Forcible Entry Cases

1
FORCIBLE ENTRY CASES

Abad vs. Farrales, 647 SCRA 473, G.R. No. 178635 April 11, 2011
Ejectment; Forcible Entry; Jurisdiction; Two allegations are indispensible in actions for forcibly entry to enable
first level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that the plaintiff had prior physical possession of the
property; and, second, that the defendant deprived him of such possession by means of force, intimidation,
threats, strategy, or stealth.—Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry to enable first
level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that the plaintiff had prior physical possession of the
property; and, second, that the defendant deprived him of such possession by means of force, intimidation,
threats, strategy, or stealth.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not required to use in his allegations
the exact terminology employed by the rules. It is enough that the facts set up in the complaint show that
dispossession took place under the required conditions.—There is no question that Abad made an allegation
in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the subject property. The only issue is with respect to
his allegation, citing such property as one “of which they have complete physical and material possession of
the same until deprived thereof.” Abad argues that this substantially alleges plaintiffs prior physical
possession of the property before the dispossession, sufficient to confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the
action. The Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not required to use in his allegations the exact
terminology employed by the rules. It is enough that the facts set up in the complaint show that dispossession
took place under the required conditions.
Same; Same; Prior Physical Possession; It is of course not enough that the allegations of the complaint make
out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must also be able to prove his allegations.
He has to prove that he had prior physical for this gives him the security that entitles him to remain in the
property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.—It is of course not enough that the allegations
of the complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must also be able to prove his allegations. He
has to prove that he had prior physical possession for this gives him the security that entitles him to remain in
the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.
This case is about a) the need, when establishing the jurisdiction of the court over an action for forcible entry,
for plaintiff to allege in his complaint prior physical possession of the property and b) the need for plaintiff to
prove as well the fact of such prior physical possession.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Servillano Abad claims that on August 6, 2002 he and his wife, Dr. Estrella E. Gavilan-Abad, bought a
428-square meter registered property on 7 Administration St., GSIS Village, Project 8, Quezon City,[1] from
Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis Farrales. The latter were the wife and sons, respectively, of the late brother of
respondents Oscar Farrales (Oscar) and Daisy Farrales-Villamayor (Daisy).[2] Teresita operated a boarding
house on the property.[3]
Because the Abads did not consider running the boarding house themselves, they agreed to lease the
property back to Teresita for P30,000.00 a month so she could continue with her business.[4] But, although
the lease had a good start, Teresita suddenly abandoned the boarding house,[5] forcing the Abads to take
over by engaging the services of Bencio Duran, Teresita's helper, to oversee the boarding house business.[6]
On December 7, 2002, Dr. Abad went to the boarding house to have certain damage to some toilets repaired.
While she was attending to the matter, she also hired house painters to give the boarding house fresh coat of
paint.[7] On December 8, 2002 Oscar and Daisy came, accompanied by two men, and forcibly took possession
2
of the boarding house. Frightened, the painters called the Abads who immediately sought police help. The
Abads were later appeased, however, when they learned that the intruders left the place.
Two days later or on December 10, 2002, the day the Abads left for abroad, Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered
and took possession of the property once again. Because of this, on March 10, 2003 petitioner Servillano Abad
(Abad) filed a complaint[8] for forcible entry against the two before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City.[9]
Oscar and Daisy vehemently denied that they forcibly seized the place. They claimed ownership of it by
inheritance. They also claimed that they had been in possession of the same from the time of their birth.
[10] That Oscar had been residing on the property since 1967 as attested to by a March 31, 2003 certification
issued by Barangay Bahay Toro.[11]
While the defendants admitted that Daisy herself ceased to reside on the property as early as 1986, they
pointed out that she did not effectively give up her possession. Oscar and Daisy further claimed that when
their parents were still alive, the latter mortgaged the property to a bank to secure a loan. After their mother
passed away, they decided to lease portions of the property to help pay the loan. Daisy managed the
operation of the boarding house.[12] To bolster their claim, Oscar and Daisy presented copies of rental
receipts[13] going back from 2001 to 2003. They would not have been able to lease the rooms unless they
were in possession.[14]
Further, Oscar and Daisy asked the MeTC to dismiss the action on the ground of failure of Abad to show that
he and his wife enjoyed prior physical possession of the property, an essential requisite in forcible entry cases.
Abad's allegation that he and his wife immediately leased the property after they bought it was proof that
they were never in possession of it for any length of time.[15]
On March 30, 2005 the MeTC rendered a decision[16] in favor of Abad, stating that Oscar and Daisy could not
acquire ownership of the property since it was registered. And, as owner, Abad was entitled to possession.
Disagreeing with the MeTC, Oscar and Daisy went up to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. In a
decision17 dated October 26, 2005, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC in its totality. It held that
Oscar and Daisy could no longer impugn the jurisdiction of the MeTC over the action since they raised the
ground of Abad's failure to allege prior physical possession in his complaint for the first time on appeal.
Besides, said the RTC, since the complaint alleged that Servillano owned the property, it may be presumed
that he also had prior possession of it. No evidence to the contrary having been presented, the presumption
stood.
Abad moved for immediate execution[18] and partial reconsideration[19] of the decision with respect to his
claim for attorney's fees, exemplary damages, and reasonable rents. For their part, Oscar and Daisy sought
reconsideration[20] of the RTC decision and moved to strike out Abad's motions.[21] On December 1, 2005
the RTC issued an Order,[22] granting Abad's motion for immediate execution that would place him in
possession and ordering the immediate release to him of the P390,000.00 supersedeas bond that Oscar and
Daisy posted in the case. Further, the RTC partially reconsidered its decision by awarding attorney's fees of
P20,000.00 to Abad. Oscar and Daisy moved for the reconsideration of this order.[23] In an Order dated
December 9, 2005, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Oscar and Daisy of its October 26,
2005 Decision on the ground of non-compliance with Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Undaunted, Oscar and Daisy filed a petition for review[24] with the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 8, 2007
3
the CA rendered a decision,[25] annulling the decisions and orders of both the MeTC and the RTC on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA pointed out that Abad merely alleged in his complaint that he leased the
property to Teresita after he and his wife bought the same and that, thereafter, Oscar and Daisy forcibly
entered the same. Since Abad did not make the jurisdictional averment of prior physical possession, the
MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his action. Further, Oscar and Daisy ably proved actual possession
from 1967 through the barangay certification. Since the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, all the
proceedings in the case were void.[26]
Abad moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same,[27] hence, in the present petition for review.
[28]
Questions Presented
The case presents the following questions:
1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently alleged in his complaint the jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession
of the disputed property to vest the MeTC with jurisdiction over his action; and
2. In the affirmative, whether or not Abad sufficiently proved that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the
property in question.
The Court's Rulings
Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry to enable first level courts to acquire jurisdiction
over them: first, that the plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property; and, second, that the
defendant deprived him of such possession by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth.[29]
There is no question that Abad made an allegation in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the
subject property. The only issue is with respect to his allegation, citing such property as one "of which they
have complete physical and material possession of the same until deprived thereof." Abad argues that this
substantially alleges plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property before the dispossession, sufficient to
confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action. The Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not
required to use in his allegations the exact terminology employed by the rules. It is enough that the facts set
up in the complaint show that dispossession took place under the required conditions.[30]
It is of course not enough that the allegations of the complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff
must also be able to prove his allegations. He has to prove that he had prior physical possession[31] for this
gives him the security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a better right lawfully
ejects him.[32]
Here, evidently, the Abads did not take physical possession of the property after buying the same since they
immediately rented it to Teresita who had already been using the property as a boarding house. Abad claims
that their renting it to Teresita was an act of ownership that amounted to their acquiring full physical
possession of the same.[33]
But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita began only in September 2002.[34] Oscar and Daisy, on the
other hand, have proved that they had been renting spaces in the property as early as 2001 as evidenced by
receipts that they issued to their lessees. This was long before they supposedly entered the property, using
force, in 2002.
4
Of course, Abad pointed out that the cited receipts covered rents in a place called "D's Condominium" in
Sampaloc, Manila, and were only made to appear through handwritten notations that they were issued for
rooms in the property subject of the suit.[35] But a close examination of the receipts shows that "D's
Condominium" was just the name that Daisy employed in her business of renting rooms. The receipts did not
necessarily describe another place. Indeed, they provided blank spaces for describing as the subject of rent
the property subject of this case. And, except for Abad's bare claim that Teresita and his sons had long been in
possession before they sold it to him and his wife, he offered no evidence to show that this was in fact the
case.
Abad assails as irregularly issued the barangay certification that Oscar had been residing on the subject
property since 1967. He claims that it could have been issued as a mere favor to a friend, the barangay
chairman having been Oscar's childhood playmate[36] But Abad has no proof of these allegations. He has not
overcome the presumption that the barangay chairman performed his official duty and acted regularly in
issuing such certification.[37]
Finally, Abad argued that with the title to the property in his name, he has in his favor the right to the actual,
physical, exclusive, continuous, and peaceful possession of the same. He pointed out that his possession de
facto began from the time of the signing and notarization of the deed of absolute sale, becoming de jure once
the title was issued in his name.[38]
It is of course true that a property owner has the right to exercise the attributes of ownership, one of which is
the right to possess the property. But Abad is missing the point. He is referring to possession flowing from
ownership which is not in issue in this case. Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than
physical possession or possession de facto, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Only
prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.[9]
For these reasons, the Court finds that Servillano utterly failed to prove prior physical possession in his favor.
The absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry warrants the dismissal of the
complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review of petitioner Servillano E. Abad and AFFIRMS in their
entirety the decision dated March 8, 2007 and resolution dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP 92617.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
[1] Transfer Certificate of Title N-241669 over the property was issued in the name of the Abads by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on September 19, 2002.
[2] Rollo,p. 10-11.
[3] Records, pp. 249-250 (pagination in red ink); records, pp. 165 (pagination in red ink), 372.
[4] Id. at 12-13, 165 (pagination in red ink), 255 (pagination in red ink).
5
[5] Rollo, p.
16, CA rollo, 275, records, p. 165 (pagination in red ink).
[6] Id.; id.
[7] Id.; records, p. 165.
[8] Records, pp. 1-6. The complaint was raffled to Branch 37 and docketed as Civil Case 30312.
[9] Rollo, pp. 12-13, 16-17; records, pp. 166-167 (pagination in red ink).
[10] CA rollo, pp. 156, 158; id. at 192, 196,347.438.
[11] Id. at 229.
[12] Id. at 79, 174.
[13] Records, pp. 220-240.
[14] CA rollo, p. 21; Records 437.
[15] Id. at 159, 174,202-203.
[16] Records, pp. 275-277.
[17] CA rollo, pp. 48-50.
[18] Records, pp. 384-385.
[19] Id. at 395-396.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 51-63.
[21] Id. at 214-223.
[22] Id. at 64-67.
[23] Id. at 68-76.
[24] Id. at 9-46. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP 92617.
[25] Rollo, pp. 47-60. Penned by Associate justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa with Associate Justices Marina L.
Buzon and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
[26] Id. at 56-58.
[27] Id. at 77-78.
6
[28] Id. at 8-46.
[29] Section 1, Rule 70 of the RULES OF COURT; Sales v. Barro, G.R. No. 171678, December 10, 2008. 573 SCRA
456, 462-463; Varona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124148, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 577, 583-584,
citing Spouses Tirana v. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, 299 (2001).
[30] Cajayon v. Spouses Batuyong, 517 Phil. 648, 659 (2006).
[31] Domalsin v. Spouses Valenciano, 515 Phil. 745, 763 (2006).
[32] De Grano v. Lacaba, G.R. No. 15S877, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 148, 157.
[33] Records, pp. 41,44-45, 62.
[34] Id. at 12-13.
[35] Rollo, p. 39.
[36] Id. at 37.
[37] Please see: San Miguel Village School v. Pimdogar, G.R. No. 80264, May 31, 1989, 173 SCRA 704,
710; Autencio v. City Administrator Manara, 489 Phil. 752, 758 (2005).
[38] Records, pp. 174 (pagination in red ink), 368.
[39] De Grano v. Lacaba, supra note 32, at 159.
[40] Lee v. Paz, G.R. No. 183606, October 27, 2009.
Antazo vs. Doblada, 611 SCRA 586, G.R. No. 178908 February 4, 2010
Remedial Law; Ejectment; Forcible Entry; Unlawful Detainer; In ejectment cases, possession means nothing
more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.—
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced, considering that this is a forcible entry case. They are apparently referring
to “possession” flowing from ownership of the property, as opposed to actual possession. In ejectment cases,
possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law.
Same; Same; Same; Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case.—Prior
physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of
his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. The party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
Same; Same; Same; In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.—We
also note that petitioners did not deny in their Answer respondents’ allegation that they constructed a
concrete fence on the subject property. Failure to specifically deny the allegation amounts to a judicial
admission. Unlawfully entering the subject property, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom
7
the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does
not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Even usurpers of land owned by another are entitled to remain on it until they are
lawfully ejected therefrom.—While the Letter intimates that petitioners were in possession of the property
prior to respondents and that the latter were the ones who forcibly evicted them therefrom, such statement
is clearly self-serving and unsupported by other evidence. Verily, this information, assuming that it is true, is
not relevant to the resolution of this case. This case involves respondents’ cause of action against petitioners
for evicting them from the subject property which was in their possession. It is immaterial how respondents
came into such possession or by what right they did so. Even usurpers of land owned by another are entitled
to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected therefrom.
Same; Same; Same; The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands.—Granting
that petitioners had earlier possession and respondents were the ones who first forcibly dispossessed them of
the property, this circumstance would not have given petitioners license to recover possession in the same
way. Such course of action is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule on ejectment. The underlying
philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the
party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party
deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Petitioners would have had a right of action
against respondents to file an ejectment suit, but they evidently let the chance pass and chose the easier and
faster way. Unfortunately for them, this time, their opponents chose to resort to appropriate judicial
measures.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rodrigo L. Yuson for petitioners.
Pablo B. Francisco for respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated February 28, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated July 18, 2007, which affirmed the order directing petitioners to vacate the subject property.
The case arose from the following antecedents:
Respondents, Leonides Doblada, Diosdado Celestra, Leopoldo Celestra, Ferdinand Celestra, and Roberto
Doblada, filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners, spouses Eulogio N. Antazo and Nelia C.
Antazo. The complaint alleged that respondents have been in open and peaceful possession of a parcel of
land, identified as Assessor’s Lot Nos. 112 and 113, located in Barangay Pila-Pila, Binangonan, Rizal, with an
area of, approximately, 551.87 square meters.3
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Marlene
Gonzales-Sison, concurring; Rollo, pp. 21-32.
8
2 Id., at pp. 34-35.
3 CA Rollo, p. 60.
589
Respondents narrated that, in May 2003, they received a letter from petitioners, through the Panganiban
Law Office, informing them that the latter had bought the property. It was made to appear in the said letter
that respondents forcibly took possession of the property from petitioners. Respondents replied that they
could not have wrested possession of the property from petitioners, as they were in possession thereof and
that, in fact, on June 11, 2003, petitioners evicted them therefrom, destroyed respondents’ bamboo fence,
and constructed a concrete perimeter fence thereon.4
In their Answer, petitioners admitted that they sent a letter to respondents through the Panganiban Law
