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LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
OF THE ARMIES
In Two Volumes
Volume II: September 1944-May 1945
by
Roland G. Ruppenthal
Advisory Committee
(As of 30 May 1958)
Elmer Ellis Brig. Gen. John B. Sullivan
University of Missouri U.S. Continental Army Command
Samuel Flagg Bemis Brig. Gen. Edgar C. Doleman
Yale University Army War College
Gordon A. Craig Brig. Gen. Frederick R. Zierath
Princeton University Command and General Staff College
Oron J. Hale Brig. Gen. Kenneth F. Zitzman
University of Virginia Industrial College of the Armed Forces
W. Stull Holt Col. Vincent J. Esposito
University of Washington United States Military Academy
T. .Harry Williams
Louisiana State University
iii
... to Those Who Served
Foreword
This volume completes the bridge between combat and services in the
European theater for which the author laid the foundations in Volume I.
It is as important a book for combat commanders as for those who have to
plan and execute logistical operations. It will leave the nonmilitary reader
in no doubt of the enormous weight and complexity of the administrative
burden that the Army had to assume to assure the success of its ground and
air forces, and the resourcefulness with which it managed that burden.
On the other hand, those who have to think about the future can here
study a test of the principle of a single service of supply supporting the
national element of allied forces under a coalition headquarters and a
supreme allied commander.
R. W. STEPHENS
Washington, D.C. Maj. Gen., U.S.A.
15June 1958 Chief of Military History
vii
Preface
This volume completes the story of the logistic support of U.S. forces
in the European theater, carrying the account forward from mid-September
1944 to the end of hostilities in May 1945. It follows the pattern, established
in Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I , of focusing on the influence
which logistical support or lack of it had on the planning and the conduct
of tactical operations. T h e inclination consequently has been to concen-
trate on the problem areas in logistic support, such as port discharge and
transportation difficulties, and supply and manpower shortages. As explained
in the Preface to Volume I, it was not intended to cover all aspects of
logistics as the term is commonly defined. To avoid duplication, such sub-
jects as hospitalization and evacuation, communications, and construction
are purposely left to the technical service histories, where they can be given
proper coverage. T h e one major exception is the account of the rebuilding
of Cherbourg, which was so important to the development of the logistic
structure in the summer and early fall of 1944 that it is presented as a case
history in planning and execution. A substantial amount of space has been
given to the discussion of theater command and organization because of
the persistent influence which that problem had on logistic support and on
the relations between the service and combat elements. In general, the
topical treatment predominates, but within the boundaries of the two dis-
tinct periods of tactical developments. One major violation of chronology
occurs in the treatment of local procurement (Chapter XVIII), which did
not lend itself to division.
T h e author’s work was again lightened by the use of preliminary studies
prepared by members of the Historical Section, ETO. For Volume II these
were: Robert W. Coakley’s two-volume study of theater command and
organization; John E. Henderson’s study of the replacement problem; and
George H. Elliott’s study of the use of indigenous manpower. Once again
Mr. Royce L. Thompson gave invaluable aid in running down records and
in researching several thorny problems.
ROLAND G. RUPPENTHAL
Washington, D. C .
15 June 1958
X
Contents
T H E TYRANNY OF LOGISTICS,
SEPTEMBER 1944–FEBRUARY 1945
Chapter Page
I. LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS AS T H E ARBITER OF TAC-
TICAL PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(1) The Pursuit's Effect on Logistic Plans . . . . . . . 3
(2) Competing Tactical Plans . . . . . . . .
. . 8
( 3 ) The September Decisions . . . . . . . . . . 11
(4) Prospects at the End of September . . . . . .
. . 17
II. TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS . 22
(1) Tactical Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
(2) Organization and Command . . . . . . . . . 26
xi
Chapter Page
VII. SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: RATIONS, POL, AND COAL . 188
(1) Rations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
(2) POL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
(3) Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
xii
Chapter Page
XIV . MOVEMENTS AND DISTRIBUTION: PORT DISCHARGE
AND CLEARANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
(1) Planning and Controlling Movements . . . . . . . 390
(2) Discharge and Clearance . . . . . . . . . . . 393
(3) Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
(4) BOLERO in Reverse . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
XV . MOVEMENTS AND DISTRIBUTION: TRANSPORTATION
AND FORWARD DELIVERIES . . . . . . . . . 405
(1) T h e Railways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
(2) Motor Transport–XYZ . . . . . . . . . . . 415
(3) Inland Waterways . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
(4) Air Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
(5) Forward Deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
XVI . SUPPLY IN THE LAST MONTHS . .. . . . . . . 433
(1) Rations. POL. and Coal . . . .. . . . . . . 433
(2) Ammunition . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 441
(3) Equipment . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 452
XVII . END OF THE REPLACEMENT PROBLEM . . . . . . 459
(1) T h e Turning Point . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
(2) Withdrawals Are Stopped . . . . . . . . . . 461
(3) Results of the Retraining Program . . . . . . . . 467
XVIII . LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON THE CONTINENT. JUNE
1944-AUGUST 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
(1) Purpose and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
(2) The Use of Nonmilitary Labor . . . . . . . . . 475
(3) Local Procurement of Supplies . . . . . . . . . 486
XIX . RETROSPECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503
GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523
xiii
Tables
No. Page
1. Beach Discharges, 1 July-17 November 1944 . . . . . . . . 57
2. Discharge Performance of Normandy's Minor Ports . . . . . . 62
3. Discharge Performance of the Brittany Ports . . . . . . . . 95
4. Tonnages Discharged at Continental Ports, June 1944-April 1945 . . 124
5. Artillery Ammunition Expenditures, 15-21 October 1944 . . . . 256
6. 12th Army Group Artillery Ammunition Expenditures, 6 June-22 Oc-
tober 1944, Compared With Day of Supply Rates . . . . . . 267
7. OVERLORD Divisional Build-up, D plus go to D plus 210 . . . . . 281
8. Divisional Build-up in the European Theater, 1942-1945 . , . . 282
9. Theater Strength by Major Component, May 1944-April 1945 . . . 288
10. Battle and Nonbattle Casualties, June 1944-May 1945 . . . . * 317
11. Combat Zone Maintenance Factors, June-October 1944 . . . . 430
12. Combat Zone Consumption Experience, 23 March-25 April 1945 . . 432
13. Ammunition Day of Supply by Type: Selected Planned Rates, Sep-
tember 1944-April 1945, and Actual Expenditures, June 1944-Feb-
ruary 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * 446
14. Civilians Employed in the Communications Zone in Selected Weeks,
1944-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * 477
Maps
1. Tactical Progress, 1 2 September 1944-9 February 1945 . . . .
2. E T 0 Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. COMZ Boundaries, November 1944-January 1945 . . . . . .
4. T h e Port of Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Highway Express Routes, September 1944-February 1945 . . . .
6. Tactical Developments, 8 February-8 May 1945 . . . . . . .
7. COMZ Boundaries, April 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Movement Program, March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . .
9. Railways in Use by U.S. Forces East of Paris . . . . . . . .
10. XYZ Truck Routes, 25 March-8 May 1945 . . . . . . . .
11. T h e POL Pipeline Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xiv
Illustrations
Page
Maj. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Brig. Gen. John P. Ratay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Troops Debarking Onto a Causeway . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Bulldozer Stuck in the Thick Mud . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
T h e Port of Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Destruction at Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Marginal Wharf Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Laying Railway Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Seatrain Unloading a Gondola . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
LST’s Discharging Cargo on the Beach . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Crane Lifting a Lock Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Dukws Transferring Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Quay at Rouen Loaded With Incoming Supplies . . . . . . . . 103
Ships Discharging Cargo for Clearance by Rail . . . . . . . . 112
Remains of Decanting Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Searching for Casualties in Wreckage . . . . . . . . . . . 117
General Destruction at Marseille . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Close-up of Damaged Dock Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Trucks Loaded With Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Red Ball Express Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Truck-Tractor and Semitrailer Stuck in Thick Mud . . . . . . . 142
Loaded 10-Ton Semitrailers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Truck Tractors, 5-Ton, Hauling 10-Ton Semitrailers . . . . . . . 145
Four 750-Gallon Skid Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
American Locomotive Lowered by Crane . . . . . . . . . . 152
Maj. Gen. Frank S. Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Convoy of Trucks Carrying Essential Supplies . . . . . . . . . 159
C–47’s Airdropping Supplies by Parachute . . . . . . . . . . 164
Barge Convoy on Albert Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Supply Trucks Passing Through Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . 185
Portion of the Major Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Camouflaged Pumping Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
POL Storage Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Thousands of Jerricans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Sign Appealing for the Return of Jerricans . . . . . . . . . 206
U.S. First Army’s POL Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
General Dwight D. Eisenhower . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Serving a Hot Meal to Cold Infantrymen . . . . . . . . . . 224
xv
Page
Parsons Jacket 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Infantryman Wearing a Field Jacket M1943 . . . . . . . . . 231
Medium Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Street Fighting in Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
“And me a Clerk-Typist!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Officer Candidate Class, Fontainebleau . . . . . . . . . . . 332
Orientation Lecture for Enlisted Men . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Infantry Replacements Checking Equipment . . . . . . . . . 341
Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Ludendorff Railway Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
Stacks of War Matériel in Open Storage . . . . . . . . . . 397
Toot Sweet Express Ready To Leave Cherbourg ........ 406
Bridge Across the Rhine at Wesel . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
Single-Track Railroad Bridge at Mainz . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Truck-Tractor and 40-Ton Tank Transporters . . . . . . . . 417
Highway Bridge Over the Meuse River . . . . . . . . . . 423
C–47 Transport Planes Bringing in POL . . . . . . . . . . 439
Pershing Tanks M26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
M24 Light Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
French Civilians Employed by U.S. Forces . . . . . . . . . . 480
Italian Service Unit Men Loading Cases of Rations . . . . . . . 483
German Prisoners of War Filling 50-Gallon Oil Drums . . . . . . 487
Renault Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
Belgian Workers in a Rubber Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
Soldiers Equipping Medium Tank Tracks . . . . . . . . . . 493
First Division Troops Wearing Winter Camouflage Garments . . . . 495
xvi
THE TYRANNY OF LOGISTICS,
SEPTEMBER 1944–FEBRUARY 1945
CHAPTER I
it appropriate to consider the larger ques- vided only that the ports were captured
tion of the reasons why the Communica- on the dates forecast, and then only by
tions Zone was unable to meet the de- the narrowest margin. In fact, deficits in
mands placed upon it, and to consider port discharge capacity were predicted
the purely logistic aspects of the various beginning in the fifth month (October).
operational plans for which the field They admitted that there were certain
commands now claimed priority. hidden assets, such as supply by air and
The reasons for the so-called “supply other possible expedients. But there was
failure” become apparent enough when also the possibility of additional liabili-
one recalls the invasion plan and com- ties. Any material variation in logistical
pares the expected with the actual course planning factors, such as a higher rate
of the operation. The predicted develop- of demolitions, or tonnage requirements
ment of the OVERLORD operation was larger than estimated, would impinge
based on both tactical and logistical con- directly on the rate of build-up and capa-
siderations. On its operational side the bility of support. By the same token any
plan was predicated on an estimate that unexpected acceleration in the advance
the enemy would make successive stands would have a like effect in creating addi-
on the major water barriers across France tional port discharge and transportation
and Belgium. In accord with this assump- liabilities. 1
tion it was expected that he would make Since the OVERLORD operation devel-
a stand at the Seine and that that line oped quite differently from what had
would not be reached until D plus go. been expected, the assumptions on which
Furthermore, plans had contemplated a the schedules had been based were largely
fairly steady rate of advance rather than voided. For the first seven weeks the
the pursuit of a disorganized enemy. advance was much slower than antici-
While such a forecast of progress was pated, and the Allied forces were con-
admittedly conjectural, it necessarily fined to a shallow Normandy bridgehead.
formed the basis of logistic preparations. From the viewpoint of logistic support,
In the belief, for example, that the Seine the lag in operations was not immediately
ports would not quickly become avail- serious, for it resulted in short lines of
able, great emphasis was placed on the communication and gave the service
development of the Brittany area, and forces added time to develop the port
a pause of at least a month at the Seine facilities at Cherbourg, whose capture
was expected to be necessary to develop had been delayed. But the long restric-
an administrative base capable of sup- tion to this area promised serious con-
porting further offensives. sequences for the future, for the port
Even on these assumptions the margin capacity of Cherbourg and the beaches
of safety of the OVERLORD logistic plan severely limited the force which could
was believed to be nonexistent. In an be maintained during the fall and winter
administrative appreciation prepared months.
