G. R. No. 136773               June 25, 2003 The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 11 for the year 1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax
MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO MANONGSONG, Petitioners,
vs.
FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO
ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR.,
BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO
DELA CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the Decision2 of 26 June 1998 and the Resolution of 21 December 1998 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10 April 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the property in controversy and
awarding to petitioners a portion of the property.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Agatona Guevarra ("Guevarra") and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children, namely: (1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta
Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo ("Jumaquio
sisters"); (3) Victor Lopez, married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents Narciso,
Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married to respondent
Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz, and of
Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez
Manongsong ("Manongsong").
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila with an area of
approximately 152 square meters ("Property"). The records do not show that the Property is registered under the Torrens
system. The Property is particularly described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 3 as bounded in the north by Juan Gallardo,
south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by San Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 was registered
with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Piñas on 30 September 1984 in the name of "Benigna Lopez, et al". 4 However,
the improvements on the portion of the Property denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Piñas were separately
declared in the name of "Filomena J. Estimo" under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-02145 dated 14 October 1991. 5
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong ("petitioners") filed a Complaint 6 on 19 June 1992, alleging that Manongsong and
respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code, 7 petitioners prayed for the
partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market value, and for
damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarra’s death, her children inherited the
Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the
five children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez’
sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her father’s 1/5 share in the Property by right of representation.
There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarra’s children and their offspring, have been in
possession of the Property for as long as they can remember. The area actually occupied by each respondent family differs,
ranging in size from approximately 25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any portion of
the Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo ("Ortiz family"), as
well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and Roberto dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio ("Dela
Cruz family"), entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise
Agreement8 dated 12 September 1992 ("Agreement"), petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed that each group of
heirs would receive an equal share in the Property. The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of
partition to this effect and prayed further that "those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those who
have less and those who have none shall get the correct and proper portion." 9
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez – who each occupy 50 square meter portions of the Property –
and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the Agreement. 10 However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed petitioners’ claim.
The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro ("Navarro"), supposedly the mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to
Guevarra’s daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
Declaration No. 911 described a residential parcel of land with an area of 172.51 square meters, located on San Jose St.,
Manuyo, Las Piñas, Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal Street
to the east and San Jose Street to the west. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of "Agatona Lopez" and
"Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA 12 ("Kasulatan") dated 11 October
1957, the relevant portion of which states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa LAS PIÑAS, ay siyang nagma-may-
ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Piñas, Rizal, lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong
napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:
BOUNDARIES:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION BILANG 911.
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO (₱250.00), SALAPING
PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at
naninirahan sa Las Piñas, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga na buong
kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang
mga tagapagmana at kahalili, ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang walang
anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at hindi taniman ng palay o mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing lupa kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa
kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994 that the "‘KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG
LUPA’, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta Lopez (Bumili), was notarized by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11
October 1957 and entered in his Notarial Register xxx." 13 The certification further stated that Atty. Andrada was a duly
appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the Property for more than thirty years, they also
invoked the defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches. The
Jumaquio sisters argued that the present action should have been filed years earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he was alive
or by Manongsong when the latter reached legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in 1992 when
Manongsong was already 33 years old.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision 14 of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that the
Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence attacking its validity. The trial court declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them
through conveyance by means of a Deed of Sale executed by their common ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother Enriqueta,
which deed was presented in evidence as Exhs. "4" to "4-A". Plaintiff Milagros Manongsong debunks the evidence as fake. The
document of sale, in the observance of the Court, is however duly authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the RTC of
the Manila Clerk of Court as duly notarized public document (Exh. "5"). No countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to
overcome or impugn the document’s legality or its validity.
xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character. No
positive evidence had been introduced that it was solely a paraphernal property. The name of Justina Navarro’s spouse/husband
was not mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time the conveyance was made to Justina Navarro. Agatona
Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question to
the exclusion of others. She is entitled to her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs "4" & "4-1"(sic)] did not at all provide for the
reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate
children including the grandchildren, by right of representation, as described in the order of intestate succession. The same Deed
of Sale should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of
their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly specified by law like for instance disinheritance for cause. xxx (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s
decision was directed against the Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the remaining active
defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J. Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:
1
 1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be immediately partitioned giving plaintiff
Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share of 1/5 of the area in square meters, or the prevailing market value on
the date of the decision;
2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱10,000.00 as compensatory damages for having deprived the latter the use
and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;
3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs’ litigation expenses and attorney’s fee in the sum of ₱10,000.00; and
4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners, in their appellee’s brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the first time a supposed photocopy of the death
certificate16 of Guevarra, which stated that Guevarra’s mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an
affidavit17 from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only by name and had never met her personally,
although he had lived for some years with Agatona Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these
documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit presented by petitioners on the ground
that petitioners never formally offered these documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission that Navarro was the original owner of the
Property, as follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that Justina Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the
original owner of the subject property and was the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-appellees in their Reply-
Memorandum averred:
"As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as follows:
x x x           x x x          x x x
‘History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA NAVARRO who has a daughter by the name
of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the other hand has six children namely: xxx xxx xxx.’
which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since this is the admitted history, facts of the case,
it follows that there should have been proper document to extinguish this status of co-ownership between the common owners
either by (1) Court action or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx."
The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:
"x x x           x x x          x x x
With the parties’ admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of relationship of the heirs with one another, it has
been elicited ascendant Justina Navarro is the common ancestor  of the heirs herein mentioned, however, it must be noted that
the parties failed to amplify who was the husband and the number of compulsory heirs of Justina Navarro. xxx xxx xxx"
Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina Navarro was their common ancestor and was
the original owner of the subject property.
The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the Property was conjugal in nature when Navarro
sold it. The appellate court reasoned as follows:
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property of marriage belongs to the conjugal
partnership, must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coveture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property was acquired by Justina Navarro
during her marriage. xxx
The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not supported by any evidence.
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation purposes under the name of Justina
Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby
rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees’ complaint in so far as defendants-appellants are concerned.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of 21 December
1998.19
On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate court’s decision and resolution to this Court. The Court initially denied
the petition for review due to certain procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due course to the petition in its Resolution of
31 January 2000.20
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED SALE BY ONE
JUSTINA NAVARRO;
2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE REVIEWABLE;
3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;
4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND SHOULD PREVAIL;
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER CO-HEIRS;
6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF PETITIONERS.21
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove, by the requisite quantum of evidence, that
Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law are appealable to this Court under
Rule 45. However, where the factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the authority to
review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts. 22 This is precisely the situation in this case.
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases,
as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :23
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the
burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must
be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of
evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that
which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of the Property by
inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege that the Property originally
belonged to Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property. As the parties claiming the
affirmative of these issues, petitioners had the burden of proof to establish their case by preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax declarations and the testimonies of witnesses.
However, the Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted
petitioners’ claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie evidence of its
authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. 24 Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the document should be
upheld.25 The trial court itself held that "(n)o countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the
document’s legality or its validity."26
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and thus still presumed to be authentic. The
Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine. 27
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to
Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not agree. The trial court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on
evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is
proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 28
2
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage. There is no basis for
applying the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911
showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarro’s name. 29 This tends to support the argument
that the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial court’s declaration that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs
of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable
consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no
diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, 30 that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary
consideration.1âwphi1
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2)
determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. 31 The presence of these elements is apparent on the
face of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for ₱250.00.32
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by petitioners for the first time on appeal
We find no error in the Court of Appeals’ refusal to give any probative value to the alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the
affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their appellee’s brief. Petitioners could
easily have offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents
for the first time on appeal without any explanation. For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer in evidence
these documents before the trial court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 33 To admit these documents
now is contrary to due process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert Navarro’s ownership of the Property. Benjamin
dela Cruz, Sr.’s affidavit stated merely that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was not personally acquainted with
her.34 Guevarra’s alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was indeed the mother of Guevarra. These
documents do not prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that Navarro did not own the Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the
Court of Appeals that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that this constitutes an
impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his theory on appeal.
To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.35
If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine petitioners’ case. Absent any hereditary
relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then to the
latter’s children, including petitioners, by succession. There would then be no basis for petitioners’ claim of co-ownership by
virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not undermine respondents’ position since they anchor their
claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from Guevarra.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute by clear and convincing evidence,
this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to Guevarra’s
estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners’ complaint for partition of the Property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of
petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 126376               November 20, 2003
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and
NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL
JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES
ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN,
SPOUSES TELESFORO CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN,
and SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 to annul the Decision2 dated 26 June 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 3 dated 18 February 1993 rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati ("trial court") in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case after it found that the parties executed the
Deeds of Sale for valid consideration and that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against the defendants.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and
Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The
married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant parents Leonardo
Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their
names, to wit:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 11 July 1978, in
favor of defendant Felicitas Joaquin, for a consideration of ₱6,000.00 (Exh. "C"), pursuant to which TCT No.
[36113/T-172] was issued in her name (Exh. "C-1");
2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 7 June 1979, in
favor of defendant Clarita Joaquin, for a consideration of ₱1[2],000.00 (Exh. "D"), pursuant to which TCT No. S-
109772 was issued in her name (Exh. "D-1");
3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in
favor of defendant spouses Fidel Joaquin and Conchita Bernardo, for a consideration of ₱54,[3]00.00 (Exh. "E"),
pursuant to which TCT No. 155329 was issued to them (Exh. "E-1");
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in
favor of defendant spouses Artemio Joaquin and Socorro Angeles, for a consideration of ₱[54,3]00.00 (Exh. "F"),
pursuant to which TCT No. 155330 was issued to them (Exh. "F-1"); and
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 9
September 1988, in favor of Tomas Joaquin, for a consideration of ₱20,000.00 (Exh. "G"), pursuant to which TCT
No. 157203 was issued in her name (Exh. "G-1").
6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 7 October 1988,
in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a consideration of ₱25,000.00 (Exh. "K"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157779 was
issued in his name (Exh. "K-1").]
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
- XX-
The deeds of sale, Annexes "C," "D," "E," "F," and "G," [and "K"] are simulated as they are, are NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO because –
a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx over the properties in litis;
b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the questioned deeds, the properties are
more than three-fold times more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein;
c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties (vendors and vendees); and
d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly
deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
- XXI -
Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 36113/T-172, S-109772, 155329, 155330,
157203 [and 157779] issued by the Registrar of Deeds over the properties in litis xxx are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against them as well as the requisite standing
and interest to assail their titles over the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and made by
defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that
the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual and legal basis. 4 (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant spouses Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis. 5 Instead
of filing an Answer with their co-defendants, Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a Motion to Dismiss. 6 In granting the dismissal
to Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis, the trial court noted that "compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is
contingent since said right commences only from the moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines."7
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The trial court stated:
3
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx father will show that the Deeds of Sale were all
executed for valuable consideration. This assertion must prevail over the negative allegation of plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action against defendants since there can be no
legitime to speak of prior to the death of their parents. The court finds this contention tenable. In determining the legitime, the
value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered (Art. 908 of the New Civil Code). Hence, the legitime of
a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of
their legitime while their parents live.
All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.
In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together, the counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.1âwphi1 The appellate court ruled:
To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this case, which is, whether xxx they have a cause
of action against appellees.
Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant brothers and sisters, are compulsory heirs of
defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the properties of
their defendant parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the latter’s death. While still alive,
defendant parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question. Neither do they claim to be creditors of their
defendant parents. Consequently, they cannot be considered as real parties in interest to assail the validity of said deeds either
for gross inadequacy or lack of consideration or for failure to express the true intent of the parties. In point is the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et al., 101 SCRA 376, thus:
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have
no legal capacity to challenge their validity.
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their legitime by the dispositions made by their
defendant parents in favor of their defendant brothers and sisters. But, as correctly held by the court  a quo, "the legitime of a
compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their
legitime while their parents live."
With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by plaintiffs-appellants is inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE IN QUESTION HAD
NO VALID CONSIDERATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS A
CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS OF SALE DO NOT EXPRESS
THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE WAS PART AND
PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE
SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF THEIR INTEREST OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE A GOOD,
SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 10
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
We will discuss petitioners’ legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale before discussing the issues on the
purported lack of consideration and gross inadequacy of the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
Petitioners’ Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint, petitioners asserted that the "purported sale
of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs
(plaintiffs herein) of their legitime." Petitioners’ strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale declared void so that ownership of the
lots would eventually revert to their respondent parents. If their parents die still owning the lots, petitioners and their respondent
siblings will then co-own their parents’ estate by hereditary succession. 11
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to
show any legal right to the properties. The trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the action for this reason alone. An
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. 12
[T]he question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or
the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’"
xxx
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are
bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can
show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it (Ibañez v.
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) xxx.
These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate,
or consequential interest…. The phrase ‘present substantial interest’ more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the
subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has
the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him." 13
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated,
petitioners’ right to their parents’ properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents’ death. While still living, the
parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime,
petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their parents’ estate. While
the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent
father. Thus, petitioners ask the court to declare the Deeds of Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual contract, a contract of sale becomes a
binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the
price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price
is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the
parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. 14 Article 1471 of the
Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with
the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is
different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation
under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract. 15
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated. To prove simulation, petitioners
presented Emma Joaquin Valdoz’s testimony stating that their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would
transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase price. 16 The trial court did not find the
allegation of absolute simulation of price credible. Petitioners’ failure to prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their
lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings’ financial capacity to buy the questioned lots. 17 On the other hand, the Deeds of
Sale which petitioners presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents’ minds meet as
to the purchase price, but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent
siblings have also fully paid the price to their respondent father. 18
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price
Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been
fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the
parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied)
4
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate,
or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter
of sale. All the respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave. As we stated in Vales v.
Villa:19
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from unwise investments,
relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of
persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but
because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable
judgment, and lose money by them – indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore.
There must be, in addition, a violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the
courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis in the original)
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties and carry greater weight when they coincide
with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a showing
that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion.20 In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid consideration, and that the defendant
children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by
the buyer to the seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
G.R. No. 141882             March 11, 2005
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims between two sets of heirs, a conflict ironically
made grievous by the fact that the decedent in this case had resorted to great lengths to allocate which properties should go to
which set of heirs.
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision1  dated 30 September 1999 of the Court of Appeals which reversed
the Decision2  dated 7 May 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.
The factual antecedents follow.
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with
Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escaño (Josefa) and
Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn),
Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro). 3
The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fifty-four (954) square meters, known as Lot No.
63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died, the land was
among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitled  "Josefa Teves
Escaño v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al." 4 Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor.
Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement5 which embodied the partition of all the properties of
Don Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental,
12th Judicial District, rendered a Decision6 dated 31 January 1964. The CFI decision declared a tract of land known as Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was
to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. 7 Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais,
including the electric plant, the "movie property," the commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The
remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual death of
Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaňo and
Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories
and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother
but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to
their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated  to the wife in second
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged
natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio
Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of
Liabilities8 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental
Deed)9 dated 31 July 1973. This instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner. 10 On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the registration of the subject lot in its name. A court,
so it appeared, issued an order 11 cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12 November
1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the name of petitioner. 12 Since then, petitioner has been paying taxes
assessed on the subject lot.13
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of
the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria
Cadayday, respondents herein.14 On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home and constructed a lumber yard.
Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate 15  dated 18 March
1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose
Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63
from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate16  dated 9 November 1983.
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale, respondents discovered that the lot was already titled
in the name of petitioner. Thus, they failed to register the deed. 17
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC Branch 45 of Bais City, seeking the declaration of
nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names,
plus damages.18
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this Court finds judgment in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, and thus hereby orders:
(1) That complaint be dismissed;
(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified as Lot No. 63 registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-375;
(3) That plaintiffs pay costs.
Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby ordered dismissed. 19
The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the interpretation of paragraph 13 of the  Compromise
Agreement.20 It added that the direct adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise Agreement was only in favor of
Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and Emilio. 21 Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification of the
terms of the adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage.
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of their
deceased mother Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latter’s death. Thus, upon Don
Julian’s death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, except their proper share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties adjudicated in
favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and
Don Julian was under no impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4)
children.22
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words "shall be," the adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her
four (4) children was not final and operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian during his
lifetime.23 It cited paragraph 1424 of the Compromise Agreement in support of his conclusion.25 With Lot No. 63 being the
conjugal property of Don Julian and Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no
hereditary rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of the
latter.26
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julian’s death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer a part of his estate since
he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial
5
partition by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it. Had respondents exercised
prudence before buying the subject lot by investigating the registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds, they would have
discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203 had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of
petitioner, the trial court added.27
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s decision. The decretal part of the appellate decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one is entered declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null
and void.
With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its Manager, Julian L. Teves.
SO ORDERED.28
Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement  incorporated in CFI decision dated 31 January 1964, particularly paragraph
13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate except as
regards his (Don Julian’s) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa. 29 The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession
of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the
same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res judicata.30 Don Julian could have disposed of
only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.31
The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a
document like the Supplemental Deed  which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor of his
heirs from the second marriage. It also found out that the blanks reserved for the Book No. and Page No. at the upper right
corner of TCT No. T-375, "to identify the exact location where the said title was registered or transferred," were not filled up,
thereby indicating that the TCT is "spurious and of dubious origin." 32
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, raising
pure questions of law.
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the appellate court, to wit: (a) that future legitime can be
determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign
Lot No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same for his heirs from the second marriage pursuant to the Compromise
Agreement; (c) that the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage; and (d) that
TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious for not containing entries on the Book No. and Page No. 33
While most of petitioner’s legal arguments have merit, the application of the appropriate provisions of law to the facts borne out
by the evidence on record nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals in favor of
respondents.
Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement has to be quoted again:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaño and Emilio
B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and
accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but
also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their
father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged
natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn
Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves." (Emphasis supplied)
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the
second marriage became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them the
right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior
to the death of Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos34 is relevant, where we defined future inheritance
as any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future
acquire by succession. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a
contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a
contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the
exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.35
For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. 36 A contract
may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the
following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. 37
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on
future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
....
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no
formalities are prescribed by the Article. 38 The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily
require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the
formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no
will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the
physical determination of the part to be given to each heir. 39
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 1056 40 of the old Civil Code. The only change in the
provision is that Article 1080 now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act  inter
vivos. This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an act  inter vivos, he
must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. 41
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to partition  inter vivos his property, and distribute
them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui
generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante  during his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title
until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited
only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. 42
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering
that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to
the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute
of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist. 43
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian
remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage
at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his
lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated
to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during
his lifetime. The lower court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court disagreed, holding
that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second
marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well-founded.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in
the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. 44 It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in
the direct line from inheritance. 45 It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in
the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without
expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. 46 But there is no preterition where the testator
allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir. 47
6
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition  inter vivos of his properties, as
evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to
the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which
the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the  Compromise
Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line. 48 Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s
heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on preterition, still the petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there
was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner,
and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a
transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No.
63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which
necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears therein.49 A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of
the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly
the real interest of its owner.50
To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on
the defect of the title must be adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens title. Thus,
contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, the appearance of a mere thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his signature in
the Supplemental Deed would not affect the validity of petitioner’s title for this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a
recognized mode of signature.51
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave
irregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process established by law. And,
worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee relies on a voluntary
instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his name such instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is
evident from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The sections read,
thus:
SEC. 53. Presentation of owner’s duplicate upon entry of new certificate. – No voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument,
except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown. (Emphasis
supplied)
....
SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. – An owner desiring to convey his registered land in fee simple
shall execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter
make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an
owner’s duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificate the date of
transfer, the volume and page of the registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a reference by
number to the last preceding certificate. The original and the owner’s duplicate of the grantor’s certificate shall be
stamped "cancelled." The deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed with the number and the place of
registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed. (Emphasis supplied)
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed,  it should have presented it to the Register of Deeds to
secure the transfer of the title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on the
succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it had presented the Supplemental Deed. In fact, there is absolutely no
mention of a reference to said document in the original and transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard that the finding of the
Court of Appeals concerning the absence of entries on the blanks intended for the Book No. and Page No. gains significant
relevance. Indeed, this aspect fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT No. 5203 and the consequent issuance of
TCT No. T-375 in its place are not predicated on a valid transaction.
What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:
Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.
CONDITIONS: Lost owner’s duplicate is hereby cancelled, and null and void and a new Certificate of Title No.
375 is issued per Order of the Court of First Instance on file in this office.
Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.
(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)52
What the entry indicates is that the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 5203 was lost, a petition for the reconstitution of the said
owner’s duplicate was filed in court, and the court issued an order for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate and its
replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to be believed, the court concerned (CFI, according to the entry) issued an order
for the issuance of a new title which is TCT No. T-375 although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the Registry of
Deeds had not been lost.
Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may order the reconstitution and replacement of the
lost title only, nothing else. Since what was lost is the owner’s copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owner’s copy could be ordered
replaced. Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted owner’s copy of the original
certificate of title but a new transfer certificate of title in place of the original certificate of title. But if the court order, as the
entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title—even designating the very number of the new transfer
certificate of title itself—the order would be patently unlawful. A court cannot legally order the cancellation and replacement of
the original of the O.C.T. which has not been lost, 53 as the petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss merely of the
owner’s duplicate of the OCT
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient contrivance to effect the transfer of title to the subject lot
in its name, instead of the Supplemental Deed which should be its proper course of action. It was so constrained to do because
the Supplemental Deed  does not constitute a deed of conveyance of the "registered land in fee simple" "in a form sufficient in
law," as required by Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.
A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses that the assignment is not supported by any
consideration. The provision reads:
....
WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities executed by Julian L. Teves,
Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño at Dumaguete City on 16 th day of November 1972 and ratified in the City of
Dumaguete before Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and entered in the latter’s notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page
No. 17; Book No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño, transferred, conveyed
and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its assets and liabilities as reflected in the Balance Sheet of the former as
of December 31, 1971.
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the Decision made in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the following
properties were adjudicated to Don Julian L. Teves. We quote.
From the properties at Bais
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves
....
Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with all improvements. Assessed value
- P2,720.00
....
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in order to effect the registration of the
transfer of the above corporation.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and
assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of EIGHTY-FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall
become absolute upon signing.54 (Emphasis supplied)
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the instrument does not represent the consideration for the
assignment made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair market value of  all the nineteen (19) properties
enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in favor of petitioner.
Consequently, the testimony 55 of petitioner’s accountant that the assignment is supported by consideration cannot prevail over
the clear provision to the contrary in the Supplemental Deed.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948 mortgage which is annotated on the back of the TCT
No. T-375 as the consideration for the assignment. 56 However, the said annotation 57 shows that the mortgage was actually
executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, not of petitioner. 58 Clearly, said mortgage, executed as it was in favor
7
of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being no showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation,
could not have been the consideration for the assignment to petitioner.
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract, namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties;
(2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) Cause  of the obligation which is established.
Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts
lack an essential element and they are not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph (2). 59 The
absence of the usual recital of consideration in a transaction which normally should be supported by a consideration such as the
assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact that the assignee is a
corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the President and Director, forecloses the application of the presumption of
existence of consideration established by law.60
Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749 of the New Civil Code is clear on the point,
thus:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take
effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this
step shall be noted in both instruments.
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,61 this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the
donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of
the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in
the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public document, 62 the absence of acceptance by the donee in
the same deed or even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.
One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the cardinal objectives to write finis  to a protracted litigation
and avoid multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing at all times. 63 Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts have ample
authority to rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or otherwise not raised in an appeal, if these are indispensable or
necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues. 64 Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of
which are necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case, or to serve the interest of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.65
In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed, i.e., whether it is valid or void, is unmistakably
determinative of the underlying controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument which is at the core
of the controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the trial court and the appellate
court.66 Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking down the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to be a
blatant nullity.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
G.R. No. L-14070             March 29, 1961
MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, LEONCIO GERVACIO BLAS and LODA GERVACIO
BLAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSALINA SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the deceased MAXIMA SANTOS VDA.
DE BLAS, in Sp. Proc. No. 2524, Court of First Instance of Rizal, defendants-appellants. MARTA GERVACIO BLAS
and DR. JOSE CHIVI, defendants-appellants.
Teofilo Sison and Nicanor Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.
De los Santos, Caluag, Pascal and Felizardo for defendants-appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate of Maxima Santos, to secure a judicial declaration
that one-half of the properties left by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, the greater bulk of which are set forth and described in the
project of partition presented in the proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas, had been
promised by the deceased Maxima Santos to be delivered upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs, and requesting that the
said properties so promised be adjudicated to the plaintiffs. The complaint also prays for actual damages in the amount of
P50,000. (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-65.) The alleged promise of the deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a document
executed by Maxima Santos on December 26, 1936 attached to the complaint as Annex "H" and introduced at the trial as
Exhibit "A". (Ibid., pp. 258-259.) The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit certain properties
enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof, situated in Malabon, Rizal and Obando, Bulacan, but which properties have already been in
included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and evidently partitioned and conveyed to his heirs in the
proceedings for the administration of his (Simeon Blas) estate.
Defendant, who is the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, filed an answer with a
counterclaim, and later, an amended answer and a counterclaim. The said amended answer admits the allegations of the
complaint as to her capacity as administratrix the death of Simeon Blas on January 3, 1937; the fact that Simeon Blas and Marta
Cruz begot three children only one of whom, namely, Eulalio Blas, left legitimate descendants; that Simeon Blas contracted a
second marriage with Maxima Santos on June 28, 1898. She denies for lack of sufficient information and belief, knowledge
edge of the first marriage of Simeon Blas to Marta Cruz, the averment that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz acquired properties
situated in Obando, Bulacan, that said properties were utilized as capital, etc. As special defenses, she alleges that the properties
of the spouses Blas and Santos had been settled and liquidated in the project of partition of the estate of said Simeon Blas; that
pursuant to the project of partition, plaintiffs and some defendants had already received the respective properties adjudicated to
them; that the plaintiffs and the defendants Marta Geracio and Jose Chivi are estopped from impugning the validity of the
project of partition of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and from questioning the ownership in the properties conveyed in
the project of partition to Maxima Santos as her own exclusive property; that the testament executed by Maxima Santos is valid,
the plain plaintiffs having no right to recover any portion of Maxima Santos' estate now under administration by the court. A
counterclaim for the amount of P50,000 as damages is also included in the complaint, as also a cross-claim against Marta
Gervacio Blas and Jose Chivi.
Trial of the case was Conducted and, thereafter, the court, Hon. Gustave Victoriano, presiding, rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint, with costs against plaintiff, and dismissing also the counterclaim and cross-claim decision ,the plaintiffs filed by
the defendants. From this district have appealed to this Court.
The facts essential to an understanding of the issues involved in the case may be briefly summarized as follows: Simeon Blas
contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before 1898. They had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left
children, namely, Maria Gervacio Blas, one of the plaintiffs, Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro Gervacio
Blas. Lazaro died in 1950, and is survived by three legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein, namely, Manuel Gervacio Blas,
Leoncio Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas. Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a
second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the properties required by Simeon
Blas and Marta Cruz was made. Three of the properties left are fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima Santos does not
appear to have apported properties to her marriage with Simeon Blas.
On December 26, 1936, only over a week before over a week before his death on January 9, 1937, Simeon Blas executed a last
will and testament. In the said testament Simeon Blas makes the following declarations:
I
2. Sa panahon ng aking pangalawang asawa, MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, ay nagkaroon ako at nakatipon ng mga
kayamanan (bienes) at pag-aari (propriedades) na ang lahat ng lupa, palaisdaan at iba pang pag-aari ay umaabot sa
halagang ANIM NA RAAN PITONG PU'T WALONG DAAN LIBO WALONG DAAN WALONG PUNG PISO
(678,880-00) sang-ayon sa mga halaga sa amillarimento (valor Amillarado.)
II
1. Ang kalahati ng lahat ng aming pag-aari, matapos mabayaran ang lahat ng aking o aming pag-kakautang na mag-
asawa, kung mayroon man, yayamang ang lahat ng ito ay kita sa loob ng matrimonio (bienes ganaciales) ay bahagi
ng para sa aking asawa, MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, sang-ayon sa batas. (Record on Appeal, pp. 250-251.)
The above testamentary provisions may be translated as follows:
I
2. During my second marriage with Maxima Santos de Blas, I possessed and acquired wealth and properties,
consisting of lands, fishponds and other kinds of properties, the total assessed value of which reached the amount
P678,880.00.
II
1. One-half of our properties, after the payment of my and our indebtedness, all these properties having been acquired
during marriage (conjugal properties), constitutes the share of my wife Maxima Santos de Blas, according to the law.
8
At the time of the execution of said will, Andres Pascual a son-in-law of the testator, and Avelina Pascual and others, were
present. Andres Pascual had married a descendant by the first marriage. The will was prepared by Andres Pascual, with the help
of his nephew Avelino Pascual. The testator asked Andres Pascual to prepare a document which was presented in court as
Exhibit "A", thus:
Q — Was there anybody who asked you to prepare this document?
A — Don Simeon Blas asked me to prepare this document (referring to Exhibit "A"), (t.s.n., Sarmiento to, P. 24).
The reason why the testator ordered the preparation of Exhibit "A" was because the properties that the testator had acquired
during his first marriage with Marta Cruz had not been liquidated and were not separated from those acquired during the second
marriage. Pascual's testimony is as follows:
Q — To whom do you refer with the word "they"?
A — Simeon Blas and his first wife, Marta Cruz. When Marta Cruz died they had not made a liquidation of their
conjugal properties and so all those properties were included all in the assets of the second marriage, and that is the
reason why this document was prepared. (t.s.n., Sarmiento, p. 36.)
The above testimony is fully corroborated by that of Leoncio Gervacio, son-in-law of Simeon Blas.
Q — Please state to the Court?
A — My children were claiming from their grandfather Simeon Blas the properties left by their grandmother Marta
Cruz in the year 1936.
Q — And what happened with that claim of your children against Simeon Blas regarding the assets or properties of
the first marriage that were left after the death of Marta Cruz in 1936?
A — The claim was not pushed through because they reached into an agreement whereby the parties Simeon Blas
Maxima Santos, Maria Gervacio Bias, Marta Gervacio Blas and Lazaro Gervacio Blas agreed that Simeon Blas and
Maxima Blas will give one-half of the estate of Simeon Blas. (t.s.n., Sarmiento, pp. 143-144).
The document which was thus prepared and which is marked as Exhibit "A" reads in Tagalog, thus:
MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:
Na akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong gulang, kasal kay SIMEON BLAS, taga bayan ng
Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay malaya kong ipinahahayag:
Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling kalooban na nilagdaan ng aking asawa, SIMEON BLAS, at
ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng aking karangalan at sa harap ng aking asawa na igagalang at pagpipitaganan ang lahat at
bawa't isang bahagi ng nabanggit na testamento at ipinangangako ko pa sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito na ang
lahat ng maiiwang pag-aari at kayamanan naming mag-asawa, na nauukol at bahaging para sa akin sa paggawa ko
naman ng aking testamento ay ipagkakaloob ko ang kalahati (½) sa mga herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng
aking nabanggit na asawa, SIMEON BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento, na ako'y makapipili o makahihirang na kahit
kangino sa kanila ng aking pagbibigyan at pamamanahan sang-ayon sa paggalang, paglilingkod, at pakikisama ng
gagawin sa akin.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito ngayon ika 26 ng Diciembre ng taong
1936, dito sa San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp. 29-30 — Appellant's brief).
(Fdo.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
and which, translated into English, reads as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, of legal age, married to SIMEON BLAS, resident of Malabon, Rizal,
Philippines, voluntarily state:
That I have read and knew the contents of the will signed by my husband, SIMEON BLAS, (2) and I promise on my
word of honor in the presence of my husband that I will respect and obey all and every disposition of said will (3) and
furthermore, I promise in this document that all the properties my husband and I will leave, the portion and share
corresponding to me when I make my will, I will give one-half (½) to the heirs and legatees or the beneficiaries
named in the will of my husband, (4) and that I can select or choose any of them, to whom I will give depending upon
the respect, service and treatment accorded to me.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I signed this document this 26th day of December, 1936 at San Francisco del Monte, San
Juan, Rizal, Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp. 30-31, Appellant's brief).
(Sgd.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
The court below held that said Exhibit "A" has not created any right in favor of plaintiffs which can serve as basis for the
complaint; that neither can it be considered as a valid and enforceable contract for lack of consideration and because it deals
with future inheritance. The court also declared that Exhibit "A" is not a will because it does not comply with the requisites for
the execution of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation, etc.
Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief before us, argue vehemently that the heirs of Simeon Blas
and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during said first
marriage, because the same were already included in the mass of properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas
and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will, and that the action to recover the same has prescribed. This contention is
correct. The descendants of Marta Cruz can no longer claim the conjugal properties that she and her husband may have required
during their marriage although no liquidation of such properties and delivery thereof to the heirs of Marta Cruz have been made,
no action to recover said propertied having been presented in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas.
But the principal basis for the plaintiffs' action in the case at bar is the document Exhibit "A". It is not disputed that this
document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that the conjugal properties of me on Blas for the reason
his first marriage had not been liquidated; that it was prepared at the same time as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26,
1936, at the instance of the latter himself. It is also not disputed that the document was signed by Maxima Santos and one copy
thereof, which was presented in court as Exhibit "A", was kept by plaintiffs' witness Andres Pascual.
Plaintiffs-appellants argue before us that Exhibit "A" is both a trust agreement and a contract in the nature of a compromise to
avoid litigation. Defendants-appellees, in answer, claim that it is neither a trust agreement nor a compromise a agreement.
Considering that the properties of the first marriage of Simeon Blas had not been liquidated when Simeon Blas executed his will
on December 26, 1936', and the further fact such properties where actually , and the further fact that included as conjugal
properties acquired during the second marriage, we find, as contended by plaintiffs-appellants that the preparation and execution
of Exhibit "A" was ordered by Simeon Blas evidently to prevent his heirs by his first marriage from contesting his will and
demanding liquidation of the conjugal properties acquired during the first marriage, and an accounting of the fruits and proceeds
thereof from the time of the death of his first wife.
Exhibit "A", therefore, appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force at the time of
the execution of Exhibit "A", which provides as follows:
Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or retaining something
avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which has already the provocation been instituted. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Exhibit "A" states that the maker (Maxima Santos) had read and knew the contents of the will of her husband read and knew the
contents of the will Simeon Blas — she was evidently referring to the declaration in the will(of Simeon Blas) that his properties
are conjugal properties and one-half thereof belongs to her (Maxima Santos) as her share of the conjugal assets under the law.
