Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 10/20/2020 09:23 AM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by N. Alvarez,Deputy Clerk

20STCV40105
Assigned for all purposes to: Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Judicial Officer: Mel Red Recana

1 David K. Schneider (SBN 139288)

SCHNEIDER & BRANCH
2 655 West Broadway, Suite 1400
San Diego, CA 92101
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Tel: (619) 233-5500
4 Fax: (619) 233-5562
Email: dks@scheiderbranchlaw.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
6 MEHCAD BROOKS

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA

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9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

10 MEHCAD BROOKS, Case No.

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Plaintiff, COMPLAINT FOR:

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V. 1. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE;
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RODNEY DIGGS; IVIE MC'NEILL WYATT 2. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY;
14 PURCELL & DIGGS, A PROFESSIONAL ond
LAW CORPORATION, and DOES 1-30,
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inclusive, 3. BREACH OF CONTRACT

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Defendants.
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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COMPLAINT
 Plaintiff Mehcad Brooks ("") files this Complaint against Defendant Rodney Diggs

("") and Ivie McNeill Wyatt Purcell & Diggs, A Professional Law Corporation, and Demand for

Jury Trial, and in support would respectfully show:

INTRODUCTION

1. This case arises from Defendants' negligent representation of Brooks, a successful actor

and rising star in the entertainment industry, in a lawsuit filed by Brooks against his former talent agency.

When Brooks hired Diggs and his firm to represent Brooks in the legal battle of his life against his

abusive and predatory fornner talent agency, Brooks thought he would receive the type of top-quality

representation advertised by Diggs' firm, whose website states the firm is "committed to providing

superior legal services" and that its "lawyers are zealous, devoted and focused advocates" for its clients.

!vie rsvi")cNei)!%A!>,yatt
PurceJl & Digqs u>"yderstaiqds
the <:ornpiex"ties and r>i.aances
of sports arid ertterta:rary"ier>t b=us:iryesses arrc:i our labht'i,i'ers are zea!ous, devoted
arid PC)CL3S'ed dc't't.t"ocates HOT OLlr Ciel'ThfS. AS a resait., !Ve pr O'Vlde C4"te!ThtS !V[fh Van'!,

'eA.a{J-er!e(Yie!f'rSpOrfbarH:lea'nter+a!.t'ttT)ertT,:t-a!!"lT.xaft.erS:n(Judl{lq:

2. What Brooks got was an attorney-Diggs-who barely went through the motions of

representing Brooks, and was constantly distracted by other seemingly more important areas of his life:

parties and romantic conquests. As a result, Diggs wholly failed to diligently work Brooks' case-to the

point where the damage was irreversible, causing Brooks to lose his case. In other words, Diggs not only

fumbled the football, he carelessly tossed it onto the field for the other team to scoop up and score, while

20 Diggs was busy "flirting" with the cheerleaders.

3. In the mid-2000"s, after years of hard work and dedication to his craft, Brooks was already

22 a successful actor. Brooks was a "rising star" and aspiring script writer-increasingly sought-after and

with many options when considering hiring an agent. Brooks selected Innovative Artists Talent &

24 Literary Agency, Inc. ("IA"). IA, as Brooks' agent, had a duty to "use all reasonable efforts to procure

employment" for Brooks in several listed entertainment areas, specifically including as a "writer" in the

26 "literary" field.

27 4. However, when Brooks shared with IA what he considered to be his best literary work

28 yet-the idea of a television series based on the Salem witch trials-IA, to put it charitably, dropped the

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COMPLAINT
 ball. While neglecting Brooks, IA was encouraging and assisting another one of IA's clients-Adam

Simon, who was a longtime friend of IA agent James Stein, to develop and pursue a Salem television

project "remarkably" and not so coincidentally similar to Brooks' idea. Despite its duty to promote

Brooks in the literary field, IA wholly neglected its duty and failed to take any action to develop Brooks'

literary aspirations or assist Brooks in procuring employment in the literary field. IA therefore failed to

perform its contractual obligations and more importantly it violated specific laws and public policies

intended to protect artists, actors and writers from unscrupulous talent agencies.

5. Shortly after learning that IA favored one client over another, Brooks filed a claim in

arbitration asserting his basic rights under the law and the agency contract.

6. During the arbitration, Brooks hired attorney Diggs to represent him. Diggs"

performance, however, fell well below the standard of care that one would expect an attorney to provide

to his client, especially in a case that was so important to Brooks, who had been taken advantage of his

own talent agency whom he hired to protect his interests and promote his work.

7. Throughout his representation, Diggs seemed much more focused on partying, pursuing the

ladies, and having a good time, than on helping Brooks successfully prosecute his legal claims against IA.

8. Diggs' lack of effort and inattention to Brooks' case harmed Brooks and led directly to his

losing the arbitration, resulting in a take-nothing award on Brooks' claims, which was confirmed as

modified by order of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, on Februa.ty 28, 2020.

Diggs' improper and damaging conduct during the arbitration proceedings was the basis for the arbitrator

20 awarding sanctions against Brooks, which ultimately were removed from the award by the California

Superior Court as an excess of the arbitrator"s authority.