Office, but they denied that respondents had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. They
averred that respondents failed to show their right to recover possession of the property. On the contrary,
petitioners claimed that they are the ones entitled to possess the property considering that they purchased it
from a certain Carmencita S. Anciano, registered it for taxation purposes in their names, and paid the real
property tax thereon.
The records reveal that the subject property is part of the parcel of land owned by Eduardo Paralejas,
respondents’ great grandfather, who died in 1939. Paralejas had three daughters: Matea, Eufemia and
Leoncia. On April 12, 1983, Eufemia and Atanacio Buesa, Matea’s son, purportedly executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale,5 adjudicating to themselves the entire parcel of land and, at the same time, selling it to
Guadalupe Morales Sevillano. The document bears the thumbprints of Eufemia and Atanacio, which,
respondents claim, are not genuine. After Sevillano died on November 24, 1995, her sole heir, Carmencita S.
Anciano, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, executed a document, denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay ng
Paglilipat sa Sarili
_______________
4 Id., at p. 61.
5 Id., at pp. 44-46.
590
ng Mga Lupang Naiwan ng Namatay,6 adjudicating to herself the properties that Sevillano left, which included
the subject property. On April 21, 2003, Anciano sold the subject property to petitioners.7
On July 2, 2004, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) dismissed the complaint because respondents failed to prove
by preponderance of evidence that they had prior possession of the subject property. The court a quo found
that ownership and possession of the subject property was transferred to petitioners when they purchased
the same from Anciano. 8
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially affirmed the MTC Decision.9 Upon respondents’ motion for
reconsideration, the RTC, in an Order dated May 29, 2006, reversed its previous decision and ruled in favor of
respondents, thus:
9
“Wherefore, this Court reconsiders the Decision of Judge Bernelito R. Fernandez, dated August 18, 2005, and
the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan dated July 2, 2004 is hereby reversed as follows:
A. That the complaint which was dismissed by the Lower Court is hereby reinstated.
B. That this Court finds that the plaintiffs-appellants were in prior possession of lot 112 and 113, subject of
this case, before defendants-appellees Eulogio Antazo and Nelia Antazo forcibly seized possession of the
aforementioned property from the plaintiffs-appellants.
C. That defendants-appellees, Eulogio Antazo, and Nelia Antazo are hereby ordered to vacate lots 112, 113
situated at Barrio Pila-Pila, Binangonan, Rizal, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17-0765 consisting of 787.87
square meters.
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 127-128.
7 Id., at pp. 76-77.
8 Rollo, p. 46.
9 Id., at p. 51.
591
D. That there was a substantial compliance of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law.
E. That the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to pay 1,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation
for the occupancy of the lots from the time they purchased the property on April 21, 2003 up to the present.
F. The defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of 20,000.00 pesos.
G. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”10
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC on August 1, 2006.11
Unrelenting, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA. On February 28, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision with modification, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION deleting the award of P1,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the land from April 21, 2003 up to the present.
SO ORDERED.”12
10
According to the CA, petitioners may not eject respondents from the subject property since it appears that, as
between them, the latter had prior possession thereof. Assuming that petitioners have the legal title to the
property and that respondents are mere usurpers thereof, the latter are nonetheless entitled to stay until
they are lawfully ejected therefrom.13 The CA also deleted the amount of reasonable compensation awarded
to respondents for the use and occupation of
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 56-57.
11 CA Rollo, p. 201.
12 Rollo, p. 31.
13 Id., at pp. 27-29.
592
the property, ratiocinating that the latter can recover only the damages they have sustained as mere
possessors.14
Both petitioners and respondents moved for the partial reconsideration of the decision. In a Resolution dated
July 18, 2007, the CA denied both motions.15
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari, ascribing the following errors to the CA:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVERSING
ITS EARLIER DECISION DATED AUGUST 18, 2005 AND IN ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF PETITIONERS FROM
LOTS 112 AND 113;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE PRIORITY IN POSSESSION OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.16
Petitioners contend that respondents’ claim is not supported by competent evidence. They aver that when
they bought the property from Anciano, the latter transferred to them possession and ownership of the
subject property. They point out that, after they purchased the property from Anciano, they declared it in
their names for taxation purposes and paid real property tax thereon.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced, considering that this is a forcible entry case. They are apparently referring
to “possession” flowing from ownership of the property, as opposed to actual possession. In ejectment cases,
possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law.17
_______________
14 Id., at p. 30.
11
15 Id., at p. 35.
16 Id., at p. 13.
17 Arbizo v. Santillan, G.R. No. 171315, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 610.
593
Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of
his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.18 The party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.19
We are convinced that respondents were in prior possession of the property and that petitioners deprived
them of such possession by means of force.
In the Letter dated May 26, 2003, Atty. Jimmy R. Panganiban of Panganiban Law Office, on behalf of
petitioners, wrote to respondents:
“According to my clients, they bought the above-mentioned property from the true and absolute owner
sometime in April 2003. Immediately upon the sale of said land in their favor, they took possession thereof in
the concept of an owner. They reported to me that they are now fencing said property. They were surprise[d]
that through force, violence, threat, strategy, and stealth you deprived them of possession. The saddest part
of it is that you timed the deprivation after they have already paid a worker for one week fencing activity.
They have already bought fencing construction materials such as gravel[,] sand, steel, wires, and others. They
could not understand why you are doing this thing to them because they know that you have no legal basis
[for] putting up a bamboo fence at the frontage portion of the said property.
Accordingly, FINAL DEMAND is hereby made upon all of you to remove the bamboo fence and to restore my
clients’ possession within five (5) days from receipt of this letter. If you [fail] to comply with this demand, I
shall take it that I am at liberty to file
_______________
18 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 510-511.
19 Id., at p. 493.
594
an ejectment case against all of you in order to protect the rights and interests of my clients.”20
The RTC correctly concluded that it would have been unnecessary to write the letter if petitioners were
already in possession of the property. The contents of the letter are clear—petitioners are demanding that
respondents restore possession of the property to them.
We also note that petitioners did not deny in their Answer respondents’ allegation that they constructed a
concrete fence on the subject property. Failure to specifically deny the allegation amounts to a judicial
admission. Unlawfully entering the subject property, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom
12
the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does
not have to institute a state of war.21 No other proof is necessary.
While the Letter intimates that petitioners were in possession of the property prior to respondents and that
the latter were the ones who forcibly evicted them therefrom, such statement is clearly self-serving and
unsupported by other evidence. Verily, this information, assuming that it is true, is not relevant to the
resolution of this case. This case involves respondents’ cause of action against petitioners for evicting them
from the subject property which was in their possession. It is immaterial how respondents came into such
possession or by what right they did so. Even usurpers of land owned by another are entitled to remain on it
until they are lawfully ejected therefrom.22
Granting that petitioners had earlier possession and respondents were the ones who first forcibly
dispossessed them of the property, this circumstance would not have given peti-
_______________
20 CA Rollo, p. 137. (Emphasis supplied.)
21 Arbizo v. Santillan, supra note 17, at 624-625.
22 Heirs of Pedro Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, G.R. No. 146815, April 9, 2003, 401 SCRA 181, 185.
595
tioners license to recover possession in the same way. Such course of action is precisely what is sought to be
avoided by the rule on ejectment. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of
the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law
alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own
hands.23 Petitioners would have had a right of action against respondents to file an ejectment suit, but they
evidently let the chance pass and chose the easier and faster way. Unfortunately for them, this time, their
opponents chose to resort to appropriate judicial measures.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The CA Decision dated February 28, 2007 and Resolution
dated July 18, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,** Corona (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—The fact of prior physical possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry case—the plaintiff
must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises long before he was deprived thereof by
the defendant. (Acaylan Jr. vs. Harayo, 560 SCRA 624 [2008])
——o0o——
_______________
13
23 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18, at 512.
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Special Order No. 818 dated
January 18, 2010. Antazo vs. Doblada, 611 SCRA 586, G.R. No. 178908 February 4, 2010
G.R. No. 142308. November 15, 2005.*
SPS. REV. ELMER J. BAÑES & ANGELA BAÑES, SPS. REV. MANUEL DEL ROSARIO & GUIA DEL ROSARIO, and SPS.
PEDRO SAN RAMON & NENITA SAN RAMON, petitioners, vs. LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE PHILIPPINES, OSCAR
ALMAZAN, JAMES CERDENOLA, LUIS AO-AS, EDWINO MERCADO, ANTONIO REYES and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Judgments; Appeals; Motions for Reconsideration; Pleadings and Practice; While it is true that a pro forma
motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the period to appeal, it is also axiomatic that
Rules on the perfection of appeals must occasionally yield to the loftier ends of substantial justice and equity.
—True, a pro forma motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the period to appeal.
However, it is also axiomatic that Rules on the perfection of appeals must occasionally yield to the loftier ends
of substantial justice and equity. In the present case, petitioners filed their motion for extension of time to file
a petition for review within
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
14
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bañes vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines
15 days from receipt of the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333,
which was granted. Then they filed their petition for review with this Court within the extended period. Under
the premises and considering the merits of the case which ultimately negate the finding of the CA that the
motion for reconsideration was pro forma, justice would be better served if we consider the present petition
for review as duly filed.
Same; Same; Law of the Case; Words and Phrases; Law of the case is the opinion delivered by the court on a
former appeal—it applies to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and
remands the case of the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of
the case upon subsequent appeal.—Law of the case is the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It applies to
an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower
court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent
appeal. It further means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
14
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case before the court. As a rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case
whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a
rehearing. Indeed, courts must adhere thereto, whether the legal principles laid down were “correct on
general principles or not,” or “whether the question is right or wrong” because public policy, judicial
orderliness and economy require such stability in the final judgments of courts or tribunals of competent
jurisdiction.
Actions; Ejectment; Forcible Entry; In filing forcible entry cases, two allegations are mandatory for the
municipal court to acquire jurisdiction—first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
property, and, second, he must allege that he has been deprived of his possession by any of the means
provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
Any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner
himself.—There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building
by means of force, intimidation, threat,
15
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 15, 2005
15
strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on
who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical
possession of the property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of
the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to
the physical possession of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto
may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any
claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation
thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case,
the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war—the act of going to the property and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies exertion of force over the property; The words “by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth” include every situation or condition under which one person can
wrongfully enter upon real property to exclude another, who has prior possession therefrom.—In order to
constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of
war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based
on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. As expressly stated in David vs. Cordova …The
words “by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth” include every situation or condition under which
one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession
therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already
15
clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes
such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be
maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the
mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.
16
16
Same; Same; Same; The presence of men in the subject property restricting a person’s mobility constitutes
force contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.—The presence of such men in the subject
property restricting petitioners’ mobility constitutes force contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.
Same; Same; Same; Regardless of the actual condition of the ti-tle of the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.—It is true that petitioners
Bañes and Del Rosario wrote LCP expressing their willingness to voluntarily vacate the premises upon finding
another place to live in, but this is after respondents had padlocked the premises and used armed men to
prevent their coming to and from the premises. Otherwise stated, said letters do not negate the initial use of
force by respondents which constituted forcible entry. It is undisputed that respondents owned the property
occupied by petitioners, still their use of force in evicting petitioners therefrom was not justified. Indeed,
regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not
be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. The owner who has title over the property cannot take the
law into his own hands to regain possession of said property. He must go to court.
Roberto L. Mendoza for petitioners.
Humphrey D. Tumaneng for respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333 dated No-
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Omar U. Amin (now retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Hector L.
Hofileña (now retired) and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Rollo, pp. 42-54.
17
16
17
vember 12, 1999 and its Resolution2 dated February 15, 2000 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On August 16, 1990, certain members of the Lutheran Church in the Philippines (LCP) filed an action against its
President, Thomas Batong, and six other members of the Board of Directors,3 before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), for accounting and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and
appointment of a management committee. This resulted in the division of the LCP into two factions, namely:
the Batong/Saguilayan group which includes herein petitioners and the Ladlad/Almazan group which includes
herein respondents Almazan, et al.
On October 16, 1992, the SEC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which reads as follows:
“…It is hereby ordered that you, the above-named respon-dents,4 your agents, representative or any person
acting for or under your instruction refrain from representing yourselves or from acting as board of directors
or officers of the Lutheran Church in the Philippines, Inc. (LCP) and from holding any convention or general or
special membership meeting as well as election of the members of the LCP Board of Directors, until further
order from this Hearing Officer.”5
By virtue of said injunction, on August 13, 1993,6 herein respondents, with the aid of certain members of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, the Philippine National Police, and Sheriff Primo Alimurong of
the Regional Trial
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 56-58.
3 Juanito Basalong, Augusto Catangui, Paul Garcia, Guido Rivera, Victorio Saguilayan and Danilo Zamora;
Records, Vol. I, p. 113.
4Ibid.
5 Records, Vol. I, p. 113.
6 Decision dated April 15, 1997 of RTC, Manila, Br. 34 in Civil Case No. 96-79078, RTC Rollo, p. 77.
18
18
17
Court (RTC), Manila, tried to dispossess petitioners, as previous clergymen and occupants of the residential
houses located at 4443 Old Sta. Mesa Street, Manila, owned by LCP and form part of the compound where
the principal office of LCP is located. Petitioners however refused to leave the same. Thus, the main gate of
the subject property was padlocked by respondents, preventing the petitioners and their families from going
in and out of said place. Security guards were also stationed at the premises with an instruction not to allow
petitioners entry and exit.7
Almost a month thereafter, or on September 9, 1993, petitioners Manuel G. Del Rosario and Elmer J. Bañes
wrote letters addressed to Rev. Eduardo Ladlad, as LCP President.
Del Rosario’s letter reads:
Dear Rev. Ladlad:
Greetings in Christ’s love and peace.
This is to request for an extension of my family’s stay at the residence we are presently staying and which I
was told to leave on or before September 10, 1993. If it is all possible, please let us stay up to the Schools’
semestral break so as to give us sufficient time to look for a place where we could settle in and which will not
so much affect the travel time of my girls to go to and come home from school.
We hope that your Board will favorably grant this request for the sake of Christian charity with which we are
making the appeal. And, thank you so much for the benign audience you accorded us last night.
In Christ,
(sgd.)
Manuel G. del Rosario
(In his own handwriting)