The agreement or promise that Maxima Santos makes in Exhibit "A" is to hold one-half of her said share in the conjugal assets
in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or
legatees as she may choose in her last will and testament. It is to be noted that the conjugal properties referred to are those that
were actually existing at that time, December 26, 1936. Simeon Blas died on January 9, 1937. On June 2, 1937, an inventory of
the properties left by him, all considered conjugal, was submitted by Maxima Santos herself as administratrix of his estate. A
list of said properties is found in Annex "E", the complete inventory submitted by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, is
administratrix of the estate of her husband, dated March 10, 1939. The properties which were given to Maxima Santos as her
share in the conjugal properties are also specified in the project of partition submitted by said Maxima Santos herself on March
14, 1939. (Record on Appeal, pp. 195-241.) Under Exhibit "A", therefore, Maxima Santos contracted the obligation and
promised to give one-half of the above indicated properties to the heirs and legatees of Simeon Blas.
Counsel for the defendant-appellee claims Exhibit "A" is a worthless piece of paper because it is not a will nor a
donation mortis causa nor a contract. As we have in indicated above, it is a compromise and at the same time a contract with a
sufficient cause or consideration. It is also contended that it deals with future inheritance. We do not think that Exhibit "A" is a
contract on future inheritance. it is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal
properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the
husband. The conjugal properties were in existence at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936. As a
matter of fact, Maxima Santos included these properties in her inventory of her husband's estate of June 2, 1937. The promise
does not refer to any properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of her husband, because it is her share in the
conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement or promise contained in Exhibit "A" is not void under Article 1271 of the old Civil
Code, has been decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of October 8, 19154, thus:
9
 Que si bien el art. 1271 del Codigo civil dispone que sobre la herenciafutura no se podra celebrar otros contratos que 44. Bangkal Pugad (a) 34.2779    "    
aquellos cuyo objecto seapracticar entre vivos la division de un caudal, conforme al articulo 1056,  esta prohibicion
(b) 51.7919    "    
noes aplicable al caso, porque la obligacion que contrajoel recurr en contrato privado de otorgar testamento e
instituir heredera a su subrina de los bienes que adquirio en virtud de herencia , procedentes desu finada consorte (c) 2.5202    "    
que le quedasen sobrantes despues de pagar las deudas, y del ganacial que se expresa, asi como de reconocer, 45. Magtapat Bangkal, Lubao, Pampanga (a) 18.0024    "    
ademas, con alguna cosaa otros sobrinos, se refiere a bienes conocidos y determinados existentes cuando tal
compromisi se otorgo, y no a la universalidad de una herencia que, sequn el art. 659 del citado Codigo civil, as (b) 7.3265    "    
determina a muerte, constituyendola todos los bienes, derechos y obligaciones que por ella no sehayan extinguido: ..." (c) 53.5180    "    
(Emphasis supplied.) 46. Pinanganakan, Lubao, Pampanga 159.0078    "    
It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 of the Civil Code is "  future
inheritance." To us future  inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the 47. Emigdio Lingid, Lubao, Pampanga 34.5229    "    
contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are well 48. Propios, Lubao, Pampanga 80.5382    "    
defined properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as belonging to his wife
49. Batang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan, Pampanga 43.3350    "    
as her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in the conjugal properties may not be considered
as  future inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time Exhibit "A" was executed. 50. Binatang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan, Pampanga 3.5069    "    
The trial court held that the plaintiffs-appellants in the case at bar are concluded by the judgement rendered in the proceedings 51. Sapang Magtua, Sexmoan, Pampanga 56,8242    "    
for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas for the reason that the properties left by him belonged to himself and his wife
Maxima Santos; that the project of partition in the said case, adjudicating to Maxima Santos one-half as her share in the 52. Kay Limpin, Sexmoan, Pampanga 5.0130    "    
conjugal properties, is a bar to another action on the same subject matter, Maxima Santos having become absolute owner of the 53. Calise Mabalumbum, Sexmoan, Pampanga 23.8935    "    
said properties adjudicated in her favor. As already adverted to above, these contentions would be correct if applied to the claim 54. Messapinit Kineke, Sexmoan, Pampanga (a) 5.2972     "    
of the plaintiffs-appellants that said properties were acquired with the first wife of Simeon Blas, Marta Cruz. But the main
ground upon which plaintiffs base their present action is the document Exhibit "A", already fully considered above. As this (b) 5.9230    "    
private document contains the express promise made by Maxima Santos to convey in her testament, upon her death, one-half of (c) 1.4638    "    
the conjugal properties she would receive as her share in the conjugal properties, the action to enforce the said promise did not
(d) 1.4638    "    
arise until and after her death when it was found that she did not comply with her above-mentioned promise. (Art. 1969, old
Civil Code.) The argument that the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants herein to oppose the project of partition in the settlement (e) 2.8316    "    
of the estate of Simeon Blas, especially that portion of the project which assigned to Maxima Santos one-half of all the conjugal (f) 10.4412    "    
properties bars their present action, is, therefore, devoid of merit. It may be added that plaintiffs-appellants did not question the
validity of the project of partition precisely because of the promise made by Maxima Santos in the compromise Exhibit "A"; (g) 3.9033    "    
they acquised in the approval of said project of partition because they were relying on the promise made by Maxima Santos in (h) 11.9263    "    
Exhibit "A", that she would transmit one-half of the conjugal properties that she was going to receive as her share in the (i) 6.0574    "    
conjugal partnership upon her death and in her will, to the heirs and legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.
Neither can the claim of prescription be considered in favor of the defendants. The right of action arose at the time of the death 55. Dalang, Banga, Sexmoan, Pampanga 23.3989    "    
of Maxima Santos on October 5,1956, when she failed to comply with the promise made by her in Exhibit "A". The plaintiffs- 62. Alaminos, Pangasinan 147.1242    "    
appellants immediately presented this action on December 27, 1956, upon learning of such failure on the part of Maxima Santos 80. Mangasu Sexmoan, Pampanga 10.000    "    
to comply with said promise. This defense is, therefore, also without merit.
It is next contended by the defendant-appellee that Maxima Santos complied with her above-mentioned promise, — that Andres 81. Don Tomas, Sexmoan, Pampanga 21.6435    "    
Pascual, Tomasa Avelino, Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pimpin and Marta Gervacio Blas were given substancial legacies in the will 82. Matikling, Lubao, Pampanga       16.0000    "    
and testament of Maxima Santos. To determine whether she had actually complied with the promise made in Exhibit "A", there
          Total area ............................... 1045.7863    "    
is herein set forth a list only of the fishponds and their respective areas as contained in the list of properties she acquired as her
share in the conjugal partnership, which list includes, besides many ricelands as well as residential lots, thus:                     (See Record on Record, pp. 195-241.)
31. Paco, Obando, Bulacan 5.8396 has. In her will, Maxima Santos devised to Marta Gervacio Blas the 80-hectare fishpond situated in Lubao, Pampanga. The fishpond
devised is evidently that designated as "Propios" in Lubao, Pampanga, item No. 8 in the list of properties adjudicated to her in
32. Pangjolo, Obando 3.5857    "    
the project of partition. (Record on Appeal, p. 215.) Considering that the total area of the fishponds amount to 1045.7863
34. Batang Pirasuan, Lubao, Pampanga 11.9515    "     hectares, the 80 hectares devised to Marta Gervacio Blas is not even one-tenth of the total area of the fishponds. Add to this the
35. Calangian, Lubao, Pampanga 30.2059    "     fact that in the will she imposed upon Marta Gervacio Blas de Chivi an existing obligation on said fishponds, namely, its lease
in 1957 and the duty to pay out of the rentals thereof an obligation to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation RFC ( Ibid., pp.
38. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 215.4325    "     262-263.) Angelina Blas was given only a lot of 150 square meters in Hulong Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, and Leony Blas, the sum
39. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 8.3763    "     of P300.00 (Ibid., p. 264.)
40. Bangkal, Sinubli 23.0730    "     It is evident from a consideration of the above figures and facts that Maxima Santos did not comply with her obligation to
devise one-half of her conjugal properties to the heirs and legatees of her husband. She does not state that she had complied
41. Tagulod, 6.8692    "     with such obligation in her will. If she intended to comply therewith by giving some of the heirs of Simeon Blas the properties

10
mentioned above, the most that can be considered in her favor is to deduct the value of said properties from the total amount of
properties which she had undertaken to convey upon her death.
All the issues in the pleadings of the parties and in their respective briefs, have now been fully discussed and considered.
Reiterating what we have stated above, we declare that by Exhibit "A", a compromise to avoid litigation, Maxima Santos
promised to devise to the heirs and legatees of her husband Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she received as her share in
the conjugal partnership of herself and her husband, which share is specified in the project of partition submitted by herself on
March 14, 1939 in the settlement of the estate of her husband, and which is found on pages 195 to 240 of the record on appeal
and on pages 27 to 46 of the project of partition, submitted by Maxima Santos herself before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in Civil Case No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de Bias, Administradora";
and that she failed to comply with her aforementioned obligation. (Exhibit "A")
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellee, administratrix of the estate of
Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated o Maxima Santos as her share in the
conjugal properties in said Civil Case No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de
Blas, Administradora", to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas. Considering that all said heirs and legatees,
designated in the will of Simeon Blas as the persons for whose benefit Exhibit "A" had been executed, have not appeared in
these proceedings, the record is hereby remanded to the court below, with instructions that, after the conveyance of the
properties hereinabove ordered had been effected, the said heirs and legatees (of Simeon Blas) file adversary pleadings to
determine the participation of each and every one of them in said properties. Costs against the defendant- appellee Rosalina
Santos.
G.R. No. 165300               April 23, 2010
ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA COMANDANTE and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO PANGAN
and ELIZABETH PANGAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The basic questions to be resolved in this case are: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir
while the parents are still living valid? Is an adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the basis of such waiver
likewise valid and effective as to bind the subsequent owners and hold them liable to the claimant?
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the December 12, 2003 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70888. 3 Said Decision modified the June 14, 2001 Summary Judgment 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 by holding respondents Spouses Bienvenido and
Elizabeth Pangan (the Pangans) not solidarily liable with the other respondents, Spouses Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the Diazes)
and Reina Comandante (Comandante), to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer). Likewise assailed is the CA
Resolution5 dated September 10, 2004 which denied petitioner’s as well as respondents Spouses Diaz and Comandante’s
respective motions for reconsideration.
The parties’ respective versions of the factual antecedents are as follows:
Version of the Petitioner
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint 6 that on May 7, 1999, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter
Comandante, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), 7 obtained from him a loan of ₱1,118,228.00. The loan was secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract 8 by way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-6604 9 and a
Promissory Note10 payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated
checks to secure payment of said loan.
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a valuable consideration of ₱600,000.00,
which amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), 11  the pertinent portions of which read:
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence and postal address at No. 6, Road 20, Project 8,
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, for a valuable consideration of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ( ₱600,000.00)
which constitutes my legal obligation/loan to Pedro M. Ferrer, likewise of legal age, Filipino, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with
residence and postal address at No. 9, Lot 4, Puerto Rico Street, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
by virtue of these presents, do hereby WAIVE, and/or REPUDIATE all my hereditary rights and interests as a legitimate
heir/daughter of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz in favor of said Pedro M. Ferrer, his heirs and assigns over a certain
parcel of land together with all the improvements found thereon and which property is more particularly described as follows:
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887
xxxx
and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT 6604 (82020) PR-18887.
(sgd.)
REINA D. COMANDANTE
Affiant
On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim 12 which he caused to be annotated at the back of
TCT No. RT-6604 on May 26, 1999.
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment.
Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29,
1999 a Complaint13 for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and
Comandante docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 and raffled to Branch 224 of RTC, Quezon City.
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative relief the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage 14 and,
second, by impleading as additional defendants the Pangans as the mortgaged property covered by TCT No. RT-6604 was
already transferred under their names in TCT No. N-209049. Petitioner prayed in his second amended complaint that all the
respondents be ordered to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum of ₱1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial
foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage Contract.
Version of the Respondents
In her Answer15 to petitioner’s original complaint, Comandante alleged that petitioner and his wife were her fellow members in
the Couples for Christ Movement. Sometime in 1998, she sought the help of petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a bank
of her parents’ lot located at No. 6, Rd. 20, Project 8, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. RT-6604. She also sought financial
accommodations from the couple on several occasions which totaled ₱500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these
loans were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several postdated checks she issued in favor of
petitioner.
As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his wife, presented to Comandante sometime in May
1998 a document denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining
to a waiver of her hereditary share over her parents’ abovementioned property. Purportedly, the execution of said waiver was to
secure Comandante’s loan with the couple which at that time had already ballooned to ₱600,000.00 due to interests.
A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following documents: (1) a Real Estate Mortgage Contract over
her parents’ property; and, (2) an undated Promissory Note, both corresponding to the amount of ₱1,118,228.00, which
petitioner claimed to be the total amount of Comandante’s monetary obligation to him exclusive of charges and interests.
Comandante alleged that she reminded petitioner that she was not the registered owner of the subject property and that although
her parents granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the property to banks and other financial
institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner nonetheless assured Comandante that the SPA was also applicable to their
transaction. As Comandante was still hesitant, petitioner and his wife threatened to foreclose the former’s taxi units and present
the postdated checks she issued to the bank for payment. For fear of losing her taxi units which were the only source of her
livelihood, Comandante was thus constrained to sign the mortgage agreement as well as the promissory note. Petitioner,
however, did not furnish her with copies of said documents on the pretext that they still have to be notarized, but, as can be
gleaned from the records, the documents were never notarized. Moreover, Comandante claimed that the SPA alluded to by
petitioner in his complaint was not the same SPA under which she thought she derived the authority to execute the mortgage
contract.
Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o‘ clock in the morning, she executed an Affidavit of
Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A (Still Undivided) Real Property, 16 which she
caused to be annotated on the title of the subject property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on the same day.
Interestingly, petitioner filed his complaint later that day too.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in her Answer to the amended complaint 17 that said complaint
states no cause of action against her because the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his
complaint were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her; that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) is a useless document as its execution is prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil Code, 18 hence, it
cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioner’s favor; that the Real Estate Mortgage was of doubtful validity as
11
she executed the same without valid authority from her parents; and, that the prayer for collection and/or judicial foreclosure
was irregular as petitioner cannot seek said remedies at the same time.
Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed on October 4, 1999 a Petition for Cancellation of
Adverse Claim (P.E. 2468) Under The Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 19 docketed as
LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) and raffled to Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City. Petitioner who was impleaded as respondent
therein moved for the consolidation of said case 20 with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. On June 24, 2000, Branch 220 of RTC,
Quezon City ordered the consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. Accordingly, the
records of the former case was forwarded to Branch 224.
For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action against them. They claimed that they do not even know
petitioner and that they did not execute any SPA in favor of Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the
subject property. They also contested the due execution of the SPA as it was neither authenticated before the Philippine
Consulate in the United States nor notarized before a notary public in the State of New York where the Diazes have been
residing for 16 years. They claimed that they do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also pointed out that the complaint
merely refers to Comandante’s personal obligation to petitioner with which they had nothing to do. They thus prayed that the
complaint against them be dismissed.21
At the Pangans’ end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith and for a consideration of
₱3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latter’s daughter Comandante who was clothed with SPA
acknowledged before the Consul of New York. The Pangans immediately took actual possession of the property without anyone
complaining or protesting. Soon thereafter, they were issued TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No. RT-6604 which was
cancelled. 22
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by petitioner that the subject land had been
mortgaged to him by the Diazes. Upon inquiry from Comandante, the latter readily admitted that she has a personal loan with
petitioner for which the mortgage of the property in petitioner’s favor was executed. She admitted, though, that her parents were
not aware of such mortgage and that they did not authorize her to enter into such contract. Comandante also informed the
Pangans that the signatures of her parents appearing on the SPA are fictitious and that it was petitioner who prepared such
document.
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot
impair their rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over
a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioner’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest
over the property considering that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract cannot bind them nor in any way impair their ownership
of subject property because it was not registered before the Register of Deeds. 23
All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
in varying amounts.
After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes filed on March 29, 2001 a Motion for Summary
Judgment24 alleging that: first, since the documents alluded to by petitioner in his complaint were defective, he was not entitled
to any legal right or relief; and, second, it was clear from the pleadings that it is Comandante who has an outstanding obligation
with petitioner which the latter never denied. With these, the Diazes believed that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact against them and, hence, they were entitled to summary judgment.
On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 25 claiming that his suit against the respondents is
meritorious and well-founded and that same is documented and supported by law and jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse
claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604, which was carried over in TCT No. 209049 under the names of the Pangans,
is not merely anchored on the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante, but also on the Real Estate Mortgage likewise executed by her in representation of her parents and in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner insisted that said adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid and is registrable under Section 70 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City had already determined the sufficiency
and/or validity of such registration by annotating said claim, and this, respondents failed to question. Petitioner further averred
that even before the sale and transfer to the Pangans of the subject property, the latter were already aware of the existence of his
adverse claim. In view of these, petitioner prayed that his Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the filing of the parties’ respective Oppositions to the said motions for summary judgment, the trial court, in an Order
dated May 31, 2001,26 deemed both motions for summary judgment submitted for resolution. Quoting substantially petitioner’s
allegations in his Motion for Summary Judgment, it thereafter rendered on June 14, 2001 a Summary Judgment 27 in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants by:
a) ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (₱1,118,228.00) which is blood money of
plaintiff;
b) ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City that the rights and interest of the plaintiff over
subject property be annotated at the back of T.C.T. No. N-209049;
c) SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiff’s expenses of TEN THOUSAND PESOS ( ₱10,000.00) and to pay
the costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA. 29 The Pangans faulted the trial court in holding them jointly and
severally liable with the Diazes and Comandante for the satisfaction of the latter’s personal obligation to petitioner in the total
amount of ₱1,118,228.00. The Diazes and Comandante, on the other hand, imputed error upon the trial court in rendering
summary judgment in favor of petitioner. They averred that assuming the summary judgment was proper, the trial court should
not have considered the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they were defective, as well as petitioner’s
frivolous and non-registrable adverse claim.
In its Decision30 dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights null and void. However,
it found the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Comandante on behalf of her parents as binding between the parties thereto.
As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding upon them as they were purchasers in good
faith and for value. The property was free from the mortgage encumbrance of petitioner when they acquired it as they only came
to know of the adverse claim through petitioner’s phone call which came right after the former’s acquisition of the property. The
CA further ruled that as Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights and interests upon which petitioner’s adverse claim was
based is a nullity, it could not be a source of any right in his favor. Hence, the Pangans were not bound to take notice of such
claim and are thus not liable to petitioner.
Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the Summary Judgment as raised by the Diazes
and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA merely modified the assailed Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the
Pangans among those solidarily liable to petitioner, in effect affirming in all other respects the assailed summary judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil
Case No. Q-99-38876 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of Php
1,118, 228.00; and
2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the amount of
Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.31
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the CA in its Resolution 33 dated September 10, 2004, he now
comes to us through this petition for review on certiorari insisting that the Pangans should, together with the other respondents,
be held solidarily liable to him for the amount of ₱1,118,228.00.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for Summary Judgment he filed before the trial court. He insists that
his Adverse Claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 is not merely anchored on Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over A Real Property (Still Undivided) but also on her being the attorney-in-fact of the Diazes when she
executed the mortgage contract in favor of petitioner. He avers that his adverse claim is not frivolous or invalid and is
registrable as the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City even allowed its annotation. He also claims that even prior to the sale of
subject property to the Pangans, the latter already knew of his valid and existing adverse claim thereon and are, therefore, not
purchasers in good faith. Thus, petitioner maintains that the Pangans should be held, together with the Diazes and Comandante,
jointly and severally liable to him in the total amount of ₱1,118,228.00.
Petitioner’s contentions are untenable.
The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part:
xxxx
1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of compulsory heir’s share over an undivided certain parcel of land together
with all the improvements found therein x x x as evidenced by Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A
12
 Real Property, executed by REINA D. COMANDANTE (a compulsory/legitimate heir of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and
Imelda G. Diaz), x x x.
2. That in order to protect my interest over said property as a Recipient/Benefactor, for the registered owners/parents
might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same in a fraudulent manner without my knowledge and consent, for the
owner’s duplicate title was not surrendered to me, it is petitioned that this Affidavit of Adverse Claim be
ANNOTATED at the back of the said title particularly on the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to attest (to) the truth of the foregoing facts and to petition the
Honorable Registrar of Deeds, Quezon City, to annotate this Affidavit of Adverse Claim at the back of the said title
particularly the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with
the said office, so that my interest as Recipient/Benefactor of the said property will be protected especially the
registered owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same without my
knowledge and consent. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the waiver of hereditary interest executed by Comandante.
This fact cannot be any clearer especially so when the inscription of his adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 reads as
follows:
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - - Executed under oath by PEDRO M. FERRER,
married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming among others that they have a claim, the interest over said property as
Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of a waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a real property x x x34 (Emphasis ours)
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s assertion that the adverse claim was also anchored on the mortgage contract
allegedly executed by Comandante on behalf of her parents.
The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights valid? Is petitioner’s adverse claim based on
such waiver likewise valid and effective?
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioner’s adverse claim should have been determined by the trial court after the
petition for cancellation of petitioner’s adverse claim filed by Comandante was consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-99-
38876.35 This is in consonance with Section 70 of PD 1529 which provides:
Section 70. Adverse Claim. –  Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which
the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices
may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The
adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period,  the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest : Provided,
however, That after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is
situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of validity of
such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse
claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five
thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the
Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been held that the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse
claim may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the
immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is only when such claim
is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled. 36
As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any showing that the trial court conducted any hearing on the
matter. Instead, what the trial court did was to include this material issue among those for which it has rendered its summary
judgment as shown by the following portion of the judgment:
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020)
PR-18887, and carried over to defendants-Sps. Pangan’s Title No. N-20909, is not merely anchored on defendant Reina
Comandante’s "Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property" but also on her being the Attorney-In-Fact of
the previous registered owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and Imelda Diaz about the Real Estate Mortgage Contract for a
loan of ₱1,118,228.00 which is a blood money of the plaintiff. Moreover, subject Adverse Claim in LRC Case No. Q-12009
(99) is NOT frivolous and invalid and consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue of Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (now
Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529). 37 (Emphasis ours)
It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the claim of petitioner that his adverse claim subject of LRC
Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not frivolous, invalid and is consequently registrable. We likewise lament the apparent lack of effort
on the part of said court to make even a short ratiocination as to how it came up with said conclusion. In fact, what followed the
above-quoted portion of the summary judgment are mere recitals of the arguments raised by petitioner in his motion for
summary judgment. And in the dispositive portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that petitioner’s adverse claim be
inscribed at the back of the title of the Pangans. What is worse is that despite this glaring defect, the CA manifestly overlooked
the matter even if respondents vigorously raised the same before it.
Be that as it may, respondents’ efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we find significant, have not gone to naught as will be
hereinafter discussed.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed
by Comandante is null and void for being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioner’s adverse claim which
was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or interest over the property.
We agree with the respondents.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered "future", the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the
second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. 38
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are
still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of
Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and,
such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance
as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in
petitioner’s favor.
In Tañedo v. Court of Appeals,39  we invalidated the contract of sale between Lazaro Tañedo and therein private respondents
since the subject matter thereof was a "one hectare of whatever share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey
of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac."   It constitutes a part of
Tañedo’s future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between
the parties.
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any
right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioner’s adverse claim, it is provided in Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that
the claimant has a right or interest in the registered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to
registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject property flows from Comandante’s invalid waiver of hereditary rights
upon petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioner’s adverse claim is
without any basis and must consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled.
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not stop here as the Diazes and Comandante in their
Comment40 call our attention to the failure of the CA to pass upon the issue of the propriety of the issuance by the trial court of
the Summary Judgment in favor of petitioner despite the fact that they have raised this issue before the appellate court. They
argue that summary judgment is proper only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. Thus,
where the defendant presented defenses tendering factual issue which call for presentation of evidence, as when he specifically
denies the material allegations in the complaint, summary judgment cannot be rendered.
The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case which they claim should have precluded the trial
court from issuing a summary judgment in petitioner’s favor. First, the execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to
13
by petitioner in his complaint was never admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as such fact is disputed, trial should have been
conducted to determine the truth of the matter, same being a genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court merely took the word of
the plaintiff and assumed that said document was indeed executed by them. Second, although Comandante acknowledges that
she has a personal obligation with petitioner, she nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount of ₱1,118,228.00.
Instead, she claims only the amount of ₱500,000.00 or ₱600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. Moreover, the
Diazes deny borrowing any money from petitioner and neither did the Pangans owe him a single centavo. Thus, the true amount
of the obligation due the petitioner and how each of the respondents are responsible for such amount are genuine issues which
need formal presentation of evidence. Lastly, they aver that the trial court ignored factual and material issues such as the lack of
probative value of Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights as well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante signed the
mortgage contract and promissory note in her personal capacity; and, that all such documents were prepared by petitioner who
acted as a lawyer and the creditor of Comandante at the same time.
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent provisions of which are the following:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or
a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing.
After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a procedural devise resorted to in order to avoid long
drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried,
the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not in
dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the
pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such fact which requires the presentation
of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. 41
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the coverage of summary judgment. The variance in
the allegations of the parties in their pleadings is evident.
Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on the alleged real estate mortgage over the
subject property allegedly entered into by Comandante in behalf of her parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to
₱1,118,228.00. To support this claim, petitioner attached to his complaint (1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by the
Diazes; (2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract pertaining to the amount of ₱1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory Note.
Comandante, in her Answer to petitioner’s Amended Complaint, assailed the validity and due execution of the abovementioned
documents. She asserted that the same were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her and that it was petitioner who
prepared all of them. Also, although she admitted owing petitioner, same was not an absolute admission as she limited herself to
an obligation amounting only to ₱600,000.00 inclusive of charges and interests. She likewise claimed that such obligation is her
personal obligation and not of her parents.
The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing their daughter to mortgage their property to
petitioner as well as having any obligation to the latter.
Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of evidence. For one, it is necessary to ascertain in a
full blown trial the validity and due execution of the SPA, the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the
determination of the following equally significant questions depends on them, to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner
or is the obligation a purely personal obligation of Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum of ₱1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real
Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine
issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial. 42 From the foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court should have refrained from
issuing the summary judgment but instead proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view of this, the present case
should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper disposition according to the rudiments of a regular trial
on the merits and not through an abbreviated termination of the case by summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 12, 2003 insofar as it
excluded the respondents Spouses Bienvenido Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan from among those solidarily liable to petitioner
Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer, is AFFIRMED. The inscription of the adverse claim of petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer on T.C.T. No.
N-209049 is hereby ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as its other aspects are concerned, the assailed Decision is  SET ASIDE
and VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999
ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA
VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and
ESTHER VILLALON, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 31976 1, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City 2, which rendered inofficious
the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of herein petitioner, to the extent that it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial,
and ordering petitioner to convey to herein private respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial, that portion of the donated land
proportionate to Victor Imperial's legitime.
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his
acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several
lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the transaction
was in fact a donation.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute
Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by
petitioner herein into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 3 , under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the
legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square
meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case
of Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs — the herein
petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted
in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the
motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo
Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving
as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the donation with the Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of  res judicata, by
virtue of the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, Civil Case No. 7646, for "Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession" with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the
amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the
latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the
legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest. 4
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient property to Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of
563 hectares of agricultural land in Manito, Albay; (2) reiterated the defense of res judicata, and (3) raised the additional
defenses of prescription and laches.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, and was
substituted in this action by his sons, namely, Antonio, Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all surnamed Villalon, and his
widow, Esther H. Villalon.
14
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of
Leoncio's death, he left no property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner. The
RTC went on further to state that petitioner's allegation that other properties existed and were inherited by Victor was not
substantiated by the evidence. 5
The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this manner:
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters, one half of that or 16,418 square meters
becomes the free portion of Leoncio which could be absorbed in the donation to defendant. The other half,
which is also 16,418 square meters is where the legitime of the adopted son Victor Imperial has to be
taken.
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child (including the adopted child) in relation to the
acknowledged natural child (defendant) is 10 is to 5[,] with the acknowledged natural child getting 1/2 of
the legitime of the legitimate (adopted) child, in accordance with Art. 895 of the New Civil Code which
provides:
The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the natural
children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the
legitimate children or descendants.
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has been taken) plaintiffs are therefore entitled to
10,940 square meters while defendant gets 5,420 square meters. 6
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code  7, reckoned
from March 15, 1962, when the writ of execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that the
original complaint having been filed in 1986, the action has not yet prescribed. In addition, the trial court regarded the defense
of prescription as having been waived, this not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision of December 13, 1990 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale otherwise known as Doc. No. 8; Book
No. 14; Page No. 1; Series of 1951 of the Notarial file of Pompeyo B. Calleja which is considered a
donation, is hereby reduced proportionately insofar as it affected the legitime of the late Victor Imperial,
which share is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent that plaintiffs are ordered to be given by
defendant a portion of 10,940 square meters thereof.
In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given to plaintiffs should include the portion
which they are presently occupying, by virtue of the extended lease to their father Ricardo Villalon, where
the bungalow in question stands.
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from any other portion that may be agreed upon
by the parties, otherwise, this court will appoint a commissioner to undertake the partition.
The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as part of his legitime and by virtue of the
reduced donation.
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not sufficiently proved.
SO ORDERED. 8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
Before us, petitioner questions the following findings of respondent court: (1) that there was no  res judicata, there being no
identity of parties and cause of action between the instant case and Civil Case No. 1177; (2) that private respondents had a right
to question the donation; (3) that private respondents' action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; and (4) that the
donation was inofficious and should be reduced.
It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be, between the first and second action, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. 9 A perusal of the records leads us to conclude that there is no identity of parties and of cause of
action as between Civil Case No. 1177 and Civil Case No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by Leoncio in his capacity
as donor of the questioned donation. While it is true that upon his death, Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the action, such
does not alter the fact that Victor's participation in the case was in representation of the interests of the original plaintiff,
Leoncio. The purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of the estate 10, or his heir, as in this case, for
which no court appointment is required. 11 Petitioner's argument, therefore, that there is substantial identity between Leoncio
and private respondents, being heirs and successors-in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Moreover, Leoncio's cause of action as donor of the property was fraud, purportedly employed upon him by petitioner in the
execution of the donation. While the same circumstances of fraud and deceit are alleged in private respondents' complaint, it
also raises the additional ground of inofficiousness of donation.
Contrary to petitioner's contentions, inofficiousness of donation does not, and could not, form part of Leoncio's cause of action
in Civil Case No. 1177. Inofficiousness as a cause of action may arise only upon the death of the donor, as the value of the
donation will then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor-deceased. 12
Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the revocation in full of the donation on ground of fraud, the
instant case actually has two alternative causes of action. First, for fraud and deceit, under the same circumstances as alleged in
Leoncio's complaint, which seeks the annulment in full of the donation, and which the trial court correctly dismissed because
the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 1177 served as a ratification and waiver on the part of Leoncio of whatever defects
in voluntariness and consent may have been attendant in the making of the donation. The second cause of action is the alleged
inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment of Victor's legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire
donation, but only of that portion diminishing the legitime. 13 It is on the basis of this second cause of action that private
respondents prevailed in the lower courts.
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to contest the donation. Petitioner sources his argument from Article
772 of the Civil Code, thus:
Only those who at the time of the donor's death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors
in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious donations . . . .
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation.
However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177
and even moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be remembered that at the time of the
substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the
execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act
on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition
presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter's death, his act of moving for execution of the
compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped
from subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his death, precluded
from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053:
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to
his heirs.
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioner's other assignment of errors. Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of
an inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable
prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a "real action
over an immovable" allots undue credence to private respondents' description of their complaint, as one for "Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property", which suggests the action to be, in part, a real action
enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land.1âwphi1.nêt
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. In the recent case of  Vizconde vs.
Court of
Appeals 14, we declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the
time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance,
hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 15
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the
following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition
or adoption of a child; 16 (2) four years, for non-compliance with conditions of the donation; 17 and (3) at any time during the
lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their
support. 18 Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, 19 the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of
legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of
prescription.
15
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations,
required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction
for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the
death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the
legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
As for the trial court's holding that the defense of prescription had been waived, it not being one of the issues agreed upon at
pre-trial, suffice it to say that while the terms of the pre-trial order bind the parties as to the matters to be taken up in trial, it
would be the height of injustice for us to adhere to this technicality when the fact of prescription is manifest in the pleadings of
the parties, as well as the findings of fact of the lower courts. 20
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has prescription set in, private respondents are also guilty of estoppel
by laches. It may be recalled that Leoncio died on January 8, 1962. Fifteen years later, Victor died, leaving as his sole heir
Ricardo Villalon, who also died four years later. While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the
donation of his deceased father. As we have discussed earlier, the fact that he actively participated in Civil Case No. 1177 did
not amount to a renunciation of his inheritance and does not preclude him from bringing an action to claim his legitime. These
are matters that Victor could not possibly be unaware of, considering that he is a lawyer 21. Ricardo Villalon was even a lessee
of a portion of the donated property, and could have instituted the action as sole heir of his natural son, or at the very least,
raised the matter of legitime by way of counterclaim in an ejectment case 22 filed against him by petitioner in 1979. Neither does
it help private respondents' cause that five years have elapsed since the death of Ricardo in 1981 before they filed their
complaint with the RTC.
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined
to assert it. 23 We find the necessity for the application of the principle of estoppel by laches in this case, in order to avoid an
injustice.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the donation to be inofficious because Leoncio had no
other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property.
Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as Victor's legitime. This was
upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the
following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations
and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all donations subject
to collation would be added to it. 24
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself, which is brought to collation.
Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired Victor's legitime, private
respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an
immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature, class and
quality; 25 (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities;  26 or (3) in
the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public
auction. 27
We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on grounds of prescription and laches.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 31976, affirming  in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646, is reversed and set aside. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and
JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
 
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory
still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her
estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken
care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the
court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they
filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of
the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as
intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo
Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective
estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and
other taxes due to the government.1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to
his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended
period
granted.2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith
issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and
executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender
to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to
surrender the TCT's, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their
names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated January
30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely
"interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an
Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two
assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents before the Court of
Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that
in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to
hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order
which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to maintain the  status quo or
lease of the premises thereon to third parties. 3 Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no
interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the
entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or
orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been
ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains
finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such
order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the
will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical
questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final order makes the will conclusive against the
whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated,7 particularly on three aspects:
n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will
and testament;
16
 n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of
wills;
n the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8
n and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the
time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and
that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly
prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically
valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of
their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot
be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be
disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party
had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of
the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was
aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As
early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments
of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei
publicae ut finis sit litium — the very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.  15 To fulfill
this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful.  16 The
only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence,  17 which
circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an
unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were
declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the
same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise
those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum
shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court.  18 It is clear from the
executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In
support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled
cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no project of
partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of
Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it
should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to the
laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again
re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is preferred to
intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by
law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that
the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No
intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity.