22 9. If it were not for Diggs' negligent conduct during the arbitration proceeding, Brooks

would have prevailed in his claims against IA.

24 THE PARTIES

10. Plaintiff Mehcad Brooks ("Brooks") is an individual who resides in the County of Los

26 Angeles, State of California.

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COMPLAINT
 11. Defendant Rodney Diggs ("Diggs") is an individual who, on information and belief,

resides in the County of Los Angeles. Diggs is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a California-

licensed attorney.

12. Defendant Ivie McNeill Wyatt Purcell & Diggs, A Professional Law Corporation ("the

Firm"), is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. The

Firm was previously known as Ivie McNeill & Wyatt, a Law Corporation, until December 31, 2019,

when it filed a Certificate of Amendment of Articles of Incorporation, Name Change Only - Stock, with

the California Secretary of State, changing its name to Ivie McNeill Wyatt Purcell & Diggs, A

Professional Law Corporation. The Firm is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a law firm located in

Los Angeles, California.

13. Doeslthrough30,inclusive,arefictitiousnamesofdefendantssuedhereinpursuantto

section 474 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Each Doe defendant and each specifically named defendant

is liable and responsible for Brooks' damages as alleged herein. Brooks will seek leave of court to

amend this complaint wben the true names of said Doe defendants can be ascertained, or alternatively

Brooks will seek leave of Court to add them at the time of trial.

14. At all times herein mentioned, each Defendant named above was the agent, servant,

employee, partner, alter ego, aider and abettor, co-conspirator and/or joint venture of each other, was

engaged with the other Defendant in a joint enterprise for profit, and was at all times operating and acting

within the purpose, scope, and authority of said agency, service, employment, partnership, conspiracy

20 and/or joint venture, and with the knowledge and consent of the other Defendant, and each Defendant has

ratified and approved the acts of the other Defendant.

22 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

15. This Court has jurisdiction over Diggs and the Firm pursuant to California's long-arm

24 jurisdictionstatute,section410.10oftheCalifomiaCodeofCivilProcedure. ThisCourthasjurisdiction

over Diggs because, upon information and belief, Diggs is domiciled in California. This Court has

26 jurisdiction over Diggs also because Diggs has purposely availed himself of the California forum by

27 having substantial and continuous business contacts with California, because Brooks' claims stated

herein arise from and are related to Diggs' contacts with California, and California's exercise of personal

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COMPLAINT
 jurisdiction over Diggs comports with fair play and substantial justice. This Court has jurisdiction over

the Firm because the Firm is incorporated in California and has its principal place of business in

California.

16. Venue is proper in Los Angeles County pursuant to section 395(a) of the California Code

of Civil Procedure because either some or all of the Defendants in this lawsuit reside in Los Angeles

County. Venue is also proper in Los Angeles County under section 395.5 of the California Code of Civil

Procedure because the Firm's principal place of business is in Los Angeles County, and the Firm's

liability for acts and omissions complained of herein arose in Los Angeles County.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Brooks Signs With Innovative Artists

17. Brooks is a successful actor who has appeared in lead roles in many television and movie

productions, and is also a recording artist and author of several movie and television scripts. He has been

nominated for and won numerous awards including the SAG award, a Young Hollywood Award,

Variety's Ten Actors to Watch, and the NAACP Image Award.

18. On February 13, 2003, Brooks signed an agency contract with IA. Prior to IA, Brooks was

represented by a different agency and specifically Ms. Sheila Wenzel.

19. In the arbitration, Wenzel described Brooks as a "rising star" with the "it" factor,

explaining that Brooks had "charisma, very smart, very intelligent, and willing to grow." Wenzel further

explained that even before joining IA in 2003, Brooks showed interest in fields outside the talent arena,

20 including writing, music, producing, and directing.

20. In early 2003, Wenzel was recruited by IA's owner and president, Scott Harris, to join IA.

22 Harris promised Wenzel that IA would represent her clients in all entertainment areas, including writing,

directing, producing, commercials, and endorsements. Wenzel repeated these representations to her

24 clients, including Brooks. Based on these assurances, Wenzel and her clients-including Brooks-

switched to IA in 2003.

26 21. The agency contract signed by Brooks in 2003, like all subsequent renewal contracts

27 entered into by Brooks and IA, was a form contract approved by The Labor Commissioner of California

that specifically obligated IA to "use all reasonable efforts to procure employment" for Brooks in "all

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COMPLAINT
 branches of the entertainment, literary, and/or related fields.='

22. Brooks never had a contract with any individual IA agent but instead, at all relevant times,

Brooks' agent was the entity IA. Although IA was internally divided between the "Talent Department"

and the "Literary Department," these were internal distinctions only as there was only one formal

entity-IA-that contracted with its various clients, including Brooks. IA's obligations to Brooks

included "all branches" and was not dependent on IA's internal structure or corporate titles. IA certainly

understood that its scope of agreed services included literary works. For example, during the mid-2000s,

IA assisted Brooks regarding several of his literary projects, including "Mancuso," a pilot that Brooks

optioned,

23. However, IA's inattention to Brooks' literary aspirations became an issue in 2007.

Although Brooks had proven his capabilities as a writer by writing and optioning an original screenplay,

IA was anything but diligent in representing him on the literary side. Testimony from Brooks and

Wenzel along with emails show that Brooks" dissatisfaction with IA5s efforts on the literary side

ultimately led to Brooks" briefly terminating IA's literary representation on October 4, 2007. For about

seven months thereafter, Brooks used a different agency for literary representation.

