CEBU OXYGEN v. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES, GR No.

L-40474, 1975-08-29
Facts:
This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court... dismissing petitioner's application for
registration of title over a parcel of land
The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces Street
City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved... declared the terminal portion of
M. Borces Street,... as an abandoned road
Subsequently,... the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting
City Mayor to sell the land through a public... bidding... he lot was awarded to the herein
petitioner being the highest bidder... the City of Cebu,... executed a deed of absolute sale to the
herein petitioner
By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the
Cour... to have its title to the land registered... the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a
motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a
public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside
the commerce of... man.  Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private
individual.
trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application for registration of title.[6]
Hence, the instant petition for review.
Issues:
Does the City Charter of Cebu City... alid right to declare a road as abandoned
City provides:
Revised Charter of Cebu City provides
Ruling:
Revised Charter of Cebu City provides:... the City Council shall have the following legislative
powers:

34. x x x; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square.  Property
thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."... it is
undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.

In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio,... Favis vs. City of Baguio,... ppellant may not challenge
the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use
and converting the remainder thereof into an alley.  These are acts well within the ambit of the
power to close a... city street.  The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to
determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use.
"Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary.  And the discretion will not ordinarily be
controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion.
So the fact... that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the
vacation ordinance."
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title
was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
rticle 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State."
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale
to the petitioner is valid.  Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.
GR. No. L-29910.
CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CO. V. BERCILLES  
66 SCRA 431
 

FACTS:
The  land  sought  to  be  registered  in  this  case  was  formerly  a  part  of  a street.  Through a
resolution, it was declared to be an abandoned road and not part of the City development plan.  
Thereafter, it was sold through a public  bidding  and  petitioner  was  the  highest  bidder.    He 
then  sought  to register said land but his application was dismissed.   
 

HELD:
The  portion  of  the  city  street  subject  to  petitioner’s  application  for registration  of  title 
was  withdrawn  from  public  use.    Then  it  follows  that such  withdrawn  portion  becomes 
patrimonial  property  of  the  State.    It  is also very clear from the Charter that property thus
withdrawn from public servitude  may  be  used  or  conveyed  for  any  purpose  for  which 
other  real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. 
Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles
L-40474, August 29, 1975

FACTS: The City Council of Cebu, in 1968, considered as an abandoned road, the terminal
portion of one of its streets. Later it authorized the sale through public bidding of the property.
The Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. was able to purchase the same. It then petitioned the RTC
of Cebu for the registration of the land. The petition was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal
(Prosecutor) who argued that the lot is still part of the public domain, and cannot therefore be
registered.

ISSUE: May the lot be registered in the name of the buyer?

HELD: Yes, the land can be registered in the name of the buyer, because the street in question
has already been withdrawn from public use, and accordingly has become patrimonial property.
The sale of the lot was therefore valid.
LAUREL VS GARCIA
MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ
Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is
located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for
damage done by the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion.
As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the
property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed
to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation
exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or
ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the
formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation
and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and
its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need
to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to
validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to
effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex
situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties
procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In
discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the
foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional
limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797
 

FACTS:
The  subject  Roppongi  property  is  one  of  the  properties  acquired  by  the Philippines from
Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement.  The property is where the Philippine Embassy was
once located, before it transferred to the  Nampeidai  property.    It  was  decided  that  the 
properties  would  be
available to sale or disposition.  One of the first properties opened up for public  auction  was 
the  Roppongi  property,  despite  numerous  oppositions from different sectors.
 
HELD:
The  Roppongi  property  was  acquired  together  with  the  other  properties through  reparation 
agreements.    They  were  assigned  to  the  government sector  and  that  the  Roppongi 
property  was  specifically  designated  under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy.
 
It  is  of  public  dominion  unless  it  is  convincingly  shown  that  the  property has become
patrimonial.  The respondents have failed to do so.
 
