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Arellano University School of Law

Center for Legal Education and Research





1. What is the Operative Fact Doctrine?

The doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased or
disregarded. It nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It is an exception to the
rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. (Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

2. How did the Disbursement Acceleration Program violate the principle of separation of powers?

The principle of separation of powers was violated, as follows:

a. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of
the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end
of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the
General Appropriations Act;
b. The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive; and
c. The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act. (Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

3. How did the Pork Barrel System violate the principles of (a) separation of powers; and (b) non-
delegability of legislative power?

a. The principle of separation of powers was violated by giving legislators post-enactment authority
to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations and in fund release and realignment. These post-enactment measures are not related
to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
b. The principle of non-delegability was violated since legislators were effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged with the Congress. (Belgica vs.
Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe)

Note: The petition assailing the constitutionality of the 2014 GAA’s Lump-Sum Discretionary Funds
was dismissed. The Court ruled that the appropriations in the 2014 GAA are valid items with
discernible singular appropriation purpose in compliance with the rule on singular correspondence.

4. The Municipality of Donada (the “Municipality”) donated parcels of land to the Department of
Health (DOH), which, however, erroneously included portions of Bautista’s property. When
Bautista discovered this, he filed a complaint against the DOH. The DOH moved to dismiss the
case, invoking immunity from suit. Is DOH correct?

No. State immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The State's
power of eminent domain shall be exercised through expropriation proceedings in court. When private
property is taken for public use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to
initiate expropriation proceedings, and the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State
immunity, and submission to the jurisdiction of the court. (DOTC vs. Spouses Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, January
29, 2016)


5. What is the period of imprisonment under the Senate’s power of contempt during inquiries in
aid of legislation?

The period of imprisonment under the Senate’s inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of
legislation only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is
invoked. Senate’s Legislative inquiry terminates on: (a) upon the approval or disapproval of the
Committee Report; and (b) upon the expiration of one (1) Congress. (Balag vs. Senate of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

6. What are the parameters in determining who may participate in the Party-List elections?

a. Three (3) groups may participate in the Party-List system, namely: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations;
b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized or under-represented” sector;
c. Political Parties can participate in Party-List elections provided they register under the Party-List
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections;
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and under-represented” or “lacking
well-defined political constituencies;”
e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
under-represented” must belong to the “marginalized and under-represented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-
defined constituencies”, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record
of advocacy of their respective sectors; and
f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided they have at least one (1) nominee who remains qualified.
(Atong-Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)

7. The COMELEC cancelled Abang Lingkod’s registration in the party-list system due to material
misrepresentation for allegedly submitting digitally altered photographs of activities to make it
appear that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Was
the cancellation proper?

No. Sectoral parties or organizations, such as Abang Lingkod, are no longer required to adduce
evidence showing their track record. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. Hence, Abang Lingkod did not commit material misrepresentation
to warrant its cancellation. Misrepresentation to be considered material should refer to the qualification
for elective office and affect the candidate’s eligibility. (Abang Lingkod Partylist vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952,
October 22, 2013)

8. Congressman Vic caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the President, wherein
he accused Secretary Alexine of colluding with communists and of planning a coup d’état to
replace the President. A complaint for Damages was filed against Congressman Vic alleging
that his statements are libelous. Congressman Vic invokes the privileged speech. Is his
contention correct?

No. The publication of said letter is not covered by the “speech or debate” referred to in the
Constitution. Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in
session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question (Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L - 15905, August 3, 1966)

9. What are the requisites for a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Sec. 25(5), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution?

a. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
b. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations of their respective
offices; and
c. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the General Appropriations Law for their
respective offices. (Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No.,209287, July 1, 2014)


10. What are the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis of declaration of
Martial Law or Suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus?

a. Actual rebellion or invasion; and

b. Public safety requires it; and
c. There is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

Note: “Sufficiency of Factual Basis” should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the
President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Accuracy is not the same as sufficiency as the former requires a higher degree of standard. (Lagman vs.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017)

11. What is the effect of the initiation of an impeachment complaint as regards the filing of
another impeachment complaint against the same official?

Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period. (Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)

12. President Nadine issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period
not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute
Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Before the expiration of the period, the President
requested the Congress to extend Proclamation No. 216. The Congress approved the
extension until December 31, 2017. Thereafter, the President asked to further extend the
proclamation for one year. The Congress approved again the further extension of the
proclamation. Kath, a concerned citizen, questioned the validity of the extension contending
that: (a) the Constitution allows only a one-time extension of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, not a series of extensions amounting to perpetuity;
and (b) assuming the extension was valid, the extension should only be for sixty (60) days.

a. Does the Constitution only allow a one-time extension of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

No. Whenever there is a determination that the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety
requires the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Congress
may exercise its authority to grant such extension as may be requested by the President, even if
it be subsequent to the initial extension.

b. Should the extension be limited to sixty (60) days?

No. the Constitution did not fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension. It
gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the
extension shall be "for a period to be determined by the Congress." As regards the frequency
and duration of the extension, the determinative factor is as long as "the invasion or rebellion
persists and public safety requires" such extension. (Lagman vs. Pimentel, G.R. No. 235935, February 6,

13. What are the effects of a proclamation Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus?

a. It does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.

b. It does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies.
c. It does not authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function.

14. Distinguish disapproved ad interim appointment from by-passed appointment.


Ad interim appointments are appointments made by the By-passed appointment is one,
President while Congress is not in session or doing recess. An which receives neither
ad interim appointment is permanent in nature and takes effect approval nor rejection from the
immediately. Thus, one who was issued an ad interim Commission. (Matibag vs.
appointment may immediately enter upon the discharge of his Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2,
functions. An ad interim appointment ceases to be valid upon
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or, if not
confirmed, until the next adjournment of Congress.

15. Enumerate the groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President. Which
group requires the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments?

a. The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in the Constitution;
b. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
c. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
d. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
(Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Note: Only presidential appointments belonging to the first group requires the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. (Manalo vs. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999)

16. Differentiate the Judicial Review from the Congressional Power to Revoke of the President’s
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.


The Court may strike down the presidential Congress may revoke the proclamation or
proclamation in an appropriate proceeding suspension, which revocation shall not be set
filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of aside by the President.
sufficient factual basis.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis Congress may take into consideration not only
of the proclamation or suspension, the Court data available prior to, but likewise events
considers only the information and data supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court
available to the President prior to or at the time which does not look into the absolute correctness
of the declaration; it is not allowed to of the factual basis as will be discussed below,
"undertake an independent investigation Congress could probe deeper and further; it can
beyond the pleadings. delve into the accuracy of the facts presented
before it.
Court's review power is passive; it is only Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the
initiated by the filing of a petition "in an sense that it may be activated by Congress itself
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. at any time after the proclamation or suspension
was made.
(Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017)

17. Does the Office of the President have jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power
over a Deputy Ombudsman?

No. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter
egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority,
cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The law
directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an
Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. (Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, G. R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014)

18. Will your answer be the same if it is the Special Prosecutor who is subjected to the
disciplinary authority of the President?

No. The Office of the President has administrative disciplinary power over the Special Prosecutor.
Sec. 21 of the Ombudsman Act grants the President the power to remove a Special Prosecutor for
any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman. (Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, G.
R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014)

19. Is the President’s decision, to allow the burial of President Marcos’ remains in the Libingan
Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB), a justiciable controversy?

No. It is political question, in the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and Administrative
Code of 1987. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, the President’s
decision on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review. (Ocampo vs. Enriquez, G.R. No.
225973, November 8, 2016)

20. What are the two (2) kinds of executive privilege?


Communications, documents or other materials Advisory opinions, recommendations and
that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations comprising part of a process by
deliberations and that the President believes which governmental decisions and policies are
should remain confidential. formulated.
Applies to decision-making of the President Applies to decision-making of executive officials
Constitutional principle of separation of power Common Law Privilege.
and the President's unique constitutional role.
Applies to documents in their entirety, and Only applies to the deliberative phase of the
covers final and post-decisional materials as documents
well as pre-deliberative ones
Congressional or judicial negation of Subject to lesser scrutiny. (Neri vs. Senate
the presidential communications privilege is Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
always subject to greater scrutiny.

