (Van Heuven et al. 1998). This indicates that the result patterns were
the same irrespective of whether the lists contained words from one or
from two languages. In conclusion, at present, there is no convincing
RT evidence that the relative activation of words from two languages
(“relative language activation”) is modulated by task demands or par-
ticipant strategies. Thus with respect to word reading, there is no strong
support for top-down feedback dependent on a bilingual’s expectations
as in the “language mode” hypothesis (Grosjean 1997).
In recent years, the BIA+ model has been subjected to empirical
tests of different kinds. One interesting issue is to what extent studies
measuring brain activity (e.g., using ERPs and fMRI) support different
assumptions made by the BIA+ model. We will consider some recent
evidence from our lab in the last part of this chapter. The first study
to be reviewed examined how the BIA+ model could be extended to
account for semantic priming in bilinguals; the second study investigated
cognate effects in sentence contexts; and the third study tested if the
distinction in the BIA+ model between a word identification system and
a task/decision system can be mapped onto brain areas.

3.1. Semantic Priming of Interlingual Homographs in

Dutch-English Bilinguals: RT and ERP Evidenc
Kerkhofs et al. (2006) formulated a variant of the BIA+ model to account
for bilingual semantic priming of IHs and conducted an RT and an Event-
Related-Potential (ERP) study to test this model. The model, depicted
in Figure 4, assumes parallel activation of both readings of an IH. As
we know from RT studies reviewed above, in an English lexical deci-
sion task, the recognition of the English reading of the IHs will be
affected by competition from the Dutch reading. This inhibition will be
largest for those items that have a low-frequency reading in English
and a high-frequency reading in Dutch. However, if each IH target
is preceded by a semantically related English prime, low-frequency
English items should benefit most from the support; due to semantic
priming, the target reading is strengthened and becomes less sensitive to
competition by the non-target reading. For instance, if the target word
ANGEL is preceded by the prime HEAVEN, the English target reading
(“heavenly messenger”) should suffer less from the competition by the
Dutch target reading (“sting”) than when the prime word is unrelated
(e.g., BUSH). Dutch-English bilinguals performed an English lexical
decision task on the target, which was preceded by the semantically
related or unrelated prime. Reaction times did indeed show that (a)
IHs with high-frequency Dutch readings were processed slower than
matched IHs with low-frequency Dutch readings in the unrelated con-
dition; (b) the conditions that suffered most from competition in the
unrelated condition also benefited most from primes in the related con-
dition. Furthermore, in the ERP study, an effect was found of semantic
relatedness in the N400. The English frequency of an IH modulated
the size of N400 effect, as was evident from an observed interaction
between relatedness, English frequency, and midline electrodes. There
was also a main effect of Dutch frequency on the N400: When the Dutch
frequency of IH was higher, the ERP pattern was shifted in a more nega-
tive direction. Therefore, the study allows for a number of conclusions.
First, a semantic priming effect was found in both the RT and ERP data
(N400) for interlingual homographs processed in a second language
(L2); both L1 (Dutch) and L2 (English) frequency affected the size
and nature of the N400 effect; and there were consistent cross-linguistic

“yes” “no” Response level
SE SE SD
Lexical level
OE OE OD
“Heaven” “Angel” Input level

prime target
Figure 4. The BIA+ model variant of semantic priming.
interference effects in RTs and ERPs that support a language nonselective

access model.
Note that the results are inconsistent with a study by Rodrigues-
Fornells et al. (2002). In this study, Catalan-Spanish bilinguals per-
formed a Spanish go/no-go task involving Spanish and Catalan words
and pseudowords. The ERPs for these bilinguals neither showed any
sensitivity to frequency variations in Catalan (whereas they did for Span-
ish), nor any differences between Catalan words and pseudowords. On
the basis of these results, Rodriguez-Fornells et al. (2005: 1026) con-
cluded that “words from the non-target language are rejected at an early
stage before semantic analysis in bilinguals.” In contrast, we found
cross-linguistic inhibition that was modulated by the presentation of a
semantically related prime word. This indicates that the cross-linguistic
effects are, at least to some extent, located at the level of semantic rep-
resentations. There are several possible explanations for the differences
between our results and those of Rodriguez-Fornells et al. For instance,
Rodriguez-Fornells et al. examined the ERPs for no-go responses (i.e.,
no reactions) to words that exist exclusively in one language, while we
considered ERPs for lexical decisions to IHs, which are words in two
languages. In our opinion, the direct contrast between the two readings
of IHs allows the researcher to optimally play out two languages against
one another. Thus, ambiguous words should be especially sensitive to
cross-linguistic effects. For a more extensive discussion of the ERP
results by Rodriguez-Fornells et al. we refer to Grosjean et al. (2003).

To conclude, the present study indicates that cross-linguistic effects in

the ERPs of a second language can occur, thus arguing in favor of a
bilingual lexicon that is language nonselective in nature.
3.2. Sentence Priming of Cognates in Dutch-English
Bilinguals: RT and ERP Evidence
In a study by Dijkstra et al. (in preparation), Dutch-English bilinguals
made English lexical decisions on target words that were preceded by a
sentence context. The authors applied the technique of Rapid Serial
Visual Presentation (RSVP) and presented each word of a sentence
for 345 ms and then replaced it by a blank for 300 ms. The sen-
tence materials that were used were adapted from those by Van Hell
(1998), which were rated with respect to several factors including con-
text availability, length, and log word frequency. The target words
were Dutch-English non-identical cognates or matched English con-
trol words, which fitted in the preceding sentence context with either
a high or a low CLOZE probability (a measure of semantic expecta-
tion). An example of a sentence including a high CLOZE probability
and a cognate target is: The/man/brought/his/sick/son/to/the/doctor. In
the RT study, the participants had to make a lexical decision on the
word “doctor” (a dot indicated that it was the target word). For the same
materials (with a phrase added to avoid wrap-up effects), ERPs were
also measured. A number of factors were manipulated in the experi-
ment: cognate status of the target word (cognate/one-language control),
semantic constraint of the preceding sentence context (high/low), and
the language of the sentence preceding the target word (English/Dutch).
In the RT results, main effects were found for semantic constraint and
cognate status, but no interaction reached statistical significance. The
result pattern in the ERPs, however, showed a more complex inter-
action between all three manipulated factors. The major conclusions
were that cognate effects in RTs and ERPs also occur for cognates
in sentences following a language (or code) switch, and that at least
three factors affect bilingual word recognition in sentences (cf. Altarriba
et al. 1996): the language of the sentence (English/Dutch) preceding the
target item, the lexical characteristics of that item, and the semantic con-
straint between the item and its preceding sentence context. Other studies

corroborate this view, but it is puzzling that the obtained result patterns
appear to differ across studies (Altarriba et al. 1996; Schwartz & Kroll
submitted).
3.3. Processing of Interlingual Homographs:
RT and fMRI Evidence
Van Heuven et al. (submitted) conducted an RT and an fMRI study
involving IH processing by monolinguals and Dutch-English bilinguals.
One issue they investigated was whether the BIA+ model’s distinction
between a language processing system and a task/decision system is
reflected in brain activation. Another issue was whether tasks varying
in the assumed degree of competition lead to activation differences in
areas of the brain that have been associated with cognitive control. Three
lexical decision experiments were conducted: an English visual lexical
decision task performed by 12 Dutch-English bilinguals; a generalized
visual lexical decision task (GVLD) by 12 Dutch-English bilinguals; and
an English visual lexical decision task (EVLD) by 12 monolinguals. In
the fMRI study, the participants performed the tasks in a 1.5T scanner
(letter strings were presented for 500 ms).
Analysis of the RT and brain imaging data for the three participant
groups in the various tasks showed the following. With respect to the
RTs for bilinguals in the EVLD, slower RTs were found for IHs than for
controls. In the GVLD, the RTs for the bilinguals were non-significantly
different for IHs and controls, and the same held in the EVLD of the
monolinguals.
In the EVLD, there was more brain activity for the IHs than for Con-
trols in the left inferior/middle frontal gyrus (BA 44/45/46) and in the
medial part of superior frontal cortex (BA 32/6/8), which is part of
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). In the GVLD, more brain
activity was also found for the IHs than for the controls in the left
inferior/middle frontal gyrus, but the activity was about the same for
IHs and controls in the medial/superior frontal cortex. Finally, there
were no brain activation differences for IHs and controls in the EVLD
for monolinguals.
A comparison of the two tasks (EVLD and GVLD) for the bilinguals
indicated strong dACC activity in the EVLD but not in the GVLD, and

this finding was accompanied by inhibitory effects in the RTs for the
IHs in the EVLD.
These result patterns for RTs and brain activity can be accounted for
when the inhibition effect for IHs in the EVLD is interpreted as evidence
for competition between the English and the Dutch readings of the IHs.
According to BIA+, such competition takes place not only within the lex-
icon (lateral inhibition), but also at the level of responding: The English
and Dutch readings of the same item are linked to two different and com-
peting responses (“yes” vs. “no”). This view is supported by the brain
data. The dACC has been associated with conflict detection and moni-
toring incompatible responses (Barch et al. 2000; Botvinick et al. 2001;
Gehring et al. 2001). The presence of dACC activity in the EVLD can
therefore be interpreted as the consequence of response-based conflict
for the IHs relative to the controls. (Because the BOLD response for IHs
turned out to be higher than for control words and for pseudowords, the
observed increased brain activation cannot be ascribed to lexical status.)
On the basis of further analyses, Van Heuven et al. reached the conclu-
sion that a whole network of brain areas (also involving basal ganglia
and cerebellum) may be recruited to resolve the response conflict for
the IHs.
To summarize this study, the behavioral results for Dutch-English
bilinguals indicate that both readings of an IH become active and com-
pete, whereas the imaging data show that the most involved brain areas
are located in the left superior frontal regions (medial part) and bilat-
erally in the inferior and middle frontal regions. The dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex is more active when ambiguous language information
leads to competing task-relevant responses; more generally, it appears
that language conflicts may be resolved with the help of brain areas
associated with cognitive control.
Again, the results of this study involving IHs are different from
those in the fMRI part of the study of Rodriguez-Fornells et al. (2002),
mentioned above. According to these authors, their Catalan-Spanish
bilinguals were able to effectively block the influences of a second lan-
guage by using a phonological route to conduct the task at hand. As for
the ERP part of the study, it appears that stimulus differences (IHs vs one-
language words) and/or task differences (lexical decision vs. go/no-go)

may underlie the observed differences in result patterns (note that a more
recent word production study by Rodriguez-Fornells et al. [2005] found
evidence supporting language nonselective lexical access.)
Altogether, the results of our electrophysiological and neuroimaging
studies are in line with the RT studies that support a language nonselec-
tive model of lexical access, such as the BIA+ model. In addition, the
ERP studies provide some insight in the relationship of RT differences
to N400 effects, for example, in semantic priming. The MRI study pro-
vides evidence with respect to the distinction between a representational
system and cognitive control/task aspects in terms of differently located
brain areas. Future research may attempt to extend functional models
of bilingual processing (based to a large extent on RT data) to include
electrophysiological and neuroimaging data (Dijkstra & Van Heuven,
in press).
4. CO N CLU SIO N
Gradually, more and more evidence becomes available with respect to

the role various types of context play during the processing of lexical
items. The studies discussed here considered such diverse factors as sim-
ilar lexical items, stimulus list composition, instruction, task demands,
and sentence context. It is clear that in the last decade or so bilingual
research has collected a considerable corpus of evidence with respect to
bilingual word recognition. Nevertheless, a number of important ques-
tions remain to be answered and are not discussed extensively. Three of
these are the following
1. Do some context factors change the activation of lexical items?

Many researchers propose (or implicitly assume) that there is something
like a “relative activation of languages,” meaning that all word candi-
dates belonging to one language may be “more active” than the words
belonging to another language. The idea that frequency and recency of
usage affects the “resting level activation” of words is probably shared
by most researchers. Because one language is usually predominant in
everyday life, many words of that language are used more often than the
words of the second language. The result is a relatively higher activation

of this language (usually L1). This may be considered the “bottom-up”

view of relative language activation.
However, some researchers have proposed that other contextual fac-
tors such as instruction and expectations about the bilingualism of
interlocutors may also affect the relative activation of L1 and L2. This
could be called the “top-down” view of relative language activation.
Although we do not think that the present evidence is in favor of this
view (see above), a more thorough investigation of this issue remains
to be done (see Dijkstra & Van Hell [2003] for a discussion of different
views on relative language activation).
2. What is the exact nature of the decision criteria and strategies that
participants use?
As an alternative or complement to changing the relative activation of
L1/L2 lexical items, it may be that certain types of contexts affect the
setting of the decision criteria that are used to perform the task. However,
this view begs the question of how to consider such decision criteria and
their sensitivity to local and more global context effects. An even more
difficult issue here is whether a task/decision system can be specified
to such an extent that it can be implemented in a computational model
like the BIA-framework. Given that this problem has been around for
over 15 years, it does not seem likely that it will be resolved in the
near future.
3. What (on-line) role can language membership information play?

An issue that is related to relative language activation and decision cri-
teria, but seldom explicitly considered, concerns the role of language
membership information in bilingual word recognition. If a person per-
forms an English lexical decision task incorporating English words,
Dutch words, and nonwords, the only way that this task can be reliably
executed is by retrieving language information; otherwise, all Dutch
words would be given a “yes, it is a word” response (on the basis of
their high activation). Nevertheless, it appears that the response times
obtained under these types of conditions are hardly different from those
in an experiment that incorporates only English words and nonwords (see
Dijkstra & Snoeren 2004). The implication is that language membership

becomes available simultaneously with or very quickly following word

identification.
In a sentence context, language membership information is available
for all words preceding the target word. It is an interesting question
whether the language of the preceding sentence is able to facilitate the
processing of a subsequent target word. More generally, there is the ques-
tion whether language membership is a characteristic only of individual
words or also of syntactic frames or sentences as a whole.
Thus, there are several issues specific to bilingual processing that
researchers should turn their attention to in the future. However, the
mere fact that researchers are now formulating unique questions with
respect to the complex interplay between context and bilingual lexical
processing, shows that research in bilingualism has left its infancy and
is quickly growing up.
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conflict in the bilingual brain.

CH A PTER 8
REPRESENTATION AND SKILL IN SECOND

LANGUAGE LEARNERS AND PROFICIENT
BILINGUALS
Judith F. Kroll and Jared A. Linck

The Pennsylvania State University
Abstract
What does it take to become a skilled bilingual? Past research on the acquisition of a
second language (L2) by adult learners has focused on the degree to which the attainment
of proficiency is constrained by the age at which L2 exposure occurs (e.g., Johnson &
Newport 1989; Birdsong 1999; Flege 2003), by the degree of transfer from the first
language (L1) to the L2 (e.g., MacWhinney 1997; Pienemann 1998), and by the context
of acquisition (e.g., Freed 1995). Most of this work has addressed issues of represen-
tation. The general assumption is that the representations at each level of linguistic
analysis gradually approximate those of native speakers with increasing proficiency in
the L2, although particularly for the phonology and syntax, there may be limits to how
completely these representations can be acquired (e.g., Flege et al. 1995; Weber-Fox &
Neville 1996). In addition to acquiring representations of the lexicon, grammar, and
phonology of the L2, it is also necessary to acquire a set of cognitive skills that enable
the L2 to be processed automatically (e.g., DeKeyser 2001; Segalowitz & Hultstijn
2005) and to learn to negotiate the activation of the two languages so that the intended
language is selected (e.g., Green 1998; Grosjean 2001).
In this chapter, we consider the interplay of representation and skill in

both second language learners and proficient bilinguals. A particular
focus in our discussion concerns the implications of the finding that
the activity of the unintended language is not eliminated once individ-
uals achieve proficiency in the L2. A large body of recent research has
demonstrated that even highly proficient bilinguals cannot effectively
switch off the unintended language. In reading (e.g., Dijkstra & Van
237
© 2007 Springer.

238 JUDIT H F. K RO LL A N D J A RED A . LIN CK
Heuven 2002; Van Hell & Dijkstra 2002), listening (Marian & Spivey
2003), and speaking (Hermans et al. 1998; Costa et al. 1999), there is
evidence that aspects of both languages are active and potentially com-
pete for selection. Although we might expect that the weaker L2 would
be affected by the more dominant L1 when learners are in early stages
of L2 acquisition, the observation of parallel language activity among
the most proficient bilinguals suggests that L2 skill is not a simple mat-
ter of overcoming the influence of L1. It also suggests that proficient
bilinguals may be particularly expert in executing the control that is
required to accomplish skilled performance in the presence of potential
competition, an implication that has been supported in recent studies of
executive function in early bilinguals during childhood and in old age
(e.g., Bialystok 2005).
The paper is organized in four sections. First, we review the evi-
dence regarding the development of L2 proficiency in light of the recent
findings for parallel activity of both languages. We then consider how
models of automaticity have been applied to language learning and
examine the evidence that has been taken to support the presence of
increased processing skill in the L2. In the third section of the chapter,
we present the results of studies that have specifically addressed the
factors that appear to modulate the cognitive processes that support
skilled L2 use, including individual differences in memory and atten-
tional resources, aspects of the context of language exposure, and the
interactions between them. Finally, we discuss the implications of the
evidence we have reviewed for the cognitive consequences conferred by
bilingualism.
Our discussion will focus primarily on skill at the level of lexical
access because that is the context in which there has been the great-
est research activity. However, we briefly consider findings at the
level of the phonology and grammar where they are relevant to the
development of L2 skill. Throughout the chapter we adopt a broad def-
inition of bilingualism to include all individuals who use more than
one language regularly. We distinguish bilingual groups with respect to
their proficiency in the L2, their relative language dominance, and the
degree to which the context of language use supports each of the two
languages.

R E PR E SEN TATIO N A N D SK ILL 239
2. DE VE L OPING L2 PRO FICIEN CY A S A N A D U LT
For adult learners, the process of acquiring a high level of skill in a sec-
ond language, particularly for individuals restricted to tutored instruction
in a classroom environment, is typically a difficult and less than fully
successful experience. Some past studies of learners during early stages
of L2 acquisition suggest that access to the L2, at both the level of the
lexicon and grammar, is initially mediated through the L1 and that only
with increasing L2 proficiency are learners able to use the L2 indepen-
dently (e.g., Kroll & Stewart 1994; Talamas et al. 1999; MacWhinney
2005). To the extent that the L1 provides information about the L2,
the learner will benefit from transfer (but see Flege 1987, for evi-
dence that cross-language similarity can impede as well as facilitate
L2 development).
Psycholinguistic research on language processing in the L2 has
focused primarily on the performance of relatively skilled adult bilin-
guals, with fewer studies that specifically address the changes that occur
in language processing as L2 skill develops. One question that has
received some attention in the literature is whether and when learners
are able to directly access the meaning of new words in the L2 without
mediation via the L1. An early study by Potter et al. (1984) suggested
that even L2 learners at early stages of acquisition are able to concep-
tually process the meaning of words in the L2 directly. The evidence
on which this claim was based involved a comparison of picture nam-
ing and word translation, language processing tasks that engage shared
component stages in speech planning. Potter et al. argued that if learners
rely on the translation of the L2 word to understand it, then translation
from the L1 into the L2 should be a relatively direct lexical process of
word association, without conceptual processing. In contrast, naming a
picture in the L2 would first require conceptual understanding and only
after the L1 name of the picture was retrieved could the association to
L2 be accessed. By this logic, translation should be performed faster
than picture naming. In a series of experiments, Potter et al. (1984)
showed that learners and highly proficient bilinguals were able to trans-
late words and name pictures in the L2 in about the same amount of
time, suggesting that direct word associations between the L1 and L2

were not active. A surprising result in this study was that although the
learners were slower to perform tasks in the L2 than the highly proficient
bilinguals, the pattern of their data was the same, suggesting a common
mechanism.
Subsequent research challenged the conclusions of Potter et al.
(1984) by showing that learners at stages of acquisition earlier than
Potter et al.’s (19984) participants did indeed appear to rely on access
to the L1 translation equivalent when using the L2 (e.g., Kroll & Curley
1988; Chen & Leung 1989). These studies used the same comparison
of translation and picture naming as used in the Potter et al. experi-
ments, but showed that at low levels of proficiency learners were faster
to translate into the L2 than to name pictures in the L2, suggesting that
translation was mediated directly by word-to-word associations from
the L1 to the L2. At higher levels of proficiency, the results replicated
the pattern reported by Potter et al. (1984) with similar performance
for translation and picture naming, supporting a process of conceptual
mediation across the two languages.
A number of studies provided evidence to support a shift from initial
reliance on L1 translations to more direct conceptual processing of the
L2, with increasing proficiency in the L2. Talamas et al. (1999) used a
translation recognition task first reported by De Groot (1992) in which
individuals are shown a word in one language followed by a word in
the other language and are asked to judge whether the second word is
the correct translation of the first word. Two groups of English-Spanish
learners were tested who differed in their L2 proficiency in Spanish. In
the critical conditions of the experiment, the second word was not the
correct translation of the first word but a foil that was similar in form or
meaning to the translation equivalent. For example, if the first word was
man in English, the second word might be hambre, which means hunger
in Spanish but resembles the form of the correct translation, hombre. In
addition to form-relatives of the translation equivalent, other foils were
semantically related, such as mujer in Spanish, which means woman.
The time to reject the foil as the incorrect translation was compared to
the time to reject a completely unrelated distractor. Talamas et al. (1999)
found that less proficient learners were more likely to be fooled by the
translation relatives than the semantically related foils. The magnitude of

interference was greater for the form pairs than for the semantic pairs. In
contrast, the opposite pattern was found for the more proficient learners
who produced greater interference for the semantic pairs than for the
form pairs. Talamas et al. argued that the shift in sensitivity from form
to meaning reflected a change in the degree to which learners were able
to process the meaning of the L2 words directly with increasing skill
in the L2.
There has been a great deal of debate concerning the issue of how
early in L2 learning access to the meaning of L2 words is available,
with some studies supporting the initial claim by Potter et al. (1984) that
even learners at the earliest stages have direct access to the meanings of
words in the L2 (e.g., Altarriba & Mathis 1997; De Groot & Poot 1997;
Frenck-Mestre & Prince 1997), and other studies support the idea that
conceptual access changes as L2 skill increases (e.g., Dufour & Kroll
1995). More critically, in the time since these studies appeared, there has
been a flood of research findings on the performance of highly proficient
bilinguals that suggests that even at very high levels of L2 skill there is
parallel activity of both languages.
It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to review the findings on
language nonselectivity exhaustively, but we summarize the main results
briefly (see recent reviews by Dijkstra 2005, this volume; and Kroll et al.
2005). The recent experiments on visual and spoken word recognition
demonstrate that when a highly skilled bilingual sees or hears a word
in one language, information about the form relatives of that word are
active in the other language. Thus, if a bilingual in English and Spanish
sees the word actor in English, the cognate translation of that word in
Spanish, actor, will also be activated briefly. When word forms in two
languages also converge semantically, as in the case of cognates, there
is typically facilitation in word recognition (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 1998;
Van Hell & Dijkstra 2002), although interference has been observed
when similarly spelled cognates map onto different pronunciations in
the two languages and when bilinguals are required to read the words
aloud (e.g., Schwartz et al. in press). When word forms in two lan-
guages correspond to different meanings, as in the case of interlingual
homographs, an inhibitory pattern is typically observed (e.g., Dijkstra
et al. 1998; Jared & Szucs 2002; Von Studnitz & Green 2002). Perhaps

most dramatically, there is evidence that word neighbors are activated

in both of the bilingual’s languages even when a word recognition task
is performed in one language alone and even when that language is the
bilingual’s native language (e.g., Van Heuven et al. 1998; Jared & Kroll
2001). All of these results suggest that there is bottom-up activation
of information corresponding to each language in a manner that is lan-
guage nonselective. Only at a relatively late stage of processing is the
language of the target word hypothesized to be selected. Of particular
interest, studies that have attempted to induce language selectivity by
making the language of a semantic or sentence context more salient (e.g.,
De Bruijn et al. 2001; Schwartz & Kroll in press) or by manipulating
the bilingual’s expectations via instructions (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 2000),
have largely failed to override the involuntary activity of the unintended
language.
How can we understand the changes that occur as learners achieve
higher levels of proficiency in the L2 and, at the same time, the persis-
tent form-related activity of the L1 that has been observed in even highly
skilled bilinguals? Kroll and Stewart (1994) proposed the Revised Hier-
archical Model (RHM) to account for the developmental changes that
occur with respect to reliance on links from the L2 word to its respective
translation equivalent in L1. The model, shown in Figure 1, represents
the connections between lexical and conceptual representations for each
of the two languages. At the lexical level, the L2 is hypothesized to be
strongly associated to its L1 translation, whereas lexical associations
from L1 to L2 are hypothesized to be relatively weak. However, L1 is
represented as strongly associated to conceptual representations whereas
the word-to-concept link for L2 is weaker. According to the RHM, at
early stages of L2 learning, the lexical connections from L2 to L1 play
an important role so that the learner is able to exploit the existing con-
ceptual representations for L1. As learners become more proficient in
the L2, the word-to-concept links become stronger so that L2 can be
processed without access to the translation in L1.
The activity of the L1 that is the focus of the RHM concerns the
translation equivalent, not the form relatives that have been shown to be
active for highly proficient bilinguals. Dijkstra and Van Heuven (1998)
proposed the Bilingual Interactive Activation (BIA) model, shown in