early in June, SHAEF planners had con- Whatever temporary advantage ac-
cluded that port capacity would suffice 1 Adm Appreciation, SHAEF G–4 Post-NEPTUNE
to support the planned build-up pro- Opns, 17 Jun 44, SHAEF, 12 A Gp 370.2.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 5
crued from the short lines of communi- in the period before the breakout, and in
cation and low maintenance scales in the subsequent period could not be de-
Normandy quickly disappeared after the veloped at the speed with which tanks
breakout at the end of July. By D plus 79 and other combat vehicles were able to
(24 August) Allied forces had closed to race to the Seine. T h e result was that the
the Seine eleven days ahead of schedule armies had already used up their opera-
despite a lag of approximately thirty tional reserves by the time they reached
days at the beginning of the breakout. the Seine. Since rail lines and pipelines
Tactically, and to some extent logistically, could not be pushed forward quickly
the spectacular encircling drive of early enough, motor transport facilities were
August brought definite advantages to strained to the breaking point attempt-
the Allied forces. It resulted in the al- ing to meet even the barest maintenance
most complete destruction of the German needs of the armies. T h e Communica-
Seventh Army and thus eliminated a tions Zone consequently found it impos-
large enemy force which later might sible to establish stocks in advance de-
have delayed the Allied advance to the pots. Furthermore, none of the Brittany
Seine; it greatly accelerated the whole ports had as yet been captured, and only
campaign and helped ensure a rapid ad- one major port–Cherbourg–was opera-
vance to the enemy’s border; and it fa- tional. It remained to be seen whether
cilitated the early capture of the Seine compensation could be gained by the
ports and Antwerp, making it possible earlier opening of either Le Havre or
to cancel plans for the capture of Qui- Antwerp.
beron Bay and southern Brittany ports. But the arrival at the Seine marked
From the point of view of logistic sup- only the beginning of supply difficulties.
port the rapid advance to the Seine also Despite the logistic complications which
had its less favorable aspects, and even at the rapid advance had already clearly
this early date (D plus 79) foreshadowed foreshadowed, the decision was now
serious complications. T h e fact that the made to cross the Seine, and a few days
OVERLORD objective was reached on D later to encircle Paris and to continue
plus 79 rather than D plus 90 was in it- the pursuit without pause. On purely
self not serious, for the supply structure tactical grounds such decisions were logi-
was sufficiently flexible to accommodate cally indicated. T h e decisive victory in
itself to a variation of eleven days. T h e the Falaise–Argentan pocket and the dis-
departure from the scheduled advance integration of enemy resistance offered
had actually been more serious. Because opportunities which it would have been
of the initial lag in operations, U.S. folly to ignore. Furthermore, with forty-
forces had been at the D-plus-20 line at six divisions on the Continent, the Allies
D plus 49, and between D plus 49 and D enjoyed a definite superiority in both
plus 79, a period of thirty days, had actu- armor and infantry, as well as in air
ally advanced a distance which by plan power, and could move in almost any
was to have been covered in seventy days. direction against a weakened enemy.
T h e lines of communication obviously T h e situation in northern France,
could not be developed beyond St. Lô coupled with the Seventh Army’s success-
6 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
ful drive from the south, appeared so were now further aggravated. T h e main
favorable, in fact, as to afford an oppor- problem, as before, was the deficiency
tunity to broaden the entire scope of the in transport, which only worsened as the
drive into Germany. Post-OVERLORD lines of communication extended farther
plans (beyond D plus go) had contem- and farther eastward. Despite great ef-
plated only a secondary effort south of forts, rail reconstruction was unable to
the Ardennes along the axis Reims– keep pace with the advance. Air supply
Verdun–Metz by a relatively small force. repeatedly failed to match its predicted
This force was to have the mission of capacity. Motor transport therefore con-
diverting enemy resistance from the tinued to bear the principal burden of
main thrust in the north and preventing forward movement and was unable to
the escape of enemy troops from south- deliver daily maintenance needs, to say
west France by linking up with Seventh nothing of stocking intermediate or ad-
Army forces moving up the valley of vance supply depots.
the Rhône. This plan was now modified T h e unbearable supply task which
to provide for an attack along the sub- the continued advance created can best
sidiary axis in greater strength than be appreciated by comparing planned
originally contemplated, although the with actual developments. At D plus go
main effort was still to be made in the it had been assumed that no more than
north. twelve U.S. divisions would have to be
From the point of view of logistics supported at the Seine. Not until D plus
these decisions to cross the Seine and con- 120 was it thought feasible to support
tinue the pursuit, and to augment the twelve divisions in their first offensive
forces employed south of the Ardennes, action beyond that barrier, and not until
constituted a radical departure from D plus 150 was it contemplated that a
earlier plans. They carried with them “minor advance” might be supported
a supply task out of all proportion to from the Aisne River as a line of depar-
planned capabilities. They were much ture, seventy-five miles beyond the Seine.2
more far-reaching in their effects than At D plus 90 (4 September), however,
the alteration in plans of early August the Communications Zone was already
by which the bulk of the Third Army’s supporting sixteen divisions at a distance
forces had been directed eastward rather of 150 miles beyond the Seine. Within
than into Brittany. With the supply another ten days (mid-September) First
structure already severely strained by Army forces were operating at the Ger-
the speed with which the last 200 miles man border in the vicinity of Aachen,
had been covered, these decisions en- well over 200 miles beyond Paris. Since
tailed the risk of a complete breakdown. plans had not contemplated reaching that
T h e continued advances late in August area until D plus 330 (May 1945), it
and at the beginning of September con- was necessary to support U.S. forces at
sequently brought hectic days and sleep- this distance approximately 230 days
less nights to supply officers. All the diffi- earlier than expected. Moreover, the city
culties which had already begun to
appear during the approach to the Seine 2 lbid., Annexure M.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 7
of Paris had become an additional sup- decision for which the Communications
ply liability as the result of its liberation Zone bore no responsibility. In fact, it
on D plus 80, 55 days earlier than ex- was only because of the pressure of logis-
pected. U.S. supply lines were now 450 tical planners that a full corps was de-
miles long, leading exclusively from voted to the task. In the view of the
Cherbourg and the beaches, still the chief of the G–4 Logistical Plans Branch
only points of intake. at SHAEF, there was an element of poetic
In addition to overtaxing transport justice in the fact that the Third Army,
facilities, this extension of the lines of whose mission it was to clear Brittany,
communication made unbearable de- later felt so acutely the shortage of sup-
mands on all types of service troop units. plies which resulted in part from the
T h e service troop basis, like transporta- failureto acquirethe Brittany ports.3
tion facilities, was based on the more Contrary to plan, therefore, and as
conservative rate of advance envisaged a direct consequence of the late August
in the OVERLORD plan. When the tempo decisions, the Communications Zone
of operations accelerated in August, re- within a matter of days suddenly had
quiring the leapfrogging of depots and been faced with the task of supplying
dumps and a high degree of mobility considerably greater forces at much
for supply stocks, available depot units greater distances than contemplated.
were soon distributed thinly over most This, despite a motor transport deficiency
of northern France, and were unequal which had been predicted before D Day
to the task. on the basis of even the conservative
At least some of the difficulties schedules of the OVERLORD plan; despite
stemmed from the delay in capturing the failure to develop the port discharge
the Brittany ports, for port discharge and capacity of the Brittany area, which had
port clearance capacity were already been regarded as essential to the admin-
proving inadequate. Scheduled to de- istrative support of U.S. forces: and de-
velop a discharge capacity of nearly spite the premature assumption of re-
14,000 tons per day by D plus go, the sponsibilities in connection with the
Brittany ports, with the exception of civil relief of Paris.
St. Malo, were still in enemy hands at In view of the Communications Zone’s
this date. As a result, the entire capacity performances far in excess of what was
of the Brittany area, which had been believed feasible in the OVERLORD plan,
counted on so heavily in logistic plan- it might be argued that estimates of
ning, was still unavailable to U.S. forces. logistic capabilities had been far too
The delay in the capture of the Brit- conservative. But these performances did
tany ports was at least partially the fruit not represent full-scale support, and
of the decision of early August by which were accomplished only by resorting to
the largest possible force was devoted such expedients as immobilizing incom-
to the exploitation of the breakthrough ing divisions and other combat elements
to the east. This decision almost ines-
capably involved postponement in the 3 Col. William Whipple, “Logistical Bottleneck,”
capture of the Brittany ports and was a T h e Infantry Journal, LXII (March, 1948), 14.
8 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
in order to provide additional truck depot system, and the great bulk of all
companies, using army transportation supplies on the Continent were still in
for line-of-communications hauling, cur- the Normandy base area.
tailing port clearance, and largely ne- T h e whirlwind advances of August
glecting the armies’ needs for replace- and early September thus left the Com-
ment equipment and supplies. These munications Zone in the condition of an
were obviously makeshift arrangements immature athlete who has overexerted
which could not be continued indefi- himself in his first test of endurance.
nitely, and later exacted a big price. And there was no time for true recovery.
They were expedients, moreover, which T h e task of delivering the increasing
were attended by such practices as hi- daily needs of the combat forces re-
jacking supplies and “diverting” entire mained. At the same time the Communi-
truck companies, and involved many cations Zone had to adjust itself to cir-
other irregular practices which pre- cumstances wholly unexpected a few
vented an orderly and businesslike or- weeks earlier, and try to build the muscle
ganization of the Communications Zone. required to meet the strain of future
They left deep scars and had a prolonged extensions of the supply lines.
effect on its efficiency and on its ability
to serve the armies. (2) Competing Tactical Plans
According to a belief commonly held Although exasperated by the increas-
at the time, the armies might have rolled ing difficulties over supply, field com-
on had they only had sufficient gasoline. manders did not immediately appreciate
Such a view ignored the many other re- the full implications of the worsening
quirements of a modern army on wheels. logistic situation. A heady optimism still
By mid-September ordnance equipment pervaded the Allied forces in the first
—particularly combat vehicles and trucks days of September, and in at least two
—was already badly worn. Both armies of the major field headquarters—Third
had entered the Continent with new Army and 21 Army Group–there were
equipment, and in the first weeks main- strong convictions that the war could be
tenance had been a relatively simple shortened if they were afforded priority
matter. For six weeks following the in supply.5
breakout from Normandy, weather, ter- T h e possibility of a quick drive across
rain, and the disorganization and weak- the Rhine by the Third Army was care-
ness of the enemy had presented ideal fully investigated at Supreme Headquar-
conditions for a gasoline-powered army. ters late in August. At the time there ap-
In that period the two armies made a peared little in the way of enemy forces
grueling run across northern France to prevent such an advance, and it was
without adequate maintenance. Forward believed by some that a bold thrust
reserves of major items and of spare parts would induce an immediate surrender.
were practically nonexistent.4 It had
been impossible to establish an adequate 5 See Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1954). pages 250–60, for a fuller dis-
4 FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. IV, p. 2. cussion.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 9
Planners of 12th Army Group admitted for the establishment of advance fields
that it could be carried out only by required precious supplies and transpor-
sacrificing the mobility of other forces, tation.6 Furthermore, Frankfurt was not
for transportation was already sorely an objective of prime importance, and
strained. T h e Third Army by this pro- the area which the advance would have
posal would be given priority on all avail- occupied included neither the political
able supplies. With a strength of not nor economic heart of Germany.
more than ten or twelve divisions, it was Most important of all was the great
argued, this force could be maintained gamble which such an undertaking
if other armies were held inactive; if would have entailed from the point of
bombers, in addition to troop carrier view of future logistic support. T h e con-
planes, were used for the transport of centration of all resources into a single
supplies; and if British forces were held thrust in the Third Army area would cer-
at the Seine or shortly beyond that river. tainly have required indefinite post-
Even by these measures the advocates of ponement of any attempt to capture
the plan agreed that the force probably Antwerp. Without this port there was
could be supported only a short distance little hope of receiving, staging, and
beyond the Rhine, possibly as far as employing the new divisions arriving
Frankfurt. each month, and no possibility that the
From both the strategic and logistic logistic potential would be great enough
standpoints the plan had several weak- to allow the extension of the Third
nesses. A force of 10or 12 divisions con- Army’s operations beyond Frankfurt.
stituted but a small portion of the Allied Finally, the entire proposal was predi-
forces then on the Continent (47 divi- cated on the conviction that the enemy
sions at the end of August). It was also could be frightened into immediate ca-
a relatively small force compared with pitulation. Herein lay the crux of the
the still-existing German Army in the whole matter. Such a result was by no
west. A narrow thrust to the Rhine would means assured at this time. While the
not have impaired the strength of that enemy was badly disorganized at the mo-
force materially, and an advance in the ment, there was no certainty as to what
center of the western front would have was transpiring inside Germany despite
created exposed flanks of great length the attempted assassination of Hitler in
to both the north and south. In the north July. Should the enemy refuse to be
this flank would have extended approxi- shocked into immediate surrender, the
mately 300 miles through enemy terri- operation, in the view of the logistic
tory, and would have rendered the Third planners, would bring the Allied forces
Army lines of communication especially to the brink of administrative disaster.
vulnerable to attack, particularly in
view of the forced immobility of “quies- 6Competition was already keen for the use of
advance fields for tactical use and the reception of
cent” Allied divisions operating at re- air-transported cargo. See Roland G. Ruppenthal,
duced maintenance scales in the rear. Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May
1941–September 1944, UNITED STATES ARMY
Fighter cover would also be difficult to IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953). pp. 576–
establish as far forward as the Rhine, 77. (Hereafter cited as Logistical Support I.)