21. What are the three elements of presidential communications privilege?

a. The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential


b. The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational
proximity" with the President; and
c. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important
evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority. (Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)


22. What are political questions?

Questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. They are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. (Ocampo vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016)

23. May the Judicial and Bar Council cluster its nominees for vacancies in the Judiciary?

No. The clustering impinged upon the President's appointing power because his option for every
vacancy was limited in each cluster, and once he had appointed a nominee from one cluster, he was
proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for other vacancies. The power
to recommend of the Judicial and Bar Council cannot be used to restrict or limit the President’s
power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to choose someone whom he considers worth appointing
to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. (Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017)

24. Is Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act, which restricts the review of decisions of the
Ombudsman strictly through appeal by certiorari through Supreme Court, valid?

No. The Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure. The provision takes away the remedy
of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally
vested in courts. Moreover, it also increased this Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its
consent (Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

25. What is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)?

A legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person,
institution or the government has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws,
protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights shall be treated as a SLAPP. (Rule
6, Section 1, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)

26. Can Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan challenge the validity of an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC)?

Yes. A Writ of Kalikasan may be availed of to challenge defects in the ECC provided that: (a) the
defects are causally linked or reasonably connected to an environmental damage of the nature and
magnitude contemplated under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan; and (b the case does not violate, or
falls under an exception to, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and/or primary
jurisdiction. (Paje vs. Casiño, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015)

27. Can the court award damages to petitioners in a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of

No, the grant of damages to petitioners is expressly prohibited in a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan. (Rule 7, Sec. 15 (e), Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)


28. Does the Department of Justice have the power to issue Hold Departure Orders (HDO)?

No. The power to issue HDO is inherent to the courts. The DOJ does not have the inherent power to
issue HDO, watchlist orders, or allow departure orders, unlike the courts, or to restrict the right to
travel in anyway. It is limited to the powers expressly granted to it by law and may not extend the
same on its own accord or by any skewed interpretation of its authority. (Genuino vs. De Lima, G.R. No.
197930, April 17, 2018)

29. What are the conditions that must be satisfied in the inspection of passengers and their
effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit?

a. The manner of search must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or

persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule;
b. Neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable
identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected;
c. Purpose must be confined to ensuring public safety; and
d. Courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence
was planted against the accused. (Saluday vs. People, GR No. 215305, April 3, 2018)

30. Frankie was arrested by Bantay Bayan operatives of Pasay City, which resulted to the seizure
illegal drugs. Frankie moved to suppress the seize items, arguing that the search made
against him was illegal, rendering the evidence inadmissible. The prosecution contends that
Bantay Bayan operatives are not state agents, hence, the constitutional proscription against
unreasonable search and seizure would not apply. Is the prosecution correct?

No. The proscription under the Bill of Rights is applicable to individuals who act under the color of a
state-related function. The acts of Bantay Bayan operatives or any barangay-based or other
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and
order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function. (Miguel vs. People, G.R. No.
227038, July 31, 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe)

31. What is the Lemon Test?

It is a test to determine whether an act of the government violates the non-establishment clause, with
the following requisites: (a) have a legislative secular purpose; (b) does not primarily inhibit or
advance a religion; and (c) there is no excessive entanglement between state and religion. (Diocese of
Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

32. Can the government regulate electoral campaigns by private citizens without violating their
right to speech?

Yes. Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of
persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not
candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates
to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably
the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the
time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be
prohibited or censored onthe basis of its content. (Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January
21, 2015)

33. Does Reproductive Health Law violate the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling
medical health practitioners, under the pain of penalty, to refer patients to institutions despite
their conscientious objections?

Yes. Said law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem RH products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. (Imbong v Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

34. Distinguish the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine from the Overbreadth Doctrine.


A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness Decrees that a governmental purpose to
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of control or prevent activities
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its constitutionally subject to state
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant regulations may not be achieved by
to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due means which sweep unnecessarily
process for failure to accord persons, especially the broadly and thereby invade the area of
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; protected freedoms.
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.
(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)

35. Can a law also be facially challenged for violation of religious freedom?

Yes. The Court usually applies facial challenges to free speech cases. However, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

36. Can the COMELEC deny the application for registration filed by an organization composed of
men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgender
individuals (LGBTs), based on moral grounds, saying that it is in violation of the principles
laid down in the Bible and the Koran?