If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid,
the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of
succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof
were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he
described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of
properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect.
Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly
ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not married to the late
Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 138774            March 8, 2001
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the
property of her father to his illegitimate children?
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 declaring void the deed of sale
of two parcels of land conveyed to petitioners who are illegitimate children of the deceased to the exclusion of respondent, his
sole legitimate daughter.
The facts2 are:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz,
who are now both deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with
whom he begot seven (7) children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his
daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, 3 Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that
Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa Ganap na
Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale,
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. 4
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with
damages.5 She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated
August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. After due
proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law applicable thereon, the Court hereby renders
judgment:
"a) sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan" (Exh."G") executed on 15 August 1993 by the late
Gregorio Francisco in favor of the defendants;
"b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-59.585 (Exh. "I") issued to defendant Regina
Francisco and No. T-59.386 (Exh. "H") issued to defendant Zenaida Pascual; and
"c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants' counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees for lack of
merit." 6
In time7, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.8
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
rendered as follows:
"1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983 (Exhibit "G") is declared null and void from the
beginning and TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59-586 (M), both of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan
Branch) in the names of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual, respectively, are annulled and cancelled;
"2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to cancel the aforementioned TCT Nos. T-
59.585 (M) and T-59.586 (M) and to reinstate Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-132740 and T-117160 both in the
name of Gregorio Francisco.
17
 "3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual jointly and solidarily are ordered to pay plaintiff-
appellant Alfonso the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
"4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of merit.
"Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees." 9
Hence, this petition.10
The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the appellate court. The jurisdiction of
this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to review
of pure errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing
that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.11
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties and are
not reviewable by this Court,12 unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule. 13
Petitioner has failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions. 14
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of
the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they
bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991. 15
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in
Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the
Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank.
Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club. 16
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She
bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. 17 She had no other source of income.
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could
save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration
for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even
present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void. 18
Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code 19 provisions insofar as the transaction affected
respondent's legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters 20 at the expense of his legitimate
daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property.
Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of
the mother.
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving
spouse as hereinafter provided."
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their
father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of
her father as his only legitimate child. 21
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the
estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 48545 is
AFFIRMED, in toto.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-
appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal
beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an
Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His
will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was
appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00
por accion ................................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad, residentes en Manila,
I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a
favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca Santa Cruz Building, lo
ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados, en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del
querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE
PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de
Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con
sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:—
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina
Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis
Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las usufiructuarias nombradas
conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto
delegado, sin intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided
into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion"
shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the
widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
18
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of
Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with
respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions
for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within
the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines
in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants,
violates the testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in
its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They admit that the
testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow
or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she
is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears that the court  a
quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the
estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which
is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more
than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and
tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in
default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple
or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although
the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and
the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case
such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the
inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance,
shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at
time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the
appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar
reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y
fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow
Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the
estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because
she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes
refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is
valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following
reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art.
863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from
the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission. The
Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be
only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa,
Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has
obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree
"from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to
and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These
are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of
the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution
when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only
succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which
enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest
title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de
Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-2277 December 29, 1950
MONICO CONCEPCION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PACIENCIA STA. ANA, defendant-appellee.
Yap and Garcia for appellant.
Tomas Yumol for appellee.
FERIA, J.:
An action was instituted by Monico Concepcion vs. Paciencia Sta. Ana to annul the sale made by the late Perpetua Concepcion,
sister of the plaintiff, of three parcels of land with the improvements thereon to the defendant. The complaint alleges, among
others, that the plaintiff is the only surviving legitimate brother of Perpetua Concepcion, who died on or about January 28, 1948,
without issue and without leaving any will; that in her life time or on about June 29, 1945, said Perpetua Concepcion, in
connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, sold and conveyed three parcels of land for a false and
fictitious consideration to the defendant, who secured transfer certificates of title of said lands issued under her name; and that
19
the defendant has been in possession of the properties sold since the death of Perpetua Concepcion, thereby causing damages to
the plaintiff in the amount of not less than two hundred (P200) pesos.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, because the deceased
being the owner of the properties sold had the right to enjoy and dispose of them without further limitation than those
established by law.
The Court of First Instance of Manila granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint on the ground that "the
plaintiff is not a party to the deed of sale executed by Perpetua Concepcion in favor of the defendant. Even in the assumption
that the consideration of the contract is fictitious, the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendant. Under article 1302 of
the Civil Code, "the action to annul a contract may be brought by any person principally or subsidiarily bound thereby." The
plaintiff is not bound by the deed of sale executed by the deceased in favor of the defendant. He has no obligation under the
deed."
Plaintiff appealed from the order of the court dismissing his complaint, and now assigns as erroneous the order appealed from
on the following grounds: (1) that a simulated or fictitious sale for a fictitious or false consideration is null and void  per se or
non-existence, hence it cannot transfer ownership; and (2) that according to article 1302 of the same code, "the action to annul a
contract may be brought by a person principally or subsidiarily bound thereby," and as under article 1257 of the Civil Code
"contracts shall be binding only upon the parties who make them and their heirs," the plaintiff as heir of the deceased
contracting party can bring action to annul the contract of sale under consideration.
(1) The plaintiff's contention that a simulated or fictitious contract of sale with a false consideration is null and void  per se, or is
a contrato inexistente, not merely a contrato nulo, is not correct. Article 1276 of the Civil Code 1 expressly provides that "the
statement of a false consideration in contract shall be ground for annulment," and article 1301 of the same code provided for the
limitation of actions for annulment of a contract.
In support of his contention that the contract of sale under consideration being a fictitious contract or contract with a false
consideration is null per se or non-existent, plaintiff quotes Manresa's comment on article 1274 to 1277, Vol. 8, p. 623, which
says: "Recognizing this analogy, it was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that a fictitious contract, or contract entered into
with false consideration does not confer any right or produce any legal effect, citing the judgments of the Supreme Court of
Spain of October 31, 1865, of March 21, 1884, and of November 23, 1877." Appellant's conclusion is not correct. By stating
that contracts with false consideration confer no right and produce no legal effect, Manresa does not mean to say that they are
null and void  per se or non-existent as contradistinguished from annullable, for the effects of both non-existent and annullable
contracts that have been annulled are the same: they confer no right and produce no legal effect. What Manresa says on page
700 of the same volume, commenting on article 1301, is the following: "The expression of a false cause or consideration in the
contract does not make it non-existent, and it shall only be a ground for an action for nullity as provided by article 1276 and
confirmed by article 1301 of the Civil Code. There are some who consider this somewhat confused under the Code; for us it is
very clear, for the code repeatedly provides that the effect of a false consideration is limited to making the contract voidable,
and we have already pointed out that in this particular, our Civil Code has deviated deliberately from the French Code, which
includes indistinctly in one and the same provision contracts without consideration and contracts in which the consideration is
illicit or false."
In the case of De Belen vs. Collector of Customs and Sheriff of Manila (46 Phil. 241), this court, through Mr. Justice Street, said
that "The distinction between entire absence of contract (inexistencia) and the situation requiring an action of rescission or
nullity is fully expounded by Manresa in his comment on article 1300 of the Civil Code (q.v.)."
(2) As to the appellant's second and last contention, under the law action to annul a contract entered into with all the requisites
mentioned in article 1261 whenever they are tainted with the vice which invalidate them in accordance with law, may be
brought, not only by any person principally bound or who made them, but also by his heir to whom the right and obligation
arising from the contract are transmitted. Hence if no such rights, actions or obligations have been transmitted to the heir, the
latter can not bring an action to annul the contract in representation of the contracting party who made it. In  Wolfson vs. Estate
of Martinez, 20 Phil., 340, this Supreme Court quoted with approval the judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 18,
1901, in which it was held that "he who is not a party to a contract, or an assignee thereunder, or does not represent those who
took part therein, has under articles 1257 and 1302 of the Civil Code no legal capacity to challenge the validity of such
contract." And in Irlanda vs. Pitargue (22 Phil. 383) we held that "the testamentary or legal heir continues in law as the juridical
personality of his predecessor in interest, who transmit to him from the moment of his death such of his rights, actions and
obligations as are not extinguished thereby."lawphil.net
The question to be resolved is, therefore, whether the deceased Perpetua Concepcion has transmitted to the plaintiff any right
arising from the contract under consideration in order that he can bring an action to annul the sale voluntarily made by her to the
defendant with a false consideration.
We are of the opinion and so hold, that the late Perpetua Concepcion has not transmitted to the plaintiff any right arising from
the contract of conveyance or sale of her lands to the defendant, and therefore the plaintiff cannot file an action to annul such
contract as representative of the deceased.
According to the complaint, the deceased, in connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, (that is, in
order not to leave the properties above mentioned upon her death to the plaintiff) sold and conveyed them to the latter, for a
false and fictitious consideration. It is, therefore obvious, that the conveyance or sale of said properties to the defendant was
voluntarily made by the deceased to said defendant. As the deceased had no forced heir, she was free to dispose of all her
properties as absolute owner thereof, without further limitation than those established by law, and the right to dispose of a thing
involves the right to give or to convey it to another without any consideration. The only limitation established by law on her
right to convey said properties to the defendant without any consideration is, that she could not dispose of or transfer her
property to another in fraud of her creditors. And this court, in Solis vs. Chua Pua Hermanos (50 Phil. 636), through Mr. Justice
Street, held that "a voluntary conveyance, without any consideration whatever, is prima facie good as between the parties, and
such an instrument can not be declared fraudulent as against creditors in the absence of proof, that there was at the time of the
execution of the conveyance a creditor who could be defrauded by the conveyance, 27 C. J., 470."
Even a forced heir of the deceased Perpetua Concepcion would have no right to institute as representative of the decedent, an
action of nullity of a contract made by the decedent to defraud his creditors, because such a contract being considered illicit
under article 1306 of the Civil Code, Perpetua Concepcion herself had no right of action to annul it and recover the properties
she had conveyed to the defendant. But the forced heir could in such case bring an action to rescind the contract under article
1291 (3) of the Civil Code. Manresa in his comments on articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code (4th edition, volume 8, pp.
717, 718), says: "As to heirs, it is interesting that the judgment of May 6, 1902, of the Supreme Court of Spain which denied a
forced heir the right to institute an action to annul contracts considered a illicit, for having been entered into by his predecessor
in interest for the purpose of depriving the forced heir of his legitime. The judgment purported to hold that the proper action
would have been an action to rescind conformity with what we indicated in commenting on article 1291, and declared that 'even
forced heirs who accept an inheritance under the benefit of inventory are within the rule 2 of article 1806, that denies to the
guilty party the right to recover anything he may have given, or to enforce the performance of any undertaking in his favor,
when the other party has nothing to do with the illicit consideration; a doctrine laid down in the judgment of July 4, 1896.'"
The reason why a forced heir has the right to institute an action of rescission is that the right to the legitime is similar to a credit
of a creditor. As the same Spanish author correctly states in commenting on article 1291 of the Civil Code: "The rights of a
forced heir to the legitime are undoubtedly similar to a credit of a creditor in so far as the rights to the legitime may be defeated
by fraudulent contracts, and are superior to the will of those bound to respect them. In its judgment of October 28, 1897, the
Supreme Court of Spain held that the forced heirs instituted as such by their father to the latter's testament have the undeniable
right to institute an action to annul contracts entered into by the father to their prejudice. As it is seen the action is called action
of nullity, but it is rather an action of rescission taking into account the purpose for which it is instituted and the confusion of
ideas that has prevailed in this matter. The doctrine we shall expound in commenting on articles 1302 and 1306 will confirm
what we have just stated." (Manresa Codigo Civil, 4th edition, Vol. 8, pp. 667 and 668.)
Therefore, as the plaintiff in the present case, not being a forced heir of the late Perpetua Concepcion, can not institute an action
to annul under article 1300 or to rescind under article 1291 (3) of the Civil Code the contract under consideration entered into
by the deceased with the defendant.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 153736               August 12, 2010
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by: ROSARIO SESPEÑE and their Children, namely:
NICANOR S. TUMBOKON, JR., NELIA S. TUMBOKON, NEMIA T. SEGOVIA, NOBELLA S. TUMBOKON,
NABIGAIL T. TAAY, NAZARENE T. MONTALVO, NORGEL S. TUMBOKON, NEYSA S. TUMBOKON,
SILVESTRE S. TUMBOKON, NORA T. MILCZAREK, NONITA T. CARPIO, NERLYN S. TUMBOKON, and
NINFA T. SOLIDUM, Petitioners,
vs.
APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The question presented in this appeal is whether the ruling in a criminal prosecution for qualified theft (involving coconut fruits)
bound the complainant (petitioners herein) and the accused (respondents herein) on the issue of ownership of the land, which
was brought up as a defense,  as to preclude the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Court of Appeals (CA) from adjudicating the
same issue in a civil case filed prior to the promulgation of the decision in the criminal case.
20
Under contention herein are the ownership and possession of that parcel of land with an area of 12,480 square meters, more or
less, situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly Barangay San Isidro, in the Municipality of Ibajay, Province of Aklan. The land
– planted to rice, corn, and coconuts – was originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespeñe (Alejandra), who had had two
marriages. The first marriage was to Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was Victor Miralles.
The second marriage was to Jose Garcia, by whom she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia (Apolonia), who married Primo
Legaspi. Alejandra died without a will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who
had predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles; hence, Crisanto Miralles was Alejandra’s grandson.
The ownership and possession of the parcel of land became controversial after Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario
Sespeñe (petitioners) asserted their right in it by virtue of their purchase of it from Cresenciana Inog, who had supposedly
acquired it by purchase from Victor Miralles. The tug-of-war over the property between the petitioners and the respondents first
led to the commencement of a criminal case. The Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespeñe filed a criminal complaint
for qualified theft against respondents Apolonia and Paulina S. Magtanum and others not parties herein, namely: Rosendo
Magtanum, Antonio Magtanum, Ulpiano Mangilaya, charging them with stealing coconut fruits from the land subject of the
present case.1 The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2269, was assigned to Branch III of the erstwhile Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Aklan.2
After trial, the CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty as charged in its decision dated June 10, 1972. The
respondents appealed (C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR), but the CA affirmed their conviction on February 19, 1975, whereby the CA
rejected respondent Apolonia’s defense of ownership of the land. 3
In the meanwhile, on September 21, 1972, or prior to the CA’s rendition of its decision in the criminal case, the petitioners
commenced this suit for recovery of ownership and possession of real property with damages against the respondents in the
CFI. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 240 and entitled Spouses Nicanor P. Tumbokon and Rosario S. Sespeñe v. Apolonia
G. Legaspi, Jesus Legaspi, Alejandra Legaspi, Primo Legaspi, Jose Legaspi, and Paulina S. de Magtanum, was assigned also to
Branch III of the CFI, and involved the same parcel of land from where the coconut fruits subject of the crime of qualified theft
in Criminal Case No. 2269 had been taken.
On February 17, 1994, the RTC, which meanwhile replaced the CFI following the implementation of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act,4 rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners herein, holding and disposing thus:
After a careful study of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the plaintiffs were able to establish that plaintiff Rosario
Sespeñe Tumbokon purchased the land in question from Cresenciana Inog on December 31, 1959 (Exh. "C"). Cresenciana Inog,
in turn, acquired the land by purchase from Victor Miralles on June 19, 1957 (Exh. "B"). Seven (7) years before, on May 8,
1950, the land was mortgaged by Victor Miralles to Cresenciana Inog as shown by a Deed of Pacto de Retro (Exh. "A"), and
from 1950 up to 1959, Cresenciana Inog was in continuous and peaceful possession of the land in question. xxx
xxxx
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The plaintiffs are hereby declared the true and lawful owners, and entitled to the possession of the parcel of land of
12,480 square meters in area, declared in the name of plaintiff Rosario S. Tumbokon, under Tax Declaration No.
29220, situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly San Isidro), Ibajay, Aklan;
2. The defendants are ordered and directed to vacate the land in question, and restore and deliver the possession
thereof to the plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to damages, but with costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.5
The respondents appealed to the CA.
On May 15, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the complaint, 6 opining and ruling thus:
The appellees trace their acquisition of the subject lot to the admitted primal owner Alejandra Sespeñe through her supposed
sale of it to her son-in-law Victor Miralles, who sold this to Cresenciana Inog, and who in turn sold it to the appellees. In the
process, they presented the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "B", June 19, 1957) executed by Victor Miralles in favor of
Cresenciana Inog but wherein it is provided in the said instrument that:
That this parcel of land abovementioned was inherited from the deceased Alejandra Sespeñe, by the party of the First Part being
the sole heir of the said Alejandra Sespeñe, having no other brothers or sisters.
This claim of being the sole heir is obviously false and erroneous for Alejandra Sespeñe had more than one intestate heir, and
Victor Miralles as a mere son-in-law could not be one of them.
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from
Alejandra Sespeñe. This supposed sale was oral, one that can of course be facilely feigned. And it is likely to be so for the claim
is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who
were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and
performed the obligations of an owner for no tax declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or even adverted to.
The testimonial evidence of the appellants as to ownership, the sale and possession is inadequate, with even the appellant
Nicanor Tumbokon stating that:
Q Did you come to know before you purchase (sic) the property from whom did V. Miralles acquired (sic) the land?
A No, sir.
xxx
Q And you did not come to know out (sic) and why V. Miralles came to possess the land under litigation before it
was sold to C. Inog?
A All I was informed was V. Miralles became automatically the heir of A. Sespeñe after the death of the wife which
is the only daughter of A. Sespeñe.
Q How did you know that V. Miralles became automatically the heir of the land after the death of his wife?
A He is the only son-in-law. (TSN, pp. 2-3, Feb. 26, 1974; emphasis supplied)
While Victor Miralles may have been in physical possession of the lot for a while, this was not as owner but as mere
Administrator as was clearly appearing in tax declaration no. 21714 ("Exhs. "J", "1").The corroboration in this by
Lourdes Macawili (TSN, June 7, 1973) does not help the appellees (herein petitioners) any for she never knew the
source of the property. Neither does the testimony of Crisanto Miralles succor the appellees (petitioners). He was the
son of Victor Miralles and the husband of the said Cresenciana Inog, the supposed buyer, owner and possessor of the
land in question from 1950-1957, and yet Crisanto Miralles could only say:
Q Are there improvements on the land in question?
A I do not know because I did not bother to go to the land in question.(TSN, p. 4, Aug. 18, 1973; emphasis supplied)]
These strongly suggest that the sales and claim of possession were shams, and are further demolished by the
following testimonies:
Q After the death of Alejandra Sespeñe who inherited this land in question?
A Apolonia.
Q At present who is in possession of the land in question?
A Apolonia Legaspi.
Q From the time that Apolonia Legaspi took possession of the land up to the present do you know if anybody
interrupted her possession?
A No sir. (tsn, Urbana Tañ-an Vda. de Franco, p. 7, Nov. 24, 1977)
xxx
Q Now, since when did you know the land in question?
A Since I was at the age of 20 yrs. old. (TSN; Crispina Taladtad, p. 3; Jan. 20, 1977; [she was 74 yrs. old at the time
of this testimony]).
xxx
Q And for how long has Apolonia Garcia Legaspi been in possession of the land in question?
A Since the time I was at the age of 20 yrs. old when I was been (sic) invited there to work up to the present she is in
possession of the land.
Q You said that you know Cresenciana Inog, do you know if Cresenciana Inog has ever possessed the land in
question?
A Never.
Q You also said that you know Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife Rosario Tumbokon, my question is do you know if
this Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife Rosario have ever possessed and usufructed this land under litigation?
A No, sir.
Q You also stated a while ago that you know Victor Miralles, do you know if Victor Miralles had ever possessed this
under litigation?
A No, he had not. (p. 9, ibid; emphasis supplied)
Thus neither do We buy the appellee’s contention that ownership of the disputed land was acquired by their predecessors-in-
interest thru lapse of time. Acquisitive prescription requires possession in the concept of owner, and they have not been able to
prove even mere possession.
As proponents it was incumbent upon the appellees to prove that they were the owners of the lot and that they were being
unlawfully deprived of their possession thereof. But this they failed to do. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must
prove his affirmative allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the
21
plaintiff or complainant has to prove this affirmative allegations in the complaint and the defendant or the respondent has to
prove the affirmative allegation in his affirmative defenses and counterclaim.(AKELCO vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121439, Jan
25,2000)
But this hoary rule also cuts both ways. Appellants too must also prove the allegations to support their prayer to declare the
litigated lot the exclusive property of the defendants Apolonia G. Legaspi and Paulina S. Magtanum;  (Answer, p. 6, record).
Apolonia Legaspi however is only one of the putative intestate heirs of Alejandra Sespeñe, the other being Crisanto Miralles
who stands in the stead of Ciriaca, his predeceased mother and other daughter of the decedent. But then no judgment can be
made as to their successional rights for Crisanto Miralles was never impleaded. Neither is there a proof that can convince that
Paulina S. Magtanum who is merely a niece of the decedent, should also be declared a co-owner of the inherited lot.
Because of said inadequacies, We cannot rule beyond the holding that the appellees (petitioners) are not the owners and
therefore not entitled to the recovery of the litigated lot.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in its place judgment is rendered DISMISSING the
Complaint.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The issues to be resolved are the following:
1. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. CV 45672 reversing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 240 was
supported by law and the evidence on record;
2. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR affirming the decision of the CFI of Aklan in Criminal
Case No. 2269 had the effect of res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land involved in Civil Case No. 240,
considering that such land was the same land involved in Criminal Case No. 2269.
Ruling
The petition has no merit.
A jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: the one, public policy and
Reversal by the CA was supported
by law and the evidence on record
The CA correctly found that the petitioners’ claim of ownership could not be legally and factually sustained.
First of all, the petitioners adduced no competent evidence to establish that Victor Miralles, the transferor of the land to
Cresenciana Inog (the petitioners’ immediate predecessor in interest) had any legal right in the first place to transfer ownership.
He was not himself an heir of Alejandra, being only her son-in-law (as the husband of Ciriaca, one of Alejandra’s two
daughters). Thus, the statement in the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit B) entered into between Victor Miralles and Cresenciana
Inog, to the effect that the "parcel of land was inherited from the deceased Alejandra Sespeñe" by Victor Miralles "being the
sole heir of the said Alejandra Sespeñe, having no other brothers or sisters," was outrightly false.
Secondly, a decedent’s compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedent’s estate are exclusively the
persons enumerated in Article 887, Civil Code, viz:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the
extent established by this Code. (807a)
Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: respondent Apolonia, her daughter, and Crisanto Miralles,
her grandson. The latter succeeded Alejandra by right of representation because his mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased Alejandra.
Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of
the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were living or if she could have
inherited.8 Herein, the representative (Crisanto Miralles) was called to the succession by law and not by the person represented
(Ciriaca); he thus succeeded Alejandra, not Ciriaca.9
The foregoing undeniable facts rendered the hearsay testimony of Nicanor Tumbokon to the effect that he had been informed
that Victor Miralles had "bec[o]me automatically the heir" of Alejandra "after the death of his wife," the wife being "the only
daughter" and he "the only son-in-law" a plain irrelevancy.
Thirdly, Victor Miralles’ supposed acquisition of the land by oral sale from Alejandra had no competent factual support in the
records. For one, the oral sale was incompatible with the petitioners’ anchor claim that he had acquired the land by inheritance
from Alejandra. Also, the evidence that the petitioners adduced on the oral sale was insufficient and incredible, warranting the
CA’s rejection of the oral sale under the following terms:
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from
Alejandra Sespeñe. This supposed sale was oral, one that can of course be facilely feigned. And it is likely to be so for the claim
is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who
were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and
performed the obligations of an owner for no tax declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or even adverted to. 10
With Victor Miralles lacking any just and legal right in the land, except as an heir of Ciriaca, the transfer of the land from him to
Cresenciana Inog was ineffectual. As a consequence, Cresenciana Inog did not legally acquire the land, and, in turn, did not
validly transfer it to the petitioners.
B
Bar by  res judicata  is  not applicable.
The petitioners submit that the final ruling in the criminal case had already determined the issue of ownership of the land; and
that such ruling in the criminal case barred the issue of ownership in the civil case under the doctrine of res judicata.
The submission has no merit.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. 11 The
doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad principle
that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and
fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation – reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the
other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for one and the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari pro una
et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine will subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the
gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness. 12
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous
suit.13 The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same
issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so
long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 14
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must
be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of the
subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action. 151avvph!1
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior judgment, or estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a
judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; the second, known as
conclusiveness of judgment, also known as the rule of auter action pendant,  ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in
a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action and has the
effect of preclusion of issues only.16
Based on the foregoing standards, this action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
First of all, bar by prior judgment, the first aspect of the doctrine, is not applicable, because the causes of action in the civil and
the criminal actions were different and distinct from each other. The civil action is for the recovery of ownership of the land
filed by the petitioners, while the criminal action was to determine whether the act of the respondents of taking the coconut
fruits from the trees growing within the disputed land constituted the crime of qualified theft. In the former, the main issue is the
legal ownership of the land, but in the latter, the legal ownership of the land was not the main issue. The issue of guilt or
innocence was not dependent on the ownership of the land, inasmuch as a person could be guilty of theft of the growing fruits
even if he were the owner of the land.
Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners themselves commenced both actions, and fully and directly
participated in the trial of both actions. Any estoppel from assailing the authority of the CA to determine the ownership of the
22
land based on the evidence presented in the civil action applied only to the petitioners, who should not be allowed to assail the
outcome of the civil action after the CA had ruled adversely against them.
Moreover, the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment  is subject to exceptions, such as where there is a change in the applicable
legal context, or to avoid inequitable administration of justice. 17 Applying the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgments to this
case will surely be iniquitous to the respondents who have rightly relied on the civil case, not on the criminal case, to settle the
issue of ownership of the land. This action for recovery of ownership was brought precisely to settle the issue of ownership of
the property. In contrast, the pronouncement on ownership of the land made in the criminal case was only the response to the
respondents having raised the ownership as a matter of defense.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision rendered on May 15, 2001 by the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
G.R. No. 118449 February 11, 1998
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G.
NICOLAS, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's
wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael
and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio
predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela,
Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P135,000.00), evidenced by a "Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT No. T-36734".1 In view
thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita.  2 On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the
Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six
Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). 3 In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land
with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Parañaque (hereafter Parañaque property) using a portion of the proceeds
of sale of the Valenzuela property. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was
deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred. Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer,
were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the investigation
conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. 4 Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner
succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters.
Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With
Waiver of Shares", 5 with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the
properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank
deposits, a car and the Parañaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses in
the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00). 6 The settlement gave fifty
percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Savings Account No.
104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to
petitioner. The Parañaque property and the car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their " claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heirs" 7 in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding 8 docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo,
and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate.
Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother Herein
private respondent Ramon filed an opposition 9 dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardo's
guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition 10 alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the
Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder.
Ramon pleaded for the court's intervention "to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution made by
deceased Rafael to his children," 11 Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. C-1699, entitled "In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that their
legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime.  12 Ramon
stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate
daughter of Estrellita." 13
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the guardian of Salud and Ricardo while
Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. The court's Order did not include petitioner in
the slate of Rafael's heirs. 14 Neither was the Parañaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the
estate. 15 Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardo's guardian for Selling
his ward's property without the court's knowledge and permission. 16
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner "ten (10) days . . . within which to file any
appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any
pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon." In response, petitioner filed a
Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has
no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994.  17 Despite
the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding and asked that the Parañaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the
Valenzuela property, be collated. 18 Acting on Ramon's motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the same in an Order
which pertinently reads as follows:
x x x           x x x          x x x
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case and considering the
comment on his Manifestation, the same is hereby granted. 19
x x x           x x x          x x x
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon opposed. 20 On August 12, 1994, the RTC
rendered an Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It provides:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicant's argument is that spouses Vizconde were then financially
incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from
the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael
Nicolas in the latter's ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent
for support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And, Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-facto
separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of
violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the property from
the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as
taxi business, canteen concessions and garment manufacturing.  However, no competent evidence has been
submitted to indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was
for a valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous
and the subject property in Parañaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of the
property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 21 (Emphasis added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision of
December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals 22 denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated
the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as "the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the
deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court)." 23 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari. Finding  prima facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate court's Order, which respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the
transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Parañaque property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
23
 Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of
the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an
ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according
to law and the will of the testator. 24 Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and
involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.  25 The purpose is to attain
equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in
interest making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in
the estate, and that the predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the
contrary. 26 Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought
to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, 27 the rationale
being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 28
The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of
Appeals, committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of
Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children
and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they
exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the
manner and to the extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a
third person or a stranger. 29 As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may
he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding,  30 which petitioner
correctly argued in his manifestation. 31
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be
included in the estate proceedings. 32 Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate
action to resolve title. 33 In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction
when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that
the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true
intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate court's
jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:
. . . we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate
proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or
excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or
ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the
question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit. 34
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the
intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's
heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the provisions of article
1035 35 of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations received by
the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime or hereditary portion to
which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack
of ground or basis therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error
in ordering collation of the Parañaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the
Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela
property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Parañaque property has no statutory
basis. 36 The order of the probate court presupposes that the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to
Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,  37 by
Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the
present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation against
petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not
have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers
only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent
the transfer of the Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heir" 38 in the Parañaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to collation.
Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than
the value of the Valenzuela property. 39 Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not
be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination
by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 189697               June 27, 2012
ELEUTERIO RIVERA, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Rosita L. Rivera-Ramirez, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT RAMIREZ and RAYMOND RAMIREZ, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a court’s adjudication of non-issues and the authority of the administrator to examine and secure evidence
from persons having knowledge of properties allegedly belonging to the decedent’s estate.
The Facts and the Case
The spouses Adolfo Ramirez (Adolfo) and Rosita Rivera (Rosita) were married in 1942. Their only child died in infancy. They
acquired during their lifetime the Sta. Teresita General Hospital and other properties. Rosita died in September 1990, followed
by her husband Adolfo in December 1993.
On February 7, 1995 petitioner Eleuterio P. Rivera (Eleuterio) filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City covering the estate of Rosita, who allegedly died without a will and with no direct
ascendants or descendants.1 Eleuterio claimed2 that he was Rosita’s nephew, being the son of her brother Federico. Eleuterio
submitted to the intestate court a list of the names of the decedent’s other nephews and nieces all of whom expressed conformity
to Eleuterio’s appointment as administrator of her estate.
On March 28, 1995 the RTC issued letters of administration appointing Eleuterio as Rosita’s estate administrator. 3 On
September 6, 1995 Eleuterio submitted an initial inventory of her properties. On April 18, 1996 he filed in his capacity as
administrator a motion with the court to compel the examination and production of documents relating to properties believed to
be a part of her estate, foremost of which was the Sta. Teresita General Hospital that respondent Robert Ramirez (Robert) had
been managing.4 Robert claims, together with Raymond Ramirez (Raymond) and Lydia Ramirez (Lydia), that they were
children of Adolfo by another woman. Robert opposed the issuance of the subpoena.
On joint motion of the parties, however, the RTC issued an order on March 26, 1998, suspending the proceedings in the case
pending the resolution of a separate case involving the properties of the estate. 5 Four years later or on May 16, 2002 Eleuterio,
as administrator of Rosita’s estate, moved for the revival of the proceedings and requested anew the production and examination
of documents in Robert’s possession relating to Rosita’s estate. The RTC apparently never got to act on the motion.
Meantime, on March 25, 2005 administrator Eleuterio moved for the joint settlement in the same case of the estates of Rosita
and her husband, Adolfo6 considering that the spouses’ properties were conjugal. Eleuterio expressed willingness to co-
administer the late spouses’ estate with Adolfo’s heirs, namely, Raymond, Robert, and Lydia Ramirez. Robert agreed to the
joint settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses but insisted that the court also probate the deceased Adolfo’s will of
October 10, 1990 which Robert presented.
24
As a side issue, Robert initially retained the services of Atty. Antonio Pacheo to represent him in the estate case. The lawyer had
previously counseled for the late Adolfo and the hospital. But Robert and Atty. Pacheo soon had a parting of ways, resulting in
the dismissal of the lawyer. Raymond, who did not see eye to eye with his brother Robert, subsequently retained the services of
Atty. Pacheo to represent him in the case. This created an issue because Robert wanted the lawyer inhibited from the case
considering that the latter would be working against the interest of a former client.
On July 17, 2006 Eleuterio, as administrator of Rosita’s estate, reiterated his motion to compel examination and production of
the hospital’s documents in Robert’s possession. On February 12, 2007 the RTC granted the administrator’s motion and ordered
Robert to bring to court the books of account, financial statements, and other documents relating to the operations of the Sta.
Teresita General Hospital. The RTC also declined to inhibit Atty. Pacheo as Raymond’s counsel. Robert moved to quash the
subpoena on the grounds that the documents belonged to the hospital, which had a distinct personality; that the hospital did not
form part of Rosita’s estate; and that Eleuterio, as administrator only of Rosita’s estate, had no right to inspect and have access
to Adolfo’s estate. But the RTC denied Robert’s motion on June 19, 2007.
Robert filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 imputing grave abuse of discretion by the RTC
for allowing the production and examination of the subject documents and for not inhibiting Atty. Pacheo from the case. On
February 17, 2009 the CA rendered judgment, 8 annulling the RTC’s orders insofar as they granted the production and
examination of the hospital’s documents. Essentially, the CA ruled that Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives were not
her heirs since she had an adopted child in Raymond and that, consequently, Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to request
production of the hospital’s documents or to institute the petition for the settlement of her estate. The CA affirmed, however, the
non-inhibition of Atty. Pacheo from the case. Eleuterio’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the present
petition for review.
Issues Presented
The case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Eleuterio and his relatives were not Rosita’s heirs and, therefore, had no right to
institute the petition for the settlement of her estate or to seek the production and examination of the hospital’s documents; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to subpoena the specified documents in Robert’s
possession.
