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Hearts

AND
Minds

How to Win Hearts and Minds:


The Theory Behind the Program

Intrinsic Motivation
A review of the academic literature on motivation, with an emphasis on intrinsic motivation (Hudson et al, 1998) summarised
the main psychological theories that can be fit in a number of broad categories:
• need theories
• learning theory and operant theory
• social-cognitive theories
• attribution theory
• cognitive evaluation theory
• current thinking on the role of rewards and incentives, often felt to be motivating

The main conclusions were that the scientific literature is extensive and often contradictory. Many of the experiments used to
measure intrinsic motivation are trivial and have no long-term component. Nevertheless there is a number of consistent
conclusions that could be drawn
• Highly motivated people feel in control or feel powerful, competent and high on self-efficacy. These people are intrinsically
motivated to do their job. The downside is that these feelings may be biased ('unrealistic optimism'; 'illusion of control').
• Less motivated people don't feel in control or feel powerless, less competent and low on self-efficacy. These people show
less initiative. These feelings may be biased too ('learned helplessness').
• Extrinsic rewards can move the locus of control from internal to external, praise and reward for quality of performance may
increase the internal locus of control.
• Under certain circumstances rewards and incentives may change behaviour, but it is also true that intrinsic motivation may
be hampered. Simple application of rewards may be attached to the wrong behaviours.
• Although behaviour may be changed, underlying beliefs may remain unchanged. This suggests that reversion to old
behaviour patterns is very likely.
• Belief is a crucial factor in determining how and why people will behave. Values may be acceptable but expectations will
be driven by beliefs.

What is clear from this is that people need to feel that


• they have a sufficient degree of control over their environment and actions
• their beliefs have to be consistent with their values
and
• inappropriate rewards may actually turn out to be counter-productive in the creation of an intrinsically motivated individual.

Readiness for Change HSE Culture


Steps Actions Issues to be resolved before How is this issue to be tackled? The concept of intrinsic motivation is a complex one, known GENERATIVE (High Reliability Orgs)
Action proceeding - Method
- Action Party to be hard to develop head on, so the program concentrated HSE is how we do business
Do it - When
upon the development of a cultural maturity model based round here
1 Consciousness raising Are all involved fully conscious of the
upon an original model of Westrum (1992). This model

ed
existence of the problems?
described three stages in development of an organisation's

rm
Preparation 2 Creation of need in Do they have a clear personal need to PROACTIVE
culture, based upon Westrum's observations in the auto

fo
individuals achieve a new state, the goal? Safety leadership and values
Making plans

In
3 Making the outcome Do they all believe the goal is realistic
industry in Michigan and the aviation industry's response to drive continuous improvement
AWARENESS

y
ly
believable to all and credible in their work?

lit
concerned accidents. This original model had three stages: The

ng

bi
Awareness Maintenance Pathological, the Bureaucratic and the Generative. There

ta
si
4 Making the outcome Is the desired goal believed to be
CALCULATIVE

ea

un
achievable achievable under current conditions?
Keep it alive was no psychometric validation and most scientific work had We have systems in place to

cr

co
5 Information about Are people aware of successes
been carried out in the area of safety climate or static manage all hazards
In
successes elsewhere and do they know who to

Ac
contact?

Ignorance Improve on it! descriptions of the safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000).

d
an
6 Personal vision Has everyone developed an idea of
what achieving the goal means for REACTIVE
them and their work site?
Testing the culture model

st
Safety is important, we do a lot

u
7 Plan construction Has a feasible plan been designed?
The maturity model was field tested for its psychometric every time we have an accident

Tr
PLANNING

ng
A critical review of the change literature, mostly from the 8 Measurement points Is there a set of realistic evaluation validity in a number of settings, and went through a number

si
indicators for success?
management literature (Lawrie, Parker & Hudson, 2000) of phases. After an initial series of structured brainstorms

ea
9 Commitment Has everyone publicly committed to
PATHOLOGICAL
with a small number of highly experienced individuals, the

cr
highlighted a number of requirements but did not provide a their plan? Who cares as long as

In
descriptions were reduced under a five-step ladder scale, we're not caught
substantial foundation for the management of change within 10 Do Has the plan been carried out?

organisations that had any serious scientific validity. Most of the adding the Reactive and Proactive stages and changing the
11 Review Have the plan indicators been
models were common sense but had never been validated name from Bureaucratic to Calculative.
ACTION

reviewed?

independently. There was, however, a model for change of belief 12 Revise Have any necessary alterations to the statements was created, matching the original elements
plan been implemented?
and subsequent behaviour, Prochaska and DiClemente's Have missing elements been identified The initial field test demonstrated that a Readiness to proposed to cover HSE-culture. This was tested using five-point
Transtheoretical Model (Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcross, 1992)
and reported?
Change test, based on the Prochaska & DiClimenti model (a scales in an air force squadron in the Netherlands (Croes,
available in the field of Health Psychology. This model allowed for
13 Review by
management
Has the whole process been carried
out as agreed? climate model of satisfaction) and the culture test did not 2000) and the data collected was used in a factor analysis to
Has it been kept up long enough to
correlate. The implication was that it was tapping a cultural define a limited set of reliable factors. These factors were then
MAINTENANCE

a drug-dependence metaphor for HSE behaviour while being become a habit?

well-established in a number of areas of application. People are 14 Outcome Has the target group internalised the
rather than a climate measure. used in a series of structured interviews with content specialists
‘addicted’ to unsafe behaviour which looks as if they have no beliefs and values so that the intended
goal is reached and maintained
in Houston, Aberdeen and The Hague to fill in detailed
intrinsic motivation for HSE. without constant supervision? The original test was not detailed enough to serve as more description of the 18 factors that had been uncovered
than a measurement tool, so a large set of descriptive (Hudson & Parker, 2002).