Lexical
links
L1 L2
Conceptual Conceptual
links links
Concepts
Figure 1. The revised hierarchical model (adapted from Kroll & Stewart 1994).
Figure 2, to account for the persistent form activity across the bilingual’s
two languages (and see Dijkstra & Van Heuven [2002] for a descrip-
tion of the BIA+ model, an extended version of the BIA model). The
BIA model takes the Interactive Activation Model first described by
McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) for monolingual word recognition
and extends it to the bilingual case so that activity among feature and
letter information feeds into both of the bilingual’s languages. Unlike
the monolingual model, the BIA model includes a set of language nodes
that serve to sort out the intended language by integrating bottom-up
activation with top-down inhibition.
Whereas the RHM assumes that the lexical representations of the
two languages are functionally independent, the BIA model assumes
that the bilingual lexicon is integrated and that access is language non-
selective. Because the RHM was initially proposed to account for the
translation performance of learners and relatively proficient bilinguals,
it is more of a model of production than perception. In contrast, the
BIA model was proposed to account for the earliest processes engaged
during the comprehension of words in each language. One way of rec-
onciling the apparently conflicting claims associated with each model is
to assume that the activity of the L1 involves different representations

Dutch English
Language node
level
Dutch English
Word level words words
pos 1 pos 4
Letter level
pos 2 pos 3
pos 1 pos 4
Feature level
pos 2 pos 3
Visual input
Figure 2. The bilingual interactive activation model (adapted from Dijkstra &
Van Heuven 1998).

in L2 production and in L2 comprehension. The top-down nature of L2

production will necessarily involve the activation of meaning-related
alternatives, including the translation equivalent, whereas the bottom-
up nature of L2 comprehension will engage form relatives that resemble
the initial input at the level of the orthography or phonology of words
that are read or spoken.
In a recent developmental study, Sunderman and Kroll (in press)
attempted to test the RHM and BIA model directly in the same context.
Native English speakers at different levels of skill in Spanish as the L2
performed the translation recognition task described above in the Tala-
mas et al. (1999) study. Like the Talamas et al. (1999) study, the critical
trials were those in which the two words were not translation equivalents,
but related either by lexical form or meaning. Unlike the Talamas et al.
(1999) study, Sunderman and Kroll included two different types of lex-
ical foils. One condition included words in English like those in the
previous study that resembled the translation equivalent of the Span-
ish word. Another condition included words in English that were direct
lexical neighbors of the Spanish words; for example, the word man in
English looks like the Spanish word mano which means hand. The lex-
ical translation condition provides an indication of the degree to which
the translation equivalent is active, the type of activity proposed by the
RHM. The direct lexical neighbor condition provides an indication of the
degree to which lexical properties in the L1 are active when L2 words are
recognition, the type of activity proposed by the BIA model. Sunderman
and Kroll found that native English speakers at early stages of learning
Spanish were sensitive to both types of lexical foils. However, more pro-
ficient learners were sensitive only to the direct lexical form relatives
and not to the distractors that resembled the translation equivalent. This
pattern of results permits a clarification of the apparently conflicting pre-
dictions of the two models. There is a developmental course over which
the activity of the L1 diminishes as learners achieve greater skill in the
L2, but that activity is restricted to reliance on the translation equivalent.
The activation of form relatives in L1 occurs early in L2 learning and
persists as learners become proficient in the L2. Because the lexical level
activity of form relatives does not diminish over development (indeed,
the evidence suggests that it may increase, with greater effects of L2 on

L1 as skill in L2 increases), there will be a need to develop mechanisms

of control that allow the learner and bilingual to negotiate the relative
activity of the two languages.
Two other results of the Sunderman and Kroll (in press) study further
suggest that even when learners at early stages of L2 acquisition are
dependent on access to the L1 translation equivalent, they are also able
to access aspects of meaning and grammatical form. Unlike the results
of the Talamas et al. (1999) experiment, the learners in Sunderman
and Kroll’s study showed significant semantic interference effects in
translation recognition (e.g., mujer, which means woman in Spanish,
was harder to reject as the translation of man than an unrelated control
word in Spanish). Of interest is that these learners were also sensitive
to the grammatical class of the words. When words in the transla-
tion recognition task are the correct translation of each other, they are
necessarily members of the same grammatical class. However, words
that are not translation equivalents can or cannot be members of the
same class. Sunderman and Kroll manipulated this factor and found that
both types of lexical form interference, that is, for translation relatives
and for lexical form relatives, were eliminated when the two words
were drawn from different grammatical categories. The result shows
that even at stages of L2 learning in which learners rely on the trans-
fer from the L1 translation, there is sensitivity to some grammatical
information in the L2. A critical question for future research is to con-
sider how these effects are manifest in actual sentence context and in
production.
The picture of L2 development that emerges from the studies reviewed
suggests a more complex interaction across levels of language repre-
sentation than previously assumed. On one hand, there is apparently
early sensitivity to aspects of meaning and grammar that we might have
expected to depend on greater proficiency in the L2. Support for this
view comes from a recent study of L2 learners in the first months of
L2 study (McLaughlin et al. 2004) that shows that although behavioral
indices of sensitivity to L2 grammar may not reveal that learning has
occurred, event-related potentials (ERPs) show that there is a pattern
of brain activity suggesting very early sensitivity to the L2. On the
other hand, increasing proficiency in the L2 does not correspond to a

switching off of the L1. There is reduced reliance on the translation

equivalent, but persistent lexical activity that suggests a system that is
fundamentally open to cross-language influences. The question we con-
sider in the remainder of the chapter is how successful L2 learners and
proficient bilinguals acquire high levels of skill in the L2 and manage
to negotiate the potential competition across languages that may result
from the parallel activity of both languages.
3. DE VE L O PIN G A U TO M ATICITY A N D
INHIBITO RY CO N TRO L IN L2
3.1. Automaticity
Skilled performance typically involves the development of auto-
maticity of the component cognitive processes (e.g., Kahneman
1973; Schneider & Shiffrin 1977). Although automaticity has been
operationalized in a variety of ways in the cognitive literature
(Segalowitz & Hulstijn 2005), most definitions include the following
four characteristics: processing is fast, requires little or no attentional
effort (i.e., consumes few cognitive resources), occurs outside of con-
scious awareness, and is ballistic in nature (i.e., cannot be stopped once
it has been initiated). The issue we consider is whether this character-
ization also applies to the acquisition of L2 as a new skill and how
automaticity of the L2 might be measured.
In studies of adult L2 learners, it is clear that learners typically become
faster in processing the L2 as they become more proficient. In Figure 3,
we illustrate this effect with data from a study by Kroll et al. (2002).
These are data for a simple task – naming words aloud in the L1 and
the L2. Two groups of native English speakers learning French are
compared, one more proficient and the other less proficient. The less
proficient group had been studying French less than 5 years and the
more proficient group for more than five years. As each of the graphs
in Figure 3 show, less proficient learners were slower and less accurate
to name words in L2 than more proficient learners. A further result of
interest is that less proficient learners were also slower to name words
in L1 than the more proficient learners, although the two groups were

800
Less
700
proficient
More
600
proficient
500
L1 L2
Language of naming
1
0.9 Less
0.8 proficient
0.7 More
proficient
0.6
0.5
L1 L2
Language of naming
Figure 3. Performance data from two groups of learners (Kroll et al. 2002). Mean
naming latencies (in ms) and percent accuracy for naming words aloud in the L1 and L2
are shown for two groups of native English speakers learning French. One group is less
proficient in French as the L2 as the other is more proficient.
both native English speakers and the lists of words in each languages
appeared in separate blocks. As we will suggest later in the chapter, this
difference in L1 performance is consistent with the hypothesis that L1
must be inhibited for L2 to be spoken when learners are at early stages
of L2 acquisition
On one level, it might seem appealing to assume that as the pro-
cessing of L2 becomes more automatic, it becomes more accurate and
faster. As the data shown in Figure 3 suggest, lexical access is faster
and more reliable and the ability to access the L2 phonology is more
skilled with increasing L2 proficiency. However, automaticity is dis-
tinct from a simple increase in speed of processing (e.g., Segalowitz &
Hulstijn 2005). That is, a given change in performance could be due to

faster processing or more automatic processing. One method of distin-

guishing between these two possibilities involves examining the amount
of time required for processing to occur. In particular, Segalowitz
and Segalowitz (1993) proposed that the coefficient of variability for
reaction times could provide useful information about the nature of
the underlying cognitive processes. The coefficient of variability is
the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean reaction time for each
individual.
If faster responding is driven solely by an increase in the speed of pro-
cessing, then the variability in time to perform that task should decrease
in proportion to the overall time to perform the task. That is, the increased
speed of processing essentially shrinks the time frame within which pro-
cessing occurs, and this thereby shrinks the range of variability. If this
is the case, the coefficient of variability should remain constant even as
mean reaction time decreases (since the mean and standard deviation are
adjusted by the same proportion), and therefore should not be related
to mean reaction time. However, if instead faster responding is due to
something other than an increase in speed of processing (e.g., more
automatic processing), then the change in standard deviation should be
larger than the change in mean reaction time (Segalowitz & Segalowitz
1993), and the coefficient of variability should be correlated with the
mean reaction time. If this is found, then it is believed that fundamen-
tal changes have been made to the underlying processes resulting in
automaticity.
This has been a fruitful method for identifying automaticity in lan-
guage processing. Segalowitz et al. (1998) found the predicted pattern
of results in a study involving the lexical decision task. In lexical deci-
sion, participants decide whether letter strings are real words or not in
a particular language. The time to make lexical decisions has been used
extensively within the monolingual and bilingual literature as a means
to model lexical architecture and processing (e.g., Balota 1994; Dijkstra
et al. 1998). Segalowitz et al. (1998) found that in conditions in which
automatic processing was hypothesized to occur, the coefficient of vari-
ability changed as a function of reaction time. But in conditions in which
a general speed-up of processing was the only hypothesized change, the
coefficient of variability remained constant.

By this account, increased speed and accuracy alone does not indicate
increased automaticity. Rather there is reorganization that changes the
consistency with which processing occurs. One proposal for how this
change comes about has been suggested by Logan’s (1988) instance
theory of automaticity. Logan argued that there are two routes by which
processing can occur. Initially, the system must compute each step in
the process using some algorithm. Since this requires the computation
of every step in the process, this first route is slower and requires more
cognitive resources. However, each time these initial algorithms are
computed, a memory trace of that process is left in memory, and a new
memory trace is laid with each subsequent completion of the algorithm.
So the second possible route for processing involves a search for the
memory trace of the required steps. As the number of memory traces
increases (i.e., with increasing practice), the system can more rapidly
find a memory trace of the processing steps and implement the process
based on this memory trace. This theory of automaticity is considered a
race model in that the route by which processing occurs is the route which
wins the “race” to identify the steps required to perform the process.
Automaticity, therefore, is considered to be attained when the memory
retrieval process is completed more quickly than the algorithmic process,
thereby increasing the efficiency of processing.
Within the domain of L2 learning, there are a number of different ways
in which automaticity might develop, especially because different levels
of language processing may impose differential processing demands
that affect the rate at which these changes occur. But even within this
brief review of automaticity, what is apparent is that the process of
become proficient in the L2 is not simply a matter of acquiring adequate
representations for the L2. Rather, that process must be accompanied by
the development of cognitive procedures that themselves change with
increased L2 skill.
3.2. Inhibitory Control

Of the cognitive skills that are likely to be recruited during L2 learning,
a prime candidate for predicting success in this process is inhibitory
control. Although the research reviewed earlier suggests that even pro-
ficient bilinguals are unable to switch off one of their two languages

when the context requires one language alone, during the earliest stages
of L2 learning it is not clear how learners can ever begin to produce the
L2 given the overwhelming dominance of the L1 without some degree
of inhibition.
Green (1998) proposed the Inhibitory Control (IC) model as a sketch
of how this process might work. The model, shown in Figure 4, embeds
the bilingual’s lexicon in a complex system of cognitive control mech-
anisms that serve to focus attention on the task to be performed and to
reactively inhibit the representations not to be produced. The insight here
was that linguistic representations alone do not enable actions. Lexical,
grammatical, and phonological forms need to be selected both within
and across languages to enable bilinguals to use the intended language.
Without modulation by what Green called task schemas, it would be
virtually impossible to engage linguistic representations in the specific
tasks required by the context.
The empirical context in which the predictions of the IC model have
been examined most extensively is language switching. At the lexical
level, the main prediction of the model is that to the extent that the L1
is more active than the L2, it will require greater inhibition than the L2.
Meuter and Allport (1999) examined the predicted asymmetry by asking
Goal Conceptualizer SAS
Bilingual Language
Input lexico-semantic task
system schema
Output
Figure 4. The inhibitory control model (adapted from Green 1998).

L2 learners to name single digits in either the L1 or the L2 depending

on the color of the background. In the switching task, the language of
naming varies across trials, such that the participant must either name
the digits in the same language as in the previous trial (i.e., non-switch
trials) or switch to the other language (i.e., switch trials). Meuter and
Allport found clear evidence for the asymmetry predicted by the IC
model. There were switch costs for both languages, but they were larger
when bilinguals switched into the L1 than into the L2. Although this
pattern may seem counterintuitive, the account is that naming in the
L2 requires suppression of the L1 whereas naming in the L1 requires
little suppression of L2. Therefore, on a trial following L2 naming, L1
will be less available and will require additional processing resources to
be named.
Costa and Santesteban (2004) examined language switching in a
similar paradigm but using picture rather than digit naming. In their
experiments, an alternating runs design was adopted (Rogers & Monsell
1995) in which the languages alternated predictably (two L1 naming tri-
als, two L2 naming trials, etc.). Research on task switching has shown
that strict alternation reduces but does not eliminate switch costs. The
goal of the Costa and Santesteban study was to determine whether
the asymmetric pattern of switch costs reported by Meuter and Allport
(1999) was the reflection of the language dominance of their subjects. If
bilinguals who are strongly dominant in the L1 are functionally less pro-
ficient in the L2, then inhibition of the L1 may be necessary to enable
production in the L2. Costa and Santesteban asked whether the same
pattern would hold for highly balanced and proficient Spanish-Catalan
bilinguals who had acquired the two languages in early childhood. If not,
it might suggest that once a high level of proficiency was achieved, active
inhibition of the unintended language is not required. They showed that
there was indeed a difference in the pattern of switch costs as a function
of language proficiency and balance. These data are shown in Figure 5.
The highly proficient and balanced bilinguals produced switch costs but
they were symmetric across their two languages. A group of less pro-
ficient Spanish-Catalan bilinguals replicated the asymmetry reported
by Meuter and Allport. The interpretation that Costa and Santesteban
assigned to these results was that there was a developmental progression

from cross-language competition and inhibition for the less proficient

bilinguals to selective control for the more proficient bilinguals.
But is the switch cost asymmetry the best indicator of the presence of
inhibition? A striking aspect of the language switching data is that the
time to name in L1 is often slower than the time to name in L2, even
when the pattern of switch costs is asymmetric for the two languages (see
Figure 5). A feature of the language switching paradigm that potentially
complicates the interpretation of these data is that both the switch and
nonswitch trials occur in the context of a mixed language list. That
is, the switching paradigm requires that both languages be active. The
longer naming latencies in L1 in the Costa and Santesteban (2004) study,
even for the highly proficient bilinguals who produced symmetric switch
costs, suggests that L1 may be inhibited for both groups of bilinguals.
To investigate this possibility, Kroll et al. (in preparation) manipulated
the requirement for bilinguals to keep each of their languages active in
a cued picture naming paradigm. In this task, a variant of simple picture
naming, bilinguals either knew in advance the language in which they
were to name (the blocked condition) or did not know the language to
be used until signaled by a tone cue (the mixed condition). In the mixed
condition, a high tone cued one language and a low tone cued the other
language. In the blocked condition, the participants were instructed to
name the picture when they heard one of the tones and to say “no” when
Spanish-Catalan low proficiency Spanish-Catalan high proficiency

870 L1 780 L1
(Spanish) (Spanish)
L2 L2
850 (Catalan) 760 (Catalan)
Naming latencies (ms)
Naming latencies (ms)
830 740
810 720
790 700
770 680
No-switch Switch No-switch Switch
Figure 5. Patterns of language switch costs in picture naming for two groups of Spanish-
Catalan bilinguals who differ in their proficiency and language dominance (adapted from
Costa & Santesteban 2004).

they heard the other tone. In both the mixed and blocked conditions,
the timing of the tones was varied relative to the presentation of the
picture to tap into the time course of speech planning. The participants
were relatively proficient but late Dutch–English and English–French
bilinguals. For present purposes, the critical result concerns the effects
of language mixture on the two languages. The time for Dutch–English
bilinguals to name pictures in each language and under each condition is
shown in Figure 6. For L2, the requirement to keep both languages active
in the mixed condition had little consequence relative to the blocked
condition. In contrast, for L1, there was a marked cost in processing
time when both languages were required to be active. Furthermore, like
the language switching data, under the mixed language conditions the
L1 naming latencies were actually longer than those in L2. Under the
blocked conditions, the more typical advantage of L1 relative to L2
was obtained. The pattern of results suggests that L1 is normally active
during the planning of L2 speech and must be inhibited.
Overall mixed vs. Blocked naming latencies

900
Mixed
Blocked
850
Mean naming latency (ms)
800
750
700
650
600
L1 L2
Language
Figure 6. Mean latencies (in ms) to name pictures in L1 and L2 for Dutch-English
bilinguals under mixed and blocked language conditions (adapted from Kroll et al.
in preparation).

If inhibition is required to achieve proficient performance, then we

might predict that individuals who possess the cognitive resources that
allow them to effectively inhibit irrelevant information more easily
might also achieve L2 proficiency more easily than individuals who
are less skilled in this respect. In the next section of the chapter we con-
sider the evidence on the role of individual cognitive differences in L2
acquisition and performance.
4. MODULATIN G ATTEN TIO N A N D

L AN G U A G E SELECTIO N
Even highly proficient bilinguals often say that speaking in the L2, par-
ticularly under formal circumstances, is mentally exhausting and that
they experience word finding difficulties and make speech errors that
they would never otherwise make. Research on the attentional mod-
ulation of L2 performance supports L2 speakers’ phenomenology in
demonstrating that the L2 requires the allocation of greater processing
resources than the L1 (e.g., Miyake & Friedman 1998; Hasegawa et al.
2002). If greater cognitive and attentional resources are needed to
process L2, then a clear prediction is that individuals who normally
have more of those resources should be advantaged in the process of
L2 acquisition and performance (for a recent review of this topic, see
Michael & Gollan 2005). To illustrate how individual differences might
modulate L2 processing, we review four studies from our own work
that examine different aspects of this problem. A particular hypothesis
is that cognitive resources may be allocated to controlling the persistent
activity of the unintended language that we have suggested is a feature
of using two languages not only during early stages of learning but also
once individuals become skilled in the L2.
4.1. Study 1: Cognate Susceptibility in L2 Learners

Kroll et al. (2002) performed a study in which the ability of L2 learners
at different stages of L2 proficiency was compared on word naming and
word translation tasks. The data shown in Figure 3 for native English
speaking students learning French were taken from the first experiment

in this study. In the second experiment, Kroll et al. again examined the
performance of L2 learners but compared their performance to highly
proficient bilinguals and also administered a reading span measure to
assess the role of memory resources in modulating L2 skill. The crit-
ical result concerned the effects of span on translation performance
when the words to be translated were cognates or not. As noted ear-
lier, cognates are translation equivalents that share aspects of lexical
form (i.e., orthography and/or phonology). In translation, bilinguals are
typically faster to translate cognates than matched non-cognate target
words (e.g., De Groot 1992). However, the cognate facilitation observed
in word translation for proficient bilinguals is not a superficial reflec-
tion of lexical transparency; cognate translations are affected by the
same semantic variables that influence non-cognate translation (e.g.,
Kroll & Stewart 1994). In the Kroll et al. study, the degree of cog-
nate facilitation was modulated by reading span. Ironically, L2 learners
with higher memory span enjoyed less cognate facilitation compared
to learners with lower memory span (see Figure 7). In fact, the higher
memory span learners were slower than the lower memory span learn-
ers when translating cognates. The results suggests that the learners with
greater memory resources avoided relying upon cues made available by
the orthographic overlap of cognates, even when these cues would have
enhanced their performance. Because shared lexical form is not a reliable
cue to translation (i.e., there are also interlingual homographs or false
friends), there is reason to resist reliance on superficial similarity. With
greater memory resources available, these learners appeared to be able to
exert more attentional control when translating from one language into
the other.
4.2. Study 2: Errors in Spoken Translation
A second set of informative results comes from research examining
errors that learners make in attempting to translate words. Tokowicz
et al. (2004) were interested in the types of errors made when translating
words, focusing on factors that potentially influence L2 performance:
working memory capacity and study abroad experience. The partici-
pants were relatively proficient L2 learners who were native English
speakers with Spanish as the L2. Some of them had spent a substantial

amount of time studying abroad (fifteen months or more) and other

had spent less time abroad (eight months or less). Within these two
groups, participants were assigned to subgroups based on their perfor-
mance on an operation span measure of working memory (Turner &
Engle 1989). All participants performed a translation task that involved
producing the L2 translation of an L1 word. Trials in which the partic-
ipant provided the translation of a semantically related word instead of
the target translation were coded as meaning errors. If the participant
simply did not produce a translation (e.g., “I don’t know”), then the
trial was coded as a non-response error. The number of meaning errors
was then compared with the number of non-response errors produced.
For three out of the four groups, participants produced significantly
more non-response errors than meaning errors. That is, when the partic-
ipants did not produce the correct translation, they simply tended not to
respond. However, a different pattern of results was found for the partic-
ipants with more study abroad experience and higher working memory
capacity. These participants produced as many meaning errors as non-
response errors, suggesting that they preferred to err on the side of saying
too much, even if they were unsure of their accuracy. Tokowicz et al.
(2004) concluded that the study abroad environment encouraged the
learner to attempt to communicate as much as possible through the use
of approximate translations, but that only those learners with sufficient
memory resources were able to do so due to the amount of information
300
Mean 250
magnitude 200
of cognate 150
facilitation Low span learners
(ms) 100
50 High span learners
0
L1 to L2 L2 to L1
Direction of translation
Figure 7. Mean magnitude of cognate facilitation (in) for L2 learners as a function of

direction of translation and memory span (adapted from Kroll et al. 2002).

that must be maintained in memory. Although this led to more errors

in production, the joint combination of study abroad experience and
higher working memory appears to have facilitated the development
of oral fluency – a critical outcome for students who study abroad
(Segalowitz & Freed 2004).
4.3. Study 3: Modulating Lexical Interference from the L1
The first two studies we have described focused on production skills.
In a recent study on the effects of study abroad experience (Linck &
Kroll 2005) we also investigated the role of working memory resources
on modulating lexical interference from the L1. We hypothesized that
while learners were immersed in a study abroad experience, they would
be better able to reduce the activation of the L1, which would result
in enhanced L2 performance. The further question was whether the
predicted effects would be modulated by available cognitive resources.
Linck and Kroll (2005) tested participants who were native English
speakers learning Spanish either with or without study abroad experi-
ence. The immersed learners were tested while still immersed in the
L2 environment towards the end of their semester abroad in Spain. The
classroom learners were at the same level of university Spanish courses
but had no previous study abroad experience. The critical task was the
translation recognition described earlier in the study by Sunderman and
Kroll (in press). An L2 word was presented (e.g., cara, meaning face
in English), followed by an L1 word (e.g., card). The participant was
instructed to decide whether the second word was a correct translation
of the first word and respond by pressing a button marked yes or the
button marked no. In the critical trials, the second word was a distractor
word requiring a no response. On these trials, the distractor word was
related to the target translation (e.g., face) in lexical form (e.g., fact) or
in meaning (e.g., nose).
The results of other translation recognition studies (e.g., Sunderman &
Kroll in press; Talamas et al. 1999) have shown that at early stages
of L2 acquisition, learners are more susceptible to interference from
lexical relatives in the L1 that resemble the translation equivalent. The
research reviewed earlier produced mixed findings with respect to mean-
ing; some studies suggest that only more proficient learners are sensitive

to meaning (e.g., Talamas et al. 1999), whereas other studies sug-

gest that all learners are able to comprehend the meaning of L2 words
(e.g., Altarriba & Mathis 1997; Sunderman & Kroll in press). Linck and
Kroll showed that immersed learners were indeed less susceptible to
interference from lexical neighbors in L1 than classroom learners who
had similar levels of L2 study. However, the pattern of interference was
modulated by learners’available working memory resources. These data
are shown in Figure 8.
The immersed learners overall showed an increasing sensitivity to
the meaning distractors and a decreasing sensitivity to the lexical form
distractors, indicating that the immersed learners were beginning to pro-
cess the L2 words in a more conceptual manner. In addition, the higher
working memory participants showed more sensitivity to the meaning
distractors – even for the classroom learners with no immersion experi-
ence. More specifically, we see that the classroom learners with higher
working memory performed very similarly to the immersed learners
with lower working memory. Higher memory span appeared to reduce
the degree to which learners were distracted by words that resembled
the translation equivalent in L1. Moreover, the learners with study
abroad experience who also had greater working memory resources
Control group (classroom)

Immersed group
150 (abroad)
Magnitude of interference
125
150
100 125
Lexical Lexical
75 100
translation translation
(ms)
50 relative 75 relative
50
25 Meaning Meaning
25
0 relative relative
0
–25 Lower Higher –25 Lower Higher
span span –50
–50 span span
Memory span group Memory span group
Figure 8. Mean magnitude of interference (in ms) in translation recognition for control
learners confined to the classroom vs. immersed learners studying abroad as a function
of their relative memory span. Data are shown for interference generated by lexical
translation relatives and meaning relatives (adapted from Linck & Kroll 2005).

available demonstrated even deeper levels of conceptual processing.