P.S.
Ed,
_______________
7 Rollo, pp. 45-46, CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333 dated November 12, 1999.
19
19

18
I assure you that we will leave the place even before the semestral break as soon as we get a place to move
into. Hope you take much considerations on the difficulty of looking for a place we can afford to stay.
Ditto8
Bañes’s letter reads as follows:
Dear Rev. Ladlad,
Grace, Mercy and Peace from God our Father and Lord! The house where we live in for some two years now,
meant so many things to us…
Now we don’t have a place to go. I’m sure Eddie, you know my situation. We can’t hardly afford to rent a
decent house. Please do extend your helping hand to me and my family.
May I propose that we stay in the Caloocan Property—the lower portion of the house. The Upper portion is
for Rev. Saquilayang’s office and Chapel of Immanuel Lutheran Church. We will definitely leave the Yellow
house once we find a place to live.
Thank you very much.
May we expect a favorable response soonest.
In Christ,
(sgd)
Rev. Elmer J. Bañes9
Petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario eventually left the premises.10 Petitioners-spouses San Ramon did not
write any letter but they were able to leave the premises by befriending the guards posted at the gate.11
_______________
8 Records, Vol. I, p. 218.
9Id., p. 219.
10 Rollo, p. 46, CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333 dated November 12, 1999.
11 Id., pp. 113-114, MeTC Decision dated May 2, 1996.
20
20
19
On December 3, 1993, petitioners filed an action for forcible entry with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order and preliminary mandatory injunction against the respondents herein. Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 13, Manila granted petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining
order.12 The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 142991-CV, was subsequently raffled to MeTC, Branch 7 and on
March 2, 1994, the court, through Judge Emelita Habacon-Garayblas, issued an order granting petitioners’
prayer for injunctive relief, pertinent portions of which read:
“…it appearing that plaintiffs are suffering and will continue to suffer great and irreparable damage and injury
unless restored in the physical possession of the premises in dispute; and it further appearing that at present
defendants threaten to continue demolishing the houses of the plaintiffs on the basis of these considerations,
the Court finds that the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction pending final determination of
the principal issues is proper and in order. The Court therefore resolves to grant the application for writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.”13
On March 5, 1994, respondents filed a (belated) motion to suspend resolution of the prayer for issuance of
preliminary mandatory injunction and for inhibition. On March 16, 1994, Judge Habacon-Garayblas inhibited
herself from further hearing the case and ordered its record to be returned to the office of the Executive
Judge for re-raffle. The case was reraffled to Branch 18 on March 18, 1994.14
Respondents then went to the RTC by way of prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining
order and preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-69789, questioning the correctness
of the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the petitioners.
_______________
12 Id., p. 46.
13 Records, Vol. I, pp. 410-411.
14 Rollo, p. 47, CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333 dated November 12, 1999.
21
21
On March 21, 1994, RTC, Branch 42, Manila, issued a temporary restraining order in favor of herein
respondents.15 On April 8, 1994, the RTC Branch 42, Manila issued an Order stating that inasmuch as the case
emanated from a case before the SEC, respondents are entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for.16 Pertinent
portions of said Order read:
20
“On the petitioners’ (herein respondents) application for a writ of preliminary injunction, admittedly the
parties in the case before the lower court are members of the Lutheran Church of the Philippines. And the
evidence submitted by the petitioners, as well as the transcript of the proceedings in the lower court which
were attached to the respondents’ opposition to the application for preliminary injunction established that
the case in the lower court is an off-shoot of a case that emanated from a case before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, whose orders were elevated to the Court of Appeals.
From the admitted facts, as well as evidence adduced, this Court finds that the petitioners are entitled to the
injunctive relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) let a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the respondents, particularly the Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court from further conducting proceedings in Civil Case No. 142991 until further orders
from this Court.”17
Petitioners elevated said Order to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34504 via a petition for certiorari, which
rendered a decision on October 13, 1995, annulling and setting aside the injunction issued by the RTC, the
fallo of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent court is DISSOLVED.
_______________
15 Ibid.
16 Records, Vol. III, p. 1199.
17 Ibid.
22
22
SO ORDERED.”18
Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied.
The case was thereafter remanded to the MeTC, Branch 18, presided by Judge Thelma Ponferrada who
rendered her decision dated May 2, 1996, thus:
21
“The fact of dispossession of the subject property is not disputed. The sole issue as defined in the preliminary
conference order of January 16, 1996… is whether or not such dispossession constitutes forcible entry under
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
From the evidence on record, the Court believes and so finds that the dispossession of the subject property
was effected without the required attendant circumstances of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing this case without pronouncements as to costs.”19
(Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that there was no force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, Judge Ponferrada gave weight to:
the letter of petitioner Rev. Elmer Bañes to the LCP President asking that they be allowed to live in the LCP’s
Caloocan property and signifying that they (Spouses Bañes) will leave the “yellow house” once they find
another place to live in; the testimony of petitioner Angela Bañes that the sheriff did not approach her
concerning the enforcement of the writ and that she is not aware that the sheriff approached her husband;
the testimony of petitioner Nenita San Ramon that she and her husband were able to leave the premises by
befriending the guard posted in their compound; and the joint affidavit of the petitioners which stated that
the guards and the counsel of LCP, Atty. Almazan, stopped Nenita San Ramon from leaving
_______________
18 Rollo, p. 100.
19 Id., pp. 111-115.
23
23
the premises to prevent her from appearing in the criminal complaint she filed against them.20
Petitioners appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-79078. The RTC, on April 15,
1997, reversed and set aside the MeTC decision.21 The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the lower court is hereby set aside
and a new one is hereby entered:
1.Ordering the defendants and those who derived possession from them to vacate, surrender and restore
possession of the questioned premises to the plaintiffs;
2.Ordering defendants to jointly and solidarily pay each of the plaintiffs’ spouses the sum of P5,000.00 a
month, starting from October 15, 1993 until defendants vacate and surrender the questioned premises to the
plaintiffs, as and for reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises;
22
3.Ordering defendants to jointly and solidarily pay each plaintiff spouses the sum of P20,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fee; and
4.The cost of suit.”22
Respondents thereafter went to the CA on a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 44333. On
November 12, 1999, the CA rendered herein assailed judgment wherein it found that while herein
respondents (petitioners in the CA) committed acts contrary to what is sanctioned by the laws, still, herein
petitioners (respondents in the CA) are not entitled to favorable judgment in their forcible entry case as
evidence show that they were willing to vacate the premises, thus:
_______________
20 Rollo, pp. 111-114.
21 Id., pp. 121-125.
22 Id., p. 125.
24
24
“Petitioner in utilizing the preliminary injunction order of SEC in evicting the respondents from the subject
premises, indeed committed an act contrary to what is sanctioned by the laws…
Respondent court erred in failing to consider the above-quoted letters to the president of LCP. For indeed, the
letter shows the willingness of the private respondents to voluntarily vacate the subject premises, only they
were requesting for an extension of their stay there. Which was obviously allowed by the petitioners, since
the respondents were able to stay there until October 1993, and respondents spouses were allowed, as
requested, to stay at the Caloocan property of LCP without paying rental. Such expression of willingness to
voluntarily vacate the subject premises clearly negates the elements of force and intimidation in a forcible
entry case.
Further, the letter of Rev. Del Rosario to the president of LCP convinced this Court that there is lack of force
and intimidation in the present case to constitute a forcible entry. . . .
...
Respondent court also erred in failing to consider the testimony of private respondent Angela Bañes on
February 17, 1994, proving that their request to allow them to transfer to the Caloocan property of LCP was
given due course by the petitioners. . . .
23
The above-quoted testimony of Angela Bañes (sic) renders the award of damages, in the amount of P5,000.00
monthly as reasonable rent in favor of the respondents by the respondent court, improper, as the
respondents were allowed by LCP to stay in the said property without payment of rental. Therefore, since
private respondents were allowed to stay at the petitioner’s place for free, they could not possibly spend for
rental. Clearly, respondent court erred in awarding payment of reasonable rent in favor of the respondents.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, finding cogent reasons to reverse the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 34, Manila, dated April 15, 1997 in the Civil Case No. 96-79078, entitled “Sps. Rev. Elmer J.
Bañes, et al. vs. Oscar Almazan, et al.,” the same is hereby SET ASIDE, adopting the decision of Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, and present petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to cost.
25
25
SO ORDERED.”23
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,24 petitioners now come before this Court alleging that
the CA erred:
…IN IGNORING THE LAW OF THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF DISPOSSESSION OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WHICH WAS ALREADY LITIGATED BY THE PARTIES AND ESTABLISHED IN CA-G.R. NO. 34504-Sp.
Proc. No. (sic)
II
…IN OVERTURNING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE PRESENCE OF FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION IN THE DISPOSSESSION OF PETITIONERS BECAUSE SAID FINDINGS ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT
WEIGHT AND RESPECT AS THE TRIAL JUDGE PERSONALLY HEARD THE EVIDENCE
III
…IN ALLOWING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO RAISE THE ABSENCE OF FORCE OR INTIMIDATION AS A DEFENSE
CONSIDERING THAT (1) THIS DEFENSE WAS NOT TIMELY RAISE (SIC) BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
ANSWER; AND (2) RESPONDENTS JUDICIALLY ADMITTED IN THEIR PLEADINGS THE USE OF FORCE OR
INTIMIDATION TO DISPOSSESS PETITIONERS
IV
24
…IN RULING THAT NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION WAS EMPLOYED IN DISPOSSESSING PETITIONERS AS THIS IS
NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE WHO
HEARD THE EVIDENCE AND THE RTC
…IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AND REASONABLE COMPENSATION
FOR
_______________
23 Id., pp. 49-54.
24 Id., p. 58.
26
26
THE PREMISES AS THIS IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH SECTION 17, RULE 70 AND THE RULE LAID DOWN IN
VAZQUEZ VS. GARCIA25
Petitioners argue that: it is settled in the October 13, 1995 Decision of the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34504, that
the acts of respondents in forcibly evicting the petitioners under the guise of a writ of injunction issued by the
SEC is not sanctioned by law;26 an entry of judgment of the said decision was made on June 7, 1996, thus said
issue is barred by the rule on conclusiveness of judgment as provided in Section 49, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court;27 the parties already litigated the issue of dispossession and the CA declared that petitioners had been
in possession of the subject premises long before the SEC case was filed and it was only because petitioners
refused to recognize the duly constituted board of directors that they were made to suffer by being taken out
of the house they had long been occupying; the findings of Judge Habacon-
_______________
25 Id., pp. 20-21.
26 Id., p. 22.
27 Rule 39, Section 49. Effect of Judgment.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or
judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
xxx
b)In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
25
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
c)In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
27
27
Garayblas of MeTC Branch 7, Manila, that respondents, together with several armed security guards, forcibly
took possession of the residential houses, occupied by petitioners, and evicted petitioners therefrom are also
entitled to great weight; the CA erred in allowing the respondents to belatedly raise the defense that
petitioners voluntarily vacated the subject premises because an appellant can only include in his assignment
of errors those questions of law or fact that have been raised in the court below and which are within the
issues framed by the parties; the CA’s findings that there was an absence of force and intimidation to
dispossess petitioners directly conflict with the findings of the RTC; the RTC’s conclusions are consistent and
find basis in the original findings of Judge Habacon-Garayblas who actually heard and received the evidence;
the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333, held that petitioners offered no resistance to their illegal eviction hence no
force or intimidation was employed, but, there is no necessity that the force offered or intended to be offered
be resisted if the failure to resist is due to intimidation or a well founded belief that resistance will be useless;
the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333, erred in ruling that petitioners are not entitled to attorney’s fees and
reasonable compensation for the premises; the award of reasonable compensation is warranted under
Section 17, Rule 70 in forcible entry cases and irrespective of whether the plaintiff is paying rents thereon or
not; as ruled in Vazquez vs. Garcia which was cited in the RTC decision, the plaintiff steps into the shoes of the
lessor and as such cannot recover damages other than the reasonable value of the use and enjoyment of the
property.28
Petitioners then prayed that the decision dated November 12, 1999 of the CA be reversed and set aside, the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the same be dissolved and the
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 24-37.
28
28
decision dated May 2, 199629 of the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 96-79078 be affirmed in toto.30
26
Respondents in their Comment contend that: petitioners were former clergymen of the LCP, who, during their
tour of duty, were given the privilege to use and occupy the subject properties not in their own right but as
mere agents/representatives of respondent LCP; petitioners admitted this, as manifested by their letters to
the officers of LCP asking for an extension of time to stay at the subject premises and look for a new place to
live in; eventually, petitioners transferred to another property also owned by respondent LCP without paying
any rents thereon; petitioners filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent LCP and its officers a few
months after they were recalled by respondents and despite being allowed to stay in the subject premises in
accordance with their letters requesting for extension to stay therein; the case for forcible entry has no basis
in fact and in law; and the November 12, 1999 decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333 has become final
and executory and can no longer be reviewed by this Court since the motion for reconsideration earlier filed
by petitioners with the CA was denied for being pro forma as “it has not raised any new issue or substantial
argument so as to merit its grant,” and therefore, it has not interrupted the time to appeal.31
On the issues raised by petitioners, respondents counter that: the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 34504 cannot be
considered as the law of the case in the present case since the two cases involved different issues; CA-G.R. SP
No. 34504 dwelt on the writ of injunction issued by the trial court and reached the CA by certiorari while the
present case involves the alleged forcible entry committed by respondents and reached the CA by way of
petition for review; petitioners who participated in the proceedings before the MeTC of Manila, Branch
_______________
29 Should be April 15, 1997.
30 Rollo, p. 37.
31 Id., pp. 145-146.
29
29
18 and the appeal proceedings before the RTC of Manila, Branch 34 are also estopped from raising this issue;
petitioners did not possess the subject properties in their own right but as mere agents and/or
representatives of the respondent LCP, thus, they never had any cause of action to file a case for forcible
entry; it was Branch 18 of the MeTC of Manila which was tasked to rule on the main issue of alleged forcible
entry and said court held in its May 2, 199632 decision that the dispossession of the petitioners was effected
without force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; petitioners were willing to voluntarily leave the subject
premises and merely requested for an extension of their stay therein, showing there was no force,
intimidation or stealth; furthermore, such request was allowed as petitioners were able to stay thereat until
October 1993; the absence of force, intimidation, stealth and strategy was also confirmed by the CA; and
there being no forcible entry in this case, there can be no justification for the award of damages and/or
attorney’s fees and it will be absurd for the respondent LCP to pay rentals for the use of its own properties
unto its own former employee acting as an agent of the former.33
27
Before going to the merits, the Court shall first address a matter raised by respondents, i.e., considering that
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333 was denied for being pro forma,
said motion did not toll the period of filing an appeal thus the decision of the CA on November 12, 1999 has
become final.
True, a pro forma motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the period to appeal.34
However, it is also axiomatic that Rules on the perfection of appeals must occasionally yield to the loftier ends
of substantial justice and
_______________
32 Should be April 15, 1997.
33 Id., pp. 153-163.
34 PCI Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120739, July 20, 2000, 336 SCRA 258, 264.
30
30
equity.35 In the present case, petitioners filed their motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
within 15 days from receipt of the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
44333, which was granted. Then they filed their petition for review with this Court within the extended
period. Under the premises and considering the merits of the case which ultimately negate the finding of the
CA that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma, justice would be better served if we consider the
present petition for review as duly filed.
The crux of the present petition is: Whether petitioners were removed from the premises by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Petitioners argue that the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34504, already ruled that the act of respondent LCP in
dispossessing petitioners of the subject property is not sanctioned by law and that it was only because
petitioners refused to recognize the new set of directors that they were made to suffer by taking them out of
the house they have been occupying. Such findings, petitioners claim, should be considered as the law of the
case.
We are not persuaded.
Law of the case is the opinion delivered on a former appeal.36 It applies to an established rule that when an
appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the
question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal.37 It further means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in
28
_______________
35 Remulla vs. Manlongat, G.R. No. 148189, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 226.
36 Pelayo vs. Perez, G.R. No. 141323, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 475, citing Cucueco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 139278, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 290.
37 Ibid.
31
31
the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.38
As a rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question
is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.39 Indeed,
courts must adhere thereto, whether the legal principles laid down were “correct on general principles or
not,” or “whether the question is right or wrong”40 because public policy, judicial orderliness and economy
require such stability in the final judgments of courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction.41
In this case however, a review of the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34504, which petitioners claim
should be considered as the law of the case with respect to the matter of dispossession made by the
respondents, reveals that what the CA resolved in said case was not the fact of dispossession of petitioners
but whether the controversy falls under the jurisdiction of regular courts or with the SEC which would justify
an injunction to stop the proceedings before the MeTC. It said:
. . . We . . .deem it necessary to settle the issue of whether or not the action for forcible entry in this particular
case arose out of an intra-corporate controversy such that it is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and not the ordinary court which has jurisdiction over the same.42
...
_______________
38 Ibid.
39 President of Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 154973, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 473.
40 Ibid.
41 Kabankalan Catholic College vs. Kabankalan Catholic College Union-PACIWU-TUCP, G.R. No. 157320, June
28, 2005, 461 SCRA 481.
29
42 Rollo, p. 94.
32
32
Although the controversy is between a religious corporation and its members regarding the possession of
corporate property, We are of the opinion that the primary concern of the petitioners is to be relieved of the
unlawful and violent acts employed by the private respondents which amounted to the disturbance of the
former’s quiet and peaceful possession thereof.43
Said decision made it plain that it has not made any factual findings yet but resolved the matter based only on
the pleadings submitted by the parties. We quote:
From the allegations of the complaint in the forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 142991) with the MTC (sic) of
Manila, Branch 18, the existence of an intra-corporate relationship between the parties is not clearly evident
notwithstanding the fact that the Lutheran Church in the Philippines (LCP) was a named defendant. A perusal
of the complaint reveals that the petitioners, plaintiffs therein were in actual and peaceful possession of the
subject premises since 1980 by virtue of their position as clergymen of the LCP who were entitled to housing
privileges and that sometime in August 1993, they were forced to vacate the same by people “purporting to
act in behalf of LCP”… supposedly sanctioned by a writ of injunction issued by the SEC.
With respect to petitioners Pedro and Nenita San Ramon, they allegedly executed an agreement with the LCP
wherein she was to undertake the repairs of the house and pay P6,000.00 a month as rent.
It is clear therefrom that petitioners had been in possession of the property in question from 1980 and even
at the time the SEC case was instituted by the LCP. It was in 1993 when the private respondents ousted
petitioners from the property allegedly with the use of force, threat and intimidation.
All the elements necessary to establish a case for forcible entry were sufficiently alleged by the petitioners.
For the private respondents to enforce their legal right to possession, they should have resorted to the proper
action in law.
_______________
43 Id., p. 96.
33
30
33
The acts of the private respondents as alleged by the petitioners in forcibly evicting them under the guise of a
writ of injunction issued by the SEC is not sanctioned by law. While among the acts sought to be enjoined by
the writ against the illegally constituted board and their representatives is the holding of LCP properties, the
said writ cannot be validly utilized herein.44 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners capitalize on the statement of the CA that:
“Suffice it to state that petitioners had been in possession of the subject premises long before the SEC case
was filed. However, because of the fact that petitioners refused to recognize the duly constituted board of
directors, they are now made to suffer the consequences of their acts by being taken out of the possession of
the house they had long been occupying.”45 (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, such statement should be qualified by the fact that the CA merely relied on the allegations made
by the petitioners in their complaint in reaching its conclusion that the regular courts have jurisdiction on the
case. As pronounced by the CA near the end of its decision:
“Hence, in the light of the foregoing, We find that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders. Considering that the issue in forcible entry
cases is one of prior possession, such issue may be properly resolved in the ordinary courts by applying civil
law principles. The authority of the SEC to settle this issue cannot be conceded.”46
Since a reading in its entirety of the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34504 reveals that no factual
conclusions were made yet, particularly on the matter of dispossession, the doctrine of the law of the case
cannot apply in this case.
Now on the matter of whether there was force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth in this case.
_______________
44 Id., pp. 95-97.
45 Id., p. 97.
46 Id., pp. 99-100.
34
34