Managing Rule Breaking Working Safely Improving Supervision


The brochure `Managing Consequences
External Goals
Rewards Look, Speak and Listen
Rule Breaking', is based Attitudes
Job Requirements HIGH
Teaching - Patronising Delegating - Abdicating
Crew
upon empirical work derived
motivation
from Ajzen and Fishbein's Intention Telling - Yelling Participating - "Do it all"
Theory of Planned Behaviour
Motivation

LOW

and doctoral work on the Social Norms Work


Planning
Behaviour Sense Know Plan Act LOW Crew Competence HIGH
types and causes of rule
violations in railway Expectation
Can you Do you know Do you know Can you do it?
shunting operations (Free, Feelings of
Control see it? how bad it is? what to do?
Situational factors
1992). The basis for the tool Powerfulness
Powerlessness
Opportunity
Perception of The brochure 'Improving Supervision’ makes use of a well-established model of
was a large-scale study of procedures
Supervision situational Leadership developed by Hersey and Blanchard. All supervisors have
Cooperation
North Sea offshore workers their own style of managing their job and people Unfortunately, a successful
and supervisors, in both the leadership style in one situation will not guarantee success in another and, taken
UK and the Netherlands. Maintain = Keep on doing it to extremes, each style can become undesirable. We distinguish four styles that
Analysis of the responses rule-breaking personalities as a result of a supervisors adopt:
found what has been structured analysis of the responses. The results
labelled the Lethal Cocktail, are extremely solid and this provides a There is a considerable literature in the area of Behaviour Based Safety Telling a strongly directive style.
predicting reported past guarantee that the factors identified are real and Management, concentrating upon getting people to behave safely. Much of this is Teaching a style that encourages people and adds explanation todirection.
violation behaviour (on a that preventative and remedial measures will, based upon the behaviourist tradition (Daniels, 1994) or on social psychological
five point scale) at 64% of therefore, be meaningful and effective. These work on self-efficacy (Geller, 1991; Geller et al, 1992). The Hearts and Minds Participating a style where leadership is shown by providing an example.
the variance (Verschuur, studies used more advanced statistical Working Safely brochure is, however, intended to be more generic and covers a Delegating a style where the leader demonstrates trust in the competence
2004). techniques than simple means and standard wider range of issues, starting with the assumption that people intend to be safe, and motivation of the crew.
deviations, involving factor analysis and but may fail for a variety of reasons. This means that a well-established literature
An earlier study found the PRINCALS analyses for non-parametric data. on perception and decision making can be called on to justify the first two
popular distinction between boxes identified.
Sheep and Wolves types of
P04214_002.ai / Unclassified / ECCN: Not subject to EAR - No US Content

References References References


Croes, S. (2000) Safety Culture at Volkel Air Force Base. Leiden University, Department of Psychology. Hale, A. (2000) Editorial: Culture's confusions. Safety Science, 34, 1-14 v d Merwe, K. (2003) Cognitive strain in the cockpit: The influence of threatening future events on performance. Leiden and Otago Universities Department
Daniels, Aubry C. (1994) Bringing out the Best in People Use the Power of Positive Reinforcement: An Executive Book Summary. (ISSN 0747-2196). Hudson, P.T.W. (2003) Applying the lessons of high-risk industries to medicine. Quality and Safety in Health Care, of Psychology, report.
Free, R. (1992) Bending the Rules. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Manchester Hudson, P.T.W. & Parker, D. (2002) Profiling safety culture: The OGP interview study. Report to OGP. London. Leiden University, Reason, J.T. (1997) Managing the risks of Organisational Accidents. Aldershot: Ashgate
Geller, E.S. (1991). If only more would actively care. Journal of Applied Behaviour Analysis, 24, 607-612. epartment of Psychology Prochaska, J. O., DiClemente, C. C., & Norcross, J. C. (1992) In search of how people change: applications to addictive behaviours. American
Geller, E. S., Gilmore, M. R., & Roberts, D.S. (1992). Achieving total safety management through employee involvement. Newport, Jonker, H. (2000) Cockpit decision making: How the Rule of Three can help making go-nogo decisions. Leiden University, Psychologist, 47, 9, 1102-1114.
VA: Make-A-Difference, Inc. Department of Psychology, report. Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974) Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131
Guldenmund, F. W. (2000) The nature of safety culture: A review of theory and research. Safety Science, 34, 215-257 Verschuur, W.L.G. (in prep) Bending the Rules: A Psychological Evaluation of Non-compliance. Ph.D. Thesis Department of Psychology, Leiden University.
Westrum R.(1991) Cultures with requisite imagination. In J. Wise, P. Stager & J. Hopkin (Eds), Verification and validation in complex man-machine systems.
New York: Springer