24. However, in 2008, Wenzel became concerned that IA might lose all of Brooks'

representation and urged her colleagues on IA's literary side to convince Brooks to return for

comprehensive representation. She arranged for an "entourage" meeting at IA's offices in which Brooks

met with many agents who convinced him to come back for complete across-the-board representation-

20 expressly including literary representation.

25. Brooks, in reliance on IA's assurances, returned to IA for comprehensive representation

22 and on May 5, 2008 entered into another agency contract. The contract specifically included

representation in the "literary" field. Pursuant to the agency contract, IA received a percentage of any

24 income received by Brooks for projects obtained during IA's representation.

Brooks' Salem Project

26 26. In the spring of 2010, Brooks began developing an idea for a television project based on

27 the Salem witch trials. Brooks' concept, which he initially worked on with a colleague named Kyle

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COMPLAINT
 Newman, was to combine certain historical events but using real witches to create a suspenseful plot

where "you don"t know who a witch is."

27. Brooks shared his Salem idea directly with IA's president Scott Harris at a dinner party

Harris hosted in May of 2010. As described by Wenzel, Harris was very impressed with Brooks' Salem

idea, and he even recommended that the idea be presented to HBO.

28. A few months later, in an August 23, 2010 e-mail, Brooks sent IA a description of his

Salem idea. In the e-mail addressed to Wenzel at her IA e-mail address, Brooks outlined the basic

theme: "This show will be gritty and real, accurately portraying colonial life while dealing with issues

such as class, race, religion and politics (issues also relevant to present day)... Everything you know or

think you know will be challenged in this suspenseful roller coaster ride with layer upon layer of

mystery, treachery and heart stopping twists."

29. Brooks considered this his best literary work yet and devoted substantial efforts to develop

the project. Brooks completed a treatment for Salem, which he registered with the Writers Guild of

America on May 23, 2011. In fact, it was Wenzel, who was aware of Brooks' efforts, who specifically

advised Brooks to register his work with the WGA to protect his ideas.

30. After registering the Salem treatment, Brooks continued to work on completing his pilot

script. Both Wenzel and Brooks discussed Brooks' Salem idea directly with IA literary agent Jim Stein

and that Stein was on Brooks' "team" to assist in pursuing the project and IA the contract for Brooks.

IA ASSiStSAdam Simon with Simon's Salem Proiect Without Telling Brooks

20 31. Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Brooks or Wenzel, Stein and IA were actively assisting

another one of IA's longtime literary clients, Adam Simon, to find work. During this time period, Simon

22 was in severe financial distress, unable to pay medical bills, and had his "house in foreclosure." Stein

and Simon had a very close relationship dating back almost 20 years.

24 32. Stein's IA calendar showed approximately 140 entries relating to meetings or calls with

Simon. Stein"s calendar also reflected that in August 2011, about a year after Brooks told IA bout his

26 Salem project, Stein arranged a meeting between Simon, Rob Carliner and Josh Barry. Simon testified in

27 the arbitration hearing that this meeting and introduction to Josh Barry would ultimately lead to his own

28 Salempro3ect- which he titled "Malice." Simon testified that Barry contactedhim around October31,

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COMPLAINT
 2011 and asked Simon to consider working on a project based on the Salem historical events but with

"real witches." Given Simon's precarious financial condition, he described the offer as a "life changing

call" and that he was "grateful to Jim Stein and Innovative Artists to set up the chain of events that lead

to that."

33. Neither Stein nor anyone else at IA disclosed to Brooks that another IA client, Simon, was

working on a Salem project. Wenzel testified in the arbitration hearing that she did not know that Simon

was working on his Salem project but agreed that had she known, it would have been important to inform

Brooks:

Q: And while we're on that topic, we just saw on that page the duty not to conceal
information. I think the contract called it pertinent. Do you see that?
Right.
And isn't it-would you consider it, in your almost 20 years experience as an
agent, pertinent if another one of your clients was developing a project-literary
product that was similar to a different client?
A: Yes, I would tell them.

34. Stein and IA actively and successfully assisted Simon in pursuing his Salem project,

which was sold to FOX 21, ran for several seasons, and generated in excess of $1.5 million in revenue to

Simon.

35. Wenzel learned in an August 5, 2013 internal casting call e-mail that a Salem project was

being produced. Wenzel assumed that the project was Brooks' and sent him a congratulatory e-mail. In

fact, Wenzel anticipated sharing the revenue since she knew Brooks had developed the idea while an IA

20 client. When Wenzel found out it was not Brooks' production but that it was another IA client Simon5s,

she pulled up both scripts on her IA computer. After comparing Brooks' and Simon's script, Wenzel

22 was "shocked" at the similarity.