31
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning
and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.47 In filing forcible entry cases, the law
tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff
must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of
his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court i.e., by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.48 It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is
determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property.49 Indeed, any of the parties who can
prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself50 since such cases
proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de
facto and undue deprivation thereof.51
In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a
state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the
action is based on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.52
_______________
47 David vs. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 384.
48 David vs. Cordova, supra; Sps. Tirona vs. Alejo, G.R. No. 129313, October 10, 2001, 367 SCRA 17, 30.
49 Solanda Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123479, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 645, 646.
50 Gener vs. Faustino, G.R. No. 130730, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 631, 643.
51 Bongato vs. Malvar, supra.
52 David vs. Cordova, supra.
35
35
As expressly stated in David vs. Cordova53
“…The words “by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth” include every situation or condition under
which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession
therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already
clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes
such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be
32
maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the
mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.”54
In this case, the very testimony which was quoted by Judge Ponferrada in concluding that there was no force
mentions the presence of guards at the premises which prevented the ingress and egress of petitioners from
the premises. Said portion reads:
…Nenita San Ramon testified in this wise:
Q.
When did you leave the premises Madam witness?
A.
I left on August 27, sir.
Q.
Why did you leave the premises?
A.
Actually, according to the guard, upon order of Atty. Almazan, the people inside cannot come out of the
compound, sir.
Q.
And so what happened next?
A.
I tried to befriendly (sic) with the guard and they looked for Atty. Almazan. And then when they found out
that Atty. Almazan was not in the vicinity, they told me that I can go out of the compound sir.
Q.
Who was with you if any, when you left the premises?
A.
My husband sir.
Q.
Who else?
A.
33
None, sir, except my husband sir.
_______________
53 Supra.
54 Ibid.
36
36
Q.
Were you allowed to return to the compound, after you left on August 27, madam witness?
A.
No more sir.
Q.
Who prohibited you from entering?
A.
The guard sir.
Q.
Were you able to bring out with you any items from your house?
A.
Our dresses only.55
Clearly, the presence of such men in the subject property restricting petitioners’ mobility constitutes force
contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The MeTC, through Judge Ponferrada, and the CA in the herein assailed decision ratiocinated that since
petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario wrote the LCP through its president, on September 9, 1993, months after
respondents sought the ouster of petitioners from the property, expressing that they are willing to vacate the
34
premises upon finding another place to live in, no force was employed by the respondents, thus there was no
forcible entry.
We do not agree.
It is true that petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario wrote LCP expressing their willingness to voluntarily vacate
the premises upon finding another place to live in, but this is after respondents had padlocked the premises
and used armed men to prevent their coming to and from the premises. Otherwise stated, said letters do not
negate the initial use of force by respondents which constituted forcible entry. It is undisputed that
respondents owned the property occupied by petitioners, still their use of force in evicting petitioners
therefrom was not justified.
Indeed, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be
_______________
55 Rollo, pp. 113-114.
37
37
thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.56 The owner who has title over the property cannot take the
law into his own hands to regain possession of said property.57 He must go to court.58
Sec. 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 17. Judgment.—If, after trial, the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that
said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim
is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs
as justice requires.
However, while we find that there was forcible entry in this case, we cannot grant the prayer of petitioners-
spouses Bañes that they be restored to the subject premises. It is established that they stayed on the property
for free as privilege of petitioner Elmer Bañes as a clergyman of LCP and that after the initial forcible entry of
respondents, petitioner Elmer Bañes expressed, through his letter, his willingness to vacate the property upon
finding a new place to live in and proposed that he stay in the Caloocan property of respondent LCP. It is on
record that the spouses Bañes are now staying in another property owned by the LCP in Caloocan City without
paying rent.59 It can be said, therefore, that they have lost their cause of action to ask for restitution having
transferred, as they have requested, to another property of LCP without paying any rentals.
35
_______________
56 Pajuyo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Rollo, p. 53, Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333 dated November 12, 1999.
38
38
The situation is different insofar as petitioners spouses Del Rosario and spouses San Ramon are concerned.
Evidence do not disclose that they asked for or were given by LCP another place to stay in.
We are therefore left with no recourse but to affirm the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-79078 ordering the
respondents and those who derived possession from them to vacate, surrender and restore possession of the
questioned premises to petitioners Del Rosario and San Ramon. This, notwithstanding the reality that the stay
of petitioners Del Rosario is dependent on whether the latter still has the privilege to stay in the premises as a
clergyman of respondent LCP. Said issue is best resolved in an action for unlawful detainer which respondents
should have filed against petitioners in the first place.
Likewise, the claim that petitioners-spouses San Ramon had no valid lease contract with respondent LCP is not
a proper defense in the forcible entry case filed by herein petitioners inasmuch as petitioners-spouses San
Ramon, just like petitioners-spouses Del Rosario, ought not to have been forcibly driven out of the premises
without due process of law which is the filing of the proper unlawful detainer case against them in the proper
court by respondent LCP instead of it making use of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the SEC in
forcing them to leave the premises.
Respondents cannot justify their forcible entry in the premises occupied by petitioners by claiming that the
latter have no valid right to the continued possession of the property. Respondents should have filed the
appropriate unlawful detainer case against them instead of forcing them out of the premises.
Furthermore, although we are affirming the RTC Decision dated April 15, 1997 in Civil Case No. 96-79078 that
there is forcible entry committed by respondents against petitioners, we find it not equitable and not within
the contemplation of the above-quoted provisions of Section 17, Rule 70 that petitioners be awarded by the
RTC the amount of P5,000.00 a
39

36
39
month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. Evidently, that portion of
Section 17, Rule 70 which awards reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises refers
to unlawful detainer cases and not to forcible entry suits like the present case.
If at all, the rentals that petitioners could have been entitled to would be those rentals which petitioners had
to pay for the use of the houses where they eventually transferred. However, it is undisputed that petitioners-
spouses Bañes transferred to another property of respondent LCP at Caloocan City, without being charged
any rentals. Thus, they are not entitled to the amount of P5,000.00 a month awarded by the RTC.
With regard to petitioners-spouses Del Rosario and spouses San Ramon, they failed to present evidence
showing that they were paying rentals for the places they are now occupying. Hence, the RTC award of
P5,000.00 has no valid basis.
We sustain the award for attorney’s fee in accordance with Rule 70, Sec. 17 of the Rules of Court60 and Art.
2208 of the Civil Code.61
_______________
60 Sec. 17. Judgment.—If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall
render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of
rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it
finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a
counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party
and award costs as justice requires.
61 Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
...
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
...
40
40

37
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333 dated November 12, 1999 is
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 96-
79078 dated April 15, 1997 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that: (a) petitioners-spouses Rev. Elmer J.
Bañes and Angela Bañes are not entitled to restitution of the subject property; and (b) the award of P5,000.00
a month to each of petitioners-spouses as and for reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
subject premises is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.
Petition granted, judgment annulled and set aside. That of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 34 affirmed
with modification.
Notes.—A party cannot re-litigate an issue that has already been adjudicated in a previous case. (Lucero vs.
Commission on Elections, 234 SCRA 280 [1994])
The doctrine of “law of the case” applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an
appellate court. “Law of the case” relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to
subsequent proceedings in the same case. (Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 [1995])
——o0o——
_______________
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation must be reasonable.
Bañes vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, 475 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 142308 November 15, 2005
CASES CITED IN THE CASE (NEWLY DECIDED CASES ON FORCIBLE ENTRY)
533 SCRA 474 City of Makati vs. Ygaña
557 SCRA 334 Flore s vs. Quitalig
519 SCRA 1 Escobar vs. Luna
548 SCRA 315 Meralco Industrial Engineering Services Corporation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission
593 SCRA 440 Dy vs. Mandy Commodities Co, Inc.
546 SCRA 610 Arbizo vs. Santillan
516 SCRA 84 Bejar vs. Caluag

38
591 SCRA 350 Bunyi vs. Factor
656 SCRA 315 Export Processing Zone Authority (now Philippine Export Zone
Authority)vs. Pulido
650 SCRA 344 Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
726 SCRA 696 Basic Rules on Motion for Reconsideration and Second Motion for
Reconsideration
G.R. No. 129313. October 10, 2001.*
SPOUSES MA. CRISTINA D. TIRONA and OSCAR TIRONA, SPOUSES MA. PAZ D. BAUTISTA and CESAR BAUTISTA,
SPOUSES MA. ARANZAZU D. ORETA and CANUTO ORETA, SPOUSES MA. CORAZON D. BAUTISTA and PABLO S.
BAUTISTA, JR., and DEO S. DIONISIO, petitioners, vs. HON. FLORO P. ALEJO as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, JUANITO IGNACIO and LUIS NUÑEZ, respondents.
Actions; Ejectment; Pleadings and Practice; The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the
complaint, and the rule is no different in actions for ejectment.—The jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the allegations of the complaint, and the rule is no different in actions for ejectment. Thus, in ascertaining
whether or not the action is one for forcible entry falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts,
the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined.
Same; Same; Forcible Entry; Unlawful Detainer; Words and Phrases; It cannot be inferred from the phrase
“thereby depriving said owners of the possession of the same” that the petitioners were supposedly deprived
of is a prior physical possession; The word “possession” as used in forcible entry
_______________
* SECOND DIVISON.
18
18
Tirona vs. Alejo
and unlawful detainer, means nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law.—Petitioners submit that the phrase “thereby depriving said owners of the
possession of the same” in paragraph 4 is tantamount to an averment of prior physical possession since
private respondents could not have deprived them of possession unless the latter had been previously in
possession of the subject properties. We are not persuaded. It cannot be inferred from the aforecited phrase
that the possession that petitioners were supposedly deprived of is a prior physical possession. The question
arises, what sort of prior physical possession is to be averred? The word “possession” as used in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, means nothing more than physical possession, (stress supplied) not legal possession in
39
the sense contemplated in civil law. The allegation must likewise show priority in time. Both requisites are
wanting in the phrase relied upon by petitioners.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Forcible Entry” and “Unlawful Detainer,” Distinguished.—A reading of the
allegations in the complaints leads us to conclude that petitioners’ action was one for forcible entry, not
unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two actions are: (1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff
must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in
illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the
possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by
reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in
courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set
out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable. Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical
possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the
means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy,
and stealth. Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege prior physical
possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged is unlawful deprivation of their
possession by private respondents. The deficiency is fatal to petitioners’ actions before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Valenzuela. Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction. No reversible
error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan Trial Court acquired no
jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos.
19
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 10, 2001
19
Tirona vs. Alejo
6632 and 6633 for failure of the complaints to aver prior physical possession by petitioners.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Pleadings; The policy in this jurisdiction is that amendments to
pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the interests of substantial justice; An amendment is not
allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is
to confer jurisdiction upon the court, or where the action originally pleaded in the complaint was outside the
jurisdiction of the court—it is axiomatic that before an amendment can be permitted, the trial court must
have acquired jurisdiction over the case in the first instance.—The policy in this jurisdiction is that
amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the interests of substantial justice. Thus,
amendments of the complaint may be allowed even if an order for its dismissal has been issued so long as the
motion to amend is filed before the order of dismissal acquired finality. Note, however, that it is not a hard
and fast rule. An amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint
and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court, or where the action originally
pleaded in the complaint was outside the jurisdiction of the court. We have carefully perused petitioners’
proposed amendments and found them to include the allegation that petitioners were in prior physical
possession of the disputed fishponds before said possession was allegedly disturbed. Clearly, the purpose is to
40
sidestep the RTC ruling that MeTC had no jurisdiction over their complaints and allow the inferior court to
acquire jurisdiction. This we cannot allow. Where the court of origin had no jurisdiction over the original
complaint in the first place, amendments may not be had. It is axiomatic that before an amendment can be
permitted, the trial court must have acquired jurisdiction over the case in the first instance.
Agrarian Reform; Statutes; Words and Phrases; A substantive law is a law which creates, defines, or regulates
rights concerning life, liberty, or property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the
administration of public affairs; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7881 should be given a prospective operation and may
not affect rights claimed under previous agrarian legislation.—At the outset, we must point out that
petitioners’ reliance upon Republic Act No. 7881 is off tangent. It is not disputed that at the time of the filing
of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633, an agrarian relations dispute was pending before the DARAB. The records
show that private respondents as the complainants in Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R, were asserting tenancy
rights, including the right to possession of the disputed fishponds or parts thereof, under Republic Act Nos.
3844 and 1199. Pri-
20
20
Tirona vs. Alejo
back to 1975 in the case of respondent Ignacio and 1979 in the case of respondent Nuñez, under substantive
laws. A substantive law is a law, which creates, defines, or regulates rights concerning life, liberty, or property,
or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs. Republic Act No. 7881,
in exempting prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, is a substantive law. By its very nature and essence, substantive law operates prospectively and may not
be construed retroactively without affecting previous or past rights. Hence, in view of the absence of a
contrary intent in its provisions, Republic Act No. 7881 should be given a prospective operation and may not
affect rights claimed under previous agrarian legislation.
Same; Actions; Motion to Dismiss; Litis Pendentia; Requisites.—Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
litis pendentia or pendency of another action is a ground for the dismissal of the second action. Recall that in
the motions to dismiss filed by private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633, the pendency of the
DARAB case was one of the grounds relied upon in seeking the dismissal of both actions. For litis pendentia to
lie, the following requisites must be satisfied: 1. Identity of parties or representation in both cases; 2. Identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for; 3. The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis;
and 4. Identity of the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be rendered in
the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under
consideration.
Same; Same; Same; Undergirding the principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex
another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action.—These
requisites, in our view, are present in this case. For one, the parties in the DARAB case and in the forcible
entry cases filed with the MeTC are the same. Also, there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for.
The action in Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R is for “declaration of tenancy, accounting, recovery of possession,
41
specific performance, recovery of sum of money, plus damages” against petitioners. Note that the properties
that private respondents seek to recover possession of in the DARAB case form part of the properties from
which petitioners seek the ejectment of private respondents. The evident and logical conclusion then is that
any decision that may be rendered in the DARAB case regarding the question of possession will also resolve
the question of possession in the forcible entry cases. Undergirding the principle of litis pendentia is the
theory that a
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VOL. 367, OCTOBER 10, 2001
21
Tirona vs. Alejo
party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause
of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same matter should not be subject of
controversy in court more than once in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided, for the sake
of the stability in the rights and status of persons. The MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 82, recognized this
doctrine when it dismissed Civil Case No. 6632 to avoid the possibility of two contradictory decisions on the
question of possession emanating from the DARAB and the trial court. In turn, the RTC was correct in finding
that the issue of possession was inextricably intertwined with the agrarian dispute, an issue which was
beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the inferior court to settle. In so doing, the RTC deferred to the
primary jurisdiction and administrative expertise of the DARAB to settle agrarian cases. Thus, we are
constrained to conclude that under the concept of litis pendentia, the pendency of DARAB Case No. IV-MM-
0099-95R served as a bar to the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633.
Same; Same; Same; Forum Shopping; To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping,
the test applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another.—That there was a DARAB case pending involving the same parties with
the same subject matter at the time petitioners filed Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 is not contested.
Petitioners admit that they assumed that the issues in the agrarian case and the forcible entry cases were
different and hence saw no need to report the pendency of the former to the trial court in their certification
of nonforum shopping. We fail to see the basis for this assumption. The records disclose that the issue of
possession as raised in the forcible entry cases is necessarily included in the question of agricultural tenancy
raised in the DARAB case. Note that petitioners actively participated in the latter case and thus, could not
have been unaware that the possession of the subject fishponds or parts thereof was in issue before the
Board. Petitioners’ failure to see that paragraphs 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94
applied to them is simply incomprehensible. We agree with the RTC in certifying under oath that they have no
knowledge of any case pending before any other tribunal or agency involving the same issue raised in their
forcible entry cases, petitioners were less than candid. To determine whether a party violated the rule against
forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Recall that as earlier discussed, the requisites of
litis pendentia barred the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 given the pendency of DARAB Case No. IV-
MM-
22
42
22
Tirona vs. Alejo
0099-95R. Based thereon, the Regional Trial Court correctly dismissed the forcible entry cases on the
additional ground of forum shopping.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br.
172.
Federico Y. Alikpala for petitioners.
Luisito B. Domingo for private respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the joint decision1 dated April 10, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Cases Nos. 5169-V-97 and 5093-V-97.
The factual background of this petition are culled from the records of the cases.
A. Civil Case No. 5093-V-97

