Debate about abortion

I. Abortion is not Immoral

Given the facts as we can at present prove them to be, there is no good reason to regard
abortion as immoral. To demonstrate this we must first explain what it means for
something to be moral or immoral, and also what abortion is.

A. The Facts of Morality

The Nature of Moral Disputes

The foundation of every moral system is the combination of values with facts. To
disagree on a point of morality can thus be a dispute about the facts (such as the
circumstances and consequences of an action), or a dispute about values, or both. If a
disagreement hinges on facts, one case or the other is vindicated when both sides
honestly investigate and acknowledge the facts that can be known. If a disagreement
hinges on values, inquiry must be made as to why each holds the values they do. Values
are either the conclusions derived from certain facts in combination with certain other
values, or else they are fundamental. Disputes over values that are the conclusions
derived from certain facts in combination with certain other values are resolved as for all
other moral disagreements--by investigating the facts more carefully.

Disputes over fundamental values, however, are irreconcilable. Both sides must agree to
disagree, or develop a mutually agreeable compromise. It is even possible, within certain
limits, to respect the individual moral sentiments of others even when we do not adopt
those principles ourselves. But disputes that appear irreconcilable are not necessarily
about fundamental values. They may simply result from either side failing to understand
the reasons for either position, or from the inability to establish certain facts as true or
false. Such cases must be resolved by first tolerating eachother or working out a
compromise, while continuing to logically analyze the dispute and to investigate the
facts. In law, this principle is manifest as moratoria, temporary injunctions, and holding
suspects in custody (with or without allowance of bail), all of which being necessarily
temporary solutions pending investigation, trial or judicial consideration. These
observations must be kept in mind throughout this debate.

The Values We Share

Those who argue that abortion is wrong generally base their argument on respect for
individual human existence. Usually, this value, or something similar, is rightly assumed
to be universally shared, and then the dispute arises only on matters of fact. I will
continue this assumption. There are those, we can imagine, who not only have no value
for respecting individual human existence, but also could not even in principle be
persuaded to adopt such a value (e.g. by appealing to some other values they did possess
which would be fulfilled by adopting a value for human life). But such people would not
be persuadable on any point of morality anyway, rendering this debate of no use or
interest to such a creature. We are thus speaking to, and for, everyone else.

The Nature of This Debate

Given the above, the required set of circumstances for abortion to be immoral are any
which violate respect for individual human existence. The question here is thus not
whether the value for individual human existence is justified (this will be assumed for
this debate), but whether any circumstances of abortion contradict the object of that
value. This is therefore a dispute about the facts, not values. Moreover, there are in
almost all moral systems cases when killing is not immoral, and some when it is even
moral. Self defense (or the defense of others) is the most prominent and relevant example
here. But I imagine there will be no secular dispute in actual matters of self defense. In
other words, I will assume for now that everyone agrees that abortion neither is immoral,
nor should be illegal, when necessary to save the mother's life. This leaves only one issue
for debate: whether elective abortion is immoral.

Digression on Moral Relativism

Something must first be said briefly about the moral subjectivism inherent in this
analysis. Based on the above, it follows that some things could be "immoral" for some
people and "moral" (or amoral) for others, since people vary in their values. For example,
some people may possess a fundamental value for all animal life of any kind, which
would entail not eating meat, not allowing suicide, nor even allowing the removal of life
support for a brain-dead patient. But this value system would only exist for them, not for
others. However, my analysis does not entail moral relativism in the usual sense, since it
is also possible (and I believe it is the case) that some fundamental values are shared by
all people, or very nearly all people (I allow some rare exceptions for the sociopath, who
is generally regarded as having a mind alien to the vast majority of humankind, devoid of
all ordinary moral sentiment).

If the above is true, it follows that there is a universal moral truth for everyone (or every
sane person), a truth which derives from this set of shared values, whatever it happens to
be. And this universal moral truth would exist side by side with other quasi-moral
principles derived from non-universal values, shared within various groups or not shared
at all. It is thus possible for abortion to be "immoral" for some but not all people, in this
sense--just as it is possible for eating pork to be "immoral" for some but not all people.
However, it might be better to call such things principles rather than morals, in order to
reserve the title "morals" for only those principles that are universal (or would be
universal, if everyone knew all the facts and all the ways these facts interacted with their
values). From now on, when I employ the term "moral" or its cognates, I am referring to
this universal truth, and not to the equally true but necessarily parochial principles found
everywhere in human society.

Therefore, my argument here is not addressed to parochial "principles," which are valid
for those individuals who hold them in conviction (and often worthy of respect even from
those who do not hold them, but understand their basis). Instead, I am addressing myself
to the question of whether abortion is universally immoral, i.e. immoral on the grounds of
a value possessed by all non-sociopathic human beings. And I believe that a value for
individual human existence is one of these universally shared values, or else one or more
other values is universally shared which in turn entail such a respect, even if a person
who possesses these values is unaware of this connection (and thus lacks respect for
individual human existence out of ignorance or error).

To put this all simply, the proposition "abortion is immoral" means to me that every non-
sociopathic human being has some value which is contradicted or undermined by the
practice of abortion, even if they are unaware of this contradiction. My position is thus
that such a value does not exist, with respect to abortion, as the facts are presently
understood.

B. The Facts of Abortion

What Abortion is and How it Happens

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica (s.v. "Abortion"), the American College of

Obstetricians and Gynecologists has defined abortion as "the expulsion or extraction of
all (complete) or any part (incomplete) of the placenta or membranes, with or without an
abortus, before the 20th week (before 134 days) of gestation." This definition is based on
the scientifically-established fact that a developing human organism cannot survive
outside the womb before this date and therefore premature birth is not even an elective
option. In reality, before the 24th week the chance of a baby's survival outside the womb
is almost nil, but doctors use the 20th week as the cut-off because there have been some
rare cases of survival at that early a point, but none before, and the degree of organ
development that is necessary for survival even to be feasible occurs between 20 and 24
weeks of gestation.

Most abortions are conducted before the 85th day (within the first trimester). An abortion
conducted between the 85th and 134th day of a pregnancy (second trimester) is formally
called a "late-term abortion." Recent invention in political circles of the term "partial-
birth abortion" refers not to abortion at all, but to the killing of a premature (third
trimester) baby who is considered to have a remote chance of survival outside the womb.
Such a procedure is almost unheard of and is conducted only under the most unusual of
circumstances, such as when a baby is already dead, or cannot be prematurely delivered--
due to deformity or injury of the womb or birth canal--but must still be removed to save
the mother's life. In almost every other case, after the 20th week, "abortion" is neither
safe nor necessary--the baby would simply be delivered. Before that period, however, it is
likely that most abortions are either spontaneous (i.e. a miscarriage) or elective (i.e. at the
mother's choice, and not medically necessary to save her life).

However, abortion statistics, such as appear in any World Almanac, only measure
medical procedures, including the use of prescription abortifacients like the "Abortion
Pill." What is rarely understood in this issue is the fact that the most popular means of
birth control actually partly relies upon inducing early abortion, and is very likely
responsible for many times as many abortions as occur in counted procedures. Hormonal
medications of this sort include "The Pill," and Norplant, as well as the numerous herbal
solutions which share the same or similar chemical properties and are thus employed in
third world countries as a less expensive alternative to the manufactured pharmaceuticals
that they mimic. All these chemicals operate simultaneously on many levels, primarily by
preventing ovulation and hindering sperm, but also by preventing implantation (and thus
causing expulsion) of an egg that, despite all else, is fertilized anyway. In other words, all
chemical forms of birth control, including the pill, cause abortions--and no one can know
whether or when they have worked by their primary means or in this last-resort manner.
This means that any discussion about the morality or legality of abortion necessarily
entangles us in the morality and legality of the use of the pill and related implants and
injections. This is all the more true given that women can deliberately cause this early-
abortion effect up to three days after intercourse by taking a double or triple dose of their
ordinary birth control pills.

The Essential Nature of Abortion

The immediate and obvious effect of abortion is the killing of a developing human
organism. What this actually entails varies according to stage of development. As of
fertilization there exists a zygote (a single cell with the genetic blueprint for constructing
a unique person) which begins travelling towards the uterus, taking roughly three days to
reach it. In this period, the zygote grows into a mass of sixty or more identical
(undifferentiated) cells. Another two or three days and this mass begins to form an
embryo (meaning that some simple differentiation occurs among the cells) and attaches to
the uterine wall. It is this event which birth control medications prevent, if they first fail
to prevent ovulation or fertilization. An abortion at this stage is clearly a very different
affair than at later stages.