That is, study abroad experience and greater memory resources each
provided benefits to the learners, but the combination of the two was
especially valuable. A clear direction in future research on this topic
will be to determine whether increased cognitive resources also function
to maintain the benefits of the immersion experience once the learner
returns home.
4.4. Study 4: Does Memory Span Modulate Parallel Activation
of the Two Languages in Word Recognition Tasks?
A final study (Michael et al. in preparation) asked whether the modula-
tion of bilingual performance observed in the studies described above
would also be seen in the performance of highly proficient bilinguals in
word recognition tasks. Dijkstra et al. (1998) showed that Dutch–English
bilinguals were slower to perform the lexical decision task in English,
their L2, when the English words were interlingual homographs. For
example, the English word room means cream in Dutch, and under
some experimental conditions it is more difficult for a Dutch speaker
to accept the homograph as a real word in English because there is a
conflict in the meaning of the English and Dutch senses of the word.
Michael et al. asked whether the magnitude of this inhibitory effect for
language ambiguous words would be reduced for bilinguals who have
relatively higher memory span relative to those who have lower span.
Dutch–English bilinguals performed two tasks. One was an English lex-
ical decision task which included English words that were unambiguous
(i.e., not also words in Dutch), English words that were ambiguous in that
they had a false friend in Dutch (e.g., room), nonwords that resembled
English words, and unambiguous Dutch words that had to be rejected as
not being English. The other was a single word translation task in which
a different set of words had to be translated from Dutch to English and
from English to Dutch. Michael et al. found that in both tasks, bilinguals
were faster when they had higher rather than lower memory span. How-
ever, memory span did not modulate the magnitude of interference for
interlingual homographs in lexical decision. That is, even bilinguals with
high span were unable to avoid the cross-language activation and com-
petition that occurred when these language ambiguous were presented.

The results support the predictions of the BIA model (see Figure 2) in
that the bottom-up activation of alternatives in each of the bilingual’s
two languages appears to be outside cognitive control processes. Only
later in the process can cognitive resources modulate the selection of the
correct language alternatives.
5. C OGNIT IVE C ON SEQ U EN CES O F BILIN G U A LISM
The evidence we have reviewed suggests that the performance of both L2

learners and highly proficient bilinguals is modulated by available cogni-
tive resources that effectively direct attentional mechanisms to allow L2
skill to develop, that inhibit the unintended language when it is active
to the degree that is possible, and that modulate the degree of cross-
language competition created by the parallel activity of both languages.
We now consider briefly the consequence of this characterization for the
more general cognitive state of the bilingual (see Bialystok 2005 for a
recent comprehensive review of research on this topic).
In a series of pioneering studies on the cognitive consequences of
bilingualism, Bialystok and colleagues have shown that young bilingual
children appear to be advantaged relative to their monolingual peers,
specifically in tasks that require executive control (e.g., Bialystok 1988,
1999, 2001; Bialystok & Codd 1997; Bialystok & Martin 2004). The
cognitive benefits that bilingualism confers to young children is specific
rather than general, so that bilinguals are not superior to monolinguals
on all cognitive measures, but only on those that specifically require that
irrelevant information be ignored.
More recently, the demonstration of positive cognitive benefits from
bilingualism has been extended to the elderly to show that a lifetime of
bilingualism provides a degree of protection against the normal effects
of cognitive aging (Bialystok et al. 2004). Research on cognitive aging
has shown that elderly individuals are particularly vulnerable to decline
on tasks that require inhibitory control. Bialystok et al. (2004) investi-
gated this issue by having younger and older adults perform the Simon
task (Simon & Rudell 1967), a nonlinguistic paradigm in which colored
squares appear on a screen and the participant is instructed to press one
key for one color and another key for the other color. In the congruent

conditions, the position of the colored square on the screen corresponds

to the location of the key press. In the incongruent condition, there is a
conflict between the color of the square and its location with respect to
the key press. The typical finding is that individuals take longer in the
incongruent condition when the stimulus and response locations do not
match. Bialystok et al. found that older individuals suffer more interfer-
ence from the incongruence in the Simon task than younger individuals
but that the rate of decline on the task with increasing age was mod-
ulated by bilingualism. Elderly bilinguals are susceptible to cognitive
aging, but the level at which they suffer interference from stimulus-
response conflicts, such as those in the Simon task, is reduced relative
to age-matched monolingual controls. It is tempting to speculate that
the cross-language competition described earlier in this chapter is the
source of the observed cognitive benefits. That is, bilinguals spend a
lifetime sharpening a set of cognitive skills that specifically function to
reduce competition across their two languages. If one language must
be inhibited to use the other, then bilinguals potentially develop exper-
tise in inhibitory control that then extends beyond linguistic tasks to
domain general cognitive performance. In a sense, bilinguals become
competition experts. This account is attractive in providing an inte-
grated framework for understanding a large body of research results on
the cognitive basis of bilingualism. However, at this time, there is very
little direct evidence that shows precisely how the specific negotiation of
competition across language systems might map onto benefits of the sort
that have been described. This issue is a clear priority for the research
agenda but the methods for linking bilingual performance to specific
cognitive benefits have yet to be clearly described.
Alternative accounts claim that bilinguals suffer costs associated with
the use of two languages by virtue of using each of their languages less
often than monolinguals. This view has been represented most promi-
nently in the work of Gollan and her colleagues (e.g., Gollan & Acenas
2004; Gollan et al. 2005). The idea in this work is that the reduced use of
each language when more than one language is available makes the rela-
tive frequency of each language lower. The evidence to support this view
comes from experiments that show that bilinguals have more tip-of-the-
tongue (TOT) states than monolinguals (e.g., Gollan & Silverberg 2001;

Gollan & Acenas 2004). In a TOT state, individuals cannot remember a

word but are confident that they know the word they are attempting to
retrieve and can provide details about the feature of the word (e.g., its
stress pattern, number of syllables, first letter). In and of itself, increased
TOTs for bilinguals relative to monolinguals could be explained as a
reflection of cross-language competition. However, these studies have
shown that the rate of TOTs is reduced for words for which the bilingual
knows the translation. That is, easily accessed translation equivalents
should pose the greatest problem with respect to cross-language compe-
tition because the competitors are highly available. Yet the results do not
support that conclusion. Furthermore, bilinguals are slower than mono-
linguals in tasks such as simple picture naming, even when performance
is compared on the native language for both groups. Gollan et al. have
shown that it takes approximately five repetitions of the picture naming
trials for the bilingual data to begin to approximate the monolingual
data, a pattern consistent with the frequency explanation. It is not as
clear how the frequency alternative can account for the positive cogni-
tive consequences that have been observed on inhibitory control tasks.
But the problem is sufficiently complex that is it probably premature to
reject any one explanation at this stage.
6. CO N CLU SIO N S
Our goal in this chapter was to provide a brief review of the psycholin-
guistic studies that have examined the cognitive basis of L2 learning
and proficient bilingual performance. The research we have reviewed
suggests clearly that successful attainment of L2 skills relies on cogni-
tive support in addition to the development of linguistic representations.
Although much of the research on this topic is at an early stage of devel-
opment, both with respect to empirical paradigms and with respect to
theory building, the available studies provide an initial foundation that
we believe holds promise for answering these questions. The initial pic-
ture based on this preliminary evidence is already quite complex and
likely to become more so with the next generation of research findings.
For example, we have discussed inhibitory mechanisms as if they are
a unitary phenomenon. The cognitive literature has begun to consider

how components of inhibitory control might differ in their locus and

scope (e.g., Friedman & Miyake 2004). It will be critical for research on
bilingualism to begin to consider more differentiated alternatives about
control processes. In addition to the behavioral data we have reviewed,
a current focus of intense research activity is on the neural basis of these
phenomena. The emerging results of cognitive neuroscience investiga-
tions into these issues also suggests that bilingualism has consequences
for both brain mechanisms and architecture (e.g., Mechelli et al. 2004;
Ullman 2004; Bialystok et al. 2005; and see Abutalebi et al. 2005 for a
recent review of brain imaging studies with bilinguals). The convergence
of behavioral, neural, and developmental evidence is likely to provide
an active agenda for research on the cognitive basis of bilingualism.
In doing so, it demonstrates how research on bilingualism provides an
important tool for investigating the constraints and plasticity of cognitive
and neural systems.
AU TH O R’S N O TES
The writing of this chapter was supported in part by NSF Grant BCS-
0418071 to Judith F. Kroll. Correspondence concerning this chapter
should be addressed to Judith F. Kroll, Department of Psychology,
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802 USA. Email
address: jfk7psu.edu
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CH A PTER 9
SECOND LANGUAGE GENDER SYSTEM AFFECTS

FIRST LANGUAGE GENDER CLASSIFICATION
Elena Andonova1 , Ani Gosheva1 , Armina Janyan1 , and

Jasmin Sadat Schaffai2
1 New Bulgarian University, Sofia
2 Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft, Osnabrück
Abstract
When you speak about the sea, in some languages you have to refer to it in the mas-
culine gender (il mare in Italian), in others in feminine (la mer in French), and in still
others in neuter (Mopemo in Bulgarian). Examples such as these are usually provided as
arguments for the arbitrariness principle going back to Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1916)
postulate on the arbitrary nature of the relationship between the two aspects of the verbal
sign – concepts and acoustic images. Grammatical gender is widely assumed to be a
prime example of arbitrariness due to the fact that there is ample cross-linguistic variabil-
ity in the genders of nouns referring to one and the same concept and little systematicity
in the mapping between different gender categories (e.g., masculine, feminine, and
neuter) and the meaning of nouns within languages.
In the face of so much arbitrariness, a curious observer may ask whether the relation-
ship between language(s) and thought may also be arbitrary or, alternatively, subject
to certain constraints. While cognitive constraints on language are rarely in the focus
of attention (however, see the literature on working memory and language processing,
e.g., Caplan & Waters 1999; MacDonald & Christiansen 2002), there has been plenty of
speculation and a growing amount of experimental data collected to address the possi-
bility that cross-linguistic variation is associated with variation in mental processes. The
latter view is usually subsumed under the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf 1956) whose
strong version of linguistic determinism has long been discredited but whose softer for-
mulation in terms of linguistic relativity has undergone a revival in recent years. The two
issues are indeed intertwined, especially if the general conceptual or mental apparatus of
humans is held to be cross-linguistically and cross-culturally universal. The arbitrariness
principle would then predict dissociation between the variability of linguistic compe-
tence and behavior and the universality of mental processes and representations. In this
sense, it would preclude the possibility for a “Whorfian” influence of the language we
speak on the way we view extra-linguistic reality.
271
© 2007 Springer.

272 E L E N A A N D O N O VA ET A L.
1. ALT E R NAT IVE V IEWS O N G RA M MATICA L G EN D ER
Alternative views focusing on the motivated, grounded and non-arbitrary

nature of form-function mappings in human languages have been pro-
posed in socially and functionally minded research communities, for
example, from the almost forgotten general semantics of Hayakawa
(1949), to the cognitive linguistics of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), social
semiotics of Hodge and Kress (1988), critical linguistics and critical dis-
course analysis (Fairclough 1995), etc. In the psycholinguistic literature,
a strong candidate for framing research on cross-linguistic variability
and its functional implications for language acquisition, processing, and
loss has been the Competition Model (Bates & MacWhinney 1989).
Research within this framework has shown that languages differ not
only qualitatively, for example, the types of cues speakers of different
languages use in language comprehension, but also quantitatively, that
is, the degree of reliance on these cues. For instance, even though ani-
macy, agreement, and word order are all used as clues to understanding
thematic relations in various languages, the degree to which each of
them is a reliable source of information differs – in French, the sentence
processing hierarchy is agreement > animacy > word order whereas
in English word order dominates (Bates & MacWhinney 1989). Thus,
even though structurally similar grammatical gender systems may be
found in a pair of languages, the extent to which gender information
is useful and reliable in language processing may vary. The processing
of grammatical gender has attracted an explosion of interest in psy-
cholinguistic research in the last few years. As a result of a number
of these studies, the arbitrariness principle has come under more fire.
At the word level, the mapping between syntactic features and form
is not arbitrary; for example, in Italian, the correlation between the
grammatical gender of a word and its ending is a reliable cue (see
Bates et al. 1995). In a timed gender-monitoring task in Bulgarian,
Andonova et al. (2004) established a role in grammatical gender pro-
cessing for the so-called “semantic” gender – participants performed
with higher accuracy and faster speed on items that had “sexed” refer-
ents, for example, “girl” and “teacher,” than others. Furthermore, they
also found a grammatical gender by participant sex interaction whereby

SE C OND L A N G U A G E G EN D ER SY STEM 273
women’s performance on processing nouns in feminine was better

than men’s.
In addition, recent years have seen a new wave of evidence indicating
the existence of cross-linguistic differences in cognitive performance.
Such neo-Whorfian effects have been emphasized by findings on spatial
language and categorization (Choi & Bowerman 1991; Majid et al.
2004), conceptualization of time (Boroditsky 2001), color cognition
(Roberson et al. 2004), numerical cognition (Brysbaert et al. 1998),
etc. For example, Choi and Bowerman’s (1991) finding of language-
specificity in spatial cognition shows that, unlike English speakers
whose conceptualization of spatial configurations is associated with
the distinction between support and containment relations, for Korean
speakers, the dividing line falls between tight-fitting and loose-fitting
arrangements.
Thus, the neo-Whorfian view being explored considers variation in
cognitive behavior and categorization in particular as a function of
variation across languages. Part of this agenda is a host of studies
examining the relationship between grammatical gender systems and
speakers’ conceptualizations of non-sexed, inanimate objects in cate-
gorization and similarity judgment tasks (Sera et al. 1994; Flaherty
2001; Sera et al. 2002; Phillips & Boroditsky 2003; Vigliocco et al.
2005). Indeed, although grammatical gender has mostly been seen
as a purely formal and semantically arbitrary distinction, some recent
research suggests that this assumption may need to be revised. To begin
with, studies have shown systematic correlations between the meaning
of words and their grammatical gender, for example, in German abstract
nouns (Zubin& Köpcke 1984). The partially non-arbitrary nature of the
mapping between phonological form and grammatical gender across
languages should not be underestimated, even if it may not strike a
novice learner of a typical gender-marking language as a reliable basis
for gender classifications. The strength of this correlation between form
(word ending, for example) and gender varies across languages – it is
relatively high in Spanish and Bulgarian, for example, but lower in Ger-
man. Unlike the difference between three- and two-gender systems, the
variability in the consistency of mapping between phonological form
and gender categories and its consequences for categorization behavior

(see below), however, are rarely discussed in the literature under

review.
The impact of grammatical gender on speakers’ non-linguistic
behavior has been explored through a number of experimental
paradigms, including male/female voice attribution to objects (Sera et al.
1994, 2002), male/female name attribution to objects (Flaherty 2001),
similarity judgments and memory tasks (Boroditsky& Schmidt 2000;
Vigliocco et al. 2005), etc. The findings have been mostly in line with
the hypothesized conceptual-grammatical “alignment” effect, for exam-
ple, speakers attribute voices to pictured objects that are consistent with
grammatical gender distinctions in their language (Sera et al. 1994) both
when the labels of the objects were supplied as part of the experimental
paradigm and when they were not. In a typical experimental setup, voice
assignment (male vs. female) to inanimate objects, the critical manip-
ulation is on the grammatical gender (masculine vs. feminine) of the
nouns that are normally used to name these objects.
Finding evidence for the influence of grammatical gender systems on
speakers’ behavior has not always been a straightforward task, however.
For example, while positive evidence for the link between grammar and
male/female categorization has been found in monolingual speakers of
Spanish (Sera et al. 1994) and French (Sera et al. 2002), no reliable
effects were found for German speakers (Sera et al. 2002).
Such differences in results call for an explanation, even if somewhat
tentative. One line of argumentation has been based on distinguishing
types of languages while another is concerned with types of experi-
mental tasks. A provisional explanation for the absence of grammatical
gender effects in Sera et al.’s (2002) study of German has been the
difference between two-gender (masculine, feminine) and three-gender
(masculine, feminine, neuter) grammatical systems; the latter are seen as
being at a disadvantage in such tasks, that is, exerting less influence on
speakers’ categorization behavior. Vigliocco et al. (2005) discovered no
effects of grammatical gender on triadic similarity judgments of words
in German-speaking participants and interpreted this null result as sup-
porting a “sex and gender” hypothesis which explains gender effects as
arising as a generalization from the transparent relationship between the
sex of human referents and the gender of nouns rather than an alternative

“similarity and gender” hypothesis in which the same effects are seen as
a consequence of similarity in linguistic contexts. Vigliocco et al. (2005)
see German as a language with a weaker correspondence between the
genders of nouns referring to humans and the sex of referents, that is,
more arbitrariness, because of its tripartite gender system.
Furthermore, a debate is currently under way on the locus of gram-
matical gender effects, which is based on the distinction between
experimental paradigms involving language processing. While one view
considers grammatical gender to be part of speakers’ conceptualization
of even non-sexed objects in such languages (Boroditsky & Schmidt
2000), the alternative “lexicalist” position was recently defended by
Vigliocco et al. (2005). As a reminder, earlier Sera et al. (1994) showed
the presence of such effects in both their label and non-label (lexical
and non-lexical) tasks. In their comparison of gender-specific effects
on similarity judgments accompanied or not by a verbal shadowing
task (meant to produce verbal interference and thus eliminate purely
lexical effects), Phillips and Boroditsky (2003) found that similarity
ratings did not differ across tasks. Based on these and similar results
(Boroditsky & Schmidt 2000), they argue that, once established, the
effect is not language-specific (not dependent on language processing
since objects appear to have conceptual gender). Vigliocco et al. (2005)
conclude that such gender-specific effects may be strictly limited to ver-
bal tasks, given that they found no such effects in a picture similarity
judgment task which could be performed without recourse to lexical
labels (experiment 4), and that these mechanisms may have a role in
language development but do not extend to conceptual structures. In a
related discussion of how and when language affects cognition, Hunt
and Agnoli (1991) maintained that the impact is only in terms of com-
putation costs for users of a language, and not in terms of specific
representations.
2. GR AMMAR EFFECTS IN BILIN G U A LS
The neo-Whorfian impact of cross-linguistic differences on cognition

has been researched almost exclusively in monolingual populations.
It is reasonable to ask if it is only the native language that can exert

this kind of influence. Three recent studies have addressed this issue.
Athanasopoulos (2006) examined the effects of variation in grammati-
cal number marking systems in the two languages of Japanese-English
bilinguals on a similarity of pictures task, and found evidence supporting
the hypothesis that acquisition of a second language with different gram-
matical properties from the first language can further alter cognition. In
addition, Athanasopoulos (2006) established that better knowledge of
grammatical number in their L2 led Japanese-English speakers to resem-
ble monolingual speakers of English in their behavior and concluded that
L2 effects on cognition correlate with L2 proficiency.
Two further studies have explored the possibility that knowledge of a
second grammatical gender system may affect speakers’ performance in
categorization tasks in similar ways as it does first-language speakers.
Bassetti (2005) compared grammatical gender’s effect on object percep-
tion in Italian-German bilingual and in Italian monolingual nine-year-old
children in a voice attribution task. She found an effect of Italian gram-
matical gender in the performance of the Italian monolingual children
but not in the Italian-German bilingual children (only items of opposite
genders in their two languages were included in the materials). While
this is an interesting result in itself, her findings were based on only 12
test items. Bassetti concludes that when the bilingual’s two grammatical
gender systems are in conflict, grammatical gender ceases to constitute a
reliable cue; therefore, bilingualism eliminates a language-induced bias
in the perception of reality.
A notable exception to the predominantly “monolingual” picture on
grammatical gender effects has been a study reported in Phillips and
Boroditsky (2003) in which Spanish-German bilinguals who were also
fluent in English (thus, in fact, trilingual) rated the similarity of objects
and animals to human males and females. Participants’ experience with
Spanish ranged from 1 to 61 years and with German from 1 to 67 years.
On a scale from 1 (not fluent) to 5 (very fluent), they rated themselves as
quite fluent, that is, on average 4.19 in Spanish, 4.27 in German and 4.28
in English. Phillips and Boroditsky found a significant positive correla-
tion between people’s relative proficiency in Spanish/German and their
biases in the similarity task. Their judgments were aligned more with the
grammatical gender system of a language if their self-rated proficiency

in that language was higher. The existence of such a correlation is a

striking result which points towards the importance of how well a cer-
tain language is mastered for language-specific (here, gender-specific)
effects on cognitive tasks to emerge.
The participants in their study, however, were a mixed group whose
gender-marking language may have been a recent acquisition (e.g., one
year) or a life-long experience (e.g., 67 years), thus possibly varying
across the L1–L2–L3 continuum and unspecified with respect to the
question whether their dominant or preferred language was a gender-
marking one (and which one – Spanish or German), or a gender
non-marking language such as English. In this sense, it is not clear
from these results to what extent the correlation between gender effects
and language proficiency may be due principally to the first language
dominating the scene vs. the second (or third) language additionally
leaving its traces on cognitive behavior.
In fact, there have been no published findings of the direct effects
of a specific second language system on categorization in bilinguals,
with the exception of number marking in English affecting advanced
Japanese-English bilinguals (Athanasopoulos 2006). It is legitimate to
ask, then, if bilinguals’ second language gender system may also affect
their performance in a task that concerns classification in their first
language. Does the acquisition of a second language in which gram-
matical gender demarcations do not repeat those in a bilingual’s first
language lead to a contradictory set of expectations, hence less overall
reliance on gender as a cue in linguistic and non-linguistic processing
as expected by Bassetti (2005), or does it modify their representations
of the grammatical items in their first language in line with the gender
system of the second language? More specifically, can the grammatical
system of L2 affect classification choices in L1 directly, that is, can the
availability of a gender-marking system on nouns in L2 bias bilinguals’
preference for masculine vs. feminine gender classifications in their L1
in a way that would show alignment with the grammar of their second
language?
This is the main research question we started out with in exam-
ining the behavior of speakers of different gender-marking second
languages in terms of gender alignment effects. Our first set of data came

from Spanish- and German-speaking bilinguals whose first language is

Bulgarian (gender-marking itself), but we also extended our investi-
gation into German-L1 (also gender-marking) bilinguals (Russian- and
French-speaking). As a result, we were in a better position to address
the issue of generalizability of findings and also to look into variation
arising from the different combinations of languages involved. Note that
German is frequently cited as a rare exception to the growing body of
evidence for gender effects on categorization. Interpretations invariably
tend to focus on its three-member system (vs. two-member in Romance
languages) and/or the relatively high degree of arbitrariness of form-
meaning mappings. If German grammatical gender is indeed lacking in
“semantic force,” to borrow Sera et al.’s (1994) term, then the gendered
second languages of such bilinguals could be expected to produce an
even stronger influence in classification tasks. The relative influence of
second languages on Bulgarian-L1 bilinguals, on the other hand, is an
open question. On the one hand, it may be rather fragile since grammat-
ical gender processing in Bulgarian has been shown to be sensitive to
semantic factors (Andonova et al. 2004); on the other hand, if a demar-
cation line is to be drawn between two-gender and three-gender systems,
with the latter being more arbitrary, then the performance of Bulgarian-
L1 bilinguals may also “fall prey” more easily to the second language
system, especially if it is itself one of more (e.g., Spanish) vs. less
(e.g., German) semantic force. In both studies we also included an
English-L2 control group.
Both Bulgarian and German have three genders: masculine, feminine,
and neuter; that is, they are structurally but not lexically and functionally
isomorphic. In order to reduce the potentially confounding influence of
the gender system in bilinguals’ first language, we chose to elicit their
classifications on a novel experimental task. Participants in both stud-
ies were instructed to imagine that there would be no neuter category
in the gender system of their first language and to select a “new” gen-
der (masculine or feminine) for a number of existing neuter nouns. In
our first experiment, our hypothesis was that Bulgarian-German and
Bulgarian-Spanish bilinguals would make their choices in line with the
grammatical gender distinctions found in their second language. We
also expected that the degree of bias in the two L2 groups may differ,

based on previous studies which have concluded that the German system
does not affect classifications as much as Spanish and French (Sera
et al. 1994; Vigliocco et al. 2005). We expected that Bulgarian-Spanish
and Bulgarian-German speakers would agree on the classification of
items that are of the same gender in Spanish and German systematically
by showing the greatest degree of consensus on those items (matching
masculine, MM, and matching feminine, FF) in comparison with items
whose translation equivalents are of different genders in German and
Spanish (mismatching items).
Finally, previous studies with monolinguals have also demonstrated
“indirect” cross-linguistic effects, such as an apparent effect of Spanish
gender among speakers of English (4th grade and older) and German
(only children up to 4th grade were tested for German) but no cross-
linguistic effect of French gender (Sera et al. 2002). Thus, if we find
that one language’s gender assignments can predict the classification of
words by speakers of other second languages, we expected the source of
such an effect to be the “semantically strong” Spanish, but not German
or French, as second languages. These linguistic constructions may then
reflect shared ideas about the properties of gender.
3. E XPE R IMEN T 1: BILIN G U A LS WITH