36. Knowing that Stein had discussions with Brooks about Salem, Wenzel concluded that

24 something was "wrong" and that Brooks' idea was taken and used as the basis for Simon's project. A-fter

then receiving a strange unsolicited call from Harris about Brooks, Wenzel felt that Harris and IA were

26 guilty of having taken advantage of Brooks and violated their duties to him. Wenzel, who worked for

27 Haris for over 14 years, described Harris in the arbitration hearing as "dishonest."

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COMPLAINT
 l 37. Brooks did not initially watch the "Malice" production, but was driving home in Los

2 Angeles shortly before Season Two and saw a billboard advertising "Salem" using the tag line "Witch

3 Among us." He explained that was the same tag line he had developed:

4 Simon's Tag Line Brooks' Tag Line

5 rn a maxsiigv ameeiarsmivo i m aa M cesmo*yr@i Timg mti wm&

TELEV/S/ON

6 SALEM(TV)
Wi/ahamr>ngyou...

7/-E DARJ(NE8S(T'!7)
7 New !Ahrld Order hamessesthe yvarof elechcdy and Wds the wM

77-!EMOO8 0F VENICE(TV)
Ottw4bpraqueJ.
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THE CHATEAU(TV)
Five amptoyeeahystarkal experienceworkingat an ib and pregtj@us
His.
9 Hdlytoffl

GFrOf-LIFE(TV)
Dwumanfarysems. An intmvenfionand seilng boot camp forsubJads
10 suk.kja.

MANCuSO (TV)
The 8ChJal 8r!1* (:lfthe kngOfdllnlnlamJfMe'd
umalOOVOr
narCObDg &finl
11 American history.Md d's a woman.Photand blble am urrRlen./ sham

12

13 38. When he saw the billboards, Brooks pulled over to the side of the road, called his manager

14 and asked him which agency was responsible for Salem. When he found out that it was IA, Brooks

15 became almost physically ill.

16 Diggs and the Firm's Conduct Harm Brooks' Case

17 39. As the agency contract had an arbitration clause, Brooks filed suit against IA in JAMS

18 Arbitration, asserting claims against IA for breach of fiduciary duties, constructive fraud, and breach of

19 contract (the "Arbitration").

20 40. Brooks hired Diggs and the Firm to represent him in the Arbitration. Brooks and the Firm

21 entered into a written Retainer Agreement, dated April 28, 2017, which was signed by Brooks and Diggs,

22 who at that time was a Director at the Firm.

23 41. Diggs and the Firm represented Brooks during a critical stage of his dispute with IA, and

24 were responsible for retaining experts, preparing witness and exhibit lists, and preparing Brooks' case for

25 trial.

26 42. But Diggs never was fully tuned-in to the case, and oftentimes was distracted by other

27 pleasures in life, i.e., alcohol, parties, and women. As a result, Diggs failed to properly give Brooks'

28 case the attention needed to successfully litigate Brooks' claims.

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COMPLAINT
 43. On multiple occasions, Diggs called Brooks from a bar to discuss the case-oftentimes

during "happy hour" in the late afternoon. Diggs would sometimes be noticeably intoxicated on the

calls. When Diggs and Brooks would have calls or meetings to discuss the case, Diggs would

oftentimes change the subject to talk about parties and festivals that he had either recently been to or was

planning on attending. For example, immediately after Brooks" deposition, Diggs flew to Toronto to

partake in "Caribana," an annual weeks-long Caribbean-themed festival.

44. Instead of having an in-depth discussion with Brooks regarding the deposition and the

case, Diggs was singularly focused on the party scene awaiting him in Toronto-telling Brooks about

"how bad the bitches were" at the festival and "how much pussy there is up there." Although Diggs told

Brooks he planned to be in Toronto for five days for the festival, upon information and belief, Diggs

actually stayed there for two weeks-partying away instead of working on Brooks' case.

45. Diggs was always bragging about his "business" trips to places like Italy, and about how

attractive the women he worked with were, especially the female associates at his firm. In sum, Diggs

seemed more interested in living the "high life," i.e., drinking, having fun, and chasing women, than he

was in performing competent legal work for his clients, including Brooks.

46. Because of Diggs' inattention to Brooks' case and overall lack of diligence and failure to

prepare, Diggs and the Firm's conduct harmed Brooks' case, tainted Brooks' credibility in the eyes of the

arbitrator, and directly resulted in an adverse judgment against Brooks.

47. For example, Diggs, despite being responsible for timely retaining and preparing experts

20 for Brooks' case, negligently delayed locating, retaining, and preparing experts. Mr. Gary Bledsoe, who

served in a supporting co-counsel role for Brooks, made repeated requests to Diggs to locate and

22 designate experts for Brooks. Diggs, however, failed to diligently locate, retain, and prepare experts for

the case.

24 48. Diggs' failure to timely and adequately retain and prepare expert witnesses - including a

damage expert - led directly to their disqualification and exclusion during the Arbitration. For example,

26 Diggs hired Mr. Mark Litwak as a damages expert to testify regarding Brooks' damages in connection

27 with his Salem idea. Diggs hired Mr. Litwak less than forty-eight hours before his deposition - almost

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COMPLAINT
 per se negligence. During his deposition, Mr. Litwak admitted that he could not testify about any

specific amount that Brooks had lost because he "[didn't] have enough information."