Ruling of the Court
One. The CA held that based on the article Women Physicians of the World 9 found in the record of the case before it, the late
Rosita, a physician, had adopted Raymond as her child. An adopted child, said the CA, is deemed a legitimate child of the
adopter. This being the case, Raymond’s presence barred Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives from inheriting
intestate from her.10 A further consequence is that they also did not have the right to seek the production and examination of the
documents allegedly in Robert’s possession.
But, whether or not the late Rosita had judicially adopted Raymond as her child is a question of fact that had neither been
considered nor passed upon by the RTC in a direct challenge to the claim of Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives that
they have the right to inherit from her. The relevant issue before the RTC was only whether or not the duly appointed
administrator of Rosita’s estate had the right to the production and examination of the documents believed to be in Robert’s
possession. Indeed, one of the reasons Robert brought the special civil action of certiorari before the CA is that Eleuterio had no
right to inspect the requested documents and have access to Adolfo’s estate when Eleuterio’s authority as administrator
extended only to Rosita’s estate.
The Court understands the CA’s commendable desire to minimize multiple appeals. But the issues regarding the late Rosita’s
supposed judicial adoption of Raymond as her child and the consequent absence of right on the part of Eleuterio, et al. to file a
petition for the settlement of Rosita’s estate were never raised and properly tried before the RTC. Consequently, the CA gravely
abused its discretion in adjudicating such issues and denying Eleuterio and his relatives their right to be heard on them.
Two. As for the right of the administrator of Rosita’s estate to the production and examination of the specified documents
believed to be in Robert’s possession, Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides that these can be allowed based on the
administrator’s belief that the person named in the request for subpoena has documents in his possession that tend to show the
decedent’s right to real or personal property. Thus:
Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. – If an executor or administrator, heir,
legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the
estate that a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods or chattels of the
deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract or other writing
which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the
last will and testament of the deceased, the Court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on
oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such examination or such
interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for contempt, and may commit him to prison until he submits to the
order of the court. The interrogatories put to any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be filed in
the clerk’s office. (Emphasis supplied)
The production and examination is nothing to be afraid of since the intestate court has no authority to decide who the decedent’s
heirs are in connection with such incident which is confined to the examination of documents which may aid the administrator
in determining properties believed to belong to the decedent’s estate. What is more, that court has no authority to decide the
question of whether certain properties belong to the estate or to the person sought to be examined. 11
In fact, if after the examination the court has good reason to believe that the person examined is in possession of properties that
belong to the deceased, the administrator cannot detain the property. He has to file an ordinary action for recovery of the
properties.12 The purpose of the production and examination of documents is to elicit information or secure evidence from
persons suspected of having possession of, or knowledge of properties suspected of belonging to the estate of the deceased. The
procedure is inquisitorial in nature, designed as an economical and efficient mode of discovering properties of the estate. 13
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 100203
dated February 17, 2009, and REINSTATES the February 12, 2007 order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Special
Proceedings Q-95-22919 granting petitioner Eleuterio P. Rivera’s motion to compel examination and production of document
dated July 17, 2006.
G.R. No. 200169               January 28, 2015
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner.
vs.
EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 30, 2006 Decision 2 and December 20, 2011 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229 affirming the August 17, 1999 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 and denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 5
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on August 26,
1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein subject properties) covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject
titles).6
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City (Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory
injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591 and assigned to Branch 49 of
the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint 7 alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he
(petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have
stolen the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of
Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second owner’s copy
of Certificate of Title No. T-25896,which respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent
presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory injunctive relief,
in that respondent be ordered to surrender to him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession; and that
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere
stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or
adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter
inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited
her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented
the following documents, among others:
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok No. 2, Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company
(BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit "C" and submarkings), wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s
parent;
25
 2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit "F"), which indicated that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
3. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10, 1957 (Exhibit "G"), a public
instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his
signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent;
4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated October 29, 1954 (Exhibit "L"), indicating
that petitioner is his son;
5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit "M"), where it is declared that the Aguilar spouses
are his parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit "O") addressed to a BMMC supervisor introducing petitioner as Alfredo
Aguilar’s son and recommending him for employment.
7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry to the effect that the record of births
during the period 1945 to 1946 were "all destroyed by nature," hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of
petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit "Q"). 9
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano
(Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar confirmed petitioner’s identity, and she testified that
petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses and that during her marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the Aguilar
spouses’ conjugal home built on one of the subject properties. On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she
is the sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses have only one son – herein petitioner – who was born at BMMC; that
after the death of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim ownership of the subject properties because they
recognized petitioner as the Aguilar spouses’ sole child and heir; that petitioner was charged with murder, convicted,
imprisoned, and later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on parole, petitioner continued to live with his mother
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar in one of the subject properties, and continues to live there with his family. 10
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but
only heard his name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by consanguinity or affinity to petitioner;
that she attended to Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under medication in a hospital until her death; that Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar’s hospital and funeral expenses were paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an
affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilar’s estate; that she did not
steal the subject titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a prior planned sale of the
subject properties did not push through because when petitioner’s opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed disagreement as to
the agreed price.11
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar
spouses were married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not
know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew a certain "Rodolfo" whose nickname was "Mait"; that petitioner is not the
son of the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano. 12
Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (Exhibit "2")announcing among others
that she and Alfredo have no issue, and that she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s estate.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as follows:
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a
biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced
confirming his biological relationship as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in
the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue and
that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never a son by consanguinity nor
a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.
This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this action to be considered qualified or entitled to
the issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with cost.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of legal basis.
SO ORDERED.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.14 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, the appeal essentially argued that petitioner
is indeed the Aguilar spouses’ son; that under Article 172 of the Family Code, 15 an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the
documentary evidence presented, petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate biological son of the Aguilar spouses and the
sole heir to their estate. He argued that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the records covering the period
1945-194616 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed as shown by Exhibits "Q" to "Q-3"; for this reason, he
presented the foregoing documentary evidence to prove his relationship to the Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular
reference to, among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G"), arguing that the same was made under oath and thus
sufficient under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish that he is a child and heir of the Aguilar spouses. Finally, petitioner
questioned the trial court’s reliance upon Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s affidavit (Exhibit "2") attesting that she and Alfredo have
no children and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo, when such piece of evidence has been discarded by the trial
court in a previous Order dated April 1, 1998, stating thus:
Except for defendant’s Exhibit "2", all other Exhibits, Exhibits "1", "3", "4" and "5", together with their submarkings, are all
admitted in evidence.17
On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial court’s August 17, 1999 Decision, pronouncing
thus:
The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with the deceased spouses Aguilar deserve scant
consideration by this Court. The Elementary School Permanent Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as proof of
filiation. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439:
"Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute evidence of filiation."
As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, WE hold thatit cannot be
considered as evidence of filiation. As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360:
"A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax
return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof."
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the parents of the former are Alfredo and Candelaria
Siasat Aguilar does not prove filiation. The Highest Tribunal declared that a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father
of bride is not competent evidence of filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") and the Information Sheet of
Employment of Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit "L"), allegedly tend to establish that plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently
known as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has been bearing the surname of his alleged parents.
WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant’s argument. Use of a family surname certainly does not establish pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar are concerned, WE cannot accept them
as sufficient proof to establish and prove the filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses. While the former is
a public instrument and the latter bears the signature of Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to
show filiation based on open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Filiation is a serious matter that must
be resolved according to the requirements of the law. All told, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to hurdle the "high standard
of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one’s legitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding
open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses Aguilar, thereby negating his right to demand the
delivery of the subject TCTs in his favor, this Court cannot grant the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed for.
xxxx
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and unmistakable right that has been violated. Neither
had he shown permanent and urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ.
With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in denying the same. Aside from the fact that plaintiff-
appellant failed to show his clear right over the subject parcels of land so that he has not sustained any damage by reason of the
withholding of the TCTs from him, there is no clear testimony on the anguish or anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result
thereof. Well entrenched in law and jurisprudence is the principle that the grant of moral damages is expressly allowed by law
in instances where proofs of the mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock were shown.
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The impugned Decision of the trial
court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 19 but in a December 20, 2011 Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the
present Petition.
Issues
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,20 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which raises the following issues:
26
In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of RTC Branch 49, Bacolod City, and the Resolution denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error [in] not taking into
consideration petitioner’s Exhibit "G" (SSS E-1 acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo
Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public document that satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the [Family]
Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with respect to the application of Article 172 of the Family Code
particularly [paragraph] 3 thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court relating to
public document which is substantial enough to merit consideration of this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence and
forestall future litigation.21
Petitioner’s Arguments
In his Petition and Reply 22 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and praying that judgment be rendered
ordering respondent to surrender the owner’s duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070,
petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that said SSS Form E-1 is a
declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status as the latter’s son; this recognition should be accorded more
weight than the presumption of legitimacy, since Article 172 itself declares that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation
without need of court action. He adds that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public instrument such as the SSS Form E-1
is the "highest form of recognition which partake (sic) of the nature of a complete act of recognition bestowed upon" him as the
son of the late Alfredo Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his
legitimacy; that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family
Code;23 and that having proved his filiation, mandatory injunction should issue, and an award of damages is in order.
Respondent’s Arguments
In her Comment24 and Memorandum,25 respondent simply echoes the pronouncements of the CA, adding that the Petition is a
mere rehash of the CA appeal which has been passed upon succinctly by the appellate court.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, 26 has held that –
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of
an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action
for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents.1âwphi1 The certificates of
live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock
are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the
physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents
sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171,
of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be
legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded that petitioner – who was born on March
5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar 28 and before their respective deaths 29 – has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS
Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172
of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of
the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence –
particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") – to prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said
document as mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express
recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. And, relative to said form of
acknowledgment, the Court has further held that:
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be
strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices
that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is
merely corroborative of such other evidence. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount
consideration" in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a
Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development." 30 (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the
National Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to
go through the trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on
petitioner; the Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit "Q") contained just such
an advice for petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his
Certificate of Live Birth, since for every registered birth in the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to
said office.
As to petitioner's argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his
legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family
Code, the Court has held before that -Article 263 31 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove
that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy.
Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. 32
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter's estate.
Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar's. estate, since succession pertains, in the
first place, to the descending direct line.33
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision and December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to
SURRENDER to the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-
(15462) 1070.
G.R. No. 180997               November 17, 2010
SPOUSES MARIANO (a.k.a. QUAKY) and EMMA BOLAÑOS, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSCEF ZUÑIGA BERNARTE, CLARO ZUÑIGA, PERFECTO ZUÑIGA, and CEFERINA ZUÑIGA-
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
27
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision dated March 30, 2007 2 and the Resolution
dated November 26, 20073 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84452.
The antecedents—
Subject of the controversy is a 238-square-meter lot, designated as Lot No. 1-P, and situated in Poblacion, Rapu-Rapu, Albay.
Petitioner-spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaños (petitioner-spouses) purchased it from Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague (Cresencia)
on June 20, 2001. The sale was registered in the name of petitioner-spouses before the Municipal Assessor’s Office in Rapu-
Rapu, Albay.
On October 30, 2001, respondents Roscef Zuñiga Bernarte, Claro Zuñiga, Perfecto Zuñiga, and Ceferina Zuñiga-Garcia
(Roscef, et al.) filed a complaint 4 for declaration of partial nullity of deeds of transfer and sale with prayer for preliminary
injunction against petitioner-spouses, Flavia Zuñiga (Flavia), and Cresencia before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 10033.
The complaint, in essence, alleged that: Roscef, et al., and Flavia and Cresencia are legitimate half-blood brothers and sisters, all
children of the deceased Roman Zuñiga, Sr. (Roman) from his second and first marriages, respectively; during his lifetime,
Roman owned a residential land with improvements, identified as Lot No. 1-P per Tax Declaration No. 99-001-01704 5 for the
year 2000; Roman had the lot declared for taxation purposes in the name of Flavia, Sisters and Brothers, per a Sworn
Statement6 he executed in 1973, and filed with the then Assessor’s Office, which issued Tax Declaration No. 2975; 7 Roman
died on August 9, 1976, and his heirs did not settle or partition the subject property; on June 20, 2001, Flavia, without authority
from the co-owners of the lot, executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale 8 over it in favor of Cresencia; Cresencia, in turn, also
without authority from the said co-owners, executed on the same day a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale 9 in favor of petitioner-
spouses; on the basis of these notarized deeds, Tax Declaration No. 99-001-01703 10 was issued to petitioner-spouses as sole
declared owners of Lot No. 1-P.
In praying for preliminary injunction, Roscef, et al. further alleged that petitioner-spouses started demolishing their ancestral
home on the subject property and initiated the construction of a new building thereon, despite pleas to desist from further
destroying the ancestral home.
In her answer with cross-claim, 11 Flavia denied the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Cresencia, and alleged that the subsequent sale made by the latter was valid and effective only as to her aliquot share, but null
and void as to the rest of the property. She also claimed that, during the confrontation before the barangay, she informed
Mariano of these facts and even admonished him not to destroy the existing house on Lot No. 1-P, nor to make any
constructions thereon. She said that, despite this notice, petitioner-spouses, on August 15, 2001, forcibly entered her house and
demolished a large portion of it.
In her own answer,12 Cresencia denied the material allegations of the complaint, and alleged that Flavia was the sole owner of
Lot No. 1-P, thus making her a buyer and seller in good faith and for value. Cresencia also averred that Roscef, et al., as
children of Roman by his second wife, do not have any share in the subject property since Roman had already orally partitioned
it during his lifetime.
For their part, petitioner-spouses alleged that the subject property was owned in common by Flavia, Cresencia, and their full-
blood brothers and sisters only, and that, later on, Flavia acquired the entire lot. Flavia then sold it to Cresencia, who, in turn,
sold it to petitioner-spouses. They asserted that they had acquired Lot No. 1-P in good faith and for value, without any
knowledge of the adverse claim of Roscef, et al. or that the property did not fully belong to Cresencia. 13
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that Roscef, et al., Flavia and Cresencia are legitimate half brothers and sisters and the
identities of the parties and of the subject property.14
Trial on the merits ensued. Thereafter, the RTC rendered its decision dated December 1, 2004, 15 disposing as follows—
WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, this Court renders judgment declaring that the property interest acquired by the spouses
Mariano and Emma Bolaños over Lot No. 1-P – a 238-square-meter lot situated [o]n Salazar Street, Poblacion Rapu-Rapu,
Albay – is limited only to the ideal shares belonging to Flavia A. Zuñiga and Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague constitutive of an ideal
share equivalent to 2/11 portion of such lot, and hereby partially nullifying the two deeds of absolute sale both dated 20 June
2001 over Lot No. 1-P exceeding the ideal share of 1/11 for each one of the sellers Flavia A. Zuñiga and Cresencia Zuñiga-
Echague. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs the amounts of: a) 15,000 pesos as attorney’s fees; and b)
10,000 pesos as litigation expenses. The defendants shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.16
Aggrieved, petitioner-spouses interposed an appeal before the CA, ascribing error to the RTC in holding that the property was
the capital of Roman and in declaring that the property interest acquired by them was limited only to the ideal shares of Flavia.
The CA denied the appeal, and affirmed in toto the RTC judgment. Hence, this petition anchored on the sole question of law of
whether or not the CA wrongly applied the law on co-ownership, specifically Article 484, 17 relative to Article 98018 of the Civil
Code.
Petitioner-spouses argue that the CA gravely erred when it concluded that Lot No. 1-P is owned in common by the children
from the first and second marriages of Roman. They posit that the brothers and sisters mentioned in Tax Declaration No. 2975
for December 14, 1948-1949 refer only to Roman’s children from his first marriage, when the property was bequeathed to them
by their father, then still a widower, and prior to the celebration of his marriage to Ceferina on October 18, 1954. They claim
that Roman did so probably because the property belonged to the paraphernal property of his deceased first spouse Flavia.
According to them, there was no credible evidence, not even a single document, to prove that the property originally belonged
to Roman, but the RTC and the CA gave credit to Ceferina’s testimony that she was told by her father, while at a tender age,
that the property belonged to them. They contend, to the contrary, that the testimony of Josefina, a child from the first marriage,
should be the one given credence due to her unbiased assertion that the property was purchased from the paraphernal assets of
their mother Flavia, such that the lot had never been registered in the name of Roman because he had no reason to claim it as his
own.
We disagree. The assertions of petitioner-spouses cannot stand on the face of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial,
presented before the RTC.
More specifically, petitioner-spouses’ contention, i.e., that the subject property really belonged to Roman’s first spouse Flavia
as her paraphernal property, cannot be sustained. This position was anchored from the testimony of Josefina 19 that the lot was
actually bought by her maternal grandfather and given to her mother Flavia. Josefina’s declarations before the RTC do not
deserve merit and weight, particularly in light of her statement that she was told so by her elders way back in 1923, when at that
time she was only around three (3) years of age.20 Besides, such a pronouncement was not supported by any proof, save for the
lame excuse that the deed of sale showing the said transaction was allegedly lost and destroyed by a typhoon at a time when she
was already married, claiming that she was then the custodian of the supposed document. Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. 21 In other words, it must be natural,
reasonable, and probable to warrant belief. The standard as to the truth of human testimony is its conformity to human
knowledge, observation, and experience; the courts cannot heed otherwise. 22 Regretfully, petitioner-spouses’ allegations do not
measure up to the yardstick of verity.
The findings of the RTC, as concurred by the CA, are enlightening —
The facts of the case that appear of record to be without dispute follow, to wit: Roman Zuñiga, Sr. during his lifetime married
twice. His first wife was Flavia while Ceferina became his second wife. Flavia died sometime in the year 1944 or 1945. Roman
Sr. and Flavia begot seven children, namely: Josefina, Flavia, Woodrow, Pablo, Manuel, Roman, Jr. and Cresencia. On 18
October 1954, Roman Zuñiga, Sr. married Ceferina Bendaña (Exhibits "F," "6"). Roman, Sr. and Ceferina had four children,
and they were the plaintiffs Roscef, Claro, Perfecto and Ceferina. Roman Zuñiga, Sr. died on 9 August 1976. It appears that his
second wife Ceferina Bendaña died ahead of him. His eleven children by his first and by his second marriage survived him. In
the face of the sworn statement he executed in the year 1973 he declared the lot in question (now Lot No. 1-P) then embraced by
Tax Declaration No. 2975 as among the several properties that belonged to him (Exhibits "C," "3," in relation to Exhibits "A,"
"1"). Such lot under such tax declaration was declared for taxation purposes for the first time on 14 December 1948 in the name
of Flavia A. Zuñiga, brothers and sisters (Exhibits "A," "1"). Flavia A. Zuñiga sold such 238-square-meter lot situated in Salazar
St., Poblacion, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to her sister Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague on 20 June 2001 (Exhibits "D," "2"). On the same day
Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague sold the same lot in favor of the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaños (Exhibit "E").
Now, Roman Zuñiga, Sr.’s first wife Flavia passed away in the year 1944 or 1945. On 18 October 1954, he married his second
wife Ceferina. Lot No. 1-P was declared for tax purposes for the first time on 14 December 1948 in the name of Flavia Zuñiga’s
sisters and brothers. The defendant Flavia A. Zuñiga admitted that her parents always declared the properties they acquired in
her name – Flavia A. Zuñiga[,] sisters and brothers – since she was a 7-year-old lass. She never acquired the properties on her
own – including Lot No. 1-P. She would always recognize her father Roman Zuñiga, Sr. as the actual owner of such lot when he
was alive.
The reckoning date for the acquisition of Lot No. 1-P should be the date when it was declared for tax purposes in the name of
the defendant Flavia A. Zuñiga, sisters and brothers – which is 14 December 1948 – notwithstanding the testimonies rendered
that such lot was acquired while Roman Zuñiga, Sr. was married to Flavia – and even prior to such marriage. Such testimonies
that are obviously easy to fabricate have no documentary evidence seen of record to sustain them. This Court finds Tax
Declaration No. 2975 (Exhibit[s] "A," "1") that bec[a]me effective in the year 1949 as the credible ancient documentary
evidence that speaks of the true date Roman Zuñiga, Sr. acquired Lot No. 1-P. As earlier noted, his first wife died in the year
28
1944 or 1945 while he married his second wife on 18 October 1954. Obviously, Roman Zuñiga, Sr., while still a widower in the
year 1948, acquired Lot No. 1-P. Clearly such lot was his capital property.
Roman Zuñiga, Sr. having passed away on 9 August 1976, Lot No. 1-P now forms part of his estate. Except for Lot No. 1-P, the
record has not shown any other property left by Roman Zuñiga, Sr. at the time of his death. In the absence of whatever evidence
that he executed a will his legitimate children by his first and second marriages inherit such lot in equal share[s] as intestate
heirs (Article 980, The Civil Code). It follows that Lot No. 1-P has to be divided among them into eleven equal shares.
Until such time that Lot No. 1-P has been partitioned among Roman Zuñiga, Sr.’s eleven legitimate children, as co-owners
being co-heirs their shares remain ideal (Article 1078, The Civil Code). Not one of the eleven children can claim as his or hers a
specifically identified portion of Lot No. 1-P.
This Court finds Flavia Zuñiga’s verbal claim that she never sold Lot No. 1-P to her sister Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague to be
without merit. Not a shred of evidence appears of record showing that the signature appearing in the face of the deed of absolute
sale was not Flavia A. Zuñiga’s (Exhibits "D," "2"). At any rate, this Court holds that the written deed of absolute sale dated 20
June 2001 that Flavia A. Zuñiga signed is more credible evidence than her self-serving, uncorroborated and easy to concoct
testimony that she never sold such lot to her sister Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague.1awphil
However, the above deed of absolute sale that Flavia A. Zuñiga executed was valid and effective only to the extent of her ideal
share in Lot No. 1-P. The validity of the other deed of absolute sale Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague executed in favor of the spouses
Mariano and Emma Bolaños is limited to her ideal share and the other ideal share she acquired from Flavia A. Zuñiga. In
effect[,] the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaños acquired the ideal shares of the sisters Flavia A. Zuñiga and Cresencia
Zuñiga-Echague.
The claim by the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaños that they were purchasers in good faith has little relevance. Lot No. 1-P
appears as [an] unregistered lot, and thus they merely step into the shoes of the seller. They cannot acquire [a] property interest
greater tha[n] Cresencia Zuñiga- Echague’s.
Anyway, the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaños acquired Lot No. 1-P from Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague on the very same day
that Flavia A. Zuñiga sold it to Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague. The tax declaration over Lot No. 1-P at the time the spouses
Mariano and Emma Bolaños acquired such lot speaks that its owners were Flavia A. Zuñiga, sisters and brothers (Exhibit "G").
Awareness by the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaños of such tax declaration while they were buying Lot No. 1-P, they knew
that Flavia A. Zuñiga was not the exclusive owner of Lot No. 1-P at the time they purchased it. 23
Considering that Roman died on August 9, 1976, the provisions of the Civil Code on succession, then the law in force, should
apply, particularly Articles 979 and 980, viz.—
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or
age, and even if they should come from different marriages. x x x.
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Thus, the RTC correctly ruled that Lot No. 1-P rightfully belongs to the 11 children of Roman, seven (7) from his first marriage
with Flavia and four (4) from his second marriage with Ceferina, in equal shares. As there was no partition among Roman’s
children, the lot was owned by them in common. And inasmuch as Flavia did not successfully repudiate her sale of her aliquot
share to Cresencia, the transfer stands as valid and effective. Consequently, what Cresencia sold to petitioner spouses was her
own share and Flavia’s share in the property that she acquired by virtue of the notarized deed of sale, which is only 2/11 of Lot
No. 1-P. Therefore, the restitution of the property in excess of that portion by petitioner spouses is clearly warranted.
Indeed, the findings of the trial court, with respect to the operative facts and the credibility of witnesses, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of deference and respect by this Court, except when: (1) the
findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) a lower court’s inference from its
factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(4) the findings of the court go beyond the issues of the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is misapprehension of facts; and (6) the findings of fact are conclusions without
mention of the specific evidence on which they are based are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by
evidence on record.24 Notably, none of these exceptions is attendant in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 30, 2007 and the Resolution dated November
26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 84452 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal
protection before as well as after birth. 1 In case of assault on his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and
vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose
Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. 2 After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa’s
parents in Fairview, Quezon City.3 Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. 4
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition
to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. 5 He alleged that nine years before he married Ma.
Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. 6 Gerardo also found
out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City. 7
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham
and that she never lived with Mario at all.8
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the
child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. 9
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the
‘bastardization’ of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the
… decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called ‘visitation rights’… between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m.
of any Sunday."10 She argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
illegitimate child."11 She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her
maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of ‘Concepcion’ as Jose Gerardo’s surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion and made the following
observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other, something they should never do if they
want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially as he is a boy, who must have
a father figure to recognize – something that the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and
psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art.
8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration."
WHEREFORE, the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED. 12
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to
Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardo’s surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had
already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.13
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative father visitation rights over his
illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the "best interest of the child" policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that
"[a]t bottom, it (was) the child’s welfare and not the convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in
granting visitation rights a few hours once a week." 14
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mother’s surname  motu proprio. The child,
represented by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect
the correction in the civil registry.15
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed a motion to
set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved the motion for
reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by
Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable – established by the evidence in this case – that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario
Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called "marriage" with
29
the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was
legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose
Gerardo – under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao;
he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo],
but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164,
Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over
the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even
supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing marriage
between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a
judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship.16
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave
little weight to Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
were married:
We are not unaware of the movant’s argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the appellant have judicially
admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family
Code mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress." (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare
declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are
the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.  Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied. 18 Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. 19 Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or
born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.20
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. 22 We explained the rationale of this rule in
the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals23 :
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) 24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose
Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, 25 his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife.26 Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional
cases, his heirs.27 Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. 28 To
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt
that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. 29 Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 30
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. 31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. 32 This may
take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception.33 Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place
through the violation of prison regulations.34
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in
Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove
personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband,
Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts
the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the
marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa’s statement in her answer 35 to the petition for annulment of marriage 36 that she never lived with
Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was
binding on her.
Gerardo’s argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son
with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could
have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never
lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardo’s conception and birth.
Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility.
Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the
husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. 37 A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. 38 Hence,
Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband
and that her offspring is illegitimate. 39 The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It
also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children. 40
Gerardo’s insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court does
not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was
immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it
would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the
denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the
child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. 41 Otherwise, the child will be at the
mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was
not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.42
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. 43 Although a record of birth or birth
certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, 44 as the status of a child is determined by the law itself,
proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after
300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be established. 45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even
then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was
improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 46 As prima facie evidence, the
statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to
the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. 47 Between the certificate of birth which is prima
facie evidence of Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the
best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy while claiming that
they both had the child’s interests at heart. The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable
30
to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames
of both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance. 48 On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the
surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more limited group and his
legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart. 49 Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination
against him), in the eyes of society, a ‘bastard’ is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state,
the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very persons who were passionately
declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should
end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose
Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of
incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his
infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. 50 A person’s surname or family name identifies the family to
which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child.51 Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in
the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardo’s name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his
paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a
parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to
each other’s company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to
visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Child’s Welfare Paramount. – In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly
emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender years. 52 Through its laws, the State safeguards them
from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of
society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the
issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 154645             July 13, 2004
MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES REYES, MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. -- all surnamed REYES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though registered in the paramour’s name, property acquired with the salaries and earnings of a husband belongs to his
conjugal partnership with the legal spouse. The filiation of the paramour’s children must be settled in a probate or special
proceeding instituted for the purpose, not in an action for recovery of property.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the February 4, 2002
Decision2 and the August 14, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 45883. The CA disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby partially DENIED and the Decision dated May 30,
1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 111 in Civil Case No. 9722-P is  MODIFIED to read, as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant as follows:
‘a. Declaring the house and lot registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 (26627-A) of the
Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV as conjugal partnership property of the late Spouses
Rodolfo and Lourdes Reyes;
‘b. Ordering the [petitioner] to surrender possession of said subject property, pursuant to the applicable law
on succession, to the respective estates of the late Rodolfo Reyes and Lourdes Reyes and to pay a
reasonable rental of P10,000.00 a month, to the same juridical entities, upon their failure to do so until
possession of the property is delivered; and
‘c. To pay [respondents] attorney’s fees in the sum of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs.’"4
The questioned Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
"[Respondents] filed a Complaint for reconveyance and damages, dated January 23, 1982, before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, containing the following allegations:
‘x x x The complaint alleges that [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who
died on September 12, 1981; that [respondents] Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are the
legitimate children of [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes; that for years
before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino; that before
his death, x x x Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company
with an income of P15,000.00 a month and, after retirement on September 30, 1980, received from said
company benefits and emoluments in the amount of P315,0[1]1.79; that [respondent] wife was not the
recipient of any portion of the said amount.
‘The complaint further alleges that on July 12, 1979, a [D]eed of [S]ale of a property consisting of a house
and lot at BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon
Golez in favor of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the
Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was issued in the name of [petitioner] Milagros B.
Joaquino; that the funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased
Rodolfo A. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as [petitioner] Joaquino was without the
means to pay for the same; that [petitioner] executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A.
Reyes to mortgage the property to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to pay the balance of the
purchase price; that said Rodolfo A. Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of Commonwealth Insurance
Corporation for P140,000.00 and to guaranty payment thereof, he secured a life insurance [policy] with
Philam Life Insurance Corporation for the said amount, assigning the proceeds thereof to Commonwealth
Insurance Corporation; that the monthly amortizations of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A.
Reyes before his death and at the time of his death, the outstanding balance of  P110,000.00 was to be paid
out of his Philam Life Insurance [p]olicy.
‘The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in [petitioner’s] possession and that the real
and personal properties in [petitioner’s] possession are conjugal partnership propert[ies] of the spouses
Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to [respondent] Lourdes P.
Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the [other respondents]
as his forced heirs. [Respondents] therefore, pray that the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be
declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and that [petitioner] be
ordered to reconvey the property in [respondents’] favor; that the two cars in [petitioner’s] possession be
31
 delivered to [respondents] and that [petitioner] be made to pay actual, compensatory and moral damages to
[respondents] as well as attorney’s fees.’
xxx      xxx      xxx
"[Petitioner] eventually filed her Answer, dated August 1, 1982, the allegations of which have been summarized by
the trial court in the following manner:
‘In her Answer, [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino alleges that she purchased the real property in question
with her own exclusive funds and it was only for convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes facilitated the
mortgage over the same; that although the late Rodolfo Reyes paid the monthly amortization of the
mortgage as attorney-in-fact of [petitioner], the money came exclusively from [her].
‘[Petitioner] further alleges in her answer, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that during all the
nineteen (19) years that [she] lived with Rodolfo Reyes from 1962 continuously up to September 12, 1981
when the latter died, [petitioner] never had knowledge whatsoever that he was married to someone else,
much less to [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes; that [petitioner] was never the beneficiary of the emoluments
or other pecuniary benefits of the late Rodolfo Reyes during his lifetime or after his death because [she]
had the financial capacity to support herself and her children begotten with the late Rodolfo Reyes.
[Petitioner] prays for a judgment dismissing [respondents’] complaint and for the latter to pay unto
[petitioner] moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as may be determined during the trial,
including atto[r]ney’s fees and the costs of the suit. x x x.’
xxx      xxx      xxx
"On February 2, 1993, [respondent] Lourdes Reyes died.
"Subsequently, the trial court granted the complaint based on the following factual findings:
‘Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3, 1947 in Manila. They have four
children, namely: Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo Jr., all surnamed Reyes and co-[respondents] in
this case. Rodolfo Reyes died on September 12, 1981. At the time of his death, Rodolfo Reyes was living
with his common-law wife, Milagros Joaquino, x x x with whom she begot three (3) children namely: Jose
Romillo, Imelda May and Charina, all surnamed Reyes.
‘During his lifetime, Rodolfo Reyes worked with Marsman and Company and later transferred to Warner
Barnes & Co., where he assumed the position of Vice-President [Comptroller] until he retired on
September 30, 1980. His monthly salary at Warner Barnes & Co. was  P15,000.00 x x x and upon his
separation or retirement from said company, Rodolfo Reyes received a lump sum of  P315,011.79 in full
payment and settlement of his separation and retirement benefits.
‘During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and [petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and while
living together, they decided to buy the house and lot situated at No. 12 Baghdad Street, Phase 3, BF
Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 12, 1979 was executed in favor of
[petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-90293 covering the said property
was issued in the name of [petitioner only] on July 20, 1979.
‘To secure the finances with which to pay the purchase price of the property in the amount of P140,000.00,
[petitioner] executed on July 20, 1979, a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes for the
latter, as attorney-in-fact, to secure a loan from the Commonwealth Insurance Company. An application
for mortgage loan was filed by Rodolfo Reyes with the Commonwealth Insurance Company and a Real
Estate Mortgage Contract was executed as collateral to the mortgage loan. The loan was payable in ten
(10) years with a monthly amortization of P1,166.67. The monthly amortizations were paid by Rodolfo
Reyes and after his death, the balance of P109,797.64 was paid in full to the Commonwealth Insurance by
the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes.’" 5
On appeal to the CA, petitioner questioned the following findings of the trial court: 1) that the house and lot had been paid in
full from the proceeds of the loan that Rodolfo Reyes obtained from the Commonwealth Insurance Company; 2) that his salaries
and earnings, which were his and Lourdes’ conjugal funds, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed property was conjugal; and
3) that petitioner’s illegitimate children, not having been recognized or acknowledged by him in any of the ways provided by
law, acquired no successional rights to his estate.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the RTC, the CA held that the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes because the
monthly amortizations for the loan, as well as the premiums for the life insurance policy that paid for the balance thereof, came
from his salaries and earnings. Like the trial court, it found no sufficient proof that petitioner was financially capable of buying
the disputed property, or that she had actually contributed her own exclusive funds to pay for it. Hence, it ordered her to
surrender possession of the property to the respective estates of the spouses.
The appellate court, however, held that the trial court should not have resolved the issue of the filiation and the successional
rights of petitioner’s children. Such issues, it said, were not properly cognizable in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance and
damages and were better ventilated in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose.
Hence, this Petition.6
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
"I.
Whether or not it has been indubitably established in a court of law and trier of facts, the Regional Trial Court, that
petitioner’s three [3] illegitimate children are x x x indeed the children of the late Rodolfo Reyes.
"II.
Whether or not it is legally permissible for [respondents] to make a mockery of the law by denying [the] filiations of
their [two] 2 illegitimate sisters and one [1] illegitimate brother when in fact the very complaint filed by their mother,
the lawful wife, Lourdes[,] shows that her husband Rodolfo had illicit relations with the petitioner Milagros and had
lived with her in a house and lot at Baghdad Street.