B UL GAR IAN A S TH EIR FIRST LA N G U A G E
3.1. Participants
The participants in this experiment were three groups of bilinguals
whose first language was Bulgarian. There were 19 Bulgarian-English
bilinguals (11 women, 8 men) whose average age was 13.83 years (range
13–14), 16 Bulgarian-German bilinguals (9 women, 7 men) with an
average age of 15.70 years (range 15–16), and 15 Bulgarian-Spanish
bilinguals (9 women, 6 men) with an average age of 15.86 years (range
15–16). They had studied their second language since the age of 12 for
2 years (English) or for 4 years (German and Spanish). Bulgarian was
the first language for all of them; none knew a third language other than
English, or had a parent whose first language was not Bulgarian. All
participants were high school students in one of the so-called “language

schools” in Sofia where the second language is studied intensively for a

full year following grade seven. Afterwards, students continue to study
the language as a special subject and take some other subjects in the
medium of the same language. All in all, second-language exposure is
abundant and rigorous and normally students develop a high level of
command of the target language.
3.2. Procedure
The experiment was conducted in classrooms in the three schools. For
each Bulgarian neuter noun on the list, participants were asked to answer
the following question (in Bulgarian): “If there were no neuter gender
in the Bulgarian language, which gender would each of these words be
in?” by indicating either masculine or feminine on the answer sheet.
Participants could take as much time as they needed to fill out the
questionnaire.
3.3. Materials
A list with a total of 99 Bulgarian neuter nouns was set up. The gen-
der of one-third of the translation equivalents for the Bulgarian nouns
(33 items) was masculine in both German and Spanish, of another third
it was feminine in both German and Spanish, and for the last third it
was either masculine in German and feminine in Spanish or vice versa;
that is, mismatched across the two gender-marking second languages.
Nouns varied in concreteness, imageability, and frequency, and referred
to natural kinds (including animals), artifacts, and abstract concepts.
In the list, nouns were presented in a randomized order. One item was
subsequently excluded from the analyses as an outlier.
3.4. Results
The dependent variable was calculated as the mean percent of feminine
choices across participants in the by-item analyses, and across items
in the by-participant analyses. For example, if all participants chose
feminine for a given item, the value of the dependent variable for that
item would be 100%, and if they all chose masculine, the value of
the mean percent choice of feminine (FCh%) would be 0% indicating
an absolute bias against feminine in favor of masculine. Chance level

performance would be reflected in values around 50% . As the dependent

variable reflects a binary choice, the exact opposite would be valid for
choices of masculine.
Two sets of analyses were conducted on the mean percent choice of
feminine, one where data were averaged over items and the second one
with data averaged over participants. The overall picture of results from
these analyses was very similar. Participants tended to assign mascu-
line as a new gender category to the Bulgarian neuter nouns more than
feminine (M = 41.15%, SD = 13.04% in the by-participants analysis;
M = 40.28%, SD = 19.70% in the by-items analysis), a result which
we interpret as a markedness effect, that is, an asymmetry between the
two members of the gender category where masculine is the unmarked,
or default, value, and feminine is the marked member of the opposi-
tion. A bias favoring male-like representations has been shown before
(Sera et al. 2002); here we further extend this finding to a bias favoring
masculine-gender choices.
A one-way ANOVA with second language as a between-participant
variable explored further this finding showing a main effect of L2 on
the mean percent choice of feminine (F[2, 291] = 4.30; p < .05), with
the values for English-L2, German-L2, and Spanish-L2 speakers being
43.38%, 41.80%, and 35.65%, respectively. A Tukey HSD posthoc test
revealed that only the English and Spanish speakers’ choices differed
significantly.
In order to address the research questions outlined above, two sets
of statistical analyses were conducted. In the first, we examined the
effects of grammatical gender on the performance of each bilingual
group. The second set compared the choices of the English-speaking
bilinguals whose second language did not incorporate a system of
grammatical gender with those of the bilinguals whose second lan-
guage had a specific grammatical gender system, that is, the German-
and Spanish-speaking bilinguals. To avoid redundancy, we report here
only the by-items analysis and the results of the by-participants anal-
ysis on those occasions where they diverged. Table 1 summarizes
item means and standard deviations (SD) of percent choice of femi-
nine in the three L2 groups for each gender in the two gender-marking
languages.

Table 1. Mean percent choice of feminine and standard deviations

(in parentheses) in the three L2 groups for translation equivalents of
items with masculine and feminine gender in German and Spanish
German gender Spanish gender

Masc Fem Masc Fem
German-L2 34.70 (22.42) 47.83 (21.09) 35.64 (22.82) 49.06 (20.22)

Spanish-L2 33.77 (20.40) 37.25 (19.76) 32.06 (19.52) 39.89 (20.00)
English-L2 41.73 (16.86) 44.77 (13.40) 40.82 (14.47) 46.39 (15.40)
3.4.1. Bulgarian-German bilinguals A one-way analysis of variance

revealed a significant effect of German grammatical gender on the
choices of German-speaking bilinguals (F[1, 96] = 8.90; p < .01), who
assigned feminine gender 47.83% of the time to those Bulgarian neuter
nouns whose translation equivalents in German are feminine nouns, and
only 34.70% to items whose German equivalent is in the masculine gen-
der. This significant difference shows that German-speaking bilinguals
were aligning their choices with the grammatical system of their second
language.
Aone-way analysis of variance was run on German speakers’data with
Spanish gender as a within-subject variable. Spanish gender was found
to have affected the choices of German speakers indirectly (F[1, 96] =
9.33; p < .01): in their data set there was a bias towards choosing
feminine for nouns with feminine equivalents (49.06%) in Spanish more
than those with masculine equivalents (35.64%) (Table 1).
3.4.2. Bulgarian-Spanish bilinguals A similar one-way analysis of vari-
ance found a marginal effect of Spanish grammatical gender on the
performance of Spanish-speaking bilinguals (F[1, 96] = 3.83; p =
.0532) who assigned feminine 39.89% of the time to the Bulgarian
equivalents of Spanish feminine nouns and 32.06% to those of Spanish
masculine nouns. In the by-participants analysis this effect was statisti-
cally significant (F[1, 58] = 5.48; p < .05), with 40.45% assigned for
Spanish feminine and 32.72% for Spanish masculine. Here the general
trend is the same as in the German-speaking group; that is, participants
were aligning their choices with the organization of grammatical gender
in their second language.

A one-way analysis of variance was run on the Spanish speakers’ data

with German gender as a within-subject variable. German gender had
no effect on the choices of Spanish speaking bilinguals (F[1, 96] = .74;
p < .4).
3.4.3. Bulgarian-English bilinguals Two further tests were carried out

on the data for the English-speaking group. A one-way analysis of vari-
ance revealed no effect of German gender (F[1, 96] = .99; p < .4)
and a second one-way ANOVA established only a marginal effect of
Spanish gender on their choices (F[1, 96] = 3.40; p < .07). The by-
participants analysis revealed that this effect was statistically significant
(F[1, 74] = 5.15; p < .05) with 46.97% assigned to Spanish feminine
equivalents and 40.85% to masculine equivalents. The results for this
bilingual group are important to keep in mind as a comparison with
those for the gender-marking-L2 speakers, that is, German- and Spanish-
speaking bilinguals. We hypothesized that there should be no principal
difference in the choices of the control group of (English-speaking)
bilinguals as a function of grammatical gender in German and Spanish
and indeed we found none, with the above exception. The fact that their
behavior was marginally consistent with the demarcation line between
feminine and masculine in Spanish deserves future attention, however.
3.4.4. Comparisons with the English-speaking controls In the next set of

analyses, we directly compared the performance of each of the two
gender-marking L2 groups with the control English speakers’ group.
A two-way ANOVA (L2 × German gender) revealed a marginal interac-
tion between language group, that is, German vs. English, and German
gender, that is, masculine vs. feminine (F[1, 192] = 3.55; p < .07).
A Tukey HSD posthoc test revealed that German speakers honored the
gender distinction found in German (47.83% for feminine nouns and
34.70% for masculine nouns) while English speakers’behavior remained
indifferent to it (44.77% for equivalents to feminine German nouns and
41.73% for masculine equivalents). In a similar comparison between the
English and the Spanish group and a subsequent Tukey HSD posthoc
test, the behavioral profile of Spanish speakers did not differ from that
of the English speakers.

3.5. Bulgarian-German and Bulgarian-Spanish

(Gender-Marking Languages)
The next question to address in our analysis of the data is whether the
hypothesis listed earlier on the distinction between matching feminine
(FF) and matching masculine (MM) items would hold for the gender-
marking second languages. To answer this question, we collapsed the
data for the two language groups together and examined their combined
choices with respect to the three levels of the gender-match variable:
(a) matching masculine items (masculine in both German and Spanish);
(b) matching feminine items (feminine in both German and Spanish);
and (c) mismatched items (masculine in German and feminine in Span-
ish or vice versa). This analysis showed that item type made a significant
difference (F[2, 95] = 4.82; p < .05) for the gender-marking L2 speak-
ers who agreed more on the matching items than the mismatching ones.
These participants chose feminine gender for 44.96% of the matching
feminine items, 31.00% for the matching masculine items, and 40.26%
for the mismatching items. ATukey HSD posthoc test revealed that there
was a significant difference in their choices between the two matching
conditions (matching masculine and matching feminine genders).
The same kind of analysis on the English-L2 data yielded no sig-
nificant effect, that is, there was no specific preference or avoidance of
feminine for either matching feminine items, matching masculine items,
or mismatching items (F[2, 95] = 2.02; p < .2), confirmed also by a
Tukey HSD posthoc test. However, the by-participants analysis yielded
a significant main effect (F[2, 54] = 3.89; p < .05). A Tukey HSD test
showed a difference between mismatching items (45.56%) and matching
feminine items (44.82%).
3.6. Discussion
The results of the analyses of bilinguals’ choices as a function of the
grammatical gender distinctions available in their second language show
that bilinguals aligned their categorization in this task with the grammars
of their respective second languages. Both German- and Spanish-
speaking bilinguals preferred feminine more for Bulgarian neuter nouns
whose translation equivalent in their second language was also feminine,

and less so if it was masculine. This kind of consistency is clear evidence

for the involvement of the second language of bilinguals during the pro-
cessing of first-language words in this categorization task. Even though
the experiment was conducted entirely in their native Bulgarian lan-
guage; that is, a monolingual language mode was aimed at and set up as
much as possible, participants’ judgments were systematically affected
by their bilingual status and their second language grammatical gen-
der representations. Furthermore, the analysis of the combined data
on gender-marking languages with respect to the cross-linguistic gen-
der status of items (matching and mismatching gender) confirmed that
these speakers were clearly differentiating between matching feminine
and matching masculine items in their judgments.
It was also important, however, to compare their performance with
the choices of the non-gender-marking English-L2 speakers. A series
of comparative analyses yielded a coherent picture of results – English
speakers were not systematically affected by the grammatical gender
assignments in German or Spanish. This set of results is in support of
the claim that it was the specific second languages’ gender distinctions
that affected German- and Spanish-speaking bilinguals and not a generic
conceptualization pattern which may have been of a more universal and
language-independent nature.
The one exception to this generally predictable pattern was a weak
indirect influence of Spanish gender in some of the analyses on partic-
ipants’ choices. It appears that Spanish gender distinctions may indeed
be closer to the intuitions of English speakers as established in previ-
ous studies (Sera et al. 1994, 2002). This is a plausible interpretation
of the English-L2 results and one commonly shared by studies of
cross-linguistic variation in grammatical gender effects. Future research,
however, should address the question of whether English speakers’ per-
formance provides a neutral baseline from which one would be able to
generalize to non-gender-marking languages as a whole vs. merely a
specific set of English speakers’ intuitions that may not be consistent
with the intuitions of speakers of other non-gender-marking languages.
Partial support for the argument that English speakers’ intuitions
may be a suitable baseline comes from the results of cross-linguistic
“implicit” gender influences in our study. Spanish gender distinctions

were found to be indirectly affecting the choices of German-speaking

bilinguals as well as those of the English-speaking group (in addition to
Spanish-L2 speakers). Thus, it is possible that the distinctions between
masculine and feminine in Spanish are consistent with a more general
pattern of conceptual differentiation and classifications of some cross-
linguistic validity, as they predicted, though not equally, the behavior of
all participants in our study.
Originally, we considered another baseline for a comparison with our
gender-marking L2 speakers which would not have been possible in
most of the studies reviewed earlier. Monolingual speakers of Bulgarian
could have provided a “default” profile in this categorization task where
knowledge of second, third, etc. languages is not required. However, two
arguments against this choice convinced us otherwise. First, in line with
international trends, true or “pure” monolinguals are an exception in this
young age group and the urban cultural landscape where we conduct our
research, thus we would be focusing on a somewhat “deviant” rather than
a representative community. Second, we needed to study comparatively
similar populations to be able to draw a conclusion with respect to the
specific gender system of L2 affecting the bilingual speaker. With a
monolingual control group, an alternative hypothesis could not have
been ruled out; that is, that it was not the second language’s grammar
but the fact that these speakers were not monolingual that was the basis
for the (then) “apparent” bilingual grammatical gender effect.
Having established the expected effect of the grammatical gender in
the second language on the classification of words in the first language,
we need to emphasize here that the bilingual participants in our study
were guided partially but not entirely by the available grammatical dis-
tinctions in their languages. Various other aspects of the perception of
these nouns’referents come into play in this gender-classification task as
well as in others. An example may be helpful: both speakers of Spanish
and German re-assigned the Bulgarian word for “tulip” to the feminine
gender, although the translation equivalents in the two languages were
of mismatching genders. More typically, however, the Bulgarian noun
meaning “future” was re-assigned feminine gender by only 25% of the
Spanish-L2 speakers but by as many as 73% of the German-L2 speak-
ers (the Spanish translation equivalent, el futuro, is masculine, and the

German one, die Zukunft, is feminine). An additional question we asked

was whether speakers’ gender-consistent behavior would be in some
way biased towards a default gender. Indeed, the data cited above point
to a markedness effect in two ways: (a) masculine was the predominant
choice overall; and (b) across gender-marking L2 groups, the degree of
alignment with the gender of the L2 equivalent was much higher for
L2-masculine items (69% ) than for L2-feminine items (44.96% ). To
our regret, information on the distribution of gender-consistency across
the different grammatical genders in a given task and language has not
been reported before, thus preventing us from making a comparison with
previous studies.
In conclusion, this first study of the influence of second-language
grammatical gender distinctions on bilinguals’ categorization of first-
language items constitutes an extension of the effect of grammatical
gender in monolingual categorization tasks demonstrated in a number
of studies in recent years. The results suggest that grammatical gender
forms at least part of the basis for categorization for speakers of lan-
guages where the gender distinctions are readily available, even in the
case of a second language system.
Some aspects of this effect have remained unclear at the end of this
first experiment. The variability of language-specific gender effects
deserves further exploration. Two possible sources of this variability
have been suggested in the literature so far. First, the presence or absence
of effects in French, Spanish, and Italian vs. German monolinguals has
been attributed to differences in the semantic transparency of gender
in two- vs. three-gender language. Contrary to expectations based on
the literature on gender effects in monolingual categorization tasks, we
did not find German-derived effects to be weaker than Spanish-derived
ones for the German-L2 and Spanish-L2 groups, respectively. This result
raises an issue with the wide-spread assumptions in the literature of the
relative arbitrariness of the German gender system and does not support
Vigliocco et al.’s (2005) “sex and gender” hypothesis as it is formu-
lated with respect to three-gender languages, but rather the alternative
“similarity and gender” view. After all, how arbitrary is a language
(German) for which Vigliocco et al. (1995) themselves admit that they
could not balance their stimuli in terms of gender and category (animate

vs. artifact)? We did find, however, indirect Spanish influences on Ger-

man speakers and marginally so on English speakers, which favors an
interpretation of cross-linguistically shared features involving Spanish.
Secondly, if such effects are dependent on the acquisition of a certain
grammar, then the level of proficiency in the second language may be
a modulating factor – highly proficient speakers may be more likely to
demonstrate gender effects not unlike their monolingual counterparts,
whereas speakers who do not have advanced levels of proficiency may
then be unable to rely on such gender representations in categorization
tasks. Limited evidence exists that gender effects may emerge and grow
stronger as an outcome of speakers’ language development. In mono-
lingual categorization tasks, language-specific effects have been shown
to vary with age and level of language development (Sera et al. 1994;
Flaherty 2001; Sera et al. 2002), as well as in a study of bilinguals
(Phillips & Boroditsky 2003). However, the answer to this question
with respect to bilinguals is far from clear. In Phillips and Boroditsky’s
study participants belonged to a mixed group where the gender-marking
language for some was their first and stronger language, while for oth-
ers it was their second and weaker language. Therefore, these were not
clearly developmental second-language dependencies.
In our second study, we attempt to throw more light on these two
aspects of variability, that is, differences stemming from gender systems
of varying transparency and variation in gender effects as a function
of language proficiency level. We also explore how generalizable the
findings from our first experiment are to bilinguals with another first
language and other L1–L2 combinations.
4. E XPE R IME NT 2: BILIN G U A LS WITH G ERM A N

AS T HEIR FIRST LA N G U A G E
4.1. Participants
The participants in this experiment were three groups of bilinguals
whose first language was German: 17 German-English bilinguals
(7 women,10 men) whose average age was 24.12 years (range 20–
33), 15 German-French bilinguals (11 women, 4 men) with an average

age of 22.87 years (range 20–30), and 11 German-Russian bilinguals

(9 women, 2 men) with an average age of 23 years (range 21–27).
They started to study their second language at an average age of 11.35
years – 9.53 for English (range 3–12; SD=2.60), 13.47 for French
(range 10–18; SD=1.73), and 11.27 for Russian (range 3–22; SD=6.84).
They had been studying their L2 for an average of 12.05 years –
14.59 for English (range 10–26; SD=4.58), 9.4 for French (range 7–
16; SD=2.47), and 11.73 for Russian (range 2–24; SD=7.59). The
participants were university students who were all enrolled in study
programs using their L2 on a regular basis. All participants were from
German speaking families, except four participants of the German-
Russian bilingual group who indicated that some of their relatives
were Russian speakers. Five German-English bilinguals, six German-
French bilinguals, and seven German-Russian bilinguals had spent at
least one semester in a foreign country where their L2 was spoken.
All participants filled out a language screening questionnaire at the end
of the experiment in which they were asked to rate their comprehen-
sion and production abilities in their L2 on a 6-point scale (from 1 for
poor ability to 6 for excellent). Self-reported mean proficiency scores
for speaking, understanding, reading and writing in L2 are listed in
Table 2. All German-French and German-Russian bilinguals reported
having learned English as a foreign language in school, starting at a
mean age of 10.31 years (10.53 for German-French bilinguals, and
10.09 for German-Russian bilinguals). All participants indicated using
their L2 more often than English in everyday life, and further rated their
Table 2. Self-report ratings of German-French (GER-FR),

German-English (GER-ENG), and German-Russian (GER-RUS)
bilinguals for speaking, understanding speech, reading and writing in
English (1 reflects poor ability and 6 reflects excellence)
Understand Speak Read Write

Self-report
ratings of: M SD M SD M SD M SD
GER-FR 4,86 0,99 4,46 0,91 −5 1,06 4,53 0,74

GER-ENG 4,82 1,13 4,29 0,98 5,11 1,11 4,17 1,28
GER-RUS 5 0,63 3,72 0,78 4,27 1,1 3,9 1,22

competence in their L2 higher than English. None of the participants

indicated a prolonged exposure to another foreign language than their
L2 or English.
4.2. Procedure
The experiment was conducted in university classrooms and participants
could take as much time as they needed. Instructions were presented and
read to the participants in German before presenting the list of German
neuter nouns. Participants were told to imagine that there were no neuter
gender in German but only masculine and feminine. They were asked
to choose intuitively the gender that fits each of the nouns best, either
masculine or feminine.
4.3. Materials
A list with a total of 80 German neuter nouns was set up. The gender of
half of the translation equivalents for the German nouns was congruent
in Russian and French (20 nouns with common feminine genders in
Russian and French, and 20 nouns with common masculine genders);
the gender of the other half of the translation equivalents was different
in Russian and French (20 nouns with masculine gender in Russian
and feminine gender in French, and 20 nouns with feminine gender in
Russian and masculine gender in French). Nouns were mostly common
words in the four languages (German, English, French, and Russian)
referring to inanimate objects apart from five names of animals; most
were concrete except for eight abstract nouns. Items were listed in a
randomized order.
4.4. Results
As in the previous experiment, two sets of analyses were conducted
on the mean percent choices of feminine, one with data averaged over
items and another with data averaged over participants. The overall
picture of results from these analyses was again very similar. Participants
tended to assign masculine as a new gender category to the German
neuter nouns more than feminine (M = 43.89%, SD = 14.47% in the
by-participants analysis and M = 44.68% and SD = 24.08% in the
by-item analysis), a result which replicates the finding from the first
experiment of a markedness effect, that is, an asymmetry between the

two members of the gender category where masculine is a default choice

and feminine is the marked member of the opposition. One participant’s
(an English-speaking male) data were excluded as his mean percent
choice of feminine was two standard deviations below the average for
all participants (7.45%). Only the by-items analyses are reported with
the by-participants analysis added when necessary (see Table 3 for the
overall item means and SDs for each condition).
Overall, there were no significant differences across language
groups on the percent choice of feminine in either the items’ analysis
(F[2, 237] = .70; p < .5) or the participants’ analysis (F[2, 169] = .24;
p < .8). For example, in the items’ analysis, the English-speaking,
French-speaking, and Russian-speaking bilinguals chose feminine for
47.18%, 44% and 42.84% of all nouns, respectively. This uniformity
shows that there was no language-specific preference for one gender
over another, although all groups had a general bias towards masculine
as the gender of choice (see above).
We now turn to the analyses of data from each of the three groups
of bilinguals. As a reminder, our expectations are that the choices of
the speakers of French and Russian will be affected by the available
gender distinctions in their second language while remaining indiffer-
ent to the gender distinctions present in the other gender-marking-L2
included in the design, that is, Russian for French-L2 speakers and
French for Russian-L2 speakers. The English-speaking bilingual choices
are not expected to be consistent with either the French or the Russian
gender system. In addition, it is hypothesized that the mean percent
choice of feminine will be affected by the degree of consistency in
Table 3. Mean percent choice of feminine and standard deviations

(in parentheses) in the three L2 groups for translation equivalents of items
with masculine and feminine gender in French and Russian
French gender Russian gender

Masc Fem Masc Fem
French-L2 37.83 (20.39) 50.17 (22.85) 42.39 (19.56) 45.53 (24.94)

Russian-L2 39.32 (25.08) 46.36 (26.27) 36.60 (22.51) 48.78 (27.48)
English-L2 45.00 (22.92) 49.38 (25.27) 42.15 (22.75) 51.98 (24.58)

gender assignment across the two gender-marking languages (matching

masculine items, matching feminine items, mismatching items) for the
speakers of French and Russian but not for the English speakers.
4.4.1. German-French bilinguals There was a significant main effect

of French gender on the performance of German-French bilinguals
(F[1, 78] = 6.49; p < .05) who chose the feminine gender on average
for 50.17% of the time for those German neuter nouns whose transla-
tion equivalent in French was feminine and only 37.83% for those nouns
whose French equivalent was in masculine. Russian gender did not affect
the performance of French-speaking bilinguals (F[1, 78] = .39; p < .6).
4.4.2. German-Russian bilinguals There was a significant main effect of

Russian gender on the Russian-speaking group (F[1, 78] = 4.68; p <
.05) who chose feminine gender on average 48.78% for Russian feminine
gender equivalents 36.60% for Russian masculine gender equivalents.
There was no effect of French gender on the Russian-speaking group in
the items’ analysis (F[1, 78] = 1.51; p < .3) but a main effect of French
gender emerged in the participants’ analysis (F[1, 40] = 5.30; p < .05).
On average, Russian speakers chose feminine for 46.09% of those nouns
whose equivalent in French was in the feminine and 39.32% for those
with masculine-gender French equivalents.
4.4.3. German-English bilinguals No effect of French gender was

observed in the English speakers’ data (F[1, 78] = 66; p < .5). The
effect of Russian gender on English speakers was only marginally sig-
nificant ([F(1, 78) = 3.44; p < .07]; they chose feminine on average
51.98% of the time for feminine items and 42.15% of the time for
masculine items).
4.5. German-French and German-Russian bilinguals