On March 25, 1996, herein petitioners sued private respondent Luis Nuñez before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 6633 for ejectment. Petitioners
claimed to be owners of various fishpond lots located at Coloong, Valenzuela.2 They alleged, among others
that:
______________
1 Rollo, pp. 243-247.
2 Specifically, these properties are Lot 1 of the cons.—subd. Plan (LRC) Pcs-20114, with an area of 40,810
square meters more or less, covered by TCT No. T-228752 in the names of the spouses Maria Aranzazu D.
Oreta and Canuto Oreta; Lot 2 of the cons.—subd. Plan (LRC) Pcs-20114, with an area of 41,319 square meters
more or less, covered by TCT No. T-228753 in the names of the spouses Maria Corazon D. Bautista and Pablo
S. Bautista, Jr.; Lot 3 of the cons.—subd. Plan (LRC) Pcs-20114, with a total area of 43,406 square meters more
or less, with TCT No. T-228754 in the names of the spouses Maria Cristina D. Tirona and Oscar Tirona; Lot 4 of
the cons.—subd. Plan (LRC) Pcs-20114, consisting of 41,349 square meters more or less, with TCT No. T-
228755 in the name of Deo S. Dionisio; and Lot 5 of the cons.—subd. Plan (LRC) Pcs-20114, totaling 41,349
square meters more or less, covered by TCT No. T-228756 in
23
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Tirona vs. Alejo
(1) on January 20, 1996, private respondent Nuñez, “by means of force, stealth, or strategy, unlawfully
entered the said fishpond lots and occupied the same” against their will, thereby depriving them of
possession of said fishponds; (2) Nuñez illegally occupied a house owned by and built on the lot of petitioner
Deo Dionisio; and (3) Nuñez unlawfully operated and used petitioners’ fishponds, despite their demands to
vacate the same. Petitioners prayed that the court order Nuñez to vacate Dionisio’s house; surrender
possession of the fishponds to them; remove all milkfish fingerlings at his expense; and pay a monthly
compensation of P29,000.00 from January 20, 1996 to the time he surrenders possession, with interest at
twelve percent (12%) yearly until fully paid.
Nuñez admitted in his answer that petitioners owned the fishponds, but denied the other allegations. He
raised the following affirmative defenses: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, for petitioners’
failure to allege prior physical possession in their complaint; (2) petitioners’ action was premature in view of
the pendency of a complaint he filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
docketed as Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R, where the issue of possession in the concept of tenancy is the same
as that raised by petitioners in Civil Case No. 6633; and (3) petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping since they
were fully aware of the said DARAB case. He moved that the ejectment suit be dismissed.
On October 1, 1996, the MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 81, decided Civil Case No. 6633 as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant and all persons claiming rights under him:
1.To peacefully vacate and surrender the subject premises to the plaintiffs;
2.To peacefully vacate and surrender the house belonging to plaintiff Deo S. Dionisio;
the name of the spouses Maria Paz D. Bautista and Cezar Bautista. See Annexes “A” to “F,” Complaint, Rollo,
pp. 69-74.
24
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Tirona vs. Alejo
pensation from January 20, 1996 up to the time he finally vacates the subject premises;
4.To pay the amount of P10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
5.To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.3
44
On November 15, 1996, Nuñez appealed said decision to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, which
docketed the appeal as Civil Case No. 5093-V-97.
B. Civil Case No. 5169-V-97

On March 25, 1996, petitioners also instituted Civil Case No. 6632 for ejectment against private respondent
Juanito Ignacio with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 82. The allegations were essentially
the same as those against private respondent Nuñez, except it is alleged that Ignacio “also illegally occupied
the house constructed on the lot of, and belonging to the plaintiff Spouses Ma. Paz D. Bautista and Cesar
Bautista.” Petitioners sought the same relief prayed for in Civil Case No. 6633.
Ignacio raised similar defenses as those offered by Nuñez in Civil Case No. 6633. Like Nuñez, he also moved for
dismissal of the ejectment suit against him.
On February 11, 1997, the MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 82 issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 6632
against Ignacio, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, defendant’s motion to cite plaintiffs in contempt of court is denied, and
his other motion to dismiss the case is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.4
In granting Ignacio’s Motion to Dismiss, the MeTC said:
_____________
3 Records, Civil Case No. 5093-V-97, p. 111.
4 Records, Civil Case No. 5169-V-97, p. 250.
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It is now clear to the mind of the Court that the issue of recovery of possession pursued by plaintiffs in this
case is pending also for adjudication among other issues in DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95. There is no
dispute that both this case and the DARAB case involve the same real property or at least, adjoining lots
covered by titles in the names of some of the plaintiffs, which lots are also involved in this case.
xxx
Clearly, said DARAB case is a prejudicial question to the case at bar, and or vice versa (stress in the original).
The possibility that this Court and the DARAB may come up with two contradicting decisions on issue of
45
possession shall always be there, and since the DARAB case was filed first, there appears compelling necessity
to halt proceedings in this case.5
On February 27, 1997, petitioners appealed the foregoing Order to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
which docketed their appeal as Civil Case No. 5169-V-97.
Since Civil Cases Nos. 5093-V-97 and 5169-V-97 involved essentially the same parties, the same subject
matter, and the same issues, the cases were jointly heard before Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela.
On April 10, 1997, Civil Cases Nos. 5093-V-97 and 5169-V-97 were jointly decided.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.Affirming the appealed Order of the trial court dated February 11, 1997 dismissing Civil Case No. 6632, with
the modification that the plaintiffs be made liable to pay the costs of suit; and
2.Reversing the appealed decision of the trial court dated October 1, 1996 in Civil Case No. 6633 and
dismissing the above-entitled case for the reasons stated above. The plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.6
In ruling against herein petitioners, the RTC found:
(1)As correctly pointed out by the counsel for the defendants in his memorandum on appeal, it is now settled
that a complaint for forcible
____________
5 Id., at 249-250.
6 Rollo, p. 210.
26
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Tirona vs. Alejo
entry to fall within the jurisdiction of the inferior court must allege plaintiffs’ prior physical possession of the
property by any of the means provided in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. Bare allegation in
the complaint that the plaintiff was deprived of the possession of the property is insufficient to make the
action one for forcible entry (citation omitted).
In the instant case, while the complainants allege that the defendants (Ignacio in Civil Case No. 6632 and
Nuñez in Civil Case No. 6633) by means of force, stealth or strategy “unlawfully entered the said fishpond lots
and occupied the same against the will of the plaintiffs,” there is no allegation that the plaintiffs had prior
physical possession of the property in dispute. The complaint(s) in the above-entitled cases therefore did not
fall within the jurisdiction of the trial courts.
46
(2)The DARAB case (Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R) between the herein parties and covering the same subject
matter was filed way ahead of the instant cases. The allegation in the DARAB complaint that the complainants
are agricultural or share tenants is opposed to the claim of the respondents in their answer that the
complainants are their industrial partners. The DARAB case thus presented a dispute that is clearly agrarian in
nature. Under existing laws . . . the Department of Agrarian Reform, thru the DARAB, is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters or agrarian disputes.
The principal issue in the instant cases for forcible entry—whether or not to eject the defendants from the
fishponds—is necessarily connected with the agrarian dispute now pending resolution before the DARAB. It is
therefore beyond the competence of the inferior court to resolve.
x x x
(3)The plaintiffs were less than honest in certifying under oath that they have no knowledge of any case
pending before any tribunal or agency involving the same issues raised in the instant cases. At the time of
their certification, there was pending before the DARAB of a case between the same parties with the same
subject matter and where the issue of possession as raised in the instant cases is necessarily included in the
larger issue of agricultural tenancy. The plaintiffs therefore violated Administrative Order No. 04-94 of the
Supreme Court, which is a ground for dismissal.7
On May 6, 1997, petitioners filed with the RTC a joint Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint in Civil Cases Nos.
6632 and 6633
_____________
7 Id. at 209-210.
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Tirona vs. Alejo
and a Motion for Reconsideration, together with the proposed Amended Complaints. On May 20, 1997, the
RTC denied the aforementioned motions.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners assign the following as errors committed by the RTC:
1.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING PRIME IMPORTANCE TO THE FAILURE OF PLAINTIFFS TO AVER IN
THEIR COMPLAINT(S) THAT THEY WERE IN POSSESSION AT THE TIME OF THE FORCIBLE ENTRY MADE BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
2.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE IN POSSESSION OF
THEIR PROPERTIES AT THE TIME OF FORCIBLE ENTRY THEREUNTO BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, FOR WHICH
RELIEFS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO HEREIN PETITIONERS.
3.THE PENDENCY OF THE SUIT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
DID NOT PROSCRIBE THE INSTITUTION OF THE EJECTMENT CASE(S).
4.THERE HAD BEEN NO INFRACTION ON THE AFFIDAVIT OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING REQUIREMENTS.
The main issue for our resolution involves the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts: was petitioners’
failure to allege prior physical possession in a case for forcible entry fatal to the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts? Ancillary thereto, we also must inquire (a) whether the pendency of the Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R
47
before the DARAB barred the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for forcible entry; and (b) whether
petitioners violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 proscribing forum shopping.
On the main issue, petitioners contend that the averment of the identities of the persons in possession of the
disputed properties at the time of the forcible entry thereunto is not jurisdictional in character. Petitioners
argue that the deficiency, if any, could have been remedied by amended or supplemental pleadings or by the
submission of admissible evidence. They point out that the MeTC, Branch 81 in Civil Case No. 6633 had
received evidence of petitioners’ actual possession, resulting in a finding of fact of actual possession in its
Decision of October 1, 1996. It was, therefore, an error for the RTC to have disregarded said finding of fact on
the
28
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Tirona vs. Alejo
ground that the requisites for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction over the forcible entry cases had not been
complied with. It was likewise error for the RTC to have denied the admission of petitioners’ Amended
Complaints.
Private respondents argue that a closer scrutiny of the allegations in the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632
and 6633 filed with the court of origin will clearly show that there is no allegation whatsoever of prior physical
possession on petitioners’ part. All that is averred is unlawful deprivation by private respondents. They submit
that this glaring defect is fatal enough to deprive the inferior court of jurisdiction over the forcible entry cases.
With respect to the denial of admission of petitioners’ Amended Complaints, private respondents point out
that amendments for the purpose of making the complaint confer jurisdiction upon the court are not allowed.
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the rule is no different in
actions for ejectment.8 Thus, in ascertaining whether or not the action is one for forcible entry falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are to be examined. Petitioners’ complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 are virtually identical,
save as to the names of the defendants and the owners of the houses allegedly occupied by private
respondents. The pertinent allegations in Civil Case No. 6633 read:
3)That plaintiffs in their individual rights, are respective owners in fee simple of fishpond lots located at
Barangay Coloong, Municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, with areas, lot numbers, and titles, xerox copies
of which are Annexed hereto . . .
xxx
4)That on or about January 20, 1996, said defendant Luis Nuñez by means of force, stealth or strategy,
unlawfully entered the said fishpond lots and occupied the same against the will of the plaintiffs thereby
depriving said owners of the possession of the same;
____________
8 Lavibo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123462, 271 SCRA 143, 146 (1997) citing Asset Privatization Trust v.
Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 627 (1994).
48
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Tirona vs. Alejo
5)That defendant Luis Nuñez also illegally occupied the house constructed on the lot of, and belonging to,
plaintiff Deo S. Dionisio;
6)That said defendant also planted bangus fingerlings in the said fishponds and despite demands for them to
remove the same and vacate the fishponds . . . still continue to unlawfully, illegally, and wantonly occupy said
house and operate said fishponds to the great damage and prejudice of the plaintiffs.9
Petitioners submit that the phrase “thereby depriving said owners of the possession of the same” in
paragraph 4 is tantamount to an averment of prior physical possession since private respondents could not
have deprived them of possession unless the latter had been previously in possession of the subject
properties.
We are not persuaded. It cannot be inferred from the aforecited phrase that the possession that petitioners
were supposedly deprived of is a prior physical possession. The question arises, what sort of prior physical
possession is to be averred? The word “possession” as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, means
nothing more than physical possession, (stress supplied) not legal possession in the sense contemplated in
civil law.10 The allegation must likewise show priority in time. Both requisites are wanting in the phrase relied
upon by petitioners.
A reading of the allegations in the complaints leads us to conclude that petitioners’ action was one for forcible
entry, not unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two actions are: (1) In an action for forcible entry,
the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived
thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in
forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but
becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In
pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be
___________
9 Records, Civil Case No. 5093-V-97, pp. 1-2.
10 Mediran v. Villanueva, G.R No. 12838, 37 Phil. 752, 761 (1918).
30
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Tirona vs. Alejo

49
specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.11 Hence, in actions for forcible entry,
two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his
prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession
by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation,
threats, strategy, and stealth.12 Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege
prior physical possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged is unlawful deprivation
of their possession by private respondents. The deficiency is fatal to petitioners’ actions before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela. Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction.
No reversible error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan Trial Court
acquired no jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for failure of the complaints to aver prior physical
possession by petitioners.
But was the deficiency remedied, however, when petitioners submitted their Amended Complaints?
The policy in this jurisdiction is that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the
interests of substantial justice. Thus, amendments of the complaint may be allowed even if an order for its
dismissal has been issued so long as the motion to amend is filed before the order of dismissal acquired
finality.13 Note, however, that it is not a hard and fast rule. An amendment is not allowed where the court
has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction
upon the court,14 or where the action originally pleaded in the
_____________
11 Gumiran v. Gumiran, G.R. No. 6364, 21 Phil. 174, 179 (1912).
12 Pasagui v. Villablanca, G.R. No. L-21998, 68 SCRA 18, 21 (1975).
13 Constantino, et al., v. Hon. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. L-16853, 118 Phil. 385, 388-389; 8 SCRA 379 (1963), citing
Arranz v. Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., 108 Phil. 747 (1960).
14 Rosario and Untalan v. Carangdang, et al., G.R. No. L-7076, 96 Phil. 845, 850 (1955).
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Tirona vs. Alejo
complaint was outside the jurisdiction of the court.15 We have carefully perused petitioners’ proposed
amendments and found them to include the allegation that petitioners were in prior physical possession of
the disputed fishponds before said possession was allegedly disturbed. Clearly, the purpose is to sidestep the
RTC ruling that MeTC had no jurisdiction over their complaints and allow the inferior court to acquire
jurisdiction. This we cannot allow. Where the court of origin had no jurisdiction over the original complaint in
the first place, amendments may not be had. It is axiomatic that before an amendment can be permitted, the
trial court must have acquired jurisdiction over the case in the first instance.16
50
Regarding the second issue, petitioners contend that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over Case No. IV-MM-
0099-95R. They submit that with the passage of Republic Act No. 788117 on February 20, 1995, private lands
directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds are exempt from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or Republic Act No. 6657. No agrarian relation thus subsisted between
the parties for the DARAB to take cognizance of. Thus, litis pendentia did not bar the filing of Civil Cases Nos.
6632 and 6633. Stated differently, the pendency of Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R did not divest the MeTC of its
jurisdiction to hear and try the forcible entry cases.
Private respondents contend that a comparison between DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R and Civil Cases
Nos. 6632 and 6633 would show the same parties, the same subject matter of controversy, and the same
issues. In other words, litis pendentia lies and
_____________
15 Versoza v. Versoza, G.R. No. L-25609, 135 Phil. 84, 93; 26 SCRA 78 (1968), citing Tamayo v. San Miguel
Brewery, Inc., 119 Phil. 368; 10 SCRA 115 (1964) Campos Rueda Corp. v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-18453,
September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 240 and Rosario v. Carangdang, supra.
16 Gaspar v. Dorado, et al., G.R. No. L-17884, 122 Phil. 728, 731; 15 SCRA 331 (1965).
17 Entitled “An Act Amending Certain Provisions Of Republic Act No. 665, Entitled “An Act Amending Certain
Provisions Of Republic Act No. 6657, Entitled ‘An Act Instituting A Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
To Promote Social Justice and Industrialization, Providing The Mechanism For Its Implementation, And For
Other Purposes.”
32
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Tirona vs. Alejo
may be availed of to dismiss the cases for forcible entry filed with the MeTC.
At the outset, we must point out that petitioners’ reliance upon Republic Act No. 7881 is off tangent. It is not
disputed that at the time of the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633, an agrarian relations dispute was
pending before the DARAB. The records show that private respondents as the complainants in Case No. IV-
MM-0099-95R, were asserting tenancy rights, including the right to possession of the disputed fishponds or
parts thereof, under Republic Act Nos. 384418 and 1199.19 Private respondents were thus claiming vested
substantive rights, dating back to 1975 in the case of respondent Ignacio and 1979 in the case of respondent
Nuñez, under substantive laws. A substantive law is a law, which creates, defines, or regulates rights
concerning life, liberty, or property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of
public affairs.20 Republic Act No. 7881, in exempting prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, is a substantive law. By its very nature and essence, substantive
law operates prospectively21 and may not be construed retroactively without affecting previous or past
51
rights. Hence, in view of the absence of a contrary intent in its provisions, Republic Act No. 7881 should be
given a prospective operation and may not affect rights claimed under previous agrarian legislation.
Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, litis pendentia or pendency of another action is a ground for
the dismissal of the
______________
18 More popularly known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963. It abolished share tenancy (Sec. 4),
by establishing agricultural leasehold relations (Sec. 5). However, fishponds were among those agricultural
lands exempted from leasehold (Sec. 35), with the tenancy system prevailing in fishponds to be governed by
Republic Act No. 1199. Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844 was specifically repealed by Section 76 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
19 Also known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
20 Primicias v. Ocampo, et al., G.R. No. L-6120, 93 Phil. 446, 452 (1953).
21 Tolentino, et al., v. Alzate, et al., G.R. No. L-9267, 98 Phil. 781, 783-784 (1956).
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second action. Recall that in the motions to dismiss filed by private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and
6633, the pendency of the DARAB case was one of the grounds relied upon in seeking the dismissal of both
actions. For litis pendentia to lie, the following requisites must be satisfied:
1.Identity of parties or representation in both cases;