No. The non-establishment clause calls for government neutrality in religious matters. Governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

37. What is Benevolent Neutrality Approach?

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at
the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

38. Is the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice constitute

No. The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of
establishment, but merely accommodation, for the following reasons: (a) There is no law, ordinance
or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating that judiciary employees
attend the Catholic masses at the basement; (b) when judiciary employees attend the masses to
profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition,
without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers; (c) no government funds are being
spent; (d) Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it
been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful; and (e) the allowance of the
masses has not prejudiced other religions. (In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the
Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19 SC, March 7, 2017)

39. What are the three (3) levels of test to determine reasonableness of classification?


A classification either: (a) A classification does not involve Applies to all other
interferes with the exercise of suspect classes or fundamental subjects not covered by
fundamental rights, including the rights, but requires heightened the first two tests.
basic liberties guaranteed under scrutiny, such as in
the Constitution, or (b) burdens classifications based on gender
suspect classes. and legitimacy.
The burden is upon the The government must show The challenged
government to prove that the that the challenged classification needs only
classification is necessary to classification serves an be shown to be rationally
achieve a compelling state important state interest and that related to serving a
interest and that it is the least the classification is, at least, legitimate state interest.
restrictive means to protect such substantially related to serving
interest. that interest.

40. Distinguish Content-Based Regulations from Content-Neutral Regulations.


Refers to restrictions "based on the subject Concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one
matter of the utterance or speech." that merely controls the time, place, and manner.
Clear and Present Danger and Strict Intermediate Scrutiny Test or Substantial interest
Scrutiny test test. (Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015)

41. The City of Manila enacted an Ordinance entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from
10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and
Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other
Purposes.” The Ordinance provided exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, to wit: (a)
minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those
running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for

emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d)
those working at night. Some concerned citizens assail the constitutionality of the said
ordinance on the ground that it violates the minors’ right to travel.

a) What is the test to be used to examine the constitutionality of the subject ordinance?

The State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they
are singled out on reasonable grounds. The strict scrutiny test shall be applied considering that the
right to travel is a fundamental right. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class
is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification
(i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.

b) Does the subject ordinance violate the minors’ right to travel?

Yes. The ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinance is to keep unsupervised minors during the late
hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to
potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even
include themselves. However, the restrictions under the ordinance are not narrowly drawn. The
Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew. The Manila Ordinance do
not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others. The exceptions under the
Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. (SPARK vs. Quezon
City G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)

42. When should be the date of “taking” for purposes of determining the just compensation?

As a general rule, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of taking or the
filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. As an exception to the rule, for the purpose of
determining just compensation in the case of Hacienda Luisita vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, the date of “taking” when the Farmerworker beneficiaries were considered to own and
possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. It should be noted that it is because the stock
distribution option is a distinctive mechanism under R.A. No. 6657 that it cannot be treated similarly
with that of compulsory land acquisition as these are two different modalities under the agrarian
reform program. (Hacienda Luisita vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011)

43. What is inverse condemnation or inverted expropriation?

It is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has
been taken in fact by the government, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been attempted by the taking agency. While the typical taking occurs when the
government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire
doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without
such formal proceedings. The phrase inverse condemnation, as a common understanding of that
phrase would suggest, simply describes an action that is the inverse or reverse of a condemnation
proceeding. (NPC v Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011)


44. Discuss the Rules on Derivative Citizenship as to the alien wife.

C.A. No. 473: Judicial R.A. No. 3139: Administrative R.A. No. 9225: Citizenship
Naturalization Naturalization Retention and Re-acquisition Act
An alien wife who is The applicant's alien lawful wife No effect on the citizenship of the
legally married to a and minor children may petition alien wife.
naturalized husband the cancellation of their alien
and does not suffer certificates of registration. However, an unmarried child,
from any of the whether legitimate, illegitimate or
disqualifications may Note: If the applicant is a adopted, below 18 years of age, of
herself be declared a married woman, the approval of those who reacquire Philippine
citizen, administratively. her petition will only benefit her citizenship shall be deemed citizens
minor children, who may of the Philippines.
petition for the cancellation of
their alien certificates of
(Moya Lim Yao vs. Commission of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971)