10 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
The chance of success was a long one, proved completely unrealistic. The study
therefore, and the possibility of failure assumed, for example, that the main
too serious in its implications for future forces of both army groups would have
operations.7 In general, this view repre- reached the Rhine by 15 September
sented informal staff reaction at Supreme and that the thrust to Berlin could
Headquarters at the time, and General develop at that date. It established as
Eisenhower decided against the drive by a prerequisite, moreover, that by that
the Third Army. date the Allies would already be dis-
The proposed operation was not only charging cargo at Antwerp to the ex-
hazardous; it ran counter to all the con- tent of 1,500 tons per day. Other as-
clusions reached concerning the course sumptions were made regarding the use
to follow in the final drive into Germany. of railheads at Brussels, Châlons-sur-
Allied planners had long ago decided Marne, and Paris, and the reduction
that the major effort should be made in of maintenance scales and port clearance
the north. Strategic, tactical, and logisti- to save transportation. But the overrid-
cal considerations had all favored such a ing need was for transportation, and to
plan of action. T h e northern route led obtain sufficient lift, the study concluded,
most directly to the principal objectives would require the widest possible use of
in the enemy homeland–the industrial air transport and the most thoroughgo-
Ruhr and the governmental seat at Ber- ing marshaling of motor transport yet
lin. Tactically the terrain in the north attempted.
was far more suitable than the southern It was estimated that the thrust could
approach for the employment of tanks. be made by three British and two U.S.
Logistically it was favored by close prox- corps. T h e support of such a force re-
imity to the channel ports and by excel- quired the equivalent of 489 truck com-
lent road and rail networks. T h e Com- panies. At the moment there were only
bined Chiefs of Staff as well as the theater 347 available, leaving a shortage of 142.
planners had long since favored this This deficit, it was proposed, might be
avenue for the main effort in the final made up in part by air transport, which
advance into Germany. was believed capable of achieving a lift
Even in the north, however, Allied op- of 2,000 tons per day, the equivalent of
erations were being restricted by the 60 truck companies. But the largest part
means available. Early in September con- of the deficit was to be met by the whole-
sideration was given to a 21Army Group sale grounding of divisions. By diverting
proposal for a rapid thrust to Berlin, a their organic truck companies and by
plan even more ambitious than the one forming provisional companies from
just rejected. A study of the logistic im- both U.S. and British units it was esti-
plications of such an operation led the mated that 181 companies could be made
SHAEF G–4 staff to conclude that it available. Combined with the airlift, an
could be carried out. But its conclusions equivalent of 241 companies was thus
were based on assumptions which soon believed attainable. By these measures
it was thought possible to support five
7Whipple, op. cit., p. 12. corps in the operation, three driving to
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 11
Berlin, one British corps to the Bremen– cally, General Eisenhower had hoped that
Hamburg area, and one U.S. corps to the a force might be built up east of Paris
area of Frankfurt–Magdeburg. Ten U.S. for an additional drive on the subsidiary
divisions (1 in Paris, 9 in the Cotentin) axis south of the Ardennes. As early as
would have to be grounded, and an addi- 24 August the Supreme Commander had
tional 12 U.S. divisions relegated to a tentatively concluded that such a project
“quiescent” state (6 in Brittany, 3 in appeared impossible and decided on the
the Frankfurt–Metz area, and 3 in the necessity to push northeastward in ac-
area of Ruhr–Koblenz). Only one U.S. cordance with long-standing strategic
corps of three divisions could actually plans, meanwhile completing the con-
be supported as far forward as Berlin, quest of Brittany so as to provide the
and even these divisions on reduced ports required for the accelerated flow
maintenance. of divisions. 9
Only on the basis of the optimum con- T h e uninterrupted success of the Al-
ditions outlined above was the operation lied armies in the following weeks con-
considered at all possible. Since the as- tinued to nourish the hope that a two-
sumptions on which the plan was based pronged offensive might yet be carried
—reaching the Rhine and using Antwerp out. In the first week of September Gen-
by 15 September–proved invalid, it ap- eral Eisenhower decided that such simul-
pears that such an operation was quite taneous drives to both the Ruhr and the
infeasible.8 Saar were still within the Allies’ capa-
Logistic limitations at the beginning bilities, and he accordingly authorized
of September thus made it inadvisable an advance across the Siegfried Line by
to attempt either of the two schemes both U.S. armies. He admitted that the
outlined above. While the thrust in the supply organization by this time was
south was logistically feasible, its reward stretched to the breaking point, and
was uncertain and even of dubious value, that such an operation therefore in-
and the operation was most hazardous volved a gamble. But he believed it
from the point of view of future needs. was a gamble worth taking in order to
T h e thrust in the north, while in accord profit fully by the disorganized state of
with long-range plans, for the moment the German armies in the west.10 On
was clearly beyond available means. 10September Lt. Gen. Omar N. Brad-
ley gave the First and Third Armies
( 3 ) The September Decisions equal priority for supply for the opera-
While reluctantly concluding that any tion, subject only to the higher priority
effort involving a major extension of the accorded the capture of Brest.
lines of communication was out of the Supply of the armies was touch and go
question, SHAEF nevertheless had con- at this time, and it was necessary to keep
tinued to examine alternative possibili- a constant finger on the logistic pulse to
ties of maintaining the offensive. Specifi-
9Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Aug 44, OPD
8 Plng Paper, Logistical Implications of a Rapid Exec Office File 9.
Thrust to Berlin, Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 Logistical 10Cbl FWD–14376, Eisenhower to CCS, 9 Sep. 44,
Forecasts, Folder 13. SHAEF SGS 381 Post-OVERLORD Planning.
12 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
determine whether operations could con- had clearly come to dominate operational
tinue on the scale desired. On 12 Septem- plans. Indeed, a survey of supply capabil-
ber General Bradley met with his army ities at this time indicated that logistic
commanders and their G–4’s, and with restrictions might determine the scale
the Commanding General, Advance Sec- of the Allies’ efforts for some time to
tion, and the G–4 of the Communica- come. U.S. cargo discharge was averaging
tions Zone to discuss the relation be- less than 35,000 tons daily. This was in-
tween the supply situation and the tacti- sufficient to clear the arriving shipping,
cal moves then in progress. Both armies with the result that over a hundred Lib-
at this time reported sufficient ammuni- erty ships were already awaiting dis-
tion and gasoline to carry them to the charge early in September.
Rhine. In view of the current tactical Even this tonnage was more than
commitments and the relatively good could be cleared from the ports by the
state of supply at the moment, General available personnel and transport. T h e
Bradley decided to permit the simultane- number of truck companies available
ous attacks by the two armies to continue. for port clearance had dropped to sixteen
Supply capabilities were clearly unequal and sometimes less as a result of the de-
to the support of sustained operations by mands for line-of-communications haul-
both armies against determined opposi- ing, and supplies were accumulating in
tion, however, for deliveries were being the ports and in the beach areas. Inade-
made at the rate of only about 3,300 tons quate transportation plus the deficit in
per day to the First Army and 2,500 tons port discharge capacity thus threatened
to the Third. T h e dual offensive was sup- to create a bad congestion both offshore
portable, therefore, only if it could con- and in the Normandy base area.11
tinue at its previous pace and achieve These basic deficiencies were bound
quick success. Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, to restrict the number of divisions sup-
Jr., Commanding General, Third Army, portable in active operations and hence
accordingly was told that unless he was limit the scale of combat. At D plus 90
able to force a crossing of the Moselle (4 September) the build-up of U.S. divi-
with the mass of his forces within the sions on the Continent totaled twenty-
next few days he was to discontinue the one as planned (plus the southern
attacks and assume the defensive along forces), despite the acceleration of July.
his southern flank. After the middle of August, however, it
This condition could not be met. had been impossible to maintain all divi-
Within the next ten days increasing re- sions adequately. By early September
sistance in both the First and Third three had been immobilized and their
Army sectors brought about a shift of motor transport used to form provisional
effort and of available resources to the truck companies. Two new divisions-
north, as was suspected might be neces- the 94th and 95th–were to begin arriving
sary. on 10September. But Brig. Gen. Ray-
By mid-September, then, the Allied
forces had definitely become the victims 11Ltr, Whipple to CAO, sub: U.S. Troop Flow
To Support a Maximum Effort, n.d. [early Sep].
of their own success; logistic limitations SHAEF G–4 Logistical Forecasts, Folder 13.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 13
mond G. Moses, the army group G–4, into Germany. General Eisenhower felt
doubted whether they could be sup- that the supply organization was now
ported east of the Seine, and surmised stretched to its absolute limit both as to
that they might also have to remain in port intake and inland distribution. He
the lodgment area and be made available believed that the line at which adminis-
to the Communications Zone in order trative difficulties were expected to im-
to increase the latter’s hauling capacity.12 pose a period of relative inaction, orig-
Logistic planners estimated that there inally expected to be the Seine, had cer-
would be twenty-nine divisions on the tainly now been reached. 14
Continent by 1 October (in addition to T h e situation in mid-September
the DRAGOON forces in southern France) clearly indicated an urgent need to
but thought it unlikely that more than shorten the lines of communication. T h e
twenty of these could be maintained in problem was actually a dual one, for
combat as far forward as the Rhine at there was a parallel need for additional
that date on the basis of the current lo- port capacity. T h e maximum force which
gistic outlook. Any extension of the lines could be supported through Cherbourg
of communication beyond the Rhine and the beaches was rapidly being
promised to reduce further the number reached, and new capacity was required
of divisions supportable in combat.13 to compensate for that lost in Brittany.
This concern over the size of the forces T h e obvious solution to this dual re-
which could be supported beyond the quirement lay in the development of the
Rhine reflected the optimism which still Seine ports and Antwerp. Even at the
pervaded the higher headquarters in time the Allied forces were crossing the
mid-September and which proved quite Seine, when the capture of the Brittany
unrealistic. But while crossing the Rhine ports was still considered of prime impor-
and seizing the vital Ruhr objective in tance, General Eisenhower had empha-
the north were still considered feasible, sized the imperative necessity in the
the gloomy logistic forecasts served to drive to the northeast to secure a “perma-
underscore one conclusion which had nent and adequate base at Antwerp.” 15
already been accepted by Supreme Head- T h e further extension of the lines of
quarters if not the lower echelons. This communication in the next few weeks
was that, even should it prove possible to served to enhance the importance of
capture both the Saar and Ruhr objec- Antwerp even more. Conferences with
tives, these areas were at the absolute his top commanders between 9 and 11
maximum distance at which Allied forces September sustained the Supreme Com-
could be supported for the time being mander in his previous conviction that
and it would be absolutely imperative the early seizure of deepwater ports and
to develop additional logistic capacity the improvement of base facilities were
before attempting a power thrust deep essential prerequisites to a final drive
into Germany. His analysis of the situa- on both tactical and administrative
tion is clearly revealed in cables which grounds.17
he addressed to both the army group Logistic resources were likewise lack-
commanders and the Combined Chiefs ing for the full implementation of the
of Staff on 13 September. In the Su- second course, for they were not suffi-
preme Commander’s view the port posi- cient to permit simultaneous attacks
tion at this time was such that a stretch along the entire front. T h e decision, as
of a week or ten days of bad Channel announced by the Supreme Commander,
weather-a condition which became more provided that the Allies were to push
and more probable with the aproaching forward to the Rhine, securing bridge-
fall months-would paralyze Allied activ- heads over that river, seize the Ruhr, and
ities and make the maintenance of the concentrate in preparation for a final
armies even in a defensive role exceed- nonstop drive into Germany. Because of
the limited logistic capabilities available,
ingly difficult. Distribution of supplies
the timing of the Allies’ efforts toward
on the Continent was approaching solu-
the attainment of immediate objectives
tion, he felt, through the improvement
along the entire front now became of
in the railway system. But the most im- the utmost importance. Implementation
mediate objective, and one which had of this plan consequently required a suc-
been foreseen as essential from the very cession of attacks, first by the 21 Army
inception of the OVERLORD plan, was Group, then by First Army, and then by
winning deepwater ports and improv- the Third Army, with supply priority
ing communications.16 shifting as necessary. Tactical operations,
T h e Allied forces at this time had be- to paraphrase an old maxim, had now
fore them two possible courses of action. definitely become the art of the logisti-
( 1 ) They could concentrate all resources cally possible.18
behind a single blow on a narrow front T h e paramount influence which logis-
directed toward the center of Germany (a tic considerations were to have in any
proposal favored by the 21 Army Group operations undertaken in the near fu-
commander). (2) They could advance ture went beyond the determination of
along the entire front with the aim of the scale and timing of attacks. Future
seizing suitable positions on the German logistic needs also figured large in the
frontier where they could regroup, estab- determination of immediate objectives,
lish maintenance facilities, and mount a for General Eisenhower specified that
broad drive into Germany. T h e first additional bases must be secured simul-
course, conceived of as a “knife-like taneously with the attacks eastward. Ac-
thrust” to Berlin, had already been cordingly, the Supreme Commander
rejected by the Supreme Commander
17 Cbl FWD–13889, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 5
Sep 44, Eyes Only Cbls, Smith Papers, Dept of
16 Cbl FWD–14764, Eisenhower to CCS and Major Army Library.
Coinds, 13 Sep 44. 12 A Gp 371.3 Mil Objectives, 18For a fuller discussion of the debate on strategy
and SHAEF AG 381–3 SHAEF to AGWAR Rpts on in September see Pogue, The Supreme Command,
OVERLORD. pp. 288–98.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 15
gave Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Mont- uisite for the final drive into Germany.20
gomery, the 21 Army Group commander, Even the present operation in the north,
the mission of securing the approaches to he noted in a separate communication to
Antwerp or Rotterdam and the capture Field Marshal Montgomery, was a bold
of additional Channel ports; and he or- bid for a big prize in view of the current
dered General Bradley to reduce Brest maintenance situation. T h e Supreme
as quickly as possible in order to accom- Commander considered the operation
modate the staging of additional divi- amply worth the risk. But he took this
sions, and to make physical junction with additional opportunity to stress once
the forces from the south so that the sup- again the conviction that a large-scale
ply lines leading from Marseille might drive into the “enemy’s heart” was un-
assist in the support of the 12th Army thinkable without building u p additional
Group as soon as any surplus capacity logistic potential. He indicated that this
could be developed.19 desideratum was now taken for granted
It was in accord with the above deci- in his own mind by closing with the
sions that the 21 Army Group was given remark, “Of course, we need Antwerp.” 21
preference in the allocation of the avail- T h e dilemma in which the Allies
able administrative means for the com- found themselves at this time was a di-
bined US.-British airborne operation rect outcome of the August and early
known as MARKET-GARDEN, which was September decisions by which logistic
launched on 17 September with the in- considerations had been repeatedly sub-
tention of winning a bridgehead over ordinated to the enticing prospects which
the Rhine and turning the flank of the beckoned eastward. General Eisenhower
enemy’s fortified defense line in the himself admitted that he had repeatedly
north. MARKET-GARDEN was a limited been willing to defer the capture of ports
objective operation, however, as General (referring obviously to Brittany) in favor
Eisenhower later found it necessary to of the bolder actions which had taken
re-emphasize. At a meeting with his prin- the Allied armies to the German border.