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of  man.    It  cannot 
be  alienated.    Its  ownership  is  a  special  collective ownership for general use and payment,
in application to the satisfaction of collective  needs,  and  resides  in  the  social  group.    The 
purpose  is  not  to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is  intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
 
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy  service 
doesn’t  automatically  convert  it  to  patrimonial  property.  Any such conversion happens only
if the property is withdrawn from public use.  A property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.
SALVADOR H. LAUREL v. RAMON GARCIA, GR No. 92013, 1990-07-25
Facts:
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for
national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their
losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.
Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and
utilization of reparations and development loans.  The procurements are divided into those for
use by the government sector... and those for private parties in projects as the then National
Economic Council shall determine.  Those intended for the private sector shall be made available
by sale to Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities... in
national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year
Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector",... As intended, it became the site of
the Philippine Embassy... until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs.  Due to the failure of our government to provide
necessary funds, the Roppongi... property has remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to
Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese
firm - Kajima Corporation - which shall construct two (2)... buildings in Roppongi and one (1)
building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai.  The
consideration of the construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the...
buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai.
The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery.  At the
end of the lease period, all... the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the
Philippine government.  No change of ownership or title shall occur.  (See Annex "B" to Reply
to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease period... and
thereafter.  However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is pending
approval and ratification between the parties.  Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino
created a committee to study the... disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in
Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders
Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
Issues:
The petitioner in G. R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1)  Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?; and
(2)  Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell
the Roppongi property?
Ruling:
Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion,
and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public
service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision.  He states that being one of public dominion, no
ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the
State.
The Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and
consular quarters, buildings and other improvements"... he respondents, for their part, refute the
petitioner's contention by saying that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but
by the laws of Japan where the property is located.  They rely upon the rule of lex... situs which
is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the
title to a property.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man.  It cannot be
alienated.  Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
application to the satisfaction... of collective needs, and resides in the social group.  The purpose
is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does
not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.  Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part... of the government to withdraw it
from being such
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the
Roppongi property's original purpose.  Even the failure by the government to repair the building
in Roppongi is not... abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of
government funds.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a
provision in its text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for
the government sector.  The executive order does not... declare that the properties lost their
public character.  It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to
Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other... disposition.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones to
insist that in the sale of extremely valuable government property, Japanese law and not
Philippine law should prevail.  The Japanese law -- its coverage... and effects, when enacted, and
exceptions to its provisions -- is not presented to the Court.  It is simply asserted that the lex
loci... rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without stating what that law provides.  It is
assumed on faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title.  There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines.  The issue is the authority of the respondent... officials to
validly dispose of property belonging to the State.  And the validity of the procedures adopted to
effect its sale.  This is governed by Philippine law.  The rule of... lex situs does not apply.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public
dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property.  It was given to the Filipino people
in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese
military occupation, for the suffering of... widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and
kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war.  The
Tokyo properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face
of an invader; like the... monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not
expect economic or financial benefits from them.  But who would think of selling these
monuments?  Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we... keep our properties in Japan
as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died and suffered.  Even if we should become
paupers we should not think of selling them.  For it would be as if we sold the lives and blood
and tears of our... countrymen.
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices
fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos -
veterans and civilians alike. 
Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy
determination where both the President and Congress must concur.
 Case Digest: Laurel vs Garcia

6/24/2020

0 COMMENTS

 
ISSUE:  Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property. 

FACTS:  The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi
property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations
Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino
created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in
Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to
avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. 

DECISION:  Granted 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed
true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by
real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and
civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a
policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the
properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public
dominion must be faithfully followed.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc

FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC
of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse
and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the
fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It
was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner
and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February
2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of
Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that
the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the
Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners
can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they
presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is
no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition
by prescription.
Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic
August 6, 2017Light

G.R. No. 179987

Facts:

1. On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration of
title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo
Velazco and that he and his predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious,
exclusive and continuous possession of the said land for more than 30 years.
 2. Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-grandfather
which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the administrator
of the properties which the son of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties
therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
1. They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable and
disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
3. The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of Republic v
Hebierto.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed

Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to dissect them. The
case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141

1. It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests the right to
ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes
such rights. One did not repeal the other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable” from
“agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be registered, as we may take a look at
Sec. 9 of CA 141.

The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not Herbierto, the
latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle
the original registration. Thus:

1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when at the time
of the application, the land is already classified as alienable and disposable. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the right nugatory
and the provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippine is still
not an independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of interpretation of Art.
1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.

1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men and the
patrimonial property of the State can be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.
 2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no longer in
use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director
of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the executive or legislative
declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive act, regardless
if the land was classified as alienable and disposable, that the land sought to be
registered, can be acquired through prescription.