Nerve cells do not appear until the third week, and though full cellular differentiation
occurs in the fourth week, no functioning organs appear until the end of the second
month, at which point the entire embryo is little more than an inch long, and is now
formally called a "fetus" because preliminary organ development is complete and most of
the remaining development is a matter of mere growth in size. At that stage, simple reflex
nerve-muscle action is possible (the sort of event that doctors test for in adults by striking
the knee with a hammer), and electricity can be conducted just as it can in a disembodied
nerve cell. But the fetus does not become truly neurologically active until the fifth month
(an event we call "quickening"). This activity might only be a generative one, i.e. the
spontaneous nerve pulses could merely be autonomous or spontaneous reflexes aimed at
stimulating and developing muscle and organ tissue. Nevertheless, it is in this month that
a complex cerebral cortex, the one unique feature of human--in contrast with animal--
brains, begins to develop, and is typically complete, though still growing, by the sixth
month. What is actually going on mentally at that point is unknown, but the hardware is
in place for a human mind to exist in at least a primitive state.
The great majority of elective abortions occur before the fourth month begins, and there
is effectively no such thing as an elective abortion in the fifth month or later. No
competent doctor would advise it, no intelligent mother would risk it. Consequently, I
will not argue for the legality or morality of "abortion" after the 20th week. Certainly,
such a procedure could be immoral, in that it could be an act of disrespect for an
individual human's existence. Though it is doubtful that this argument can rightly be
applied to elective abortions prior to the 20th week (the only period in which the word
"abortion" is properly applied in medical terminology), it is clear that caution is certainly
warranted after that--perhaps even sufficient caution to consider the act immoral and to
make it illegal--except, as we have noted, in cases of genuine necessity.

Individual Human Existence

Until the 20th week, the cut-off date for an actual "abortion" to occur, there is no
complex cerebral cortex and no major central nervous activity. That is a condition
universally regarded as a state of death in adults. An adult human being in such a state
cannot really be "killed," just unplugged. And such an act would not be disrespectful of
their individual existence because that existence has already ceased, and only a body
remains. Even if we were able to regenerate a brain-dead patient's cerebral cortex, using
the genetic blueprint in her cells, we would still fail to resurrect her. We would instead
merely create an identical twin inside a used body, with an infantile mind and no
memories, no complex personality traits, and no intellectual skills. Although this fresh
brain would be ready to learn and develop anew, it would be a different person. None of
the unique features of the deceased would exist any more--the only mental features that
would survive are the very same features that would be shared by any natural identical
twins.

The fetus before quickening is in the very same state as this hypothetical regenerated
person. And the analogy of identical twins is a crucial one. Twins share the exact same
blueprint for brain and body, and there is nothing "individual" about a blueprint that can
be shared by more than one individual person--their individuality does not derive from
their blueprint, but from their unique personal development, which begins almost
certainly before birth, but without any doubt upon birth, when there can be no mistake
that novel sensory data has begun transforming the brain and educating it in unique ways.
None of this individualization can occur before the existence of a complex cortex that can
be individualized (pre-fifth-month)--certainly none before there is a central nerve organ
of any kind (pre-third-month). Therefore, an individual human (as opposed to a vacant
body) cannot exist when a medically-defined abortion occurs. This entails that abortion
cannot counter our shared value for individual human existence.

C. The Moral Status of Abortion

I conclude that abortion is not immoral. But I have assumed that my facts are correct, and
that there are no other values contradicted by allowing or performing abortion. In
particular, I have carefully defined a value for human life in a particular way which may
be incorrect, though I believe my definition most acurately reflects common human
values. Whether this must be defended remains to be seen.

II. Abortion should not be Illegal

Given that abortion--an elective termination of pregnancy before the 20th week--does not
violate anyone's rights and does no substantial harm, and actually performs some limited
positive good, there is no good reason to make abortion illegal.

A. Abortion Does No Harm

From a point of view outside of this affair, the killing of a neurologically inactive fetus is
no greater a harm than the killing of a mouse, and in fact decidedly less--a mouse is
neurologically active, and though it lacks a complex cerebral cortex, it has a brain of
suitable complexity to perceive pain (and I would argue that the mouse deserves some
moral consideration, though less than humans). A fetus cannot perceive pain (and
perception is not quite the same thing as sensation: sensation can exist without a brain,
but perception cannot). The neural structures necessary to register and record sensations
of pain transmitted by the appropriate nerves either do not exist or are not functioning
before the fifth month of gestation. A fetus can no more feel pain than a surgical patient
under general anasthesia, or a paraplegic whose lower-body nerves continue reacting to
stimuli, but cease sending signals to the brain. And we have already established that a
fetus does not contain an individual human personality of any kind, any more than a
brain-dead adult does. With no perception of pain, and no loss of an individual
personality, the act of abortion causes no immediate harm.

However, there may be indirect harm caused by abortion. For instance, there may be
unacceptable medical risks to the mother, as there always are with any surgical
procedure, even surgery of the outpatient variety. But I doubt such risks are unacceptable
enough to warrant making the procedure illegal. I recently had elective surgery to remove
a benign cyst from my wrist. This required general anasthesia and a 45-minute cutting-
and-suturing of my flesh. The risks I voluntarily undertook were no less and almost
certainly greater than the risks attending competently-performed abortions (especially
chemical abortions). Since it would be absurd to outlaw the procedure I underwent, it
would be absurd to outlaw abortion on the same ground. Mothers should be informed of
the risks, as all surgical patients should be, but they should not be denied the right to
voluntarily accept those risks. Whether there is any other kind of harm caused by
abortion which would justify outlawing it remains to be seen.

Something must briefly be said about the risks of sex in general, since sex--voluntary or
involuntary--is itself necessary for abortion to ever become an issue. The fact that
celibacy is always safer than being sexually active is irrelevant here, since most things we
do are more dangerous than not doing them (such as driving rather than walking to the
theatre), and if it were appropriate to force everyone to live safely, then not only should
abortion be illegal, but so should sex in all but the most limited of circumstances (and so
should driving a car for that matter). I will assume no one wishes to argue for such an
Orwellian society.

B. Abortion Performs a Limited Positive Good

First, abortion is a notable benefit to society. The harm to a society that is caused by an
excess of unchecked population growth is severe and well-documented. The ability of
societies to check population growth without legalizing abortion has proven nearly non-
existent: there are few countries in which abortion is outlawed or stigmatized that are not
suffering harshly from overcrowding, with all the attendant economic, criminal, or
political troubles. In contrast, most nations that allow the procedure are maintaining
stable populations with nearly zero growth, and exhibiting more or less general
prosperity. From a purely pragmatic perspective aimed at the interests of the
commonwealth, abortion is at best a great benefit to mankind and at worst a necessary
evil. And for women who regard zero growth as a moral imperative, abortion can even be
a moral necessity from their point of view--although this would be better called a matter
of principle, so as to distinguish this personal belief from the morally universal.

Second, abortion is a significant benefit for the individual woman. The risks of death or
permanent disability certainly must be greater for a woman who carries a fetus to term
and bears a child, prematurely or not, than for a woman who aborts before the third
trimester of her pregnancy. And the social and economic ruin that can ensue from an
untimely motherhood is a serious harm as well, and although this could be alleviated by
recourse to adoption, free medical care for pregnant women, and public welfare for
women unable to work as a consequence of their pregnancy, these solutions are not as
simple as they sound, and are not so universally available as people might think (even the
United States, among the wealthiest of nations, has no such welfare system in place, not
to mention a very poor excuse for a medicare system, and there is no desirable option for
orphans in nations like India or Chad). Moreover, the potential physical harm from
bearing a child simply cannot be alleviated. Abortion thus supplies some benefit for many
women.

C. The Appropriate Legal Status of Abortion

An act that causes no involuntary harm and produces some benefits for individuals and
society in general should never be outlawed. This is based on the principle that laws
should only exist to preserve and protect the liberty of individuals and, when no liberty is
at stake either way, to increase the general welfare of all citizens. Whether that principle
is misinformed remains to be seen. But from the above analysis, there appears no way in
which outlawing abortion would even indirectly preserve or protect the liberty of any
individual, or provide any general benefit to the citizen body without uneccessarily
depriving individuals of their liberty.

A Secular Case Against Abortion

 By Jennifer Roth

Introduction
First of all, I'd like to thank Richard Carrier for agreeing to this debate, and the Internet
Infidels for sponsoring it. I hope to find that this format will allow us to go beyond the
soundbites and emotionalism that characterize all too many discussions of abortion.

I intend to show that an ethical case can be made against abortion without reference to a
deity, an immortal soul, or any other supernatural concept. Though I am not an attorney, I
also plan to point out principles upon which laws restricting abortion might be built.

My argument consists of three parts: first, that the human prenate is entitled to human
rights; second, that a child's parents are responsible for his/her welfare and that this
responsibility begins when the child's life begins; and third, that the so-called "need" for
abortion is really evidence of the need for greater justice for women.

Before starting, I wish to define a few terms. Language usage is a source of much
miscommunication and mistrust in the abortion debate -- even such seemingly basic
terms as "person" mean different things to those on opposite sides. In order to
communicate as clearly and honestly as possible, I offer the following explanations of
what I mean when I use certain terms in this debate:

• Human being: an individual member of the species Homo sapiens.