45. How did the Supreme Court treat foundlings?

The Supreme Court pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural born-citizens as based on
the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as
to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural
born citizens. Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the
country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the principle that a foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Art. 2 of the 1961 United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697,
March 8, 2016)


46. What is the Aguinaldo Doctrine (Condonation Doctrine), and why was it abandoned?

The re-election of a local government official bars the continuation of the administrative case
against him; inasmuch as the re-election of the official is tantamount to condonation by the people
of whatever misdeed he may have committed. It was abandoned because election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in
our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of
any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. (Carpio-Morales vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

47. Does the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to the Judiciary?

No. The prohibition on midnight appointment does not apply to the Judiciary, and only applies to the
Executive Branch. (Castro vs. Judicial Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010)

48. In what instances may promotional appointment (Commissioner to Chairman) be valid?

A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible
for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the
aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of
the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the
position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. (Funa
vs. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012)

49. Distinguish Quo Warranto from Impeachment as a remedy to remove an impeachable



Judicial in nature. Political in nature.
Cause of action lies on usurping, intruding or Cause of action is the commission of
unlawfully holding/ exercising a public office. impeachable offense.
Respondent is ordered to cease holding a Conviction shall result to removal of the
public position, which he/she is ineligible to respondent from the public office that he/she is
hold. legally holding.
Commenced by a verified petition brought in It must be initiated by filing of the Articles of
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Impeachment before the senate.
(Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)


50. A law was passed mandating the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voters. Does is violate the exercise of the right of suffrage by
adding a new qualification in the exercise of said right?

No. Biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere
aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
(Kabataan Party-List vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe)

51. Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office
for purposes of the three-term limit rule?

No. Preventive suspension does not interrupt the elective official’s term. Although he/she will be
barred from exercising the functions of the position during the period of suspension, his/her
continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected. (Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009)

52. Discuss the Jurisdiction over election contests.


President and Vice Supreme Court, as Presidential Not Appealable.
President. Electoral Tribunal.
Senator. Senate Electoral Tribunal. Supreme Court, via Petition for Review on
Representative. House of Representative Certiorari (under Rule 65): Within thirty (30)
Electoral Tribunal. days from receipt of a copy of the decision.
Regional, Provincial, or Commission on Elections. Supreme Court, via Petition for Review on
City Officials. Certiorari (under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court), within thirty (30)
days from receipt of a copy of the decision.
Municipal Officials. Regional Trial Court Commission on Elections, whose decision
Barangay Officials. Municipal (or Metropolitan) Trial shall be final, executory, and not
Court. appealable, within five (5) days from
promulgation or receipt of a copy of the

53. May the picture images of the ballots be considered as the "official ballots" or the equivalent
of the original paper ballots which the voters filled out?

Yes. Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official ballot" where Automated Election System
(AES) is utilized as the paper ballot, whether printed or generated by the technology applied, that
faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic
form." The picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise
"official ballots" that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. (Vinzons-Chato vs. HRET, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013)

54. May the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal nullify election results on the ground of

Yes. The annulment of election results is but a power concomitant to the HRET’s constitutional
mandate to determine the validity of the contestee's title. The HRET, as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral
irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is merely exercising its
constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes
cast. (Abayon vs. HRET, G.R. No. 222236, May 3, 2016)

55. Distinguish the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals from the declaration of failure
of elections by the COMELEC.


An incident of the judicial function of In the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative
electoral tribunals. function.
Only annul the election results Relates to the entire election in the concerned precinct
connected with the election contest or political unit.
before it.
To determine who among the The objective is the holding or continuing the elections,
candidates garnered a majority of the which were not held or were suspended, or if there was
legal votes cast.(Abayon vs. HRET, G.R. No. one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC
222236, May 3, 2016) declares a failure of elections, special elections will
have to be conducted.