Applying to the case at bar:

1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948. No other
substantive evidence was presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article
422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition
by prescription.

Petition Denied.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

Possession, Property Registration Decree, Regalia Doctrine
NOVEMBER 13, 2018

FACTS:

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased
from Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more
than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.

The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the
judgment to the CA, which reversed the RTC Judgment.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said
decision to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petition was denied.

Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.

 

ISSUE:

1. What are the classifications of public lands?

1. Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

RULING:

1.

Classifications of land according to ownership.

Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of

private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either:

(a) is intended for public use; or

(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth.

Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State.  Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State
is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.

A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department,
not in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit
of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to
classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer
intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

2.

Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable.

Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 179987, 2009-04-29

Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre
Malabanan... claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and
peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes
Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
The Republic of the Philippines likewise did... not present any evidence to controvert the
application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was "verified... to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the... manner
and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period
of possession prior to the... classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus,
the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the
property was declared alienable and... disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos'
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.
Issues:
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1)
or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
Ruling:
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The
OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of
the State refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands."
It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for
application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of
possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of... prescription
under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive
period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land
was declared alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the... property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no... longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is... duly authorized by law.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his... predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners
can date back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax Declarations they
presented in particular is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot... avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is
no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national... evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.  Thus, it is... insusceptible to acquisition
by prescription.

[ G.R. No. L-16351, June 30, 1964 ]

CALAPAN LUMBER COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.