• Prenate: an umbrella term for the zygote, embryo, and fetus. It's not a scientific or
commonly used term, but I find it a useful and relatively neutral shorthand.
• Abortion: the deliberate termination of the life of the prenate. Note three things
about this definition; it does not include miscarriage (and in that sense it departs
from the medical definition of abortion) it does not include prenatal death as an
unintended result of a medical procedure, and it does not include the removal of
the body of a prenate who has died in utero.
• Person: a being which has what are commonly referred to as "human rights". A
person need not be a human being -- one could imagine, for instance,
extraterrestrial lifeforms with rights. Whether every human being is a person is, of
course, one of the main controversies in the abortion debate.

Prenatal Personhood

"To be a [person] is to be just the sort of animal to whom, in specified situations and at a
specified stage of development (beyond infanthood and before utter senility), moral
blame and praise attach." [1]
Many defenders of abortion, both religious and secular, claim that the question of when
life begins is a religious one, and therefore the views of any one group cannot be written
into law. That claim comes in handy for them, since the idea that life begins at birth is
already effectively written into law.

I find that in the dispute over "when life begins", people are rarely asking: at what point
does an individual physical being come into existence? Rather, the question is usually: At
what point does that being become a person which must be accorded rights? The first
question can be answered scientifically, and intellectual honesty demands that we
incorporate those findings into our positions. The second, however, cannot. Personhood
is a philosophical issue, but it need not be a religious one. After all, we can't scientifically
prove that anyone is a person, but we secular humanists do manage to advocate for the
human rights of women, minorities, and the severely disabled -- all of whom have been
considered non-persons at various times in history. If prenatal personhood depended upon
the notion of ensoulment at conception or a similar supernatural phenomenon, then it
could properly be called a purely religious position. However, this is not the case.

I think that to answer the question of who is a person, we first have to ask what makes a
person a person -- that is, why does any being have human rights? Most would answer
that what sets us apart from other animals is that we have the ability to reason and to
make moral choices. A being which exhibits these abilities can be said to be functioning
as a person. Put another way, reasoning and moral decision-making are personal acts.
Not only does this make a certain intuitive sense, but if there were no beings who could
reason and make moral choices, then there could be no beings with the ability to respect
rights. Therefore, rights could not exist. I do not believe that Mr. Carrier and I differ
substantially on this point, but I am confident that he will correct me if I am mistaken in
that assumption.

I am aware of no serious dispute over whether a being who performs personal acts is, in
fact, a person. Controversy arises when trying to decide whether or not to confer
personhood upon those beings who are not currently able to perform personal acts. Such
beings include the comatose, infants, and prenates.

The case of the comatose individual is probably the easiest to resolve. Such an individual
typically has already performed personal acts in his lifetime, and will do so again when/if
the coma ends. The pre-comatose individual is identical to the comatose and post-
comatose individual. Not identical in the sense of being exactly the same, of course, but
identical in the mathematical sense of having the same identity. The comatose individual
is a person because of his identity, not because s/he is currently capable of performing
personal acts.

An infant, unlike a comatose person, has never performed a personal act. Is the infant,
then, a non-person? Only if a non-person can become a person. However, if that is
possible, then why do other non-persons, such as trees and ladybugs, never become
persons? Presumably, there is something inherent in a human infant which differentiates
her from other creatures. It is in the nature of the infant to develop into a being which can
reason and make moral choices -- barring catastrophe, of course. The ability to perform
personal acts is not added, by some outside force, to the developing infant. In the process
of her growth, she naturally builds the mental structures necessary to function as a
person. I would argue, therefore, that personhood itself is inherent in the infant.

I was born in October of 1972. That newborn in 1972 was identical (again, in the
mathematical sense) to the adult in 2000 who exhibits the ability to reason and make
moral choices. I am the person; I perform personal acts. Even before I was able to
perform personal acts, I was still the person I am now.

Current law and public opinion seem to agree. Most people and governments recognize
that infants have human rights which must be respected. In effect, we hold the infant's
rights "in trust" until such time as she is capable of exercising them. Therefore, there is
already legal precedent for the recognition of personhood in those who have yet to
develop the ability to perform personal acts. Opponents of abortion propose nothing
unheard-of, then, in advocating that all human beings should be considered persons from
the beginning of their biological lives.

This is where the question, "At what point does an individual physical being come into
existence?" becomes important. In species which reproduce sexually, this generally
occurs when the male and female gametes join to form a new organism. (I must defer to
the embryologists on the finer points of twinning and chimerism; that is, a person who is
an identical twin could be said not to have attained an individual identity until the zygote
split. This is an interesting question, but not particularly relevant to the public policy
debate.)

I realize how counterintuitive this is. The prenate -- especially at the earliest stages --
seems so foreign, so other; and yet every one of us once was a prenate. People take adults
as the norm, and then say, "It's obvious that they can't be persons! Look how unlike us,
how subhuman, they are!" They're not. It's just that our model of the "normal" human is
biased towards ourselves -- the adults.

Many (I wish I could honestly say all) supporters of prenatal personhood seek truly equal
human rights for all human beings, not just those deemed worthy by the powerful. That
inclusive spirit has been at the heart of the greatest social movements in human history.

Parental obligation

"The following is a working definition of the parental duty, against which neglectful
parental care may be measured: The child has the right to expect, and the parent has a
duty to reasonably and prudently provide, food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical
care, nurturance, and teaching." [2]

Defenders of abortion commonly argue that even if the prenate is a person, the pregnant
woman is not obligated to allow him the use of her body.
Before I address this argument, allow me a brief semantic digression. For the purposes of
this part of the essay, I will be using the term "child" to denote the human being in utero.
There are two reasons for the change in terminology. First, there is little reason to even
discuss whether a woman has obligations to a non-person, so for the sake of argument I
am assuming prenatal personhood in this section. Second, while I find the term "prenate"
useful, it is a bit artificial and tedious. I will also be using the pronouns "he" and "him" to
denote the unborn child of unknown gender, simply to avoid confusion (since the mother,
of course, will be "she" or "her").

In the United States, children are legally entitled to be supported by their parents. This
includes the right to receive basic necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, and medical
care. Children are not entitled to support from random strangers, but only from those
people who are responsible for having created their needs in the first place. Other parties,
such as adoptive parents, charities, or governments, may voluntarily take on those
responsibilities, but they are the parents' by default.

However, current law only requires parents to provide for their children's needs after
birth. If the child is a person before birth, should the parents have a duty to provide for
his needs before birth as well?

Many people would answer that they should not, because the needs in this case include
the use of the mother's body. A parent cannot be required by law to donate a kidney, or
even blood, to save his/her child's life. Therefore, abortion defenders argue, a mother
cannot be required by law to donate the use of her uterus, even though her refusal will
cause her child's death.

However, there are significant differences between a kidney donation and pregnancy. In
the former case, the transplant is an extraordinary measure. The need for it is caused by
disease or injury, and most people will never need one. The parents may not withhold
from the child the opportunity to receive a new kidney -- they must seek medical care for
her. But they need not provide a kidney themselves; they did not directly create the need.

When a woman is pregnant, the situation is different. In the usual case, where pregnancy
did not result from sexual assault, the child himself, and his need for shelter and
nourishment in the womb, is a direct result of actions taken voluntarily by both parents.
The need to live in the mother's uterus for approximately forty weeks is also not an
extraordinary measure, in the way that the term is generally used. It is a basic human
need -- every single person who has ever been born required it. Just as the newborn has a
specific claim against his parents due to the fact that they created him in all his
helplessness, so too did he have a claim against them before he was born, for the same
reason. It is true that the heavier burden falls on the mother during the prenatal period.
Men simply cannot directly provide what their children need during the first forty weeks
of their lives. (I would advocate requiring fathers to indirectly provide as much as they
can by compensating mothers for their medical bills, lost work time, and other expenses
during pregnancy.) The fact that women must shoulder more of the parental obligation
during pregnancy than men is regrettable, but does not negate the obligation.
When pregnancy occurs as the result of sexual assault, one could make a case that the
woman is not obligated to carry the child to term. She has done nothing to incur any
obligation. While I am unconvinced that a legal basis exists for banning abortion in such
cases, I still contend that the ethical thing to do is to seek a nonviolent solution which
allows the mother to heal and the child to live. No woman should feel that she must abort
in order to spare herself the social stigma of bearing "the rapist's child", or that abortion is
the only way to get on with her life after the attack. If a rape survivor feels that she must
have an abortion, the people who are supposed to help her have failed her.

I can imagine what some readers are thinking right about now. In fact, I don't need to
imagine it, because it's been hurled at me before: the accusation that, "You just want to
punish women for having sex." I ask anyone who might be thinking that to pause for a
moment, and reflect upon the possibility that your reaction might result more from
prejudice than from a careful reading of my arguments. After all, the loudest voices
against abortion in the media have belonged to people who wish everyone to conform to
their religion's version of sexual morality. I wish that weren't true, but I can't deny it.
However, I shouldn't need to explain to an atheist audience how distorted media coverage
of contentious social issues can be.

