Glynn, 1996

Innovative Genius: A Framework for Relating Individual and Organizational Intelligences to
Innovation
Author(s): Mary Ann Glynn
Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 1081-1111
Published by: Academy of Management
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g Academy of Management Review
1996, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1081-1111.
INNOVATIVEGENIUS:A FRAMEWORK
FOR RELATINGINDIVIDUAL
AND ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCES
TO INNOVATION
MARY ANN GLYNN
Emory University
In this article, organizational innovation is viewed as fundamentally

cognitive, and the concept of organizational intelligence is developed
and related to innovation. Individual and organizational intelligences
are conceptualized as being functionally similar (i.e., as purposeful
information processing that enables adaptation to environmental de-
mands). Organizational intelligence, however, is a social outcome and
is related to individual intelligence by mechanisms of aggregation,
cross-level transference, and distribution. A conceptual framework is
proposed that relates types and levels of intelligence, moderated by
contextual factors, to the two stages of the organizational innovation
process: initiation and implementation. Implications for research and
management are discussed.
In its essence, innovation involves intelligence; to put it simply, "An

innovation is a new idea" (Van de Ven, 1986: 591). Absent the creative
spark of innovative genius or the intelligence of organizational systems
that recognize and support innovation, finding new and useful solutions
to problems becomes troublesome. Advancing the idea that "[a]t their core,
most successful enterprises today can be considered intelligent enter-
prises," Quinn (1992: 48) epitomized the growing realization that organiza-
tions need to effectively manage their intellectual resources as well as
their physical assets. By so doing, organizations enhance their adaptive
potential to meet increasingly turbulent and uncertain environmental con-
ditions.
The role of intelligence in innovation becomes evident when intelli-
gence fails innovation, as, for instance, when organizations make routine,
noninnovative responses to novel and complex problems (Marcus, 1988),
or, conversely, when firms make innovative responses when a routine one
would suffice (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Authors have hinted at the role of
cognition in fostering innovation. Mezias and Glynn (1993) found that the
This article benefited greatly from constructive insights offered by Pamela Barr, Robert
Drazin, AMR's five anonymous reviewers, and Susan Jackson; my thanks go to all of them.
1081
1082 Academy of Management Review October
amount and type of organizational innovation is related to learning pro-

cesses, and Cohen and Levinthal (1990) demonstrated that organizational
innovation is dependent upon the organization's knowledge base. Implicit
in theories of organizational cognition, such as organizational learning
(Senge, 1990), memory (Walsh & Ungson, 1991), and sense making (Weick,
1990), is intelligence, for without it an entity cannot learn, remember, or
process information effectively. Although cognitive perspectives on orga-
nizations have flourished in recent years, researchers have not elaborated
on either the nature and function of intelligence in organizations or on its
role in affecting innovation. That is the purpose of this article.
In the realization that intelligence is "the ability to solve problems,
or create products, that are valued within one or more cultural settings"
(Gardner, 1993:x) lies its link to organizational innovation, which is defined
as novelty that is useful (Amabile, 1988; Kanter, 1983). Figure 1 provides
the conceptual framework for this article. The objective is to begin to
build a theory that explains the cognitive foundations of organizational
innovation. The central idea is that intelligence is embedded in organiza-
tions and operates both through individual agents and institutionalized
systems to affect organizational innovation. Organizational innovation is
based on individual and organizational intelligences, which are moder-
ated by contextual factors. Thus, the question of how to make firms more
innovative involves the question of how to make firms more intelligent. The
framework of Figure 1 is used to organize this analysis of the intelligence-
innovation relationship in organizations.
INTELLIGENCEIN ORGANIZATIONS:
INDIVIDUALAND ORGANIZATIONAL
An organization is a body of thought thought by thinking think-
ers. (Weick, 1990: 288)
Like other cognitive constructs applied to organizations, intelligence

can be considered at multiple levels of analysis. Adopting the multilevel
framework outlined by Glynn, Lant, and Milliken (1994), I examine intelli-
gence at both the individual level and the systemic level; I also consider
the interrelationship of these levels.
Because I was interested in exploring the relationship between orga-
nizational innovation and intelligence, I focus on how intelligence is mani-
fested by individuals as members of organizations and by an organization
as a collective. Although it is feasible to examine intelligence at other
levels of analysis, particularly at the intermediate, meso, or small-group
level (e.g., Williams & Sternberg, 1988), setting limits on this exploratory
work was necessary.
Individual Intelligence
In the psychological literature, individual intelligence is conceptual-
ized as information-processing capability that is used to solve problems
1996 Glynn 1083
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or meet task challenges (Sternberg & Salter, 1988).Importantly, intelligence

requires intentionality (of the actor), and it is flexibly adaptive, not rigidly
stereotyped (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1989). Earlier literature focused on intelli-
gence as an individual trait (e.g., Spearman, 1927; Terman, 1916), which
consisted of several basic cognitive processes, including perception,
learning, encoding, memory, and reasoning. Fundamental to intelligence
is expertise, the repertoire of knowledge used to solve problems. This
repertoire consists of both declarative knowledge (i.e., factual information,
causal beliefs, or perceptual orientations) and procedural knowledge (i.e.,
the strategies, rules, and skills for acquiring, storing, retrieving, and ma-
nipulating declarative knowledge) (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1989).
Although intelligence is generally viewed as purposeful information-
processing capability (Barron & Harrington, 1981;Gregory, 1994),there is no
consensual definition of the construct for animals, humans, or machines. At
present, there are two major-but divergent-approaches to intelligence
in the psychological literature: (a) a cognitive or psychometric perspective,
which focuses on intelligence as an individual trait, and (b) a contextualist
perspective, which focuses on intelligence as a social product, related to
the cultural, normative web in which individuals are embedded (Stern-
berg, 1985a). These two perspectives differ in their theoretical orientation,
levels of analysis, assumptions about the measurement of intellligence,
and ways in which differences in intelligence can best be explained; they
are outlined in Table 1. Both perspectives are examined in this article,
because, taken together, they offer a broader and more comprehensive
approach to organizational intelligence.
Cognitive or psychometric perspective. According to this perspective,
intelligence is conceptualized as an individual's overarching capacity for
thinking and problem solving; this "general cognitive ability" is called
the g factor (Spearman, 1927). Thus, the main objective of the cognitive
perspective has been the development of standardized instruments with
which to assess interindividual differences in intelligence; the intelligence
quotient (IQ) test eventually became the dominant indicator.
In empirical studies on the effects of individual intelligence in work
settings, researchers found that intelligence (or general cognitive ability)
is an important predictor of task performance, particularly for complex
jobs (Gottfredson, 1986; Hunter, 1986). Support for the classic tenet that
"Performance = Motivation x Ability" (Campbell, 1976) was demonstrated
in several studies. In a longitudinal survey of 105 MBA graduates, O'Reilly
and Chatman (1994) found that together intelligence and hard work af-
fected job performance and career success. Similarly, Wright, Kacmar,
McMahan, and Deleeuw (1995), in their study of 203 warehousers, demon-
strated that cognitive ability had significant main and interaction effects
(with personality) on the development of work-related knowledge and
performance. Ree, Carretta, and Teachout (1995) found that cognitive abil-
ity directly affected the acquisition of job knowledge and indirectly af-
fected work performance. Thus, there is considerable empirical validation
1996 Glynn 1085
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that general cognitive ability is a significant predictor of job and career