COMMUNITY SAWMILL COMPANY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is an action for injunction, prohibition against defendant public officers, compensatory,
exemplary and nominal damages, attorney's fees and costs.
All the defendants prayed in their respective answers for the dismissal of the second amended
complaint, in addition to their counterclaims.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro rendered judgment, the dispositive
part of which reads:
Wherefore, this Court renders judgment:
1. Finding:
(a) That the road and bridge in question, known as the Biga-Communal Goob (from Km. 12.3S
to 15.88) was constructed during the period from 1950 to 1952 by the plaintiff at its exclusive
expense with the knowledge and consent of the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro;
(b) That before actual construction of said road and bridge the personnel of the Office of the
District Engineer surveyed the lay-out of the road to be constructed, also at the expense of the
plaintiff;
(c) That before the actual construction of the road in question the plaintiff secured and used road-
right-of-way agreements (Exhs. Y, Y-1 to Y-7 and Z-AA), executed in favor of the plaintiff by
the owners of the several portions of land traversed by said road;
(d) That from the completion of the road up to the present the plaintiff has been contributing to
the repair and maintenance of the said road such as stones, gravel, sand and lumber at its own
expense;
(c) That before the completion of the road in question, to the same has been used by the public
without any restriction with the written consent of the plaintiff as embodied in Resolution No.
222 (Exh. A) and 119 (Exh- B) with the exception of logging and lumber concerns who might
use the road with the permission of the plaintiff;
(f) Th«t Lao Kee (alias Lu Pong), Lee Cok, Tan. Hong, Tan Kiun, Co G«ac, Yan Ong Chi Hian,
Tan Tak Tiap, Kiok Chia and the Community Sawmill Company had used the road and bridge in
question Bomctime before April 6. 1953, until the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
of June 25. 1953, manifest bad faith;
2. Declaring:
(a) That Resolution No. 186, series of 1953, marked Exh. C. is valid insofar as it repealed
Resolution No. 222, series of 1953, marked Exh. "A", and Resolution No. 119, series of 1953,
marked Exh. B;
(b) That Resolution No. 186, series of 1953, marked Exh. C insofar as it declared that the road
and bridge in question. public. is null and void the same being in violation of Sec. 2131 of the
Revised Administrative Code;
(c) That the road and bridge in question are of private ownership belonging to the plaintiff;
(d) That the said defendant Lao Kee (alias Lu Pong). Lee Cok, Tan Hong, Tan Kian, Co Giac,
Tan Hong Chia Hian, Tan Tiik Tiao, Kiok Chia and Community Sawmill did not have the right
to use the road and bridge in question;
3. Ordering:
(a) That the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the Community Sawmill Company he
made permanent, perpetually restraining the said defendants Lao Kee (alias Lu Pong), Lee Cok,
Tan Hong, Tan Kian, Co Giac, Tan Hong Chia Hian, Tan Tak Tiao. Kiok Chia and Community
Sawmill Company, their agents, attorneys, or other persons or entities from acting on their
behalf;
(b) The same defendants named in the immediately preceding paragraph to pay jointly and
severally to the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs;
4. Absolving from the third amended complaint the defendants Marciuno Roque, Pablo Lorenzo,
Isaias Fernando, Francisco Infantado. Bernabe Jamilla and Cenon C. Laurena;
6. Dismissing all the counterclaims filed by the defendants for lack of sufficient merits. (Civil
case No. R-542)
From the judgment thus rendered, the defendants Lao Kee (alias Lu Pong), Lee Cok, Tan Hong,
Tan Kian, Co Giac, Chia Hian, Tan Tak Tiao, Kiok Chia, all acting under the name and style of
Community Sawmill Company, appealed to this Court. They claim that the trial court committed
the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the road in question is a private road and that, therefore,
plaintiff could legally deny Us use to herein appellants.
2. The lower court erred in ordering herein appellants to pay plaintiff attorney's fees.
3. The lower court erred in holding that plaintiff can recover expenses of litigation under article
2208 of the Civil Code.
4. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint and finding for herein appellants on
their counterclaim.
At the trial, the parties submitted to the Court a stipulation of facts which reads:
1. That the parties agree to the existence and authenticity of the following resolutions which were
passed by the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro, as follows:
(a) Resolution No. 22,2. Series of 1950 (Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint), but not
its regularity and validity, which must be proven;
(b) Resolution No. 119, Series of 1953 (Annex "B" of the Third Amended Complaint);
(c) Resolution No. 186, Sertes of 1055, revoking Resolutions Nos. 222. Series of 1950 nnd 119,
Series of 1953. of the Provincial Board, granting the Calapan Lumber Company the exclusive
right under certain conditions to use the Viga-Communal Goob road for a period of twenty (20)
years, and declaring said road as a toll road.
2. That the parties agree as to the existence and authenticity of the following official
communications, indorsements and letters re the Biga-Communal-Goob read:
(a) Letter dated March 20, 1953 addressed to the Hon. Executive Secretary, signed l>y Rodolfo
Naguit and Joe Ong, both representatives of the Community Sawmill Company;
(b) 1st Indorsement of Assistant Executive Secretary Lucas Madumba, dated March 21. 11)53
(Annex "C", Third Amended Complaint);
(c) 2nd Indorsement of Governor Infantado dated March 23, 1963;
(d) 3rd Indorsement of District Engineer C. C. Laurena dated Match 26, 1953;
(e) 4th Indorsement of Governor Infantado dated March 28, 1953;
(f) Letter of ltodolfo G. Naguit, representative of the Community Sawmill Company, dated May
4, 1953 and add leased to the Assistant Executive Secretary, Office of the President;
(g) Letter of Atty. Ferdinand E. Marcos, counsel for the plaintiff company addressed to
Executive Secretary Marciano Roque, dated May 21. 1953 (Annex "F", Third Amended
Complaint) ;
(h) 7th Indorsement of Director of Public Works, Isaias Fernando, dated April 20, 1953 (Annex
"D", Third Amended Complaint) ;
(i) 8th Indorsement of Undersecretary Vicente Orosa, dated April 25, 1953;
(j) 9th Indorsement of Executive Secretary Marciano Roque dated May 11, 1953 (Annex "E",
Third Amended Complaint);
(k) 3rd Indorsement of Acting Executive Secretary Marciano Roque, dated July 3, 11)53 and the
4th Indorsement of Undersecretary Vicente Orosa. dated July 16, 1953;
(l) 1st Indorsement of Acting Executive Secretary Marciano Roque, dated July 17, 1953.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
XXX
Resolution No. 222, adopted 4 December 1950, reads:
Whereas, there is nt present an unfinished provincial road in the barrio of Viga, of the