2.Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for;
3.The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis; and
4.Identity of the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be rendered in the
other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under
consideration.22
These requisites, in our view, are present in this case. For one, the parties in the DARAB case and in the
forcible entry cases filed with the MeTC are the same. Also, there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for. The action in Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R is for “declaration of tenancy, accounting, recovery of
possession, specific performance, recovery of sum of money, plus damages” against petitioners. Note that the
properties that private respondents seek to recover possession of in the DARAB case form part of the
properties from which petitioners seek the ejectment of private respondents. The evident and logical
conclusion then is that any decision that may be rendered in the DARAB case regarding the question of
possession will also resolve the question of possession in the forcible entry cases. Undergirding the principle
of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same
subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same
52
matter should not be subject of controversy in court more than once in order that possible conflicting
judgments may be avoided, for the sake of the stability in the rights and status of persons. The MeTC of
Valenzuela, Branch 82, recognized this doctrine when it dismissed Civil Case No. 6632 to avoid the
34
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Tirona vs. Alejo
possibility of two contradictory decisions on the question of possession emanating from the DARAB and the
trial court. In turn, the RTC was correct in finding that the issue of possession was inextricably intertwined
with the agrarian dispute, an issue which was beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the inferior court to
settle. In so doing, the RTC deferred to the primary jurisdiction and administrative expertise of the DARAB to
settle agrarian cases. Thus, we are constrained to conclude that under the concept of litis pendentia, the
pendency of DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R served as a bar to the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633.
On the third issue, petitioners maintain that the petitioner-affiant who subscribed the requisite Affidavit of
Non-forum Shopping understood that the issues pending resolution before the DARAB had no relation to
petitioners’ actions for forcible entry, and hence had seen no need to report anymore the pendency of the
DARAB case. Moreover, private respondents claim that in their pleadings they early enough disclosed the
pendency of the DARAB case to the courts hearing the ejectment cases. Hence, they aver that there was no
violation whatsoever of the non-forum shopping requirements.
Private respondents argue that petitioners’ explanations on the matter amount to a mea culpa on account of
wild speculation and assumption of the facts of the case. They ask us to affirm the findings below that
petitioners violated the Court’s Circular proscribing forum shopping.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94, imposing additional requisites in civil complaints, petitions,
and other initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and agencies to prevent forum shopping, provides in part:
1.The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or
other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not
theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there
is
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53
any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status
thereof; and (d) if should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certificate
contemplated herein have been filed.
xxx
2.Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing . . .
That there was a DARAB case pending involving the same parties with the same subject matter at the time
petitioners filed Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 is not contested. Petitioners admit that they assumed that the
issues in the agrarian case and the forcible entry cases were different and hence saw no need to report the
pendency of the former to the trial court in their certification of non-forum shopping. We fail to see the basis
for this assumption. The records disclose that the issue of possession as raised in the forcible entry cases is
necessarily included in the question of agricultural tenancy raised in the DARAB case. Note that petitioners
actively participated in the latter case and thus, could not have been unaware that the possession of the
subject fishponds or parts thereof was in issue before the Board. Petitioners’ failure to see that paragraphs
1(b), 1(c), or 1(d) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 applied to them is simply incomprehensible. We agree
with the RTC in certifying under oath that they have no knowledge of any case pending before any other
tribunal or agency involving the same issue raised in their forcible entry cases, petitioners were less than
candid.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another.23 Recall that as earlier dis-
______________
23 Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108451, 337 Phil. 605, 615; 275 SCRA 267 (1997), citing First
Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259 (1996).
36
36
Tirona vs. Alejo
cussed, the requisites of litis pendentia barred the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 given the pendency
of DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R. Based thereon, the Regional Trial Court correctly dismissed the forcible
entry cases on the additional ground of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch
172, in Civil Cases Nos. 5093-V-97 and 5169-V-97 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

54
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—The requisites of lis pendens as a ground for dismissal of a complaint are (1) identity of parties or at
least such representing the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted as prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity in both cases is such that the judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata to the
other case. Not all these requisites are present herein. (Atienza vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 737 [1994])
Where the issue is the right of the lessee to occupy the subject apartment unit, the same should be properly
threshed out in an ejectment suit and not in an action for damages where the question of possession is
likewise the primary issue to be resolved, even if the unlawful detainer suit was filed later than the one for
damages. (University Physicians Sevices, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 86 [1994]) Tirona vs. Alejo, 367
SCRA 17, G.R. No. 129313 October 10, 2001
G.R. No. 172008. August 1, 2012.*

HEIRS OF ROGELIO ISIP, SR., namely: CELEDONIA, ROLANDO, ROGELIO, JR., all surnamed ISIP, and IRENE ISIP-
SILVESTRE, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact ROLANDO ISIP, petitioners vs. RODOLFO QUINTOS,
RODOLFO DE GUZMAN and ISAGANI ISIP, doing business under the name RONIRO ENTERPRISES COMPANY,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Possession; It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should
himself occupy the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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VOL. 678, AUGUST 1, 2012
105
Heirs of Rogelio Isip, Sr. vs. Quintos
property as someone in his name may perform the act.—In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 626 (1999),
we held thus: Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own property. It is not necessary that the owner of a
parcel of land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other
words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the
property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy. This declaration is
[in conformity] with Art. 524 of the Civil Code providing that possession may be exercised in one’s own name
or in the name [of] another. The CA therefore correctly cited the case of Dalida v. Court of Appeals, 117 SCRA
480 (1982), where it was held that a mere caretaker of a land has no right of possession over such land.
55
A.D. Corvera & Associates for petitioners.
Hipolito F. Sañez for respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In forcible entry cases, the only issue is who has the better right of possession over the subject property.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated June 18, 2003 and Resolution2 dated March
21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74178. The CA
_______________
1 CA Rollo, pp. 167-185; penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Danilo B. Pine.
2 Id., at pp. 235-238; penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Arturo D. Brion (also a member of this court) and Mariflor Punzalan Castillo.
106
106
affirmed the Order3 dated July 31, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154, in SCA No.
2146 which reconsidered and set aside its own Decision4 dated March 25, 2002 and in effect affirmed in toto
the Decision5 dated May 22, 2001 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig City, Branch 74, in Civil
Case No. 1715 which dismissed herein petitioners’ complaint for forcible entry against the respondents.
Factual Antecedents
In 1986, Rogelio Isip, Sr. (Rogelio Sr.) occupied and took possession of a parcel of land known as Lot 69, Block
169 Psd-13-002680. Located at No. 2 Barrameda Street, Upper Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, the said parcel
of land contains an area of 292 square meters, more or less, where Rogelio Sr. constructed a small house to
serve as his place of residence.
A year later, Toyo Keiki Philippines, Inc. (Toyo Keiki) requested Rogelio Sr. that it be allowed to dig a deep well
on the subject property and to put up thereon a water distribution system. Since Rogelio Sr. was a stockholder
of Toyo Keiki, he allowed the corporation to build the water distribution system. Thus, Toyo Keiki tore down
Rogelio Sr.’s house and replaced it with a bigger structure with a room for the latter and an office in front. The
water distribution project, however, did not become fully operational.
56
In January 1991, the deep well was rehabilitated with funding from Sunrise Management Corporation and Jiro
Yamashita. Upon the completion of the rehabilitation work, Sunrise Management Corporation operated the
water distribution system with Rogelio Sr. as General Manager, assisted
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 39-43; penned by Judge Abraham B. Borreta.
4 Id., at pp. 58-76.
5 Id., at pp. 47-57; penned by Judge Benjamin T. Pozon.
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VOL. 678, AUGUST 1, 2012
107
by his two sons Rolando Isip (Rolando) and Rogelio Isip, Jr. (Rogelio Jr.) and brother-in-law Alfredo Lobo.
In 1997, Rodolfo Quintos (Quintos) proposed to Rogelio Sr. to operate a car repair shop in the compound.
Since Quintos is a former claims manager in an insurance company and is familiar with running a business,
Rogelio Sr. agreed and, hence, a car repair shop was constructed in the compound. However, despite the
completion of the repair shop, they were not able to start the business due to Rogelio Sr.’s illness.
On February 5, 1998, Rogelio Sr. died. Six months later, his son Rolando was appointed General Manager of
the water distribution system of Sunrise Management Corporation. Quintos then revived to Rolando the
proposal to establish the car repair shop.
Quintos allegedly told Rolando that there was a need for accreditation from the insurance companies before
the car repair shop could commence operation. In line with such accreditation, Quintos told Rolando that
inspectors from the insurance companies will conduct ocular inspection to see if the building is being used for
commercial or business purposes and not for residential use. Hence, Rolando had to temporarily vacate the
premises. Relying on the representations of Quintos, who was their legal counsel and the godfather of Rogelio
Jr., Rolando and Rogelio Jr. agreed to temporarily vacate the compound.
When Rolando returned to the compound, however, he was refused entry by three armed security guards
allegedly upon the instructions of Quintos, Rodolfo De Guzman (De Guzman), and Isagani Isip (Isip). A notice
was also posted at the gates of the compound that Sunrise Management Corporation had been dissolved and
that the deep well compound was already under the management of Roniro Enterprises Company (Roniro
Enterpises).
Thus, on January 4, 1999, petitioners Celedonia Isip, Rolando, Rogelio Jr. and Irene Isip-Silvestre, claiming to
be the
108
57
108
legitimate children and legal heirs of Rogelio Sr., filed before the MeTC of Taguig City a complaint for forcible
entry against respondents Quintos, De Guzman, and Isip, all doing business under the name Roniro
Enterprises. Petitioners claimed that respondents, through deceit, strategy, and stealth, succeeded in entering
the deep well compound and once inside the premises, prevented the petitioners from re-entering the same
through the use of force, intimidation, and threat.
Respondents vehemently denied the charge. They asserted that Eddie Dizal Pontino (Pontino) formerly owned
and occupied the disputed lot. On May 12, 1984, he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Rights in favor of
Pendatun Hadji Datu (Hadji Datu) for the sum of P60,000.00. However, on May 19, 1984, Pontino rescinded
the said contract of sale on the ground that Hadji Datu failed to pay the purchase price of the lot after
repeated demands to do so.6
Despite the rescission of the contract of sale, Hadji Datu sold the lot to Toyo Keiki, through its President
Michael S. Sagara (Sagara), the latter being unaware of the said rescission. Subsequently Pontino wrote a
letter7 to Toyo Keiki through Sagara informing the latter that Hadji Datu never became the owner of the
subject lot. Thus, when Hadji Datu tried to claim the balance of the purchase price, Sagara told him that he
cannot release the said amount because Pontino claimed to be the true owner and possessor of the subject
lot.
In 1988, Pontino and Jedco Corporation entered into a Deed of Assignment concerning the water distribution
system and the subject lot. Jedco Corporation then acquired the right of possession over the premises in
question and the control over the operation of the water distribution system.
It was not long thereafter when Jedco Corporation decided to withdraw and relinquish its rights over the
premises in
_______________
6 See letter of even date, Rollo, p. 230.
7 Id., at p. 226.
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VOL. 678, AUGUST 1, 2012
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58
question in favor of De Guzman. De Guzman then took over the premises and summoned the late Ireneo Isip
(Ireneo) and Quintos to help him in the operation of the water distribution business. Ireneo then
recommended his brother Rogelio Sr. to manage the said business under the umbrella of Sunrise
Management Corporation.
Respondents claimed that Rogelio Sr., the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, was an employee of Sunrise
Management Corporation. After the death of Rogelio Sr., De Guzman wrote a letter dated August 14, 1998
addressed to the president and chairman of the board of Sunrise Management Corporation stating that he is
terminating the services of the said corporation because of the unfortunate death of Rogelio Sr. In the same
letter, De Guzman likewise held Sunrise Management Corporation, together with the sons of Rogelio Sr.,
responsible to render an accounting relative to the operation of the said deep well.
Respondents prayed that judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of merit; ordering
petitioners to jointly and severally pay moral damages and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, plus other
litigation expenses as may be proven, and the costs of the suit.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
After summary proceedings, the MeTC rendered a Decision on May 22, 2001 dismissing the complaint for lack
of cause of action. It held that no forcible entry was committed since Roniro Enterprises was merely exercising
its right over the premises.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Upon appeal, the RTC initially reversed and set aside the MeTC’s Decision. On respondents’ motion for
reconsideration,
110
110
however, the RTC issued an Order8 reversing its earlier Decision and affirming the MeTC’s May 22, 2001
Decision. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 25, 2002, of this Court is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and
the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 1715, which was
appealed to this Court, is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review before the CA. On June 18, 2003, the CA rendered the herein
assailed Decision10 dismissing the petition and affirming the Order of the RTC. Undeterred, petitioners filed a
59
motion for reconsideration11 but it was likewise denied.12 Despite having been thrice rebuffed, petitioners
remain unfazed and are now before this Court via this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
The only issue to be determined in this case is whether the respondents committed forcible entry.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a case of forcible entry may be filed by, “a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
_______________
8 CA Rollo, pp. 39-43.
9 Id., at p. 43.
10 Id., at pp. 167-185.
1 1 Id., at pp. 189-201.
12 Id., at pp. 235-238.
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111
strategy, or stealth x x x.” In cases of forcible entry, “the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic
inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.”13
In the case at bench, petitioners argue that respondents deprived them of the possession of their lot through
deceit, strategy, and stealth. They aver that respondents deceived them to temporarily vacate the premises
on the pretext that they must convince the insurance inspectors that the premises are being used solely for
commercial purposes. They were thus allegedly tricked to move out and once the respondents achieved their
goal, they were prevented from entering the premises by posting security guards at the gates.
For their part, respondents claim that they have in their favor prior possession of the land dating back to
1984. They stake their claim of possession upon the right of title and possession of Pontino. The respondents
posit that through a series of various transfers originating from Pontino, they now legally occupy the subject
premises and do their business therein under the name Roniro Enterprises.
60
It is clear that respondents have prior possession de facto. While petitioners allege that their predecessor-in-
interest Rogelio Sr. was in possession of the subject lot in 1986, evidence on record supports the respondents’
claim that as early as 1984, Pontino not only possessed and occupied the lot but also had a title over the
disputed property. And by virtue of a Deed of Assignment between Pontino and Jedco Corporation, which the
latter relinquished in favor of De Guzman, respondents enjoy the right of prior possession de facto. In
addition, the possession of respondents was lawful from the beginning since it was acquired through lawful
means and thus no forcible entry was committed.
Petitioners further assert that the lot they occupy is different from the lot occupied by the respondents. They
claim that
_______________
13 Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 153; 250 SCRA 108, 114 (1995).
112
112
their lot is located at No. 2, Barrameda St., Upper Bicutan, Taguig while the lot occupied by the respondents is
located in Lower Bicutan. This, according to the petitioners, is enough reason to reverse the Decision of the
CA as the same “does not conform to the truth.”14
However, and as correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, “the point raised by the [petitioners] x x x
in respect of the identity of the property subject of the controversy may not be considered anymore at this
point since it was never raised as an issue in their appeal, nay even when the case was heard by the court a
quo.”15
Moreover, the resolution of the issue raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the evidence presented
during trial. It has been consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Only questions of law
may be entertained subject only to certain exceptions, none of which are present in the instant petition. It is
the function of trial courts to resolve factual issues whose findings on these matters are accorded respect and
considered binding by the Supreme Court especially when there is no conflict in the factual findings of both
the trial court and the appellate court. In this case, the MeTC, the RTC and the CA are one in their findings
that respondents did not forcibly enter the subject premises. All three tribunals found that respondents’
possession is lawful and legal from the beginning.
The petitioners also want us to reverse the findings of the court a quo that their predecessor-in-interest was
an employee of Roniro Enterprises.
We find no reason to do so.
It is clear from the facts that when the rights over the subject lot was relinquished in favor of De Guzman,
Rogelio Sr. was employed in order to help the respondents run the water
61
_______________
14 Rollo, pp. 28-39.
15 CA Rollo, p. 184.
113
VOL. 678, AUGUST 1, 2012
113
distribution system. Hence, it was actually through the respondents that the petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest was able to enter the disputed lot. And although Rogelio Sr. was able to occupy the lot, he was in fact
possessing the same in the name of the respondents. Verily, whatever right to possess petitioners have in this
case cannot be superior to that of the respondents since it was from the latter that their predecessor-in-
interest derived his claim of possession.
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,16 we held thus:
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as those a
party would naturally exercise over his own property. It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land
should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner
of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when
another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy. This declaration is [in conformity]
with Art. 524 of the Civil Code providing that possession may be exercised in one’s own name or in the name
[of] another.
The CA therefore correctly cited the case of Dalida v. Court of Appeals,17 where it was held that a mere
caretaker of a land has no right of possession over such land.
To conclude and to finally put this case to rest, forcible entry being an ejectment case is summary in nature.
When the findings of facts of the trial court have been affirmed by the CA, such are binding and deemed
conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated June 18, 2003 and
Resolution dated March 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74178 are hereby AFFIRMED.
_______________
16 374 Phil. 236, 242-243; 315 SCRA 626, 632-633 (1999).
17 202 Phil 804; 117 SCRA 480 (1982).
114
62
114
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro (Acting Chairperson),** Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Perlas-Bernabe,*** JJ., concur.
Notes.—The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential for
the MeTC’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical
possession of the property; (b) they must assert that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the
owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property. (Nuñez vs.
SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 618 SCRA 134 [2010])
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth—in such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning
and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto; Any of the parties who can prove prior
possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and
undue deprivation thereof. (Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr., 650 SCRA 344 [2011])
——o0o——
_______________
** Per Special Order No. 1226 dated May 30, 2012.
*** Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30, 2012. Heirs of Rogelio Isip, Sr. vs. Quintos, 678 SCRA 104, G.R.
No. 172008 August 1, 2012
G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010.*

CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, JOSE DERAMA, CATES RAMA, JOSIE MIWA, TOTO NOLASCO, JESUS OLIQUINO,
NORBERTO LOPEZ, RUBEN ESPOSO, BERNARDO FLORESCA, MARINA DIMATALO, ROBLE DIMANDAKO,
RICARDO PEÑA, EDUARDO ESPINO, ANTONIO GALLEGOS, VICTOR SANDOVAL, FELICITAS ABRANTES, MERCY
CRUZ, ROSENDO ORGANO, RICKY BARENO, ANITA TAKSAGON, JOSIE RAMA and PABLO DIMANDAKO,
petitioners, vs. MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (MAHA), respondent.
Actions; Ejectment; What determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over
the case are the allegations in the complaint.—Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the
action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In
ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
63
Same; Same; Two entirely distinct and different causes of action under Section 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.—There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit:
(1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose
occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from the
defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied)
with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right
thereunder.
Same; Same; Requisites for a complaint to sufficiently allege a cause of action for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer.—In forcible
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
539
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 11, 2010
539
Sarmienta vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA)
entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the
property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must
be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of
lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building “after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.” x x x A complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such
possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Same; Same; Possession by Tolerance; Well-settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another
at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him.—Petitioners’ continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they shall
comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the
right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of possession had already expired or had been
terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally
occupying the land. Well-settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.
64
Same; Same; Unlawful Detainer; In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue of resolution is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of
540
540
the parties.—As to petitioners’ argument that MAHA’s title is void for having been secured fraudulently, we
find that such issue was improperly raised. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties. Since the only issue involved is the physical or material possession of the premises, that is possession
de facto and not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed out in a separate action.
Luis O. Oreta for petitioners.
Julio F. Andres, Jr. for respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Decision1 dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution2
dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050. The CA had affirmed the Decision3
dated January 10, 20064 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 05-485
which reversed the Decision5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Antipolo City, Branch 1, in Civil
Case No. 104-00.
The case stemmed from a complaint6 for “Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer” filed by respondent Manalite
Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA) against AMARA W CIGEL-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 30-39. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Lucenito N. Tagle
and Ramon R. Garcia concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 132-133.
3 Id., at pp. 74-77.
4 Erroneously dated January 10, 2005.

65
5 Rollo, pp. 69-73.
6 CA Rollo, pp. 22-25.
541
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 11, 2010
541
SALO Association (AMARA) and its members. The complaint was raffled to the MTCC of Antipolo City, Branch
1 and docketed as Civil Case No. 104-00.
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 2226037 with an area of 9,936 square meters situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase I, Barangay Sta. Cruz,
Antipolo City.8 Through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, petitioners entered the premises and
constructed their temporary houses and an office building.9 Petitioners likewise even filed a civil case to annul
MAHA’s title on September 2, 1992, but said case was dismissed by the trial court. After said dismissal, MAHA
demanded that petitioners vacate the land. Petitioners pleaded that they be given one year within which to
look for a place to transfer, to which request MAHA acceded. The said one-year period, however, was
repeatedly extended due to the benevolence of MAHA’s members. Later on, petitioners came up with a
proposal that they become members of MAHA so they can be qualified to acquire portions of the property by
sale pursuant to the Community Mortgage Program (CMP).10 MAHA again agreed and tolerated petitioners’
possession, giving them until December 1999 to comply with the requirements to avail of the CMP benefits.
Petitioners nonetheless failed to comply with said requirements. Thus, on August 9, 2000, MAHA sent formal
demand letters to petitioners to vacate the property. Upon the latter’s refusal to heed the demand, MAHA
filed the complaint for “Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer.”
In their Answer with Counterclaims,11 petitioners denied the said allegations and averred that they are the
owners of the subject lot, having been in actual physical possession
_______________
7 Id., at p. 307.
8 Id., at p. 23.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id., at pp. 27-30.
542
542
66
thereof for more than thirty (30) years before MAHA intruded into the land. They claimed that as the years
went by, they established the AMARA and bought the subject property from Julian Tallano. The property later
became known as the Tallano Estate and registered under TCT No. 498. They likewise argued that the
allegations in the complaint do not confer jurisdiction upon the court acting as an ejectment court, and that
the complaint was irregular and defective because its caption states that it was for “Forcible Entry/Unlawful
Detainer.” MAHA, additionally, had no legal capacity to sue and was guilty of forum shopping. Its officers were
likewise fictitious.
On May 19, 2005, the MTCC of Antipolo City rendered a decision dismissing the case for lack of cause of
action. The MTCC held that the complaint filed was one of forcible entry, but MAHA failed to establish the
jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in its complaint.12 Also, the trial court held that
MAHA’s failure to initiate immediate legal action after petitioners unlawfully entered its property and its
subsequent declaration of benevolence upon the petitioners cannot be construed as tolerance in accordance
with law as to justify the treatment of the case as one for unlawful detainer.13
MAHA appealed the decision to the RTC. The RTC rendered a Decision dated January 10, 2006, reversing the
decision of the MTCC. The RTC held that the lower court erred in dismissing the case by considering the
complaint as one of forcible entry which required prior physical possession. The RTC found that MAHA was
able to allege and prove by preponderance of evidence that petitioners’ occupation of the property was by
mere “tolerance.” MAHA tolerated the occupation until all those who wanted to acquire MAHA’s rights of
ownership could comply with membership obligations and
_______________
12 Rollo, pp. 72-73.
13 Id.
543
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 11, 2010
543
dues.14 Petitioners, however, failed to comply with said obligations within the given period; thus, their
occupation became illegal after MAHA demanded that they vacate the property.15 The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is rendered ordering the defendants; their representatives and all persons acting for and in their
behalf; members of their families; their lessees and sub-lessees; or other people whose occupation of the
67
premises are from the authority of defendants, their representatives or members of the defendants’ families;
and other transferees pendente lite:
1) to vacate the subject premises;
2) to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) as for
attorney’s fee[s] and the cost of suit; and,
3) to pay the plaintiff severally the sum of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per month from June 1992 until
the premises are actually vacated.
SO ORDERED.”16
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the decision of the RTC. In a Decision
dated October 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA held that while the complaint in the
beginning alleged facts which make out a case for forcible entry, the rest of the averments therein show that
the cause of action was actually for unlawful detainer. The CA noted that the complaint alleged supervening
events that would show that what was initially forcible entry was later tolerated by MAHA thereby converting
its cause of action into one for unlawful detainer. Accordingly, the complaint was filed within the required
one-year period counted from the date of last de-
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 75-76.
15 Id., at p. 76.
16 Id., at pp. 76-77.
544
544
mand. The CA further held that the fact that the complaint was captioned as both for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer does not render it defective as the nature of the complaint is determined by the allegations
of the complaint. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74 dated January 10, [2006] is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”17
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration from the said decision was denied in a Resolution dated May 21, 2008.
Hence, petitioners are now before this Court raising the following issues:
68
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 74 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 05-485
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT [IN CITIES], BRANCH 1, ANTIPOLO CITY THAT
DISMISS[ED] THE FORCIBLE ENTRY/UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
COURT [A QUO] ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
COMPLAINT BOTH CAPTIONED AS FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS NOT DEFECTIVE.
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 38-39.
545
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 11, 2010
545
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS [HAVE] A SUPERIOR RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1, ANTIPOLO CITY HAS
JURISDICTION.
VI. WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1, ANTIPOLO CITY HAS
JURISDICTION OVER AN EJECTMENT CASE BASED ON FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER.18
Essentially, there are two principal issues for our resolution: (1) whether or not the allegations in the
complaint are sufficient to make up a case of forcible entry or unlawful detainer; and (2) whether or not the
CA was correct in affirming the RTC’s decision finding a case of unlawful detainer.
Petitioners assert that the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in actions for forcible entry
was not alleged with particularity in the complaint, as it merely alleged that respondent had been deprived of
its possession over the property. They also maintained that they were not withholding possession of the
property upon the expiration or termination of their right to possess because they never executed any
contract, express or implied, in favor of the respondent. Hence, there was also no unlawful detainer.
We deny the petition.
Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.19 In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section
69
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 173-175.
19 Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 156.
546
546
1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides:
“SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.”
There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for
forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation
thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from the defendant
whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession
of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.20 In unlawful detainer,
there must be an allegation in
_______________
20 Quizon v. Juan, G.R. No. 171442, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 601, 609-610.
547
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 11, 2010
547
70
the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any
contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building “after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.”
In the present case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a
case of unlawful detainer:
“x x x x
3. Plaintiff is the registered owner of that certain parcel of land involved in the instant case covered by TCT
No. 222603 containing an area of 9,936 sq.m. situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase I, Baranggay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo
City, which property was place under community mortgage program (CMP);
4. Other defendants in the instant case are all member and officers of defendant AMARA who, through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth entered into the premises herein and constructed their
temporary houses and office building respectively, pre-empting plaintiff from using the premises thus,
depriving the same of its prior possession thereof;
5. On September 2, 1992 as an strategy of the cheapest sort defendants, in conspiracy and collusion with
each other, defendants as representative of Heirs of Antonio and Hermogenes Rodriquez, the alleged owner
of the property at bar, filed civil case no. 92-2454 against plaintiff, lodge before Branch 73 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, seeking to annul plaintiff title;
6. Immediately upon final dismissal of such groundless, baseless and malicious suit, plaintiff demanded
defendants to vacate the premises, but the latter pleaded with the former to be given a one (1) year period
within which to look for a place to transfer, which period, upon pleas of defendants, coupled with plaintiff’s
benevolence was repeatedly extended by said plaintiffs tolerance of occupancy thereof, but under such terms
and conditions. Due to failure to comply with their undertaking despite repeated demands therefor plaintiffs
sent a formal demand letter upon defendants;
7. Upon receipt of the above-stated demand, defendants propose to become members of plaintiff, as
qualification to acquire
548
548
portions of the property by sale pursuant to the CMP, to which plaintiff agreed and tolerated defendants
possession by giving the same a period until the month of December 1999, to comply with all the
requirements pre-requisite to the availing of the CMP benefits but failed and despite repeated demands
71
therefor, thus, the filing of a complaint with the Baranggay and the issuance of the certificate to file action
dated February 8, 2000;
8. As time is of the essence, and the fact that the defendants are mere intruders or usurpers who have no
possessory right whatsoever over the land illegally occupied by them, trifling technicalities that would tend to
defeat the speedy administration of justice formal demand is not necessary thereto, (Republic vs. Cruz C.A.
G.R. No. 24910 R Feb. 7, 1964) however, to afford a sufficient period of time within which to vacate the
premises peacefully another oral and formal demands were made upon the same to that effect, and demolish
the temporary office and houses they constructed on plaintiff’s property and instead defendants again, as
representative to alleged “Estate of Julian Tallano” filed a complaint for ejectment against plaintiffs former
President, Hon. Marcelino Aben which case, is docketed as civil case no. 4119, lodged, before branch 11 of
this Honorable court, defendants obstinately refused to peacefully turn over the property they intruded upon
in fact they even dared plaintiff to file a case against them boasting that nobody can order them to vacate the
premises;
9. Defendants’ letter dated August 9, 2000, acknowledged actual receipt of plaintiffs two (2) formal
demands letters. Thus, “the issuance of Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman” dated September 25,
2000;
10. As a result thereof, plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of the undersigned counsel in order
to immediately institute the instant suit for which services plaintiff agreed to pay the amount of P35,000.00
plus P3,500.00 per court appearance;
x x x x”21
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially,
possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by toler-
_______________
21 Rollo, pp. 61-62.
549
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 11, 2010
549
ance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand
on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.22
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners’ stay and
gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners’
continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements of
72
the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate
the property as their right of possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA
required petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land.23 Well settled is the
rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.24 Thus, the RTC and the CA
correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.
As to petitioners’ argument that MAHA’s title is void for having been secured fraudulently, we find that such
issue was improperly raised. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any
_______________
22 Cabrera v. Getaruela, G.R. No. 164213, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 129, 136-137.
23 See Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142276, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 755, 767.
24 Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, G.R. No. 176995, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 624, 644.
550
550
of the parties.25 Since the only issue involved is the physical or material possession of the premises, that is
possession de facto and not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed out in a separate
action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050
are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Brion, Bersamin and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Note.—The one-year period within which to commence an ejectment proceeding is a prescriptive period as
well as a jurisdictional requirement. (Barnachea vs. Court of Appeals, 559 SCRA 363 [2008])
73
——o0o——
_______________
25 See Cabrera v. Getaruela, supra note 22, at p. 138. Sarmienta vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc.
(MAHA), 632 SCRA 538, G.R. No. 182953 October 11, 2010
G.R. No. 180542. April 12, 2010.*