49. Mr. Litwak admitted during his deposition that he had been retained by Diggs merely two

days before the deposition, and that Diggs did not provide him with the documents he requested, which

were necessary for him to competently testify as to Brooks' damages. To little surprise, Mr. Litwak

could not articulate any factual basis for his opinions and was excluded by the arbitrator. The arbitrator

recognized Diggs' complete failure to properly prepare Mr. Litwak: "He shouldn't have been deposed.

He shouldn't have been presented for deposition unprepared."

50. Similarly, Diggs failed to properly prepare Dr. Lew Hunter for his deposition. Diggs had

retained Dr. Hunter as an expert regarding certain aspects of IA's liability, and was supposed to testify

regarding the similarity of Brooks' and Simon's scripts, and analyses and comparisons of those scripts.

However, Diggs' failure to adequately prepare Dr. Hunter for his deposition dramatically and fatally

injured his credibility. The arbitrator observed regarding Diggs' failure to prepare Dr. Hunter: "It

appears to me that counsel at the time... [referring to Mr. Diggs] did not prepare Mr. Hunter adequately

in this case." The arbitrator again reiterated: "I also don"t think that Mr. Diggs properly prepared this

witness at the deposition."

51. Further, Diggs wholly failed to prepare Brooks -his own dient -for Brooks" deposition.

Diggs promised to fly to Vancouver to meet with Brooks to prepare for Brooks' deposition, and then fly

back to Los Angeles with Brooks to continue discussing litigation strategy and deposition preparation.

20 Diggs again dropped the ball and failed to meet with Brooks as promised. Instead, Diggs treated Brooks

to a brief Skype call in which Diggs merely provided a general outline of how depositions work. Brooks

22 therefore went into his deposition completely unprepared.

52. Diggs also initially refused Brooks' request to notice IA president Scott Harris's

24 deposition, saying it would be a waste of time, despite the fact that Brooks shared his Salem idea with

Harris personally while at a dinner party. When Diggs finally agreed to notice Harris for a deposition,

26 Diggs told Brooks and Mr. Bledsoe that he would be unable to take the deposition, and refused to even

27 provide an associate from the Firm to assist with the deposition, leaving Mr. Bledsoe, who was acting as

non-lead counsel, to handle the deposition alone and without assistance from Diggs or the Firm.

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 53. The most crucial non-party witness was Sheila Wenzel. Diggs was convinced that Brooks

needed to "coach" Sheila to make certain factual statements in her deposition-statements that would

have been false. Diggs believed the only way Brooks could win his case was if Wenzel testified she had

personal knowledge that Stein gave Brooks' Salem material to Simon-completely missing the fact that

Brooks' claim had always been a breach of fiduciary duty case, not a theft case. When Brooks declined

to follow Diggs' directive to encourage Wenzel to lie in her deposition, Diggs made pessimistic

statements to Brooks about the case, and began suggesting that Brooks drop the case-even though the

facts clearly showed IA breached its fiduciary duties to Brooks. Diggs' inability to comprehend the

strength of Brooks' case and the reasons for why IA was liable to Brooks further-in addition to Diggs'

"extracurricular" interests-caused Diggs to lose interest in the case and decline to diligently prepare and

prosecute the case.

54. During the arbitration proceedings, IA failed to produce emails between IA's agents and

Brooks, which were sent to and from an email address that Brooks no longer had access to at the time of

the arbitration proceedings. Despite Brooks' repeated requests for Diggs to file a motion to compel IA to

produce those emails, Diggs dismissively refused to do so, without ever explaining why. Those emails

would have been key evidence to rebut IA's claim that Brooks never communicated with IA's literary

agents. Diggs' stubborn refusal to move to compel those cornrnunications therefore harmed Brooks'

ability to adequately and successfully present his case to the arbitrator.

55. Despite desperate requests by Brooks and Mr. Bledsoe, Diggs failed to request more time

20 to designate experts and failed to file a motion to compel IA to produce Brooks' emails.

56. When confronted by Mr. Bledsoe regarding his failure to designate experts, prepare

22 witnesses for their depositions, and diligently litigate the case, Diggs confessed that he was afraid.

Diggs indicated that he was afraid to challenge the arbitrator's rulings, afraid to request more time

24 to identify experts, afraid to file a motion to compel discovery, and afraid to add a discrimination claim

to the lawsuit. Remarkably, Diggs even said he was scared of opposing cotmsel.

26 57. Diggs' inexcusable conduct caused significant delays in the Arbitration and tainted

27 Brooks' credibility in the eyes of the arbitrator. The Arbitration hearing had initially been scheduled for

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COMPLAINT
 lateNovember20l7. However,ontheeveoftheArbitrationhearing,Diggsinexplicablyattemptedto

withdraw as counsel for Brooks.

58. Despite filing a motion to withdraw, Diggs astoundingly failed to also request a

continuance of the arbitration hearing and of the deadlines to file witness lists, exhibit lists and expert

designations. Instead, Diggs brazenly-despite having filed a motion to withdraw-continued to act as

Brooks' counsel for the following two weeks, filing and agreeing with IA on witness lists, exhibit lists,

and expert designations in the lead up to the then-scheduled arbitration hearing. Regarding the expert

designations, Diggs excluded experts that Brooks had previously named. Even after Mr. Bledsoe

requested that Diggs include those experts on the witness list, Diggs filed the witness list without adding

them.