municipality of Calapan, known as the Biga-Communal Goob road, the construction of which
could not be undertaken by the province due to insufficiency of funds;
Whereas, the Calapan Lumber Co., Inc., through its President, Mr. D. M. Gotauco, in a letter
addressed to the Governor of this province this made representation to undertake the construction
of said road under certain conditions; and the province is willing to accede to the request of the .
Lumber Co. Inc. and to give it the sole right for its use, provided that after a period of twenty
(20) years, said company shall donate lo the province the road it had constructed; provided
further that during the said period of 20 years other concerns dealing in logs and/or lumber may
use the same road upon permission granted to them by the said Calapan Lumber Co., Inc.. and
provided finally that said road is open to all non-logging concerns or individuals during the said
period of 20 years; Now, therefore, be it:
RESOLVED , That the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro grants, as hereby is granting, the
Calapan Lumber Co., Inc. to undertake the construction of the unfinished provincial road to the
barrio of Viga, municipality of Calapan, known as the Viga-Connnunal-Goob-Road, subject to
the stipulation stated above; and
RESOLVED FURTHER , That copies of this resolution be furnished the District Engineer and
the Calapan Lumber Co., Inc., through its President, Mr. D. M. Gotauco, for the information.
XXX
Resolution No. 119, adopted 6 April 1953, reads:
Whereas, under Resolution No. 222, series of 1950, the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro
under the former administration, granted the Calapan Lumber Co., Inc. the right to undertake the
construction of the unfinished Viga-Communal-Goob provincial road the sole right for its use,
under the following conditions:
(1) That after a period of twenty (20) years, said company shall donate to the province the road it
had constructed;
(2) That during the said period of 2G years other concerns dealing in logs and/or lumber may use
the same road upon permission granted to them by the Calapan Lumber Co.. and
(3) That said road is open to all non-logging concerns or individuals during the raid period of 20
years.
Whereas, according to the records of the Provincial Board the said resolution has not been
amended or modified up to the present, and, therefore, the same is still in force and binding as
per agreement stipulated therein;
Whereas, this Board has received reliable information to the effect that another certain lumber
company is attempting to use, or has actually used the same road, by allowing to pass thru it its
heavy trucks and tractors without securing any permission from the Culapari Lumber Co., Inc. to
the detriment and prejudice of the interests of the latter lumber company which shouldered the
cost of its completion in accordance with the rights granted to it by the province; and
Whereas, after a cartful consideration of the matter this Board is of the opinion that the right of
the Calapan Lumber Co., Inc., over the said road as stipulated in the conditions set forth in the
resolution must be upheld for obvious reasons; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro to authorize, as it hereby authorizes,
the Calapan Lumber Company. Inc. to prohibit the use of the Viga-Cominunal-Goob provincial
road, from point Km. 12.38 up to Km. 15.88 of said road, by any other concern or company
dealing in logs and/or lumber, without the permission or consent of the said Calapan Lumber
Co., Inc., in accordance with one of the stipulations or conditions agreed upon in Resolution No.
222, series of 1950, of the Provincial Board; and
RESOLVED, FURTHER, That the District Engineer and the Calapan Lumber Co., Inc. be
furnished with copies of this resolution, for their information.
XXX
Resolution No. 186, adopted 19 June 1953, reads:
REVOKING RESOLUTIONS NOS. 222, SERIES OP 1950, AND 119. SERIES OF 1953, OF
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD, GRANTING THE CALAPAN LUMBER COMPANY THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO USE THE VIGA-COMMUNAL-
GOOB PROVINCIAL ROAD FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY (20) YEARS.
Whereas, under Resolution No. 222, series of 1950, the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro,
under the former provincial administration, granted the Calapan Lumber Co., Inc., an authority to
undertake the construction of the unfinished Viga-Goob provincial road from Point Km. 12.38 to
Km. 15.88. and the exclusive right for its use, under certain conditions;
Whereas, on April 6, 1953, this Board passed another resolution (119) maintaining the right of
the Calapan Lumber Co., Inc., over the said road under the conditions stipulated in the above-
cited resolution No. 222, and forthwith authorized the said company to prohibit the use of the
portion of said road constructed at its expense by any other concern or company dealing in logs
or lumber without its permission;
Whereas, in a 9th Indorsement dated May 11, 1953, the pertinent parts of which are quoted
hereunder, the Honorable, the Executive Secretary, to whom the case regarding this matter was
appealed for decision, and upon the recommendation of the Director of Public Works and with
the concurrence of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications, ruled that
provincial roads are considered as properties for public use and the Provincial Board may not
therefore grant the exclusive use thereof to any private individual or entity which would
discriminate against or exclude the general public from a reasonable use thereof, and therefore,
the resolution in question should be revoked:
In this connection, it should be stated that provincial roads are properties for public use and the
provincial board may not grant the exclusive use thereof to any private individual or entity or
enter into a contract or agreement which would tend to discriminate against or exclude the
general public from a reasonable use thereof. Resolutions Nos. 222, series of 1950, and 119,
series of 1953. of the Provincial Board, granting the Calapan Lumber Company an exclusive
right to use the said road for a period of twenty (20) years and to prohibit lumber or logging
concerns from using the road in question without the company's permission, should therefore be
revoked. In consonance with the policy of the law, and as correctly suggested by the Director of
Public Works and the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications, the portion of the
Viga-Communal Road from Km. 12.38 to 15.88. having a length of 3.5 kilometers, should be
declared a toll road in order to raise funds for its maintenance and with which to reimburse the
Calapan Lumber Company for the expenses the latter had incurred in the construction of this
portion of the road.
Whereas, in view of the said ruling, this Board has been requested to take immediate action on
the matter, to declare the above-said portion of the Viga-Communal-Goob provincial road as a
toll road; and
Whereas, according to an estimate made by the Office of the District Engineer the Calapan