(Gender-Marking Languages)
In order to assess the level of consistency of the speakers of gender-
marking second languages, we conducted the following additional
analysis. Data for the two groups were collapsed and the effect
of the gender match variable with three levels (feminine-matched,

masculine-matched, and mismatched items) was examined. A one-way

ANOVA on the gender-marking languages revealed a significant main
effect (F[2, 77] = 3.58; p < .05) of the gender match variable. A Tukey
HSD test showed a significantly higher percent of feminine choices for
the feminine-matched items across the two languages (53.48%) than for
the masculine-matched (36.92%) or mismatched (41.52%) items. The
difference between the masculine-matched and mismatched conditions
was not significant.
Finally, there have been reports (Phillips & Boroditsky 2003) of
a correlation between gender consistency and measures of language
experience and proficiency but the correlation reported there may have
reached statistical significance due to the wide range of participants’lan-
guage experience. We examined whether the data for our participants
who formed more homogeneous bilingual groups would reveal the same
tendency. To this end, we carried out a set of correlation analyses involv-
ing gender consistency (the match vs. mismatch of participants’ choice
of gender and the gender of the translation equivalent in their second lan-
guage) and a number of language experience and proficiency measures
such as the age of first exposure to L2, the duration of L2 exposure in
years, and four proficiency scales based on their self ratings (understand-
ing, speaking, reading, and writing skills). Although gender consistency
did not correlate with the two measures of language experience and with
most measures of self-rated proficiency, a significant positive correla-
tion emerged between gender consistency and self-ratings of speaking
ability in the analysis of the combined data from German-Russian and
German-French bilinguals (r = .25, p < .02). The more highly par-
ticipants rated their speaking ability in L2, the more their choices were
consistent with the L2 gender system. In two further separate analyses,
this positive correlation was found to be statistically significant for the
German-French speakers (r = .27, p < .04) and to exhibit a trend in the
same direction for the German-Russian bilinguals (r = .27, p < .075).
4.6. Discussion
As in our first experiment, bilingual speakers based their
re-classifications of neuter nouns in the first language on the grammatical
gender distinctions available in their second language. This effect was

found for both the French-speaking and Russian-speaking groups. We

have thus been able to establish a more general pattern of L2 grammatical
gender impact on categorizations in L1 which holds across two differ-
ent first languages (Bulgarian and German) and four different second
languages (German, Spanish, French, and Russian). The consistency of
these findings provides a clear answer to our research question – the
grammar of the second language does indeed affect categorization in
the first language of a bilingual.
In addition, we found some weak cross-linguistic influences such as
the main effect of French gender on Russian-L2 speakers. Note that in
the first experiment, an effect of Spanish grammatical gender emerged
on the performance of all L2 groups. These results points toward the
cross-linguistic relevance of the genders of these two languages in line
with previous studies (Sera et al. 1994, 2002; Vigliocco et al. 2005).
It is quite possible that the grammatical gender systems of Romance
languages are more in synchrony with the categorization intuitions of
speakers of other languages as well, as suggested by Sera et al. (2002).
Alternatively, we need to consider the assumption that two-gender
systems hold less arbitrariness (Vigliocco et al. 2005) and are thus full of
more semantic potential, which allows them to have a greater impact on
tasks beyond purely formal distinctions. On this account, three-gender
systems such as German and Russian should exert no influence because
of their high degree of semantic arbitrariness. The combined findings
of the two experiments reported here do not support such an expla-
nation. While it is true that one of the two-gender L2s (Spanish) did
produce apparent or indirect cross-linguistic effects, the three-gender
language systems also had the predicted impact on the performance
of their L2 speakers. Thus, they were found to be a reliable basis for
L1 classifications just as the two-gender systems. We must conclude,
therefore, that all four gender-marking second languages covered in our
studies guided their speakers’ choices. Admittedly, the Spanish gender
system displayed some cross-linguistic validity as well, which needs
further investigation. Despite wide variation, speakers across languages
also share some common beliefs; for example, they have been reported
to associate natural objects with feminine and artifacts with masculine
gender (Mullen 1990; Sera et al. 1994). In addition, Sera et al. (2002)

argue in favor of a close correlation between the Spanish gender system

and conceptual/perceptual features of objects associated with men and
women. These biases appear to overlap considerably with the gender
differentiations found in Spanish grammar.
Finally, we discovered a significant positive correlation between
gender consistency and one of the measures of language proficiency
(speaking ability in L2) but no correlations with the other proficiency
scales or the language experience measures (age of first exposure and
length of exposure in years). Thus, the data suggest the impact of a
developmental trajectory on the consistency of the L2 gender effect in
that the effect emerges and grows with enhanced speaking abilities.
5. CO N CLU SIO N
In two studies we have established that bilingual speakers make gram-

matically consistent gender re-assignments in line with their second
language systems. These effects were demonstrated in speakers of
two different first languages (Bulgarian and German) and four differ-
ent gender-marking second languages (Spanish, German, Russian, and
French); thus they appear to be generalizable beyond a single combina-
tion of linguistic skills. In addition, we found that Spanish and French but
not German and Russian gender categories are associated with indirect
cross-linguistic influence on speakers of other languages, thus pro-
viding a learning heuristic through their partially non-arbitrary nature.
Such cross-linguistic correspondences have implications for learning
new gender systems when the grammar-semantics mapping is relatively
transparent.
Taken together, these results indicate that grammatical gender affects
not only monolinguals’ performance but also bilinguals’ choices; fur-
thermore, the grammatical system of a bilingual’s second language
can affect linguistic categorization related to their first language as
shown in a novel word re-classification procedure. Additionally, we
have established a positive correlation between participants’ gender
choice consistency and their self-rated L2 speaking ability indicating the
importance of the level of proficiency in a language for the emergence
of effects specifically related to its grammar system.

Future research needs to explore the conditions that constrain these

effects in order to establish clear implications for theories involving
interaction of the grammatical systems of a bilingual’s two languages,
especially in the L2 → L1 direction. Until now, research on the impact
of the second language on the first has focused mostly on the issue
of attrition, including negative reverse transfer effects. Monolingual-
bilingual differences, however, do not have to be detrimental to the
speaker of multiple languages; they may show (as in the case of our
studies) a way of thinking and categorizing items in one’s first language
that is mediated and possibly enriched by a speaker’s experience with
a second language. These findings are more easily compatible with a
highly integrated or at least highly interactive system of knowledge of
the bilingual’s two languages.
The grammar-specific effects of L2 established here go beyond what
has been known as “thinking for speaking” (Slobin 1996), that is, they
emerged when speakers were not in the mode of operation of the respec-
tive (second) language. In fact, the experimental setup was deliberately
designed to be highly conservative to allow for a monolingual mode, in
Grosjean’s (2001) terms, to be evoked as much as possible. They can
also hardly be “blamed” on cross-cultural variation as a confounding
factor, as all our participants belonged to the same cultural and genera-
tional background and continued to use their abundantly co-present first
language daily, as well as to be immersed in the relatively homogeneous
mainstream culture.
Grammatical gender has been called various names, from a “quirk”
of grammar (Phillips & Boroditsky 2003) to a semantic “force”
(Sera et al. 1994). Gender marking and agreement is a useful struc-
tural device in language processing, which in some languages can also
have a semantic component (e.g., Bulgarian; cf. Andonova et al. 2004).
Attending to such distinctions in relation to meaningful extralinguis-
tic reference may not only help learning but also have an impact on
adult language processing as well. It appears that relating grammati-
cal knowledge to meaningful experience with the extralinguistic world
makes these differences salient not only grammatically, as speakers are
not only mastering a set of arbitrarily differentiating features. It is indeed
a different learning and processing scenario: grasping the systematicity

of mappings within a linguistic category is less useful if one cannot

further establish and exploit a regular match between this and an extra-
linguistic set of distinctions, that is, co-occurrence across meaningful
categories shaped by experience.
Bilinguals may be at an advantage in this respect if their first lan-
guage is a gender-marking one – after all, they have already learned to
use one set of gender distinctions and, depending on the extent of use of
gender in their language (i.e., how much it is gender-loaded) and on the
degree of form-function transparency, they may also be more sensitive
to such mappings and “relate” more easily to a second language system
as well. Having said that, it is also important to explore in future studies
to what extent the match or mismatch between the two gender systems
may affect bilingual processing. When comparing two gender systems,
one can examine the degree of similarity between them along at least
three different dimensions: structural (how many gender categories each
distinguishes), lexical (the extent of overlap between the two lexicons
in terms of gender), and functional (the range of functions it is recruited
in, the gender loadedness of each language system, how often it is
marked and is a cue to meaning), in addition to the degree of arbitrari-
ness vs. transparency of form-function mappings in two senses, that is,
the mapping between phonological form and grammatical gender (rarely
discussed in the relevant literature on gender-based categorizations) and
the mapping between gender categories and meaningful extra-linguistic
distinctions (sex, animacy, etc.). Presumably, all of these may affect the
relative difficulty of the language learning and language processing task
in a bilingual.
Our studies have left two related research questions open for future
exploration, one of which is the developmental path of gender-specific
effects arising from the second language. In addition, research on gram-
matical gender processing by monolingual adult speakers of Bulgarian
has found evidence for an interaction of gender categories and speaker
sex (Andonova et al. 2004). Future studies can examine whether
participant-gender-specific influences are sufficiently strong to extend
to grammatical gender processing in the second language as well and
whether they increase or diminish with age and language experience.
Flaherty (2001) discovered a clear influence of grammatical gender in

Spanish children but not in adults: boys’ choice of male gender for the
masculine nouns was higher, as was girls’ choice of female for the femi-
nine nouns. This result, in addition to the interaction in Bulgarian adults
mentioned above, speaks in favor of exploring this research issue fur-
ther. Such an agenda fits well into a general focus on how experience
enters the scene in linguistic and non-linguistic behavior, an aspect of
cognitive behavior that is well worth pursuing.
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CH A PTER 10
BEY OND LANGUAGE:

CHILDHOOD BILINGUALISM ENHANCES
HIGH-LEVEL COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS
Ágnes Melinda Kovács

International School for Advanced Studies (S.I.S.S.A.–I.S.A.S.), Trieste, Italy
Abstract
Children growing up in a bilingual environment have to build up two language systems
from the linguistic input. They will use the two languages alternately as a function of
their interlocutor in their everyday interaction. At a young age, a bilingual child may be
faced with somewhat different requirements than a monolingual one. This chapter will
discuss the possible changes that bilingualism might induce in the cognitive system in
this early phase of development. Adult neuroimaging evidence suggests that bilingualism
can result in differential functional specialization of the two languages depending on
the age of acquisition, and moreover, can even lead to reorganization at neuronal level.
Here we present behavioral studies indicating that bilingual children outperform their
monolingual peers on tasks that require high levels of cognitive control, such as executive
function and false-belief tasks. The extensive experience bilingual children gain in
inhibiting one language while switching to the other may lead to an enhancement of
their domain-general executive control abilities that are involved in different aspects of
cognitive functioning.
Mastering two languages is a very common phenomenon even in child-

hood. Nonetheless, how the developing mind manages more than one
language is not as straightforward as it might seem at a first glance. In
spite of the extensive behavioral and neuro-imaging research of the last
twenty years that has brought various answers about how the adult brain
deals with two languages, the nature of bilingual development remains
open to different theoretical scenarios.
One could think of several possibilities. It could be that the child’s
cognitive system is actually overloaded by the input coming from the
bilingual environment, and this might result in slower information
301
© 2007 Springer.

302 ÁGNES MELIN D A K O VÁCS
processing reflected in a delayed performance. Alternatively, the young

brain might be challenged by the complexity of the input; facing two
languages might thus lead to functional and structural reorganization and
to a mandatory acceleration in the development of the involved abilities.
However, it is also feasible that processing an additional language does
not pose specific demands to the child’s mind; therefore, we should not
observe any differences in the developmental trajectories of bilinguals
and monolinguals. Whichever of these frameworks turns out to be the
case, it may carry interesting answers not only about the bilingual mind,
but also about the organization and development of the cognitive system
in general.
The present chapter will examine these possibilities and will try to
shed light on the ways in which the experience of being exposed to
more than one language very early in childhood could influence the
development of different cognitive abilities (with special emphasis on
executive control and theory of mind) and might also bring us closer to
understanding the architecture of these mechanisms.
We will discuss questions analogous to the ones that were asked
when addressing the so-called paradox of bilingual language acquisi-
tion (Petitto et al. 2001), but we will mainly focus on socio-cognitive
domains different from language development. The bilingual language
acquisition paradox actually refers, on the one hand, to the amazement of
parents and scientists when observing how effortlessly children acquire
two or more languages. On the other hand, it captures the worry that
exposing children to two languages causes language delays and confu-
sion. Recent studies suggest that bilingual children, who are exposed to
approximately equal input in the two languages, mix the languages only
if they hear language-mixing from their parents, and actually have no dif-
ficulties in keeping the language systems separate (Genesee et al. 1995).
Moreover, they achieve the linguistic milestones in both of their lan-
guages around the same time as monolinguals do, even if the languages
belong to different modalities (English and French or Sign Language and
French; Petitto et al. 2001). This is not very surprising if we consider
the powerful language discrimination abilities that are already present
at birth and allow human newborns to differentiate languages based
on their rhythmic properties (Nazzi et al. 1998; Ramus et al. 2000).

B E YOND L ANGUAG E: CH ILD H O O D BILIN G U A LISM 303
At four months of age bilingual infants distinguish even two languages

that have very similar rhythmic characteristics (Spanish and Catalan),
while monolinguals at the same age cannot (Bosh & Sebastian-Galles
1997, 2001). The discrimination depends very much on the linguis-
tic exposure, and bilingualism can make a significant difference in the
development of this ability.
The finding that the pattern of bilingual language acquisition is fun-
damentally similar to the monolingual one leads us to think that at least
in the language domain, bilingualism does not alter the flow of nor-
mal language development. However, even if the outcome is similar,
this does not necessarily mean that the bilingual brain recruits the same
mechanisms in the same manner when processing two languages as the
monolingual brain facing one language. Mechanisms of attention, inhi-
bition and selection might get involved to a greater extent when dealing
with the simultaneous use of two languages.
2. YOUN G BILIN G U A L BRA IN S
There is no doubt that the human brain can acquire two or more lan-
guages at different stages of development. The studies investigating how
the bilingual brain deals with two languages in adulthood can also carry
important insights about what might be happening during the develop-
mental process. Early and late bilinguals are actually faced with the two
languages in diverse stages of brain maturation and cognitive develop-
ment, which would predict differences in language processing and in
the neural substrates for the languages between these two populations.
The interest of this field of research in bilingualism is twofold: one is
related to the issue of brain plasticity and focuses mainly on the negative
correlation between brain maturation and second language proficiency.
The other addresses the question of differential brain specialization and
investigates whether a new language could possibly engage brain regions
that are different from the ones serving the first language, or if the two
languages are actually processed by the same neural substrates.
Addressing the first issue, some studies found that in the initial phase
of learning a second language adults out-perform children (Snow &
Hoefnagel-Hole 1978); nevertheless, the vast majority of the research

data indicates that persons who have started learning a second language
early in their childhood achieve higher levels of proficiency (Johnson &
Newport 1989; Newport 1990). Various theories have been formulated
to explain the phenomenon of an apparent critical period for acquir-
ing different aspects of a new language. According to a maturational
hypothesis, the language acquisition capacity declines during develop-
ment due to changes in specific brain structures that lose their plasticity.
Johnson and Newport (1989), studying Chinese and Korean immigrants,
found a linear relation between the age of arrival to the United States
and the level of language proficiency. According to their data, language
acquisition seems to clearly decline up to puberty and reaches a plateau
afterwards. Moreover, only those persons showed a comparable perfor-
mance to native speakers who learned the second language before the
age of six. Alternatively the “less is more” hypothesis was proposed by
Newport (1990), suggesting that young children’s limited information
processing and working memory capacities could be the reason why
they acquire a new language more easily. These limited capacities form
a “narrow window” that constrains the amount of information entering
in the computational system but at the same time allows a better analysis
and faster processing of the data that actually gets in.
Furthermore, Pallier et al. (2003) found data that might shed new light
on the critical period hypothesis. In their study, adults of Korean origin
who were adopted by French families between ages 3 and 8 showed no
recollection of the Korean language in behavioral tests and no specific
brain activation when comparing the Korean language to a language they
had never heard. Additionally, they had similar results to native speak-
ers of French when tested with French linguistic stimuli. The authors
argue that the plasticity of the language system can be very high even
in middle childhood and early linguistic influences remain malleable to
redescription for quite a long period.
The second question related to the representation of the two lan-
guages in the bilingual brain has been a subject of great debate over
the last ten years. The experimental results derived from imaging and
neurophysiological studies have provided ambiguous results; therefore
it seems hard to establish if there is a common cortical substrate within
which all languages operate. The main question that arises is whether

multiple languages are represented by possibly overlapping cerebral

regions within the language dominant hemisphere, or whether the cere-
bral representation of a second language differs fundamentally from that
of the first.
Studies have found evidence suggesting that the same brain areas
are responsible for the two languages in both early and late bilinguals
(here the late bilinguals started learning their second language after the
age of 6) (Klein et al. 1995; Chee et al.1999; Illes et al. 1999). They
argue that this data does not seem to support the hypothesis that a lan-
guage learned later in life is represented differently from the native
language; there were no differences in the neural substrates thought to
serve within- and across-language searches. However, other lines of
research propose that there are important differences in how the brains
of early and late bilinguals represent the two languages. Performing
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) during picture nam-
ing or sentence generation tasks, Hernandez et al. (2000) and Kim et al.
(1997) have found that early bilinguals showed activation in correspond-
ing brain structures, while late bilinguals showed differential activation
as a function of languages. The latter finding was also sustained by
Event Related Evoked Potential (ERP) results (Weber-Fox & Neville
1996). Moreover, some studies found diverse activation patterns for
the two languages also in early bilinguals while subjects performed a
grammatical decision task (Proverbio et al. 2002).
Although the majority of the research in the field tries to relate bilin-
gual processing to functional changes in the brain, there have been
attempts that link bilingualism to impressive structural changes at the
neuronal level. Mechelli et al. (2004) have shown that bilingual adults
have greater gray matter density in specific brain areas (left inferior
parietal cortex) than monolinguals. This structural reorganization was
found to be more significant in early bilinguals (who learned the second
language before the age of 5) when compared to late bilinguals, even if
both groups used the two languages on a daily basis in the last five years
preceding the study.
Consequently, the main challenge will be to determine what this
structural change and the possible differential localization and func-
tional organization mean for the cognitive system, and additionally, to

assess which mechanisms sustain these adjustments in the course of

development. On the other hand, one could also think of alternative
explanations for the common neural substrate finding by taking, for
example, the processing of the two languages as analogous to the pro-
cessing of two rules that are served by a single system in the prefrontal
cortex. Diverse neural systems underlying the different languages in late
bilinguals might mean that a new language learned after puberty will
involve new areas, possibly because by this age the typical language
areas might have already lost their plasticity. However, this argument
does not hold for the dissimilar activation patterns observed in early
bilinguals, since they were exposed to the second language early in their
development. These latter results are quite intriguing and could lead to
a reevaluation of our current theories about language processing and
organization. On the other hand, when explaining the findings of com-
mon neural substrates for the two languages, we could think about the
processing of the two languages in the specific language areas of the
brain as analogous to two rules that are processed by a single system in
the prefrontal cortex.
3. W HAT DOES BILIN G U A LISM M EA N FO R

T HE DE VE L O PIN G CO G N ITIV E SY STEM?
3.1. Bilingualism as an Obstacle

It does not seem warranted to presume that bilingualism causes delays
in the child’s cognitive development, since we have evidence that it
does not imply any confusion or delay at the linguistic level, which
should be the most pertinent domain. However, it is still a possibility we
have to consider. Thinking in a limited resources framework, it could be
argued that achieving the same linguistic milestones may be realized at
the expense of other cognitive abilities. For comprehensible reasons, the
fear of negative effects is always stronger than the comfort of positive
ones, so a great amount of positive evidence is needed to overcome
negative or ambiguous data.
Concern was first expressed at the beginning of the last century, when
it was anecdotally observed that children of immigrants performed much

lower on different cognitive tasks when compared to monolinguals. One

of the explanations offered at that time was that bilingualism implies a
cognitive overload, which affects performance since the two languages
are competing for mental resources, and in this way causes cognitive
confusion. This view did not have a long life, mainly because it was
suggested that the studied bilinguals probably did not have the adequate
proficiency level to perform the tasks in their second language. However,
findings of consecutive studies point to possible negative consequences
of bilingualism, mainly observed in adulthood. Such effects can be
language mixing, interference, attrition (Seliger 1996), and confusion
(MacNamara 1967). Nevertheless, it was argued that bilinguals develop
high proficiency in certain abilities that help them overcome interference
such as metalinguistic awareness and analytical strategies (Ben-Zeev
1977). Besides, as we will see later, problems of language mixing
and low resistance to interference might be problems orthogonal to
bilingualism and be more related to deficits of a central executive system.
3.2. Bilingualism as a Launch Pad: Three Hypotheses

of Possible Advantages Induced by Bilingualism
Recently, concerns about the negative aspects of early bilingualism have
dissipated, as bilingual children exposed to two languages from birth
have been found to be in line with their monolingual peers. At this
point one could stop and acknowledge that bilingualism at least does
not cause delays and disorders. However, converging data from differ-
ent fields suggests that bilingualism might imply significant behavioral
adjustments in adulthood and even structural reorganization in the brain,
so it is worth searching for further positive effects that are observable
from a young age.
As discussed in previous parts of this chapter, adult neuroimaging
studies suggest that bilingualism leads not only to functional plasticity
(Kim et al. 1997), but also to structural changes in the brain (Mechelli
et al. 2004). Acquiring two languages results in increased grey matter
density in the left inferior parietal cortex, and the degree of struc-
tural reorganization is actually modulated by the age of acquisition and
proficiency. Additionally, data coming from bilingual language process-
ing studies with adults suggest that the extensive practice in language

switching and control leads to superior performance when shifting to a

third language (Costa & Santesteban 2004), or when shifting languages
and performing an attentional shift at the same time, a conjecture that
seems to overtax the processing resources of late bilinguals but not that
of the early bilinguals (Kovács & Téglás 2005).
While investigating the question from a developmental point of view,
different frameworks could be formulated about how bilingualism might
induce cognitive advantages in childhood, despite the heavier load that
weighs on bilinguals’ cognitive systems. Of course, the brain cannot
remain passive when faced with demanding tasks. According to the
hypothesis of over-compensation, the developing human brain might
receive the extra load of two languages as a challenge and greatly adapt to
it, for example, by changing its morphology. In consequence, a structural
reorganization makes the bilingual brain different from the monolingual
one, thus possibly boosting the development of cognitive competencies
in general.
A more specific proposal would argue that experience in attend-
ing to one language and ignoring the other might enhance bilingual
children’s selective attention and control abilities (Bialystok 1999;
Polonyi & Németh 2001). Such early language switching, along with
the permanent monitoring of the two language systems, employs mecha-
nisms such as inhibition and control that thus might begin an exceptional
developmental trajectory due to the extra training (Kovács 2003).
A third conjecture would propose that encoding and associating words
from two languages with a common concept might require superior
representational abilities (Bialystok & Martin 2004). Considering that
bilingual children are permanently in contact with two languages and
often also two cultures in the early phase of development, the flexibility
that allows all concepts to be expressed in at least two ways should
have a positive influence on their representational abilities, possibly also
inducing an advantage in representing mental states (Kovács 2002).
In the following sections we will discuss evidence in favor and against
these hypotheses and try to draw conclusions about what they could
mean for the construction of the developing mind. All three frame-
works posit a critical bilingual advantage; however, they greatly differ
in modeling the mechanisms responsible for this advantage and in their

predictions about well-defined enhancements that will either manifest in

a domain-general manner, or be restricted to some very specific cognitive
sub-systems.
4. C HAL L E NG IN G TH E BILIN G U A L MIN D
In line with the over-compensatory hypothesis that proposed a gen-

eral enhancement of the bilingual cognitive system as a result of
structural brain reorganization, behavioral studies suggest that high lev-
els of bilingualism imply high levels of cognitive functioning (e.g.,
higher flexibility in problem solving; Lambert 1992). We should note
that the left inferior parietal cortex, where the morphological change
was observed in bilinguals, seems to be linked to various compe-
tencies outside the language domain, such as working memory in
monkeys (Friedman & Goldman-Rakic 1994) or spatiotemporal inte-
gration and procedural and declarative learning in humans (Willingham
et al. 2002). Given the findings that show a functional relation between
this brain area and these domain-general mechanisms, it is possible
that the cognitive enhancement of bilinguals will actually extend to all
information-processing taking place.
Bochner’s (1996) research findings seem to support this view, and
show that bilingualism has positive effects on the cognitive system in
general. According to this study, bilinguals were more interested in
the curriculum, they used strategies that allowed them to perform out-
standingly in some areas, and they were more achievement-oriented
when compared to monolinguals. Other studies propose that bilingual-
ism implies higher cognitive flexibility, metalinguistic awareness, and
creativity (Hakuta & Garcia 1989).
In specific research on metalinguistic abilities, Bialystok (1986)
showed that bilingual children performed better than monolinguals in
judging the grammaticality of sentences with semantic anomalies (e.g.,
“Why is the cat barking so loudly?”). However, the study found no
differences between the groups when judging sentences with grammat-
ical violations that contained no distracting semantic information (e.g.,
“Why the dog is barking so loudly?”). The authors argued that judging
sentences that involve disregarding a salient semantic anomaly (a cat

barking) requires high levels of control to overlook this anomaly before

performing the grammatical analysis, and bilinguals were found to per-
form better. In contrast, the sentences where no differences were found
between the groups had no inhibitory demands and involved only high
levels of analysis for performing the grammaticality judgment. This data
does not provide strong support for the general bilingual advantage view,
but instead gives good indications toward specific domains that might
get facilitated.
5. SHAR PE NIN G EX ECU TIV E FU N CTIO N S

DUR ING L ANGUAG E SWITCH IN G A N D M O N ITO RIN G
If we inspect bilingualism purely from an information-processing point

of view, we cannot neglect what daily language switching and systematic
monitoring of communicative behavior might mean for the cognitive
system. Studies have found that the experience gained during continuous
language selection and inhibition results in advantages not only in the
language domain, but also in other areas that require central inhibitory
functions to a large extent. In the theoretical background of these studies
lies the hypothesis that bilinguals might use the same mechanisms for
language switching that they recruit when solving executive function
tasks (such as the Dimensional Change Card Sorting, the Day and Night
Stroop and the Simon tasks for children).
The term “executive function” (EF) refers to the cognitive processes
responsible for high-level action control, planning, inhibition, coor-
dination, and control of action sequences, which are necessary for
maintaining a goal and for fulfilling it despite distracting stimuli. A func-
tional model of these control functions was first described by Norman
and Shallice (1986) with two distinct levels: the contention scheduling
that entails the inhibition and activation of actions, and the supervi-
sory attentional system, which constitutes a higher level of control
and is involved in tasks requiring planning, decision making, novel
or ill-learned action sequences, difficult actions, and in overcoming
temptation or strong habitual response tendencies. The slow develop-
ment of these functions has been linked to the gradual maturation of
the prefrontal cortex, reaching adult levels only around adolescence

(Bunge et al. 2002), with important improvements around the age of

four (Gerstard et al. 1994; Frye et al. 1995).
One of the typical tasks for assessing executive function develop-
ment in young children is the Dimensional Change Card Sorting Task
(DCCS – Frye et al. 1995). In this task, children have to sort 12 test cards
(e.g., 6 red flowers and 6 blue cars) according to one of two rules in con-
flict in two boxes affixed with a target card (a blue flower or a red car). In
the pre-switch phase children are asked to sort the cards according to one
dimension (shape or color) and children from around the age of 3 usu-
ally perform well in this phase of the study. However, up to 4 or 5 years
of age, children seem have difficulties in the post-switch phase when
the rule changes and they have to sort the cards according to the other
dimension. In one of her studies, Bialystok examined whether bilin-
gual 3-to-5-year-olds have an advantage in performing this card-sorting
task, which requires high levels of control and provides conflict (Bia-
lystok 1999). The results show that bilingual children performed better
than monolinguals, suggesting that bilingualism has a positive impact
on the development of executive functioning, possibly as a result of the
constant management of the two languages.
In order to perform well in this type of card sorting task, children
have to be able to clearly represent the different dimensions of the objects
(color and shape), keep in mind the two rules, inhibit the first sorting rule
and apply the second rule in the post-switch phase. A recent study inves-
tigated whether the bilingual advantage on the DCCS task might arise
from superior representational abilities that help bilinguals to encode
and represent the different dimensions of the task stimuli, or from their
superiority in the inhibition of attention (Bialystok & Martin 2004). In
this study abstract semantic dimensions (like “things to play with” and
“things to wear”) were introduced as card sorting criteria in addition to
the color and shape. The data seem to support the initial proposal of an
inhibitory advantage in ignoring previously salient perceptual informa-
tion, given the findings that bilinguals outperformed monolinguals on
sorting tasks where the target was a perceptual feature (color or shape),
but not on versions of the task where the target dimension was an abstract
semantic feature (“things to play with” or “things to wear”), and thus
posed higher representational demands.