cipal staff officers and top commanders But such deferments could no longer be
held on 22 September he took pains to made in view of the approaching bad
make clear his desire that all concerned weather and the resistance the enemy was
“differentiate clearly between the logis- beginning to offer in fortress defense.22
tic requirements for attaining objectives T h e necessity for building up the logis-
covered by present directives, including tic potential before attempting major
the seizure of the Ruhr and breaching the offensives was more and more widely ac-
Siegfried Line, and the requirements for cepted toward the end of September.
the final drive on Berlin.” In this con- Since the overriding necessity was for a
nection he demanded general acceptance shortening of the lines of communication
of the fact that the possession of an addi-
tional major deepwater port on the
20Min, Mtg SHAEF War Room, 22 Sep 44. SHAEF
north flank was an indispensable prereq- SGS 381 Post-OVERLORD Planning.
21Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Sep 44,
19 Cbl, Eisenhower to CCS and Major Coinds, 13 SHAEF SGS 381 Post-OVERLORDPlanning.
Sep 44. 22Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Sep 44.
16 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
and additional port capacity, the devel- was to have an important bearing on the
opment of Antwerp offered the best pos- employment of Allied, and particularly
sible solution of the problem. T h e effect U.S., forces. Estimates made late in Sep-
which the pursuit and the decisions of tember indicated that Antwerp might
early September had on the logistic struc- not begin operating before 1 November.
ture was therefore momentous, for it There was every prospect, therefore, that
rendered earlier plans largely obsolete U.S. forces would have to depend on lines
by necessitating the shift of the main ad- of communication reaching all the way
ministrative base northeastward months back to Normandy, aided somewhat by
earlier than had been anticipated. the capacity of the Seine ports. As Gen-
Logistic planners realized early that eral Bradley noted to the Third Army
these developments would require a commander in explaining the reasons
complete recasting of administrative for the decisions of midSeptember, the
plans. 23 Tactical operations had been total tonnages which the Communica-
supported all the way across northern tions, Zone could guarantee to deliver
France and Belgium without the Brittany were sufficient to support the attacks of
ports, and with the front lines now 400 only one of the American armies if all
to 500 miles distant, the value of these the other U.S. forces reverted to the de-
ports greatly diminished. By 9 Septem- fensive. Even such commitments required
ber the Supreme Commander had de- the postponement of many essential ad-
cided that Quiberon Bay and the ports ministrative measures, such as moving
of Lorient, St. Nazaire, and Nantes were air units and replacements forward,
no longer essential for the support of building advance airfields, winterizing
U.S. forces, and he informed the 12th troops and equipment, and replacing
Army Group commander that it would worn-out equipment.26 T h e priority
not be necessary to reduce these ports by now held by operations aimed at the
force of arms, and that the enemy garri- Ruhr inevitably placed the burden of
sons might simply be contained. 24At this the sacrifice on the 12th Army Group
time the capture of Brest still held the forces operating south of the Ardennes–
highest priority, but that port was also that is, the Third Army.
destined to be abandoned before long. Fortunately, it was possible to relieve
Logistic planners, foreseeing this pos- the strain on the attenuated lines of the
sibility, suggested in the first days of 12th Army Group somewhat by shifting
September that U.S. port development a portion of the burden to the south. T h e
resources be used to supplement British 6th Army Group, commanded by Lt.
units in developing the ports north of Gen. Jacob L. Devers and now embrac-
the Seine.25 ing all the forces which had built up in
T h e speed with which the northern the southern lodgment, possessed an in-
ports could be brought into operation
26Ltr, Bradley to Patton, 23 Sep 44, 12 A Gp
23Memo, Whipple for CAO, sub: Latest Log Devs, 371.3 Mil Objectives I; Memo, Moses for Col
3 Sep 44. SHAEF G–4 381 War Plans General I. William L. Barriger, sub: Confirmation of Tele-
24Cbl FWD–14376, Eisenhower to CCS, 9 Sep 44. phone Conversation This Date, 9 Sep 44, 12 A Gp
25Memo, Whipple for CAO, 3 Sep 44. G–4 Memos 1944, Folder 56.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 17
be operating on very extended lines of Gen. James H. Stratton, the theater G–4,
communication for some time to come. that the field forces should be able to
For administrative reasons, therefore, count on daily maintenance at the rate
they concluded that it would be desir- of 650 tons per division slice. Added to
able to withhold an advance into Ger- the needs of the Ninth Air Force and the
many beyond the Ruhr until late Octo- Advance Section, this brought the total
ber in order to permit the development maintenance requirements in the for-
of the Antwerp-Rotterdam port capacity ward areas to 18,800 tons per day in the
and to ensure the establishment of se- first half of October, assuming the em-
cure advance bases near Antwerp for 21 ployment of 22 divisions, 20,750 tons per
Army Group and in the region of Metz– day in the second half of the month,
Nancy for 12th Army Group. In con- with 2 5 divisions, and 22,700 tons by
sidering several alternative courses the 1 November, when the strength of the
planners estimated that it would be pos- 12th Army Group would reach 28 divi-
sible to support “limited forces” in an sions. General Moses estimated, however,
advance in October, but only on the
that the field forces would require the
basis of conditions which were unlikely
delivery of approximately 100,000 tons
to be met: if infantry divisions were not
of supplies over and above these daily
motorized; if air supply were made avail-
maintenance requirements in order to
able to the extent of 2,000 tons per day
meet deficiencies in equipment and estab-
or some thirty truck companies were
lish minimum reserves of about three
withdrawn from quiescent divisions to
days in all classes of supply. He used 1
assist in the forward movement of sup-
November as a target date for the begin-
plies; if opposition were slight; if for-
ning of discharge operations at Antwerp.
ward reserves were accumulated at about
On the assumption that the daily main-
half normal rates; if not more than
tenance requirements could be met, he
twenty-five divisions were employed for-
requested the Communications Zone to
ward on the Rhine; and if objectives
estimate the time necessary to deliver
were reached within about a fortnight. 31
the additional 100,000 tons and also to
At the end of the month the Commu-
establish depots in the Advance Sec-
nications Zone, in response to an inquiry
tion. 32
from the army group G–4, General
T h e COMZ reply was discouraging
Moses, presented figures on its delivery
indeed. General Stratton was even less
capabilities which revealed even more
optimistic about the prospects of quick
clearly the impossibility of supporting
dividends from the port of Antwerp.
large-scale operations east of the Rhine.
He did not believe that discharge there
General Moses had indicated to Brig.
could be counted on before the middle
of November, although he estimated that
31SHAEF G–3 Appreciation, Factors Affecting Ad-
vance into Germany After Occupation of the Ruhr,
24 Sep 44, and Memo by Plng Stf, summarizing 32Memo, Moses for Stratton, sub: Supply Esti-
above, same date, SHAEF SGS 381 Post-OVERLORD mate, 25 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 400 Supplies General
Planning. 44 III.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 19
some tonnage would begin to move for- distributed between the two army areas.33
ward from Le Havre and Rouen by mid- T h e outlook for the next six to eight
October and might average 3,000 tons weeks was thus a depressing one. There
per day in the last half of the month. On appeared no escaping the prospect that
this basis he estimated that it would be the forces which the 12th Army Group
approximately sixty days before any sub- could maintain actively operational
stantial tonnages could be built up in the would either have to be reduced in size
forward areas. In fact, he pointed out that or continue on the starvation scales which
for the entire month of October COMZ had characterized their support for the
deliveries would not even meet daily past several weeks. At the beginning of
maintenance requirements. October the 12th Army Group comprised
T h e Communications Zone planned 20 divisions (10 in First Army, 8 in
to build small reserves-totaling about Third, and 2 in Ninth). In addition,
11,000tons-in the First Army area in the there were in the Cotentin and Brittany
last two weeks of October, but this was a total of 7 divisions, of which 1 was
to be accomplished only at the expense engaged in a tactical mission and the re-
of falling short of the daily maintenance maining 6 were either grounded or in
needs of the other armies. Delivery ca- the process of marrying up with their
pacity was expected to exceed daily needs equipment. By mid-October, it was esti-
by a few hundred tons early in Novem- mated, 25 divisions could be made opera-
ber, but the build-up of reserves was tionally available to the 12th Army
contemplated in only one area-the First Group. T h e army group commander
Army’s-and even then at the sacrifice naturally wanted to use the additional
of some of the Ninth Army’s daily re- units becoming available, and General
quirements. Less than 30,000 tons of re- Bradley in fact indicated his intention
serves were expected to be built up-all of moving 6 divisions forward from the
in the First Army area–by mid-Novem- Cotentin between 10 and 20 October.
ber. Not until then did the Communica- Allowing for the transfer of 1 division
tions Zone expect its port and transporta- (the 44th) to the 6th Army Group, this
tion situation to improve sufficiently to would result in a net increase of 5 divi-
begin building reserves over and above sions and raise the strength of the group
daily needs in the Third and Ninth Army to 25 divisions.34
areas and in the depots of the Ninth Air G–4 planners
at SHAEF had estimated
Force and the Advance Section. In the that the provision of daily maintenance
last two weeks of November it hoped for this number of divisions and the
to deliver approximately 100,000 tons of building of a reasonable minimum of re-
reserve supplies to the forward areas.
These stocks it planned to set down in
the Huy–Aachen area for the First Army, 33Memo, Stratton for Moses, sub: Supply Esti-
mate, 1 Oct 44, ADSEC AG 400 Supplies General,
in the Longwy–Metz–Nancy area for or SHAEF G–4 400 Supplies General 44 III.
Third and Ninth Armies, and initially 34Memo, Col C. Ravenhill, Deputy Chief Log
Plans, for G–4, 10 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 Mainte-
at Reims for the Ninth Air Force. T h e nance of British and U.S. Forces 153/2/GDP–1, Box
Advance Section’s dumps were to be 1, Folder 42.
20 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
serves would require deliveries of more engagement of only two thirds of the
than 22,000 tons of supplies per day.35 total, and the accumulation of reserves
T h e forwarding of such tonnages was for only the one army having first prior-
obviously out of the question in view of ity for its effort-that is, First Army,
the Communications Zone’s announced with ten divisions. 36
capabilities. Deliveries in September had On 11 October SHAEF informed Gen-
averaged only 8,000–10,000tons per day, eral Bradley of this limitation on the
and the maximum tonnage which the size of the maintainable force, noting
Communications Zone estimated it might that his proposal to move additional divi-
deliver in the last half of October was sions forward from Normandy conse-
20,000. With this tonnage it was esti- quently would be feasible only if a cor-
mated that all twenty-five divisions could responding number of divisions was
be maintained only if scales of main- withdrawn from the line and rested.37
tenance were kept below those consid- Within the next ten days, nevertheless,
ered sound. T h e support of the 12th additional units were moved forward
Army Group would therefore be on a and committed, bringing the line
hand-to-mouth basis and without the strength of the 12th Army Group to
accumulation of any reserves. This was twenty-three divisions.
a risk that was unacceptable to supply Meanwhile, supply deliveries had ac-
officers in view of the imminence of win- tually been sufficient to support only
ter weather (which would require the thirteen divisions adequately, to say noth-
forward movement of substantial ton-
ing of maintaining the twenty on which
nages of heavy clothing and winterization
recent plans had been based.38T h e pros-
equipment), the need to build up bridg-
pect of providing adequate support to
ing equipment for the expected river
crossing operations, the heavier require- the growing number of divisions thus
ments for ammunition, and the accom- appeared even more dismal toward the
plishment of higher echelon repair of end of October, providing abundant
vehicles which had already been long proof of the necessity for a strict ration-
delayed. On the basis of the COMZ esti- ing of the meager resources available.
mates the SHAEF G–4 planners con- In the course of the month Supreme
cluded that logistic limitations would Headquarters therefore prepared to in-
not permit the employment of more than
twenty divisions in the 12th Army
38 SHAEF G–4 Allocation of Tonnages I for
Group. Even this allowed the “mobile” Period 15–28 Oct, 8 Oct 44, and covering Ltr,
Whipple to Crawford, sub: Tonnage Allocations, 8
Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 400 Supplies General 44 III;
35 O n the basis of 560 tons of maintenance per Memo, Whipple for G–3 Plng Stf, sub: Advance
division slice at regular scales, 280 tons of reserves Across the Rhine, 14 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 381 War
build-up per day (one half day per day), totaling Plans General II.