HUBERT NUÑEZ, petitioner, vs. SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC., through its representative, CESAR
SYLIANTENG, respondent.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Ejectment; Ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of first level
courts.—Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved, there can be no gainsaying the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts by express provision of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in
relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition to being conferred by law,
however, a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some
of the claims asserted therein. In much the same way that it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive
characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses
set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.
Same; Same; Same; Forcible Entry; Essential requisites for Metropolitan Trial Court’s (MeTC’s) acquisition of
jurisdiction over forcible entry cases.—The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following
requisites are essential for the MeTC’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must
allege their prior physical possession of the property; (b) they must assert that they were deprived of
possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) the action must be filed within
one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical
possession of the property.
Ejectment; Forcible Entry; Possession; One need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch
of the property at all times to be considered in possession.—While prior physical possession is,
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
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VOL. 618, APRIL 12, 2010
135
Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc.
admittedly, an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in petitioner’s position
is, however, evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but
also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Because possession can also be acquired by juridical acts to which the law
74
gives the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession, execution and registration of public
instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like, it has been held that one need not have
actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times to be considered in possession.
Same; Same; Same; The one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the
dispossession when the same had been effected by means of stealth.—Ordinarily reckoned from the date of
actual entry on the land, the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the
dispossession when, as here, the same had been effected by means of stealth.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.—The rule is settled, however, that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as
these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic consideration of due process impels this rule.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Gregorio D. David for petitioner.
N.A. Aranzaso & Associates for respondent.
136
136
PEREZ, J.:
The determination of the jurisdiction of first level courts over ejectment cases is at the heart of this Petition
for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which seeks the
nullification and setting aside of the 31 July 2007 Decision rendered by the Special Twelfth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91771.1
The Facts
The subject matter of the instant suit is a 635.50 square meter parcel of land situated at Calle Solana,
Intramuros, Manila and registered in the name of respondent SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc. under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 87556 of the Manila City Registry of Deeds. Despite having acquired the same
thru the 4 June 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana
Sylianteng,2 it appears that respondent was constrained to leave the subject parcel idle and unguarded for
some time due to important business concerns. In October 2003, an ocular inspection conducted by
respondent’s representatives revealed that the property was already occupied by petitioner Hubert Nuñez
and 21 other individuals.3 Initially faulting one Vivencia Fidel with unjustified refusal to heed its verbal
75
demands to vacate the subject parcel, respondent filed its 5 December 2003 complaint for forcible entry
which was
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 61-73.
2 Records, p. 10a.
3 Vivencia Fidel, Maximo Mahipus, Jr., Hermigildo Mangubat, Epifanio Casolita II, Erlinda Inciong, Edgar
Amador, Joseph Duerme, Rolando Jamang, Romeo Granada, Romeo Figueroa, Brando Galciso, Eunice Banaag,
Cecilia Agonos, Beth De Guzman, Mario P. Tampol, Elizabeth Francisco, Edmundo R. Barela, Reynaldo
Granada, Zedric Bananag, Estanislao J. La Fuente and Danilo P. Jerusalem.
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VOL. 618, APRIL 12, 2010
137
docketed as Civil Case No. 177060 before Branch 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.4
Additionally impleading petitioner and the rest of the occupants of the property, respondent filed its 9
January 2004 amended complaint, alleging, among other matters, that thru its representatives and
predecessors-in-interest, it had continuously possessed the subject realty, over which it exercised all
attributes of ownership, including payment of real property taxes and other sundry expenses; that without
the benefit of any lease agreement or possessory right, however, petitioners and his co-defendants have
succeeded in occupying the property by means of strategy and stealth; and, that according to reliable sources,
the latter had been in occupancy of the same parcel since 1999. Together with the ejectment of the occupants
of the subject premises, respondent prayed for the grant of its claims for reasonable rentals, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and the costs.5
Specifically denying the material allegations of the foregoing amended complaint in his 14 February 2004
Answer, petitioner averred that the property occupied by him is owned by one Maria Ysabel Potenciano
Padilla Sylianteng, with whom he had concluded a subsisting lease agreement over the same, and that, in
addition to respondent’s lack of cause of action against him, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case for
lack of prior demand to vacate and referral of the controversy to the barangay authorities for a possible
amicable settlement.6 Likewise questioning the MeTC’s jurisdiction over the case, the rest of the defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss7 which they adopted as their answer subsequent to its 27 February 2004 denial
upon the finding that a sufficient
_______________
4 Records, pp. 15-20.
5 Rollo, pp. 24-30.

76
6 Id., at pp. 31-34.
7 Records, pp. 59-64.
138
138
cause of action can be gleaned from the allegations of the complaint.8
After an ocular inspection conducted on 9 June 2004, it appears that the MeTC concluded that the crowding
of the residential units on the subject parcel rendered the determination of its exact metes and bounds
impossible.9 Unable to present his lessor’s title, petitioner also appears to have agreed to the use of TCT No.
87556 as basis for determining the exact measurement of respondent’s property.10 With the parties’ further
failure to abide by their agreement to cause a survey of the property thru an impartial surveyor from the
Office of the City Assessor or City Engineer, the record shows that respondent submitted a survey plan
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Joseph Padilla who determined that petitioner was, indeed, occupying a
portion of the subject parcel.11 Relying on said report, the MeTC went on to render a Decision dated 23
November 2004,12 resolving the complaint in the following wise:
“Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against all the
defendants and ordering the latter to:
1. vacate the subject premises located at Lot 11, Block 45, Solana St., Intramuros, Manila;
2. for each [defendant], to pay Php5,000.00 a month counted from October 2003 until defendants vacate
the subject property;
3. to pay Php15,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
4. to pay the costs of suit.”13
_______________
8 Id., at p. 58.
9 Id., at pp. 76-77.
10 Id., at p. 145.
11 Id., at p. 128.
12 Rollo, pp. 37-43.

77
13 Id., at p. 43.
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VOL. 618, APRIL 12, 2010
139
On appeal, the foregoing decision was affirmed in toto in the 14 July 2005 Order issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112490.14 Dissatisfied with said Order, petitioner elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review filed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.15 Finding that the allegations in respondent’s amended complaint sufficiently made out a
cause of action for forcible entry against petitioner, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed
decision, dismissing said petition for review upon the following findings and conclusions:
“Parenthetically, although the dispossession took place more than one year from the illegal entry of petitioner
and his co-defendants, knowledge of the same was only acquired by petitioner in 2003 when the ocular
inspection was made. While ordinarily, the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date of
the actual entry on the land, the same however, does not hold true when entry was made through stealth, in
which case, the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
Neither may petitioner seek refuge in the alleged demand letter dated 31 July 1996 sent by respondent’s
counsel which sought his ouster from the subject premises. Not only was the existence of this letter
immaterial to the issue of illegal entry into the subject premises but the same cannot bind respondent who
has no participation therein. Moreover, it also bears stressing that not once did petitioner refute the lack of
knowledge on the part of respondent of the alleged lease contract and their usurpation of the disputed
property. Verily, granting that a lease contract truly existed, respondent’s lack of knowledge of the lease
contract and the failure to register the same in the Register of Deeds cannot bind third parties like respondent
and therefore, withhold respondent’s right to institute the action for ejectment.
As to the identity of the premises occupied by petitioner Nuñez, We find that the RTC committed no
reversible error in admitting the evidence of respondent which consists of the plan prepared
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 44-50.
15 Id., at pp. 15-21.
140
140

78
by Geodetic Engineer Padilla. Suffice it to state that petitioner, during the proceedings below, agreed to
secure an impartial survey from the Assessor’s Office or the Office of the City Engineer. However, when he
took no action after failing to obtain the survey from said offices, his consequent failure to secure, on his own,
the services of an impartial surveyor to determine and rebut respondent’s allegation, he did so on his own
accord and had no other person but himself to blame.”16
The Issues
Upon receipt of the Court of Appeals’ 4 November 2007 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of
the aforequoted decision,17 petitioner filed the petition at bench on the following grounds:
THE COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF
FORCIBLE ENTRY ARE NOT PRESENT AND ADDITIONALLY THERE IS A QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP.
II
THE PETITIONER SHOULD NOT VACATE THE LEASED PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS AN EXISTING
LEASE CONTRACT WITH THE OWNER WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 1671 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE.18
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the
property in-
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 70-71.
17 Id., at pp. 79-80.
18 Id., at p. 9.
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79
volved,19 there can be no gainsaying the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of first level courts20 by express provision of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to
Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.21 In addition to being conferred by law,22 however, a
court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint23 and the
character of the relief sought,24 irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some
of the claims asserted therein.25 In much the same way that it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive
characterization of the case
_______________
19 Tubiano v. Razo, 390 Phil. 863, 868; 335 SCRA 531, 536 (2000).
20 Corpuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117005, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 275, 279.
21 Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
may at anytime within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
22 Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato, 384 Phil. 252, 259-260; 327 SCRA 521, 528 (2000).
23 Gochan v. Young, 406 Phil. 663, 673-674; 354 SCRA 207, 216 (2001).
24 Sunny Motor Sales, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 517, 520; 363 SCRA 283, 287 (2001).
25 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 793, 798; 356 SCRA 661, 666-667 (2001).
142
142
by one of the parties,26 jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a
motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.27
The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential for the MeTC’s
acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the
property; (b) they must assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; and, (c) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal
possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.28 As it is not essential that
80
the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, it is considered a sufficient compliance of the
requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions.29 The
one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual
entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned thereof.30
Even prescinding from the fact that the parties had admitted the MeTC’s jurisdiction,31 our perusal of the
record shows that respondent’s 9 January 2004 amended complaint was able to make out a cause of action
for forcible entry against petitioner. As the registered owner of the subject parcel, re-
_______________
26 Pilipinas Bank v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 18, 28; 326 SCRA 147, 154 (2000).
27 Tamano v. Ortiz, 353 Phil. 775, 780; 291 SCRA 584, 588 (1998).
28 De La Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 103, 115.
29 Cajayon v. Sps. Batuyong, G.R. No. 149118, 16 February 2006, 482 SCRA 461, 471-472.
30 Ong v. Parel, 407 Phil. 1045, 1053; 355 SCRA 691, 696 (2001).
31 Records, pp. 94 and 145.
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VOL. 618, APRIL 12, 2010
143
spondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and thru its predecessors-in-interest, it had been in
possession of the subject parcel and had exercised over the same all attributes of ownership, including the
payment of realty taxes and other expenses; that an ocular inspection conducted in October 2003 revealed
that petitioner and his co-defendants have succeeded in occupying the property by means of stealth and
strategy; and, that its subsequent demands to vacate had been unheeded by said interlopers.32 Considering
that the test for determining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff,33 we find that
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case.
Then as now, petitioner argues that, aside from the admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left
idle and unguarded, respondent’s claim of prior possession is clearly negated by the fact that he had been in
occupancy thereof since 1999. While prior physical possession is, admittedly, an indispensable requirement in
forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in petitioner’s position is, however, evident from the principle that
possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.34 Because
possession can also be acquired by juridical acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, e.g.,
81
donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information
titles and the like, it has been held that one need not have actual or physical occupation of every
_______________
32 Rollo, pp. 25-28.
33 Heirs of Demetrio Melchor v. Melchor, 461 Phil. 437, 443-444; 415 SCRA 726, 732 (2003).
34 Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 619; 454 SCRA 653, 671 (2005).
144
144
square inch of the property at all times to be considered in possession.35
In this case, the subject parcel was acquired by respondent by virtue of the 4 June 1999 Deed of Assignment
executed in its favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. Although it did not immediately
put the same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered in
its name as of 27 February 200236 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon37 alongside the
sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not
matter that, by the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003, petitioner had already
been occupying the land since 1999. Ordinarily reckoned from the date of actual entry on the land, the one
year period is counted from the time the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the dispossession when, as here, the
same had been effected by means of stealth.38
Petitioner had, of course, endeavored to establish that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had served him
a demand to vacate the subject parcel as early as 31 July 1996.39 Correctly brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals on the ground, among others, that respondent had no participation in its preparation, we find said
demand letter of little or no use to petitioner’s cause in view of its non-presentation before the MeTC.
However, much as it may now be expedient for petitioner to anchor his cause thereon, said demand letter
was first introduced in the record only as an attachment to his reply to respondent’s comment to the motion
for reconsidera-
_______________
35 Quizon v. Juan, G.R. No. 171442, 17 June 2008, 554 SCRA 601, 612.
36 Records, p. 21.
37 Id., at p. 86.
82
38 Ong v. Parel, supra note 30.
39 Rollo, pp. 18 and 59.
145
VOL. 618, APRIL 12, 2010
145
tion of the 14 July 2005 order issued by the RTC.40 The rule is settled, however, that points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.41 Basic consideration
of due process impels this rule.42
A similar dearth of merit may be said of the exceptions petitioner continues to take against the MeTC’s
reliance on the survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Joseph Padilla to the effect that that the premises
occupied by petitioner lies within the metes and bounds of respondent’s property. As mere allegation is not
evidence,43 the rule is settled that plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint which are denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the material
allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter.44 Given the parties’ failure to make good on their
agreement to cause a survey of the property thru an impartial surveyor from the Office of the City Assessor or
City Engineer, respondent’s submission of said report was evidently for the purpose discharging the onus of
proving petitioner’s encroachment on the subject parcel, as alleged in the complaint. As the party asserting
the contrary proposition, petitioner cannot expediently disparage the admissibility and probative value of said
survey plan to compensate for his failure to prove his own assertions.
Petitioner is, finally, out on a limb in faulting the Court of Appeals with failure to apply the first paragraph of
Article
_______________
40 Records, pp. 310-314.
41 Almocera v. Ong, G.R. No. 170479, 18 February 2008, 546 SCRA 164, 178.
42 Magaling v. Ong, G.R. No. 173333, 13 August 2008, 562 SCRA 152, 170-171.
43 Gateway Electronics Corporation v. Asianbank Corporation, G.R. No. 172041, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA
698, 718-719.
44 Republic v. Vda. de Neri, 468 Phil. 842, 862; 424 SCRA 676, 692 (2004).
146
83
146
1676 of the Civil Code of the Philippines45 in relation to the lease he claims to have concluded with one Maria
Ysabel Potenciano Padilla Sylianteng. In the absence of proof of his lessor’s title or respondent’s prior
knowledge of said contract of lease, petitioner’s harping over the same provision simply amounts to an
implied admission that the premises occupied by him lie within the metes and bounds of the subject parcel.
Even then, the resolution of said issue is clearly inappropriate since ejectment cases are summary actions
intended to provide an expeditious manner for protecting possession or right to possession without
involvement of title.46 Moreover, if a defendant’s mere assertion of ownership in an ejectment case will not
oust the MeTC of its summary jurisdiction,47 we fail to see why it should be any different in this case where
petitioner merely alleged his lessor’s supposed title over the subject parcel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza,** JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
_______________
45 Art. 1676. The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded in the Registry of
Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of sale, or
when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease.
46 Cayabyab v. Gomez de Aquino, G.R. No.159974, 5 September 2007, 532 SCRA 353, 361.
47 Tecson v. Gutierrez, 493 Phil. 132, 138; 452 SCRA 781, 786 (2005).
** Per Special Order No. 832, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza is hereby designated as Additional
Member of the Second Division in place of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, who is on Official Leave from
April 6-8, 2010. Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 618 SCRA 134, G.R. No. 180542<br/> April 12,
2010

Forcible Entry Cases

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1

FORCIBLE ENTRY CASES

The case presents the following questions:

Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[7] Id.; records, p. 165.

[10] CA rollo, pp. 156, 158; id. at 192, 196,347.438.

[12] Id. at 79, 174.

[13] Records, pp. 220-240.

[14] CA rollo, p. 21; Records 437.

[15] Id. at 159, 174,202-203.

[16] Records, pp. 275-277.

[17] CA rollo, pp. 48-50.

[18] Records, pp. 384-385.

[20] CA rollo, pp. 51-63.

[24] Id. at 9-46. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP 92617.

[30] Cajayon v. Spouses Batuyong, 517 Phil. 648, 659 (2006).

[31] Domalsin v. Spouses Valenciano, 515 Phil. 745, 763 (2006).

[33] Records, pp. 41,44-45, 62.

[38] Records, pp. 174 (pagination in red ink), 368.

[39] De Grano v. Lacaba, supra note 32, at 159.

[40] Lee v. Paz, G.R. No. 183606, October 27, 2009.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Rodrigo L. Yuson for petitioners.

Pablo B. Francisco for respondents.

The case arose from the following antecedents:

2 Id., at pp. 34-35.

3 CA Rollo, p. 60.

5 Id., at pp. 44-46.

6 Id., at pp. 127-128.

7 Id., at pp. 76-77.

D. That there was a substantial compliance of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law.

G. To pay the costs of suit.

10 Id., at pp. 56-57.

11 CA Rollo, p. 201.

13 Id., at pp. 27-29.

The petition is without merit.

20 CA Rollo, p. 137. (Emphasis supplied.)

21 Arbizo v. Santillan, supra note 17, at 624-625.

Carpio,** Corona (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

23 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18, at 512.

G.R. No. 142308. November 15, 2005.*

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bañes vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines

VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 15, 2005

Bañes vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bañes vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Roberto L. Mendoza for petitioners.

Humphrey D. Tumaneng for respondents.

VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 15, 2005

Bañes vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines

The facts are as follows:

2 Rollo, pp. 56-58.

5 Records, Vol. I, p. 113.

Bañes vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines

Del Rosario’s letter reads:

Dear Rev. Ladlad:

Greetings in Christ’s love and peace.

(In his own handwriting)

VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 15, 2005