"III.
Whether or not the fact that the Court of Appeals made a finding that the house and lot at Baghdad Street are conjugal
property of lawfully wedded Rodolfo and Lourdes including the insurance proceeds which was used to pay the final
bill for the house and lot, this will prevail over Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
"IV.
Whether or not the Supreme Court should enforce the rule that the parties to a lawsuit should only tell the truth at the
trial and in [their] pleadings x x x.
"V.
Whether or not the legitimate children of the late Rodolfo Reyes should respect their father’s desire that his
illegitimate children should have a home or a roof over their heads in consonance with his duty to love, care and
provide for his children even after his death."7
The issues boil down to the following: 1) the nature of the house and lot on Baghdad Street (BF Homes Parañaque, Metro
Manila); and 2) the propriety of ruling on the filiation and the successional rights of petitioner’s children.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
The Conjugal Nature of the Disputed Property
Before tackling the merits, we must first point out some undisputed facts and guiding principles.
As to the facts, it is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo Reyes was legally married to Respondent Lourdes Reyes on January
3, 1947.8 It is also admitted that for 19 years or so, and while their marriage was subsisting, he was actually living with
petitioner. It was during this time, in 1979, that the disputed house and lot was purchased and registered in petitioner’s name.
Plainly, therefore, the applicable law is the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of
gains (CPG) is created upon marriage 9 and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or
judicial separation of property. 10 Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and wife. 11 As to what
constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:
"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the
exclusive property of each spouse."
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife
exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be
proven to have been acquired during the existence of the marriage. 12
The law places the burden of proof 13 on the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to establish their claim by a preponderance of
evidence14 -- evidence that has greater weight or is more convincing than that which is offered to oppose it. 15
On the other hand, Article 144 16 of the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and a woman who are living
together but are not legally married. Prevailing jurisprudence holds, though, that for Article 144 to apply, the couple must not be
32
incapacitated to contract marriage. 17 It has been held that the Article is inapplicable to common-law relations amounting to
adultery or concubinage, as in this case. The reason therefor is the absurdity of creating a co-ownership in cases in which there
exists a prior conjugal partnership between the man and his lawful wife. 18
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied. 19 The latter Article provides:
"Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidence of credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party which acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith."
Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by them in common and  in proportion to their
respective contributions.
With these facts and principles firmly settled, we now proceed to the merits of the first issue.
The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds paid for the house and lot in question. Upon the resolution of this
issue depends the determination of whether the property is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by
Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.
The above issue, which is clearly factual, has been passed upon by both the trial and the appellate courts, with similar results in
favor of respondents. Such finding is generally conclusive; it is not the function of this Court to review questions of fact. 20
Moreover, it is well-settled that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in cases brought to it from the
Court of Appeals or under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 21 This principle applies with greater force herein, because the CA
came up with the same factual findings as those of the RTC.
Even then, heeding petitioner’s plea, we have gone through the pleadings and the evidence presented by the parties to find out if
there is any circumstance that might warrant a reversal of the factual findings. Unfortunately for petitioner, we have found none.
Indeed, a preponderance of evidence has duly established that the disputed house and lot was paid by Rodolfo Reyes, using his
salaries and earnings. By substantial evidence, respondents showed the following facts: 1) that Rodolfo was gainfully employed
as comptroller at Warner, Barnes and Co., Inc. until his retirement on September 30, 1980, upon which he received a sizeable
retirement package;22 2) that at exactly the same time the property was allegedly purchased, 23 he applied for a mortgage loan 24 --
intended for "housing" 25 -- from the Commonwealth Insurance Company; 3) that he secured the loan with a real estate
mortgage26 over the same property; 4) that he paid the monthly amortizations for the loan 27 as well as the semi-annual
premiums28 for a Philam Life insurance policy, which he was required to take as additional security; and 5) that with the
proceeds of his life insurance policy, the balance of the loan was paid to Commonwealth by Philam Life Insurance Company. 29
All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives
rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by
Rodolfo were used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were
conjugal funds under the Civil Code.
In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her claims -- that she was financially capable of buying the house and
lot, or that she actually contributed to the payments therefor.
Indeed, it does not appear that she was gainfully employed at any time after 1961 30 when the property was purchased. Hearsay
are the Affidavits31 and the undated Certification32 she had presented to prove that she borrowed money from her siblings and
had earnings from a jewelry business. Respondents had not been given any opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, who had
not testified on these matters. Based on the rules of evidence, the Affidavits and the Certification have to be rejected. In fact,
they have no probative value.33 The CA was also correct in disregarding petitioner’s allegation that part of the purchase money
had come from the sale of a drugstore34 four years earlier.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty in petitioner’s name was
tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was
void, because it was "made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation."
The prohibition against donations between spouses 35 must likewise apply to donations between persons living together in illicit
relations; otherwise, the latter would be better situated than the former. 36 Article 87 of the Family Code now expressly provides
thus:
"Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage ."
(Italics supplied)
Regarding the registration of the property in petitioner’s name, it is enough to stress that a certificate of title under the Torrens
system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership. 37 It has been held that
property is conjugal if acquired in a common-law relationship during the subsistence of a preexisting legal marriage, even if it is
titled in the name of the common-law wife. 38 In this case, a constructive trust is deemed created under Article 1456 of the Civil
Code, which we quote:
"Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."
The registration of the property in petitioner’s name was clearly designed to deprive Rodolfo’s legal spouse and compulsory
heirs of ownership. By operation of law, petitioner is deemed to hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely
on the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a
certificate of title.39
Second Issue:
Ruling on Illegitimate Filiation
Not Proper
It is petitioner’s alternative submission that her children are entitled to a share in the disputed property, because they were
voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children. Claiming that the issue of her children’s illegitimate filiation was duly
established in the trial court, she faults the CA for ruling that the issue was improper in the instant case.
Her position is untenable.
Indeed, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court
in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. 40 Sustaining the appellate court in Agapay
v. Palang,41 this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
Considerations of due process should have likewise deterred the RTC from ruling on the status of petitioner’s children. It is
evident from the pleadings of the parties that this issue was not presented in either the original 42 or the Supplemental
Complaint43 for reconveyance of property and damages; that it was not pleaded and specifically prayed for by petitioner in her
Answers44 thereto; and that it was not traversed by respondents’ Reply to the Supplemental Complaint. 45 Neither did petitioner’s
Memorandum,46 which was submitted to the trial court, raise and discuss this issue. In view thereof, the illegitimate filiation of
her children could not have been duly established by the proceedings as required by Article 887 of the Civil Code. 47
In view of the foregoing reasons, the CA cannot be faulted for tackling the propriety of the RTC’s ruling on the status of the
children of petitioner, though she did not assign this matter as an error. The general rule -- that only errors assigned may be
passed upon by an appellate court – admits of exceptions. Even unassigned errors may be taken up by such court if the
consideration of those errors would be necessary for arriving at a just decision or for serving the interest of justice. 48
The invocation by petitioner of Articles 19 49 and 2150 of the Civil Code is also unmeritorious. Clearly, the illegitimate filiation of
her children was not the subject of inquiry and was in fact not duly established in this case. Thus, she could not have shown that
respondents had acted in bad faith or with intent to prejudice her children. These are conditions necessary to show that an act
constitutes an abuse of rights under Article 19. 51 She also failed to show that respondents -- in violation of the provisions of
Article 21 of the Civil Code -- had acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Moreover, we note that the issue concerning the applicability of Articles 19 and 21 was not raised by petitioner in the trial court
or even in the CA. Hence, she should not be permitted to raise it now. Basic is the rule that parties may not bring up on appeal
issues that have not been raised on trial.52
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 141501             July 21, 2006
ELINO RIVERA, DOMINADOR CLAUREN, SOLEDAD CLAUREN DE RIVERA, TEOFILA RIVERA and
CECILIA RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
33
HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA* represented by MELCHOR VILLANUEVA, ANGELINA VILLANUEVA,
VICTORIANO DE LUNA, CABANATUAN CITY RURAL BANK, INC. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA
ECIJA, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 from a decision2 and a resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
51449 touches upon questions of filiation, presumptions of co-equal acquisition and res judicata.
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the half-sister-in-law (Soledad), and the children of a half-
brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion
and Melchor, all surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of Romualdo
Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva). 4 They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva and are represented by Melchor. They
were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death. 5 The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter
respondent Angelina) and husband Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late
Villanueva.
From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was
married to one Amanda Musngi who died on April 20, 1963. 6 In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several
properties including the properties contested in this case. The disputed properties are:
(a) Lot No. 266-B-1, with an area of 1,787 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. NT-21446 [in the names of Villanueva and Gonzales], together with the residential house erected thereon and
other improvements;
(b) Lot No. 266-B-3 [included in the coverage of transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-21446], with an area of 5,353
square meters, more or less, situated at Poblacion, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(c) [Lot 801-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-12201 [in the names of Villanueva and Gonzales],
with [an] area of 15.400 hectares, more or less, situated at Llanera, Nueva Ecija;
(d) [Lot 3-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-51899 [in the names of Villanueva and Gonzales], with
an area of 4.0019 hectares, more or less, situated at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(e) [Lot No. 838 covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-17193 [in the names of Villanueva, Gonzales and
one Soledad Alarcon vda. de Rivera], with an area of 3.8718 hectares, more or less, situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(f) [Lot 884-B covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-26670 [in the name of Gonzales], with an area of
3.5972 hectares, more or less, situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(g) Subdivision lots situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 106813 to
106931, inclusive, although the land covered by TCT No. NT-106827 … was already sold to one Pastor Barlaan;
(h) Shares of stocks, tractor, jewelries and other chattels, with an approximate value of at least P100,000; and
(i) Savings deposit with the [Philippine] National Bank, in the amount of P118,722.61.7
Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will.
On August 8, 1980, Villanueva and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale, 8 that is, an
extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. In this document,
Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.
Petitioners (Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales' estate and annulment of titles and damages, with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 37. It was docketed as Civil Case No. SD-857 (SD-
857). In dismissing the complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2)
respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners. 9
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed it. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter despite
the RTC's ruling in another case, Special Proceedings No. SD-144 (SD-144), entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the
late Pacita C. Gonzales, Epifanio C. Rivera, petitioner, v. Romualdo Villanueva, oppositor, in which the trial court appointed
Epifanio Rivera as administrator of Gonzales' estate. 10
They argue that the trial court's decision in SD-144, to the effect that respondent Angelina was neither the adopted nor the
illegitimate daughter of Gonzales, should have operated as res judicata on the matter of respondent Angelina's status.
The first issue here is whether or not the findings regarding respondent Angelina's filiation in SD-144 are conclusive on SD-857
and therefore res judicata. The second is the determination of her real status in relation to Gonzales. Finally, there is the
question of whether or not the real properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales were equally owned by them.
We resolve the first issue in the negative. Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It sets forth the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the
merits and without fraud or collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive
of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 11
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits and
(4) there, must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 12
A number of factors militate against the existence of res judicata. First, the parties in the two cases are different. Epifanio C.
Rivera, who incidentally is not a party in this petition, filed SD-144 seeking letters of administration over his dead sister's estate.
Villanueva was his lone opponent. On the other hand, although both Villanueva and respondent Angelina were parties in SD-
857, Epifanio Rivera was not. Petitioners never alleged that Epifanio represented their interests, and vice versa.
Furthermore, in SD-144, the trial court never actually acquired jurisdiction over respondent Angelina's person. She was not even
a party there, given that Villanueva did not represent her interest when he opposed Epifanio Rivera's petition.
Finally and most significantly, there was no identity of cause of action between the two suits. By their very nature, they were
entirely distinct from each other. SD-144 was a special proceeding while SD-857 was an ordinary civil case. The former was
concerned with the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Epifanio Rivera while the latter was for partition and
annulment of titles, and damages.
Clearly, then, there was no res judicata. Nevertheless, this still begged the question of whether or not it was proven, as the CA
held, that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the decedent Gonzales. On this issue, we find merit in the
petition.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the decedent, based solely on her
birth certificate. According to the assailed decision, "the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother
of Angelina Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her father." 13 The CA
found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate child.
However, a closer examination of the birth certificate 14 reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both
Villanueva and Gonzales.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 15 However, one of the exceptions to this rule is when the judgment of
the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts. 16 We believe this to be just such an instance.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,17 Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that she was the sole heir of the late
Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for
membership in the Government Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records.
She also testified that she had been reared and continuously treated as Vicente's daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua's alleged parents had been unable to beget children, the siblings
of Benitez-Badua's supposed father were able to rebut all of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was
counted against Benitez-Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten
years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents
is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of
such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a
public document. (emphasis ours)18
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 19 It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. 20 Following the logic of Benitez,
respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of
her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua that are simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-
Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of
parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been born after their alleged parents had lived together childless
for several years.
34
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case which ineluctably support the conclusion that
respondent Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged
mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause 21 at the time of the alleged birth.
Unlike Chipongian who had been married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childless with
Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was
Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have
validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was
invalid.
Finally, we come to the question of whether or not the properties acquired by Gonzales and Villanueva during their cohabitation
were equally owned by them. According to the trial court in SD-857, 22 Gonzales and Villanueva lived together without the
benefit of marriage and therefore their property relations were governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
However, the contending parties agreed that the relationship of Villanueva and Gonzales was  adulterous,  at least until the death
of Amanda Musngi, Villanueva's legal wife, on April 20, 1963. In their appeal brief, petitioners made the following admission:
From 1927 until her death, Pacita [Gonzales] lived together with defendant Romualdo Villanueva ("Romualdo") as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Earlier, or sometime in 1913 or 1914, Romualdo was married
to Amanda Musngi (or "Amanda"). Amanda died on April 20, 1963.23 (emphasis supplied)
Respondent Angelina, in her memorandum in SD-857, actually agreed with petitioners on the nature of Villanueva's relationship
with Gonzales:24
While Romualdo Villanueva claimed that he and Pacita C. Gonzales lived as husband and wife and that they were
married, it turned out that he was not legally married to the latter, for then, his marriage in the year 1927, was
still subsisting with one Amanda Musngi. (emphasis supplied)
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their property relations during those
36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way
incapacitated from getting married. 25 According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v. Jose,26 no co-ownership exists between
parties to an adulterous relationship. In Agapay v. Palang,27  we expounded on this doctrine by declaring that in such a
relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order
to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
In Agapay, Miguel Palang and his paramour Erlinda Agapay bought a parcel of riceland in Pangasinan which they registered in
their names. However, because Agapay failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, she
could not rightfully claim co-ownership over the same.
Here, the records show only four properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales between 1927 and 1963 which they registered
in both their names.28 Following Agapay, these can only be apportioned according to the actual contributions of each.
Unfortunately, the records are devoid of any evidence that Gonzales contributed anything to the acquisition of these properties.
Petitioners merely asserted that she acquired these properties through her own industry 29 without a shred of evidence to support
the allegation. On the other hand, it was clearly demonstrated that Villanueva was the municipal treasurer of Talavera for many
years and therefore the lone breadwinner. In accordance with Agapay,  none of these four parcels of land should accrue to
petitioners.
There is only one parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-26670, 30 registered solely in Gonzales'
name, which was acquired between 1927 and 1963. 31 This fact of registration created a conclusiveness of title in favor of the
person in whose name it was registered. 32 In SD-857, although Villanueva sought to prove that he alone had purchased the
properties and that only he could have done so during the period of cohabitation (since he was the sole breadwinner), he never
actually challenged the validity of the registration in her name. Thus the efficacy of the title in Gonzales' name remained
unrebutted. As Gonzales' sole property, this should accrue entirely to her heirs.
The only property acquired after Musngi's death in 1963 and registered in the names of both Villanueva and Gonzales was Lot
3-A covered by TCT No. NT-51899.33 This was governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil
Code. Half of it should pertain to Gonzales' heirs and the other half, to Villanueva.
The rest of the properties registered solely in Gonzales' name were also acquired after the death of Amanda Musngi in 1963.
The records show that the subdivision lots situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija covered by TCTs Nos. 106813 to 106931 were
acquired in 1971.34 These properties were governed by co-ownership under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Again, half should
accrue to Gonzales' heirs and the other half, to Villanueva.
Significantly, the trial court in SD-857 did not establish the exact relationship between petitioners and Gonzales, a relationship
defendants therein (now respondents) vigorously denied. In view of this, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin
for the proper determination and identification of Gonzales' heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51449 are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial partition with sale
and REMANDING the case to the court of origin for the determination and identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the
corresponding partition of her estate.
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated
May 29, 1992.1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel
died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and
Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San
Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of
private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can
well and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian
who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or
without descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them
since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal
heir; . . .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and
capable of administering his estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove
that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns
and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4)
School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino
Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late
Vicente, then 77 years of age,2 categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were
unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for letters
and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and another one entered declaring that
appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez
and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition
to the petition for the appointment of an administrator of the intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez
is, consequently, DENIED; said petition and the proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and the
35
 lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of Special proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in accordance
with law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and misapprehension of facts when it failed to
apply the provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in
adopting and upholding private respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or impugn directly or indirectly, the
legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it gave more weight to the testimonial evidence of witnesses of private respondents whose credibility
and demeanor have not convinced the trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof, than the documentary
and testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way not in accord with law or with applicable
decisions of the supreme Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be
sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of the husband or that of a
donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the
birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of
the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the
husband except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his
heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines;
and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband
or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the
fact of registration of said birth, which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding Article only in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child
is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the  husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the  husband or any
of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs.  Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Article 170 of the Family Code] is not
well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to
claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all.
Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as
follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to establish
her biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and
convincing that she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a child,
the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and without he and his wife's
legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their own true child, giving her
the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that she was really their daughter and entitled to
inherit from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore,
never delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister
had already been married for ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten or
still could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-
known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his sister for
a number of years. There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez,
Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy and the youngest of
the children of their widowed mother) through law school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly
respected and consulted on family matters, that her brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless,
they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt
elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow
up unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister
Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years
old and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her testimony by the
presiding judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence in Parañaque, MM. Considering, her
advanced age and weak physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's
testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she
would hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under her
oath as a witness. There were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who
testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday especially as she had
drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year
appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at
all, and that it is also true with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's
36
 personal beautician who used to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that
she did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that
when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she
was surprised and asked the latter where the baby came from, and "she told me that the child was brought
by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as her delivering a baby,
are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never became
pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering
and caring for a baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel
Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true
mother of that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is
highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36 years old at the time
of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth
certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and caring
hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late
age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How come, then, that as
appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida
Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent times for people who
want to avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as their supposed
child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the
trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings by merely putting
himself and his wife as the parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to
legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not come around doing so either because he was
too busy or for some other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the
status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and
his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after
Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN
because she died without descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on a witness stand by
appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document
and that he signed the same only because the latter told him to do so (p. 24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why
would Atty. Benitez make such a statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not really
his and his wife's daughter and descendant and, therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr.
Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document without understanding completely the
meaning of the words "descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we cannot believe, Dr.
Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13,
1990). Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased sister
and brother-in-law, as against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is really the daughter and only legal heir
of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before her death, would write a
note to her husband and Marissa stating that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my child or only daughter
will inherit what is legally my own property, in case I die without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband —
that any inheritance due him from my property — when he die — to make our own
daughter his sole heir. This do [sic] not mean what he legally owns or his inherited
property. I leave him to decide for himself regarding those.
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for the foregoing
requests to her husband, since Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel
Chipongian had to implore and supplicate her husband to give appellee although without any legal papers
her properties when she dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the properties that he would
inherit from her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is not truly their daughter and could not be their
legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother
Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria
and Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother of
Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only
registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record. The weight of these findings was not negated
by documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3")
purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the
deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be  prima facie  evidence of the facts therein stated."
As related above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the
content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased
Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively
repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was made
twenty-eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 138493               June 15, 2000
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,
vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that
the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor
by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper
party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto. 4
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby rendered, to
wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void "ab initio";
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan
City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for private
respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
37
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del
Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred
to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046.
From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20,
1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the
knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the
child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera
appear as the mother by forging her signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and
personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth
certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged,
and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is
falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct
family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate
child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is
void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed
parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's
last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void
and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the
estate of cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and hearing, judgment
[be] render[ed] declaring . . . the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and
ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan
City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the publication of
the petition and the date of hearing thereof in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the
City Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on
the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that
plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that
the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code." The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of private
respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent."
In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto;
that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the
truth of the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-
blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . . Certificate of Baptism, . . . Student's
Report Card . . . all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and
affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on
the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñoza Babiera; that
plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that
the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code. 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the biological child of
Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further
observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA
noted that the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical
complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein,
which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn the
child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation
wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation
of the child's Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the
mother.
Hence, this appeal.6
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding of
appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute of
limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public record of
petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony of respondent. 7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:  Subject of
the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 8 of the Family Code states that the child's
filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not
subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit." 9 The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition
which the latter filed against the former. 10 The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it
applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the
child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled thus:
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
x x x           x x x          x x x
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is
the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of
the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy
of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his
child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in
Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-
taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because
this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim
their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being
38
 neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue:  Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed.
She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the
birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city
or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or
where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad.
If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be
counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever
is earlier.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn
her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to
nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio. 1
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's testimony that petitioner was not her real child,
cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific
facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar. 14 More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her signatures
in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one,
there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.1awphil Moreover,
at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at
such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical
care normally available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give
birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:
q Who are your children?
a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your husband Eugenio Babiera, what can
you say about that?
a She is not our child.
x x x           x x x          x x x
q Do you recall where she was born?
a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in your residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.
q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your daughter with your husband?
a No, sir. 15
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence other than the
said document to show that she is really Hermogena's child; Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother
would make a deposition stating that the former was not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was not
the child of respondent's parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 197099
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner,
vs.
KAREN SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
88650 promulgated on January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, which affirmed the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8. Both courts a quo  ruled that the subject document titled Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman  is null and void, and ordered herein petitioner Eugenio San Juan Geronimo (Eugenio), who was previously
joined by his brother Emiliano San Juan Geronimo (Emiliano) as codefendant, to vacate the one-half portion of the subject
6,542-square meter property and surrender its possession to respondent Karen Santos. In a Resolution 4 dated November 28,
2011, this Court ordered the deletion of the name of Emiliano from the title of the instant petition_ as co-petitioner, viz.:
x x x The Court resolves:
xxxx
(2) to AMEND the title of this petition to read "Eugenio San Juan Geronimo, petitioner vs. Karen Santos, respondent,"
considering the sworn statement of Eugenio San Juan Geronimo that he does not know whether his brother is still alive and that
his brother did not verify the instant petition; x x x 5
The following facts were found by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, viz.:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a
complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who
are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of
land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was
passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a document entitled  Pagmamana
sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the
property in question; and that consequently[,] they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject
property to their names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the land transferred to
her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.
In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother. They
disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in
truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was
allegedly impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had never
lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed any maternity leave during
the period of her service from August 1963 until October 1984.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and
Emiliano were the half-brothers of her father Rufino, being the children of Rufino’s father Marciano Geronimo with another
woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-owned Lot 1716 with the defendants’ mother Carmen, and upon his death in 1980, when
the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the property devolved on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years later, Caridad and she
executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino’s estate entitled Pagmamanahan Sa Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod
Sa Karapatan, whereby the plaintiff’s mother Caridad waived all her rights to Rufino’s share and in the land in question to her
daughter the plaintiff. Be that as it may, in 1985, guardianship proceedings appeared to have been instituted with the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it was established that the plaintiff was the minor child of Caridad with her late
husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the person and estate of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the real estate taxes on the property, but in 2000, the
defendants took possession of the land and had the tax declaration transferred to them. This compelled her to file the present
case.
Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is the only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino.
He disclosed that when Rufino’s wife could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad’s niece
from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents’ household.
Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of their brother, they
executed in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement called
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.
39
Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written
in pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972  written and the name Emma
Daño  was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the informant’s signature.
Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant of the DECS in Bulacan brought the plaintiff's service
record as an elementary school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to show that she did not have any maternity leave during the
period of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984, and a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent
that the plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her service. He declared that as far as the service record is concerned, it
reflects the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she availed of. Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that
the leaves  were reflected but the absences were not. Testifying on the plaintiff’s birth certificate, Exhibit 14, Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was an alteration in the date of birth and signature of the informant. In view of
the alterations, he considered the document questionable.6
On October 27, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman dated March 9, 2000 executed in favor of Eugenio San
Juan-Geronimo and Emilio San Juan-Geronimo as null and void;
2. Annulling Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-01453 of the subject property in the names of Eugenio San Juan-
Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo;
3. Ordering defendants Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo to vacate the ½ portion of the
subject property and to surrender the possession to the plaintiff;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of [P]30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
5. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir – being the legitimate child – of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth
which was presented in evidence. The RTC dismissed the claim of petitioner that the birth certificate appeared to have been
tampered, specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. The trial court
held that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to explain how the erasures were done. Petitioner also failed to prove that the
alterations were due to the fault of respondent or another person who was responsible for the act. In the absence of such
contrary evidence, the RTC relied on the prima facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate as a
public document.
The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has
already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC considered the following overt acts of the deceased spouses as acts
of recognition that respondent is their legitimate child: they sent her to school and paid for her tuition fees; Caridad made
respondent a beneficiary of her burial benefits from the Government Service Insurance System; and, Caridad filed a petition for
guardianship of respondent after the death of her husband Rufino. Lastly, the trial court held that to be allowed to impugn the
filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should have brought an action for the purpose under Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code. Since petitioner failed to file such action, the trial court ruled that respondent alone is entitled to the
ownership and possession of the subject land owned by Rufino. The extrajudicial settlement executed by petitioner and his
brother was therefore declared not valid and binding as respondent is Rufino’s only compulsory heir.
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of respondent and the offered evidence of a mere
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the birth certificate itself.
According to petitioner, respondent’s open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is only secondary
evidence to the birth certificate itself. Respondent questioned if it was legally permissible for petitioner to question her filiation
as a legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad in the same action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession that she herself filed against petitioner and his then co-defendant.
Respondent argued that the conditions enumerated under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, giving the putative father
and his heirs the right to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of the child, are not present in the instant case. She further
asserted that the Family Code contemplates a direct action, thus her civil status may not be assailed indirectly or collaterally in
this suit.
In the assailed Decision dated January 17, 2011, the appellate court held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the
marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in the civil registry. The CA found no evidence or admission
that Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date. It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case,
Exhibit 14, does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by the law, viz.:
x x x The reason is that under the statute establishing the civil register, Act No. 3753,  the declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or in default thereof, that declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient
for the registration of birth in the civil register. The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not
identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot
be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates to
spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the  final judgment mentioned in
Article 172 as another proof of filiation.
The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an
order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff. 8
Noting the absence of such record of birth, final judgment or admission in a public or private document that respondent is the
legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad, the appellate court – similar to the trial court – relied on Article 172 of the
Family Code which allows the introduction and admission of secondary evidence to prove one’s legitimate filiation via  open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The CA agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her
legitimate filiation, viz.:
We agree with the lower court that the plaintiff has proven her filiation by open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family
name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was
the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was
appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the
plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of
the deceased.
It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate child of Rufino and Caridad has been open  and continuous. x x
x The conclusion follows that the plaintiff is entitled to the property left by Rufino to the exclusion of his brothers, the
defendants, which consists of a one-half share in Lot 1716. 9
Petitioners moved for reconsideration 10 but the motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated May 24, 2011. Hence, this
petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE AND
RENDERED JUDGMENT BASED THEREON NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY
EVIDENCE OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE [EXHIBIT 14].
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO IMPUGN
RESPONDENT’S LEGITIMATE FILIATION.11
On the first issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to prove one’s filiation is admissible only if there is no primary
evidence, i.e, a record of birth or an authentic admission in writing. 12 Petitioner asserts that herein respondent’s birth certificate,
Exhibit 14, constitutes the primary evidence enumerated under Article 172 of the Family Code and the ruling of both courts a
quo that the document is not the one "envisioned by law" should have barred the introduction of secondary evidence. Petitioner
expounds this proposition, viz.:
The findings of the courts a quo that the birth certificate [Exhibit 14] is not [the] one envisioned by law finds support in
numerous cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court. Thus, a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate
child upon the information of a third person. Where the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate are  per se  inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. x x x
x x x The birth certificate Exhibit 14 contains erasures. The date of birth originally written in ball pen was erased and the date
April 6, 1972 was superimposed using a pentel pen; the entry on the informant also originally written in ball pen was erased and
the name E. Dano was superimposed using also a pentel pen; there is no signature as to who received it from the office of the
registry. Worst, respondent Karen confirms the existence of her birth certificate when she introduced in evidence [Exhibit A] a
mere Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, which highlighted more suspicions of
its existence, thus leading to conclusion and presumption that if such evidence is presented, it would be adverse to her claim.
40
True to the suspicion, when Exhibit 14 was introduced by the petitioner and testified on by no less than the NSO representative,
Mr. Arturo Reyes, and confirmed that there were alterations which renders the birth certificate questionable.
Argued differently, with the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity, the courts  a quo should have stopped
there, ruled that respondent Karen is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate. 13
On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred and abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it ruled that he does not have personality to impugn respondent’s legitimate filiation. 14
While petitioner admits that the CA "did not directly rule on this particular issue," 15 he nonetheless raises the said issue as an
error since the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner argues that in so affirming, the CA also adopted
the ruling of the trial court that the filiation of respondent is strictly personal to respondent’s alleged father and his heirs under
Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, 16 thereby denying petitioner the "right to impugn or question the filiation and status of
the plaintiff."17 Petitioner argues, viz.:
x x x [T]he lower court’s reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code is totally misplaced, with due respect. It should
be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation of the Family Code. A careful
reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child, and
the father [or, in proper cases, his heirs] denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to
be the child at all of a particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not merely that respondent Karen is not a legitimate child of,
but that she is not a child of Rufino Geronimo at all. x x x 18
We grant the petition.
Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent offered in evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that
respondent is a legitimate child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on
secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to prove
the filiation of legitimate children, viz.:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172 because the said
provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in
the instant case which is an action for annulment of document and recovery of possession.
Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a
direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. The rationale behind this procedural prescription is stated in
the case of Tison v. Court of Appeals,19 viz.:
x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican
Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper
complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.’ This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned.1âwphi1 The
obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long
time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the
matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
xxxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none – even his heirs – can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory." 20
What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy – or
illegitimacy – of a child is at issue. This situation does not obtain in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child – herein respondent – is not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not
the legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the
child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at all. He proffers this allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial
court by way of defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a
child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct
in admitting and ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent – even if such proof is similar to the evidence admissible under
the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove one’s filiation. In the
following cases, the courts a quo  and this Court did not bar the introduction of secondary evidence in actions which involve
allegations that the opposing party is not the child of a particular couple – even if such evidence is similar to the kind of proof
admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172.
In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,21 therein deceased spouses Vicente Benitez (Vicente) and Isabel
Chipongian (Isabel) owned various properties while they were still living. Isabel departed in 1982, while Vicente died intestate
in 1989. In 1990, Vicente’s sister (Victoria Benitez-Lirio) and nephew (Feodor Benitez Aguilar) instituted an action before the
trial court for the issuance of letters of administration of his estate in favor of Feodor. In the said proceedings, they alleged that
Vicente was "survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
legally adopted x x x." 22 They further argued that one "Marissa Benitez[-]Badua who was raised and cared for by them since
childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir [of Vicente]." 23 Marissa
opposed the petition and proffered evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente. Marissa submitted the following
evidence, viz.:
1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);
2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);
3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his
daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. 24
Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial evidence to show that the spouses Vicente and Isabel failed to beget
a child during their marriage. They testified that the late Isabel, when she was 36 years old, was even referred to an obstetrician-
gynecologist for treatment. Victoria, who was 77 years old at the time of her testimony, also categorically stated that Marissa
was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate. 25
The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared Marissa as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of
the spouses Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court reversed the RTC’s ruling holding that the trial court erred in applying
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a
child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article
166, it is the husband  who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2)
that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived
through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission
is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat- Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166
SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not welltaken.
41
This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased,
but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a
child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased." 26
Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago27 originated from a complaint for recovery of title, ownership and possession
before the trial court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent Jose and sought to
recover from her the 1/3 portion of the subject property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner’s sole possession upon
Jose’s death. Respondents sought to prove that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate
which did not itself indicate the name of Jose as her father. Citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals  and Article 263 of the
Civil Code (now Article 170 of the Family Code), 28 petitioner argued that respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally
since the case was not an action impugning a child’s legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership and possession of
property. We ruled in this case that petitioner’s reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is misplaced and respondents may
impugn the petitioner’s filiation in an action for recovery of title and possession. Thus, we affirmed the ruling of the appellate
court that the birth certificate of petitioner Labagala proved that she "was born of different parents, not Jose and his
wife."29 Citing the aforecited cases of Benitez-Badua  and Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court,30 we stated, viz.:
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code.
A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s
child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where
a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. 31
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his
wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
x x x32
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under
Article 172 of the Family Code in this action for annulment of document and recovery of possession, we are constrained to rule
after a meticulous examination of the evidence on record that all proof points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a
child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad.
While we ascribe to the general principle that this Court is not a trier of facts, 33 this rule admits of the following exceptions
where findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures ( Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]);
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of
fact areconflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) Whenthe Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of thecase and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant andappellee ( Evangelista v. Alto
Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401[1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those ofthe trial court
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents ( Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).34
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring respondent as a legitimate child and sole heir of the
deceasedspouses Rufino and Caridad is one based on a misapprehension of facts.
A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was tampered specifically on the entries
pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent –
April 6, 1972 – and the name of the informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring
erasures, the trial court still relied on the prima facie  presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for failure
of petitioner to explain how the erasures were done and if the alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that
respondent’s filiation was duly established by the birth certificate. The appellate court did not agree with this finding and
instead ruled that the birth certificate presented does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register as
envisioned by the law. We reiterate the relevant pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the
physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law;
otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the
order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final judgment  mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation. The final
judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting
letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff. 35
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her filiation by showing that she has
enjoyed that open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad, viz.:
x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family
name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was
the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was
appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the
plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of
the deceased.36
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the
superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating
testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature
of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the
respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and
the totality of the following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate, viz.:
1. The identity of one Emma Daño, whose name was superimposed as the informant regarding the birth of
respondent, remains unknown.