840 tons per division per day or 21,000 tons for the 37Cbl S–61798, SHAEF to Bradley, 11 Oct 44.
three armies. In addition, the army group would SHAEF AG 381–3 SHAEF to AGWAR Reports on
require civil affairs supplies, raising the total to OVERLORD.
more than 22,000 tons. SHAEF G–4 Allocation of 38 Memo, Whipple for G–3 Plans, sub: Mainte-
Tonnages I, for period 15–28 Oct. 8 Oct 44, SHAEF nance of 12 A Gp Divs, 21 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4
G–4 400 Supplies General 44 III. Maintenance General, Box I, Folder 47.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 21
had little choice but to concentrate al- port were clear. Not until 28 November
most all available resources behind only was the first Allied ship to drop anchor
one portion of the front lest his entire in the harbor.
advance bog down. In keeping with orig- Meantime, on the extreme right flank
inal planning, he chose the north. T h e of the western front, operations had as-
21 Army Group, while retaining its gen- sumed much the same character. After
eral objective of enveloping the Ruhr the link-up of Seventh Army with the
from the north, was at the same time to 12th Army Group in mid-September, the
open the port of Antwerp as a matter of pursuit of the enemy from the south had
great urgency. T h e neighboring First halted for the same reasons it had in the
Army could do little except conduct lim- north, despite the existence of a separate
ited operations in general support of the line of supply leading from Marseille.
21 Army Group and in preparation for Almost coincidentally with the end of
the day when the supply situation might the pursuit, the southern forces, consist-
improve and the push toward the Rhine ing of the Seventh U.S. Army and the
be renewed. Operating on an axis of ad- First French Army, came under a new
vance which had been denied first prior- headquarters, the 6th Army Group. Until
ity, the Third Army felt even more this time controlled by AFHQ in the
stringent supply restrictions than did Mediterranean, these forces now came
the First. T h e only major achievement under the direct command of General
by either army during the logistically Eisenhower.2 When directed by the Su-
drab days of October was the First Army’s preme Commander to continue the drive
reduction of Aachen. toward the Rhine, the 6th Army Group
I n the extreme north the commander tried to push northeastward through the
of the 21 Army Group, Field Marshal Saverne and Belfort gaps, only to be
Montgomery, tried at first to continue forced to the unavoidable conclusion
his push toward the Ruhr while his left that, under the existing logistical situa-
wing, in the form of the First Canadian tion, this plan, like the plans in the
Army under Lt. Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, north, was far too ambitious.
opened Antwerp. But even when T h e six weeks’ fighting between mid-
strengthened by a temporary shift of September and the end of October had
some territory to the 12th Army Group, brought little noticeable advantage to
Montgomery found the dual assignment the Allies as far as the enemy, terrain,
too demanding. T h e enemy’s position or weather was concerned. Meanwhile,
along both sides of the Schelde estuary, the logistic situation, even without use
which denied Allied access to Antwerp of Antwerp, had shown some improve-
from the sea, proved particularly strong. ment. In the Supreme Commander’s
Even after the 21 Army Group in mid- opinion, sufficient supplies had been ac-
October turned undivided attention to cumulated, when superimposed upon the
opening Antwerp, almost a month of promise of Antwerp, to warrant a re-
severe fighting under the most adverse sumption of the offensive along the en-
conditions of weather and terrain re-
mained before the approaches to the
TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 25
tire front. This is not to say that all was the Saar industrial region, and, with the
well from a logistical standpoint–the exception of a big enemy pocket hinged
U.S. armies, for example, still had to on the city of Colmar, reaching the
ration artillery ammunition drastically Rhine along a broad front in the ex-
–but in keeping with the general prin- treme south. In the north, the First and
ciple of giving the enemy no rest, Gen- Ninth Armies by mid-December had
eral Eisenhower deemed a renewal of the gotten no farther than the little Roer
attack advisable. River, less than fifteen miles beyond
Viewed in retrospect, the November Aachen. T h e 21 Army Group, in the
plans, while aimed only at closing to the meantime, had begun to assist by attacks
Rhine, were far too optimistic. T h e 12th along the American left flank, but the
Army Group, with twenty-seven divisions necessity to clear a stubborn enemy force
now available, planned major efforts both which held out in constricted terrain
north and south of the Ardennes; the west of the Maas River still limited
6th Army Group with fourteen divi- British participation.
sions, taking advantage of the mainte- Mid-December thus found the Allied
nance resources available from the Medi- armies still attempting to close to the
terranean, was to advance to the Rhine Rhine in execution of the first phase of
while protecting the 12th Army Group’s the November offensive, when, on 16
right flank. Only the 21 Army Group, December, the enemy seized the initia-
still engaged in freeing the approaches tive with a powerful counteroffensive in
to Antwerp, was to remain relatively the Ardennes area of eastern Belgium
quiescent. and northern Luxembourg. Aimed at
T h e Third Army struck the first blow crossing the Meuse and recapturing Ant-
in the new offensive on 8 November, werp, thereby splitting the Allied forces
while on 13 and 14 November, respec- and possibly annihilating those north of
tively, the Seventh U.S. and First French the Ardennes, the offensive was launched
Armies joined the assault. After await- with twenty-four divisions which the
ing favorable weather for a major air enemy had secretly marshaled.
bombardment, the First Army and the Attacking on a fifty-mile front in the
newly formed Ninth U.S. Army under center of the First U.S. Army’s sector,
Lt. Gen. William S. Simpson took up the the enemy struck in an area which had
attack in the north. been lightly held throughout the fall
Adverse weather, which set new rain- in order that U.S. forces might concen-
fall records, and terrain favoring the trate for offensive operations elsewhere.
defender, plus a remarkable German re- Though the Germans quickly broke
surgence, militated more against the re- through, tenacious resistance by isolated
newed Allied drive than did logistics. American units and quick reaction to
Whatever the primary cause, the drive the attack by Allied commanders halted
fell short. T h e Third Army and the 6th the thrust short of its first objective, the
Army Group made the most impressive Meuse River, T h e end result of the
advances, including capture of Metz, ar- enemy’s effort was a big bulge in the
rival at the Siegfried Line in front of American line. Because Antwerp had
26 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
begun operation as a port not quite three French Army troops led an attack to
weeks before the enemy struck, the im- drive the last Germans from the west
pact of the bulge on the U.S. logistical bank of the Rhine in the 6th Army
structure never became critical. Existence Group’s sector. Joined later by a corps
of the bulge nevertheless imposed cer- of the Seventh Army, on 9 February
tain communications difficulties, which they achieved their goal. Thus by early
prompted the Supreme Commander to February the entire western front was
place the Ninth Army and those elements stabilized and the enemy’s offensive ca-
of the First Army north of the enemy pabilities west of the Rhine were elimi-
salient under the operational control of nated.
Field Marshal Montgomery.
On 23 December an attack by the (2) Organization and Command 3
Third U.S. Army established tenuous While the command and administra-
contact with a beleagured American gar- tive structure of ETOUSA never
rison in the communications center of achieved complete finality because of
Bastogne, which had held out against re- the repeated necessity to adapt itself to
peated German assaults. Three weeks the changing tactical situation, in August
later, on 16 January, drives by the First and September 1944 it took the final
and Third U.S. Armies linked u p at the form envisaged in the OVERLORD plan.
road center of Houffalize. After severe T h e first week in August had been an
fighting in the face of winter weather, important one in the evolution of com-
rugged terrain, and skillful enemy de- mand and organization in both the tac-
fense, the two armies by the end of the tical and administrative fields. On the
first week of February‘ had completely tactical side, a second army (the Third)
erased the enemy’s earlier gains and in was introduced on 1 August and an army
some sectors had followed the withdraw- group organization under the command
ing Germans through the West Wall. of General Bradley was established. 4 On
T h e net effect of the German effort so the administrative side, meanwhile, the
far as the Allies were concerned was to implementation of the organizational
delay Allied offensive operations toward plan had suddenly accelerated. On 2
the Ruhr and the Saar about six weeks. August, after several delays, the Com-
T h e first week of February also saw munications Zone finally achieved legal
the enemy’s holdout position on the ex- status on the Continent by the drawing
treme right flank of the Allied line of a rear boundary for the armies. Con-
around the city of Colmar eliminated, trary to plan, the movement of Head-
but not before the Germans had quarters, Communications Zone, was ad-
launched a smaller-scale counteroffensive 3 As pointed out in the Preface to Logistical Sup-
in this sector. Though the attacks port I , the command and organizational develop-
achieved some initial success and for a ments of the pursuit period and the command de-
cisions of early fall 1944 are discussed here in order
time threatened recapture of Strasbourg, to adhere to the topical-chronological organization
adroit withdrawals followed by counter- adopted for both volumes.
4 Marking the inauguration of Phase III of the
attacks with strong reserves soon con- command plan, on D plus 56 instead of D plus 41
tained them all. O n 20 January First as planned. See Logistical Support I, 208ff.
TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 27
ing in England, and it was not expected With certain exceptions the operational
to move to the Continent until the port control of the First Allied Airborne
of Brest was in operation. Late in Army remained with Supreme Head-
August, however, Ninth Army head- quarters. 8
quarters moved to France and was as- T h e most significant augmentation of
signed to the 12th Army Group, and on the tactical command structure occurred
5 September was given command of the in mid-September with the incorpora-
VIII Corps in the Operations against tion of the Allied forces in southern
Brest. Headquarters were established in France, shortly after SHAEF assumed
close proximity to those of Brittany Base direct operational control on the Con-
Section, which had been set up at tinent. Operation DRAGOON had long
Rennes, in order to provide the neces- been intended as a corollary to OVER-
sary communications facilities and to LORD and had been planned to be
facilitate co-ordination with the Com- launched simultaneously with the land-
munications Zone in matters of supply ings in Normandy. But the necessity to
and maintenance. In addition to its transfer some of the Mediterranean
operational mission the Ninth Army was troop lift to the United Kingdom for
given the task of administering the re- OVERLORD led to the postponement of
ception and accommodation of the var- the operation. T h e final decision to
ious corps and divisions then arriving in launch the southern operation was not
Normandy. After the capture of Brest it made until 10 August 1944, and the
redeployed northeastward and eventually actual assault was made five days later.
participated in the November offensive, DRAGOONwas mounted from the
as already related. 7 North African theater, and consequently
In the meantime another type of army came under the direction of the Supreme
had been organized to co-ordinate and Commander in that area, General Sir
control Allied airborne operations. Early Henry Maitland Wilson. Make-up of the
in August SHAEF created a British-U.S. assault force was to be predominantly
combined airborne headquarters for this American, and the operational control
purpose, and in mid-August designated in the early stages was given to the
this organization the First Allied Air- Seventh U.S. Army, which was reacti-
borne Army and placed it under the vated for this purpose and placed under
command of Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brere- the command of Lt. Gen. Alexander M.
ton, who had been Commanding Gen- Patch. A French army command was to
eral, Ninth Air Force. For command and come into being as soon as the build-up
administrative purposes the U.S. com- of French forces was large enough to
ponents of this new army were organized justify it. General Jean de Lattre de
into the XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps Tassigny was to be in command of the
under the command of Maj. Gen. first French troops to go ashore, the in-
Matthew B. Ridgway, former Command- tention being that he should eventually
ing General, 82d Airborne Division. command the French army.
I n anticipation of the time when there Third U.S. Army near Sombernon on
would be two armies in the south, pro- 11 September, and it was agreed that
vision was also made for the organiza- SHAEF should take over operational
tion of an army group command. O n 1 control of the southern forces on 15
August the 6th Army Group was acti- September. On that date the control of
vated at Bastia, Corsica, under the com- AFHQ over the DRAGOON forces came to
mand of General Devers, who at the an end.
time was commanding general of the At the same time French Army B,
North African theater and Deputy Su- which had become operational on 21
preme Commander under General Wil- August, was redesignated as the First
son. Since the army group command was French Army, and the 6th Army Group,
not to become operational until such now consisting of the French First and
time as two armies were in existence, an Seventh U.S. Armies, became opera-
Advance Detachment, AFHQ, was or- tional, absorbing Advance Detachment,
ganized ta exercise over-all control in AFHQ.9 T h e XII Tactical Air Com-
the first stages. This forward echelon of mand, which supported the DRAGOON
General Wilson's headquarters, also forces, also passed from the control of
commanded by General Devers, was the North African theater to the Ninth
actually composed of basically the same Air Force in the north.
personnel which made u p the 6th Army Planning and launching DRAGOON had
Group headquarters, thus providing the entailed two territorial revisions in the
desired continuity in command. North African and European theaters.