Lumber Company has spent for the construction of the portion of the road in question having a
length of 3.5 kilometers, the amount of P25,000.00 more or less; Now therefore, be it
RESOLVED, That Resolution Nos. 222, series of 1950, and 119, series of 1953, of the
Provincial Board, which grants the Calapan Lumber Co., Inc., the exclusive right to use the
Viga-Communal-Goob provincial road a good period of 20 years, under certain conditions, be,
and hereby are, revoked;
RESOLVED, FURTHER, That portion of said Viga-Communal-Goob provincial road, from
Point Km. 12.38 up to Km. 15.88 thereof, be and hereby is, declared PROVINCIAL TOLL
ROAD, under the provisions of Section 2131 of the Revised Administrative Code;
RESOLVED, FURTHER, That the following toll rates to be paid by any motor vehicle for the
use of the provincial road be, and hereby are, fixed, effective today, June 19, 1953, the proceeds
from which shall be used for the maintenance of the said road and the balance thereof for the
reimbursement to the said company for the expenses it had incurred in the construction for said
portion of the road:
For every truck, one way .................................................... P1.00
For every weapon carrier, one way ..........................................60
For every jeeney .....................................................................30
PROVIDED, however, that the portion of the road declared herein as provincial toll road shall
continue to be so up to and until the amount spent by the Calapan Lumber Company for its
construction shall have been covered by reimbursement to said company; and
RESOLVED, FINALLY, That copies of this resolution be forwarded to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, thru the Director of Public Works and the Honorable, the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, Manila.
XXX
Resolution No. 169, adopted 21 April 1956, revoked Resolution No.. 186 insofar an it declared
Provincial Toll Road, that part of the road involved in this case.
There seems to be no doubt that Resolutions Nos. 222 and 119, adopted by the Provincial Board
of Oriental Mindoro quoted above, wereultra vires, because sections 2067 (f) and (g) on powers
of the provinces as political bodies corporate; 2102 (g) on powers of the provincial boards; 2106
(f) on powers of the provincial boards to be exercised with the approval of the Department Head;
and 2113 (a) on road and bridge fund, of the Revised Administrative Code, do not authorize the
Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro to pass and adopt said resolutions. The contention that the
Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro under section 2106 (g) invoked by the appellee is
authorized to pass the resolutions Nos. 222 and 119 quoted above, is untenable, because said
paragraph of the section authorizes the Provincial Board "to permit, upon favorable
recommendation by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and subject to such
conditions as may properly protect the public interests, the construction and maintenance, for
private use, of railways, conduits, and telephone lines across public thoroughfares, streets, roads,
or other public property, and in the province: Provided, That such construction and private use
shall not prevent or obstruct the public use of such thoroughfare, streets, roads or other public
property, and that the permit granted shall at all times be subject to revocation by the Secretary
of the Interior, if, in the judgment of that official, the public interest requires it." Consequently,
Resolution No. 186 revoking the two previous resolutions was in order.
The road known as the Viga-Communal-Goob connecting two finished or completed parts of the
provincial road, from kilometer 12.38 to 15.88, as laid out by the personnel of the office of the
District Engineer was planned or intended to be laid out and constructed by the Provincial
Government of Oriental Mindoro to complete said road. The fact that the survey, lay-out and
actual construction of the unfinished part of the road were done at the appellee's expense, does
not convert said road after construction into a private road, for it does not appear that the parts of
the land where the road was laid out and constructed belong to or are owned by the appellee. The
evidence shows that the owners of such parts of land ceded their parts of the land owned by them
without any consideration because of their desire to have the road completed or to connect the
ends of two completed parts of the road. It may be conceded that the appellee built the road in
question in good faith; and such being the case, it may be argued that the appellee is entitled to
keep or have possession of the road until after it shall have been reimbursed of the expenses it
had incurred in constructing and maintaining the road in good condition. The provisions of the
Civil Code on the right of a builder in good faith on a private land [1] cannot be invoked and
applied to the road in quest on, because public interest is involved and the people living in that
part of the province are entitled to use the road. It is true that that part of the Resolution No. 186
above quoted converting the road in question into toll road contravenes section 2131 of the
Revised Administrative Code, because in the case of road the recommendation of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications and the authorization of the President of the Philippines
had to be secured and such recommendation and authorization had not been obtained.
Upon the foregoing considerations, this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the road
involved in this case cannot be declared private property, and for that reason the Provincial
Board of Oriental Mindoro may elect between paying the appellee the total cost of the
construction of the road and together with lawful interest from the date of actual disbursement by
the appellee to the date of payment by the Province of Oriental Mindoro within a reasonable
period not to exceed one year from the date this judgment shall become final; or upon securing
the recommendation of the Secretary of Pubic Works and Communications and authorization of
the President of the Philippines to designate such road and toll road, to raise the necessary fund
to reimburse the appellee of the total cost of construction of the read, together with lawful
interest from tho date of actual disbursement by the appellee to the date of payment by the
Province of Oriental Mindoro, and the latter is ordered to refund the amount paid for is by the
appellee during the enforcement of Resolution No. 186 which, as above stated, was
unauthorized. The judgment appealed from making final the preliminary writ of injunction and
ordering the appellants to pay the appellee the sum of P10,000 as attorney's fees, are reversed
and set aside. The rest of the judgment appealed from not inconsistent with this opinion is
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,
Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 7054, January 20, 1913 ]