2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of the Department of Education in Bulacan,
proved that the deceased Caridad did not have any maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11,
1963 to October 24, 1984 as shown by her Service Record as an elementary school teacher at Paombong, Bulacan.
This was corroborated by a certification from Dr. Teofila R. Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that she
did not file any maternity leave during her service. No testimonial or documentary evidence was also offered to prove
that the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or 13 years into the marriage of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad. When respondent was born, Caridad was already 40 years old. There are no hospital records of
Caridad’s delivery, and while it may have been possible for her to have given birth at her own home, this could have
been proven by medical or non-medical records or testimony if they do, in fact, exist.
4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for herself in the instant case.
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently
establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA
ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative parents because she was allowed to bear their family name
"Geronimo", they supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy,
Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his legal heirs.
In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva 37 which incisively discussed its parallelisms and contrasts with the case
of Benitez- Badua v. Court of Appeals,38 we ruled that the presence of a similar set of circumstances – which were relied upon as
secondary proof by both courts a quo  in the case at bar – does not establish that one is a child of the putativeparents. Our
discussion in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that she was the sole heir of the late
Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for
membership in the Government Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records.
She also testified that she had been reared and continuously treated as Vicente’s daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua’s alleged parents had been unable to beget children, the siblings
of Benitez- Badua’s supposed father were able to rebut all of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that
was counted against Benitez-Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten
years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
42
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.(emphasis
ours)
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interestedparties.  Following the logic of Benitez,
respondent Angelina and her codefendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of
her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez- Badua that are simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-
Baduaand respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence offiliation. Second, both claimed to be children of
parents relativelyadvanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been born after their allegedparents had lived together childless
for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between BenitezBadua and this case which ineluctably support the conclusion
thatrespondent Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate oradopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged
mother Chipongian,was not only 36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopauseat the time of the alleged birth.
Unlike Chipongian who had been marriedto Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childlesswith
Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was
Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have
validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was
invalid.39
In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with both courts a quo  and rule that the confluence of the
circumstances and the proof presented in this case do not lead to the conclusion that respondent is a child of the deceased
spouses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 88650 dated January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in
Civil Case No. 268-M-2001 for Annulment of Document and Recovery of Possession is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 192531               November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 Decision 1 of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security
System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626. 2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel
Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program
(ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to
his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother
and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS)
at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 5 addressed to petitioner,
denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of
JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union
Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits
sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the
records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision 7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4,
1985, which decree of adoption attained finality. 8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as
John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary
even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries;
Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for
by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the
appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting
parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the
claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC. 10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful
beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise
meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee
considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is John’s
biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which
would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the
adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit
being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social
Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the primary
beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their
jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner –
Cornelio’s death certificate.13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, 14 or only less than three
(3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. 15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have
ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related
demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
43
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In
their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the
processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he
remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided
that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally,
that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the
youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated
and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired
during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as
required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner,
effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j)
of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that
the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an
interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation 16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order
to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward
restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent
parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane
has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of
statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one.
Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is
not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the termin a more
restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the
kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as
already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is
usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The
phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by
adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent
parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent
parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who
are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would
have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was crafted
undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by
nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection
clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art.
167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. 18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test
has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-
cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of
reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or
interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind
the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and their
dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of
action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of
the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
44
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an
opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental
authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have
still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental
authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made.
In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still
qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed.
However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent
died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent
ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, 21 who was then left
to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20
of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's
biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
(emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned. 1âwphi1 The
manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, 23 justifies the retention of vested
rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender
age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be
told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the
instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 24 wherein the
paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best
interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is
rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in
the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent
other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties
between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome
instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall
divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall
apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision
is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity
and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was
the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estateof
the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the
biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain
rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of
parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave
undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched
from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at
all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority resulted
in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can be established from the
documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a
housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a
bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona,
Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate 25 executed in Brazil, and in the
Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John. 26 Likewise, this is John’s
known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision. 27 Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim
before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having
been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one
roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, 28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise
known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and
expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s
deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s
parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a
beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626
as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does
not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s
untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the
benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES
and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR.,
EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and
grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on
November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His
wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a
complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who
alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the
intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
45
1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No.
1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel.
As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of
adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27,
1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants,
being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from
sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28,
1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that
Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the
ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared
the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on
February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents
from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who
have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in
fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on
the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this
argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it
became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should
have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel
from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of
Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps
withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of
the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or
rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having been
revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the
petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made
collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or
not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the
validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v.  Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75,
p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof
is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact
needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of
some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may
be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not
make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined
upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot
affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and
hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and
the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court
would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be
sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under
Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in
the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did
from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is
of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth
certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v.  Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's
legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It
serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that
civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action
for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and
Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably
to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to
his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring
properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care
even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised
to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if
he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented would have
succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the
former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
46
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a
right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted
above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of
her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers.
While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights
do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the
adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents
with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in
the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the
deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against the petitioners.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?
This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition 1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2 that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition,
this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an
adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds
that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with
the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is
hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall
henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to
use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1)
there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is
customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of
her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to
use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the
Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future,
her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the
law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has
been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that  "the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of
the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from
other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him,
or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname 10 of an individual
whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a
previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and  surname. If
she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing
her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and  surname employed before the
legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or
surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by
a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
47
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 11 of the Family
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname
Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names
and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely
provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the
legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the  right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the
Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that  the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the child
because the father’s surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the
father’s surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice
Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that  it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the
father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of this
misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s
surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his
mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child
to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof.
Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they
are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should
always be last because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name
and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee
approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent
whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear
the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. 14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights
accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an
act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This
was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child .18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
"Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes
pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to
a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name
will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 24, Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well
assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and
father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, 26 hence,
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when
the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be
authorized by some way of interpreting the law." 28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be
allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.
G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988
VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA, MARIA FRIANEZA VERGARA,
BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA BONIFACIA FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely,
DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and DECIDERIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA
HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA in her behalf and as Guardian ad litem of
Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY GLEN, all surnamed FRIANEZA respondents.
Ethelwoldo R. de Guzman for petitioners.
Tomas B. Tadeo, Sr. for private respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat wherein the protagonists are her sisters and the
children of her deceased brothers on one hand, and the petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child.
Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the Calasiao Bijon Factory assail the decision dated
October 25, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV 67055), which affirmed the
trial court's decision finding that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the off-spring, hence, not a legal heir of the late
Esperanza Cabatbat.
48
The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-3841), praying for the partition of the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died without
issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her estate was her interest in the business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in
the possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters, Consorcia Maria, Benedicta,
Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the children of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their complaint, the private
respondents alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses
Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption
proceedings.
Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza Cabatbat were: 1) the absence of any record that
Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter
was born; 2) the absence of the birth certificate of Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was supposedly born; 3) certification dated March 9, 1977, of
the Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal of the Office of the Civil Registrar General, that his office has no birth record of
Violeta Cabatbat alleged to have been born on May 26, 1948 or 1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan; 4) certification dated June 16,
1977 of Romeo Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta studied in the Calasiao Pilot Central School, Proceso Cabatbat and
Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her parents; 5) testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May 21,1948 to watch a cousin who delivered a child there and that she became acquianted
with a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948 to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta
Cabatbat.
Pitted against the evidence of the plaintiffs are the evidence of herein petitioners consisting of. 1) Violeta Cabatbat's birth record
which was filed on June 15,1948 showing that she was born on May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that she
is a legitimate child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza Cabatbat; 2) testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that Violeta is his child
with the deceased Esperanza Frianeza; 3) testimony of Benita Lastimosa denying that she delivered a child in the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is that child; 4) the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where
Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride; 5) Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1960, wherein the vendee Violeta Cabatbat, then
a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother," Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat; and 6) another Deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 21, 1961, wherein Violeta Cabatbat was assisted and represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat.
Upon the evidence, the trial court held on August 10, 1979 that Violeta Cabatbat is not a child by nature of the spouses
Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is not a legal heir of the deceased Esperanza Cabatbat. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Finding that defendant VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM is not a child by nature of the spouses, decedent
Esperanza Frianeza and defendant Proceso Cabatbat, and not a compulsory heir of the said decedent;
(2) Declaring that the heirs of the decedent are her surviving husband, defendant Proceso Cabatbat and her
sisters, plaintiffs Consorcia MARIA, BENEDICTA alias JOVITA, and BONIFACIA alias ANASTACIA,
all surnamed FRIANEZA her brothers deceased DANIEL FRIANEZA represented by his surviving
spouse, Adela Vda. de Frianeza, and their children, Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen, all
surnamed FRIANEZA and deceased DOMINGO FRIANEZA represented by his surviving spouse
Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza and their children, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and Decideria, all surnamed
FRIANEZA
(3) Finding that the estate left by the decedent are the thirty properties enumerated and described at pages
13 to 19 supra and an equity in the Calasiao Bijon Factory in the sum of P37,961.69 of which P13,221.69
remains after advances obtained by the deceased during her lifetime and lawful deductions made after her
death;
(4) That of the real properties adverted to above, three-fourth (3/4) pro- indiviso is the share of defendant
Proceso Cabatbat, as the surviving spouse, one-half (½) as his share of the conjugal estate and one-half (½)
of the remaining one-half as share as heir from his wife (decedent's) estate, while the remaining one-half
(½) of the other half is the group share of the heirs of the brothers and sisters of his wife and of the
children of the latter if deceased, whose names are already enumerated hereinbefore in the following
proportions: one-sixth (1/6) each pro-indiviso to Consorcia Maria, Benedicta alias Jovita, and Bonifacia
alias Anastacia; one-sixth (1/6) to Adela B. Vda. de Fraineza Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen,
as a group in representation of deceased brother DANIEL FRIANEZA and one. sixth (1/6) to Decideria Q.
Vda. de Frianeza, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and Decideria as a group in representation of deceased brother
DOMINGO FRIANEZA
(5) That of the balance of the equity of the deceased in the CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY in the sum of
P13,221.69, three-fourths (3/4) or P9,916.29 is the share of Proceso Cabatbat as surviving spouse and as
heir of his deceased wife, and the remaining one-fourth (1/4) to the plaintiffs under the sharing already
stated in the preceding paragraph; (a) but because defendant Proceso Cabatbat has overdrawn his share he
is ordered to return to the estate the sum of P796.34 by depositing the same with the Clark of Court; and
(b) defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, not being an heir, is ordered to return to the estate the sum of
P2,931.13 half of what she and her codefendant Proceso Cabatbat withdrew from the equity of the
deceased under Exhibit 29, receipt dated April 30, 1977;
(6) Ordering jointly defendant a Proceso Cabatbat and Violeta Cabatbat Lim to pay attorney's fees in the
sum of P5,000.00, the sum of P4,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat and Pl,000.00 from defendant
Violeta Cabatbat Lim, and litigation expenses in the sum of Pl,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat
and P200.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 236-239, Record on Appeal.)
Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court on October 25, 1984.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Petitioners have elevated the decision to Us for review on certiorari, alleging that the Intermediate Appellate Court erred:
1. In finding that petitioner is not the child of Prospers and Esperanza Cabatbat;
2. In ignoring the provisions of Section 22 of Rule 132, Rules of Court;
3. In not considering the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil Code;
4. In disregarding Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11 of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim
Petitioners' first and fourth assignments of error raise factual issues. The finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is a factual finding based on the evidence presented at the trial, hence, it is
conclusive upon Us. Well entrenched is the rule that "factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to
great respect" (Vda. de Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705). Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court which provides that: "Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need be given" does not apply to petitioners' Exhibit "5," the supposed birth registry record of
defendant Violeta Cabatbat showing that she was born on May 26,1948, at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City,
and that her father and mother are Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Frianeza, respectively. In rejecting that document, the trial
court pointedly observed:
This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of admission of the hospital does not show that
Esperanza Frianeza was ever a patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza was never admitted in
the hospital as an obstetrics case before or after May 26, 1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to June 15,
1948 (Stipulation of Facts, Pre-Trial Order of May 23, 1977, Record on Appeal, p. 117).
On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was alleged to have been delivered by Esperanza
Frianeza in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show that only one woman by
the same of the Benita Lastimosa of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to an
illegitimate child who was named by her mother Benita Lastimosa as Baby Girl Lastimosa (Exhibit S.
Plaintiffs' Folder of Exhibits, p. 39, Record on Appeal, pp. 117-118). Furthermore, the record of birth
certificates of Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry the birth
certificate of defendant Violeta Cabatbat and the only birth certificate in the file of birth certificates of the
hospital for May 26, 1948 is that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita Lastimosa. (pp. 3-
4, CA Decision, pp. 13-14, Record on Appeal.)
Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts
a cloud on the genuineness of her Exhibit 5.
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the  legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a
legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a
legal heir of the deceased.
49
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is affirmed, but with modification of paragraphs 2
and 4 of the dispositive portion thereof, by excluding the widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza,
who are not legal heirs of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating with their children and the surviving sisters of the
deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. L-18753             March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00.
She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her
signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C.
Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of
each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary
Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties;
that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear
or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind
such that she could freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's
niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the
naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The
testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition
to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress,
threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene.
The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June
17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of
Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the will
to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated
by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the
decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing
to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the
probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with
regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the
decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion
as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this
instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the
following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly
admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene
Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo
The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would
be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor ( Idem). On the other hand,
in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
"interested person." An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio
Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings,
the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect
or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she
acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor,
or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof,
and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the
execution of the will.1äwphï1.ñët
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the
testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is
true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an
adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if
it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca
Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives
of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit  ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well
expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies
any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood
tie, but the law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the
presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the
product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law
the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of
the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not
of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his
other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the
adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children
of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between the adopter
and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p.
652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of the family of
either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine
Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases
on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
50
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding
contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the
same should not have been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru
pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state
briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for she carried her
conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every page
thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix
herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the
will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a
witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards
she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and
understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He
finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their
signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly executed because it was
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. On this point the court  a
quo made the following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in
law to sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of
isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix,
attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will
on May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must
perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from
subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as
testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz,
Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere
claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because
she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in
that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the
instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the
occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by
substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free
agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person
challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the
evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided
by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as
being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does not follow that
such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not
impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law
governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to
public morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under
the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine
nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not
decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo  declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene
Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said
pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he
was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the
estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly
executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-23445             June 23, 1966
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely:
Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed
by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on
the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of
the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of
inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the
testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the
questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein. 1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed
probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated. 2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the
issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this
litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
51
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that
we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. 3 After all, there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity.
This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do
hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age
34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen
hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889,
which is similarly herein copied, thus —
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and
betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term  preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa
comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como
padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes,
resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera
de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero
forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a
clear-cut definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's
remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to
abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132. 7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away
with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she
left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will
completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime;
neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa " anulara
siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now
854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario
Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se añade
limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto
prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este
articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los
forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que
comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos
instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar,
como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution
of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of
universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was
written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive
meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal
Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente
interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun
caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el
hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente,
en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que
llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas
obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la
jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en
la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una
interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese
anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto
razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que
informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay
razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el
legislador quiere establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as
such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of
preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in
addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified
institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls
the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ...
todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws
open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado,
mejora o donacion. 14
As aforesaid, there is no  other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15 From this,
petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the
distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in
turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
" 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma
se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria";
preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said
will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition
under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is  in toto, unless in the will
there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918
52
of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity
is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive
language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance
on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el
caso. 23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said
legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage
should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This
theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of
institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly,
then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely
meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article
concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be
absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from
legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only
provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with
as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because they
are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a
bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a
particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely
nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as
universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 173614               September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA
M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order, 1 dated 3 May 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its
Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad)
filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the
complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan. 3 They begot seven
children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. 4 On 1 May
2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. 6 Six
months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the requisite
marriage license. They argued that Article 34 8 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner
and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely
three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years
openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin
Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting
parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order, 9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its
position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in
Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely
belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to
declare the marriage null and void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said motion,
the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the
complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog, 15 which was on the authority for
holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held
that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living. 16 Where one or
both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on
its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme
Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his
death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the
new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has
rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that it is
only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and
such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of
this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine
[the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced
particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right
over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the
parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs
have already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of
procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal
standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and
feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the
annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the
petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable
only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage,
53
his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband
or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. 17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case. 18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the
said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as
embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as
specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants
are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court. 20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the
lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the
RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. 21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the
discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. 22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its
failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure
question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal which is
applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the
impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the
applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration. 23 What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared
void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to
Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. 24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio
was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no
explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is
of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.  On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to
Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
G.R. No. 167109             February 6, 2007
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004, which
reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the
marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the
Resolution3 dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. 4 Thereafter, they
migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas
and Orlando divorced in April 1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. 6 Contending
that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City 7 against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss 8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-
interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against defendants Orlando B. Catalan and
Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null and void ab initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages the amount of
P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00,
including costs of this suit; and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated is ordered awarded to the
heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.10
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising the following issues:
54
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her children,
confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further
embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage
void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages. 13
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However, this issue may not be resolved without first determining the corollary
factual issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether
they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, 14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the
findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were naturalized American citizens and
that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the
allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their
naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial evidence she presented, we deem it
undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and had this citizenship status when they secured their divorce
decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the
Family Code and our Civil Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by
their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x 16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or contest the allegation in
respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988,
as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce. 17 We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint
that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. 18 It is settled rule that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The
two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 20 A divorce obtained abroad by an alien
may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 21 However,
before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the
personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if
the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the
divorce decree becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for
being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines,
one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope, 24 and the other, in
Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents. 25
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict
remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare
the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have the
personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective,
Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this
subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x 26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code,
there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions,  must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest 27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence
of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did
not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from ₱200,000.00 to
₱25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the
trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan
lacks legal personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition. No costs.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however
blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo
Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of
the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973
the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. At
the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear
despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due
to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private
55
respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his
children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987  4 only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in
favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the
children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made
in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan
children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the
other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she
and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial
court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which
provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared
null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no
legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the
issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved
in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a  controversy before the court as
to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of
Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving
spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the
submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without
the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether petitioner
was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as
such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.  12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to
conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the
aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.
Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in  Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of
petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be
set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did
not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and
Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained
solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the
time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial
court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment however from
petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of
the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial
court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.  19 Significantly, the
decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be
conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court
for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to
inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She
and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in
a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the
present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve
the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter
and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial
courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo.
Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half
(1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the
exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is
DENIED.
G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017
ROMEO F. ARA AND WILLIAM A. GARCIA, Petitioners, v. DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO AND HENRY
ROSSI, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the period allowed, and supported by the evidence required under the
Family Code.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asking that the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated
August 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated March 16, 2009, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00729 entitled "Romeo F. Ara, Ramon A. Garcia,
William A. Garcia, and Henry A. Rossi v. Dra. Fely S. Pizarro,” which modified the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court in
Special Civil Action No. 337-03 entitled "Romeo F. Ara, Ramon A. Garcia, William A. Garcia and Henry A. Rossi vs. Dra.
Fely S. Pizarro" for Judicial Partition, be set aside.
Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and Henry A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to be
children of the late Josefa A. Ara (Josefa), who died on November 18, 2002. 4
Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro (Pizarro) was born to Josefa and her then husband, Vicente Salgado (Salgado), who died
during World War II. 5 At some point toward the end of the war, Josefa met and lived with an American soldier by the name of
Darwin Gray (Gray).6 Romeo F. Ara (Ara) was born from this relationship. Josefa later met a certain Alfredo Garcia (Alfredo),
and, from this relationship, gave birth to sons Ramon Garcia (Ramon) and William A. Garcia (Garcia). 7 Josefa and Alfredo
married on January 24, 1952.8 After Alfredo passed away, Josefa met an Italian missionary named Frank Rossi, who allegedly
fathered Henry Rossi (Rossi).9
Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge, she is the only child of Josefa. 10 Further, petitioner Garcia is recorded as a
son of a certain Carmen Bucarin and Pedro Garcia, as evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth dated July 19, 1950; 11 and
petitioner Ara is recorded as a son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth. 12
56
Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi (collectively, plaintiffs a quo), verbally sought partition of the
properties left by the deceased Josefa, which were in the possession of respondent Pizarro. 13 The properties are enumerated as
follows:
1. Lot and other improvements located at Poblacion, Valencia City, Bukidnon with an area of One Thousand Two
Hundred Sixty Eight (1,268) sq. m. in the name of Josefa Salgado covered by Katibayan ng Original na Titulo No. T-
30333;
2. Tamaraw FX; and
3. RCBC Bank Passbook in the amount of One Hundred Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 108,000.00) bank deposit. 14
Respondent Pizarro refused to partition these properties. Thus, plaintiffs a quo referred the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation and amicable settlement.15
The parties were unable to reach an amicable settlement. 16 Thus, the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a Certification to
File Action dated April 3, 2003.17
Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint dated April 9, 2003 18 for judicial partition of properties left by the deceased Josefa, before the
Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch 9 (Trial Court). In her Answer, respondent Pizarro averred that, to her
knowledge, she was the only legitimate and only child of Josefa. 19 She denied that any of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings,
for lack of knowledge or information to form a belief on that matter. 20 Further, the late Josefa left other properties mostly in the
possession of plaintiffs a quo, which were omitted in the properties to be partitioned by the trial court in Special Civil Action
No. 337-03, enumerated in her counterclaim (Additional Properties). 21
Respondent Pizarro filed her Pre-Trial Brief dated July 28, 2003, which contained a proposed stipulation that the Additional
Properties also form part of the estate of Josefa. 22 Amenable to this proposal, plaintiffs  a quo moved that the Additional
Properties be included in the partition, in a Motion to Include in the Partition the Proposed Stipulation dated August 31, 2003. 23
At the pre-trial, Ara, Garcia, and Ramon claimed a property of respondent Rossi as part of the estate of Josefa. This property
was not alleged nor claimed in the original complaint. This compelled respondent Rossi to engage the services of separate
counsel, as the claim of his property constituted a conflict of interest among the plaintiffs  a quo.24
In a Pre-trial Order issued by the Trial Court on October 1, 2003, the following facts were admitted:
4. All the above mentioned fathers of the children in this case, Mr. Vicente Salgado, Mr. Darwin Grey [sic] and Henry
Rosi (sic), are all deceased. Josefa Ara Salgado is also deceased having died on November 18, 2002.
5. The properties mentioned in Paragraph 9 of the counter-claim mentioned in the Answer filed by the defendant thru
counsel are also admitted by both counsels to be part of the properties subject of this partition case.
6. The Katibayan Ng Orihinal na Titulo attached thereto as ANNEXES "C"-"C-1", are all admitted as the subject
properties.
7. Some properties involved maybe covered by the land reform program of the government and the parties have agreed
that only the remainder thereof or the proceeds of compensation shall be partitioned among them. All these properties
shall be properly determined during the inventory to be finally submitted to the Court for approval.
8. All the foregoing properties were acquired after the death of Vicente Salgado and presumably all the exclusive
properties of Josefa Ara Salgado.25
After trial, on February 20, 2006, the Trial Court, issued a Decision. The decretal portion states:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders a DECISION as follows:
1. Awarding the Baguio property to Henry Rossi, to be deducted from his share;
2. Awarding the Valencia property covered by OCT No. T- 30333; Tamaraw FX and the RCBC Bank Deposit Passbook to
defendant Fely S. Pizarro, to be deducted from her share; and
3. With respect to the other properties that may not be covered by the foregoing, the same are declared under the co-ownership
of all the plaintiffs and defendant and in equal shares.
SO ORDERED.26
Respondent Pizarro appealed the Trial Court Decision, claiming it erred in finding petitioners Ara and Garcia to be children of
Josefa, and including them in the partition of properties. 27
Petitioners Ara and Garcia, as well as respondent Rossi, also filed their own respective appeals to the Trial Court Decision.
Respondent Rossi questioned the inclusion of his property in the inventory of properties of the late Josefa. 28 Petitioners
questioned the awarding of particular properties to, and deductions from the respective shares of, respondents Pizarro and
Rossi.29
The Court of Appeals,30 on August 1, 2008, promulgated its Decision 31 and held that only respondents Pizarro and Rossi, as well
as plaintiff a quo Ramon, were the children of the late Josefa, entitled to shares in Josefa's estate:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeals are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 20
February 2006, of the court a quo, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The legitimate children of Josefa Ara,
namely, Fely Pizarro and Ramon A. Garcia, are each entitled to one (1) share, while Henry Rossi, the illegitimate child of Josefa
Ara, is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the share of a legitimate child, of the total properties of the late Josefa Ara sought to be
partitioned [.]
....
SO ORDERED.32
In omitting petitioners from the enumeration of Josefa's descendants, the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the Trial
Court. The Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court erred in allowing petitioners to prove their status as illegitimate sons of
Josefa after her death:
In holding that appellants William A. Garcia and Romeo F. Ara are the illegitimate sons of Josefa Ara, the court  a
quo ratiocinated:
Without anymore discussing the validity of their respective birth and baptismal certificates, there is sufficient evidence to hold
that all the plaintiffs are indeed the children of the said deceased Josefa Ara for having possessed and enjoyed the status of
recognized illegitimate children pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 175 of the Family Code which provides:
"Illegitimate children may establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children"
in relation to the second paragraph No. (1) of Article 172 of the same code (sic), which provides:
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, legitimate filiation shall be proven by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child."
All the plaintiffs and defendant were taken care of and supported by their mother Josefa Ara, including their education, since
their respective birth and were all united and lived as one family even up to the death and burial of their said mother, Josefa Ara.
Their mother had acknowledged all of them as her children throughout all her life directly, continuously, spontaneously and
without concealment.33 (Emphasis omitted.)
Petitioners, together with Garcia, and respondent Rossi filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, which were both denied by
the Court of Appeals on March 16, 2009.34
Petitioners bring this Petition for Review on Certiorari. 35
Respondents Pizarro and Rossi filed their respective Comments on the Petition. 36 Petitioners filed a Reply to respondents'
Comments, as well as a Motion to Submit Parties to DNA Testing, 37 which this Court denied. Memoranda were submitted by all
the parties.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied Article 285 of the Civil Code, which requires that an action for
the recognition of natural children be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents, subject to certain
exceptions.38 Petitioners assert that during Josefa's lifetime, Josefa acknowledged all of them as her children directly,
continuously, spontaneously, and without concealment.39
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not apply the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, which states
that filiation may be established even without the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or an admission of filiation in a
public or handwritten document.40
Further, petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals erred in its asymmetric application of the rule on establishing filiation. Thus,
the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent Pizarro was a daughter of Josefa Ara and Vicente Salgado, asserting there
was no basis for the same. Petitioners claim that, in her Formal Offer of Exhibits dated May 26, 2005, respondent Pizarro
offered as evidence only a Certificate of Marriage of Salgado and Josefa to support her filiation to Josefa. 41
On respondent Rossi, petitioners claim that there is no direct evidence to prove his filiation to Josefa, except for his Baptismal
Certificate, which was testified to only by respondent Rossi. 42
The primordial issue for this Court to resolve is whether petitioners may prove their filiation to Josefa through their open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children, found in the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.
This Petition is denied.
I
On establishing the filiation of illegitimate children, the Family Code provides:
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code provide:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
57
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Article 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years
within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. (268a)
Thus, a person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the death of a putative parent must do so via a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation. In Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals:43
The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation:
Article. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
....
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are
practically the same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the "private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent himself), he insists that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation.
Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from him during that time; that he has been
using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a
special power of attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has
shared in the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a director, together
with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum to the
original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate.
It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of
this Article 175 reads as follows:
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of
Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim
of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation. 44
Petitioners did not present evidence that would prove their illegitimate filiation to their putative parent, Josefa, after her death as
provided under Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code.
To recall, petitioners submitted the following to establish their filiation:
(1) Garcia's Baptismal Certificate listing Josefa as his mother, showing that the baptism was conducted on June 1, 1958,
and that Garcia was born on June 23, 1951;45
(2) Garcia's Certificate of Marriage, listing Josefa as his mother; 46
(3) A picture of Garcia's wedding, with Josefa and other relatives; 47
(4) Certificate of Marriage showing that Alfredo and Josefa were married on January 24, 1952; 48
(5) Garcia's Certificate of Live Birth from Paniqui, Tarlac, issued on October 23, 2003, 49 under Registry No. 2003-1447,
which is a late registration of his birth, showing he was born on June 23, 1951 to Alfredo and Josefa; 50
(6) A group picture of all the parties in the instant case.51
(7) In the Comment of Rossi to the Formal Offer of Exhibits of Pizarro, Rossi stated:
1. That William Garcia and Romeo Flores Ara are half brothers of Dr. Henry Rossi their mother being Josefa Ara, who
did not register them as her children for fear of losing her pension from the U.S. Veterans Office; 52
(8) Ara testified that he was a son of the late Josefa and Gray, and that his record of birth was registered at camp Murphy,
Quezon City;53 and
(9) Nelly Alipio, first degree cousin of Josefa, testified that Ara was a son of Josefa and Gray. 54
None of the foregoing constitutes evidence under the first paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.
Although not raised by petitioners, it may be argued that petitioner Garcia's Certificate of Live Birth obtained in 2003 through a
late registration of his birth is a record of birth appearing in the civil register under Article 172 of the Family Code.
True, birth certificates offer prima facie  evidence of filiation. To overthrow the presumption of truth contained in a birth
certificate, a high degree of proof is needed. 55 However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent us from
according it the same weight as any other birth certificate.
There is a reason why birth certificates are accorded such high evidentiary value. Act No. 3753, or An Act to Establish a Civil
Register, provides:
Section 5. Registration and Certification of Births. — The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or,
in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the
civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born
child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d)
civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f) and such other data may be required in the regulation to be issued.
In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the same shall report to the local civil registrar the place, date and hour of
finding and other attendant circumstances.
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the
mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father
who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.
Any foetus having human features which dies after twenty four hours of existence completely disengaged from the maternal
womb shall be entered in the proper registers as having been born and having died.
Further, Rule 21 of National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93, or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act
No. 3753, provides that a person's birth be registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar-General by one of the following
individuals:
Rule 21. Persons Responsible to Report the Event. — (1) When the birth occurred in a hospital or clinic or in a similar
institution, the administrator thereof shall be responsible in causing the registration of such birth. However, it shall be the
attendant at birth who shall certify the facts of birth.
(2) When the birth did not occur in a hospital or clinic or in a similar institution, the physician, nurse, midwife, "hilot", or
anybody who attended to the delivery of the child shall be responsible both in certifying the facts of birth and causing the
registration of such birth.
(3) In default of the hospital/clinic administrator or attendant at birth, either or both parents of the child shall cause the
registration of the birth.
(4) When the birth occurs aboard a vehicle, vessel or airplane while in transit, registration of said birth shall be a joint
responsibility of the driver, captain or pilot and the parents, as the case may be.
58
Further, the birth must be registered within 30 days from the time of birth. 56 Thus, generally, the rules require that facts of the Upon receipt of the application for delayed registration of birth, the civil registrar shall examine the Certificate of Live
report be certified by an attendant at birth, within 30 days from birth. The attendant is not only an eyewitness to the event, but (3)
Birth presented whether it has been completely and correctly filled up and all requirements complied with. (47a)
also presumably would have no reason to lie on the matter. The immediacy of the reporting, combined with the participation of
disinterested attendants at birth, or of both parents, tend to ensure that the report is a factual reporting of birth. In other words, In the delayed registration of the birth of an alien, travel documents showing the origin and nationality of the parents
(4)
the circumstances in which registration is made obviate the possibility that registration is caused by ulterior motives. The law shall be presented in addition to the requirements mentioned in Rule 25 (1). (49:2a)
provides in the case of illegitimate children that the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the Thus, petitioners submitted in evidence a delayed registration of birth of Garcia, pursuant to this rule. Petitioners point out that a
infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. This ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents. hearing on the delayed registration was held at the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac. No one appeared
National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93 also contemplates that reports of birth may be made beyond the 30-day to oppose the delayed registration, despite a notice of hearing posted at the Office of the Civil Registrar. 57
period: It is analogous to cases where a putative father's name is written on a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child, without any
Rule 25. Delayed Registration of Birth. — (1) The requirements are: showing that the putative father participated in preparing the certificate. In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals:58
a) if the person is less than eighteen (18) years old, the following shall be required: Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not
also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show that private respondent had a hand in the
    preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our
  i) four (4) copies of the Certificate of Live Birth duly accomplished and signed by the proper parties; pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958),viz:
". . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly prohibited, not only the naming of
accomplished Affidavit for Delayed Registration at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth by the father, mother the father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him,
  ii)
or guardian, declaring therein, among other things, the following: but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and
> name of child;
the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of
> date and place of birth;
fathership of said child.
    > name of the father if the child is illegitimate and has been acknowledged by him;
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein
> if legitimate, the date and place of marriage of parents; and
indicated is not competent evidence of paternity." 59 (Emphasis in the original).
> reason for not registering the birth within thirty (30) days after the date of birth.
In Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System:60
    The evidence considered by the Committee on Claims Settlement as basis of its finding that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an
acknowledged natural child of the late Judge Pascual Berciles is the birth certificate of said Pascual Voltaire Berciles marked
In case the party seeking late registration of the birth of an illegitimate child is not the mother, the party shall, in Exh. "6". We have examined carefully this birth certificate and We find that the same is not signed by either the father or the
 
addition to the foregoing facts, declare in a sworn statement the present whereabouts of the mother. mother; We find no participation or intervention whatsoever therein by the alleged father, Judge Pascual Berciles. Under our
      jurisprudence, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or
registrar is null and void. Such registration would not be evidence of paternity. (Joaquin P. Roces et al. vs. Local Civil Registrar
any two of the following documentary evidences which may show the name of the child, date and place of birth, of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050). The mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
  iii)
and name of mother (and name of father, if the child has been acknowledged); acknowledgment on his part (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729). A birth certificate does not constitute recognition in a public
instrument. (Pareja vs. Pareja, et al., 95 Phil. 167). A birth certificate, to evidence acknowledgment, must, under Section 5 of
> baptismal certificate; Act 3753, bear the signature under oath of the acknowledging parent or parents. (Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals and
> school records (nursery, kindergarten, or preparatory); Francisco Ruiz, 91 Phil. 492).
> income tax return of parent/s; ....