56. Will the conversion of a municipality into a city result in an interruption of the three-term
limit rule that will allow the incumbent municipal mayor to run as a city mayor in the next
succeeding election?

No. Although the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality, this does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. The territorial jurisdiction of the new
city is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the
same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected their
municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. (Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003)

57. Isko Morena ran for the mayoralty post in Manila and won in three consecutive elections.
While serving his third term, his opponent filed an election protest. Months before the
expiration of Mayor Isko’s third term, he was ousted from office. He ran again for the same

post in the immediately succeeding election. Is he still eligible to run for office?

Yes. He is not barred by the three-term limit rule, and is allowed to run as mayor in the immediately
succeeding election. He could not be considered as having served a full third term. An interruption
for any length of time, if due to an involuntary cause, is enough to break the elected official’s
continuity of service. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999)

58. Mayor Gretchen died and was succeeded in office by Vice Mayor Claudine. In the two
immediately succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty post. She ran
for the same position for the third time. Is she still qualified to run for office?

Yes. When she assumed the position of mayor by virtue of succession, her service should not be
treated as one full term. For the disqualification to apply, the candidate should have been thrice
elected for and had served the same post consecutively. (Borja vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3,

59. Hiyas and Puerto were added to the five of the ten towns, which used to comprise
Camarines Sur’s old First District, to form the new Second District. The elected provincial
board member in the First District filed his candidacy for the same position in the Second
District. Thereafter, his disqualification was sought for on the ground of the alleged violation
of the three-term limit rule. Decide.

The elected provincial board member is not disqualified to run for the same position in the Second
District on the ground that the addition of Hiyas and Puerto distinctively created a new district, with
an altered territory and constituency. (Naval vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014)


60. The following is the composition of SANA OIL Company, a public utility company:

Outstanding Stock Kind of Stock Number of shares

owned by Filipinos
100 Common Shares 60
100 Class A Preferred Shares 60
(with right to elect directors)
100 Class B Preferred Shares 50
(without right to elect directors)

Is the company compliant with the 60-40 requirement under the Constitution?

No. To determine if a corporation is a “Philippine National,” the Voting Control Test and the
Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied.

Under the Voting Control Test, there should be at least 60% voting shares owned by Filipinos.
There should at least be a total of 120 of common shares and Class A preferred shares owned
and controlled by Filipinos for it to be compliant with the 60% of the voting shares requirement.

Under the Beneficial Ownership Test, at least 60% of all the outstanding capital stock should be
owned by Filipinos. There should be at least a total of 180 shares of all the outstanding capital
stock owned and controlled by Filipinos. (Roy III vs. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)


61. To reduce the poverty in the country, the Department of Social Welfare and Development
launched the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (“4Ps”) wherein the government
provides cash grant to extreme poor households. The DSWD takes on the role of lead
implementing agency that oversees and coordinates the implementation, monitoring and
evaluation of the program. The program was allotted 21 million pesos in the General
Appropriations Act. Senator Isko opposed the said program alleging that giving full control
to the DSWD in the implementation of the 4Ps violates the principle of local autonomy as it
encroached on the power of the Local Government Units (LGUs) to deliver basic services to
their constituents. Is Senator Isko correct?

No. Although LGUs were vested the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services
and facilities, there was express reservation of power by the national government, that is, unless an
LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction
of the LGU. The funding for the 4Ps came from Congress, therefore, the national government is not

precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of the said program.
(Pimentel vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012, J. Perlas-Bernabe)


62. Discuss the following concepts in Public International Law.

a. Obligations Erga Omnes – those obligations which, by virtue of their nature and importance, are
the concern of all States and for whose protection all States have a legal interest. In International
Law, the concept refers to specifically determined obligations that states have towards the
international community as a whole. (Belgium vs. Spain, 1970 I.C.J. 3, February 5, 1970)

b. Jus Cogens – norms accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. It means “compelling law”
and is also called peremptory norm. Its elements are the following: (i) It is a peremptory norm of
general international law; (ii) it is accepted and recognized by the international community; (iii) there
can be no derogation therefrom; and (iv) it can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character. (Ocampo vs. Abando, GR. No. 176830, February 11, 2014).