Operation DRAGOON was a striking Southern France had been included in
success, and within two weeks of its the European theater in 1943. Because
launching General Wilson contemplated DRAGOON was to be launched from Med-
the transfer of control of the southern iterranean bases, the War Department
France forces to SHAEF, the intention redrew the theater boundaries in Feb-
being that 6th Army Group would be- ruary 1944, removing southern France,
come operational at the same time. T h e plus Switzerland, Austria, and Hungary,
size of the force under General Devers’ from the European theater, and placing
command at the time (nine divisions) them within the North African theater.
hardly justified the latter step, but Gen- On 18 September, after SHAEF had as-
eral Wilson felt it was required by both sumed control over the southern forces,
the nature of operations with French the boundaries of the European theater
forces and the length of the lines of com- were once more extended to include all
munication, and negotiations were there- of France and Switzerland. (Map 2) 10
fore undertaken to effect the transition. One more major addition to the U.S.
Tactical developments and the absence tactical command structure occurred
of essential communications facilities
9 General Devers was subsequently relieved of his
actually delayed the transfer of command other assignments in the Mediterranean, Lt. Gen.
somewhat. But the time finally appeared Joseph T. McNarney becoming Commanding Gen-
eral, NATOUSA, and Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark the
ripe after the junction of French forces Deputy Supreme Commander.
from the south with elements of the 10Organization and Command, II, 223–32.
30 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
F.Temple
MAP 2
late in 1944. On 27 December the Fif- tion and re-equipping of units returning
teenth Army was activated and assigned from the combat zone, and for planning
to the 12th Army Group. Fifteenth the occupation, particularly in the 12th
Army at first consisted only of a head- Army Group sector of the Rhineland.
quarters, and its functions initially were T h e command of the army went tem-
purely administrative. Its first responsi- porarily to Maj. Gen. Ray E. Porter,
bility was to serve as a headquarters for but on 14 January passed to Maj. Gen.
the control of U.S. units in the SHAEF Leonard T. Gerow, former commander
reserve, a task it began to perform early of the V Corps.11
in January 1945. Shortly thereafter it
In the meantime the logistic structure
was given responsibility for staging,
of U.S. forces on the Continent had
equipping, and training new units enter-
ing the Continent, for the reorganiza- 11
Ibid., II, 261–64.
TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 31
undergone its logical development, its the SHAEF Chief of Staff, the premature
evolution being governed largely by the move was also largely responsible for the
rate at which ground was recaptured. delays and difficulties in communications
T h e movement of Lt. Gen. John C. H. with the War Department which caused
Lee’s headquarters alone was a process much embarrassment in September.
which took several weeks and was not SHAEF depended on the Communica-
completed until mid-September. A por- tions Zone for such communications, and
tion of the COMZ headquarters re- the movement made it impossible to ex-
mained in England for some time. T h e tend reliable long-range communications
base section organization developed over from the rear.14
a period of some months, according to General Eisenhower himself disap-
need. proved of the move to Paris, and on 13
T h e core of the COMZ headquarters September sharply reproved the COMZ
merged with the Forward Echelon near commander, notifying Lee that his head-
Valognes, where engineers constructed quarters was not to be located there.15
new tented quarters for approximately T h e Supreme Commander modified this
11,000persons and about 560,000 square order a few days later, realizing that the
feet of hutted office accommodations.12 heavy shipments of personnel and sup-
But its location there was destined to be plies to the French capital made it im-
of short duration. Within a matter of possible to shift the COMZ headquarters
days the capture of Paris appeared im- for the present without interfering with
minent, and General Lee contemplated higher priority tasks. Paris, after all, was
an early move to that city. the logical location for the headquarters
T h e order for the move to Paris was of the theater’s administrative organiza-
actually issued by Brig. Gen. Royal B. tion, for it contained a concentration of
Lord, and without Lee’s knowledge. 13 supply depots, hospitals, airstrips and
On 1 September the Chief of Staff dis- airfields, railway stations and marshaling
patched a forward echelon to Paris, and yards, and inland waterway offloading
within the next two weeks the entire points which were vitally important to
headquarters moved to the French cap- the supply structure of the theater.
ital, a portion of it going there directly General Eisenhower nevertheless con-
from London, and the remainder from sidered the movement of General Lee’s
Valognes. Using precious motor and air headquarters extremely precipitate and
transportation at the very time of the believed the influx of Americans into
critical supply shortages at the front, the Paris to be unwise. He was obviously
movement naturally produced strong disturbed over the reports he had re-
criticism from combat commanders. In ceived about the blackmarket activities
the view of Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, of U.S. personnel in Paris, and in his
second communication to General Lee
12 Final Report of the Chief Engineer, European
Theater of Operations, 1942–45 (Paris, Hervé et
Fils [ c . 1946], prepared in Office of Chief Engr 14Cbl FWD–16198, Smith to Lt Gen Thomas
ETO, 1946, p. 326. T. Handy, 29 Sep 44, OPD Cbl Files.
13Interv with Lord, 9 Aug 5 1 , and Col Talley, 7 15Cbl FWD–14637, Eisenhower to Lee, 13 Sep 44,
Mar 51. SHAEF SGS 014.1 Civil Affairs in Paris I.
32 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
made pointed reference to reports that and other organizations such as SHAEF,
the dress, discipline, and conduct of the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S.
Americans in the French capital were Navy, and the Air Transport Command
“little short of disgraceful.” While the were using approximately 25 more. T h e
Supreme Commander now authorized Seine Section and Communications Zone
the COMZ headquarters to remain in at this time estimated that between them
Paris, he directed General Lee to stop they could release approximately 150
immediately the entry into that city of hotels, but the extent to which this was
all personnel not needed there for essen- carried out is not known.17
tial duty, and to institute a survey at These efforts to keep to a minimum
once of the units already located there the number of U.S. troops in Paris did
with a view toward removing all whose nothing to reverse the decision by which
presence was not absolutely required. that city became the permanent head-
One of the main purposes of the reduc- quarters of the Communications Zone.
tion was the desire to use Paris primarily In September General Lee’s head-
as a leave center.16 quarters quickly became the nerve cen-
Efforts to break the “Paris fever” ter of the theater’s administrative ac-
which had seized Americans of all ranks tivities.
did not meet with spectacular success. Meanwhile the Communications
On 20 October General Smith met with Zone’s territorial organization also made
SHAEF and COMZ staff officers to re- progress. As outlined elsewhere the
emphasize the Supreme Commander’s OVERLORDplanners had contemplated
policy on movements to the French cap- the establishment of a sectional or-
ital and to discuss ways of transferring ganization on the Continent and before
additional units without detriment to D Day had actually activated Base Sec-
the war effort. Some units had already tions No. 1 and No. 2, intended for
moved outside the city, but the number operations in Brittany and Normandy,
of new requests for accommodation respectiveIy.18 I n addition, they had
within Paris more than made up for the tentatively formed Base Section No. 3
removals. T h e fact that about 90 per- for use as an intermediate section be-
cent of the hotels in Paris had been tween the Advance Section and the base
taken over by the Americans produced sections. Like other plans, the scheme
an unfortunate public reaction and gave for the sectional organization was based
rise to comments that Allied demands in on a forecast of tactical operations. Since
several respects exceeded those of the these did not proceed as expected, the
Germans. T h e COMZ headquarters planned organization underwent con-
alone occupied 167 hotels, the Seine siderable change.
Base Section headquarters another 129, Early in July plans still called for
Base Sections No. 1 and No. 2 to develop
the Brittany and Cotentin Peninsulas.
16 Cbl FWD–15033, Eisenhower to Lee, SHAEF
SGS 400.3/1 Supply Problems of Allied Advance;
Memo, Col Allen Sibley to Maj Gen Robert W. 17Conf Min, Hq ETO, 20 Oct 44, EUCOM 337
Crawford, 12 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 014.1 Civil Affairs General Conferences 44 II.
in Paris 1. 18 See Logistical Support I , 216–18.
TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 33
Base Section No. 3 was now tentatively No. I the Cherbourg Command (Pro-
assigned the area of the Seine ports. In visional) and placing it under Col.
addition, an intermediate section and a Theodore Wyman, formerly a district
Paris section were contemplated, the commander in Western Base Section.
former to take over the area from Le T h e Cherbourg Command remained
Mans to Reims, the latter to take over under the control of the Advance Sec-
the administration of the headquarters tion, but Colonel Wyman was given
command in Paris. Personnel for the ad- most of the powers of a base section com-
ditional sections was to come from the mander, and within the next few days
U.K. sections, which were to be dis- his organization was reinforced with
banded generally in accordance with the officers drawn from the provisional Base
Reverse BOLEROprocess, and the United Section No. 3 in the United Kingdom.
Kingdom organized into a single U.K. These developments soon raised the
Base. question as to whether the Cherbourg
Developments in July began to bring Command might not take over the mis-
about important alterations in the mis- sion originally assigned to Base Section
sions of some of the sections. Early in No. 2—i.e., operations in Normandy.
the month the Advance Section decided T h e position of Base Section No. 2 con-
to subdivide its territory into area com- sequently became more and more uncer-
mands. On 11 July it organized the port tain, and in the last two weeks of July
of Cherbourg as Area No. I under the its movement to the Continent was twice
command of Col. Cleland C. Sibley, com- scheduled and twice postponed. T h e de-
mander of the 4th Major Port. A few cision not to use Base Section No. 2 for
days later the Advance Section set up the purpose originally intended finally
the rest of its territory as Area No. II. came as the result of a tour of inspec-
Confined for an unexpectedly long tion which General Lord, the COMZ
period to the Normandy beachhead area, Chief of Staff, made of that area toward
Brig. Gen. Ewart G. Plank’s organiza- the end of July. Satisfied with the prog-
tion was now handling a heavy load on ress of operations at Cherbourg, Gen-
the Continent, acting in the capacity of eral Lord concluded that it would be
both an advance and a base section. T h e inadvisable to impose another head-
creation of area commands was obviously quarters to supervise a job already well
an attempt to decentralize some of its under way. He proposed rather that
activities, particularly the specialized Colonel Wyman’s organization be built
functions of a major port which was to up and that it be allowed progressively
begin operating within the next few to take over additional activities as the
days. Advance Section could relinquish con-
As it turned out, the organization of trol over them, the idea being that the
area commands was the first step in the Cherbourg Command should eventually
creation of a new base section. On 21 expand in size to include the beaches as
July the Advance Section took another well as the port of Cherbourg, and that
step in this direction, redesignating Area Colonel Wyman should become the base
34 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
section commander in that area. General increase in size of the lodgment which
Plank concurred in this view.19 followed the breakout from Normandy,
By 1 August it was definitely decided, this process accelerated noticeably.
therefore, that the Cherbourg Command T h e next area to be organized was
would be the forerunner of a full-fledged Brittany. Base Section No. 1 had already
base section. For this purpose it was now arrived off UTAH Beach on 3 August
to be reinforced by the bulk of the Base and in accordance with its planned mis-
Section No. 3 headquarters. T h e transi- sion immediately proceeded to the vicin-
tion was very rapid. On 7 August, the ity of Rennes to assume the task of sup-
same day on which Headquarters, Com- porting the Third Army in Brittany and
munications Zone, opened on the Con- developing that area. An amendment in
tinent, the area around Cherbourg was plans now took place, however, to per-
detached from Advance Section and be- mit the employment of Base Section No.
came operational as the Cherbourg Base 2 in the Brittany Peninsula also. T h e
Section. I n the succeeding weeks its re- expansion of the Cherbourg Command
sponsibilities were increased rapidly by into a base section had left Base Section
the turning over of additional territory No. 2 without a mission, and it was now
in the vicinity of the beaches and by the decided to divide the responsibilities in
release of supply dumps by Advance Sec- Brittany between Base Sections No. 1
tion in the beach area. On 16 August and No. 2, leaving to the former the task
Colonel Wyman’s command was finally of developing the Quiberon Bay area
redesignated Normandy Base Section. By and supporting the Third Army in Brit-
this time it was rapidly assuming the tany, and holding the latter in reserve
enormous task of handling the reception, for use in developing the port of Brest
staging, and dispatch of troops and sup- when it was captured.
plies coming in over the beaches and Base Section No. 1 became operational
through the minor ports and Cher- on 16 August, redesignated as Brittany
bourg.20 Base Section, thus giving the Communi-
T h e creation of a base section organi- cations Zone two full-fledged base sec-
zation in the Cotentin on 7 August tions in an operational status on the
brought to realization the situation vis- Continent, one operating in the rear of
ualized in the OVERLORD plans whereby the Advance Section in Normandy and
the Advance Section and a second COMZ the other in the rear of the VIII Corps
section should become contiguous.21Un- in Brittany. T h e plan to use Base Sec-
til that time progress in the development tion No. 2 at Brest proved abortive in
of the continental organization had been view of the disappointing turn of events
retarded. With the advent of the COMZ at that port, and Brittany Base Section
headquarters proper on the Continent eventually took control of all Brittany,
early in August, and with the sudden as originally intended. T h e mission of
Brig. Gen. Leroy P. Collins’ Base Sec-
19Ltr, Lord to Plank, 25 Jul 44, and Plank’s re- tion No. 2 consequently had to be
ply, 28 Jul 44, EUCOM 381/2 War Plans General.