outcomes in organizational settings (Gottfredson, 1986; Hunter, 1986;
Schmidt, Hunter, Outerbridge, & Goff, 1988).
Despite this evidence, the cognitive or psychometric perspective has
been faulted for being too limited and not inclusive of the full range of
human activities that might be labeled intelligent. Also, it may be an
overly strict, individually centered measure of intelligence that does not
account for how intelligence may be defined by, and related to, the social
or cultural context in which it develops and functions (Gardner, 1993;
Sternberg, 1988).
Contextual perspective. Contextualists view individual intelligence
as composed of a number of distinct abilities (Sternberg & Salter, 1988),
not as an overarching trait common to all individuals. In contrast to the
psychometric perspective, in which individual intelligence is invariant to
context, contextualists argue that intelligence will vary by specific do-
mains; thus, because people are members of different societies and cul-
tures, individuals can have different types of intelligence. Radical for-
mulists argue for cultural relativism (e.g., Vygotsky, 1978), contending that
differences in intelligence reflect differences among cultures and prac-
tices, rather than differences among individuals. A theme common to this
perspective is that intelligent behavior occurs in a social context that
includes expectations, demands, and a history of prior experience.
Contextualists argue that intelligence is multifaceted and that there
are multiple intelligences, if not within a single individual, then certainly
across a spectrum of individuals. Gardner (1993: xi) introduced seven can-
didate intelligences: "the linguistic and logical-mathematical intelli-
gences that are at such premium in schools today; musical intelligence;
spatial intelligence; bodily-kinesthetic intelligence; and two forms of per-
sonal intelligence, one directed toward other persons, one directed toward
oneself." Naive, popular, or implicit theories of intelligence (Sternberg,
1985a) have been focused on individual performance in everyday work
and life contexts, and they have been used to classify intelligence into
three categories: practical problem-solving ability, verbal ability, and so-
cial competence. Because intelligence is defined relative to a particular
context, researchers have been concerned with the characteristics that
differentiate contexts, and organizations have been considered a major
contextual determinant (Veroff, 1983). Thus, "intelligence in the popular
sense of the word is inextricably linked to a specific sociocultural environ-
ment" (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1989: 9).
Critics of the contextual perspective contend that even though individ-
uals may manifest different "types" of intelligence, this may not refute
the existence of a g factor; that is, individuals may simply demonstrate
differential weightings of their intellectual abilities in response to situa-
tional demands. Supporting this idea are studies that demonstrate that
there is not a large variance in individuals' intellectual performance
across different contexts (Sternberg & Salter, 1988).
1996 Glynn 1087
Defining individual intelligence. Although there is no one best way

to study intelligence (Sternberg, 1985b), the following definition is culled
from this review of the literature:
Individual intelligence is defined as a person's capabil-
ity to process, interpret, encode, manipulate, and access
information so as to acquire, retain, and apply knowl-
edge quickly and successfully to meet external chal-
lenges or solve problems in a particular domain or
context.
Stated simply, individual intelligence is a person's purposeful information
processing that aids adaptation to task or environmental challenges. It
involves both task-relevant domain intelligence (i.e., declarative knowl-
edge) as well as flexible rules (i.e., procedural knowledge) for acquiring
information and combining existing declarative knowledge to develop
new knowledge.
Organizational Intelligence
Although intelligence has been associated primarily with individuals,
some authors have begun to conceptualize and measure it at a collective
level (e.g., Williams & Sternberg, 1988).From the outset, it must be acknowl-
edged that extending a microlevel construct to the macrolevel organization
invites opportunities for ambiguity and threats of anthropomorphism. Ad-
ditional confusion stems from the various uses of organizational intelli-
gence, including a description of the intelligence of individual organiza-
tion members as well as a description of the system (e.g., March & Olsen,
1986; Pinchot & Pinchot, 1993; Quinn, 1992); a description of information
processing capabilities as well a description of the outcome or product of
these processes (e.g., intelligence about new technologies or one's compet-
itors); a real property of systems (Huber, 1990; Leidner & Elam, 1995); and
a metaphor for organizational systems (Garud & Kotha, 1994;Morgan, 1986).
In this article, the conceptual boundaries of organizational intelli-
gence are established according to the three working assumptions that
Walsh and Ungson (1991) used to develop the construct of organizational
memory: (a) organizations functionally resemble information-processing
systems that process information from the environment; as such, organiza-
tions exhibit intelligence that is similar in function to that of individuals;
(b) modeling organizations as information-processing systems implies that
they also are interpretative systems that scan, interpret, and diagnose
environmental events for their uncertainty and complexity, which supports
the basic idea that adaptive capability underlies intelligent action; and
(c) conceptualizing an organization as "a network of intersubjectively
shared meanings that are sustained through the development and use of
a common language and everyday social interactions" (Walsh & Ungson,
1991: 61) delineates intelligence as a concept that is invoked to explain a
system but is itself not easily observed.
The first assumption, that of functional similarity between human and

organizational intelligence, leads to the following definition of organiza-
tional intelligence:
Organizational intelligence is an organization's capabil-
ity to process, interpret, encode, manipulate, and access
information in a purposeful, goal-directed manner, so it
can increase its adaptive potential in the environment
in which it operates.
This definition embodies the second boundary condition (i.e., that organi-
zational intelligence is adaptive); like individual intelligence, organiza-
tional intelligence is related to solving problems, meeting objectives, and
making effective responses to environmental challenges. Regarding the
third boundary condition, organizational intelligence offers an explana-
tion for experiential learning processes that underscore organizational
successes and failures (Glynn et al., 1994). Learning intelligently implies
that an organization has learned correctly, accurately, and appropriately
from experience; armed with good and valid information, the organization
has the potential to perform more effectively.
Although organizational intelligence may bear a functional resem-
blance to individual intelligence, it is clearly not commensurate with
individual intelligence. As a property of the collective, organizational
intelligence is a social outcome. Organizational intelligence can result
from the accumulated wisdom of its members as well as from interactions
among its members, who can be characterized as having varying levels
of intelligence (according to psychometric measurements) and varying
types of intelligence that are tied to specific domains or contexts (e.g.,
practical, linguistic, or social intelligence). That the interchange among
intelligent members affects the intelligence of a collective is evident in
the concept of "group intelligence," defined as
a concept distinct from the more familiar concept of individual
intelligence-for in the interdependent context of group func-
tioning, group members may be involved in the collaboration
differentially with regard to their abilities and desires, yield-
ing a system with characteristics and capacities unlike those
one group member could display alone. Group intelligence is
the functional intelligence of a group of people working as a
unit. (Williams & Sternberg, 1988:356)
Given that organizational intelligence is not identical with, but related
to, the intelligence of its membership, mechanisms that relate individual
and organizational intelligence are considered.
Mechanisms Relating Individual and Organizational Intelligences
By drawing from other multilevel models that were used to examine
the link between microlevel and macrolevel processes (DiMaggio, 1991;
Glynn et al., 1994; Rousseau, 1985), I identify the following set of mecha-
1996 Glynn 1089
nisms: (a) aggregation effects, whereby individual members' intelligence