c. Ex Aequo et Bono – basis for decision by an international tribunal on the grounds of justice and
fairness. It is an alternate means of decision-making in place of the normally employed legal rules
of treaties and custom (Art. 38, Statute of International Court of Justice). It is a Latin term which means
“what is just and fair or according to equity and good conscience.” (Bernas, International Law, 2009)

d. Opinio Juris – the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
e. Pacta Sunt Servanda – every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith. (Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)

f. Rebus Sic Stantibus – a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard
to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the
parties. (Art. 62, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)

g. Par in Parem non Habet Imperium – even the strongest State cannot assume jurisdiction over
another State, no matter how weak, or question the validity of its acts in so far as they are made to
take effect within its own territory. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)

h. Restitutio in Integrum – a Latin phrase meaning "returning everything to the state as it was
before". This principle is commonly followed by courts while awarding damages in common law
negligence cases. The amount of damages awarded should be sufficient bring the plaintiff back to
the position as if no tort has been committed. (Germany vs. Poland, P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 9 [1927])

i. Alternat – if and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is
opened for signature. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is,
each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his
own state. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the
purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final
consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. (Pimentel vs Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005)

j. Retorsion – an “unfriendly” conduct which is not inconsistent with any international obligation of
the State engaging in it even though it may be a response to an internationally wrongful act. Acts of
retorsion may include the prohibition of or limitations upon normal diplomatic relations or other
contacts, embargoes of various kinds or withdrawal of voluntary aid programs. (United Nations Draft
articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001)

63. Differentiate Direct and Indirect State Responsibility.

Original responsibility or direct responsibility is The State’s “indirect” or “vicarious” responsibility
borne by a State for its own – that is, for its however consists in nothing else but the State’s
Government’s – actions, and as such actions obligation to repair the moral and material damage
of the lower agents or private individuals as caused by internationally illegal actions which for
are performed at the Government’s command some reason or another, are not considered to be
or its authorization. (Oppenheim, International Law, acts of the State; and in some case, to prevent
5th Edition) such actions and punish the delinquents.

64. What is the Rule of Specialty under International Law?

Under the rule of specialty in international law, a Requested State shall surrender to a Requesting
State a person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of extradition.
(Government of HongKong Administrative Region vs. Munoz, G.R. No. 207342, November 7, 2017)

65. What are elements of the Precautionary Principle?

a. Uncertainty;
b. Serious environmental or health damage; and
c. The damage is irreversible. (Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)

66. What are the elements which should constitute command responsibility?

a. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. The superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed;
c. The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts
or punish the perpetrators thereof. (Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)

67. Is the doctrine of command responsibility applicable to amparo proceedings?

Yes. Command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict." Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order
to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever
processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute
criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to
protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable
superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject
to further investigation by the appropriate government agency. (Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
191805, November 15, 2011)

68. Distinguish a treaty from an executive agreement.


Executive agreements must remain traceable to Treaties are, by their very nature, considered
an express or implied authorization under the superior to executive agreements. Treaties
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of are products of the acts of the Executive and
these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of the Senate unlike executive agreements,
executive agreements under serious question for which are solely executive actions. Because
the main function of the Executive is to enforce the of legislative participation through the
Constitution and the laws enacted by the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the
Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the same level as a statute. If there is an
performance of these rules. In turn, executive irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty
agreements cannot create new international takes precedence over one that is prior. An
obligations that are not expressly allowed or executive agreement is treated differently.
reasonably implied in the law they purport to
Executive agreements that are inconsistent with
either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective
Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the
In international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an
executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations
(Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 212426 and 212444, January 12, 2016)

69. What are the guidelines enunciated in Saguisag vs. Ochoa in entering into international

a. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent requirements that must be fulfilled
by the international agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the Philippines: (a) the agreement must be in the form of a treaty, and (b) it must be duly
concurred in by the Senate.
b. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then the President may choose the form of
the agreement, provided that the agreement dealing with foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities is not the principal agreement that first allows their entry or presence in the Philippines.

c. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and standards set by
the law and/or treaty that the former purports to implement; and must not unduly expand the
international obligation expressly mentioned or necessarily implied in the law or treaty.
d. The executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws
and treaties. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 212426 and 212444, January 12, 2016)

70. What is the associative concept in International Law? Does the Constitution recognize the
concept of association?

An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In
the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle
ground between integration and independence.

No. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that
go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide
for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. (Province
of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008)

71. Define and explain the Archipelagic Doctrine.

An archipelago, which consists of a number of islands separated by bodies of water, should be

treated as one integral unit, and the waters inside the baselines are considered internal waters. It
has two components: (a) straight baseline method; and (b) internal water principle.

It is embodied in the second paragraph of Art. I of the 1987 Constitution which states that: The
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines (Art. I, 1987 Constitution)

72. What are the Maritime Zones under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas


Waters on the Every State has the The exclusive In a zone contiguous to its
landward side of right to establish the economic zone is an territorial sea, the coastal
the baseline of the breadth of its area beyond and State may exercise the
territorial sea form territorial sea up to a adjacent to the control necessary to:
part of the internal limit not exceeding 12 territorial sea,
waters of the nautical miles, subject to the (a) prevent infringement of
State. (Article 8, No. measured from specific legal regime its customs, fiscal,
1 UNCLOS) baselines determined established in this immigration or sanitary laws
in accordance with Part, under which and regulations within its
this Convention. the rights and territory or territorial sea;
(Article 3, UNCLOS) jurisdiction of the
coastal State and (b) punish infringement of
the rights and the above laws and
freedoms of other regulations committed
States are governed within its territory or
by the relevant territorial sea. (Article 33 no. 1
provisions of this UNCLOS)
Convention. (Article
Sovereignty over Exclusive right to Jurisdiction to prevent
Territorial Waters. explore, exploits, infringement of customs,
conserve, and fiscal, immigration, or
manage the natural sanitary laws
All Inland waters, 12 nautical miles from 200 nautical miles The contiguous zone may
between and the baseline. (Article 3, from the baseline. not extend beyond 24
connecting UNCLOS) (Article 57, UNCLOS) nautical miles from the
Islands. baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea
is measured. (Art. 33, No. 2

73. What is the Principle of Distinction, relevant to the International Humanitarian Law?

The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks
may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians. (Rule 1
and 7, Customary IHL)

74. How may a State withdraw from the ICC? When will the withdrawal take effect?

A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the
notification, unless the notification specifies a later date. (Art. 127 of Rome Statute of the International Criminal

75. Distinguish Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data and Kalikasan


Availability It is a writ directed to a person The writ of amparo is a remedy It is a remedy available to any It is a special remedy available
detaining another, commanding available to one whose right to person whose right to privacy in to a natural or juridical person,
him to produce the body of the life, liberty, and security are life, liberty, and security is entity authorized by law,
prisoner at a designated time violated or threatened with violated or threatened by an people’s organization, non-
and place, with the day and violation by an unlawful act or unlawful act or omission of a governmental organization, or
cause of his caption and omission of a public official or public official or employee, or of any public interest group
detention, to do, submit to, and employee, or of a private a private individual or entity accredited by or registered with
receive whatever the court or individual or entity. The writ engaged in the gathering, any government agency, on
judge awarding the writ shall covers extralegal killings and collecting or storing of data or behalf of persons whose
consider in that behalf. enforced disappearance or information regarding the constitutional right to a balanced
threats thereof. person, family, home and and healthful ecology is violated,
correspondence of the or threatened with violation by
aggrieved party. an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or
private individual or entity,
involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as
to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two
or more cities or provinces.
Available Against (1) Deprivation of liberty; and A violation or threatened A violation or threatened A violation or threatened
(2) Withholding the rightful violation by an unlawful act or violation of the right to privacy in violation of the right to a
custody of any person omission by: life, liberty, or security by an balanced and healthful ecology
(1) A public official; unlawful acts or omission by: by an unlawful act or omission
(2) A public employee and (1) A public official; of:
(3) (3) A private individual or (2) A public employee; (1) A public official;
entity (3) A private individual or entity (2) A public employee and
engaged in the gathering, (3) A private individual or entity
collecting, or storing of data
or information regarding the
person, family, home and
correspondence of
aggrieved party