The distinction I have drawn between the woman who is pregnant as a result of voluntary
sex and the women who is pregnant as a result of rape is not based on any value
judgments against the former. Nor is it based on the superstitious notion that a child
conceived in rape is somehow "tainted" and therefore less worthy of life. An atheistic
moral system, since it cannot depend on rules handed down from an outside source, must
instead depend on the effects our actions have on other people. It is not punitive,
therefore, to state that one who voluntarily decides to have sex has obligations to the
child who exists and has needs as a result of that action. It is simply a concrete
application of the general principle that some of our actions have consequences for other
people, and we must avoid inflicting negative consequences upon them.

Women's "need" for abortion

"There must be a remedy even for such a crying evil as this. But where shall it be found,
at least where begin, if not in the complete enfranchisement and elevation of women?"
[3]

Supporters of legal abortion have positioned themselves as the friends of women, and
they frequently paint their opponents as misogynists who are insensitive to the difficulties
faced by women with unplanned pregnancies. I've no doubt that this tactic makes for
successful fund-raising letters, but it is intellectually dishonest. It reminds me of a
politician who accuses his opponent of being soft on crime because she opposes the death
penalty.

Still, abortion proponents have many legitimate concerns. They are enraged that an
unplanned pregnancy can mean social, financial, and professional ruin for a woman.
They find it unjust that the sacrifices of raising children are borne mainly by women.
They're outraged that many women are still uneducated about the way their bodies work,
and many others lack access to safe, affordable contraception. They're absolutely right.

But shouldn't the solution to these inequities be a change in the social structures that
cause them? Legal discrimination and sanctioned violence against the very young cannot
change the unfairness of our society toward mothers -- it can only keep women from
being mothers, for a while at least. The underlying problems are not solved, and we set a
horrible precedent that allows us to define away the humanity of those who get in our
way.

If someone claims that "women will always need abortion," note the implicit
assumptions. The first is that our ability to bear children is, and always will be, a
handicap. The second is that we can never hope for our society to adequately adjust to the
needs of mothers so that women will not feel the need to abort. The third is that violence
against certain of our fellow human beings is an acceptable, even necessary way to solve
social problems.

Granted, this last little rant has nothing to do with a secular argument per se. But I find
the acceptance of abortion as a response to a sexist society to be inconsistent with
humanist ideals. Humanism values the inherent worth and dignity of every human being.
It affirms that moral standards should be based on the effect of our actions on our fellow
human beings. It embraces the use of reason and repudiates the use of violence to settle
disputes. Abortion is an ancient, backwards practice which is not worthy of those ideals.
Legal or not, we must progress beyond it.

Abortion is not Immoral and Should not

be Illegal
by Richard C. Carrier

Fundamentals of Agreement and Disagreement

Jen Roth has composed her case well, and I can see this debate will be of great value to
everyone, not only secularists. I will begin with the major points of fundamental
agreement and disagreement between us. Roth is quite right when she identifies the two
key issues in the abortion debate: "whether every human being is a person is...one of the
main controversies in the abortion debate," and "many defenders of abortion, both
religious and secular, claim that the question of when life begins is a religious one, and
therefore the views of any one group cannot be written into law."

The latter point is significant, since it is such a specious argument for the pro-choice
party to employ, except when responding to its corollary: the claim by many in the pro-
life party that abortion should be illegal because of religious reasons. That argument is
equally to be rejected on its face. Just as law is concerned with facts and evidence when
trying cases, so must facts and evidence be the issue in deciding responsible legal policy
in the first place. Though the moral values which motivate the people and their
legislatures to enact laws can derive from religious convictions, these motives must still
be matched to demonstrable facts before legislative action is justified, since legislation
goes beyond personal interests and convictions and imposes demands, and permits the
use of force, on others who are unwilling. Such an imposition needs an objective
justification--though what a society is to accomplish with its laws must necessarily be put
to vote in any democratic society, the truth is not something than can be or ought to be
decided by vote. This is the ideal of freedom of conscience. Undemonstrable judgments
of fact should be the reserve of the individual and not the basis of forcing opinions on
others, for a very good reason: for therein lies the road to intellectual oppression and
physical tyranny [1].

However, Roth and I disagree in the answering of these two questions. In the first case,
as I had expected, we define "person" differently and we must explore the reason why.
This is where a lot of "talking past each other" goes on in debates like this and thus I
hope to gradually narrow in on the issue and try to communicate my point of view while
trying to comprehend Ms. Roth's. Only then can we identify who is right and why. This
ultimately becomes not so much a question of facts as of values, since "person" is meant
to identify an object of value, and thus how it is defined will be determined by this
founding value. The next step would then be to take this value-derived definition and
apply it to observed facts.

Philosophy vs. Science

The question "at what point does an individual physical being come into existence," Roth
says "can be answered scientifically," but the question "at what point does that being
become a person which must be accorded rights....cannot [be answered scientifically],"
for "personhood is a philosophical issue." This is in part correct, since this is ultimately a
question of how a word is to be defined (more specifically, how the object of our values
is to be completely and correctly described), and though scientists can create operational
definitions for use in organizing experiments and clarifying the results, the issue of
defining terms for accurate use in general human life is the domain of philosophy, not
science. Though a scientist can also be a philosopher, and the results of both fields can
be combined and intertwined, the two activities should always be distinguished and never
confused. With that in mind, Roth's statements need to be reformulated: science can only
tell us when an individual human being comes into existence after we have defined
"individual human being," which is primarily a philosophical task; likewise, contrary to
Roth's words (though perhaps not her intent), science can tell us when that being becomes
"a person [who] must be accorded rights" once we have already tackled the philosophical
task of defining "a person [who] must be accorded rights."
Thus, Roth is both right and wrong when she says, "we can't scientifically prove that
anyone is a person." She is right in that defining "person" is a philosophical, not a
scientific task. But she is wrong in part, because once we have defined the term, science
can prove whether someone is a person. In fact, only science can do this with the greatest
success and certainty possible. How science would do it is essentially what I describe in
my opening statement. This brings us back briefly to the question of religion: for if it
were possible to adequately define and then scientifically demonstrate the existence of a
"soul," the question of when or whether a body was "ensouled" would cease to be a
uniquely religious belief and would become a demonstrable matter of fact, open to
scientific investigation, and capable of objective proof.

Theology vs. Physiology

The fact that this can't be done is what makes such discussions of "ensoulment" irrelevant
to proper legal policy debates, since without facts to back up the beliefs, the beliefs fail to
escape the domain of liberty of conscience--in other words, so long as a case cannot be
proven, what one believes in that case is merely a matter of opinion (or, if one wishes to
cloak it in more honorable vocabulary, a matter of "faith"). And mere opinion (much less
religious faith) has no business in decisions concerning the proper use of force to compel
obedience in a democratic society. As to the moral question, there are two results: first,
discussions of ensoulment are irrelevant to the personal moral lives of secularists who, by
being secular, would not regard undemonstrable facts as carrying any great weight in
their moral thought (as Roth acknowledges); second, discussions of ensoulment would be
relevant to the personal moral lives of the those among the religious who give matters of
faith greater weight, but this would only fall within the domain of personal principles, not
of universal moral truth, as I explained in my opening statement.

Since the issue of ensoulment fails to meet the standards of both democratic politics and
universal morality, we must look elsewhere for an objectively demonstrable feature of
personhood. Once we have defined "person" with this need in mind, the task falls to
science to identify when a person exists. Thus, the first question remains: how do we
define a person? The answer lies in an analysis of our relevant values. For once we fully
understand why we care about persons, we will automatically have our definition of
"person." For in such a context, "person" means that which we value as a person. Since
what we value in persons is almost certainly something everyone can see and experience
at least indirectly, and is likely something that exists as part of the constitution of a
human being, and the study of the constitution of human beings is a matter of
physiological investigation, it is not far-fetched to anticipate that physiology could be
where the answer lies.
 Defining a "Person"

This I attempted in my opening statement: we value human minds, which we only know
to exist as the result of (or in conjunction with) "a complex cerebral cortex." For we do
not regard with special value a mere body without a mind--though we can keep a
brainless body alive indefinitely, we do not generally consider this the proper thing to do
(apart from its utility in preserving donated organs for transplant). Roth, instead, follows
what is often proposed as definitive of personhood, and rightly finds fault with it: for "a
being who performs personal acts" (to use Roth's terminology) does not include "the
comatose, infants, and prenates."