accumulates to become organizational intelligence; (b) cross-level effects,
whereby individuals' intelligence is transformed and codified as organiza-
tional intelligence; and (c) distributed effects, whereby organizational in-
telligence is embedded in the structured patterns of thought and action
in which organizational members interact and engage. Each of these
mechanisms is built on a different set of theoretical assumptions and has
implications for the way in which organizational intelligence is measured;
the premises and implications of these three models are summarized in
Table 2.
Aggregation model. Through an aggregation model, organizational
intelligence is modeled as consisting of the accumulated intelligence of its
membership. This model is based on well-defined measures of individual
intelligence, such as IQ tests. Organizational intelligence can be mea-
sured, then, as the sum, the mean, or the maximum value of members'
scores on measures of general cognitive ability (Williams & Sternberg,
1988). This measure thus affords an overall index of the level of organiza-
tional intelligence, but it does not capture the multiplicity of intelligence
types within an organization.
An aggregation model represents a simple, straightforward, easily
calculated rendering of organizational intelligence, which is consistent
with the way in which individual intelligence has long been measured.
However, the usefulness of an aggregation model of organizational intelli-
gence is severely limited. It is most applicable to organizations that have
a very small membership, which is fairly homogeneous with respect to
level and type of intelligence, and that have a structure with little special-
ization. Single-product (or single-service) organizations operated by a sole
entrepreneur or very few partners may describe a case in which organiza-
tional intelligence and individual intelligence are virtually one and the
same (i.e., typically that of the chief executive). There is dubious validity
in applying an aggregation model to very large conglomerates that have
highly divisionalized structures and a diverse, heterogeneously intelli-
gent, geographically dispersed, and loosely coordinated workforce, in
which intraorganizational processes are likely to affect the relationship
between the intelligence of individuals and the intelligence of the system.
The assumptions of an aggregation model imply that organizations
can be smarter (or less intelligent) than their membership, if the organiza-
tional IQ is significantly higher (or lower) than that of the majority of its
members; members with a very high (or very low) IQ score may skew the
distribution and inflate (or deflate) the mean organizational intelligence
score. Thus, although the simplicity of an aggregation model is attractive,
its ability to capture veridically organizational intelligence is quite re-
stricted.
Cross-level model. A cross-level model directs attention to the trans-
ference of intelligence. Accordingly, diffusion and institutionalization pro-
cesses convert and encode individual intelligence in the organization's
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memory, routines, rituals, standard operating procedures, and symbols

and thus become organizational intelligence; socialization processes
transmit intelligence from embedded systems to individual members.
Three types of transference mechanisms are considered here: structured
organizational roles, technology, and social or political influences.
One structural mechanism instituted by GE, Coca-Cola, Cigna, Hew-
lett-Packard, Monsanto, and Young & Rubican is the new organizational
role known as the chief learning officer (CLO). These executives are "in
charge of directing knowledge to the right places" and extending the flow
of individual knowledge, information, and intelligence throughout the
organization (Ward, 1996: 12). In the following example, GE's CLO brings
disparate information together to solve a problem intelligently:
The General Electric manager was dismayed. As he spoke to
a recent gathering of company workers, he displayed a chart
showing that sales of appliances had slowed substantially.
The appliance division, he and others surmised, appeared to
be in serious marketing trouble.
But the attendees soon learned that the problem had nothing
to do with pricing, advertising or other basic marketing tasks.
"Up speaks a GE Capital guy and puts up his chart showing
consumer debt reaching saturation levels,". . . "Suddenly,ev-
eryone had a whole new angle on the problem." That new
perspective led the employees to try solutions not frommarket-
ing but rather from finance, such as new ways to help debt-
laden customers pay for big-ticket appliances. (Ward, 1996:12)
Just as organizational roles (e.g., CLOs) can diffuse intelligence, so too
can technologies. Because intelligence involves information processing,
those MIS and expert system technologies that facilitate organizational
learning (e.g., Argyris, 1992; Elofson & Konsynski, 1993) similarly enable
the development of organizational intelligence. Huber (1990: 63) contended
that the "[u]se of computer-assisted information storage and acquisition
technologies leads to organizational intelligence that is more accurate,
comprehensive, timely, and available." Similarly, Quinn (1992: 311) ac-
knowledged that much organizational wisdom and managerial knowl-
edge is captured and stored by information technologies (IT) in databases;
the result is that "[w]ell developed IT systems help eliminate errors [and]
leverage intellect." In spite of the advantages such computerized systems
offer, however, they are constrained to operate within a particular context
and use the algorithms, decision rules, and assumptions that define that
particular context. Thus, even though MIS, expert systems, and computer
technologies may hasten the development of organizational intelligence,
they also limit it to a particular context that is delineated by the initial
conditions under which the computer algorithms were developed.
Social and political influences also affect diffusion and transference
mechanisms. There is ample evidence that "groups have the potential to
enhance individual processes-as well as the potential to degrade them"
1996 Glynn 1093
(Sniezek, 1992: 131). The effects of such interpersonal factors are evident
in the group intelligence that emerges from interpersonal interactions and
processes (Williams & Sternberg, 1988). In a series of studies that exam-
ined the influences of majority and minority views on task performance,
Nemeth (1986) demonstrated that the positions expressed by a majority
of individuals tended to foster convergent thinking, limit the number of
alternatives, and enforce conformity to the prevailing views. Conversely,
minority viewpoints tended to stimulate divergent thinking and led to
more effective solutions: "Persons exposed to opposing minority views
exert more cognitive effort . . . attend to more aspects of the situation. . .
and . . . are more likely to detect novel solutions or come to new decisions"
(Nemeth, 1986: 25). Thus, underrepresenting or suppressing minority view-
points can affect the processing of information and, in turn, both intelli-
gence and creativity.
More generally, intelligence is fostered in social climates in which
diversity of viewpoints is permitted. Laughlin (1988: 258) pointed out that
conformity to a unanimous but erroneous majority can be reduced when
a dissenting minority viewpoint is introduced. Numerous studies of group
polarization have demonstrated that an initial tendency of groups toward
a particular direction is enhanced following group discussion. In his re-
view of this literature, Isenberg (1986: 1143) noted that there is evidence
that such polarization can result in group norms of risk or caution and
that "group members associate ability and skill with riskiness (or cau-
tion) and thus become more risky (or more cautious) in order to appear
more able and skillful." In one study, for instance, the authors (Baron &
Roper, 1976) found that, in order to appear more intelligent, individuals po-
larized their estimates to align with that of the norms. Thus, these social-
psychological influences explain why the intelligence that characterizes
a collective may not be simply an aggregation of members' intelligence.
Distributed model. In contrast to the cross-level model, a distributed
model is focused not on how intelligence is transferred within an organiza-
tion but, rather, on how organizational intelligence emerges from the pat-
terned interactions that constitute the organization (Brown & Dugoid, 1991;
Lave & Wenger, 1991). Two key insights of a distributed model follow from
the contextual perspective: (a) intelligence must be understood in terms
of, and in relation to, the social and cultural context in which it develops
and (b) intelligence may exist beyond individuals and be distributed
within the structural and symbolic systems of the collective. Therefore,
intelligence inheres as much in the artifacts and individuals
that surround one as in one's own skull. My intelligence does
not stop at my skin; rather, it encompasses my tools (paper,
pencil, computer),and my network of associates (office mates,
professional colleagues, others whom I can phone or to whom
I can dispatch electronic messages). (Gardner, 1993:xiii)
Central to the distributed model is Walsh and Ungson's (1991: 60) third
assumption, that an organization is a system of "intersubjectively shared
meanings" sustained through social interaction. March and Olsen (1986:

26) allowed for the possibility of intelligent action within loosely coupled
organizations, and they argued that some "central mechanisms of organi-
zational intelligence" are not limited to only coordination, control, and
evaluation systems in organized anarchies, but that "ambiguous goals,
loose coupling and garbage can processes are . . . frequently . . . forms
of intelligence." Thus, organizational symbols, patterns of interaction, cul-
ture, and socialization processes distribute and encapsulate organiza-
tional intelligence because "patterns of behavior in organizations code
ideas" (Sandelands & Stablein, 1987: 143).
A distributed model of organizational intelligence is informed by orga-
nizational theories that center on the creation of meaning, the social con-
struction of reality, and the development of organizational culture and
symbolism (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; Walsh & Ungson, 1991; Weick, 1979).
The idea that organizational intelligence arises from embedded interac-
tions is consistent with the view that organizations consist of interlocked
and institutionalized behaviors (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Sandelands &
Stablein, 1987; Weick, 1979). In this case, the focus is primarily on the
patterning and dynamism of these organizational behaviors rather than
the intellectual capacity of individual organizational members (e.g.,
Weick & Roberts, 1993). This view is echoed in theories of learning that
contextualize learning in the social, cultural, and communal environment
in which it takes place (Brown & Dugoid, 1991). Intelligence, according to
Weick and Roberts (1993), is the hallmark of those organizational systems
designed for reliability over efficiency. Sandelands and Stablein (1987:
138), in their construction of "organizational mind," described intelligence
as "the ability to maintain a working similarity between mind and nature.
. More generally, this ability is concerned with achieving and maintain-
ing congruence or 'isomorphism' between what is mind (i.e., ideas, feel-
ings) and what is external."
An organization may be smarter than its individual members.
Whereas individuals are limited in their capacity to process information
(March & Simon, 1958), this limitation is easily overcome by the collective.
Routine processes and organizational symbols that are rich in information
that is accurate, relevant, and externally isomorphic can lead to smart
organizations. Conversely, however, individual members may be smarter
than the organization; this is particularly true when organizational sys-
tems fail to institutionalize intelligent ideas or recognize the intelligent
contributions of members.
INFLUENCES OF INTELLIGENCEON ORGANIZATIONALINNOVATION
The process of innovation is parallel for individuals and orga-
nizations. Foreach the game is one of intelligent capitalization
on chance. (Staw, 1990:305)
Organizational Innovation
Organizational innovation is the process of bringing new, problem-
solving ideas into use (Amabile, 1988; Kanter, 1983). An innovation is novel
1996 Glynn 1095
to the adopting organization, but it may imitate something that exists

elsewhere (Aiken & Hage, 1971; Damanpour, 1991; Kimberly, 1981; Marcus,
1988;Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971;Van de Ven, 1986).Innovation is intendedly
adaptive, and it is undertaken typically in response to unfamiliar, unex-
pected, or nonroutine problems.
More formally, innovation is defined as "nonroutine, significant, and
discontinuous organizational change" (Mezias & Glynn, 1993: 78) that em-
bodies a new idea that is not consistent with the current concept of the
organization's business (Galbraith, 1982). Innovation, particularly radi-
cal, frame-breaking innovation (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Ettlie, Bridges, &
O'Keefe, 1984; Nord & Tucker, 1987), involves organizational intelligence
because it involves changes in existing organizational competencies
(Mezias & Glynn, 1993) and cognitive paradigms (Anderson & Tushman,
1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986),
mental models (Senge, 1990), and theories in use (Argyris & Schon, 1978).
Innovation is a subset of the broader category of organizational change;
innovation encompasses creativity as a subset (Woodman, Sawyer, & Grif-
fin, 1993).
In conceptualizing the process of organizational innovation, most re-
searchers use a stage approach. However, "there is no one universal and
smooth sequence of steps from initial vision through idea generation
through development and final implementation" (Amabile, 1988: 151).Many
researchers (e.g., Marcus, 1988; Rogers, 1983; Staw, 1990; Zaltman, Duncan,
& Holbeck, 1973; Van de Ven, 1986) support the following two-stage model:
(a) an initiation stage, which consists of "all activities pertaining to prob-
lem perception, information gathering, attitude formation and evaluation,
and resource attainment leading to the decision to adopt," and (b) an
implementation stage, which consists of "all events and actions pertaining
to modifications in both an innovation and an organization, initial utiliza-
tion, and continued use of the innovation when it becomes a routine feature
of the organization" (Damanpour, 1991: 562). By using this two-stage model
(depicted in Figure 1), I do not mean to suggest that organizational innova-
tion is necessarily simple, linear, or fully preprogrammed. The process
was realistically described by Quinn (1985: 83) as "opportunistic, customer
responsive, tumultuous, nonlinear and interactive in its development."
The inherent simplicity of this model is useful, however, for the theory-
development objectives of this article.
Several researchers have elaborated on this basic model to expand
the number of innovation stages. For instance, Cooper and Zmud (1990)
proposed a six-stage model for information technology innovation: initia-
tion, adoption, adaptation, acceptance, routinization, and infusion. With
a similar focus on technology-based innovative projects, Roberts and Fus-
feld (1981) viewed implementation as involving six stages: preproject, proj-
ect possibilities, project initiation, project execution, project outcome eval-
uation, and project transfer. Although these fine-grained approaches offer
a detailed examination of the innovation process, which is useful for
tracking and managing innovative projects in a firm, this level of specifi-
cation is beyond the scope of this conceptual framework. Because creators

