Escritor vs.

Facts
Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter, was charged for committing “disgraceful and immoral
conduct” under Revised Administrative Code for living with a man not her husband and for having
borne, therefore, a child within this live-in arrangement. The complainant, Estrada, who requested an
investigation for the alleged act believes that it tarnishes the court’s image and, thus should not be
allowed to remain employed as it would appear that the court condones her act. Escritor testified that
she is already a widow when he entered the judiciary in 1999. Admitted having started living with
Luciano Quilapo without the benefit of marriage twenty years ago while her husband was living with
another woman. She also admitted having a son with Quilapo. 

Moreover, she appealed that their live-in arrangement was in accordance with their religious
beliefs and has approval of religious Sect Jehovah’s witness and the Watch tower of Bible Tract Society
in which they executed “Declaration of Pledging of Faithfulness” with the approval of the elders in the
congregation.

Even though Escitor was widowed in 1988, thereby lifting legal impediments and capacitating her
to remarry on her part, her mate was still incapacitated thus making the declaration still valid and
existing. The respondent invokes that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute immoral conduct
for which she could be administratively liable because such an act was in accordance with the beliefs
and practices of her congregation.

Issues of the case:

Whether or not Soledad Escritor should he held administratively liable for “disgraceful and immoral
conduct” under Revised Administrative Code.

Rulings of the Case:

Soledad Escritor cannot be held liable for “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Revised
Administrative Code for the reason that the respondent invokes the exercise of Freedom of Religion as
one of the fundamental rights provided in our Constitution. The court uses the Compelling State Interest
and Benevolent Neutrality in rendering judgment, wherein, it takes into consideration certain conditions
pertaining to the sincerity and the centrality of the respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice
beyond serious doubt without prejudicing the state’s interest in exchange for the free exercise of
religion. While Benevolent Neutrality provides that it allows the accommodation of religion, not to
promote the government’s favoured form of religion, but to allow the respondent to exercise her
religion without hindrance provided that it does not offend compelling state interest. Furthermore, the
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms, including religious
freedom, maybe enjoyed. Therefore, the instant administrative complaint filed against the respondent
was dismissed. viewed