But this is an incorrect definition of personhood. First, though we do value especially the
existence of a rational consciousness, we also value other forms of consciousness--it
should not be assumed, for instance, that those who believe abortion is not immoral also
believe that torturing monkeys is not immoral, on the faulty ground that monkeys are not
rational creatures. To the contrary, monkeys are conscious beings, albeit inferior in
certain intellectual respects. In my opening statement I even used the example of a
mouse to make the same point. But we still do not regard monkeys as persons; thus our
value for animals is not the same as our value for persons (though it is a value
nonetheless). It is also true that rational creatures have a greater scale of value and thus
are afforded greater rights--we recognize this implicitly when we confer greater rights on
adults than on children, even children who are quite capable of performing "personal
acts." But this does not entail that killing a twelve-year-old is not immoral. Nor does this
entail that a four-year-old is not a person, for though he is an underdeveloped person he is
considered a person nonetheless. So there must be more to what we really value as a
"person."

Consequently, I did not employ this faulty definition that Roth rightly dismisses herself.
Instead, I used in my opening statement the more general concept of "an individual
human personality" as being what we especially value as a person. It is a matter of
established scientific fact that even newborn babies exhibit, and thus possess, personality
traits--one can see this described in almost any introductory college psychology textbook
(and especially texts on developmental psychology). And it would be incredible if these
traits simply "didn't" exist until the baby left the womb, for we cannot even conceive of a
mechanism that would trigger such a fundamental physiological change under such
simple circumstances (since any significant psychological change corresponds to a
comparable physiological change, as science has generally proven). We know that these
and other personality traits are the product of a complex cerebral cortex, and such a
cortex exists well before a baby is born (as I noted, it is typically in place between the
fifth and sixth month--in other words, at the onset of the third trimester). We thus have
solid, objective grounds to suppose that an individual personality begins to exist from the
sixth month of gestation. In other words, this is when a person exists. And once we
adopt this definition of "person" on philosophical grounds, the scientific evidence needed
to find a person is already available.
This in turn explains why we respect the rights of people in a coma (just as we do people
who are merely sleeping). For it is the existence of a personality that we value, not its
active manifestation. Though it is the prospect of active manifestation that makes a
personality valuable, this prospect still exists for people who are sleeping or in a coma,
for their brains remain intact, storing all the aspects of their memory and personality
which need only be unleashed--thus the personality still exists even in such states. The
one thing we can know, as certain as we know anything, is that a body without a cerebral
cortex cannot and thus does not possess a personality, even of a simple sort. It is
therefore not a person.

Parental Rights

Nevertheless, with many of Ms. Roth's individual points I agree--that is, if her arguments
are subsumed within my analysis above. For instance, though Roth competently refutes
the claim that "even if the prenate is a person, the pregnant woman is not obligated to
allow him the use of her body," her arguments, in my view, only apply to a personality--
which only has a chance of existing after month five of gestation. And to an extent she
already agrees with me, noting that "there is little reason to even discuss whether a
woman has obligations to a non-person." As to exactly when between the fifth month
and birth an actual personality begins to form is currently beyond scientific investigation,
but we have no reason to doubt that it begins very early after, if not at the same time as,
the formation of a complex cerebral cortex. And thus, within that period of gestation, I
agree with Roth, and for anyone who doesn't, her argument is well worth reading.

However, I don't know if Ms. Roth is correct that "current law only requires parents to
provide for their children's needs after birth" [2] But there is no particular reason why
this should have to be true on my theory. As far as I see it, acts which will cause future
injury to a person are just as much crimes as acts which cause immediate injury. Thus,
pregnant mothers who take drugs, or smoke or drink, etc., could justly be in danger of
prosecution if a future person (their baby) is harmed by this--at the very least, they are
certainly acting immorally. But to be exact, such an act would not strictly be immoral or
justifiably illegal until the effect actually happened (i.e. when a person exists, who is in
fact harmed). It is then that such an act would become a crime in fact. To complete the
analogy, the attempt to harm a future person is not a crime unless there is a genuine
intent, and in such a case the intent itself (coupled with action toward the intention) is the
crime--attempted murder is a crime, but "attempted manslaughter" is not. However,
abortion prevents the existence of a person and thus does not fall into this category of
actions--no harm is ever done to any person in such cases, thus even the question of
intent is irrelevant.
 The Creation of Obligation

Ms. Roth is additionally right to note that sex--even when all precautions are taken--
entails risk. And whoever assumes a risk also assumes any obligations that are thus being
risked. This is the basic principle behind all civil law, and I do believe that a woman who
becomes accidentally pregnant should have the right to sue the father for his share of the
expenses in civil court, just as she would if he had damaged her property or caused the
loss of her job--and that share could arguably be greater than half, since she is already
under several burdens that cannot be shared or transferred. The corollary of this is that
the father's voluntarily meeting of these expenses (without the involvement of the law)
would be the moral thing to do.

However, there is no obligation created for the woman to choose to carry the prenate to
term. The extent to which the father's opinion matters depends on cases, since, as far as I
know, this would be a question of oral contract (unless an actual written contract was in
place, an unusual prospect I'm sure). There would be an analogy with intellectual
property law, and this is a matter for an entirely different kind of debate (and not an easy
one at that). But if we assume the father has no rights, neither does the mother have an
obligation, since she cannot have an obligation to a person who does not exist. This
changes in the third trimester.

Removing the Need for Abortion

I also agree with Roth that we ought to seek solutions for the even-more-troublesome
social problems that often motivate abortions: as she puts it best, "pregnancy can mean
social, financial, and professional ruin for a woman," "the sacrifices of raising children
are borne mainly by women," "many women are still uneducated about the way their
bodies work, and many others lack access to safe, affordable contraception." Indeed, if
anyone really wanted to end abortion for personal reasons, they would be most wise to
put every effort into eliminating the need for it, and not try to impose their opinions on
others by force. Yet the pro-life party is rarely even modestly involved in efforts to
eliminate the social problems that motivate women to seek abortions, and for that they
can be justly criticised.

However, I do not agree with the principle that these social problems never create a
mitigating circumstance for abortion even within Roth's point of view. For it is a simple
fact that circumstances can change the conditions under which an act is immoral or even
illegal, and though one can certainly call, even fight, for those circumstances to be
changed, this has nothing to do with what we ought to expect from those who are still in
those circumstances and cannot escape them. Thus, if real, difficult, inescapable
conditions actually exist for a woman, then abortion could even be the moral thing to do.
For instance, a woman already poor and with many children, in a backward,
overpopulated country, would actually be acting for the greater good if she had an
abortion, since the loss of work and money from the pregnancy, and the risk to her health,
not to mention the addition of another mouth to feed, would actually serve to harm her
and her existing children, or put them at serious risk of harm. That women should not
have to endure such decisions is true, but irrelevant. Though Roth paints this as
embodying the view that "violence against certain of our fellow human beings is an
acceptable, even necessary way to solve social problems," the reality is that some acts are
not solutions to social problems, but solutions to immediate problems--killing someone
who is trying to kill you is not a solution to the social problem of violence, but it is
certainly a solution to an immediate problem, and a solution that is generally accepted as
both moral and legal, no matter how regrettable. Thus, accepting abortion does not have
to entail the view that violence is a solution to a social problem. Although the killing of a
person, correctly defined, would still require dire circumstances to be justified, on my
view women do not really face a moral dilemma here, since they can abort a prenate
before it becomes a person.

Conclusions

Ms. Roth and I agree on all the facts, as far as I can see. We only differ on one point of
value, and that difference I suspect is the result not of any real disagreement, but of a
semantic confusion--a logical error in moving from our value for persons to the defining
of the object of that value. My argument is that we do not value mindless bodies. We
value minds. Thus, when we talk about "persons" in the context of such values, we can
only be referring to minds. Since minds do not exist before the sixth month of
pregnancy, as science can effectively demonstrate, it follows that persons do not exist
before then. Since Jen Roth's argument, both legal and moral, hinges on the meaning of
"person," and I believe that I have correctly clarified its meaning, it follows that, if I am
right, she should agree with me that abortion (as I originally defined it in my opening
statement) is not immoral and should not be illegal.

First Rebuttal
Jennifer Roth
In his opening statement, Mr. Carrier identified two sources of disagreement on moral
issues: disputes over facts, and disputes over values. I agree with his assessment;
however, some disputes do not lend themselves to easy categorization. Take, for
example, the question of when a human individual comes into existence. The answer has
both a factual component -- the scientifically observed principles of human development
-- and a values component -- what do we mean by "human individual"?
In this rebuttal, I will focus on the ways in which Mr. Carrier and I disagree over both
facts and values in the question of human individuality. I will also identify several other
areas in which we disagree on the facts or the interpretation thereof.

The Human Individual

My opponent notes that there is nearly universal agreement on the value of respect for
individual human existence, and from that premise he concludes that the dispute over
abortion is solely a dispute about facts. I believe there is one important question of values
that he overlooks, however. That question is "What do we mean by individual human
existence?"