of most stage models acknowledge the dual components of initiation and
implementation/adoption as being vital, this article focuses on these two
key stages. The two-stage model is useful because it breaks down the
innovation process into a series of tasks, each associated with a particular
set of skills or roles, which, it is proposed, relates to a particular set of
intellectual demands.
Dominant intelligences and organizational innovation. Several re-
searchers have found that different individuals, or different types of individ-
uals, are associated with different stages of the innovation process. Innova-
tors (Kirton, 1976) are the idea generators who initiate idea generation in
stage 1;they to be nonconformers and will disregard or violate existing orga-
nizational rules and norms as the need arise. By contrast, stage 2 adaptors
(Kirton, 1976), or innovation champions (Howell & Higgins, 1990; Pinchot,
1985), have more bureaucratic savvy, which they use to navigate ideas
through the organization's formal and informal "corporate immune" sys-
tems (Pinchot, 1985), where resistance is often encountered. Roberts and
Fusfeld (1981)' found support for these distinctions in their analysis of
thousands of staff profiles in R&D and engineering firms: Idea generators
have expertise in a limited number of fields, enjoy conceptualizing ab-
stract ideas, see new and different ways of doing things, and tend to work
alone. In contrast, innovation champions have a wider range of interests,
are more applied, and interact with others to sell ideas. Beath (1991) also
found that, similar to other innovation champions, IT champions also re-
lied on the technical resources and political support of the organization.
Implicit in the distinction between innovators and adaptors (Kirton,
1976) is that different types of expertise or intelligence are involved at
each stage. In the initial, inventive stage, intelligence concerning task-
specific domains is vital. Technical knowledge of the task domain (whether
it be, for instance, verbal, mathematical, mechanical, spatial, musical,
aesthetic, or practical) is important to solving problems within that do-
main. In the second stage, however, it is knowledge about the organiza-
tion's web of formal and informal influence systems (e.g., social, political,
or interpersonal intelligence) that can influence the acceptance of new
ideas and innovative change. Thus, the dominant intelligence that suc-
cessfully underlies the generation of new ideas is proposed to be different
from the dominant intelligence that underlies successful implementation
of those ideas. Although the intelligence behind idea generation may
capitalize on domain-relevant and creativity skills (Amabile, 1988), the
intelligence behind implementation requires knowledge about the organi-
'In their complete model, Roberts and Fusfeld (1981) proposed five critical functions,
corresponding to their five-stage model of innovation. The first two functions (idea generation,
championing) are discussed, but the remaining three, all relating to project management
once an innovation is adopted (project leading, gatekeeping, sponsoring or coaching), are not.
1996 Glynn 1097
zational context and interpersonal skills. For both stages, the cognitive
agility to combine and recombine existing knowledge in new and different
ways is critical, as it is to any process of creativity, innovation, and change
(Amabile, 1988); thus, procedural knowledge must be fluid.
Proposition 1: Different dominant intelligences are asso-
ciated with different stages of the innovation process.
The dominant intelligence of innovation initiation (stage
1) is technical knowledge that is relevant to the task
domain or problem. The dominant intelligence of innova-
tion implementation and adoption (stage 2) is social, po-
litical, and/or interpersonal, which is specific to the orga-
nizational context. Both stages are characterized by
procedural flexibility in the combining and recombining
of factual (declarative) knowledge.
Levels of intelligence and organizational innovation. Figure 1 depicts
the first stage of innovation as being based on (a) domain-specific intelli-
gence at the individual level and (b) context-specific intelligence at the
organizational level. Domain-specific technical intelligence generally re-
flects an individual's education, training, expertise, and knowledge within
a particular context (Gardner, 1993); thus it is usually described at the
individual level of analysis. Organizational intelligence can be domain
specific also; certainly, organizations develop distinctive competencies
within their industries or environmental niches that may reflect domain
intelligence. However, for organizations, context-specific knowledge at the
initiation stage primarily relates to problem perception and information
gathering (Damanpour, 1991); it makes unfamiliar events understandable
in terms of how they relate specifically to the organization. In other words,
organizations tend to understand novel or uncertain environmental events
not in an abstract manner, but in a self-referential one (Milliken, 1990).
Proposition 2: There are different dominant intelligences
at different levels of analysis that affect the initiation
stage of organizational innovation. The dominant indi-
vidual intelligence is domain relevant, whereas the dom-
inant organizational intelligence is context specific.
Antecedents of Innovation Initiation at the Individual Level
Individual creativity. Although individual intelligence may affect in-
novation initiation directly (Proposition 2), it also works through individual
creativity to generate ideas or perceive problems. Even though groups or
organizations may be creative (Amabile, 1988; Woodman et al., 1993), the
individual level is examined here for two reasons. First, although one
can describe the creativity of a collective, it always involves individuals.
Amabile (1988: 126) defined creativity as "the production of novel and useful
ideas by an individual or small group of individuals working together," and
Woodman and colleagues (1993: 293) defined organizational creativity as
"the creation of a valuable, useful new product, service, idea, procedure,

or process by individuals working together in a complex social system"
(emphases added to both quotations). Second, because this work is explor-
atory and directed toward theory building, a simple, parsimonious ap-
proach was adopted.
Proposition 3: Individual creativity is an antecedent of
the initiation of organizational innovation.
Even though creativity is an antecedent of innovation, it is not a sufficient
condition. Enabling conditions that facilitate the development of organiza-
tional innovation are also involved (see Figure 1).
Enabling conditions. The availability of opportunities and the absence
of internal and external constraints affect the unfolding of the innovation
process. At the individual level, internal constraints result from individu-
als' "transient emotional and motivational states, such as depression or
elation, learned helplessness or feelings of control, inability to concentrate
or particular ability to concentrate," whereas external constraints stem
from environmental conditions, "such as loud noises, frequent interrup-
tions, insufficient illumination, inadequate resources for accomplishing
the task at hand, and so on" (Sternberg & Powell, 1988: 998).
For organizations, Amabile and Gryskiewicz (1987) found, from their
interviews with R&D scientists, that lack of operational autonomy or lack
of freedom over one's work or ideas inhibited creativity. Amabile (1988)
also noted that truly creative performance is enhanced when extrinsic
constraints are not overwhelming. At the organizational level, any innova-
tive change must overcome the constraints of organizational inertia and
resistance. In general, situations in which constraints are absent and
individuals have autonomy and control seem to favor the expression of
intelligence and the generation of innovative ideas.
Adequate resources, support, and appropriate incentives are also nec-
essary for innovation. Reviewing educational and industrial studies, Mum-
ford and Gustafson (1988: 37) concluded that "environments providing re-
wards for or explicitly stating the need for creativity engender high levels
of creative activity." Amabile and Gryskiewicz (1987) found that sufficient
resources, such as facilities, equipment, information, and funds, contrib-
uted to the creativity of R&D scientists. Although these environmental
factors encourage creativity, it is reasonable to expect that they would
encourage the expression of intelligence as well; having adequate time
and information resources to understand the task environment as well as
the support to address problems would enable intelligent action. More-
over, having the requisite power within social, cultural, or organizational
settings to act on one's understanding would also be a vital condition of
intelligent action.
Proposition 4: The initiation, idea generation of organiza-
tional innovation is dependent upon individual creativ-
ity; creativity results in innovation under the following
1996 Glynn 1099
enabling conditions: when there is opportunity for cre-