   
> insurance policy; In the case of Mendoza, et al. vs. Mella, 17 SCRA 788, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Makalintal who later
> medical records; and became chief Justice, said:
> others, such as barangay captain's certification. It should be noted, however, that a Civil Registry Law was passed in 1930 (Act No. 3753) containing provisions for the
      registration of births, including those of illegitimate parentage; and the record of birth under such law, if sufficient in contents
for the purpose, would meet the requisites for voluntary recognition even under Article 131. Since Rodolfo was born in 1935,
  iv) affidavit of two disinterested persons who might have witnessed or known the birth of the child. (46:1aa) after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a
certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such
   
reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they
If the person is eighteen (18) years old or above, he shall apply for late registration of his birth and the requirements signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753 (Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals,
b) 91 Phil. 493; In re Adoption of Lydia Duran, 92 Phil. 729). For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of
shall be:
them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the
  i) all the requirements for a child who is less than eighteen (18) years old; and nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article
  ii) Certificate of Marriage, if married. (46:1ba) 131. True enough, but in such a case there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his
or her own (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1); and in Exhibit 1 no such statement appears. The claim of voluntary recognition
    is without basis."61
Further, in People v. Villar,62 this Court sustained the Trial Court's rejection of a delayed registration of birth as conclusive
Delayed registration of birth, like ordinary registration made at the time of birth, shall be filed at the Office of the Civil
(2) evidence of the facts stated therein:
Registrar of the place where the birth occurred. (46:3)
59
In the resolution of the sole assignment of error we find as well-taken and accordingly adopt as our own the lower court's
ratiocination, thus:
After going over the evidence in support of the alleged minority of the accused Francisco Villar when he committed the crime
on or about August 24, 1977, the Court finds that Exhibit 1 and the testimonies of the defense witnesses can not have more
probative value than the written statement of Francisco Villar, Exhibit E. It is to be noted that Exhibit 1 is a delayed registration
of a supposed birth accomplished and submitted only on January 12, 1979 to the Local Civil Registrar of Caloocan City by the
witness Leonor Villar, long after the offense was committed and after the prosecution finally rested its case on November 21,
1978, thus exposing the basis of Exhibit 1 to be resting on a slender and shaky foundation, and more so, in the absence of
explanation from the defense of the reason for said late registration. Hence, the Court rejects Exhibit 1....
The appellant invokes Art. 410 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts herein contained.
Suffice it to say that the above-quoted provision makes the information given in Exhibit 1 only prima facie  but not conclusive
evidence. This must be so because the Local Civil Registrar merely receives the information submitted to him; he does not
inquire into its veracity. Moreover, to regard as conclusive the content of a certificate of live birth can lead to absurd results.
Supposing that Leonor had given John F. Kennedy as the father of Francisco, are we to accept that as an incontestable fact? In
the light of the circumstances already narrated concerning the preparation and submission of Exhibit 1, the lower court
committed no error in disregarding it.63
A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the putative parent, is tenuous proof of filiation.
Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia's delayed registration of birth the same evidentiary weight as regular birth
certificates.
Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, filiation may still be established after the death
of a putative parent through an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the
parent concerned.64 However, petitioners did not present in evidence any admissions of filiation.
An admission is an act, declaration, or omission of a party on a relevant fact, which may be used in evidence against him. 65
The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with Josefa and petitioners' relatives, and testimonies do not show
that Josefa is their mother. They do not contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less
ones pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia's Baptismal Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and
Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late registration all state that Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act, declaration, or
omission on the part of Josefa. Josefa did not participate in making any of them. The same may be said of the testimonies
presented. Although Josefa may have been in the photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. By definition, none of
the evidence presented constitutes an admission of filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code.
II
The Trial Court bypassed the issue of the birth certificates and did not consider the first paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code. Instead, it ruled only on the open and continuous possession of status of filiation:
Without anymore discussing the validity of their respective birth and baptismal certificates, there is sufficient evidence to hold
that all the plaintiffs are indeed the children of the said deceased Josefa Ara for having possessed and enjoyed the status of
recognized illegitimate children pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 175 of the Family Code[.]
....
All the plaintiffs and defendant were taken care of and supported by their mother Josefa Ara, including their education, since
their respective birth and were all united and lived as one family even up to the death and burial of their said mother, Josefa Ara.
Their mother had acknowledged all of them as her children throughout all her life directly, continuously, spontaneously and
without concealment.66
Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court had erred in allowing petitioners to prove their illegitimate filiation
through the open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children after the death of the putative parent:
However, the trial court's finding cannot be sustained. Even granting for the sake of argument that appellants Romeo F. Ara and
William Garcia did enjoy open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, still, they should have proven
this during the lifetime of the putative parent.  Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing and (sic) action for
recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which
either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the
Family Code, which We quote:
…
The law is very clear. If filiation is sought to be proved under the  second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, the
action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is evident that appellants Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia
can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of their open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child or prove their alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The
simple reason is that Josefa Ara is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of her alleged sons' illegitimate
filiation.67
The Court of Appeals did not adopt the Trial Court's appreciation of evidence. It ruled that, because petitioners' putative parent
Josefa had already passed away, petitioners were proscribed from proving their filiation under the second paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code.
The Court of Appeals properly did not give credence to the evidence submitted by petitioners regarding their status.
Josefa passed away in 2002. 68 After her death, petitioners could no longer be allowed to introduce evidence of open and
continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa. The only evidence allowed under the law would be a record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private signed, handwritten
instruction by Josefa.
An alleged parent is the best person to affirm or deny a putative descendant's filiation. Absent a record of birth appearing in a
civil register or a final judgment, an express admission of filiation in a public document, or a handwritten instrument signed by
the parent concerned, a deceased person will have no opportunity to contest a claim of filiation.
In truth, it is the mother and in some cases, the father, who witnesses the actual birth of their children. Descendants normally
only come to know of their parents through nurture and family lore. When they are born, they do not have the consciousness
required to be able to claim personal knowledge of their parents. It thus makes sense for the parents to be present when evidence
under the second paragraph of Article 172 is presented.
The limitation that an action to prove filiation as an illegitimate child be brought within the lifetime of an alleged parent
acknowledges that there may be other persons whose rights should be protected from spurious claims. This includes other
children, legitimate and illegitimate, whose statuses are supported by strong evidence of a categorical nature.
Respondent Pizarro has submitted petitioners' certificates of live birth to further disprove petitioners' filiation with Josefa. A
Certificate of Live Birth issued in Paniqui, Tarlac on July 19, 1950 shows that Garcia's parents are Pedro Garcia and Carmen
Bugarin69 while another Certificate of Live Birth issued in petitioner Ara's birthplace, Bauang, La Union, shows that he is the
son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores.70
The Court of Appeals gave credence to these birth certificates submitted by respondent Pizarro:
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of
official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
Therefore, this Court upholds the birth certificates of William Garcia and Romeo F. Ara, as issued by the Civil Registry, in line
with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where the High Court ruled that the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained
in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. Consequently, appellants Romeo F. Ara and
William Garcia are deemed not to be the illegitimate sons of the late Josefa Ara. 71
Thus, the Court of Appeals made a determination on the evidence and found that the birth certificates submitted by respondent
Pizarro belong to petitioners Garcia and Ara. These birth certificates name Carmen Bugarin 72 and Maria Flores,73 as the
respective mothers of petitioners Garcia and Ara. Considering that these birth certificates do not name Josefa as a parent of
either petitioner, petitioners are properly determined not to be Josefa's children.
Petitioners point out that the Certificate of Birth does not contain petitioner Garcia's correct birth date. They claim that the birth
date of petitioner Garcia as recorded in his baptismal certificate is June 23, 1951. This birth date is also reflected on his
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as in the Notice of Hearing of the
60
delayed registration of birth certificate of petitioner Garcia. Thus, petitioners speculate that the birth certificate submitted by
respondent Pizarro is of a different "William Garcia":
Perhaps, defendant-appellant Fely Pizarro obtained a Certificate of Live Birth and Cedula de Baotismo of a wrong person
bearing the same name William Garcia which always happened (sic) in our country considering that the family name Garcia is
very much common because in the said documents the birthdate of a certain William Garcia was June 23, 1950 not June 23,
1951, the actual birth of William Garcia.74
On this point, respondent Pizarro argues:
It may be noted that William Garcia obtained said Certificate more than six (6) months after he, with his co-plaintiffs, had filed
the case of judicial partition on 9 April 2003. Obviously, he found the need to apply for the late registration of his birth when he
learned from respondent's Answer that from her knowledge she is the only child of Josefa Ara. Very likely, William Garcia
already knew that he already has a record of birth in the municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac, showing that her mother was not Josefa
Ara.75
These are matters of appreciation of evidence, however, which cannot be subject of inquiry in a petition for review under Rule
45. Nonetheless, considering that there were two reports of birth for William Garcia, and considering further that one of the
reports was made only  after  initiating a case which would directly use said report, we cannot find error in the Court of Appeals'
decision to disregard the delayed registration.
Finally, petitioners' claim that there was no basis for the Court of Appeals to find that respondents are the children of Josefa is
untenable. Respondents' filiation with Josefa was not put in question before the Trial Court. Even petitioners admitted in their
Complaint that respondents were Josefa's children. 76 Further, on appeal, no party questioned the Trial Court's determination that
respondents Pizarro and Rossi were the children of Josefa. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining these
findings without requiring further proof.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The August 1, 2008 Decision and the March 16, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00729 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A.
TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
 
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint1 for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch
30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F.
Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr.
and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P.
Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M.
Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn
F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein
private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners
be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and
participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate children" as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:
6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children
verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways,
including but not limited to the following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate) children of the deceased
Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and
affection as above outlined.2
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered —
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose
Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego
with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of P10,000.00 as atty's fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.3
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227),
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the
lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before
respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A
Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following grounds:
A
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
B
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS
BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.
C
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE
ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND
THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY
CODE CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE
PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE
UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT
LEAST MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
D
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR PROHIBITION
AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH
ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.4
Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil
Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their
filiation, to wit:
61
 Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; . . . .
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court
lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article
175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory
recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the action will be
barred by prescription.
The law cited reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during the lifetime of the
child], except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action
may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent and her alleged sister was
filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action
has clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if
the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case
pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested of acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the application of the Family Code
in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in
this particular case?
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code. "The Committee did not define
what is meant by a 'vested or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is
submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise in the future." 5
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance" but treated by
this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother
of the minor child, and based also on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," we had
occasion to rule that:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has
been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the
petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law
in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will
ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she
represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court . The trial court is,
therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory
recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by
Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent
to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action
under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred,
notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then
still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial
court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the
passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot
be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching
in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. 8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution
dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 142877           October 2, 2001
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA
A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE
DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD
MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the
illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A.
de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July
1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon
estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which
the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being
one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The
trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13
September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering
that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of
illegitimacy.1âwphi1.nêt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus
motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the
recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely
an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine that an
action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could
only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of
cause of action and for being improper. 1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding in
asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
62
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on  certiorari. Basically, petitioners
maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine
enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.2
In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the case because
there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the
complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,3 which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in direct action frontally addressing
the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing the civil register
or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuos possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 4 The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. 5 In fact, any writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action
for judicial approval.6 Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statue of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgement. 7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live
would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8 this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. 9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the
periods set forth in Article 170,10 and in proper cases Article 171,11 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988),
the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable,12
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn
their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because
the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents.  The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, 13 or in exceptional instances the latter's
heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy
of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an
acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private document. Signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such
recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally
ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not have been
the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate
filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked
collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. 16 Indeed, a child
so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.17
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
G.R. No. 163707             September 15, 2006
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and
minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS
OANES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742,
which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 2000 2 and July 17, 20033 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP
Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution 4 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios
Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration 5 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The
case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati
City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known
heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private
respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise
prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the
estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping 6 signed by their counsel, Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts
and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of
Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss 8 on the ground that the certification against forum shopping should
have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have executed the
certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, 9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release
and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios
and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while
the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted
guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial
court also rejected petitioner's objections on the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are hereby
both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation
of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming successional
rights in the intestate estate of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification against forum shopping; that the Release
and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any
claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of
administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the
Family Code.
63
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered substantial compliance with the rules on
certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules
on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff
or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal
application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled
that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by
the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. 12 So it is in the present controversy
where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as
compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional
rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when
its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. 14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity
the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x
against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." 15 Considering that the document did not specifically mention private
respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the
latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians.
Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine
the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis
supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because
repudiation amounts to an alienation of property 16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private
respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge
of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. 17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove
their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private
respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims
that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be
premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing
law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in
which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and
whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code. 19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall
have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence
as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based
upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special
laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private
respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no
reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after
a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded
from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each
heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to
compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one
which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying
the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute
necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir.
Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here
applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent
supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well
settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact acknowledged,
may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8
Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of
the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil.,
249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is
appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's
64
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 138 for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA CRISTOBAL SIKAT, Petitioners,
vs.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
 
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56402, affirming in toto the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 156, in Civil Case No. 65035 entitled, "Mercedes Cristobal,
Anselmo A. Cristobal and Elisa Cristobal Sikat vs. Eufrosina Cristobal, Florencio Cristobal, Jose Cristobal, Heirs of Norberto
Cristobal and The Register of Deeds, San Juan, M.M."
Facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat)
claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other
hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square meters located at 194 P. Parada
St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject
property and transferred its title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and private respondents, but no settlement
was reached. Thus, a Complaint 2 for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of the
Deed of Partition executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the cancellation of TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134
and No. 165135 issued in the individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the subject property in accordance with
the law of succession and the payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa,  3 Anselmo, 4 and the late
Socorro 5 were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification 6 issued by
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901,
1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
The testimonies of the parties as summarized by the trial court are as follows:
Witness [petitioner Elisa] further testified that her mother died when she was only one year and seven months old. She lived
with the sister of her father because the latter married his second wife, Donata Enriquez. Her brother Anselmo and sister
Socorro lived with their father and the latter’s family in the subject property at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
She claimed that when their father died on February 12, 1930, his brother Anselmo stayed with her and her auntie while Socorro
stayed with their eldest sister, Mercedes, who was then married.
Meanwhile, when her stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children from the second marriage lived with them and her aunt
Martina Cristobal.
Witness testified that she is now residing at No. 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, the property subject of
the present litigation. She has been living in the said property since 1948. She claimed that there are other houses in the area
particularly those which belong to her half brothers and sisters which were now converted into factories.
She claimed that out of the five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters she occupies only thirty-six (36) square meters of the
subject lot.
She testified that the [private respondents] divided the property among themselves without giving the [petitioners] their share.
She said that she was offered by [private respondent] Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the land in question or money
because one of the children of defendant Jose Cristobal wanted to construct an apartment on the lot. She said that she will have
to ask the opinion of her other brothers and sisters.
Thereafter witness testified that she made an inquiry regarding the land and she found out that the property belonging to their
father Buenaventura Cristobal had been transferred to the defendants as evidenced by transfer certificates of title issued under
the names of Florencio Cristobal (Exhibit "E"), Norberto Cristobal (Exhibit "F"), Eufrosina Cristobal (Exhibit "G") and Jose
Cristobal (Exhibit "H").
She declared that she felt bad when she learned that the title to the property belonging to her father had been transferred to her
half brothers and sisters with the exclusion of herself and the other children from the first marriage.
She filed a petition in the barangay to settle the issue among themselves, however, no settlement was reached therein. This
prompted the [petitioners] to file the present case.
On cross-examination, [petitioner] Elisa Cristobal Sikat admitted that she was aware that the subject property was owned by her
father Buenaventura Cristobal even before the latter died. She likewise stated that the [private respondents] are the ones paying
the real estate tax due on the lot.
Ester Santos testified for the [petitioners]. In her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" she claimed that she was a neighbor of Mercedes,
Anselmo, Socorro, Elisa, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal in San Juan, Metro Manila. She said that she knows
that Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro and Elisa are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s first marriage and the
Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina, and Jose are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s second marriage.
The said witness testified that Buenaventura Cristobal and his first family lived right across where she stayed.
Witness corroborated the testimony of Elisa Cristobal Sikat regarding that the fact that Martina Cristobal is the sister of
Buenaventura Cristobal. The said sister of Buenaventura Cristobal allegedly took care of Elisa. Anselmo and Socorro were
taken care of by Buenaventura Cristobal and the latter’s second wife, Donata Enriquez, at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro
Manila.
When Buenaventura Cristobal died Anselmo was taken care of by Martina Cristobal together with Elisa. Socorro on the other
hand lived with Mercedes who was then married.
Witness testified that she and Elisa were classmates from Grade I until they finished high school at the Philippine School of
Commerce in Manila.
When the second wife of Buenaventura Cristobal died, Martina Cristobal took care of Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose
Cristobal.
Witness said that the brothers and sisters from the first and second marriages lived together with their aunt Martina Cristobal for
a long time.
When Elisa got married, she and her husband built their house on the lot located at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
Until at present, Elisa and her family lives in the said vicinity.
Witness Ester Santos declared that the children from the second marriage namely Norberto, Eufrosina, Florencio and Jose built
their houses and factory at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
She said that the children from the first and second marriages of Buenaventura Cristobal had a harmonious relationship until
sometime in 1994 when [petitioners] and Elisa Cristobal’s grandchildren were called "squatters" by the [private respondents]
and their grandchildren for residing in the subject parcel of land.
On cross-examination, witness Ester Santos said she cannot recall the name of the first wife of Buenaventura Cristobal and that
she only knew them to be married although she is not aware of the date when they were married.
[Petitioners] presented Jose Cristobal to bolster the claim that they are brothers and sisters of the [private respondents].
He claimed that the only time when he became aware that [petitioners] are his brothers and sisters was when he lived with their
aunt Martina.
He said that the reason why they were giving a portion of the lot in question to Elisa Cristobal Sikat was because the [private
respondents] want her to have a piece of property of her own and is not an admission that she is their sister.
[Private respondents] on the other hand presented Eufrosina Cristobal as their first witness. She testified that her parents,
Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez were married on March 24, 1919 at San Felipe Neri, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
Out of the said union, Norberto, Florentino, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal were born.
The witness professed that on June 18, 1926, her parents were able to buy a certain property containing five hundred thirty-five
(535) square meters.
Said witness claimed that her brother Norberto died on September 20, 1980 leaving his wife Marcelina and children Buenaflor
and Norberto, Jr.
The witness presented marked as Exhibit "33" for Norberto, Exhibit "34" for Florencio, Exhibit "35" for Eufrosina and Exhibit
"36’ for Jose the birth certificates of her brothers and sisters.
On February 24, 1948, Eufrosina admitted having executed an Extrajudicial Partition (Exhibit "D-4") with her brothers and
sisters of the property left by their parents.
65
She declared that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes, and Anselmo never asserted their alleged right over the
property subject of the present litigation.
She claimed that the [private respondents] have been paying all the taxes due on the parcel of land and that title to the property
has been subdivided under their respective names.
On cross-examination, she said that when their parents passed away they were taken care of by their aunt Martina who was the
sister of her father. She testified that she addressed Elisa Cristobal as "Kaka" and that since the time they were kids, she had
known that the [petitioners] are their brothers and sisters. 7
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment 8 on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed
to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant
evidentiary value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches.
Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision  9 dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they
were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject property because of
laches.
Hence, this Petition anchored on the sole ground that:
RESPONDENT COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES TO THE CASE AT BAR
RESULTING AS IT DOES TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY WHICH ARE EXACTLY THE VERY EVILS
SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY SUCH PRINCIPLE 10
The petition is impressed with merit. We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
upholding the claim of private respondents that they acquired ownership of the entire subject property and that the claim of
petitioners to the subject property was barred by laches.
Before anything else, it must be noted that the title of the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC was
denominated as "Annulment of Title and Damages"; nevertheless, the complaint prayed for the following:
1. Declaring the Extrajudicial Partition executed by the defendants NORBERTO CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL,
EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL and JOSE CRISTOBAL on February 24, 1948 as null and void for being fraudulent contrary to
law on succession.
2. Canceling the following Transfer Certificates of Titles issued by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal to wit:
(a) TCT No. 165132 issued in the name of FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL married to MAURA RUBIO;
(b) TCT No. 165133 issued in the name of NORBERTO CRISTOBAL, married to PAULINA IBANEZ;
(c) TCT No. 165134 issued in the name of EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL married to FORTUNATO DELA GUERRA; and
(d) TCT No. 165135 issued in the name of JOSE CRISTOBAL married to ADELAIDA IBANEZ and/or TCT No. 3993- ( if
TCT No. 165035 was cancelled and in lieu thereof to ISABELITA/MA. VICTORIA, EMMA, MA. CRISTINA, JOSELITO and
NELIA, all surnamed CRISTOBAL and children of JOSE CRISTOBAL, one of the defendants.)
3. Re-partitioning the subject property left by deceased BUENAVENTURA CRISTOBAL according to the law on succession
applicable at the time of his death.
4. Awarding ONE-HALF of the subject property to herein plaintiffs as their lawful portions in the inheritance.
5. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the following sums of money, to wit:
a. P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages
b. P300,000.00 as moral damages
c. P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees
d. P100,000.0 as exemplary damages 11
While the title of the complaint alone implies that the action involves property rights to a piece of land, the afore-quoted prayer
in the complaint reveals that, more than property rights, the action involves hereditary or successional rights of petitioners to
their deceased father’s estate solely, composed of the subject property.
Thus, even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is denominated as "Annulment of Title and Damages,"
we find it practicable to rule on the division of the subject property based on the rules of succession as prayed for in the
complaint, considering that the averments in the complaint, not the title are controlling. 12
To arrive at the final resolution of the instant Petition and the lone assignment of error therein, the following need to be resolved
first: (1) whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal; (2) whether or
not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private respondents; (3) whether or
not petitioners’ right to question the Deed of Partition had prescribed; and (4) whether or not petitioners’ right to recover their
share of the subject property is barred by laches.
Undeniably, the foregoing issues can be resolved only after certain facts have been established. Although it is settled that in the
exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on
the Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. 13 Since exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the case at bar, this Court shall make its own determination
of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case.
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 14
In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, 15 Anselmo, 16 and the late Socorro 17 were presented. Baptismal certificate
is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the
case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification 18 issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940,
1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the
community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were
also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. 19
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any proof to refute the petitioners’ claim and
evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal.
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed, children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal during the first marriage.
As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private respondents among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied)
Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not
binding on said persons. 20 In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the
subject property, the partition thereof by the private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura
Cristobal’s estate. The partition of the subject property by the private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners
were excluded therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by private respondents among
themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the transfer and registration of the subject property in the names of private
respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by private respondent Eufrocina to choose between a portion of the subject
property or money, as one of the children of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the subject
property. 21 This led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the status of the subject property. She learned afterwards that the title to the
subject property had been transferred to the names of private respondents, her half brothers and sisters, to the exclusion of
herself and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal. The Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs
66
of Buenaventura Cristobal who were also entitled to their respective shares in the subject property. Since petitioners were not
able to participate in the execution of the Deed of Partition, which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
late Buenaventura Cristobal by private respondents, such settlement is not binding on them. 22 As the extrajudicial settlement
executed by the private respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their
deceased father, it was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold that petitioners’ right to challenge the said settlement
had prescribed. Respondents defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494
of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." In Budlong v. Bondoc,  23 this Court has interpreted
said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494
of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." 24
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right of petitioners to inherit from their
deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide the subject property between petitioners and private respondents, as the
rule on succession prescribes.
It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal property of Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez,
the second wife, as the property was purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage. 25 Upon the deaths of Buenaventura in
1930 and Donata in 1936, both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the four children of
the first marriage and the four children of the second marriage shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the
Old Civil Code. Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject property
shall be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles 921 26 and 931 27 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession, each
receiving 66.875 square meters thereof.
At the time of death of Buenaventura Cristobal in 1930, Donata was only entitled to the usufruct of the land pursuant to Article
834 of the Old Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 834. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or should be so by the fault of the
deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate
children or descendants who has not received any betterment.
If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widow or widower shall have the usufruct of the third availment for
betterment, such child or descendant to have the naked ownership until, on the death of the surviving spouse, the whole title is
merged in him.
Donata’s right to usufruct of the subject property terminated upon her death in 1936.
Accordingly, the pro-indiviso shares of Buenaventura Cristobal’s eight children and their heirs, by right of representation, upon
his death in 1930, are as follows:
(1) Mercedes Cristobal- 66.875 square meters
(2) Amselmo Crostobal- 66.875 square meters
(3) Socorrro Crostobal- 66.875 square meters
(4) Elisa Crostobal-Sikat- 66.875 square meters
(5) Norberto Cristobal-66.875 square meters
(6) Florencio Cristobal-66.875 square meters
(7) Eufrocina Cristobal-66.875 square meters
(8) Jose Cristobal - 66.875 square meters
The Court will now determine whether petitioners’ right to their shares in the subject property can be barred by laches.
Respondents’ defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not
involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has
become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. 28
In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note that upon petitioner Elisa’s knowledge in 1994 that
the title to the subject property had been transferred to the private respondents to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from
the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with their barangay to settle the case among
themselves and private respondents, but since no settlement was had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March
1995, to annul private respondents’ title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to
allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or
defeat the rights of an owner. 29 Laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations.
Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful
owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another. 30
Considering that (1) petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal participation in the partition of the subject property; (2)
this case has dragged on for more than a decade, and (3) undoubtedly, petitioners sustained injury but the exact amount of
which, unfortunately, was not proved, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioners’ favor nominal damages. Nominal damages is
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. 31 Where these are allowed, they are not
treated as an equivalent of a wrong but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as
such damages should at least be commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioners considering the concept and purpose of
said damages. 32 Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in the present
case; 33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to
Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon petitioners who were not notified or
did not participate in the execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No. 165135, in the name of private
respondents consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision
and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as damages, to be paid by
private respondents.
G.R. No. 181132               June 5, 2009
HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA PANGILINAN
MARAMAG, Petitioners,
vs.
EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE GUZMAN
MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT
PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution 2 dated
January 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 85948, dismissing petitioners’ appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
The case stems from a petition 3 filed against respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, for revocation and/or
reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a
writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while respondents
were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of
the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance Company,
Ltd. (Insular)4 and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife); 5 (3) the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie—were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released
to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners
could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
In support of the prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners alleged, among others, that part of the insurance
proceeds had already been released in favor of Odessa, while the rest of the proceeds are to be released in favor of Karl Brian
and Trisha Angelie, both minors, upon the appointment of their legal guardian. Petitioners also prayed for the total amount of
₱320,000.00 as actual litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
In answer,6 Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie
as his legitimate children, and that they filed their claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it
ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among
67
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessa’s share as she
was of age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of
guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void
the designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it
disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian,
and Trisha Angelie, considering that no settlement of Loreto’s estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs
been determined. Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the children of Loreto
with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
In its own answer7 with compulsory counterclaim, Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated as an insurance policy
beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were denied because Loreto was ineligible for
insurance due to a misrepresentation in his application form that he was born on December 10, 1936 and, thus, not more than 65
years old when he signed it in September 2001; that the case was premature, there being no claim filed by the legitimate family
of Loreto; and that the law on succession does not apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.
As the whereabouts of Eva, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were not known to petitioners, summons by publication was
resorted to. Still, the illegitimate family of Loreto failed to file their answer. Hence, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners,
declared them in default in its Order dated May 7, 2004.
During the pre-trial on July 28, 2004, both Insular and Grepalife moved that the issues raised in their respective answers be
resolved first. The trial court ordered petitioners to comment within 15 days.
In their comment, petitioners alleged that the issue raised by Insular and Grepalife was purely legal – whether the complaint
itself was proper or not – and that the designation of a beneficiary is an act of liberality or a donation and, therefore, subject to
the provisions of Articles 7528 and 7729 of the Civil Code.
In reply, both Insular and Grepalife countered that the insurance proceeds belong exclusively to the designated beneficiaries in
the policies, not to the estate or to the heirs of the insured. Grepalife also reiterated that it had disqualified Eva as a beneficiary
when it ascertained that Loreto was legally married to Vicenta Pangilinan Maramag.
On September 21, 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads –
WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss incorporated in the answer of defendants Insular Life and Grepalife is granted with
respect to defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Maramag. The action shall proceed with respect to the other defendants
Eva Verna de Guzman, Insular Life and Grepalife.
SO ORDERED.10
In so ruling, the trial court ratiocinated thus –
Art. 2011 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of insurance is governed by the (sic) special laws. Matters not expressly
provided for in such special laws shall be regulated by this Code. The principal law on insurance is the Insurance Code, as
amended. Only in case of deficiency in the Insurance Code that the Civil Code may be resorted to. (Enriquez v. Sun Life
Assurance Co., 41 Phil. 269.)
The Insurance Code, as amended, contains a provision regarding to whom the insurance proceeds shall be paid. It is very clear
under Sec. 53 thereof that the insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name
or for whose benefit it is made, unless otherwise specified in the policy. Since the defendants are the ones named as the primary
beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the deceased Loreto C. Maramag and there is no showing that herein plaintiffs
were also included as beneficiary (sic) therein the insurance proceeds shall exclusively be paid to them. This is because the
beneficiary has a vested right to the indemnity, unless the insured reserves the right to change the beneficiary. (Grecio v. Sunlife
Assurance Co. of Canada, 48 Phil. [sic] 63).
Neither could the plaintiffs invoked (sic) the law on donations or the rules on testamentary succession in order to defeat the right
of herein defendants to collect the insurance indemnity. The beneficiary in a contract of insurance is not the donee spoken in the
law of donation. The rules on testamentary succession cannot apply here, for the insurance indemnity does not partake of a
donation. As such, the insurance indemnity cannot be considered as an advance of the inheritance which can be subject to
collation (Del Val v. Del Val, 29 Phil. 534). In the case of Southern Luzon Employees’ Association v. Juanita Golpeo, et al., the
Honorable Supreme Court made the following pronouncements[:]
"With the finding of the trial court that the proceeds to the Life Insurance Policy belongs exclusively to the defendant as his
individual and separate property, we agree that the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not
to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the
beneficiary and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in America. We believe that the same
doctrine obtains in these Islands by virtue of Section 428 of the Code of Commerce x x x."
In [the] light of the above pronouncements, it is very clear that the plaintiffs has (sic) no sufficient cause of action against
defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie Maramag for the reduction and/or declaration of inofficiousness of donation
as primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) of the late Loreto C. Maramag.
However, herein plaintiffs are not totally bereft of any cause of action. One of the named beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic)
taken by the late Loreto C. Maramag is his concubine Eva Verna De Guzman. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any
donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation
to him, according to said article (Art. 2012, Civil Code). If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance
contract will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is
prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary. In such case, the action for the declaration of nullity may
be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee, and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of
evidence in the same action (Comment of Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, page 897). Since the designation of
defendant Eva Verna de Guzman as one of the primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the late Loreto C.
Maramag is void under Art. 739 of the Civil Code, the insurance indemnity that should be paid to her must go to the legal heirs
of the deceased which this court may properly take cognizance as the action for the declaration for the nullity of a void donation
falls within the general jurisdiction of this Court.11
Insular12 and Grepalife13 filed their respective motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the main, that the petition failed to state a
cause of action. Insular further averred that the proceeds were divided among the three children as the remaining named
beneficiaries. Grepalife, for its part, also alleged that the premiums paid had already been refunded.
Petitioners, in their comment, reiterated their earlier arguments and posited that whether the complaint may be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action must be determined solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, such that the
defenses of Insular and Grepalife would be better threshed out during trial.1avvphi1
On June 16, 2005, the trial court issued a Resolution, disposing, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by defendants Grepalife and
Insular Life are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the portion of the Resolution of this Court dated 21 September 2004 which
ordered the prosecution of the case against defendant Eva Verna De Guzman, Grepalife and Insular Life is hereby SET ASIDE,
and the case against them is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.14
In granting the motions for reconsideration of Insular and Grepalife, the trial court considered the allegations of Insular that
Loreto revoked the designation of Eva in one policy and that Insular disqualified her as a beneficiary in the other policy such
that the entire proceeds would be paid to the illegitimate children of Loreto with Eva pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance
Code. It ruled that it is only in cases where there are no beneficiaries designated, or when the only designated beneficiary is
disqualified, that the proceeds should be paid to the estate of the insured. As to the claim that the proceeds to be paid to Loreto’s
illegitimate children should be reduced based on the rules on legitime, the trial court held that the distribution of the insurance
proceeds is governed primarily by the Insurance Code, and the provisions of the Civil Code are irrelevant and inapplicable.
With respect to the Grepalife policy, the trial court noted that Eva was never designated as a beneficiary, but only Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie; thus, it upheld the dismissal of the case as to the illegitimate children. It further held that the matter
of Loreto’s misrepresentation was premature; the appropriate action may be filed only upon denial of the claim of the named
beneficiaries for the insurance proceeds by Grepalife.
Petitioners appealed the June 16, 2005 Resolution to the CA, but it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the
decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action involved a pure question of law. The
appellate court also noted that petitioners did not file within the reglementary period a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s Resolution, dated September 21, 2004, dismissing the complaint as against Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie;
thus, the said Resolution had already attained finality.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
a. In determining the merits of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, may the Court consider
matters which were not alleged in the Complaint, particularly the defenses put up by the defendants in their Answer?
b. In granting a motion for reconsideration of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, did not the
Regional Trial Court engage in the examination and determination of what were the facts and their probative value,
or the truth thereof, when it premised the dismissal on allegations of the defendants in their answer – which had not
been proven?
c. x x x (A)re the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the insurance for the concubine? 15
In essence, petitioners posit that their petition before the trial court should not have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action because the finding that Eva was either disqualified as a beneficiary by the insurance companies or that her designation
68
was revoked by Loreto, hypothetically admitted as true, was raised only in the answers and motions for reconsideration of both
Insular and Grepalife. They argue that for a motion to dismiss to prosper on that ground, only the allegations in the complaint
should be considered. They further contend that, even assuming Insular disqualified Eva as a beneficiary, her share should not
have been distributed to her children with Loreto but, instead, awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of the insured
deceased, in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
The petition should be denied.
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial court’s finding that the petition failed to state a cause of action, as
provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the Rules of Court, which reads –
SECTION 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. 16 A complaint states a cause of action when
it contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action—(1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. If any of these elements is absent, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. 17
When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the
complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency
of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render
a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule.