59. At the hearing on Diggs' motion to withdraw on November 20, 2017, Diggs negligently

made statements that created an impression in the mind of the arbitrator that Diggs was attempting to

withdraw as counsel because he believed that Brooks' lawsuit against IA was without good cause. Diggs

stated that he needed to withdraw based on former Rule 3-700 of the California Rules of Professional

Conduct, which, among other provisions, requires an attorney's withdrawal if the client brings a claim

"without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person." CA ST

RPC Rule 1.16 (formerly CA ST RPC 3-700(B)(1)). Diggs" attempt to withdraw as counsel for Brooks

on the eve of the Arbitration hearing was actually due to Diggs' negligent failure to prepare for the

hearing, and Ihad nothing to do with any of the grounds listed in Rule 3-700 as cause for attorney

20 withdrawal.

60. Tellingly, when Diggs realized that he and the Firm could be held financially responsible

22 for a delay in the Arbitration proceedings as a result of his last-minute withdrawal, Diggs, in an abrupt

about-face, then declared in a subsequent call with the arbitrator that same day that any "conflict"

24 between him and Brooks had been resolved, and that he was no longer seeking to withdraw as counsel.

25 61. In light of the fact that Diggs' conduct was motivated by the financial interests of himself

26 and the Firm, and not Brooks' welfare, Brooks had no other choice but to fire Diggs as counsel and

27 request a continuance of the Arbitration hearing, which was ultimately set for August of 2018.

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COMPLAINT
 1 62. During the March 20, 2018 hearing on IA's motion for sanctions, IA's counsel took full

2 advantage of Diggs' reckless comments by reminding the arbitrator of Diggs' withdrawal and Diggs'

3 comments regarding Rule 3-700, and asserting that Diggs had insinuated that that Brooks' claims did not

4 have merit. This further harmed Brooks in the eyes of the arbitrator. The arbitrator then commented on

5 Diggs' self-serving conduct: "Then he came back in to the case or said he was back in. Seemingly, the

6 ethical issue had evaporated in some way." The arbitrator then stated, "I have been curious how the

7 ethical problem disappeared when there was a possibility of a financial hit."

8 63. Diggs" unprofessional conduct in attempting to withdraw, insinuating that his client"s

9 claims were brought without probable cause, and then announcing an about-face for financial reasons

10 created a damaging impression of Diggs in the mind of the arbitrator-and by extension, Brooks. Diggs'

11 conduct destroyed Brooks' credibility, placed his interests above Brooks, and essentially poisoned the

12 Arbitration.

13 64. Moreover, the arbitrator ruled that because Diggs had already filed witness and exhibits

14 lists, Brooks would be unable to amend those filings once he obtained new counsel. Brooks was

15 therefore stuck with hearing materials and filings that were prepared by an attorney who not only was

16 failing to adequately prepare and prosecute the case, but who was actively seeking to withdraw as counse

17 and indicating his belief in the lack of merit of Brooks' case. Diggs' failure to immediately seek a

18 continuance of the arbitration hearing and filing deadlines upon moving to withdraw put Brooks at a

19 disadvantage for the rest of the case as his new counsel was ultimately unable to rework or renegotiate

20 the witness list and exhibit list. Of course, new counsel could not unring the proverbial bell Diggs had

21 rung about his doubts in Brooks and the case.

22 Diggs' Conduct Resulted in an Adverse Judgment Against Brooks

23 65. The Arbitration hearing was held in August and September 2018 before the Honorable

24 Steven J. Stone. During the hearing, Brooks submitted extensive evidence, including the evidence

25 detailed above, proving that IA breached its contract with Brooks, violated fiduciary duties owed to

26 Brooks, and engaged in constructive fraud by, among other things, failing to use all reasonable efforts (or

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COMPLAINT
 1 any efforts) to procure employment for Brooks with regard to Brooks" Salem, while at the same time

2 pursuing a Salem-based project for another IA client.

3 66. On June 3, 2019, the arbitrator issued his Corrected Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

4 Law; Award and Ruling on Sanctions (the ""). The arbitrator not only ruled against Brooks on

5 his claims against IA, the arbitrator also awarded sanctions to IA in the amount of $170,550.97 due to

6 Diggs" "unwarranted delays" during the Arbitration proceedings. The arbitration award clearly stated the

7 alleged basis for sanctions: "the unwarranted delays of Brooks and his previous Counsel cannot be

8 tolerated and warrants sanctions." Although the Award did not mention Diggs by name, the arbitrator

9 was clearly referring to the delays caused by Diggs' last-minute attempted withdrawal on the eve of the

10 initiallyscheduledArbitrationhearinginNovemberof2017. Thefactthatthearbitratorreferenced

11 Diggs' "unwarranted delays" as providing the justification for sanctions against Brooks demonstrates the

12 lasting negative impression in the arbitrator's mind of Brooks and his claims, which was created by

13 Diggs' wrongful, negligent, and unprofessional conduct-namely, by failing to timely and diligently

14 retain and prepare experts, by failing to prepare Brooks' experts for their depositions, by failing to