Mr. Carrier defines a human individual as a particular personality. On the other hand, I
hold that the human individual is the organism that develops and exhibits the personality.
Moreover, I hold that the personality cannot meaningfully be considered apart from the
body.

I am not certain what kind of being the "vacant human body" (prior to the development of
the cerebral cortex) could be; if s/he is not considered a human individual. Surely the
body is not waiting for some outside force to inject a soul or a personality. Rather, the
personality results from the interaction between the body and the rest of the world.

The body is the medium through which the mind experiences the world. As such, its
development is integral to the formation of the personality. Genes, intrauterine hormone
levels, maternal disease and use of certain chemicals all have the potential to shape the
development of the brain long before a complex cortex is evident. Therefore, it is not true
that the body is merely an empty shell before the 20th week, passively awaiting the
addition of an individual personality. The body has been directing the development of the
brain all along, according to the instructions encoded in its DNA -- and with modifying
influences from the external environment.

The prenatal human may be currently unable to manifest a particular personality, but s/he
is nonetheless in the process of developing it.

Abortions After 20 Weeks

Mr. Carrier asserts that abortions after the 20th week of gestation are extremely rare, and
done only in the most extreme circumstances. He also points out that they should not
even be called "abortions" because they fall outside of the standard medical definition of
that term. If he wishes to use some other word, I have no objection. However, the fact
remains that there are doctors who do use the term "abortion" to refer to procedures after
20 weeks' gestation in which the intent is to kill the fetus, and such procedures do occur
for reasons other than to save the mother's life.

Dr. Martin Haskell of Dayton, Ohio was the first person to publicize the use of the
controversial "intact dilation and extraction" or "partial-birth abortion" procedure. In an
interview with the American Medical News in 1993, he admitted that about 80% of the
abortions he performed between 20 and 24 weeks were "purely elective" and the rest
were for "genetic reasons" such as Down syndrome or even cleft palate. [1]

In 1996, a reporter for the Bergen [NJ] Record found that 3,000 post-20-week abortions
were done per year at a single New Jersey facility, of which only "a miniscule amount"
were for medical reasons. [2]

Nationwide, the Alan Guttmacher Institute estimates that 1.5 percent of abortions are
done after the 20th week, although they do not have figures on how many are for medical
reasons.

Abortion and Population Control

My opponent argues that legal abortion is necessary to check population growth.

According to his opening statement, "The ability of societies to check population growth
without legalizing abortion has proven nearly non-existent: there are few countries in
which abortion is outlawed or stigmatized that are not suffering harshly from
overcrowding..."

However, correlation does not prove causation. The countries which experience the
fastest population growth are also those in which poverty is widespread, the infant
mortality rate is high, there is little to no social support system for the elderly, and
contraception is either unavailable or not used. These factors also tend to correlate with
high birth rates, and must be taken into account.

Slowing of population growth can be achieved without resort to abortion. In the United
States, the decline in population growth was well under way by the time abortion was
legalized nationwide in 1973. [3]

Finally, the fact that a practice helps keep population growth in check is an insufficient
reason to condone it. Historically, the primary factors keeping the population in check
included war, disease, and famine. While I agree that population and consumption are
important issues, we can and should find non-destructive means of curbing them.

Abortion as a Benefit to Women

In closing, I wish to make two quick points about the assertion that abortion is beneficial
to women. First of all, if the morbidity/mortality rates for abortion in general are in fact
lower than the rates for carrying to term in general (accurate statistics on abortion are
always hard to pin down), it still does not follow that abortion is safer than carrying to
term for any given woman. In any event, most women do not have abortions due to
medical indications. Second, I believe that Mr. Carrier was unduly dismissive when he
wrote about actions that might be taken to alleviate the social and economic harm that
can befall a pregnant woman. Of course, it will not be easy to build mother-friendly
schools and jobs, improve adoption procedures, crack down on fathers who abandon their
partners and children, and provide health care and public assistance when necessary. But
once again, I argue that we have the ability, and therefore the responsibility, to seek non-
violent solutions to the problems faced by pregnant women. I cannot stress this point
enough: we need not accept the inevitability of abortion, just as we need not accept the
inevitability of injustice toward women. To do so would be to admit that we are incapable
of doing better.

B. Are There Limited Social Benefits from Abortion?

Ms. Roth responds to my argument that "legal abortion is necessary to check population
growth" (though I actually never used the word 'necessary') because "there are few
countries in which abortion is outlawed or stigmatized that are not suffering harshly from
overcrowding" with the argument that "correlation does not prove causation." But it can
imply it, when many of the variables are shared except the variable being tested and still
a difference in effect is observed. Why, for instance, is China able to curb growth, but
Iran is not? The answer is neither simple nor certain, and I did not hinge my argument on
this point since it cannot be conclusively demonstrated. But we cannot exclude
availability of abortion (and abortifacient birth control technologies) as a factor.
Companies are now laboring to produce once-a-month pills which effectively force
menstruation even after fertilization, thus forcing an early abortion, with little or no side
effects beyond those attending natural and early miscarriage. If successful, this would
put on the market a cheap, safe, highly effective form of birth control that works entirely
by inducing abortion, yet it will be impossible to claim that this would provide no
benefits to society and to individuals. Certainly the research should proceed.

Even in the United States, I am not convinced that slowing of population growth can be
achieved without some allowance of abortion, even if it could be achieved with less.
Roth claims that "In the United States, the decline in population growth was well under
way by the time abortion was legalized nationwide in 1973," but she fails to realize,
apparently, that it was already legal in one form or another in many states after 1960, and
indeed in most states before 1973, with Roe v. Wade merely ending the last vestiges of
what amounted to already-unpopular abortion laws in this country.[13] Indeed, abortion
was still performed even when and where it was illegal, and advances in medical
technology in the mid-50's made this more possible than ever before. But doctors were
effectively given carte blanche to perform abortions, since they could contrive the
excuses allowed by the new laws, in California in 1961, and the American Law Institute's
highly influential Model Penal Code was ratified in 1962 with the same leeway toward
legalizing abortion, and this persuaded other states to follow--not surprising, considering
that 50% of the populace was already in favor of loosening the restrictions, and this
sentiment continued to rise.[14] By 1967, abortion was also effectively legal in Colorado
and North Carolina, and the ACLU set out to defend a woman's right to elective abortion
in courts everywhere. By 1969, effective legalization had expanded to ten states, and
then Missouri joined them, while the remaining barriers were struck down in California
by the State Supreme Court. New York completely legalized abortion in 1970, setting
the final trend, and abortion laws started falling in Federal judgments across the country--
by then, abortion was already almost universally practiced quasi-legally, and it was this
fact that led to the Roe v. Wade case in the first place, which was filed in 1971.

Keeping this in mind, we observe a near halving of the United States population growth
rate at precisely the time that abortion started becoming more widely available in the
1960's [15]. And Roth's own citation of census data confirms this: before 1960 (and
excluding the duration of the Great Depression and WWII) the average rate of net growth
was in the vicinity of 1.7% annually, and this drops steadily every year thereafter until
leveling off at an average of 1% or less after 1967. No doubt this was also due to a
corresponding rise in the availability and use of effective birth control chemicals, but
since birth control began to be legalized and disseminated widely even before this period,
we cannot be sure that abortion was not a helpful break on population growth. More
importantly, since the Pill (introduced in 1960) and other chemical birth control
technologies cause an unknown and unpredictable number of abortions, the rise of
chemical birth control is itself a rise in reliance on induced abortion that cannot be
ignored. And this was even more so in the later 1960's, when a major form of birth
control was the IUD, a device that only works by forcing a conceptus to abort.

Finally, when we consider Center for Disease Control data [16], we find that in the U.S.
in 1997 there were 305 abortions induced for every 1000 live births. That means that if
abortion were banned or ceased, the birth rate in this country could have risen as much as
30% that year, with up to 1305 live births in place of every actual 1000. Our population
would have grown that much faster. If we run the numbers a different way, using the
census data cited just above,[ibid.] there were approximately 268 million people in 1997,
rising during that year by 2.6 million, for a 0.96% rate of growth. If even 80% of the
1.18 million abortions of that year were carried to term, the population of the U.S. would
have risen by 3.5 million, for a 1.3% growth rate, a level unseen since 1971, and never
typical of any year after 1965. In other words, our low growth rate would soar back to
pre-1965 levels, an era without widespread abortion. Since it was in the mid-sixties that
abortion became progressively legal, and birth control education and technologies are
now more available than ever before, this provides some albeit imperfect confirmation of
the claim that abortion is beneficial in restricting population growth even in this
prosperous country.