Furthermore, Bialystok et al. (2005) have found additional data

supporting better-developed inhibition in bilinguals while subjects were
performing a Simon task. This is a nonverbal spatial task that relies on
stimulus-response compatibility. On the incongruent trials the irrelevant
location of the stimulus, for example, the left side, interferes with the
motor response performed by the right hand and in this way leads to
slower reaction times. Instead, on the congruent trials there is no inter-
ference: the stimulus appears on the right side and the response has
to be performed by the right hand. Three groups of bilinguals (5-year-
olds, middle-aged adults, and older adults) showed faster reaction times
compared to monolinguals on both congruent and incongruent trials.
Interestingly, the bilinguals also showed better performance on the con-
gruent trials that did not require any type of inhibition. The authors argue
that the need to switch between congruent and incongruent trials might
impose greater demands on the control processes of monolinguals than
bilinguals.
Another task used to test inhibition in children is the Day and Night
Stroop test (Gerstard et al. 1994) that requires children to say “day”
when a picture of a moon is shown and to say “night” when a pic-
ture of a bright sun is shown. In both cases children have to suppress
the natural response tendency to say “day” to the sun and “night” to the
moon and provide the conflicting response. The authors developed the
task with the presumption that younger children will have difficulties in
inhibiting the most evident response. The results revealed that 3-to-4-
year old children have greater difficulties in this task compared to older
children. In order to exclude the hypothesis that the problems are due to
memory deficits in remembering two rules or associations, the authors
developed a control task where children had to label two neutral cards
with unrelated labels. The results on this version of the task proved that
the presumption of a memory deficit was wrong; even younger children
had good performances in this version of the task.
Not surprisingly, an inhibitory advantage of children growing up
with two languages was found on this executive function task as well
(Kovács 2002). In this study we compared 35 bilingual and monolingual
preschool children aged from 3 to 5 years on the Day and Night Stroop
test. The results showed that the bilingual group had a significantly lower

Mean error on Day and Night stroop Mean RT on Day and Night stroop
120
9
8 100
7
6 80
5 60
4
3 40
2
20
1
0 0
Bilinguals Monolinguals Bilinguals Monolinguals
Figure 1. Mean error and SD of the two groups on the Day and Night Stroop task (left);
and mean RT (sec) and SD of the two groups on the Day and Night Stroop task (right).
error rate (p = .01 – see left figure) and faster reaction time (p = .03 –
see right figure) than the monolingual group (Figure 1).
The higher performance of bilingual children on these different exec-
utive function tasks may be a consequence of the permanent monitoring
of the languages, and training in inhibiting one language while activating
the other, that transfers and enhances performance in tasks that involve
inhibition and selection.
6. L OOKIN G IN TO O TH ERS’ M IN D S
T HR OUGH T HE LEN SES O F TWO LA N G U A G ES
For successful social interaction and communication, a bilingual child

needs to use some intricate computations. She has to choose between
two different linguistic outputs, to figure out which language to speak to
different monolingual or bilingual interlocutors, and to flexibly switch
linguistic sets as a function of the languages spoken by the others.
Consequently, scenarios can be formulated in which growing up with
two languages could promote bilingual children’s representational or
inhibitory abilities and thus possibly induce advantages in understanding
abstract mental states.
At some point, all normally developing children come to understand
that humans are driven by goals, plans, and beliefs. Possessing a mech-
anism that can identify all these internal states has a great adaptive

advantage in allowing young children to develop a prediction about

others’ behaviors. The concept of theory of mind (ToM) was introduced
by Premack and Woodruff (1978) and refers to the ability to ascribe
mental states like beliefs, desires, and intentions to oneself and to oth-
ers, and to predict and interpret behavioral actions dependent on these
states. Figuring out that reality is not the only factor that can drive oth-
ers’ behavior and that some actions are driven by false beliefs is crucial
for developing a theory of mind. It is argued that this ability is strongly
dependent on specific brain structures (Stuss et al. 2001) and its impair-
ment is considered to be the main impaired cognitive structure in autistic
disorders (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985).
A standard task for testing ToM in children is the unexpected transfer
task (Wimmer & Perner 1983) also called the Sally-Ann task. In this
task a protagonists puts an object (marble, chocolate) into location A. In
her absence the object is unexpectedly moved to location B. To assess
the understanding of the protagonist’s false-belief, children are asked
where the protagonist will look for the object when coming back to the
scene. The extensive research over the past twenty years proposed that
3-year-olds fail this task (answer that the protagonist will look for the
object where it actually is) because they cannot represent mental states
and understand how these relate to behavior, while most of the 4-year-
olds and almost all 5-year-olds succeed (see Wellman et al. 2001 for a
review).
However, a group of scientists argues that the standard false belief
tasks might not be an appropriate measure for the development of the-
ory of mind (Leslie & Thaiss 1992; Bloom & German 2000; Leslie
et al. 2005). On the one hand, they claim that the standard tasks are
too hard for young children. Perner et al. (1987) proposed first that the
standard variant of the Sally-Ann task might be too demanding. It could
be that children do understand false belief, but they also have to take
into consideration the events linked to two different protagonists and
keep in mind two different hiding places. So, the cause of their bad per-
formance could be their reduced memory capacity or poor attentional
abilities. In consequence, the authors simplified the task in many ways,
by asking more specific questions (like: “Where will Sally first look
for the marble?”), and offering clues about the object’s old hiding place

(Siegal & Beattie 1991; Freeman & Lacohee 1995). These modifications
have led to an improvement in the performance of 3-year-old chil-
dren. Besides, there is further evidence showing that three-year-olds,
though they do not pass the standard ToM task yet, possess an implicit
knowledge about false beliefs, as suggested by their anticipatory look-
ing behavior (Clements & Perner 1994). Moreover, the finding by
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), that even infants may appeal to men-
tal states to predict others’ behavior, raises serious questions as to what
the standard theory of mind tasks measure in 3 to 5-year-old preschool
children.
One answer could be what the authors argued on the other hand;
namely, that solving a typical ToM task also requires the development
of inhibitory functions (Leslie & Thaiss 1992; Carlson et al. 1998; Leslie
et al. 2005). They posit that in these tasks children need well-developed
executive functions to inhibit the default assumption that beliefs are true
(Leslie et al. 2005) or to inhibit a prepotent response involved in the ToM
tasks (the tendency to refer to the reality and indicate an empty location;
Carlson et al. 1998).
Many studies found a functional link between performance on ToM
and executive function tasks (Carlson & Moses 2001), and that children
with autism also showed associated impairments in ToM and EF (Oznoff
et al. 1991). Furthermore, individual performance on ToM was found
to correlate with performance on EF tasks (Carlson & Moses 2001).
Imaging and patient studies have shown that the medial prefrontal cortex
plays an important role in performing ToM tasks (Fletcher et al. 1995;
Stuss et al. 2001), an area regularly associated with EF.
Taking into account the above evidence about the controversial false-
belief task, we will describe two different frameworks in which bilingual
preschoolers may come to solve false-belief problems earlier than their
monolingual peers. According to the first, the exercise of bilingual chil-
dren in conceiving a concept as having two different output labels in
the two languages might transfer and concretize in an advantage in
understanding that the same reality could be represented differently
by two people. Consequently, bilingual children will be at an advan-
tage when dealing with the different representations involved in the
ToM tasks (their own true belief and the protagonist’s false-belief ).

Actually, to express the same meaning, bilinguals can choose between

two semantically equivalent lexical items, one for each of their lan-
guages. Monolinguals develop the ability to simultaneously assign two
equivalent labels to an object (e.g., bunny and rabbit) only around the
age of four, when they also develop ToM (Perner et al. 2002). In con-
trast, bilinguals must learn much earlier how to select between the two
labels of one object for successful communication.
Alternatively, bilingual children might show a higher performance
on the ToM tasks because, as we saw in the previous section, they
seem to develop higher-level control functions in the service of language
switching that transfers to tasks that require inhibition. Given that the
false-belief tasks have been shown to involve inhibition at different
levels (inhibiting a true belief, or the current location of the object)
bilinguals could be advantaged in dealing with these inhibitory demands,
thus achieving the task earlier than monolinguals.
To examine these assumptions in a previous study, we compared the
performance of 44 monolingual and bilingual children on the standard
unexpected transfer task (Kovács 2002). Children were aged between 3
and 5 years, with a comparable number of bilinguals and monolinguals
in the two groups. The criteria for selecting bilinguals were to be exposed
to both languages from birth in a more or less equal amount, and to have
parents with different native languages. The results revealed impor-
tant differences in performance between bilinguals and monolinguals.
A significantly higher percentage of bilinguals (68% ) succeeded on this
task in comparison with the monolingual group (32% ) (χ 2 = 4, 46,
p = 0, 03, see Figure 2).
In a different study, Goetz (2003) investigated the performance of
3 to 4-year-old children who entered a foreign language daycare after
the age of two and that of monolingual children on ToM tasks, but no
differences were found in the standard false-belief task. However, the
author reported an overall bilingual advantage on the administered ToM
tasks, even if the differences between the groups were not significant
at the second testing time. These mixed results might be due to the
characteristics of the studied population. The three-year-old bilinguals
participating in this research started to learn the second language in a
formal teaching environment only one year or less before the study. Even

Percent of children passing the

100 standard ToM task
80
68
60
40 32
20
0
Bilinguals Monolinguals
Figure 2. Percent of bilinguals and monolinguals passing the standard ToM task.
if they achieved a sufficient proficiency level in their second language,

the amount of exposure to the bilingual condition is considerably differ-
ent from those children who are faced with two languages from birth.
Nevertheless, the advantage of three-year-old bilingual children (who
experienced both languages from the start) on the standard ToM tasks
was reinforced by data coming from a further study where we carefully
matched monolinguals and bilinguals on general information-processing
abilities, intelligence, and socio-economic status (Kovács 2003).
In light of the evidence about the ToM and EF relation, the early ToM
abilities, and the better-developed inhibitory functions of the bilingual
children, we would argue that the bilingual advantage in performing ToM
tasks might not mean that bilingual children represent other’s mental
states earlier than monolinguals (this ability possibly being innate and
observable already in infancy, Onishi & Bailargeon 2005), but in fact
they learn to face the inhibitory demands of false belief tasks earlier.
7. C O N CLU D IN G REM A RK S
The bilingual condition could be stimulating for the highly plastic devel-
oping mind of the child, and seems to induce specific changes in the
brain and in the cognitive system. In this chapter we have investi-
gated different proposals related to the nature of these changes. The
experimental evidence appears to be more in favor of one of the three ini-
tially presented hypotheses. On one side, there was the domain-general

over-compensatory hypothesis, and on the other side there were the

two domain-specific hypotheses predicting differential advantages in
the representational or inhibitory abilities of bilingual children. The
over-compensatory framework, proposing that a structural reorganiza-
tion of the bilingual brain might result in an enhanced development of
cognitive competencies in general, gained little support since the recent
data about cognitive advantages seem to be mostly concentrated to one
very specific field.
However, it is likely that an over-compensation and reorganization
does take place in the domains that are distinctively involved in specific
stages of bilingual processing. The studies reviewed here suggest that
the only clearly facilitated area is that of executive functions, and more
specifically, of inhibition. The development of inhibitory abilities is
usually studied using tasks in which children have to inhibit a well-
learned, salient or automatic response, and bilingual children were found
to perform such tasks better. This leads us to think that they possess an
advantage exactly on this procedural/output level. This is also the level
they operate on when choosing an output language, and thus they gain
extra training in selecting and inhibiting competing responses.
In the process of evolution the human brain has developed highly
potent and very specific language acquisition mechanisms, so it is
no surprise that the complex language input (being it monolingual or
bilingual) constitutes no real challenge for the infant. Research findings
have shown that not only the adult brain, but also that of a newborn
baby, shows a strong left hemisphere specialization for human speech
(Pena et al. 2003). This relation may reflect an innate disposition of
certain brain areas for language, and would also justify the behav-
ioral findings about newborns’ incredible capacities in discriminating
languages belonging to different rhythmic classes. Possessing such pow-
erful mechanisms at birth, dealing with bilingual input might not lead to
a representational reorganization and a conceptual advantage. However,
for reasons that are not completely clear yet, bilingualism might con-
stitute a great challenge for the inhibitory system at the response level.
This framework would predict that the bilingual advantages become
observable only from the age when toddlers start using complex control
functions for selecting languages in production.

Nevertheless, even if a mechanistic proposal remains hypothetical

faced with the lack of evidence, data coming from studies employ-
ing different executive function tasks seem to converge and strengthen
the suggestion that permanent monitoring of two languages and early
language switching boost the developmental trajectory of bilinguals’
executive functions. The enhancement of this cognitive domain seems
to be so strong that it is even observable on tasks that were not explicitly
designed to test control functions.
Educators, policymakers and advocates of monolingual instruction
should consider the growing experimental evidence, which though it
does not directly address the issue of bilingual language acquisition and
proficiency, does suggest that early bilingualism can promote various
advantages for preschool aged children in the socio-cognitive domain.
The stimulating environment surrounding a bilingual child triggers
changes that might bring us closer not only to a better understanding of
how the bilingual mind is constructed, but also to the organization and
functioning of the developing cognitive system.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer and Ernő Téglás and my colleagues

for their useful comments. The preparation of this work was supported
by grants from HFSP (RGP 68/2002) and the Regione FVG (L.R. 3/98).
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CH A PTER 11
CROSS-LINGUISTIC AND COGNITIVE STRUCTURES

IN THE ACQUISIT ION OF WH-QUESTIONS IN AN
INDONESIAN-ITALIAN BILINGUAL CHILD
Antonia Soriente
Max Planck Institute of Evolutionary Anthropology, Jakarta
Abstract
This chapter examines language development in a bilingual child growing up with two
typologically distinct languages – Italian and Jakarta Indonesian. It presents a case
study of unbalanced bilingualism and focuses on the development of WH-forms and
concludes that dominance of the loose Indonesian syntactic pattern results in a non-
target word order in the construction of early WH-questions in Italian. In conclusion, the
chapter identifies cross-linguistic structures in quantitative and qualitative perspectives
and hypothesizes theoretical explanations for cross-linguistic dominance and the gradual
emergence of correct usage of Italian grammatical structures. In so doing, the study
considers how children recognize languages as separate systems and how they gradually
develop the cognitive patterns required for competence in separate though practically
co-extensive linguistic domains.
This chapter presents a case study of language development of

Guglielmo, the author’s first child. Guglielmo is a bilingual child grow-
ing up in Jakarta, with two typologically distinct and genealogically
unrelated languages that are markedly different in terms of structure,
and especially in intonational and gestural inflections. The study focuses
exclusively on structural aspects of the hierarchical emergence of
WH-questions. Though this is a case of language combination involving
an as yet unstudied language pair displaying unbalanced bilingualism
with language mixing, this is a common situation for children of mixed
marriages. In this case, while Guglielmo’s mother speaks mainly Italian
with him, the rest of his linguistic experience involves immersion in the
Indonesian context.
325
© 2007 Springer.

326 ANTO N IA SO RIEN TE
This research project identified cross-linguistic structures and explored

the acquisition of WH-questions. In order to do so, I studied the emer-
gence of WH-questions in Jakarta Indonesian and Italian and identified
their main syntactic features in order to situate this case within the
literature on bilingual language acquisition.
The study shows that Jakarta Indonesian is dominant1 and it does so
through focusing on the mixed forms produced in an Italian context,
namely in three broadly defined developmental stages – pre-production,
early production and target production. The language choice, cross-
linguistic structures and language differentiation in this bilingual context
confirm the patterns which have been previously established in the exten-
sive literature on bilingual acquisition. It adds a new dimension to this
literature, as few studies have examined emergent bilingualism in such
starkly distinct languages, though Park (2000) has done so in the case
of Korean and English and Yip and Matthews (2000) have done so in
the case of Cantonese and English.
The central question is this: to what extent is interference occurring
in this child’s speech? The initial and obvious answer is that signifi-
cant interference is occurring because the dominant language, Jakarta
Indonesian, exerts a transfer effect on the Italian spoken by the bilingual
child in the earliest developmental stage in which his Italian is weaker.
Typologically, Jakarta Indonesian (a colloquial variant as opposed to
Standard Indonesian) is an SVO language, though it allows for a rel-
atively flexible word order; it has prepositions, the noun precedes the
unmarked genitive, the adjective and the determiner. Additionally, ques-
tion words do not need to be fronted and relative clauses can only be
accessed from the subject and object position of the hierarchy scale. It is
mostly isolating and partly agglutinative; therefore there is no morpho-
logical inflection nor are there grammatical categories for gender and
number or articles. According to Ewing (2005), in Jakarta Indonesian,
there are only two open word classes, nouns and verbs. They can be
monomorphemic or morphologically complex. The monomorphemic
words can be easily shifted from one class to another. The tense mark-
ers, aspect and mood are not formally expressed other than through the
use of a few aspect markers that precede the verb. The limited number of
prefixes and suffixes is polyfunctional, and basic clauses are constituted

C R OSS-L INGUIST IC A N D CO G N ITIV E STRU CTU RES 327
by a subject and a predicate or only a predicate, so there is no copula. In

addition, the subject and other core arguments are generally unmarked
whereas oblique arguments are marked by prepositions. Verbal predi-
cates can have an actor voice and an undergoer voice where the actor
argument is optionally marked by a preposition, whereas non verbal
predicates can be juxtaposed by a subject and any phrase-forming ele-
ment without copula or linker. The language allows for null subjects and
objects in finite clauses (see Ewing 2005)2 .
Italian is also an SVO language3 , has prepositions, nouns precede
(and in some cases follow) adjectives but always follow demonstratives.
It is a highly inflected language with a very rich verbal and nominal
morphology and agreement system based on number, gender and the use
of articles. The relative clauses are realized in all the positions though
in low varieties of Italian only the subject and object can be relativized.
Questions are formed by moving the question word to sentence initial
position, at least before the verb and by inversion. Lastly, the language
allows for the use of the null subject (PROdrop) in finite clauses (see
Renzi et al. 2001; Salvi & Vanelli 2004).
Despite the many superficial typological similarities, the most impor-
tant structural difference between Italian and Jakarta Indonesian is the
distinct syntactic pattern in which the Italian word order, except for spe-
cific pragmatic reasons, is fixed. In contrast, in Jakarta Indonesian (JI),
word order is relatively flexible. Thus to summarize the key differences
between the two languages, Italian and JI are both SVO languages – but
JI word order is much more flexible. Italian has obligatory determiners
in NP while Indonesian does not. However, the most interesting differ-
ence between the languages is the range of strategies used to ensure
accurate reference, the fact that Italian has a rich inflectional mor-
phology involving agreement, cross-referencing and complex verbal
categories.
For the particular purpose of this study, only one area of the grammar
is taken into consideration, mainly the expression and evolution of the
WH-questions where the two languages display a different behavior.
In Italian, questions are marked by WH-forms where movement and
inversion are involved and an initial rising intonation pattern is requisite
(Fava 2001: 94–98). In contrast, in JI, movement is optional, so that the

WH-forms rest in most cases in-situ, do not trigger inversion (Cole et al.
in press)4 , and display an obviously different intonation pattern5 .
This chapter presents an overview of the studies on developmental
bilingualism followed by sub-sections presenting data on the acquisition
of WH-forms in Italian, in JI, and in the bilingual child. The final section
discusses cross-linguistic structures of these WH-forms.
2. DE VE L OPM EN TA L BILIN G U A LISM
Research on children acquiring two languages in a simultaneous man-

ner revolves around to what extent such children are able to distinguish
between the two languages. Do bilingual children develop one linguistic
system or two separate systems at the same time? The Unitary System
theory, proposed by Volterra and Taeschner (1978), claims that bilin-
gual children go through a process where they are unable to distinguish
between the two languages. Recent studies using the Separate Develop-
ment Hypothesis (SDH) have demonstrated that bilingual children are
able to do so early on (see Meisel 1990, 2000; Lanza 1997; De Houwer
1995).
The debate is essentially over how to deal with the fact that bilin-
guals’ language involves a great deal of variability and variation and
that there are multiple variables to consider in the analysis. As Grosjean
points out, “studying bilinguals is a very challenging enterprise. There
are many variables that differentiate a monolingual from a bilingual
other than just speaking two languages: input, context language, code
switching, lexical borrowing and increased metalinguistic awareness”
(1998: 34). Simply put, appropriate methodologies have to be used
when studying cross-linguistic structures. Nevertheless, beyond the
problem of how to assess whether the two languages are operating cog-
nitively as separate systems, linguists are now more interested in simply
observing the degree of separation and the interaction between the two
languages.
Mixed utterances produced by early bilinguals are a clear symptom
of the interaction of different language pairs and therefore are particu-
larly useful for studying this phenomenon. For example, Müller (1998),
Döpke (1998, 2001), Yip and Matthews (2000), and Kupisch (in press),

discuss the interaction of the developmental grammars of such children.

They all stress the fact that the two languages interact in the performance
level showing features of one language on the grammar of the other.
However, most authors working on this issue maintain that the main
reason for the language transfer of cross-linguistic structures is due to
dominance by one of the languages. Paradis and Genesee (1996: 3) pro-
pose that syntactic dominance and overlap is especially evident when a
child advances more rapidly in one language than in the other; whereas
Schlyter (1993: 289) writes, “the two languages are not in quite balance
during their development but that one of the two languages is weaker.”
If this possibility is correct then the cross-linguistic influence should be
unilateral, from the stronger to the weaker language. Most of the studies
report the influence of the stronger language on the syntactic structures
of the other. Yip and Matthews (2000) demonstrate that in the interac-
tion of two typologically divergent languages, such as Cantonese and
English, Cantonese dominates English. This is especially pronounced
in the domain of WH-movement and relative clauses, though the case of
null object transfer is due to input ambiguity. In a different case, Müller
(1998) reports that ambiguity of input between the structures of verb-
object word order and object-verb word order in German subordinate
clauses favors the use of English syntax. She argues that this is the case
because the fixed word order in English does not create any ambigu-
ity; therefore it is the most effective solution to constructing sentences
regardless of which language is dominant. Taking a different approach,
Grosjean (1982) and Gawliztek-Maiwald and Tracy (1996) interpret lex-
ical or syntactic borrowing as a strategy which allows children to express
something they are not able to express otherwise, because it might be
easier to learn it in one language than in another.
Other studies raise similarly interesting issues which must be con-
sidered in this study. Döpke (2001) analyzes the “atypical” structures
produced by young bilinguals in order to explain why mixing occurs,
provided that the children have already differentiated their two lan-
guages. These cross-linguistic structures are a window in the bilingual
mind and allow researchers to see what happens in the mind of a child
growing with two languages when structures of one language move to the
other language. Another possibility is that the structural properties of the

languages involved play an important role in transfer (see Lanza 2001).