15 diligently prosecute Brooks' case and prepare for the Arbitration hearing, and by attempting to

16 "withdraw" at the last minute, all of which created G'unwarranted delays.'5 If it were not for Diggs5

17 wrongful conduct, Brooks' credibility would not have been tainted, he would have had well-prepared

18 experts testify as to IA"s liability and Brooks' damages, and would have likely prevailed in the

19 Arbitration.

20 67. When IA petitioned the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles for a

21 judgment confirming the Award, Brooks urged the Superior Court to vacate the Award on public policy

22 grounds, or, in the alternative, modify the Award by removing the sanctions. Although the sanctions

23 were removed from the Award by the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, in its

24 February 28, 2020 order confirming the award as modified, the harm Diggs' conduct had caused to

25 Brooks' claims could not be undone.

26 68. Up until the time that the Superior Court entered its order confirming the Award as

27 modified, whether Diggs' conduct had ultimately caused Brooks to incur damages was merely

28 speculative and uncertain, and moreover was contingent on the ultimate outcome of the case. However,

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COMPLAINT
 1 when the Superior Court of Califo:nnia, County of Los Angeles on February 28, 2020 issued an order

2 confirming the Award as modified, Brooks' sustained compensable damages as a result of Diggs'

3 conduct, namely, (1) all amounts that Brooks paid to Diggs and the Firm in the amount of $19,147.50.,

4 (2) all amounts Brooks paid to JAMS in the amount of $111,086.76; (3) all amounts Brooks has paid to

5 experts in the Arbitration in the amount of $57,167.87; (4) all amounts Brooks has incurred in legal

6 expenses for counsel who replaced Diggs in the amounts of $216,306.62 (Davis & Santos, p.c.) and

7 $106,461.20 (Mr. Gary Bledsoe, Esq.); (5) all amounts paid to consultants in the amount of $92,800.00;

8 (6) expenses incurred for travel in the amount of $6,651.65; (7) Brooks' lost damage award in the

9 Arbitration of (a) $152,840.55 for disgorgement of IA"s benefit from Simon"s Salem project and (b)

10 $345,001.99 for disgorgement of IA's benefit from Brooks' work; and (8) $2,000,000, which represents a

11 conservative estimate of Brooks' reputation harm and associated lost opportunity in the industry arising

12 from negative publicity of the sanction award, which, as observed by the arbitrator, was a direct result of

13 Diggs' conduct. The last component of damages does not fully address the ongoing economic impact

14 that Brooks continues to suffer as a result of Diggs" gross negligence in handling the Arbitration.

15 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Professional Negligence Against Diggs and the Firm)
16

17 69. Brooks re-alleges and incorporates herein by this reference each and every allegation

18 contained in paragraphs 1 through 68 above as though fully set forth herein.

19 70. Defendants owed Brooks a duty of care to use that degree of learning, care, diligence, and

20 skill typically possessed and used by well-informed attomeys practicing in the same or similar location

21 and under similar circumstances. Defendants further owed Brooks a duty to exercise due care to protect

22 Brooks' best interests in all ethical ways and in all circumstances

23 71. Defendants breached these duties by failing to adequately, properly, and timely retain,

24 hire, and prepare experts for Brooks' case against IA, failing to adequately, properly, and timely conduct

25 discovery and prepare the evidence for the arbitration, assuming relations that prevented Defendants

26 from devoting their energies to Brooks' interests, and by causing unwarranted delays in the Arbitration.

27 all of which provoked the ire of the arbitrator, harmed Brooks' credibility, and caused Brooks to lose his

28 meritorious claims against IA, which in turn resulted in a take-nothing judgment for Brooks against IA.

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COMPLAINT
 72. But for Defendants" negligent conduct, Brooks would have prevailed on his claims against

IA.

73. In the alternative, and without waiving the foregoing, Defendants' negligent conduct was

a concurrent independent cause of Brooks' damages.

74. As a result of Defendants' negligent conduct, Brooks has incurred actual, economic, and

general damages, which are described more fully below.

75. Had Defendants conducted themselves in a non-negligent manner in prosecuting Brooks'

case, Brooks would have prevailed on his claims against IA, and would have obtained a judgment for

damages in his favor. This judgment would have been for, at the very least, $497,842.54, representing

$152,840.55 for disgorgement of IA's benefit from Simon's Salem project and $345,001.99 for

disgorgement of IA's benefit from Brooks' work. If Brooks obtained this judgment, he would have been

able to successfully collect on the judgment against IA by executing the judgment on IA's assets.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against Diggs and the Firm)

76. Brooks re-alleges and incorporates herein by this reference each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs 1 through 75 above as though fully set forth herein.

77. Defendants, as Brooks' attomeys, owed certain fiduciary duties to Brooks. These

fiduciary duties include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty, the duty of confidentiality, the duty of

diligence, the duty of honesty, and all duties imposed on California-licensed attorneys by virtue of the

20 California Rules of Professional Conduct. ((}t is well established that an attorney's duties to his client

are governed by the rules of professional conduct. Those rules, together with statutes and general

22 principles relating to other fiduciary relationships, all help define the duty component of the fiduciary

duty which an attorney owes to his client." (Mirabito v. Liccardo (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 41, 45) (citation

24 omitted). By virtue of the duty of loyalty, "an attorney is precluded from assuming any relation which

would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests." (Flatt v. Superior Court

26 (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275 289, 885 P.2d 950, 958).