ative expression and an absence of constraints, when
there are adequate resources and support to develop
ideas, and when there are strong intrinsic incentives.
Antecedents of individual creativity. Individual creativity is driven
by individual intelligence, which is moderated by individual characteris-
tics and the situational context (as shown in Figure 1). The rationale for
positing these interactive effects can be found in the conclusion Mumford
and Gustafson (1988: 28) reached from their extensive review of historical,
experimental, and field research on creativity: "Creative behavior is likely
to be determined by a complex interaction between the attributes of the
individual and the attributes of the environment."
Individual intelligence and creativity. Individual creativity has long
been associated with intelligence, both conceptually (e.g., Gardner, 1993;
Sternberg, 1985a) and empirically: "Studies of creative adult artists, scien-
tists, mathematicians, and writers find them scoring very high on tests of
general intelligence" (Barron & Harrington, 1981: 445). Based on his case
analyses of seven creative individuals-Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravin-
sky, Elliot, Graham, and Gandhi-Gardner (1993: 363) concluded that "cre-
ators differ from one another not only in terms of their dominant intelli-
gence but also in terms of breadth and the combination of intelligences."
Individuals of higher intelligence tend to outscore those of lower intel-
ligence on measures of originality, preference for complexity, and concep-
tual fluency and flexibility (Steiner, 1965). Amabile (1988: 140) noted that
creativity is not necessarily related to the amount of task-domain (or de-
clarative) knowledge that an individual possesses, but rather to the way
in which it is stored and accessed: For increased creativity, "It is not
possible to have too much knowledge; it is possible to have too many
algorithms." Thus, in addition to relevant knowledge and expertise, a
creative individual also will have flexible procedural knowledge.
Although research attests to a link between intelligence and creativ-
ity, high levels of intelligence do not guarantee creativity. Nowhere is this
more evident than in Feldman's (1982) book, Whatever Happened to the
Quiz Kids? For these children with very high IQs, "their creative perfor-
mances in their later lives have nowhere near matched their intelligent
performances in their earlier lives" (Sternberg, 1988: 125). What, then, ac-
counts for the strength (or weakness) in the intelligence-creativity link?
In their analysis of published correlations between creativity and
traditional measures of intelligence (i.e., tests of general intelligence, g
factor, or IQ), Barron and Harrington (1981) found that overall correlation
values ranged from nonsignificant to moderately positive; however, when
intelligence was measured by raters' judgments or respondents' percep-
tions (instead of IQ-type measures), correlations were significant. Even
though psychometric measures of general intelligence (IQ or g factor)
failed to predict creativity (Barron & Harrington, 1981), they do predict
job performance and career success in more established contexts (e.g.,

Gottfredson, 1986; Hunter, 1986; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1994; Ree et al., 1995).
Thus, it may not only be the measure of intelligence that is of concern,
but it may be also the type of intelligence. Assessments of g factor or IQ
tend to tap primarily verbal and mathematical intelligence, rather than
other types of intelligence (Gardner, 1993). For intelligence to be related
to creativity, the dominant intelligence (and its assessment) must relate
to the task domain in which creativity occurs.
Proposition 5: Individual intelligence results in creativity
when the dominant intelligence relates to the particular
task domain (declarative knowledge) and when there is
flexibility in combining rules for accessing and storing
information (procedural knowledge).
Individual and situational context of creativity. Summarizing findings
from extant research, Amabile (1988: 142) formulated "The Intrinsic Motiva-
tion Principle of Creativity: People will be most creative when they feel
motivated primarily by the interest, enjoyment, satisfaction, and challenge
of the work itself -and not by external pressures." Subsequent studies she
conducted with her colleagues using undergraduate and adult samples,
measuring creativity both with pen-and-pencil assessments and expert
ratings, attested to the validity of this principle (Amabile, Hill, Hennes-
sey, & Tighe, 1994). Further support of the role of intrinsic motivation in
linking intelligence and creativity was provided by Glynn and Webster
(1993), who found significant relationships among intrinsic motivation,
cognitive playfulness, and innovation intentions for a sample of highly
intelligent adults.
Woodman and colleagues (1993: 298) advocated a focus on creativity
that goes beyond an individually centered perspective but acknowledged
"an appreciation for the creative person as a partial explanation for cre-
ativity." Although researchers have debated whether creative individuals
have an enduring constellation of attributes (e.g., openness to experience,
intellectual curiosity, assertiveness, independence of judgment, spontane-
ity), a longitudinal study of women's adult development supports the no-
tion that individuals do have creative personalities and that these person-
alities tend to endure over time. Helson, Roberts, and Agronick (1995) found
that intelligence (measured as SAT verbal score), aspirations, and scores
on a creative temperament scale all contributed to the prediction of occu-
pational creativity.
when individuals have high intrinsic motivation and a
personal orientation toward creativity.
Noting that "situational variables have been all but totally ignored
in theories and testing of intelligence," Sternberg and Powell (1988: 997)
suggested several variables that operate to affect the expression of intelli-
gence, including absence of constraints, adequate resources and support,
1996 Glynn 1101
novelty (or unusualness) of circumstances, and expectations of intelligent

action. The first two (constraints and resources) are treated in this frame-
work (see Figure 1) as enabling conditions that affect both creativity and
innovation; the remaining two situational variables are discussed in terms
of their effects on the individual intelligence-creativity relationship.
Individuals tend to perform better in familiar settings: "Recall of stimu-
lus material tends to be best when it occurs in the same setting as that
in which the material was learned" (Sternberg & Powell, 1988: 999). Simi-
larly, in their review of the research, Alba and Hutchinson (1987: 427) found
that a person's ability to solve problems creatively was affected by the
novelty of the problem: "In situations in which a problem is familiar, prior
experience may lead to the direct retrieval of a prior solution-as in the
case of routinized problem solving. . . In situations in which the problem
is new, expertise allows an individual to generate and evaluate potential
solutions." When tasks are heuristic (as opposed to algorithmic, where
task behavior is governed by fixed and specific rules), creativity is favored
(Amabile, 1983). Thus, when circumstances are unfamiliar, unusual, or
novel, individuals may rely less on already learned behaviors and, in-
stead, attempt to acquire new information or reprocess existing informa-
tion in new ways that enable creativity.
Consistent with the well-documented effects of self-fulfilling prophe-
cies, it seems plausible that when intelligence is expected, valued, or
demanded, intelligent actions are more likely. Intelligence testing is al-
most always done under maximal-performance demands: "One is encour-
aged to put forth one's best effort, and the pressure to do so is clear and
present" (Sternberg & Powell, 1988: 999). Amabile and Gryskiewicz (1987)
found that organizational climate promoted creativity if innovation is val-
ued, failures are tolerated, and a spirit of cooperation and collaboration
exists.
when the task, problem, or circumstances are novel, un-
familiar, or heuristic and when an intelligent approach
to problem solving is expected and valued.
Organizational Antecedents of Innovation Initiation

and Implementation
Previous discussion focused on the relationship of organizational in-

novation to the stages of innovation (Propositions 1 and 2). In this section,
the focus is on how organizational intelligence interacts with organiza-
tional and situational characteristics to affect innovation. The rationale
for this approach is found in the work of Mumford and Gustafson (1988:
38). These authors stated that innovation is facilitated "by an environment
that provides a cognitive basis for creative efforts through structures en-
couraging the creation of systematic understandings and ongoing explora-
tion of alternative points of view."
Organizational and situational context. In her model of organizational