MUNICIPALITY OF HINUNANGAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE

DIRECTOR OP LANDS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Land Registration, ordering the registration
of the title of the petitioner to the lands described in the petition.  The appeal is taken by the
Insular Government from the registration of the title of one of the parcels of land only.  It is
situated in the municipality of Hinunangan, Province of Leyte, and contains an  area of 10,328.8
square meters.  It is bounded on the northeast by the maritime zone; on the southeast by North
America Street; on the southwest by Manilili Street, and on the northwest by San Isidro Labrador
Street.  Upon this lot is built a stone fort which has stood there from time immemorial and was in
times past used as a defense against the invasion of the Moros.

Formerly, as now, the defense of the national territory against invasion by foreign enemies rested
upon the state and not upon the towns and villages and for this reason all of the defenses were
constructed by the National Government.  In volume 2, book 3, title 7, law 1 of the Laws of the
Indies appears the following:

"We command that all the ground roundabout the castles and fortresses be clear and unoccupied,
and if any building is erected within 306 paces of the wall or other building so strong that even at
a greater distance it would prejudice the defenses, it shall be torn  down, and the owner of the
same shall be paid from the Royal Treasury for the damages caused him."
Book 4, title 7, law 12, reads as follows:

"We order that, for the security and defense of the  cities as is now assured by the castles and
fortresses, no building shall be erected within 300 paces of the walls or stockades of the new
cities."
Article 339 of the Civil Code is as follows, in  part:
"ART. 339. The following are public property:

*    *      *        *      *      *      *       *

"2. That which belongs privately to the state, which is not for public use and which is destined
for the public good or to increase the national riches, such as walls, fortresses and other
constructions for the defense of the country, and the mines as long as no concession in regard to
them is made."
Article 341 of the Civil Code provides:

"ART. 341. Public property, when it ceases to be used for the public good or for the necessities
of the defense of the country, becomes a part of the property of the state."
From these provisions it seems clear that the fortress in question was erected for the national
defense and was a part of the property of the state destined and used for that purpose.  As a
necessary result, the land upon which it stands must also have been dedicated to that purpose.