Whatever the case, I will admit that this is not a question that has been answered with
adequate studies to my knowledge, and thus my impression of things can certainly be
wrong. That is why this fact does not play any large part in my argument, which still
stands even if abortion is not necessary. For abortion (by any means--clinical, chemical,
or via the use of pills, injections, implants, or IUD's) is certainly still helpful in
controlling growth, even if as a supplementary procedure available when all else fails,
and thus it provides a limited social good, which was my only point in bringing up this
role of abortion in the first place. I already agreed that limited social benefits can be
outweighed by substantial harm, so this particular argument of mine only stands, and was
only meant to stand, if abortion is not harmful. Thus, I quite agree that "we can and
should find non-destructive means of curbing" population growth--it was only my
contention that abortion is not destructive. In this respect Roth may have misunderstood
my point.

Finally, I think Ms. Roth may be overlooking a major internal problem with her position
here: she did not address the abortifacient role of birth control technologies in her first
rebuttal. So I will reiterate: if Ms. Roth is correct, then the Pill, Norplant, IUD's, and
hormone injections, as well as native contraception remedies (such as pomegranate), are
immoral and ought to be illegal. But if we deprive the earth not only of clinical abortion,
but of virtually every single birth control technology that exists apart from the condom, it
is not at all clear how we are to prevent a disastrous population explosion, much less
maintain the current rate of growth, which is already too high.

C. Are There Limited Individual Benefits of Abortion?

Ms. Roth claims that "if the morbidity/mortality rates for abortion in general are in fact
lower than the rates for carrying to term in general...it still does not follow that abortion is
safer than carrying to term for any given woman." Although perhaps it is true that
"accurate statistics on abortion are always hard to pin down," I do not understand what
she means here. Is abortion a greater, lesser, or equal risk to a woman's health? That is a
straightforward question. And I would be seriously surprised if abortion were not
significantly less a risk, considering that it is an outpatient procedure that, unlike giving
birth, never calls for a large emergency staff or the readiness of a large quantity of life-
saving equipment, never requires surgical lesions in the mother--unlike C-section, which
is a real and unpredictable risk for every pregnant woman in labor, and very often even
ordinary births require cutting the birth canal, as many a mother will attest--and abortion
can very often be accomplished chemically (and this will be the case more and more
frequently), even without directly consulting a doctor: for ordinary birth control pills,
injections, IUD's and implants all cause abortions on occasion without the mother ever
knowing it, and a woman who wants to try to ensure this can, within three days after
intercourse, take a double or triple dose of birth control pills, without anyone else being
involved.

In contrast, among other dangers associated with pregnancy, which persist for nine
months (ordinary abortion, as I originally defined it, consumes a mere matter of minutes),
pregnancy can cause permanent damage to a woman's back, knees and feet, as well as
some of her bodily organs (such as her kidneys), and puts a woman at risk for a number
of disorders, including various forms of malnutrition--unless she is well fed, and well
cared for by a competent physician throughout the term, and is allowed a significant
amount of freedom from work (including housework and childcare), luxuries a great
many women in the world now cannot afford no matter how much they ought to have
them. The bottom line is that pregnancy and labor clearly entail numerous health risks
that are avoided by abortion, and I really doubt that any risks involved in abortion equal
or exceed them. Certainly, the burden is on Roth to prove otherwise. And that will be
difficult, since at least one Federal court has found on my side in this issue:
Abortion is one of the safest surgical procedures in terms of mortality and
morbidity, and it is much safer than continuing the pregnancy through childbirth.
In the first trimester of pregnancy, when most abortions are performed, a woman
is twenty times more likely to die from continuing the pregnancy through
childbirth than from a first-trimester abortion. At any stage of pregnancy, a
woman is ten times more likely to die from continuing the pregnancy through
childbirth than from an abortion. [17]

D. The Limited Benefits of Abortion Stand

It was never my contention that women "have abortions due to medical indications," but
rather that by avoiding pregnancy and labor they were, knowingly or not, doing better for
their own health, and trading a greater risk for a lesser one. Nor have I argued that we
should not try to improve women's lives, "to build mother-friendly schools and jobs,
improve adoption procedures, crack down on fathers who abandon their partners and
children, and provide health care and public assistance when necessary," and so on. I
agree with all of that, for reasons far more significant than anything to do with abortion.
But this is a goal, a mission, not a reality. Women do not universally enjoy those things
now, therefore stop-gap measures must be implemented. And indeed, even when all
women do have all these things (if ever that happens), it still will not follow that abortion
will be unneeded. Only when all abortifacient birth control technologies, from the Pill to
Norplant to IUD's, are obsolete, and replaced with 100% effective non-abortifacient
pregnancy-prevention technologies, which are cheap and universally available, will
elective abortion itself become obsolete. Then, it will simply become a rare if not
forgotten medical procedure, and there will no longer be much point in discussing its
morality or legality. Sure, it would be great to have that technology now, but we don't.

In the end, I see no merit in the thesis that to admit abortion is needed in the here and
now "would be to admit that we are incapable of doing better." This is a non sequitur.
We need donor transplant surgery in the here and now, as no one will deny. Yet this does
not entail that we "admit we are incapable" of developing the ability to grow cloned
organs instead, or to cultivate any other superior solution. We can do both: employ what
is necessary while working to provide something better. And as I have made abundantly
clear, even this is too strong a dichotomy. For it is not my argument that abortion is
necessary so much as that it is useful, and until we develop the utopian birth control
device I described above, abortion in one form or another will always be useful--for there
will always be a benefit to be gained, socially or for the individual, by having safe and
available abortion technologies or procedures, and that benefit will remain even if (or
when) abortion is unnecessary.

And I will now add to the reality of this risk differential and population-control benefit,
the fact that even from a mere quality-of-life perspective, a pregnancy entails a great deal
of discomfort: daily vomiting, fatigue, soreness and nausia, confusion and depression,
unhealthful weight gain, not to mention the rather extreme discomfort of labor--and that
is just the short list. Abortion by contrast is significantly less trying, being vastly shorter
in duration and having almost none of the attendant problems of pregnancy, even for a
moment. Thus, even if they were equally risky--and they aren't--a woman's happiness is
advanced by abortion if she does not want to have a child. Thus, so long as abortion does
no harm, it clearly provides yet another limited individual benefit in this sense, in
addition to the other two I have already argued. So the question is not whether abortion
provides some limited benefits. That is irrefutable. The question is whether abortion
causes significant harm--harm that is significant enough to outweigh these benefits.

II. Disputed Values

The differences that remain seem to be primarily confusions of language and meaning,
for it does not appear that there are any other disputes about the facts. It is possible that
one point of contention is the nature of what humans actually value, but I am still not sure
that is really the case. All I can do is try to clarify where the linguistic confusions in my
opinion lie, and to see what results.

A. Actual vs. Potential

Ms. Roth says "it is not true that the body is merely an empty shell before the 20th week,
passively awaiting the addition of an individual personality" since it "has been directing
the development of the brain all along, according to the instructions encoded in its DNA
-- and with modifying influences from the external environment." I don't see how the one
follows from the other. The fact that my garden is passively awaiting the addition of a
tree is not negated by the fact that there is a germinating tree seed in its soil. Just because
there is a DNA code and an active chemical process working as I speak to generate a tree
in my garden does not mean my garden has a tree in it. At the very least, a tree does not
exist until there is a visible sprout, and if I were to be especially particular, until there is
bark (especially if by "tree" I mean something I can cut down). Things don't exist until
they exist--even when they are in the process of being built. A human personality is the
existence of a certain level and kind of complexity in the organization of matter, and until
that complexity actually exists, a personality does not exist.

The reason we bother making distinctions between trees and seeds, and between
blueprints & bricks and actual buildings, and between prenates and persons, is that things
change fundamentally in various stages of complexity and organization, and we place
different value on things accordingly. Thus, Roth says "the prenatal human may be
currently unable to manifest a particular personality, but s/he is nonetheless in the process
of developing it," yet I am saying that the prenate does not even have a particular
personality. That is not the same thing as saying that a prenate cannot "manifest" a
personality--for if it has no personality to manifest, the whole question is moot. And we
cannot appeal to mere genetic personality traits as being the issue, for these are shared by
twins and yet twins are individuals. What makes twins distinct from each other is the
influence of environment upon their personalities, and this means they must actually
have personalities before they can become individuals. The question is thus when an
entity has an actual personality that has actually been individualized by environmental
effects--the only time when an "individual" can really exist--and though there is good
reason to think this occurs before birth (and without question at birth), I do not see any
good reason to think that this can occur before the fifth month of gestation.

