Salvador vs.

Mapa (2007)

G.R. No. 135080 | 2007-11-28

Subject:

Reckoning Point for Prescription of Offense; Ex post facto law defined; Orders issued not ex post facto
laws (only for penal laws)

Facts:

A loan transaction between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI)
and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) were referred to the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact
Finding- Committee for investigation as being a behest loan. The Committee was created under
Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61 was issued to define the criteria
in determining behest loans. After examination of the loan transactions, the Committee determined that
they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61 because the
stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was
under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted, Atty. Orlando L.
Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of
Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
respondents Placido I. Mapa, Jr., Rafael A. Sison; Rolando M. Zosa; Cesar C. Zalamea; Benjamin Barot,
Casimiro Tanedo, J.V. de Ocampo, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr., Francis B. Banes, Ernesto M. Caringal,
Romeo V. Jacinto, Manuel D. Tanglao and Alicia Ll. Reyes. After considering the Committee's allegation,
the Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution, dismissing the complaint. The Ombudsman
conceded that there was ground to proceed with the conduct of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless,
it dismissed the complaint holding that the offenses charged had already prescribed and that
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws. According to it, the
said orders violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a
person for an act done prior to their issuance and which was innocent when done. The Committee filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the Ombudsman. Because of this, a petition
for Review on Certiorari was filed by Committee nullify the Ombudsman’s resolution dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription and on the contention that the orders issued are ex post facto
laws.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED AT
THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED ITS COMPLAINT.
Held:

The offense charged under R.A. 3019 has not prescribed. In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019
committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, it
was ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the
time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of
discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee
on Behest Loans. Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the
offenses, and since discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the
Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not yet
prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one

(a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done
criminal, and punishes such action; or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed; or

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required
at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant

The Court added two (2) more to the list, namely:

(e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or

(f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

Orders issued are not ex post facto laws (only for penal laws). The constitutional doctrine that outlaws
an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of
the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that
define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and
memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No.
13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its
composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not
being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized
as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject
administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto law.