On a different line, Sinka (2001), examining data from two bilingual
English-Latvian girls in terms of language differentiation and analyz-
ing the few mixed utterances, concludes that the fact that Latvian and
English differ so much in their structural and morphological complexity
enables the child to separate the two language systems from an early
stage. In other words, the fewer parallel structures, the less ambigu-
ous the task is for the child to produce language-specific structures
while acquiring Latvian and English simultaneously. While Hulk and
Müller (2000) argue that influence is at work independently of domi-
nance when two languages display syntactic overlap, Kupisch (in press)
argues that dominance and internal structures determine the transfer
from a language to another as demonstrated in German-Italian bilin-
guals. Her study of the bilingual acquisition of determiners demonstrates
that when two languages are in contact, a complexity hypothesis is at
work where internal factors (the properties of the grammatical domain
of a language) can be more or less beneficial for the acquisition of a cer-
tain feature, and external factors (language dominance) can determine
influence.
The following study attempts to observe many of these issues as
they relate to the case study of Jakarta Indonesian and Italian bilingual
acquisition.
3. M ETH O D O LO G Y
Guglielmo was born in Jakarta to an Italian mother and an Indonesian

father and has been exposed to Italian and JI from birth. His parents have
followed the one-parent-one language strategy to raise him and his sister,
Beatrice, who is two years younger. The exposure of the children to the
two languages is by no means balanced because the mother, the main
source of input in Italian, works full time and spends less time at home
with the children. Other sources of Italian input are watching cartoons
and reading stories and occasionally socializing with Italian friends.
Additionally, for two months each year the family lives in Southern
Italy with the mother’s family. For the rest of the year, most of their daily
social interaction takes place in a JI context, as they have an Indonesian

caretaker and attend a local kindergarten. The siblings interact with each
other either in either language depending on the context.
Guglielmo is fluent in JI. He uses it in all contexts except when
interacting with his mother. From an early age he appeared to com-
prehend Italian, though his production was very limited until the age
of three. As expected, his Italian is typically mixed with Indonesian
elements and though he is now five years old, he is able to speak
Italian relatively fluently. However, he does so with clearly identifiable
imperfections.
The data presented below were taken from video recording transcrip-
tions and from notes in diaries. The hour-long recordings were made
weekly beginning when the child was eight months old. In these record-
ings, the two children are shown playing with each other as they normally
do. Occasionally other actors enter the picture, such as visitors or the
Indonesian maid and, when in Italy, relatives. For the most part, Italian
or Indonesian were deliberately used in order to generate the required
data base, though in some of the recordings both languages are used
when both mother and father are present.
The data in this study have only partially been coded and entered into a
longitudinal database. This is part of a larger study currently under way at
the Max Plank Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (MPI) in Jakarta
in which these data, when completely coded, will be compared to a larger
corpus of more than nine hundred thousand records of eight monolingual
JI children recorded over four years. Comparing the data to monolingual
acquisition patterns is necessary for ascertaining the degrees of similar-
ity and difference from target structures. Herein, the MPI data base and
the Italian data drawn from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney &
Snow 1985) are crucial referents for analyzing the acquisition of
WH-forms. They are also necessary for comparing syntactic structures
and for discussing cross-linguistic effects in the forms deviating from
the monolingual targets.
All the WH-forms were analyzed and coded according to form and
position in both languages. The same analysis was applied to the input.
The purpose was to analyze the frequency of occurrence of the different
WH-forms as well as the hierarchy of their cognitive function and their
sequence and age of emergence.

4. FOR M, FUNC T ION A N D CO G N ITIO N IN WH-Q U ESTIO N S
In the development of WH-questions, the order of development of

the WH-expressions seems to be similar in the two languages to which
the bilingual child is exposed. The difference is that in the case of the
weaker language, acquisition of both questions and appropriate struc-
tures is delayed, as would be expected. The order of acquisition is a
universal feature of cognitive development (see Clancy 1989). In this,
the acquisition of WH-questions is an accurate indicator of the child’s
stage of conceptual development.
For example, in studying the acquisition of Korean WH-questions
through the analysis and comparison with cross-linguistic data, Clancy
(1989) showed that the acquisition order is based on universals of cog-
nitive development. Discrepancies in acquisition can be attributed to
differences in interaction with caregivers, specifically in terms of how
verbally interactive the contexts are and to what degree the caretakers
stress syntactic repair through repetition of the child’s incorrect use of
grammar. As observed cross-linguistically, children first acquire terms
related to concrete objects when they start to grasp the notion of things
around them and need to ask for their name with “what,” then “who”
(which relates to people and possessions), then place (“where”). Next are
terms related to more abstract concepts like causality (“why”), modal-
ity (“how”) and time (“when”). This matches with the developmental
sequence of the WH-questions in Italian, JI and English, as can be seen
in the Table 1 below6 . Despite the differences in methodology and sam-
ples across the studies, the pattern of acquisition is similar in the three
languages7 .
Table 1. Emergence of WH-forms in English, JI and Italian
English Age of acq. JI Age of acq. Italian Age of acq.
what 2;2 apa 1;8 che 1;8

who 2;4 siapa 1;8 chi 1;8
where 2;2 mana 1;8 dove 1;9
how 2;9 gimana 2;4 come 2;0
why 2;11 kenapa 2;6 perché 2;2
when >3;0 kapan 3;4 quando 3;0

The issues related to the cognitive aspect in the acquisition of the

WH forms apply also to bilingual children, where it is important to
understand the principles that determine the order in which linguistic
forms are acquired.
In the case of the focus of the study presented here, if we compare
the acquisition time of the WH-forms, (see Table 4 and Figure 4) it is
apparent that the child must have reached the cognitive stage where the
notion already existed in his mind. He uses the Indonesian form first,
just like any Indonesian peer would do, and only later the Italian form. It
is obvious that he had reached the cognitive stage much earlier than the
emergence of the Italian form. The question is: Are form and function
coterminous or separate? If the child had clearly developed the cognitive
aspect expressed by the WH-form “what” since the age of 1;9, then why
is it that the first time it would appear in his Italian would be only at 2;5?
Scholars such as Clancy (1989) and Park (2000) have pointed out a corre-
lation between the input of WH-questions and the child’s cognitive level.
If we examine the longitudinal data on children’s language acqui-
sition in the MPI database, and compare adult input and children’s
output, we find that in JI, the WH-questions typically occur in the
following frequencies as shown in Table 2 and the first pie graph in
Figure 1.
The percentages in Table 2 refer to the distribution of these WH-forms
throughout the database. In fact, the question-word “what” occurs with
the highest frequency when adults are addressing the children. This is
Table 2. Comparative occurrence of WH-interrogatives
JI WH-form Adult (%) Children (%)
apa what 39 33
siapa who 12 6
mana where 24 37
gimana how 6 6
kenapa why 5 4
kok how come 8 11
kapan when 1 0.2
berapa how much 5 2

Percentage of WH-forms in adult speech
kapan “when” 1% berapa

“how much”
kok
5%
“how come” 8%
kenapa
“why” 5 %
gimana apa
“how” 6% “what”
39%
mana
“where”
24% siapa
“who”
12%
Percentage of WH-forms in child speech
kok
“how come” 11% kapan “when” 0.20%
berapa
kenapa “how much”
“why” 4% 2%
gimana
“how” 6%
apa
“what”
33%
mana
“where”
38%
siapa
“who”
6%
Figure 1. Pie-graphs comparing the frequency of WH-forms in adults and children’s

speech.

entirely predictable because when adults interact with children during

the recording sessions they typically talk of things and persons in the
“here” and now” framework.
The case study presented in this chapter concurs with the conclu-
sions of the above-mentioned studies. Clearly, in child directed speech,
adults use a different proportion of WH-words than in conversation with
each other. In effect, the most frequent forms and structures children
hear are narrower than the relative incidences of WH-forms in the adult
language. If the acquisition of the WH-words depends on repetition
with variation in the input, then frequency is a key factor determining
the emergence, use, and regularization of an item. This might partly
explain the issue of the late emergence of “when” in JI, but also cross-
linguistically in other languages8 . As mentioned earlier, Clancy (1989)
has shown that the frequency of WH-forms in the input is a critical
factor which has to be considered when studying language acquisition
in children. According to Clancy, caregivers only introduce WH-words
when they think the child is conceptually ready. But what happens when
children are mature enough for notions such as time, but adults do not
produce time related questions?
In order to explore the fact that time-related WH-forms are last to
emerge, it is worth examining the database for JI. This database contains
more than 900,000 records. The most developmentally significant aspect
of this data is the fact that kapan (when) makes up only 1% of the total
of the WH-forms used by adults in their interactions with children in
this context (see the first pie graph in Figure 1). The result is that it is
acquired very late by children and is rarely used. Indeed, kapan only
makes up 0.2% of the total WH-forms used by children, as seen in
the second pie graph in Figure 1. Indeed, lay experience with children
clearly shows that children’s concepts of time remain diffuse until well
over the age of five.
Even though Table 2 and Graph 1 show an even correspondence
between adult input and children output for “what,” “who” and “why,”
there is a striking difference between the “where” input and output.
Simply put, children seem to like using “where” more than “what.” On
the other hand, they use “how” far less frequently than it occurs in the
input. One interesting difference in this data is the striking contrast in

the use of kok (“how come”). Children use it more than adults, which
becomes an important aspect of the following data and analysis. These
differences between input and output are in all likelihood due to cogni-
tive differences between children and adults, and to the nature of their
worlds. Time is critical for adults in a way that it simply is not for chil-
dren. Clearly, cognitively speaking it is far easier to understand “what”
than “when” and this simple explanation adequately accounts for the
developmental sequence.
To summarize this data set, what is most significant is that “what”
questions are by far the most common. This is a simple fact of cognition
in that the easiest of all linguistic tasks is to label an object with a name.
This is the most rudimentary aspect of learning a language for both
adults and children. Once again, these figures confirm the general pattern
found in the acquisition of other languages as well as the hierarchical
developmental sequence. Through combining the study of syntactical
structures and the developmental sequence of the emergence of WH-
interrogatives, we can explore far more complex questions and revealing
information regarding cognition.
5. SYNTAC T IC STRU CTU RES IN WH-Q U ESTIO N S

IN T HR E E L IN G U ISTIC CO N TEX TS: ITA LIA N ,
JAKARTA, IND O N ESIA N A N D BILIN G U A L
5.1. Italian
In Italian canonical interrogative sentences the WH-form always pre-
cedes the verb and occupies the initial position in the sentence, and in
some cases, the dislocated position. On the other hand, yes-no questions
display the same structure as statements with the difference in rising into-
nation (Fava 2001: 97–98). Commenting upon WH-questions, Guasti
(1996) notes that in Italian there is a Subject Auxiliary Inversion (SAI)
that has been analyzed by Rizzi (1990) involving movement to the begin-
ning of the sentence. In the interrogative sentences, the subject cannot
intervene between the WH-operator and the verb. Thus, the subject may
occur at the end of the sentence or in a left-dislocated position. In the
acquisition of WH-questions, Italian children do not produce questions

in which there is no movement to the beginning of the sentence. Indeed,

Italian children consider these interrogative sentences as fixed struc-
tures, which is evidenced by reproducing a particular intonation pattern
(Antelmi 1997).
In Italian the SAI rule is applied whenever the fronted WH-operator
and the verb are adjacent (Guasti 2002: 188). Adjacency is obtained only
when the subject is placed in left or right peripheral position or by using
a null subject as in the following examples (Guasti 2002: 188–189).
1a)
Gianni cosa fa? Left peripheral position
Gianni what do-ind.pres.3sg
What does Gianni do?
1b)
Cosa fa Gianni? Right peripheral position
what do-ind.pres.3sg Gianni
1c)
Cosa fa? Null subject
what do-ind.pres.3sg
1d)
*Cosa Gianni fa? –
what Gianni do-ind.pres.3sg
This adjacency has been interpreted by Rizzi (1990) as a well-formedness

constraint on question formation, the WH-criterion. According to Guasti
(2002: 192), Italian learners never place the subject between the
WH-operators and the verb, as that would produce ungrammatical struc-
tures. Consequently, the head component of the WH-criterion is in place
in early Italian except for the WH-operator perché (“why”). Both appear
in this order in child and adult grammar.
Antelmi (1997: 169) describes a situation in which the first ques-
tions in child language involve repeating adult intonation patterns. In
Antlemi’s study, the WH-questions appearing in the Camilla corpus
before the age of 23 months are considered to be non-productive. Actu-
ally, “who” and “what” are fused in the WH-operator chi (“who”), and

the other operators like dove (“where”) have a formulaic aspect (Antelmi
1997: 170). Nevertheless, atypical structures with in-situ positions of
the WH-operators were never produced. For this reason, Antelmi con-
siders the first WH-questions as fixed structures reproducing a particular
intonation pattern where the WH- is NP with copular constructions of
identification and location.
This is confirmed by the analysis of the data in the CHILDES
database where very few in-situ WH-questions occur, and instances of
WH-questions in left peripheral position, especially in copular sentences
with “cosa,” “che,” and “dove.”
5.2. Jakarta Indonesian

The Jakarta Indonesian pattern of cognitive development of the
WH-forms match Italian pattern whereas its linguistic structures stand
out as markedly different.
Before describing the syntactic structure of the WH-forms, we observe
the order of acquisition of these forms as seen in Table 3.
From the MPI database, and as given above in Table 3, by the age of 1;8
these WH-expressions are used as isolates to express copular construc-
tion of identification and location. In some cases this even occurs earlier,
as early as 1;6 and 1;7. As noted earlier, the developmental sequence
is clear; first “what” emerges, then “who” and “where” emerge at the
same time. Five months later “how come” emerges; shortly thereafter
“how,” then “why” and “how much” at 2;6 and finally, at 3;4, “when.”
To recapitulate, in JI, the acquisition of WH-questions does not differ
markedly from any other linguistic context. This confirms the apparently
universal hierarchy of the emergence of WH-questions. For example,
Table 3. Order of Acquisition of WH-forms in JI children
WH-form JI Age of acq. WH-form JI Age of acq.
what apa 1;8 why kenapa 2;6

who siapa 1;8 how come kok 2;3
where mana 1;8 when kapan 3;4
how gimana 2;4 how much berapa 2;6

younger children (until 2;5) commonly use “what” and “where” but
rarely “who,” and in addition do not pose adjunct questions. Adjunct
questions emerge at 2;5 – first kenapa (“why”) then gimana (“how”)
and much later kapan (“when”). In Indonesian, kapan (“when”) emerges
only at 3;4, and in terms of frequency to a far lesser extent than all other
WH-expressions9 .
A syntactic analysis of WH-questions as proposed by Cole et al. (2001
and in press) shows that essentially JI is a WH-in-situ language, although
instances of sentence-initial WH may occur. From the MPI database it
emerges that WH-words occur in the same position as their no-WH-NP
counterpart. This is interesting as JI allows a great degree of word order
freedom; therefore, some object NPs can appear in preverbal position.
As for adjuncts, these appear post-verbally and pre-verbally. As a result,
questions of time, place, manner, and reason can appear either after or
before the verb but not necessarily in the leftmost position. There is
no evidence for obligatory movement to the beginning of the sentence
(Cole et al. in press).
2a)
Potong rambut di mana?
cut hair loc where
Where did you cut your hair?
2b)
Di mana potong rambut?
loc where cut hair
All the WH-forms as listed in Table 3 above are poly-functional; that is,
they function as indefinites amongst their other functions. As for cul-
turally significant differences affecting WH-interrogatives, kok (“how
come”) is an especially interesting case. It has the tendency to occur at
the left end of the sentence and can be used to perform an unusually
varied set of functions.
In addition, on the issue of development, JI children prefer the in-situ
structure especially in object position. Thus beyond the cognitive issue
of the sequence and timing of the emergence of WH-interrogatives, there
are some striking syntactic differences which are important to identify,

as they allow us to ask questions about syntactic dominance and transfer.

For example, in JI, copular verbs do not occur. Thus regular sentences
are deictic and basic questions come in the form of a demonstrative
(ini “this”) followed by the WH-form (apa “what”) or the reverse. With
the development of the lexicon and the increase of the verbal types of
sentences used by children, more WH-questions are uttered where the
syntactic structure is always adult-like. In a number of examples by Cole
et al. (in press), the acquisition of WH-questions is error free. Children
reproduce questions spoken by adults, and the only development is not
in the syntax but in the lexicon10 .
5.3. Bilingual Child

In the case of the development of WH-questions in the bilingual child,
we notice that while Guglielmo displays the same development as mono-
lingual peers in JI, in Italian he produces many WH-questions in-situ, a
sign that that there is syntactic interaction between the two languages.
In terms of syntactic structures, when he speaks Italian, his production
of WH-questions demonstrates that in most cases he is not able to move
the WH-form from the in-situ position to the beginning of the sentence
as expected in Italian questions. For this reason it seems obvious that
he does not apply the inversion rule, considered fundamental in Italian,
where a subject can never be placed between a WH form and the verb,
but always in the left or right dislocated position.
In observing these cross-linguistic structures from a quantitative and
qualitative point of view, it is evident that the WH-in-situ structures are
more frequent at the beginning of Italian utterances. However these utter-
ances mostly involve cosa (“what”), dove (“where”), and chi (“who”),
and it is significant that these in-situ structures are rarely found in the
case of monolingual Italian development.
Comparing the sequence of development of WH-interrogatives in the
two languages, we can better understand the timing of the acquisition
of WH-forms in Guglielmo’s Indonesian and Italian. These frequencies
are provided below in Table 411 . When these data are compared with
adult input as shown, it is clear that the age of acquisition of “what” and
“where” occur significantly earlier in Indonesian than the other forms.

Table 4. The Timing and Relative Frequency of WH-forms in JI and Italian
WH-form Indon. Age Perc. Adult Italian Age Perc. Adult

of acq. (%) input of acq. (%) input
(%) (%)
what apa 1;9 29 44 che 2;5 23 52

who siapa 2;5 5 15 chi 2;5 9 13
where mana 1;9 43 21 dove 2;5 18 18
how gimana 2;6 3 7 come 3;2 7 10
why kenapa 2;6 12 8 perché 3;4 42 5
how come kok 2;3 7 2 – – – –
when kapan 4;0 0,3 1 quando 4;4 0,4 0,3
Moreover, there is a relatively even correspondence between adult input

and child output. The first WH-expressions in Italian begin to occur
productively only at the age of 2;5. By this age the child has already
mastered nearly all the Indonesian forms except for kenapa (“why”)
and kapan (“when”).
Also typical is the fact that in the case of the non-dominant lan-
guage, in this case Italian, the emergence of all forms is significantly
delayed. The late occurrence of “when” is a particularly striking feature
of the emergence of these WH-questions. It does not just occur late,
but at a very low frequency. In addition, in the case of the use of other
WH-questions, it is notable that the subject combines “why” and “how
come” in order to produce perché, and this explains the stark contrast in
frequency of use with the adult input. To conclude the case for bilingual
acquisition, the WH-form “when” emerges later than the other forms, a
phenomenon which has been widely reported in the literature. Hyeson
Park (2000) claims that the explanation for late development of when-
questions in children acquiring English as a second language is due to
internal linguistic factors. He proposes that tense and temporal adver-
bials are interdependent. If this is the case, the problem devolves upon the
interrelationship between temporal adverbials and the aspect/modality
system in Indonesian. If we extend this consideration to the study of the
bilingual child and the late emergence of the temporal WH-form, then
part of the answer can be found in the interaction of the two typologically

different systems that the child is growing up with. The word kapan is
related to the Indonesian verbal system mainly based on modality and
aspect in which a great deal of vagueness is implied. Italian, however,
has a more complex tense based system. Obviously Guglielmo has not
yet been able to acquire this system. This is clearly demonstrated by
the fact that at least until the age of five, he was not able to control
tense-marking elements in Italian12 .
This type of developmental complexity and the creative use of
language are indications of the degree to which syntactic mixing is
occurring, as will be explored further below.
The following graphs (Figures 2 and 3) compare the acquisition of
WH-forms between monolinguals and the bilingual child. Figure 2
shows the difference between the pattern for monolingual Indone-
sians and Guglielmo, and Figure 3 shows the difference between the
emergence of WH-forms for monolingual Italians and Guglielmo.
Figure 2 shows that the acquisition of the Indonesian WH-forms in the
bilingual child follows the general trend of monolingual children, except
for the siapa (“who”) form that emerges relatively later in the bilingual
child. This might be due to a lack of input, though no in-depth study of
this data has been carried out as of yet. If we exclude “who” (siapa),
the pattern of acquisition is similar to other languages in which “where”
Acquisition of WH-forms in Indonesian

60
Age in months
50
40
30
20
10
0
apa siapa mana gimana kenapa kapan
WH-forms
Indonesian (monolinguals) Guglielmo
Figure 2. Comparison of the acquisition of WH-forms of Indonesian monolinguals and

the case of Guglielmo.

(apa) and “what” (mana) are acquired almost simultaneously. Subse-

quently, “how” (gimana) and “why” (kenapa) are acquired gradually,
and finally “when” (kapan) is only acquired at the age of 4;0 – once
again with a low frequency.
Figure 4 combines the two previous graphs in order to allow for easier
visualization of the entire data set of WH-acquisition development. The
figure shows how the emergence of WH-forms follows the same pattern
in the two languages when seen from a monolingual perspective as well
as in the two languages from the perspective of the bilingual child. In
Acquisition of WH-forms in Italian

60
50
Age in months
40
30
20
10
0
che chi dove come perche' quando
WH-forms
Italian (monolinguals) Guglielmo
Figure 3. Comparison of the Acquisition of WH-forms of Italian monolinguals and the

case of Guglielmo.
Acquisition of WH-forms
Comparison between monolinguals and the bilingual child
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
what who where how why when
Indonesian Italian Guglielmo Indonesian Guglielmo Italian
Figure 4. Comparing the combined monolingual and bilingual data.

the case of this bilingual child, if we compare the acquisition of the

WH-forms, we realize that Guglielmo must have reached the cognitive
stage, that is, the notion is already established in the pre-operational
stage. One possible explanation is that the paucity of input in Italian has
delayed the acquisition of WH-expressions. In short, while he under-
stands the form he cannot produce it until later, presumably because of
the lack of sufficient input.
In order to examine this hypothesis, we need to know more about
monolingual WH-questions. In fact, if we look at the monolin-
gual data from CHILDES and other authors’ data and analysis, it
is clear that the placement of WH-expressions is always in place
in Italian children (see Antelmi 1997: 170). Nevertheless, very few
cases of in-situ expressions have been detected. These have prob-
ably been underestimated by other linguists as performance errors
and therefore have not been accounted for. However, the fact that
they do occur means that they are possible. Additionally, it appears
to be the case that what the bilingual child is doing is over-
generalizing from the stronger language, something that other mono-
lingual children might have done independently. This demonstrates
the well known fact of linguistic dominance by the stronger language
context.
To begin with, it is useful to examine the case of “what” (apa) and
“where” (mana). If we look at the production and distribution of the
two WH-forms most used and mostly used in-situ, “what” (apa) and
“where” (mana), we realize that the child starts to use them like other
Indonesian peers at the age of 1;9. These structures persist for a relatively
long period of time. In this case, they continue even after the child starts
to produce sentences in Italian but start to decrease after the age of 4;0
when the child’s competence in Italian progresses rapidly toward the
more adult-like forms.
The case of “what” (apa) is slightly different. For instance, in most of
the cases recorded before the age of 4;0 it rests in-situ. It is only rarely
placed at the beginning of the sentence. This applies to the corresponding
form in Italian, che cosa, which becomes operative at 2;5. Again, a vast
majority of examples shows the WH-form in-situ. The early acquired
in-situ WH-forms thus serve as the basis of a syntactic transfer from