27 78. Defendants breached one or more of these fiduciary duties owed to Brooks by virtue of

their attorney-client relationship with Brooks.

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COMPLAINT
 79. Specifically, Defendants, by their conduct while acting as Brooks" legal counsel, violated

the duty of diligence and the duty of loyalty by failing to adequately, properly, and timely retain, hire,

and prepare experts for Brooks' case against IA, failing to adequately, properly, and timely conduct

discovery and prepare the evidence for the arbitration, assuming relations that prevented Defendants

from devoting their entire energies to Brooks' interests, and by causing unwarranted delays in the

Arbitration, all of which provoked the ire of the arbitrator, harmed Brooks' credibility, and caused

Brooks to lose his meritorious claims against IA, which in turn resulted in a take-nothing judgment for

Brooks against IA.

80. Additionally, Defendants, by their conduct complained of above, breached their fiduciary

duties by breaching Rule 1.1(a) (former Rule 3-110) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct: "A

lawyer shall not intentionally, recklessly, with gross negligence, or repeatedly fail to perform legal

services with competence." As explained in the Rule that was in effect at the time of Defendants'

representation, this rule imposes a duty on the attorney to apply the "diligence ... reasonably necessary

for the performance of such service." (former CA ST RPC 3-110(B)).

81. By their conduct complained of herein, Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to

Brooks by intentionally, recklessly, or with gross negligence, or repeatedly failing, to perform legal

services with competence.

82. As a result of Defendants' breaches of these and other fiduciary duties, Brooks sustained

actual, economic, and general damages, which are described more fully below.

20 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Contract Against the Firm)

22 83. Brooks re-alleges and incorporates herein by this reference each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs 1 through 82 above as though fully set forth herein.

24 84. Brooks and the Firm entered into a written Retainer Agreement, dated April 28, 2017,

whereby Brooks and the Firm agreed that the Firm would provide Brooks with legal representation in

26 Brooks' lawsuit against IA. The Retainer Agreement contained an implied term that required the Firm,

27 including Diggs, to exercise such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity.

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COMPLATNT
 85. The Firm breached the Retainer Agreement by failing to perform its duties pursuant to the

Retainer Agreement-namely, by failing to adequately, properly, and timely retain, hire, and prepare

experts for Brooks' case against IA, by assuming relations that prevented Defendants from devoting their

entire energies to Brooks' interests, and by causing unwarranted delays in the Arbitration, all of which

provoked the ire of the arbitrator, harmed Brooks' credibility, and caused Brooks to lose his meritorious

claims against IA, which in turn resulted in a take-nothing judgment for Brooks against IA.

86. As a result of Defendants' breaches of these and other fiduciary duties, Brooks sustained

actual, economic, and general damages, which are described more fully below.

DAMAGES

87. Brooks re-alleges and incorporates herein by this reference each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs 1 through 86 above as though fully set forth herein.

88. As result of Defendants' conduct described above, Brooks has sustained actual, economic,

and general damages. Specifically, Brooks has sustained the following damages, which by this suxt,

Brooks seeks to recover:

(i) $19,147.50, representing all amounts that Brooks paid to Diggs and the Firm;

(ii) $111,086.76, representing all amounts Brooks paid to JAMS;

(iii) $57,167.87, representing all amounts Brooks has paid to experts in the Arbitration;

(iv) $322,767.82, representing all amounts Brooks has incurred in legal expenses for
counsel who replaced Diggs and the Firm in the Arbitration, in the amounts of
($216,306.62 for Davis & Santos, p.c. and $106,461.20 for Mr. Gary Bledsoe,
ESQ")i
20
(v) $92,800.00, representing all amounts Brooks paid to consultants in the Arbitration;

(vi) $6,651.65, representing the expenses Brooks incurred for travel in connection with
22 the Arbitration;

(vii) $497,842.54, representing Brooks' lost damage award in the Arbitration

($152,840.55 for disgorgement of IA's benefit from Simon's Salem project and
24 $345,001.99 for disgorgement of IA"s benefit from Brooks' work); and

(viii) $2,000,000, for Brooks" reputation harm and associated lost opportunity in the
industry arising from negative publicity of the sanction award.
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COMPLAINT
 1 90. Additionally, and pleading in the alternative, because Defendants' conduct constituted one

2 or more breaches of their fiduciary duties to Brooks, Brooks is entitled to the remedy of disgorgement of

3 all fees paid to Defendants, specifically, $19,147.50.

4 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

5 91. Brooks hereby requests a jury trial on any and all claims so triable.

6 PRAYER

7 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Mehcad Brooks respectfully requests the following relief:

8 1. Actualdamagesintheamountof$3,107,464.14;

9 2. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on such actual damages,,

10 3. The costs of bringing suit; and

11 4. All other relief to which Brooks may be entitled at law or in equity.

12 DATED: October2$), 2020

13
SCHNEIDER & BRANCH
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15
BY:
16 David K. Schneider
Attorneys for Plaintiff Mehcad Brooks
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COMPLAINT