However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of the
allegations if:
1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2. such allegations are legally impossible;
3. the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4. by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
5. there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the course of the hearings
related to the case.18
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto,
they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is
that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the
insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds
of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code, 19 Eva’s share in the proceeds should be
forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and
portions of the shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled
to their respective legitimes.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the
Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code.
Section 53 of the Insurance Code states—
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for
whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive;
or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. 20 The exception to this rule is a situation
where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable
stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer. 21
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds
thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to
petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment
considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid.
Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, 22 the shares of
Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the
Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate
children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any
beneficiary,23 or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, 24 that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial court should be upheld. In the same light, the Decision of the
CA dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal;
the issue of failure to state a cause of action is a question of law and not of fact, there being no findings of fact in the first
place.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 129505           January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 133359           January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-
Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of
Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases
were consolidated considering that they involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the same.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will 1 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had
no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he
disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in
the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will 2 was annexed to the
petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and
allowing the will. The order reads:
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips (Officer's Return, dated 04 September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called for
hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on motion of petitioner,
he was allowed to adduce his evidence in support of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and was directly examined by
the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of
the petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of
sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed
his Last Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any
other person in signing it.
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last
Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia
Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses,
namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer
(Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14",
"A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of the witnesses
signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-
15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner
Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee and devisee of petitioner's properties, real and
69
 personal, approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as
executor and to serve as such without a bond.1âwphi1.nêt
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially established the material allegations
contained in his petition. The Last Will and Testament having been executed and attested as required by law; that
testator at the time of the execution of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a Will; nor
was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it was in writing and executed in the
language known and understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and subscribed by three (3)
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of another; that the testator and all the attesting witnesses signed
the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the testator has intended that the instrument should be his
Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and
Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de
Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos.
He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the
will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the
issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was
granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61)
still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.3
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew
her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial
Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.
Upon private respondent's motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing
her as special administrator of Dr. De Santos's estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of private respondent
as special administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he
came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223
before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testator's estate;
that private respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of
administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is
related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for
intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision 4 promulgated on February 13, 1998,
upheld the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch
65 on the ground that there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court.
The order reads:
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the
ground that this case is related with a case before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the
information that there is no related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending
before this Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the
Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16
February 1996 and has become final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips
filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn
after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter involves
a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion
was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for
a separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76
of the Rules of Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be approved by the Presiding Judges of
the affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996, 5 Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be
improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings
were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later
recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996,
he stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case
notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must
therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had
been partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court Branch 65)
shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City is but one court.
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the
Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos
Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a
reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for  certiorari in the Court of Appeals
which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision 6 setting aside the trial court's order on the ground that petitioner had not
shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the
probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition
for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose
the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters
testamentary with the Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings
involving the same restate estate of the decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61.
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the
order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle v. Manalo,8 he argues that
the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator,
pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon
private respondent's petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of
the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.9
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing
the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of
such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the
principle of ambulatory nature of wills.10
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It
provides:
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In
such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's death shall
govern.
70
 The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on
petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death,
shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities
adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after
his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the
requirements prescribed by law, the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testator's life, therefore,
will lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only
questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the testator's death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the
will, he may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he
should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's
death would be in order.11
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except
to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the
ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that —
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased,
it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that
probate proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that the
entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of
the estate was to be suspended until the latter's death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition
for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the probate
court.12
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, §1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of
a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:13
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the
Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to
define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing
merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or
authority of the court over the subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That
power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court
may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of
something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just
a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside
Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The
different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible
with each other.14
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is
concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator
after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:15
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate
and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the
court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the
branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and
before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the
Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for
the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of the same court. The
apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches
and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or
judge of the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private
respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct.
In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals
held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a
compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter
only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his
properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is,
therefore, not direct or immediate.
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the
opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will, and the private respondent
has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondent's opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately
misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to act as
executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the probable value and character of
the property of the estate. The true value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate. 16
Rule 79, §1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. — Any person interested in
a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as
executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A
petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or
contingent.17
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a
fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by
will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.
71
 One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's —
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 18
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator's will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the
deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of
the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:19
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of
his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one
who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to
administer the estate.20 None of these circumstances is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to
petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same
facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the
purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.1âwphi1.nêt
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of the estate of
Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the
testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery
of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the
latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 176422               March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA
CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA
VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS
SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA
P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area
of 7,749 square meters; 2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m; 3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m. 4 Lot Nos.
1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos 5 (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand,
is also in the name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner
Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four
children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion,
Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand,
are Valentin’s children. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject
of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only
daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They
claimed that after Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in
their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate from petitioners’ familial line
and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and
Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the
properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in petitioners’ claim and granted their action for
Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4, 2002,
the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels of land subject of this action in
the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-
half of the property described in the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-
149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney’s fees and damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region,
Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby
DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per Resolution 9 dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned the properties in
dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be
subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel. 11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE
NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO
NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA
TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that the properties came from the paternal line
of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in representation of their own predecessors,
Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers of Exequiel.13
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule in this regard is that it should
raise only questions of law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the CA’s findings are
contrary to those of the trial court. 14 This being the case in the petition at hand, the Court must now look into the differing
findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two issues that arise – one, whether the properties in dispute are
reservable properties and two, whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
72
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code: to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an
ours) ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were
donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the Ascendants, descendants and
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which the property came. 15 collateral relatives under Article
The lineal character of the 964 of the Civil Code
reservable property is reckoned Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as the
from the ascendant from whom the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral
prepositus received the property by relative.
gratuitous title Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants, and those who are not
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not applicable. ascendants and descendants but come from a common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.1âwphi1 A direct line is that constituted by
the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who
come from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand,
Gregoria’s descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s
ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship,
ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of
Julia’s collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to
the common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third
line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative within the third degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria
from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one
at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. 19 It is Gregoria in this
case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios. 20
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of
reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree. 21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the
Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga, Court stated:
determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third
The persons involved in reserva troncal are: degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the
gratuitous title; one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belong to the
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property; line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law; highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of
and the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor. 16 x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law,
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x. 23 (Emphasis and underscoring
from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go ours)
farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. 17 It was also immaterial for the CA The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit
from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview
73
of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree. Hence, the
CA’s disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should
apply in the distribution of Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper distribution of Gregoria’s estate at this point as the
cause of action relied upon by petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any
determination would necessarily entail reception of evidence on Gregoria’s entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is
best accomplished in an action filed specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC’s disposition of the case. In upholding the right of
petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in
their names. What the RTC should have done, assuming for argument’s sake that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the
reservable nature of the property registered on respondent’s titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and
to annotate the reservable character of the property on the title. 24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a
prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively. 25
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate
it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s rights
are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished, 27 that a reservatario becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property.28 In any event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a
reservation of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92
are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of ownership of the properties in question.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES
DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for
partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother
Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons
named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters,
Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena
Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the
San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance
Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512
of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160
and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City;
1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of
deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the
Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets
and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her
deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which
she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all).
The document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de
mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los
hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en
Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre terreno
de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1äwphï1.ñët
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their
father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16,
1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July
30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from
the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that
said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and
not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito
F. Legarda.
74
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are
reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of
her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she
contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not
holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary
shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the
reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed
matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the
petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the
stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to  reserva troncal that is
the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this
appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article
811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa  what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within
the third degree  and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in
the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved in  Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the  Florentino case and other
pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar,
extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which
together with the reserva viudal  and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate
from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the
improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations
which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas  as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover,
the reserves,  insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserve troncal,  a legal institution
which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo
lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por
ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de
donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal  (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said
descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or
brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime)
from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation)
from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant
belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l,
1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were
inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of
his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de
Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal  are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the
reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the
reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor,
72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente
a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide
personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho
Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal  is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of
land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him
the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio
Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her
name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be
noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was
inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father,
Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was
reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista
Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came
(Aglibot vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and
Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang,
48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno  52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director
of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44
Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate
passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person
entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But the
representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or  titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and
succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
75
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at
the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate
it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights
are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega,
46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro  in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the
reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at
the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs.
Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the
property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs.
Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding
future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is
that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs.
Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët
The reservatario  receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property
merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during
the reservista's  lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the
reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
property. (J.  J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's  lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can
already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary
right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even
while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt
is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose
of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of whom
the reservatarios  are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by
J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's  death, the reservatario  nearest to the prepositus  becomes, "automatically and by operation of law,
the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third
degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or  mortis
causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree,
her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties
which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo
vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa  of the reservable properties as long as
the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus,  not from
the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree
from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in
the third degree  and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree  would be a glaring violation of article 891.
That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where
it was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together with
his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful
inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir
receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right
of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children,
Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties
were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her
properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased
children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which
Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina
willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of
Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and could not be
inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths
portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere,  we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case.
That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the
property came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor
cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal  when the only relatives within the third degree are the
common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans
binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino  case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties because only relatives within
the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for
the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a
full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not
form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of
the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of
strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason
founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
76
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if
the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of
Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom
the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-
11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives
of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-
degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the
disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance
with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did
not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable
properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees.
The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their
respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
G.R. No. L-14530             April 25, 1962
LEONA AGLIBOT, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ANDREA ACAY MAÑALAC, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Nemesio Balonso for plaintiff-appellees.
Ruperto G. Martin and Associates for dependants-appellants.
DIZON, J.:
Leona and Evarista Aglibot commenced the present action (Civil Case No. 1482) in the Court of First Instance of Zambales on
July 31, 1952 to recover from Andrea Acay Mañalac and her children — Ramona, Gregorio, Felix, Angela, Juanita and
Purisima, all surnamed Mañalac — the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in barrio Namanaan, Municipality
of San Antonio, Zambales, more particularly described in paragraph 2 of their complaint, and damages.
Briefly stated, the allegations of the complaint are that the Aglibots inherited the property subject matter thereof from their
deceased niece Juliana Mañalac; that upon the death of Anacleto Mañalac, father of Juliana, the defendants took possession of
said property, claimed it as their own and had since then appropriated for themselves all the palay annually harvested therefrom
amounting to 30 cavanes; that nothwithstanding demands made upon said defendants by the Aglibots, they had refused to
surrender the property to the latter.1äwphï1.ñët
In their answer, after denying some material averments of the complaint, appellants alleged substantially the following as
affirmative defense: that the land in question was purchased from Esteban Garcia by the spouses Anacleto Mañalac and Maria
Aglibot for P1,000.00; that when Maria Aglibot died, only P300.00 of this amount had been paid; that the remaining P700.00
was paid to the vendor during the marriage of Anacleto Mañalac and appellant Andrea Acay; that Juliana Mañalac, the only
daughter of Anacleto and his first wife, died in 1920, while Anacleto died in 1942; that upon his death, his widow, Andrea
Acay, and their children acquired the property in question as his sole legal heirs. Their answer likewise claimed the sum of
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees by way of counterclaim. After due trial, upon the issue thus joined, the lower court rendered
judgement as follows: .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the plaintiffs
owners pro-indiviso of one half (1/2) of the land covered by Original Certificate No. 10 described in paragraph 2 of
the amended complaint, ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of the said one-half (1/2) of
the property covered by said title; ordering the defendants jointly and severally to deliver to the plaintiffs 15 cavanes
of palay yearly as the share of the plaintiffs from the produce of the land or its equivalent value at P10.00 a cavan
from the date of the filing of the complaint until the said one-half (1/2) portion of the property described in Original
Certificate No. 10 is delivered to the plaintiffs and ordering the defendants to pay the costs.
From the above judgment Andrea Acay and her children took the present appeal.
The evidence shows that, originally, the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Anacleto Mañalac
and Maria Aglibot, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10 of the Register of Deeds of Zambales in the name of
Anacleto Mañalac, married to Maria Aglibot; that said spouses had an only child named Juliana Mañalac; that Maria Aglibot
died on October 2, 1906; that on April 25, 1910, Anacleto Mañalac married appellant Andrea Acay with whom he had six
children (the other appellants herein); that Juliana Mañalac died intestate on October 22, 1920, leaving no other relatives except
her father, Anacleto Mañalac, and her half brothers and sisters already mentioned; that upon the death of Anacleto on June 2,
1942, his widow, Andrea Acay, and her six children took possession of the parcel of land in controversy and since then have
refused to surrender the ownership and possession thereof to the appellees; that the land produces thirty cavanes of palay yearly.
On May 18, 1951, appellees Leona and Evarista Aglibot filed a verified petition in the Court of First Instance of Zambales for
the summary partition or distribution of the properties left by the deceased Juliana Mañalac among her rightful heirs (Special
Proceeding No. 594). The court, after proper proceedings, issued an order dated October 30, 1951, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows: .
Wherefore, the Court declares that the applicant Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot are the only heirs within the
third degree of Juliana Mañalac, and belonging to the same line from which these properties originally belonged, that
is, from Maria Aglibot, being the sisters of the latter; that the value of these properties does not exceed six thousand
pesos (P6,000); and that each of the applicants is entitled to receive and enter into possession of one-half of the first
five parcels and one-fourth of the last two, after paying such debts of the estate if there be any — and the
proportionate expenses of this special proceedings, subject to the provisions of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. (Page
10, Rec. on App.).
After securing the decision abovequoted appellees made the unsuccessful demands upon appellants for the surrender of the
property in question to them, and subsequently filed the present action.
The main question to be resolved now is: Who is entitled to the land which Anacleto Mañalac inherited from his daughter,
Juliana, as between appellees(sisters of Maria Aglibot, first wife of Anacleto Mañalac), on the one hand, and appellants
(Anacleto's second wife and their children), on the other?.
It is clear from the facts of the case that the land in question is reservable property in accordance with the provisions of Article
811 of the Spanish Civil Code (Art. 891 of the New Civil Code). Both parties now admit that the entire parcel covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 10 belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Anacleto Mañalac and Maria Aglibot;
that upon the death of the latter on October 2, 1906, their only daughter, Juliana Mañalac, inherited one-half of the property, the
other pertaining to her father as his share in the conjugal partnership; that upon the death of Juliana Mañalac on October 2, 1920
without leaving any descendant, her father inherited her one-half portion of said property. In accordance with law, therefore,
Anacleto Mañalac was obliged to reserve the portion he had thus inherited from his daughter, for the benefit of appellees, Leona
and Evarista Aglibot, aunts of Juliana on the maternal side and who are, therefore, her relative within the third degree belonging
to the line from which said property came.
Appellants' contention that the major portion of the purchase price of the land in question was paid to the original owner,
Esteban Garcia, after the death of Maria Aglibot is rendered clearly untenable not only by the lack of sufficient evidence to this
effect but also by the very significant circumstance that the property was titled in the name of Anacleto Mañalac "married to
Maria Aglibot" — circumstance that strongly indicates that said spouses had acquired full ownership thereof during the lifetime
of Maria Aglibot.
A Secondary question raised by appellants is to the effect that the lower court erred in ordering them, jointly and severally, to
deliver to appellees fifteen cavanes of palay yearly or pay their equivalent value of P10.00 a cavan, from the date of the filing of
the complaint. Considering the belief of appellants that the property in controversy formed part of the estate of Anacleto
Mañalac and that upon the latter's death ownership thereof was transmitted to all his heirs, subject to the usufructuary rights of
the surviving spouse, Maria Acay, their contention — not sufficiently rebutted — that only the latter enjoyed possession of the
property since her husband's death and received the annual share pertaining to the landlord seems to be reasonable and logical.
She should be the only one, therefore, sentenced to pay the fifteen cavanes of palay yearly from the date of the filing of the
complaint.
The remaining contention of appellants that the lower court should have ordered appellees to refund to them 50% of the annual
realty tax paid on the property cannot be sustained, this matter having been raised by them for the first time on appeal.
WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
77
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010
(Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition,
reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the
plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the
burial, mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses
for scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not limited to,
specific items already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate,
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to
plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without
Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only
surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and
four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo
Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which
she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was
acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz,
Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of
Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place
his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately,
he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told
Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties
came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.
This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on
July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein
movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late
Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have
been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis
supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation,
Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh.
5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of
all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from
her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the
disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold
properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the  "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO
VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July
17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order
declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion
was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980
(or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia
Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit
an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the
properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto. Hence, this petition for
review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition
and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate
proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic
fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative
within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the
Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said
agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23
of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting,
distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a
close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties
(Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29,
1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana,
Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to
"hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated
March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these
proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant
proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late
Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the late
Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest
relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom
he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
78
 2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the
late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be
terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23),
Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared
as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy
when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead
of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court.
We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and
legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not
interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a
project of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts
and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of
the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to
determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine the
legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just
and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is necessary to
that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits;
and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the range
of the administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu,
100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276,
L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution
of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated
Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed
(Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share,
is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for
reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or
order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v.
Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960,
107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera,  100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children
by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants
were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and
that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir
of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071,  it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special
Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project
of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three years, the action
for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are
still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have
opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23
(formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the
estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within the exclusive competence of
the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud  employed by Celedonia? It is
noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her
amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing party which
prevented a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents
a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters
pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so
that there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination by
one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an
available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved
party was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such
judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law
Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic
fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his
case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-
21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969,
30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in
her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding"
and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the
lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall
initiate the necessary proceeding,  cause the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything
else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff,
[although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the
estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew
that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a
foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the petition
is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the
hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9,
1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for
the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues
of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings
was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate
court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after Celedonia Solivio was
declared as the sole heir. ... .
79
 Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required by law, despite
which the present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged
right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion
for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in
rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his  mother's side was not
false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his
mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have
been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir.
Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or defense
is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young
v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v.
Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2,
Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to
her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The  reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in
Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor  (reservista)—the ascendant who inherits by operation of
law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the
third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his
other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant,
but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold
his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from
another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse
of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil
Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by
the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in
the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share
and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother,
Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion
to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia
Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are
not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she
did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his
lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need
be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2,
1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29,
1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she
could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-
law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia,
but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation
(p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly registered in the Securities
and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving students as the
Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State
College, and the University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist Community for a
deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and enrichment of the
various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this
foundation may be named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community needs and be able
to alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum
at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State
College, as a token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which
has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his
mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be offered every February and October, and Requiem
masses every February 25th and October llth, their death anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loans from
whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the
income or such part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary
to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or
otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every
kind and description or any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishments of any of
the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of
the corporation, including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the
80
 corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of like
nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars
graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with
honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being
the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which was
donated by the Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region
VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He studied at
St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the
Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to become
Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban
Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West
Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious civic and
cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her
commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET
ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However,
comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be
conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall
be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the
Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the
estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the
proceedings therein.
G.R. No. L-13386             October 27, 1920
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all
liability under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural  mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage
Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of
land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to
his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela
Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the
parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the
same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva,
instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly
described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana
Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to
the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter  of the deceased
Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29,
1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that
the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until
the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a
legitimate daughter. (See  testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-
27, sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697,
699). Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing here the law and
legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. ( See
also In re  estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree
is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who,
in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is
the natural  sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was
Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the
third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo,
was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811
the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to
be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a
lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or tribunal. However, eminent
commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult
problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous
in the opinion that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to  legitimate relative. One of such commentators,
undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions,
in deciding the question before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather reserve the
properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the
ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for
applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in
referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the
legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not recognize the existence of the
natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established by acknowledgement between the father or mother who
acknowledges and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth, that  in
said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the exception ; which is the
reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of children or parents, of ascendants or
descendants, and in them reference is of course made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a
provision applicable only to natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother;
it does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of
natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to
938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)
81
 Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that they refer to
legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants
included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, — and as we will see also article 812, —
continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in
wholly included in the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in
articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only
to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which
states that the provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in favor of the
legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession of natural parents,
as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or
indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to succeed neither admits of
any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of
new marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called
"reserva troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony
which is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do
article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to
legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Cataluña concede the right to succeed with
respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to
reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may be raised just as the question
whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no
remedy but to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the
legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. — This is one of the most delicate points in the interpretation
of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within the third
degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It
could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the
other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to
that of the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a
descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question,
because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the
reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate
family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate
parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents
neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the
two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family. ( Ibid. pp.
251-252.)
Scævola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same conclusion as Manresa. "La
reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la  familia legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the
legitimate family.)" (See Scævola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate  the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be
a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the
lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de
Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt
and granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the
late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great
grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as
Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her
niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which
are attached to this stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and
their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D,
Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said
two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife
Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon.
In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C'
and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her
father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half
(1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as
his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently
annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the
parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate
descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven
(7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven
(7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of
Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice,
oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said
parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8)
of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of whether
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question,
or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said
defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son
Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8)
of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be
82
 collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the
expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice in
pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family relations,
they hereby waive all their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs'
sore in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the
defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds that plaintiffs
Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-
indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently,
they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real
estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all their claims against
each other for damages including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on
plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights
(3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-
64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-
Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents received by her on the properties involved in
this action for the purpose of determining the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their
shares in the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of
the  praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the
death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired
by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who
belong to the line from which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on
intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino,  3 where the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews
and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made
that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to
a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the
Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of  reserva troncal, where the
only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of
the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the
whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of
the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject. After mature
reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal  is a special
rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by
the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives
of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations
between one  reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer;
wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary
rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that
upon the death of the ascendant  reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all
the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894;
Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the
descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of the descendant
within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person
from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right
as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship,  nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the
case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de
Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is
the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews
of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of
representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the
whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the
property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided
by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This
conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva  being an exceptional case, its application
should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa
in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el
alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida
en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en
aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la
reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's hostility to
successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and
the reversion legal  of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held
without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the  praepositus), they are excluded from
the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To
this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy nephews and nieces of
the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is
readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that
provide as follows:
83
 Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal
shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces who are the children of
the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per
stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers and sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and
more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now
in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the former, whether of
the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving
spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of the whole
blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited  ab
intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or
widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and
nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a
vis the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property,
the  reservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the  reservista, who may not
dispose of it by will, as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The
latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the  reservatarios  are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands  5, where it was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the right of
a reservatario are not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of
the reservista  over property subject to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's
rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that
the  reservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
the  reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and
accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios  that survive the  reservista, the matter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a
life interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the  reservista,  the reservatario nearest to
the  prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the  reservista, and does not
even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have
been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result
should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the
property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is
entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs
against the plaintiffs-appellants.
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA,
JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed BALANTAKBO, respondents.
Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.
Tomas P. Añonuevo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in C.A.
G.R. No. CV-01292-93, which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the
consolidated cases in Civil Case No. SC-9561 and Civil Case No. SC-957.2
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third
(1/3) interest,  pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the
complaint in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7)
interest  pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957
from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de
Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal
Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:
I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo, he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si
difunto hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.
II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia
de edad sin dejar testamento alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.
IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera
formosa, legitima y universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto
padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.
x x x           x x x          x x x
(Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to
Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The same property was
subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January
23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-
Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.
84
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties described in the complaint in Civil Case
No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the
properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not contain any annotation of its
reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul
Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr.,
another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the
respective complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject matter of res involved, the transferees, the
dates of the conveyances but involve the same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs —
a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 — the one-third (1/3) interest and ownership,  pro-indiviso, in and over the
parcel of land described in paragraph three (3) sub-paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of this
decision;
b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 — the one-seventh (1/7) interest and ownership,  pro-indiviso, in and over the
ten (10) parcels of land described in paragraph three (3), sub-paragraph 2, of pages two (2) and three (3) of
this decision;
c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein ordered to be conveyed to them by the
defendants with plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-third (1/3) of
the one share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are their uncles:
2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of
the produce from the properties herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said accounting and payment of
income being for the period from January 3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:
3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay plaintiffs —
a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.
b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.
4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and 957.
x x x           x x x          x x x
(p. 46, Rollo)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court  a quo in toto. The motion for
reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.
This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners assigning the following errors allegedly committed
by the appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser for value and in good faith of the
properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.
II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable interest of the reservee in the properties
covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs (private respondents) has not yet
prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of
Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the appellate court affirmed, that they were
not innocent purchasers for value. According to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also
called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found
that there was no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title coveting the properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de
Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the
properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his
maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that
said affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of
the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul
Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were
inventoried in the said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were free from any liens and
encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo
stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree
(formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:
Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. — Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice
to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, cited in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos.
74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated
January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests,
legal and equitable, included therein . . .
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the
title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed
to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome
by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more
than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must
take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. . . .
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the mere entry of a document in the day book
without noting it on the certificate of title is not sufficient registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in
the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January
20, 1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction.
That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was
made between voluntary and involuntary registration, such as the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution,
notice of lis pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient
notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of voluntary registration of documents an
innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder
of a certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is
entered in the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title
covering the land sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not within his power to
perform. The register of deeds is duty bound to perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).
In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo which contained a statement that the
property was inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was
registered with the Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property
in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable character of the properties before
they bought the same from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of
Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:
x x x           x x x          x x x
That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described
parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo
dated December 10, 1945 and said portion in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to Raul
85
 Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and this property is entirely free from any encumbrance
of any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)
It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no such admission was made by Consuelo
to put Villa Honorio Development on notice of the reservable character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by Consuelo and registered with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long time acquaintances; that the Villa
Honorio Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family
corporations of the Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were inherited by
Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these
properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code
on reserva troncal provides:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need to register the reservable character of
the property, if only for the protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons. This was suggested as early as the case
of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted for resolution therein
was whether the reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit
of the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant reservor received the
property, should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-
mentioned, without distinction legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children. However,
in an obiter dictum this Court stated therein:
The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If
the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having the status provided
in Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this special order of succession, to
said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them, which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now be
determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is released and will be adjudicated in accordance with
the regular order of succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the efficacy or
cessation of the reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing to
do with whether the reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title to the property. The purpose of the
notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective . . . (p. 292, Ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that the
reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the
obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of  reserva viudal is
applicable to reserva troncal. (See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).
Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof
and cannot now register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can he effect the fee
simple, which does not belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said land
in good faith, free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised not to buy
the land he remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?" Aside from the fact that it is not
clear whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before or after the sale, it does not arise that he
had any knowledge of the reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the
land from his son, but also from the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his mother Rufina
Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide,
however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to note the
same in their deeds, for the reason that there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question raised in
regard thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to
annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who
inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore,
the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property subject of  reserva
viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis
supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration of the limitation is effected
(either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet.
The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but
upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor
the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of
the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a
fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the
third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the
death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory
suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old
Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years
under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein private
respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of
action has not prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation expenses and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for
attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to
recover what rightfully belongs to them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except
for the modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character of a property subject of reserva troncal.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES
DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for
partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother
Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons
named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters,
Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena
Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët
86
 (a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the
San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance
Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512
of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160
and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City;
1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of
deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the
Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets
and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her
deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which
she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all).
The document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de
mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los
hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en
Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre terreno
de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1äwphï1.ñët
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their
father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16,
1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July
30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from
the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that
said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and
not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito
F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are
reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of
her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she
contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not
holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary
shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the
reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed
matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the
petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the
stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to  reserva troncal that is
the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this
appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article
811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa  what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within
the third degree  and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in
the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved in  Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the  Florentino case and other
pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar,
extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which
together with the reserva viudal  and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate
from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the
improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations
which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas  as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover,
the reserves,  insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserve troncal,  a legal institution
which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo
lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por
ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de
donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal  (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said
descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or
brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime)
from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation)
from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant
belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l,
1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were
inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of
his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de
Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
87
The persons involved in reserve troncal  are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the
reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the
reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor,
72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente
a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide
personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho
Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal  is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of
land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him
the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio
Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her
name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be
noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was
inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father,
Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was
reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista
Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came
(Aglibot vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and
Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang,
48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno  52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director
of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44
Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate
passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person
entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But the
representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or  titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and
succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at
the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate
it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights
are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega,
46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro  in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the
reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at
the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs.
Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the
property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs.
Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding
future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is
that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs.
Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët
The reservatario  receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property
merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during
the reservista's  lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the
reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
property. (J.  J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's  lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can
already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary
right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even
while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt
is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose
of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of whom
the reservatarios  are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by
J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's  death, the reservatario  nearest to the prepositus  becomes, "automatically and by operation of law,
the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third
degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or  mortis
causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree,
her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties
which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo
vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa  of the reservable properties as long as
the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus,  not from
the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree
from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in
the third degree  and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree  would be a glaring violation of article 891.
That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where
it was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët
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 Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together with
his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful
inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir
receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right
of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children,
Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties
were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her
properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased
children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which
Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina
willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of
Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and could not be
inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths
portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere,  we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case.
That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the
property came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor
cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal  when the only relatives within the third degree are the
common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans
binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino  case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties because only relatives within
the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for
the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a
full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not
form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of
the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of
strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason
founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if
the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of
Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom
the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-
11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives
of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-
degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the
disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance
with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did
not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable
properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees.
The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their
respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
G.R. No. 6878           September 13, 1913
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina
Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of
Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed,
one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son
named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on
July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother,
Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan — appeared in the case to oppose
the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by
law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required
by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said
two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the land which are the
subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired
them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by
inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition
of hereditary property had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so
characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives;
and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration
from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation
of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil
Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a
valuable consideration — that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by
operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of law,
and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the
allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of
the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence,
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prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had
it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land
from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any
objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue
of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion
of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her possession by
free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the
son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of
land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334,
No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be
required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the children and
descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in
article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation
of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is
all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application are required by
law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free
disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's
inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired
by operation of law — that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the
interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right required by
law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant
deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said that those rice lands
were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong
to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in
such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the
opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the
right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created
by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of the  right  alleged to the
reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance,
where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by
law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the  guaranty of
that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not
exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for
requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that
this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage
imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of
action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has
such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not
by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889,
to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by operation of
law was such independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that
although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article
811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose
favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage
to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right
itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does
not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being indisputable, even though
it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has
prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said
two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in
the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that
further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief
disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not the first enforced in
the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications necessary for its
adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those
regions the renovation of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof,
where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set
apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have required from
the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any
provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code.
In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the
first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain,
for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be
reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby
cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in
both cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set
forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which
heads the section that deals in general with property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions
in article 811; and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of
said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court has already declared, the
guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer,
are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of
the provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right
required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant
who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a
first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are:
Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real
property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of
realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle of
jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and
90
guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over
the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the
relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person
who should legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be
reserved will be secured by the same  requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by
article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated  to reserve the right the provisions with respect to
the  father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads
as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required to be reserved, upon
the property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of
action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be
reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not
prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing
article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person
obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings
to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of
the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require
the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the right must be
reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if
the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property
registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of
prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for  requiring that the property be
reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be
instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place,
because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496
of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the
registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of
land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the deceased
Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who has in
himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and
enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law,
act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the
fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into
full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil
Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose favor the
reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in
whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to
be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of
June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining features of
the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two
things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII,
189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained — that is, that the surviving spouse
(the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants
immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by
virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively
— use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the
least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant
heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to
the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this
limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which
makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right
of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he has
been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between
the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and
the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt
that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the
usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of
usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited
one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds
the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can
dispose of the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage,
and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in
either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property
itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving
spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his
or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and
void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the
alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of
this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending  may mortgage or alienate it,
provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right
in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the
validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must
reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person
in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and,
the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be
valid but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be
reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with
reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a
91
second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first marriage  ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than
that the ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights  and obligations during the existence of
the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the extinction
thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn  may pertain to them has been assured, have only an
expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the manner
and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can
dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the  Direccion
General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy,
for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the
relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right
reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and
the property subject to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the time of
his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the property
proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not
exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions
subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but
he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer
will therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an
expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless
these are also within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the
relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in
fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary. ( Morell,
Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and
usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent.
Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to
alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and
have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition,
reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine
owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property,
first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no
title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place
in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place
in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right
is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December
30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right,
because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for
it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos  of the person required by law to
reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights
inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the
registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an
act of disposal mortis causa  in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom he
got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
(Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the
person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law
requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third
party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized
by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that
the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be
transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely
academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other
the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of
and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a
condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is annexed to his right of
disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation
must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law
provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in
its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed — that the alienation the purchaser may make will be
terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the
obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by
repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all
doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged — that is to say, the latter
with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the
acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much
more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit
some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make
the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more
power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to register
in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the right
required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive
her; without special findings as to costs.
G.R. No. L-12957             March 24, 1961
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale executed by Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to
reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the
appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer
appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in
favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to
dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of
appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the death of Francisco
92
Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso,
as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana
on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of the
property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368
made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance
prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the
reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving
relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as
to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal contentions being, firstly, that the lower
court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the
sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to
inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton,
Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to
the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death — the date of which does not clearly appear
of record — were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377
(southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original
Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the
time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the
taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any
descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to
appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of
Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 — which was in their possession — the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the
corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who
as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance
in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable property. Francisco
Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without
descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for
the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The
record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being
Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1)
the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in
connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a
resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to
reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by
the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas,
65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely
acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the
reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable
property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee
may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee
only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees,
was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the
reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event,
became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed
decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees —
the Esparcia spouses did — not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice to whatever action
in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her
capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-
A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar  alias Sy Quio he sired three children, namely:
Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second
marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died
without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage. In
Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half
(1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other
half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua;
and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la
Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion
de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966,
Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and
sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias
Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias
Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo  3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case
No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre
upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was subject to  reserval
troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the
complaint of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
93
 ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the latter may have has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself
as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and could be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua
belong to the line from which said property came. getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue. After his death his mother
requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition
gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by that the property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of
operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.
came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito
of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the
was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March
degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much
deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein. in time to do so.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal — whether the property in question IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua,
was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of
Court said: Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was not acquired by of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided
Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said
legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.
As such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not subject tot a  reserva troncal,  under Art. 891 of the
New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal  under
Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in  Cabardo v.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in
return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on
the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent
Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity,
without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in
question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No.
4816 which estates in express terms;
2. — Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju,
Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como
herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954
metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso;  por
con la obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas
y demas gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la
Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the
court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free
from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does
not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the
amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case
the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed
upon by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that
the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that the will was not probated was
admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate
Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua
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