B. What We Actually Value

What remains unclear to me is whether Roth means to say that we really value (or ought
to value) potential persons just as much as actual ones. If this is the point of debate--if
Roth means to say that it is immoral and should be illegal to stop a person from coming
into existence--then Ms. Roth must argue for the adoption or acceptance of a value for
not-yet-but-on-the-way persons. I do not believe such a value even potentially exists
universally. On what ground would we give a genome or a cell the right to be
developed? And is it the act of killing the conceptus, or actually not letting it develop,
that is supposed to be wrong? After all, what if a woman who conceives has her embryo
removed alive and frozen for later use, but then never uses it? Would the state compel
her to use the embryo before it approached its expiration date? Could she let it lapse
without being called a murderer? And when we have the technology to regenerate the
brains of the dead, even though the new brains will merely be clones--possessing the
minds of entirely new people, and not the actual people who died--will we be morally
obligated to regenerate them? Will death itself become effectively illegal? After all, a
body without a brain is still a potential person, simply awaiting our nurturing to develop
anew. And we cannot say that a fetus is different simply because nature is already
developing it--for, on the one hand, nature is not a person to whom we owe any special
obligations, and on the other hand, we are normally obligated to ignore nature and
attempt to revive the dead (such as through the use of CPR) when we are able. These and
many similar questions plague my mind and make me very curious just what someone
like Ms. Roth really means to advocate.

As far as it seems to me, we value actual persons, not potential ones, and have no reason
to value the latter in any way that relates to the issue of abortion. But I could be proved
wrong if it can be shown that most humans actually value potential persons as much as
actual persons, or:

1. Most humans share any value(s),

which,

2. in combination with the facts of this universe,

3. entails that we value potential persons

4. enough to regard them as in some sense deserving of the rights accorded to actual
persons.
I await the demonstration.

III. Conclusions
This debate has expanded into both sides of a moral argument, into a dispute about
certain facts, and a dispute about certain values. However, the facts I presented originally
about the act of abortion itself have not been challenged, and her belief that abortion is
harmful seems to be based on exactly the same understanding of the facts, and therefore
ours must be a difference of value. Instead, Roth has only criticised, and not very
successfully, my claim that abortion has limited benefits. But that is secondary to the
question of whether abortion is harmful, which surely it must be in order to be immoral.
Even if abortion provided no benefits, that would not make it immoral. All Ms. Roth has
claimed is, effectively, that stopping the development of potential persons is a harm. But
this would only be true if someone were actually being harmed by the act (and it is
unclear to me who that would be), or if humans generally held potential humans in such
value that humankind would be harmed by anyone acting contrary to this value. Neither
has been demonstrated.

Consequently, this may come to a difference of fundamental values, where Roth simply
has values that I and many other humans do not. If that is the case, then she is not
defending a universal moral truth, but merely explaining the basis of her own personal
principles. If so, then it remains the case that abortion is not immoral (in any universal
sense), and I would respect Roth's personal view as a way to conduct her own life: not
only for how she handles her own pregnancies--i.e. not using chemical birth control, not
having abortions, etc.--but also for how she acts to help others, by not supporting
abortion or chemical birth control directly, while instead working to make them obsolete.
But I would not respect this as a measure by which to judge others, nor would I approve
of any efforts to impose her personal principles on others by law. I believe that laws
should not take away freedoms where no obvious harm is being done. In fact, Roth has
presented no arguments that would justify outlawing abortion. I repeat my original
conclusion, with the multiple addition of one clarifying word: "there appears no way in
which outlawing abortion would even indirectly preserve or protect the liberty of any
actual individual, or provide any general benefit to the citizen body without uneccessarily
depriving actual individuals of their liberty."

Is abortion a benefit, limited or otherwise?

Mr. Carrier seemed confused by my assertion that "if the morbidity/mortality rates for
abortion in general are in fact lower than the rates for carrying to term in general...it still
does not follow that abortion is safer than carrying to term for any given woman." My
point is that some women, depending upon the state of their health, are at higher risk of
dying in childbirth than others. It does not follow that for any given woman, especially a
healthy one, abortion is safer than carrying to term. It certainly does not follow that
having an abortion is the best way (or even a good way) to avoid the potential risks of
carrying to term and giving birth. For most women, having an abortion for that reason
would be like removing a healthy breast to guard against the possibility of future breast
cancer. But then, my opponent correctly points out that women aren't generally aborting
for that reason.

I do agree that if abortion is necessary due to an imminent threat to the mother (such as
ectopic pregnancy), then it is beneficial for that woman. I also have no ethical qualms
about abortion in such circumstances. However, most women do not abort for health
reasons, but for social and economic ones.

Obviously, if the prenate is a person, then the limited good for a woman who is aborting
for non-medical reasons is outweighed by the lethal harm done to the prenate in an
abortion. Since I argue that s/he is a person, I haven't spent much time on refuting the
idea that elective abortion is of benefit to women. But even if s/he is not, I think that most
abortions are considered the "lesser of two evils", not a "limited good".

Abortion can't be compared to not having the technology to heal a disease. It's essentially
a social problem, the demand for which could be virtually eliminated not by some as-yet-
undiscovered technology (although improved contraception would help) but by an
exercise of individual, social and political will. The three most frequently cited reasons
for abortion are:

1. having a baby would interfere with work, school or other responsibilities

2. cannot afford a child
3. not wishing to be a single parent; or problems with husband/partner [4]

These are not incurable diseases or inevitable forces of nature. They are the result of
decisions by individuals and society.

If a mugger threatens to kill me, but instead lets me choose to just get beaten over the
head and have my wallet stolen, I would be hard-pressed to consider battery and robbery
as "limited goods". Similarly, I do not consider abortion beneficial to those women who
feel that their circumstances make it impossible to choose life.

To summarize, I contend that the important traits which define personhood are inherent in
the human individual, therefore a human should be considered a person with rights from
the moment s/he begins to exist as an individual. Mr. Carrier seems to agree with the
latter, but argues that the individual comes into existence at about 20 weeks' gestation,
when the nervous system is sufficiently developed for a personality to emerge. He claims
that, in essence, the personality is the individual.

The fundamental problem with that argument is that the personality is a property of the
body, not an entity unto itself. The personality stems from the workings of a physical
brain, and is shaped by sensory inputs from physical nervous system. The body precedes
the personality and is necessary for its formation and continued existence. Therefore, the
emergence of the personality in the fifth month is not the beginning of an individual, but
rather an event in the development of an already-existing physical organism.
For the reasons outlined above, I assert that the atheist can consistently hold a belief that
the embryo or fetus is a person whose rights we are bound to respect.

Parental Responsibility

I won't spend much time on this topic, not because it is unimportant (far from it), but
because Mr. Carrier and I essentially agree.

Abortion advocates often claim that even if the prenate is a person, his/her rights conflict
with the mother's and hers must take priority. However, I argue that in most situations,
this is not the case.

People have a right to keep their property, a right which is protected by laws against theft.
However, this right is not without qualification. For example, if someone has a rightful
claim against my money (perhaps because I borrowed from them or wrecked their car),
then my rights are not violated if the courts compel me to hand it over.

I assert that parents owe their children support, by virtue of having created the children
and their needs. Since every human being needs to live in the womb for approximately
forty weeks at the beginning of life, that can be considered a basic necessity. I therefore
conclude that in the typical case, the prenate has a rightful claim against the mother for
being allowed to remain living in the womb. There is no conflict of rights, though there
may be a conflict of interests. (Even that is questionable -- see below.)

There are, however, a few cases in which this reasoning may not apply. If a woman
becomes pregnant as the result of sexual assault, then she has not caused the child's
existence or dependency. While the child has a right to life (assumed in this section for
the sake of argument), s/he does not have a specific claim against the mother for support
of that life. Therefore, one could argue that a woman who is pregnant due to rape does
not owe the child the use of her body, but rather that she may choose either to give or to
withhold support. This atypical case is truly an example in which the right of the mother
to bodily autonomy conflicts with the right of the prenate to life. Whichever side one
takes in this conflict, this is an ethical question and need not be a religious one.

Pro-life Feminism

Even the common assumption that the child's right to life conflicts with the mother's
interests (rather than her rights) is very often false. If a woman is contemplating abortion
because she's too poor to raise a child, then she'll still be poor after having an abortion.
Both parties' interests are served by ensuring that she has access to affordable housing,
education, health care, and whatever other assistance she needs to give life to her child
and improve her own life.

One slogan of the pro-life movement is, "Eliminate the crisis, not the child." A crisis
pregnancy is usually a crisis not because of the child per se, but because of financial
worries and lack of support from family and friends. Abortion does not make schools and
workplaces more responsive to mothers' needs; it does not build supportive relationships.
It erases the child from the situation, but the unhealthy situation remains. It is a
destructive and short-term fix, rather than a constructive and far-sighted one.

Pro-life feminists seek to uphold the rights of both women and children; we don't believe
a woman should have to choose between her child and her future. We want a humane
welfare system which does not encourage dependence, but which enables poor women to
raise their children with dignity. We want family leave, universal health care, and strict
child support enforcement. We want to end discrimination against mothers in
employment and education. We want to end sexual assault. We want to empower women
to choose healthy sexual relationships. We want girls to grow up knowing that their
worth doesn't depend on the ability to get a man.

This is the future that all of us can and should strive for. And when people accept the
claim that "women will always need abortions", this is the future whose possibility they
implicitly deny. I hope that my fellow atheists, whatever their views on the ethics or
legality of abortion, will join with us in creating a world where no woman feels she needs
one.