innovation, Amabile (1988: 153) argued that organizations have a basic
orientation that motivates them to innovate (or not). Amabile (1988: 154)
summarized the most important aspects of the informal arrangements: "a
value placed on innovation in general, an orientation toward risk (versus
an orientation maintaining the status quo), a sense of pride in the organiza-
tion's members and what they are capable of doing, and an offensive
strategy of taking the lead toward the future (versus a defensive strategy of
simply wanting to protect the organization's past position)." Organizations
that value diversity in perspectives, tolerate ambiguity, value innovation,
and accept risk taking will tend to have a stronger orientation toward inno-
vation.
Organizations with a greater capacity for innovation tend to be or-
ganic rather than mechanistic in structure (Burns & Stalker, 1995), integra-
tive rather than segmentalist (Kanter, 1983), and they have lower formaliza-
tion, more role ambiguity, multidisciplinary teams, and job rotation (Staw,
1990). Organizational size, complexity, and formalization are considered
obstacles to innovation (Aiken & Hage, 1971; Burns & Stalker, 1995; Kanter,
1983; Nadler & Tushman, 1989; Rogers, 1983). Several studies have demon-
strated that flexible environments, broad job definitions, and job autonomy
for workers facilitate innovation (Amabile, 1988; Amabile & Gryskiewicz,
1987; Andrews & Farris, 1967; Delbecq & Mills, 1985; Pelz & Andrews, 1966).
After reviewing a number of studies on organizational climate, Mumford
and Gustafson (1988: 37) concluded that "innovative research-and-design
systems are characterized by the recognition and reward of superior per-
formance, particularly with respect to the initial exploratory stages of
creative endeavors." Leidner and Elam (1995) surveyed senior and middle-
level managers who use expert information systems and found that the use
of decision support technologies increased organizational intelligence.
In general, then, organizations characterized by less bureaucracy; less
functional specialization; more fluid, flexible, and integrative structures;
increased worker autonomy; and good communication and information
flows are thought to be more innovative.
Traditionally, the belief has been that organizational factors that favor
the initiation of innovation tend to inhibit their implementation and adop-
tion; characteristics of the "innovating organization" are aligned with
those of the first stage but not the second stage. Marcus (1988: 235) ex-
plained the reasoning:
Rule-bound approaches, which involve central direction and
highly programmed tasks, are supposed to promote implemen-
tation; that is, the number of routine tasks prescribed from
above should increase as an organization moves toward imple-
mentation. . . Conception, proposal generation, and initia-
tion, on the other hand, require fewer controls and more auton-
omy, because diversity, openness, informality, and the ability
to bring a variety of bases of information to bear on a problem
need to be encouraged.
1996 Glynn 1103
Work in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that those organizational struc-
tures and characteristics that enable initiation also enable implementa-
tion; greater autonomy and managerial discretion generally facilitate im-
plementation. In his study of how nuclear power plants implemented
externally induced safety review innovations, Marcus (1988) found that
poor safety records were associated with a rule-bound approach to imple-
mentation, whereas better safety records were associated with an ap-
proach that allowed managers greater autonomy. One reason for this
relationship between degree of implementation autonomy and innovation
success is related to intelligence: "Implementators are likely to have
greater knowledge at the point of delivery, where there are multiple and
contradictory demands . . . [Efforts to centralize authority] may encourage
low system comprehension. . . . Autonomy is needed to encourage high
levels of commitment and knowledge" (Marcus, 1988: 251).
Finally, organizational capacities for learning influence organiza-
tional innovation. According to conceptual (e.g., Stata, 1989; Tushman &
Nadler, 1986), empirical (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Henderson & Clark,
1990), and simulation research (e.g., Mezias & Glynn, 1993), an organiza-
tion's ability to learn from its own history and experiences affected its
capabilities for renewal and change. By extension, then, intelligence can
underlie effective learning to enhance organizational innovation. Taking
into account this set of organizational and situational factors leads to
the following:
Proposition 8: Organizational intelligence results in in-
novation under conditions of high organizational orien-
tation to innovation and when situational factors favor
the expression of organizational intelligence, that is,
when constraints are absent; the circumstances, prob-
lems, or tasks are novel, unfamiliar, or heuristic; ade-
quate support and resources are available; an intelligent
approach is expected and valued; and an organization
has a high capacity for effective learning.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, RESEARCH,

AND MANAGERIALPRACTICE
Implications for Theory and Research
In this article, I developed the construct of organizational intelligence
as a social outcome that related to individuals' intelligence by means of
aggregation, cross-level, or distributed effects. Thus, understanding and
assessing individual intelligence is important to understanding organ-
izational intelligence. I discussed how individuals' intelligence can be
characterized according to interindividual differences in level or type of
intelligence. An extension of this idea is to characterize organizational
intelligence according to the homogeneity or heterogeneity of its members'
intelligence with regard to these two dimensions of intelligence. Field

research might be conducted to describe organizational intelligence in
terms of members' homogeneity of intelligence levels or types, examining
differences by members' functional division, hierarchical position, or orga-
nizational tenure. More or less innovative business units or firms may be
compared for their differences in members' intelligence, and for their
degree of heterogeneity. An alternative research strategy is to use com-
puter simulations to assess the effects that variance, heterogeneity, or
composition of individual members' intelligence have on organizational
innovation. The simulation methodology could model how organizational
innovation unfolds over time and how heterogeneity in level or type of
individual intelligences affects the process. Such a model might build
upon March's (1991) simulation of mutual learning between members of
an organization and an organizational code; such research holds promise
for researchers' examination of the relationships between microlevels and
macrolevels of intelligence.
This article focused on intelligence as purposeful, adaptive informa-
tion processing that was functionally similar but not equivalent for individ-
uals and organizations. In the future, researchers might investigate the
conditions under which organizational intelligence may differ more or
less markedly from individuals' intelligence. Such an investigation would
require a specification of the general laws that govern the development
and expression of intelligence; this is a process of "microtranslation"
(DiMaggio, 1991: 77). Although (perhaps) information-processing aspects
of intelligence are functionally similar across levels of analysis (Huber,
1991: 89), other aspects of intelligence may not be so correspondingly
similar. Two such aspects of intelligence that may differ across levels
of analysis are considered next: (a) differences in the way intelligence
develops and (b) differences in the relationship between the social or
cultural context and organizational intelligence.
Organizational intelligence may develop at different rates in response
to different kinds of experiences (e.g., success versus failure or threat
versus opportunity). If intelligence involves the development of rules that
are environmentally isomorphic (Sandelands & Stablein, 1987) or ecologi-
cally valid (Siegler & Richards, 1988), these rules will change in response
to differences in context or experience. Further, one might expect that the
rate of rule development proceeds more rapidly for organizations than
for individuals, given the greater information-processing capacity of a
collective. Alternatively, one might hypothesize that an institutionalized
system would be more inert and reliant on previously learned rules be-
cause of group pressures to conformity, particularly in the absence of
dissenting minority opinions (e.g., Laughlin, 1988; Nemeth, 1986). Addi-
tional modification of this basic idea might include a consideration of
organizational size and its effects on the development of intelligence.
Specifically, are there limits to intelligence as the size of a group increases
and problems of information communication, coordination, interpretation,
1996 Glynn 1105
and integration multiply? In this article, I focused on the intelligence of