The fact that said fortress may not have been used for many years for the purposes for which it
was originally built does not of necessity deprive the state of its ownership therein.  As we have
seen, the Civil Code provides that, when the fortress ceases to be used for the purpose for which
it was constructed, it becomes the property of the state in what may be called the private sense. 
That the municipality may have exercised within recent years acts of ownership over the land by
permitting it to be occupied and consenting to the erection of private houses thereon does not
determine necessarily that the land has become the property of the municipality.  We have held
in several cases that, where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public purposes,
such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the public market, of other necessary
municipal building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the
state in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may be invoked only
as to property which is used distinctly for  public purposes.  It cannot be applied against the state 
when occupied for any other purpose.

The evidence does not disclose that the municipality has used the land for purposes distinctly
public.

The judgment in relation to the parcel of land heretofore described is reversed and the petition as
to that parcel dismissed.  In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.  So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC V.S. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., GR No. 154953, 2008-06-26
Facts:
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion
of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre
All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the
initial hearing.
On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued... an Order [8] of General Default against the whole
world except as against petitioner.
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in
granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as...
required by law.
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision.
Issues:
The issues may be summarized as follows:
Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or
earlier; and
Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.
Ruling:
Respondent Failed to Prove... that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent
failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,[16] certified that
"lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31
December 1925." The... second certification [17] in the form of a memorandum to the trial court,
which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR
(FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land,...
Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient.
the CENRO issues certificates of land... classification status for areas below 50 hectares.
The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.
In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-
B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot
10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which,... as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is
beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot
10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.
Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.
The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the... blue print plan
states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet,
Evangelista only worked on the land for three years.
he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato,
which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community.
in this case, we find Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession... of the land in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land
of the public domain in this case.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658
and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6
in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for... registration filed by
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
Principles:
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State.[14] The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for... registration is alienable and disposable
rests with the applicant.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and... disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.
In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Republic v TAN Properties Inc
August 6, 2017Light

Case involves an application for original registration of Title by respondent of a lot in Sto.
Tomas, Batangas.

Facts:

1. The requirements of publication and notice being confirmed, the trial ensued on 11
November 1999. There was no oppositor other than the Republic.
2. The witnesses presented by the respondent were 1) Primitivo Evangelista and 2) Anthony
Dimayuga Torres, father of the vendor of the land (Porting) to respondent, who got the
land from his father, Prospero Dimayuga, who was in possession of the land (open,
continuous, adverse and peaceful) since 1942. This land was previously given to
Fortunato as a donation but was revoked. The trial court rendered in favor of the
respondent wherein:
“The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration
of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land
for 30 years or more.”
This ruling was affirmed by the CA in toto.
3. Petitioner now appeals citing three issues:

Issues:

1. Whether or not the land is already alienable and disposable

2. Whether or not respondent is qualified to acquire the property in view of the
constitutional prohibition under Art. XII Sec 3 of the 1987 Constitution

Held:

1. No. The certifications from DENR are not sufficient there being no authority from the
part of CENRO to classify the land (1st certification) and the certification issued by the
RTD (2nd certification).
  The given evidences of conversion were 2 certifications from the DENR by the
CENRO, which under its Project 30 (Land classification), the land falls within the
Alienable and Disposable Zone. However, under DAO No. 20, only the PENRO can
classify lands greater than 50 ha. Hence, there was no authority to classify the land
which is evidently greater than 50 ha.
 There was also no probative value for the certificate issued by the RTD as it is
outside his function
 Both also are without a certification from the Secretary of DENR which is
required.
2. No. There is an absolute prohibition by the Constitution under Art. XII Sec 3. The only
disposition that can be made to private corporations was through a lease not exceeding 25
years, renewable by 25 years.
 The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional intent is removed.
 The exception in Acme cannot be availed here as the land therein was already
private property when it was acquired. In the case at bar, the land not being alienable
and disposable without ownership for more than 30 years, is not yet private property
when purchase from Porting.