Indonesian to Italian. This explains the sentences presented in the next

part of this chapter.
6. ANALY SIS O F TH E D ATA13
A typical example of mixed utterances, like the following, usually

emerges in a specific context in which Guglielmo is in an Italian envi-
ronment. In this case he was on his way to an Italian friend’s house.
Examples like this are in great part an expression of his excitement and
knowledge that he is about to meet his Italian friend. Therefore, he
seeks confirmation from his mother with the following type of mixed
utterance:
3a) G2;8
Questa la casa siapa? Ini rumah siapa?
dem.prox-f.sg def-f.sg house-f.sg who dem.prox home who
Whose house is this?
In Italian, the sentence should read as follows, where the WH-word is

moved at the beginning of the sentence:
3b)
Di chi è questa casa?
of who be-ind.pres.3sg dem.prox-f.sg house-f.sg
In the utterance (3a) it is clear that the child is slowly putting together the
pieces and gradually achieving competence in Italian. This is revealing,
as at this stage, though his production of Italian is still limited to the
expression of single words such as demonstratives (questa, “this”) or
nouns (la casa, “the house”), he is able to put these things together and
his task is aided by the relatively flexible Indonesian system. Thus the
above mentioned sentence lacks a copula as appropriate in Indonesian
and uses the function word (siapa, “who”) but still in the Indonesian
manner. This is the stage where this kind of mixed sentence is mostly
produced, and in the case of the WH-questions, maintained in their
Indonesian form. It is interesting that by this time he was able to produce

the appropriate Italian WH-form “chi” necessary in this sentence but

only as an isolate or as a short fixed structure such as chi è? (“who is
that?”). However, he is still unable to produce longer and more complex
structures.
In the following example, he substitutes the Indonesian form for what
(“apa”) with the Italian correspondent che cosa, which is equally impre-
cise. It seems that in his mind, che cosa (“what”) is the default WH-form,
at least in the early stages when he is slowly trying to produce full Italian
sentences. It is interesting that it can even be used in a later example (7)
to refer to “where”14 .
4a) G3;9
Si chiama che cos’è?
refl.3sg call-ind.pres.3sg what thing = be-ind.pres.3sg
What is it called?
In Italian, the proper way to ask what something is called would be to

employ come (“how”), as in the following sentence:
4b)
Come si chiama?
how refl.3sg call-ind.pres.3sg
In the next example, the contrast between Indonesian and Italian

becomes clearer. Here the object position is occupied by the WH-word
in-situ, while in Italian it should be moved to the beginning of the sen-
tence. It was expressed as the child, his mother, and some other Italian
friends approached a pond. The child uttered the following phrase while
pointing at the fish in the pond:
5) G3;2
I pesci mangiare che cos’é? Ikan makan apa?
def-m.pl fish-m.pl eat-inf what thing = be-ind.pres.3sg fish eat what
What are the fish eating?
In this sentence the child is reproducing the structure of an Indonesian

question where the common word order is SVO and where the verb

does not undergo any morphological change as the child uses the
infinitive form.
The WH-form che cosa (“what”) in object position is still left in-situ.
Sentences like this are very frequent in the database and in the diary
study, especially between the ages of 3;2 to 4;0. It is interesting to
note that the child does not recognize the copula è (“is”) as a verb
but considers it to be a unit with the WH-form “what.” This kind
of pattern is also used very frequently with the other WH-forms
considered below.
6) G3;5
Dicomprato che cos’è? (Yang) dibeli apa?
pass-buy-ppart-m.sg what thing = be-ind.pres.3sg rel pass-buy what
What did you buy?
This mixed sentence where the WH-forms in object position rest in-situ
is also interesting because the child produces a focused question with
the Indonesian passive marker di-, which can be analyzed as a copula
construction with a headless relative clause with the relativizer (yang
“that”) in the subject position (see Aman 1999).
In this case, the mistake is in the deletion of the relativizer. As
Aman has shown, this kind of mistake is common in children (Aman
1999: 4).
The following question still exemplifies Guglielmo’s tendency to
leave the question word in-situ when he speaks Italian.
7) G3;3
Gulli vuoi andare che cosa? Gulli mau ke mana?
Gulli want-ind.pres.2sg go-inf what thing? Gulli want to where
Where is Gulli going? (where am I going?)
In the example (7) it is clear that the placement of che cosa (“what”),
which actually should be dove (“where”), matches JI syntax in that this
mimics the normal Indonesian word order (keeping in mind the inherent
flexibility in Indonesian). The Italian correspondent dove starts to be
productively used only at 2;5, and in many of the examples is left in-situ.
It is interesting to note that the use of vuoi (“you want”) incorrectly

conjugated to match the third singular person of the subject, shows a clear
influence of the Indonesian system where “mau” means both volition
and near future. In this case where the sentence was uttered while the
child was getting ready to go out, Guglielmo was not expressing volition
but near future15 .
The following is an example of the WH-form of “who” still in-situ.
8) G3;7
Maeldane vuole salutare chi è? Maeldane mau
Maeldane want-3sg greet-inf who be-ind.pres.3sg Maeldane want
salamin siapa?
greet-IN who
Who will Maeldane greet?
Sentences 9–11 exemplify the developmental stage where the child pro-
duces Italian questions in which the WH-form dove rests in-situ and
other structures of Indonesian are transferred.
9a) G3;2
Di Gulli dov’ è? (Yang) Gulli (punya) mana?
of Gulli where = be-ind.pres.3sg rel Gulli have where
Where’s mine?/which one is mine?
Here the child produces a focused question in a copula construction with

a headless relative clause with the relativizer in the subject position. This
sentence is awkward for Italian speakers as in Italian the headless relative
clause with the relativizer in subject position should be preceded by a
demonstrative as follows:
9b)
Dov’è quello di Gulli?
where = be-ind.pres.3sg dem.dist-m.sg of Gulli
Where is Gulli’s (mine)?
In the next example, Guglielmo is clearly transferring the structure of

the Indonesian sentence next to it, where by the past participle comprato
(“bought”) he is trying to express the same focalization expressed by the
Indonesian passive marker di-.

10a) G3;6
Comprato dov’è? Dibeli mana?
buy-ppart-m.sg where = be-ind.pres.3sg pass-buy where
Where did you buy it?
The way the question is formulated is definitely awkward and would

not be understood by somebody who did not have a sound knowledge
of Indonesian. In Italian it would probably read as follows:
10b)
Dove l’hai comprato?
where acc.3sg = have-ind.pres.2sg buy-ppart-m.sg
The following question, a direct development of the sentence (7) where

the right WH-question is being employed, was used very often by the
child until the age of 4;6 regardless of his mother’s efforts to correct it.
It is definitely not an echo question and therefore the in-situ WH-form
should be moved to the beginning of the sentence.
11) G3;9
Vuoi andare dove, Ma? Mau ke mana Ma?
want-2sg go-inf where Mom want loc where Mom
Where are you going Mom?
In a pragmatic context where the child is asking the mother where she is
going, the use of the verb vuoi (“want”) seems to be due to contact with
Indonesian, which uses the verb “want” to indicate future and volition.
The question, not ungrammatical in Italian, would sound pragmatically
more appropriate if it was uttered omitting the modal verb vuoi.
As for come (“how”), its frequency of occurrence is very low in
comparison to other WH-forms. Also, it tends to occur in pre-posed
position in expressions that can be considered as fixed structures, as in
the following case in which he asks the name of something he either
did not know or could not remember. At this stage, we can see that his
language has developed to the point where he can produce the target
structure as follows.

12) G3;7
Come si chiama?
how refl.3sg call-ind.pres-3sg
What (how)is it called?
The following sentence was uttered while the child was trying to put
together a toy car.
13a) G3;11
Come faccio? Gimana bikinnya
how do-ind.pres.1sg how do-3sg
How do you do it? (How does it work?)
This is not exactly what an Italian would say in this context. The
word order is awkward. The appropriate question should be phrased
as follows:
13b)
Come si fa?
how imps do-ind.pres.3sg
The next two examples show that the adjunct perché, from the very
beginning of production, is in pre-posed position. This effectively
reproduces the appropriate Italian word order.
14) G3;11
Perché tajam, per che cos’è, per tusukare tanti dinosauri16 ?
why sharp for what thing=be-ind.pres.3sg for pierce-inf many dinousar
Why is it sharp? Why is that? To pierce many dinosaurs?
The next sentence displays one of the very few examples contain-
ing a when-question in Italian. It was recorded at the age of 4;4
and occurred when the child was talking on the phone to his mother,
who had been away for a while. The use of the Indonesian tempo-
ral adverbial lama demonstrates that the child still produces mixed
structures.

15) G4;4
Mamma quando vieni? No lama
Mommy when come-ind.pres.2sg neg long time
Mom, when are you coming back? Not too long.
The examples employing when-questions in both languages are too

scanty to allow any interpretation, but it should be noted that in the
few recorded sentences, the WH-word for “when” is not in-situ. This
confirms that adjuncts have the tendency to be pre-posed in the language
of the bilingual child. The child has shown a delay in the acquisition of
the WH-form “when” in both languages.
In Indonesian, kapan is only used three times starting at 4;0, where in
Italian it is only recorded once, at 4;4. From that age onward it is used
very rarely. At the present the child, being 5 years old, still produces
it with great reluctance. It might be interesting to use more structured
elicitation tasks to obtain Italian sentences with the when-question word.
It should be noticed that from a comprehension point of view the child
has shown incapability to understand and often reluctance to answer
questions introduced by “quando”. The reasons for this fact can probably
be found within the cognitive system of the child, who seems to be too
immature to understand the meaning of the questions within the system
of the languages the child is exposed to17 .
7. DISC USSIO N : TH E EV ID EN CE FO R
C R OSS-LIN G U ISTIC IN FLU EN CE
As Döpke (2001) notes, the observation of atypical structures allows

us to understand the cognitive process in the bilingual speaker’s mind
as well as the analytical skills being acquired. This is important as it
provides insights into the process through which two languages are
simultaneously acquired. If target forms are too difficult to be considered
productive, they, in fact, cannot inform us about what is happening in
the mind of the bilingual child. In any event, cross-linguistic structures
are intricate aspects of a bilingual child’s normal course of develop-
ment and are useful indicators of emerging language competence. Since
the children probably did not learn the atypical utterances from their

interlocutors as input, they must have created them themselves. In short,

atypical structures are best understood as “experiments” based on the
children’s developing analytic capacities (Döpke 2001: 5).
In order to demonstrate why and where cross-linguistic structures
occur, it is important to identify areas where the structures of the two
languages display different patterns or where the child is prone to transfer
from one language to the other. On one hand it is difficult to make
predictions, yet on the other hand, the evidence gained by case studies
such as Döpke’s demonstrates that there is a high degree of variation
among bilinguals. The variation and the structures might depend on
the language combination to which the bilingual child is exposed to,
as some language combinations generate greater structural ambiguities
than others. However, in addition to the question of whether one or two
systems are being learned simultaneously, Paradis (2001) has shown
that the occurrence of these structures depends on the degree of inter-
language ambiguity which is being generated by a particular language
combination for a particular language module.
In the case of Italian and JI, one of the areas where unusual structures
and delayed development were produced by the bilingual child was
in the expression of WH-questions. The preliminary results show that
Guglielmo’s development of WH-questions follows that of Indonesian-
speaking children. From the age of 1;7 he was able to produce Indonesian
WH-questions comparable to those of other Indonesian-speaking chil-
dren, but his Italian WH-questions lag behind those of his Italian
peers significantly. The Italian WH-forms appeared much later, at 2;5,
after he had gone through a process of producing mixed utterances in
Italian clearly based on the JI grammar with many instances of in-
situ WH-forms as described in the previous examples. It is apparent
that when Guglielmo produces WH-questions in Italian, he is typically
unable to move the WH-operator from the in-situ position to the begin-
ning of the sentence. The absence of questions with an overt subject
where the movement has located the WH-word at the beginning of the
sentence seems to demonstrate that he is not able to apply the inversion
rule that is considered fundamental in Italian. Indeed, while in Italian
a subject can never be placed between a WH-operator and the verb, in
Indonesian such fluidity is perfectly acceptable.

If, in the expression of yes-no questions, Italian and JI match exactly

with the corresponding statements with the only difference being ris-
ing intonation, the two languages have starkly different grammars in
WH-questions. This is represented by the fact that Italian involves move-
ment of the WH-words to the initial position, while in JI they tend to
remain in-situ. This contrast is more marked in object questions since
subject question expressions can appear in the fronted position in both
languages.
It would appear that Guglielmo is integrating Indonesian WH-
movement into his Italian. In JI, WH-forms generally do not move but
adjuncts can. This is exactly what Guglielmo does in the expression of
WH-questions. If dominance partly explains the phenomenon of cross-
linguistic influence, the conditions of dominance are certainly being
met here. The fact that he is able to move the adjuncts also serves as a
demonstration that he is aware of the fact that cue competition exists, and
is expressing this awareness as shown in other studies (Döpke 2001).
Considering that target expressions are being produced correctly, and
that both movement and inversion have been applied, it will be inter-
esting to see at what point the movement and inversion rules become
problematic. For example, will Guglielmo fail to apply the SAI rule in
Italian WH-questions where movement has occurred but not inversion?
Though this instance has not yet been observed, it would be interesting
if it did since Indonesian has a relatively free word order. The following
JI utterance from the MPI database is an example of such a violation of
the so called Italian WH-criterion in which the WH-question is placed
between the subject and the verb:
16)
Apa tadi Dek Ido bilang?
what earlier younger.brother Ido say
What did you (brother Ido) say?
To this date, the child has not produced such sentences. This may be
because the frequency of such expressions in JI is very low and there
is no such input in Italian. In short, it is a question of low input on one
side and on the other a complete lack of any such input.

Is cross-linguistic influence only a matter of dominance? In this

case, we see that while the subject exhibits normal monolingual acqui-
sition of JI, his Italian lags behind. If this possibility is correct then
the cross-linguistic influence should be unilateral; that is, from the
stronger to the weaker language. Another possibility is that the structural
properties of the languages involved play an important role in transfer
(see Lanza 2001).
It is also possible that there is cognitive interaction between the two,
and therefore the child’s immature stage of structure building is affected
by cross-language cue competition. As Döpke writes:
in that view, the children are aware of the fact that they
are dealing with two different language systems and intend
to express this awareness in their structural choice. In
this view target structures should be in the majority, and
cross-linguistic structures should be bilateral. (2001: 80)
However, in this case study of WH-questions, the transfer seems to be
unilateral (from Indonesian to Italian), though language-internal factors
may also be at work. Unlike Italian children who from early on acquire
WH-questions as formulaic expressions in the fronted position (Antelmi
1997), the bilingual child extends the rule of yes-no Italian questions,
where the only difference with statements is in the intonational pattern,
to the Italian WH-questions. He simply replaces the object NP with the
in-situ WH-form following the more frequent pattern in JI.
It might be interesting to see whether, in other areas of grammar,
the same pattern of directionality is observed, or if bilaterality can be
triggered by other factors. If this is the case, one explanation might be
that object WH-forms in-situ are easier to process, producing a delay in
the acquisition of the target structures in Italian. On the other hand, if
Italian syntactic structures might be beneficial to the acquisition of other
grammatical features in Indonesian, then we would observe a transfer
from Italian to Indonesian, as demonstrated by Kupisch (in press) in the
acquisition of determiners in bilingual German-Italian children where
both internal and external factors are at work in transfer.
Comparisons with other similar bilinguals could prove or disprove
the hypothesis that in-situ acquisition of WH-forms is easier to acquire

and therefore is the preferred form. The case study of bilingual children
acquiring Cantonese and English (Yip & Matthews 2000) displayed
exactly the same tendency of acquisition of in-situ WH-forms from
the Cantonese dominant language to the weaker English language.
Unfortunately, that case study has not been supported by other
longitudinal studies on similar bilinguals.
The fact that in many fewer cases Guglielmo leaves the adjuncts come
(“how”) perché (“why”) and quando (“when”) in-situ can be explained
because they were acquired at a more mature cognitive stage and because
in JI these elements typically appear in initial sentence position. In par-
ticular for perché which is invariably placed at the beginning of the
interrogative sentences, it might be that it corresponds to kok (“how
come”) and kenapa (“why”) in JI. If kenapa can occur in-situ though
the tendency is in fronted position, kok only and exclusively occurs in
fronted position and is particularly liked by children. As for the other
adjunct, quando (“when”), the paucity of examples does not permit
much discussion.
No case of transfer of Italian to JI has been observed in this area
of grammar, but the fact that no occurrence of the mentioned adja-
cency constraint (allowed in JI) being violated in Italian WH-questions
has been noticed in Guglielmo’s corpus could be the indirect expla-
nation of the rule in Italian. Nor has any study been carried out on
the intonation of JI sentences produced by the bilingual child as com-
pared to JI monolinguals, to demonstrate different intonational patterns
reproducing Italian ones.
Müller (1998) debates whether ambiguity of input might be cru-
cial for the occurrence of cross-linguistic structures. The scarcity of
examples of echo questions in adult Italian in this database, and the
left dislocated position structures both in the monolingual and bilin-
gual corpus, might have been interpreted as ambiguous by the child.
So we can pose the following question: Is it possible that the quantita-
tively significant production of in-situ questions, especially for “what,”
“where,” and “who” (the first WH-words acquired by the child) might
have been triggered by what has been generalized by the child in
the right dislocated position WH-expressions? Or were they produced
as a consequence of the few instances of echo-questions? Though

either is possible, the limited occurrence of echo-questions does not

seem to be the only factor inducing transfer. The best way to resolve
this issue is to study other cross-linguistic structures in other areas of the
grammar.
8. CO N CLU SIO N
This case of development of WH-questions in a bilingual child

demonstrates that cognitive and cross-linguistic factors are at work. In
the cognitive dimension, the WH-forms have apparently been acquired
independently and at different times by the child. In Indonesian, the
acquisition was similar to other Indonesian monolinguals, and while it
was delayed in the case of Italian, the order of acquisition remained
the same.
It seems that the WH-forms constitute a developmental/cognitive
package in which, although the child has already acquired the mean-
ings of each question, he still needs to go through the same process of
acquisition in the use of these forms that he experienced while learn-
ing Indonesian. In terms of the structural difference between the two
languages, their combination has clearly resulted in the emergence of
specific cross-linguistic structures. For example, in the expression of
WH-questions to ask for “what,” “where,” and “who,” the very first
to emerge in both systems, Guglielmo leaves the WH-question words
in-situ in Italian exactly as is typical in Jakarta Indonesian.
In short, we can distinguish three broadly defined developmental
stages of WH-forms. First, there is the preproduction stage. In this
stage, “what,” “where,” and “who” WH-questions are regularly pro-
duced in Indonesian, but in the case of Italian the child is still in the
preproduction stage. This stage lasts until the age of 2;5 when the first
WH-forms in Italian start to appear in isolation or in fragments. Second,
there is an early production stage where mixing is involved. At this stage,
Guglielmo started producing questions in Italian, but in many cases con-
tinued to use the WH-word as in Indonesian. This stage lasts until the
age of four and above and the child leaves most of the WH-questions
for “what,” “where,” and “who” in-situ, also as in the Indonesian case.
Third, there is a final stage in which appropriate structures emerge, in

which the target production of WH-forms in Italian is achieved, though

relatively late compared to a monolingual.
The simplest explanation for the above-noted occurrence of cross-
linguistic structures is that of dominance. This explanation has been
provided in other examples of bilingual acquisition in two typologically
distinct languages which display exactly the same case of syntactic
transfer. For example, Yip and Matthews (2000) discuss the develop-
ment of syntax in Cantonese and English. Their data reveals the same
kind of cross-linguistic influence in the production of WH-structures and
their conclusions also apply to this Indonesian-Italian context. Future
studies of other bilingual contexts may well confirm this pattern.
In order to more thoroughly investigate these issues, a study on cross-
linguistic influence and the interaction of different linguistic systems is
needed as well as analysis of the behavior of non-target structures of
monolingual children. It remains to be seen whether certain language
combinations produce heightened degrees of structural cognitive disso-
nance and it is this domain of research, particularly with structurally
acutely distinct languages and poly-linguistic settings, that offers an
especially interesting research horizon. On a modest level, this study
has simply sought to explore how WH in-situ questions in bilingual sit-
uations demonstrate syntactic dominance of the stronger language. In so
doing, this study has added one more case to the literature on this phe-
nomenon by examining a case of bilingual language acquisition rarely
considered – that of Jakarta Indonesian and Italian.
A BBREV IATIO N S
1 2 3: first, second and third personal pronouns

def: definite article
dist: distal
f : feminine
G: Guglielmo
imps: impersonal
ind: indicative mode
inf: infinitive
JI: Jakarta Indonesian

loc: locative
m: masculine
MPI: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
neg: negation
pass: passive
ppart: past-participle
pres: present tense
prox: proximal
refl: reflexive
rel: relativizer
sg: singular
N O TES
1. The dominant language of a bilingual, in a broad definition, refers here to the lan-
guage used with higher proficiency and following the trends of development of
monolinguals, whereas the weaker language is the one where the pace of develop-
ment is slower. Dominance also depends on quality and quantity of input resulting in
quality and quantity in the output. No MLU (mean length of utterance) calculation
has been performed simply because in Jakarta Indonesian the MLU calculation is
not considered without problems. As an isolating language with some agglutinating
features it is very difficult to calculate the number of morphemes in an utterance
and also the MLUw (mean word length of utterance) is considered difficult to apply
as it depends on what constitutes a word, a problem that in some cases cannot
be resolved. It can be interesting to see that the same problematic issue has been
addressed by Yip and Matthews (2000: 197) for Cantonese. As Döpke (1998: 564)
observes, MLU may not be directly comparable across languages, especially those
of different morphological types.
2. Many of the features listed above are also shared by Standard Indonesian though
the main difference is in a stricter verbal morphology and less free word order (see
Sneddon 1996, Musgrave 2001).
3. On this issue, recently Salvi and Vanelli (2005: 55–66) have proposed a dou-
ble word order for Italian: SV in accusative sentences, and VS in inaccusative
sentences.
4. Another relevant difference is that the so called WH-words in Jakarta Indonesian
do not represent, as in Italian, a coherent class of words, but can be treated as
pro-adverbs (Musgrave 2006 pc.).
5. Despite the interesting issues behind it, no particular study has been carried out on
the different intonational patterns in Italian and JI, nor in the utterances produced
by the bilingual child.

6. Data for English refer to a work done by Bloom et al. (1982) aimed to study the
acquisition of WH-questions by seven English speaking children aged two to three.
Data for Jakarta Indonesian come from the Child Acquisition project of the Max
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Jakarta and data for Italian are
based on the CHILDES corpus.
7. For a detailed cross-linguistic summary of the study of the development of
WH-questions in other languages, see Clancy (1989: 329)
8. Cameron-Faulkner et al.’s work on the child directed speech approach shows that
there is interdependence between the language used by adults addressing children
and what children learn at particular stages. In documenting the proportional dis-
tribution of the kind of utterances that children hear early in their third year of
life, they noted that in a surprisingly high proportion of questions (one third of the
mothers’ utterances), they actively elicited linguistic interaction with their children
(Cameron-Faulkner et al. 2003: 851). In exploring these discursive contexts, they
found that “what” was the most common and accounted for half of all the WH-
questions, followed by “where,” “why,” “how” and “which.” Interestingly enough,
they make no mention of “when,” which is predictable, as “when” universally
emerges later.
9. This issue is confirmed by another Indonesian case study carried out by Dardjowid-
joyo (2000). He notices that Echa, the child he studied, starts with “mana” and
“apa” (before the age of 2;0) and only later, she produces questions with “siapa” and
“gimana.” At the beginning Echa does not seem to be able to differentiate between
“apa” and “siapa” and “mana” means “where” and “which”. “Kapan” “when” is
not acquired productively until the age of three (Dardjowidjoyo 2000:129).
10. This confirms the tendency that early-acquisition of WH-questions in-situ is error
free as the syntactic structure is simpler since it does not involve movement
(Cole et al. in press).
11. Data refer to a database containing so far about 20,000 utterances of one-hour
monthly video-recordings taken during the age of 1;5 and 4;6. A number of data
refer to the diary study.
12. Just to give a simple example, every time the child is asked a when-question
“quando” related to the past, he simply replies with ieri “yesterday.” Ieri is the
translation of the temporal expression in Jakarta Indonesian kemaren that means
indeed yesterday but it is often used also to refer in a quite vague way to any time
in the past and whose meaning is essentially contextual.
13. In the data produced by Guglielmo, I use the orthographic convention to mark the
Italian forms in italic whereas the Jakarta Indonesian ones are underlined. Where
necessary, the JI version of the mixed utterances produced by the child is displayed
on the right.
14. It is important to notice that his sister Beatrice at more or less at the same
age produces exactly the same kind of structures where the WH-form che cosa
“what” is inappropriately used in many cases but probably means the WH-form

by default. Early inappropriate uses of “what” for “where” are mentioned also
cross-linguistically by other authors like Yip and Matthews (2000: 199) in their
Cantonese English case study.
15. The use of “want” in this meaning happens all the time in Italian sentences and is
employed in exactly the same way by Guglielmo’s younger sister.
16. This example is interesting because it shows the question word perché (“why”) and
the form per che cos’è (“for what”) in the same sentence, and because other mixing
features appear in the sentence like the morphological mixing of the Indonesian
word tusuk (“pierce”) followed by the Italian infinitive suffix of the verb.
17. In order to explain the late acquisition of the WH-question, Clark (1973) proposes
that its late acquisition depends on the fact that in English, time expressions are
derived from space expressions. He explicitly states that: “description of time is
based on spatial metaphor in which time is viewed as a single dimensional asym-
metric continuum, running horizontally from front to back through the speaker”
(Clark 1973: 52). This might explain some of the expressions used by the bilingual
child in response to “when” questions in Jakarta Indonesian and Italian prior to the
age of three where he used to reply with numbers or with a location.
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COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF BILINGUALISM

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Part 1 Structure and Components of the Bilingual

Chapter 1. The Neurofunctional Components of the Bilingual

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Part 2 Bilingual Language Processing

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Our everyday life is characterized by conscious purposiveness. Our

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Langacker focuses on epistemology rather than ontology because for

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to alter the flow of normal language development. However, as Kovacs

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that are the results of conceptual blending. According to his approach,

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that cross-linguistic factors in bilinguals’ development had an influence

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repeat those in a bilingual’s first language lead to a contradictory set of

Anderson, N. H. 1996. A functional theory of cognition. Mahwah: Erlbaum.

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Jackendoff, R. 2002. Foundation of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS OF THE

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THE NEUROFUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS

1.1. Neurofunctional Components of the Verbal

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attention to something other than what is being internalized as linguistic

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No one would ever say anything without the desire to communicate

1.2. Neurofunctional Components of the Bilingual

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memory stores or one (McCormack 1977). Typically, bilingual subjects

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shaped them, though they retain all their language-specific idiosyn-

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1.3. The Subsystems Hypothesis

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Figure 1. Partial integration (after Cook’s [2003] Figure 1.3 B).

1.4. Redundancy of Representation in each Subsystem

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is a mere historical accident and it changes over time. Let us consider a

2. T HE NAT UR E O F REPRESEN TATIO N S, TH EIR

Bilinguals have a conceptual base that is qualitatively identical to

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2.1. Similarity in Nature

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The same L1 word may activate different concepts depending on the

2.2. Similarity in Organization

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stored. In this respect, bilinguals differ from unilinguals no more than

2.3. Similarity in Development

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knowledge of the world – and, to some extent, of our native language –

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2.4. Similarity in Processing

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