individuals and organizations; understanding how intelligence develops
and unfolds in small groups or teams is an important agenda for future re-
search.
Differences in the relationship between intelligence and context might
be different across levels of analysis. For organizations, this notion implies
the consideration of different levels or types of intelligence across different
types of organizations. To map the existence and dominance of different
types of intelligence, Sternberg's (1985b) three-part framework on intelli-
gence (consisting of analytical, creative, and contextual components)
could be used in different organizational contexts, structures, and cultures.
One might speculate that more organic types of organizational structures,
because of their flexible and innovative capabilities (Burns & Stalker,
1995), would be associated with more creative aspects of intelligence.
Conversely, mechanistic organizations, with their emphasis on bureau-
cratic, functional specialization might place a premium upon analytical
(or IQ-type) intelligence. Further, the intelligence of executive leadership
also could be analyzed for organizational and industry differences. Stern-
berg (Trotter, 1986: 60) suggested that Lee Iacocca has a high level of
contextual intelligence or "street smarts." An interesting question is
whether his type of intelligence extends to other executives at Fortune
100 firms or auto manufacturing firms.
The conceptual framework proposed herein focused on radical innova-
tion because it made more cognitive demands; future researchers might
investigate the effects of intelligence on more incremental innovation.
Mezias and Glynn (1993) demonstrated that different types of organiza-
tional strategies often yield unintended consequences; strategies intended
to increase innovation often resulted in more incremental innovation than
radical innovation. In linking type of intelligence to type of innovation,
one might postulate that analytical intelligence (typically assessed by
standardized psychometric instruments like IQ tests) may rely heavily on
learned and programmed information structures and rules that may be
easily accessed but not so easily manipulated in the service of innovation
that is radical or "frame breaking" (Tushman et al., 1986). Correspondingly,
one might compare the role that intelligence plays in fostering technologi-
cal versus nontechnological innovations.
The proposed model relates intelligence to organizational innovation,
which is broadly construed as a two-stage process: (a) initiation and idea
generation and (b) implementation and adoption. More fine-grained ap-
proaches to the constructs of intelligence and innovation represent prom-
ising areas for future conceptual and empirical research. For instance,
researchers might investigate the relationship of intelligence to subcate-
gories of initiation and implementation.
Future work might be directed toward understanding intelligence in
terms of other cognitive organizational processes and placing it within
the nomological web that constitutes organizational cognition. Related
constructs include organizational learning and memory; processes related

to the development and persistence of organizational routines, rituals,
and symbols; and organizational adaptation and change. In many of these
concepts, organizational intelligence seems to be an implied but under-
specified variable. Many organizational learning theorists contend that
although learning may lead to change, it does not necessarily ensure
organizational adaptation (Glynn et al., 1994). Intelligence makes experi-
ence understandable, which aids the development of domain knowledge
and the construction of ecologically valid rules that are effective in dealing
with environmental demands. Thus, intelligence is implicitly at the core
of the learning organization (Senge, 1990); it is what enables a firm to
learn from its own experience and the experience of other firms. Distributed
views of intelligence draw attention to the intelligence embedded in insti-
tutionalized patterns of structure and symbols. An interesting research
agenda might develop from an examination of organizational routines
and artifacts to determine what they reveal about the intelligence of that
system. As in the oft-cited example of the large and varied Eskimo vocabu-
lary for snow (e.g., Whorf, 1956), so too might the analysis of the structure
and content of organizational acronyms, metaphor, or slang reveal the
intelligence underlying the coded content and codification processes of
language.
Implications for Managerial Practice
This article points to the vital role of an organization's intellectual
resources and the importance of managing intellectual capital. Organiza-
tional innovation is impossible in the absence of creative geniuses, who
initiate innovative processes, and intelligent organizational systems that
recognize and support viable innovation. Dominant intelligence needs
to fit task demands; this notion suggests that the placement function is
important in fitting individuals who have appropriate levels and types
of intelligence with jobs that require this intelligence. Even though an
accountant may have the mathematical intelligence to perform well in
financial matters, he or she may lack the social intelligence needed for a
sales position. Thus, managers should place employees in jobs that fit
their cognitive skills and abilities.
In addition to individual characteristics, managers also must attend
to situational factors that enable the expression of intelligence and moti-
vate its application to creative solutions and innovative organizational
endeavors. Such environments are characterized by an absence of con-
straints, novelty of tasks, adequate resources and support, and expecta-
tions of intelligent action. Even though this article followed previous re-
search (e.g., Amabile, 1988) in proposing that intrinsic motivation was
necessary for creativity and innovation, it is also likely that extrinsic
motivation plays a role in the process. This seems plausible at the later
stage of innovation when individuals take creative, inventive ideas and
apply them to organizational needs and problems. As innovation moves
1996 Glynn 1107
out of the idea stage into the implementation stage, extrinsic incentives
will probably be more important. If managers are able to influence motiva-
tional and situational factors, they will be better able to foster intelligent
innovation. Managers also need to adopt a strong business orientation
toward innovation and embed this orientation in their organization's op-
erating systems and cultural values. Because much of an organization's
innovation orientation lies within its visionary leadership (Amabile, 1988),
managers are well poised to be exemplary role models and to personify
the innovative genius.
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Mary Ann Glynn is an associate professor at the Goizueta Business School, Emory
University. She received her Ph.D. from Columbia University's Graduate School of
Business. Her research has focused on understanding cognition and cognitive pro-
cesses in organizations and exploring their relationship to innovation and creativity,
learning, organizational identity, and members' identification with organizations.

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Innovative Genius: A Framework for Relating Individual and Organizational Intelligences to

In this article, organizational innovation is viewed as fundamentally

In its essence, innovation involves intelligence; to put it simply, "An

amount and type of organizational innovation is related to learning pro-

Like other cognitive constructs applied to organizations, intelligence

.0.4 > 0 -4-4

or meet task challenges (Sternberg & Salter, 1988).Importantly, intelligence

o04 o CD -.O0 :4 -Q) - 4

that general cognitive ability is a significant predictor of job and career

Defining individual intelligence. Although there is no one best way

The first assumption, that of functional similarity between human and

nisms: (a) aggregation effects, whereby individual members' intelligence

fn > (1) 0) (1) (1)

t3) >4 >4

memory, routines, rituals, standard operating procedures, and symbols

meanings" sustained through social interaction. March and Olsen (1986:

to the adopting organization, but it may imitate something that exists

cation is beyond the scope of this conceptual framework. Because creators

"the creation of a valuable, useful new product, service, idea, procedure,

enabling conditions: when there is opportunity for cre-

job performance and career success in more established contexts (e.g.,

novelty (or unusualness) of circumstances, and expectations of intelligent

Organizational Antecedents of Innovation Initiation

Previous discussion focused on the relationship of organizational in-

Organizational and situational context. In her model of organizational

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, RESEARCH,

intelligence with regard to these two dimensions of intelligence. Field

and integration multiply? In this article, I focused on the intelligence of

constructs include organizational learning and memory; processes related

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