20 Organizationand Command, II, 178–87.
changed once more. On 5 September it
21See Logistical Support I , 208. was finally activated as the Loire Base
TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 35
Fenton S. Jacobs of Western Base Sec- either Oise or Channel could actually
tion had initiated planning for Base become operational, however, it was de-
Section No. 3 (intended as an inter- cided to switch their missions because
mediate section) and Brig. Gen. Charles Colonel Jacobs’ organization was con-
O. Thrasher of Southern Base Section sidered better qualified by reason of its
was tentatively scheduled to be the dep- personnel and experience for port de-
uty commander of the new U.K. Base. 25 velopment and operation. Consequently
In September plans called for the on 15 September the original Oise Sec-
creation of two additional sections to tion was redesignated Channel Base Sec-
complete the continental COMZ or- tion, under the command of Colonel
ganization. One of these was to be the Jacobs, and Channel Base Section was
Oise Section, which was scheduled to renamed Oise and placed under the com-
take over the area east of Paris as ter- mand of General Thrasher.26
ritory was relinquished by the Advance Neither of the two newly activated
Section; the other was to be Channel sections was immediately assigned area
Base Section, scheduled to develop the responsibility. Channel Base Section
Le Havre–Rouen area. Both sections presented a special problem because it
were activated and began operations in was to operate ports lying in British ter-
September, although the assignment of ritory, north of the boundary between
their respective missions was attended the 21 and 12th Army Groups. Its opera-
by some confusion. tions thus required crossing British lines
It will be recalled that originally of communication and violated the prin-
Colonel Jacobs had tentatively been ciple established by the OVERLORD
given command of Base Section No. 3 planners that U.S. and British lines of
and a planning mission for the Con- communication should be kept com-
tinent. Early in August the transfer of pletely separate. T h e resulting situation
the bulk of his headquarters to Cher- paralleled closely the relationship be-
bourg to build up Colonel Wyman’s tween British and American forces at
organization had left Colonel Jacobs ports in the United Kingdom, and
without a command. Later in the month naturally called for close co-operation.
another headquarters, known as Base Early in October Channel Base Section
Section No. 4, was constituted with was given control of Le Havre and the
Colonel Jacobs in command, and tagged immediate vicinity except for civil affairs
as an intermediate section. On 3 Septem- functions, thus becoming a small en-
ber this headquarters was officially re- clave within British-controlled territory.
designated Oise Section and opened at U.S. activities in the British territory—
Fontainebleau. transportation, for example—were han-
A week later Channel Base Section
was activated under the command of 26At the same time an exchange of engineer sec-
General Thrasher, who was given this tions was made between Colonel Jacobs’ head-
quarters and Brittany Base Section. The latter’s
assignment rather than that of deputy engineer staff had prepared specifically for the de-
commander of the U.K. Base. Before velopment of Brest, and the decision not to develop
that port left this staff without a mission to match
25Organization and Command, II, 86–92, 190–91. its ability.
TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 37
dled by Normandy Base Section west of needs and the shifting tactical situation.
the Seine and by Channel Base Section T h e territorial organization had de-
east of that river. veloped only roughly as intended, but
Oise Section’s development, mean- plans had proved sufficiently flexible to
while, was somewhat arrested, and not permit the necessary adaptations. Activa-
strictly in keeping with original inten- tion and phasing in of the various con-
tions. T h e drawing of boundaries and tinental section headquarters had lagged
the assignment of a definite territory to at first, and had then accelerated in con-
General Thrasher’s headquarters proved formance with the sudden change in
infeasible at first because of the lack of pace of tactical operations.
troops to carry out area responsibilities. T h e principal changes in plans had
For the first weeks, therefore, Oise Sec- stemmed from the fact that the main line
tion functioned in territory actually as- of communications had developed not
signed to the Advance Section. Com- from Brittany as expected, but from
munications Zone redrew the latter’s Cherbourg and the beaches, which as-
boundaries early in October, and Oise sumed an inordinately greater impor-
at that time assumed area control of the tance than anticipated. This had resulted
territory between the Advance Section first in the growth of a base section or-
and Seine Section. Its domain subse- ganization in the Cotentin in a manner
quently grew several times as the changes not contemplated, and second, in the de-
in Advance Section’s boundaries con- velopment of only relatively minor ac-
formed with the forward movement of tivity in Brittany and along the lines of
the armies. T h e bad logistic situation in communications extending eastward
the fall meanwhile made it impossible therefrom.
for Oise Section to develop into a true T h e small scale of activity in the Brit-
intermediate section as intended. Almost tany area eventually led logically to the
all supplies forwarded in September and disbandment of both the Loire and Brit-
October were immediately consumed, tany sections. T h e first step was taken on
with the result that few intermediate 1 December, when Brittany Base Section
depots could be established. Conse- absorbed Loire Section as a district.
quently Oise Section’s functions were Even this consolidation left the Brittany
limited mainly to rail and road mainte- Base Section with only limited responsi-
nance and the supply of units stationed bilities, which hardly warranted the
within its own borders.27 maintenance of a separate base section
By mid-October, with three base sec- headquarters. O n 1 February 1945 Brit-
tions, three intermediate sections, and tany Base Section was in turn absorbed
one advance section in operation, the by Normandy Base Section as a district.
Communications Zone’s administrative At this time Normandy also expanded
organization in support of the 12th Army eastward, taking over territory from
Group was relatively complete, although Channel Base Section north of the Seine
there were to be consolidations and to the new boundary between the 21 and
boundary changes to meet changing
12th Army Groups. This gave Normandy
27Organization and Command, II, 194–202. Base Section control over an area ex-
38 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
tending all the way from Brest to Dieppe, France was simpler than in the north.
including responsibility for the opera- There was no question there of the de-
tion of the ports of Le Havre and velopment of alternate port areas or
Rouen. 28 bases, since there was but one line of
Channel Base Section’s main preoc- communications possible, leading di-
cupation, meanwhile, had become han- rectly northward from Marseille u p the
dling U.S. activities at Antwerp, which valley of the Rhone. The major or-
finally opened at the end of November, ganizational problem in the south was
and operating U.S. supply lines to the the integration of its logistic structure
Advance Section. At Antwerp, as at Le with that in the north. This integration
Havre and Rouen. Channel Base Sec- did not occur simultaneously with
tion operated within British territory, SHAEF’s assumption of operational con-
but to the south of the U.S.-British trol of the 6th Army Group. It was
boundary Channel Base Section was gradual, and it was effected only after a
given responsibility in southern Belgium long transitional period, during which
extending forward to the ADSEC rear the southern forces continued to main-
boundary. (Map 3 ) tain close ties with the North African
I n the course of these consolidations theater in matters concerning their sup-
and repeated boundary changes, com- port.
mand in the base sections remained rel- Logistic planning for both French and
atively stable. T h e only important U.S. forces in the DRAGOON operation
changes occurred in Normandy Base Sec- had been done by the SOS, North
tion, where dissatisfaction with the de- African Theater of Operations, com-
velopment of Cherbourg’s capacity led manded by Maj. Gen. Thomas B.
to the relief of Colonel Wyman at the Larkin, whose headquarters was with
end of October 1944. H e was succeeded AFHQ at Caserta, Italy. After the land-
by Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, who came ing i n southern France the communica-
to the theater on temporary loan from tions zone there had developed very
the ASF. I n mid-December General much as it had i n the north. I n the early
Clay was in turn succeeded by Maj. Gen. stages an organization known as Coastal
Henry S. Aurand, who also came from Base Section (COSBASE), similar to the
an assignment i n the ASF. Except for Advance Section in the north, was at-
these changes, command in the base sec- tached to the Seventh U.S. Army and
tions was stable, all the commanders charged with the initial development of
having had similar assignments i n the the communications zone. Coastal Base
United Kingdom. 29 Section had been activated early in July
1944 at Naples under the command of
In some respects the development of Maj. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson. It accom-
the communications zone i n southern panied the Seventh Army on the land-
ings, and for the first three weeks con-
28 Within Normandy Base’ Section the British re- cerned itself mainly with the operation
tained a small enclave in the area of their D-Day
landings.
of the beaches. O n 10 September an
29 Organization and Command, II, 265–70. army rear boundary was drawn, and
F. Temple
MAP 3
40 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
leave the responsibility for logistic sup- jections to the immediate absorption
port with the North African theater.33 of the southern logistic structure by
This arrangement took effect on 1 No- COMZ-ETO. General Larkin became
vember, on which date all NATOUSA the commander of the new organization,
units in the southern lodgment were re- and was also named Deputy Commander
assigned to ETOUSA, the latter at this of the Communications Zone, ETO.
time assuming responsibility in all Early in November he moved his
purely administrative matters such as main headquarters from Caserta, Italy,
personnel (including replacements), fi- to Dijon, France, where the advance
nance, and other matters handled echelon of Communications Zone, Med-
through the adjutant general, provost iterranean Theater of Operations
marshal general, judge advocate general, (MTOUSA), was already operating the
and inspector general. SHAEF at this communications zone in southern
time assumed responsibility in civil af- France. 34
fairs matters. In effect, the advance echelon of
By this arrangement it was contem- COMZ-MTOUSA became SOLOC, and
plated that logistic support would re- since General Larkin was able to bring
main the responsibility of the North most of his headquarters staff with him
African theater for an indefinite period. to southern France, the new headquar-
Late in October, however, before the ters was simply a continuation of the
above agreement actually went into parent headquarters at Caserta. When
effect, the scheme was further modified SOLOC became operational on 20 No-
to permit the transfer of control in logis- vember, therefore, COMZ-ETO took
tic matters to the ETO within the next over a relatively intact and operating
few weeks. To facilitate this transfer a supply organization from COMZ-
special vehicle was created, known as MTOUSA. 35
Southern Line of Communications, or T h e actual integration of the supply
SOLOC. SOLOC was to be a subcom- system of the southern armies and sup-
mand of the Communications Zone, porting air forces into the Communica-
ETO, interposed between General Lee's tions Zone, ETO, was not accomplished
headquarters and the two southern sec- without difficulties. These arose not only
tions. But it was to retain the right to from the necessity of SOLOC to adjust
communicate directly with the North itself to the standing operating pro-
African theater on matters concerning cedures of the ETO, which in some re-
personnel and shipping from the Med- spects differed from those in the Mediter-
iterranean. T h e granting of such au- ranean, but also from the rather unusual
thority thus met some of the SHAEF ob- position which SOLOC held as a quasi-
independent and intermediate command
33Conf, Hq NATOUSA, sub: Transfer of Adm between Headquarters, Communications
and Supply Coincidental to the Change of Theater
Boundary, 27 Sep 44, and Aide Memoire by Lee, 30
Sep 44, ETO 381/200 Transfer . . .; SHAEF Memo, 34 North African Theater (NATOUSA) was re-
sub: Policy on Transfer of Adm Responsibility for designated Mediterranean Theater of Operations
DRAGOON Forces, 8 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 Diversion (MTOUSA) in October.
of Service Troops, DRAGOON, Box I, Folder 5 1 . 35Organization and Command, II, 235–40.
TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 43
over its rather special status as a separate also of closely scrutinizing the opera-
command, and from the supervision tions of both sections. CONAD oc-
which it exercised over the operations of casionally protested the orders of its
CONAD. Some of SOLOC’s own staff superior headquarters, claiming “inter-
officers tended to overlook their organi- ference,” as for example when SOLOC,
zation’s separate command status and concerned over the wasteful use of trans-
had to be cautioned against encouraging port facilities, stepped in to direct
higher echelons to correspond directly CONAD to obtain prior approval be-
with subordinate commands, and vice fore sending its motor transport outside
versa. General Wilson, commander of its own territory. But General Larkin re-
CONAD, had opposed the organiza- garded it fully within his authority and
tional changes by which his organization responsibility to exercise such super-
had become purely an advance section vision in the interest of the most ef-
and been deprived of control over the ficient use of resources along the entire
base area. He had proposed, without southern line of communications.
success, that the activities of the two sec- SOLOC’s continued ties with the
tions in support of the 6th Army Group Mediterranean theater were also a source
be co-ordinated by his own command, of some confusion, arising mainly from
which, he argued, was in a better posi- the situation whereby shipping was han-
tion than any other headquarters to dled through the Mediterranean and
anticipate and meet the requirements of requisitions through ETOUSA. A heavy
combat troops. CONAD found it dif- flow of both troops and supplies from
ficult to adjust to the new situation and the United States in November created
complained about SOLOC’s close super- considerable difficulties along the south-
vision. ern line. They led General Larkin to re-
It is likely that such a complaint port that the New York Port and the
against supervision from above would War Department were apparently con-
have been made even if there had been fused as to SOLOC’s position, for they
no intermediate command such as were continuing to ship all supplies in
SOLOC. Quite. understandably, the Ad- bulk to the Mediterranean, including
vance Section in the north had reacted those not only for Italy but also for
in the same way initially, resenting the southern France, which was now under
loss of control over certain activities in another theater’s jurisdiction. General
the territory it relinquished to the base Larkin desired that shipping for the
sections. Nevertheless, the activities in southern forces be set up for ETOUSA
the advance and base sections were di- and then allocated to SOLOC as neces-
vided in both the north and south, and sary.
in the latter area the supervision over Such problems were eventually ironed
communications zone operations was ex- out, but they pointed up the difficulties
ercised by SOLOC. This took the form attending the transition of control from
mainly of editing CONAD’s requisitions one theater to another, as well as the dif-
and arranging with Delta Base Section ficulty of employing an intermediate
for shipment of supplies northward, but headquarters to effect such a transfer.
TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 45
By early 1945 the integration of the Group and of the Ninth U.S. Army in 21
southern supply system had progressed Army Group. I n the south CONAD per-
sufficiently to render SOLOC superflu- formed the same function for the 6th
ous. SOLOC had served a useful pur- Army Group. T h e Advance Section for
pose in facilitating the transfer of sup- the most part drew its support directly
ply functions from MTOUSA to from the Normandy and Channel Base
ETOUSA, but in the view of the 6th Sections, which controlled the entire
Army Group its continued existence coastal area and operated the ports.
contributed to the slowness of pro- Similarly in the south Delta Base Sec-
cedure involved in going through so tion organized the base area and operated
many headquarters.36 Pressure to abolish the port of Marseille. Besides these base
the organization consequently increased, and advance organizations two sections
and on 6 February 1945 SOLOC was operated in the north, Oise Section con-
finally dissolved, CONAD and Delta trolling transportation facilities in the
Base Section then coming directly under forwarding of supplies from the base to
the command of General Lee's COMZ the advance section, and Seine Section
headquarters in Paris. concerning itself mainly with the ad-
By February, then, the continental ministration of the headquarters in and
Communications Zone consisted of three around Paris. T h e U.K. Base, mean-
base, two intermediate, and two advance while, was also a part of the Communi-
sections. I n the north the Advance Sec- cations Zone, feeding supplies and per-
tion operated in direct support of the sonnel from the United Kingdom and
First and Third Armies in the 12th Army handling certain residual administra-
tive functions there for SHAEF and
36Cbl BX–23473, 6 A Gp to SHAEF, 26 Jan 45, ETOUSA-COMZ.37
SHAEF SGS 400.3/1 Supply Problems of Allied Ad-
vance. 37 Organization and Command II, 203, 241–48.
CHAPTER III
by projecting an increase in the capacity edge that bad weather would soon ren-
of Cherbourg and the minor Normandy der the beaches unusable, prompted lo-
ports and by seeking a larger allotment gistic planners to resume the search for
of coasters so that small ports could be alternate port discharge capacity to meet
used to fuller advantage. They also con- at least the interim requirements until
sidered opening the smaller Brittany the major Brittany ports could be
ports, which had not seriously entered opened. T h e capture of Le Havre and
into the original plans. Rouen did not yet appear imminent.
Nothing had happened thus far to Consequently attention once again
alter the previous conviction that both turned to the smaller Brittany ports,
Brest and Quiberon Bay were absolutely which had received only sporadic con-
essential for the support of American sideration in the past. O n 25 August the
forces. While doubts had already arisen Communications Zone decided to go
as to the feasibility of developing Qui- ahead with the development of Morlaix,
beron Bay, mainly because of the tow- St. Brieuc, St. Malo, and Cancale, and
ing problem in the fall, it was still ex- at the same time issued instructions to
pected at the end of July that the Brit- the base section commander to develop
tany area would be developed as orig- the port of Granville on the west Nor-
inally intended. mandy coast. A target of 20,000 tons total
T h e effect which the pursuit was to capacity was set for the five ports, three
have on the port discharge problem was of which were scheduled to meet their
not immediately apparent. I n the first goals within the next ten days. 3
half of August neither SHAEF nor T h e decision to open these minor
COMZ planners contemplated major ports hardly dispelled the growing anxi-
changes in port development plans. T h e ety over the port situation. Meeting port
Communications Zone reaffirmed its in- discharge requirements was not a simple
tention of pushing the Quiberon Bay matter of adding up the total capacity
project vigorously. It also advocated dou- of every little inlet along the coast and
bling the planned capacity of Brest and, balancing this against the total tonnages
in addition, opening the Loire ports it was desired to import. Port capacity
(Nantes and St. Nazaire) as soon as re- not only had to be adequate in quantity
sources permitted.2 but of the kind suitable for handling
In the last two weeks of August con- various types of shipping and cargo. O n
fidence that Brest and Quiberon Bay paper the Allies had sufficient port ca-
could be relied on to meet U.S. port pacity to handle all the imports scheduled
needs finally began to wane. T h e con- for the next few weeks. But they were
tinued delay in the capture of the main actually very short of capacity of the type
Brittany ports, coupled with the knowl- suitable to handle the unloading of such
commodities as coal, boxed vehicles, and
2Ltr, Deputy G–4 Mov and T n Br G–4 SHAEF heavy lifts. I n the first two or three
to CAO, 1 1 Aug 44, App. 5 of Mov and T n Study,
sub: MULBERRY, Aug 44, SHAEF G–4 War Diary/
months of operations this was not a
Jnl; Ltr, Hq COMZ to SAC, sub: Port Capacities,
10 Aug 44. SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers, Wharves, 3G–4 History, I, 43; 12 A Gp Tn Sec Jnl. 2 Sep
Docks, and Berths 1944, III. 44.
48 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
major problem. All vehicles, for exam- major portion of U.S. port discharge re-
ple, were brought across the Channel quirements could be met only through
assembled in M T ships,4 LST’s, or the development of the larger deepwater
LCT’s. This was possible because the ports. T h e capture of such facilities had
stowage factor on so short a voyage was already been delayed, and anxiety in-
relatively unimportant, the vital thing creased at the end of August as to the
being to achieve the fastest possible turn- condition in which ports such as Brest
around. Beginning in September, how- and Lorient would be found if and
ever, a larger and larger portion of U.S. when they were finally captured.6
supplies was scheduled to come directly Tactical developments within the next
from the United States, loaded so as to re- week radically altered the entire outlook
duce broken stowage to a minimum and on the port situation, and eventually led
thus use space more economically. Such a to a recasting of the entire port develop
schedule meant that practically every ment program. On 4 September British
Liberty ship coming from the United forces captured the great port of Antwerp
States would contain either boxed vehi- with most of its facilities intact. On 12
cles or other heavy lifts. September the stubbornly defended and
Naturally it was desirable that such badly damaged port of Le Havre, 225
awkward loads be discharged at ports miles to the rear, also fell to British
where suitable shore cranes were avail- troops. Rouen had been occupied on 30
able. In August the only port in Allied August.
hands which possessed facilities even Preinvasion planning had accepted it
partially adapted to handling such cargo as essential from the logistic point of
was Cherbourg, and it was obvious that view that both Le Havre and Rouen
that port lacked sufficient capacity to should be captured and used. In fact, it
handle all the shipping coming directly contemplated that a crossing of the lower
from the United States. In fact, proposals Seine and seizure of these ports would
to handle heavy troop movements be the first operation attempted after the
through Cherbourg (again because of capture of the lodgment area. T h e pur-
Brest’s unavailability) already threatened pose in seizing the Seine ports, however,
to cut into the limited cargo-handling was not to serve U.S. needs, but to re-
capacity of that port. It was inevitable lieve the British forces from dependence
that some boxed vehicles and other awk- on the beaches. U.S. lines of communica-
ward loads would have to be received at tion were to be based on Cherbourg and
the beaches and minor ports, where the Brittany. It was not until much later
handling of such cargo would be that the transfer of Le Havre to the
extremely difficult.5 But eventually the Americans was contemplated. 7
T h e delay in capturing Brest and the
4 Liberties outfitted to handle motor transport.
5 Memo, Capt N. H. Vissering, Mov and Tn Br 6Shipping Note for CAO, 26 Aug 44.
G–4 SHAEF, for Whipple, sub: Comments on Stf 7SHAEF Plng Study, sub: Post-NEPTUNE Course
Study 13, 12 Aug 44, SHAEF G–3 381 War Plans of Action After Capture of the Lodgment Area,
General; Shipping Note for CAO, 26 Aug 44, SHAEF Sec. II, 30 May 4. SHAEF SGS 381 Post-OVERLORD
G–4 Mov and Tn Br War Diary/Jnl. Planning.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 49
tion of a portion of the Antwerp fa- celed. As early as 3 September the Lo-
cilities. 10 gistical Plans Branch had recommended
T h e initial enthusiasm for a complete that the South Brittany ports be aban-
shift to Antwerp as the answer to port doned.13 On the 7th SHAEF announced
discharge needs was soon tempered by that neither Nantes, St. Nazaire, nor
more sober realization concerning both Lorient would be developed, and also
the speed with which the new port ca decided finally that the much-debated
pacity might become available and the Quiberon Bay project would be aban-
current plight of the Allied forces. T h e doned. 14
Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Ex- While attention thus definitely shifted
peditionary Force, immediately gave from Brittany, no final decisions had yet
warning that both Antwerp and Rotter- been made regarding either Brest or the
dam were highly vulnerable to blocking ports which had just been uncovered.
and mining, and that if the enemy was I n view of the great changes which tacti-
successful in these operations no estimate cal developments had brought about, ne-
could be made of the time it would take cessitating a recasting of port plans, Gen-
to open these ports. 11T h e Allies needed eral Lee on 14 September summarized
additional capacity immediately; the pur- the entire port situation for the Supreme
suit was at its height, and maintenance Commander and offered his recommen-
of the armies was stretched to the limit. dations for meeting future requirements.
All transportation was fully committed, General Lee’s analysis led him to con-
and port clearance was already largely clude that the development of Brest as
sacrificed for the sake of line-of-commu- well as the other western ports to the
nications hauling. Meanwhile port dis- tonnages originally planned was no
charge had shown no improvement, longer sound. Le Havre, he noted, was
averaging only 25,000 tons per day. “Al- reported to be seriously damaged, mak-
together,” Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey M. ing it unlikely that large tonnage capac-
Gale, the chief administrative officer of ity could be developed there in the near
SHAEF, concluded, “the administrative future. In his opinion, moreover, its lo-
situation remained grim.” 12 cation did not materially shorten the
Logistic officers at SHAEF, conse- lines of communication. He believed it
quently, did not share the view that advisable, therefore, to carry out only
Antwerp would immediately meet all a limited development of Le Havre as
the Allies’ needs for port discharge, al- an interim port with a capacity of be-
though they agreed that at least some tween 8,000 and 10,000 tons per day,
of the Brittany projects could be can- and to do this as rapidly as possible with
a minimum expenditure of reconstruc-
10 DailyJnl, G–4 Plans Br COMZ, 10Sep 44, ETO tion effort.
Adm G–4 145C. General Lee voiced the now generally
11Cbl, ANCXF to SHAEF, 3 Sep 44, SHAEF AG accepted opinion that the bulk of Allied
323.3–2 Captured Ports.
12Mil Shipments Priority Mtgs, 2 and 9 Sep 44.
SHAEF AG 337–18 Mil Shipments Priority Mtgs; 13SHAEF G–4 War Diary/Jnl, 3 Sep 44.
Shipping Note for CAO, 9 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 500 14CblFWD–14066, SCAEF to 12 A Gp, 7 Sep 44,
Transportation General 1944, II. SHAEF AG 323.3–3 Port Capacities.
T H E P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 51
T h e most important project of all and out into normal unloading.20 It had
was the development of Antwerp as the always been planned that Brest should
major joint U.S. British port on the handle the reception of personnel and
Continent. 17 Antwerp was now almost organizational equipment. But the re-
universally looked upon as the early port of the survey group sent to examine
solution to the most fundamental logis- Brest upon its capture on 25 September
tic problem facing the Allies. It was con- finally confirmed the fears which had
templated that there should be a gradual been held regarding that port’s condi-
closing down of activity in the ports tion. T h e report disclosed that extreme
farther to the rear as Antwerp’s capacity demolitions, mining, and damage to
developed. T h e extent to which the ports quay facilities had rendered the port
in the rear were to be developed and useless and estimated that even limited
used from now on was therefore predi- unloading of cargo and troops would
cated on the progress in bringing Ant- not be possible for seventy-five days.21In
werp into operation. view of the more urgent commitments
Pending the development of new ca- to clear and rehabilitate Le Havre and
pacity, meanwhile, supply officials were Rouen, Brest was now given the lowest
faced with the hard fact that in the im- priority, 22and was eventually abandoned
mediate future the port situation would altogether.
continue to deteriorate. Port discharge At the end of September, therefore,
had improved slightly in the third week the port situation remained grave. All
of September, averaging nearly 37,000 hopes now centered on Antwerp, the
tons per day. But in the following week opening of which, as the Supreme Com-
it dropped to less than 28,000 tons, and mander had recently noted, would have
for another full month was to average “the effect of a blood transfusion” on the
barely 25,000 as against the originally entire maintenance situation.23His con-
estimated requirement of 38,500.18 cern, which was widely shared, was ex-
T h e drop in performance at the end pressed in a memo to the Chief of Staff
of September was caused in part by at this time. “As you know,” he said, “I
inclement weather, which hampered op- am terribly anxious about Antwerp, not
erations at the beaches.19 But discharge only the capture of its approaches, but
had also fallen off at Cherbourg because the getting of the port to working in-
of the handling of troop convoys with stantaneously thereafter.” 24 Antwerp
organizational equipment, which put an
additional strain on the port’s facilities 20Memo, Deputy Chief of Mov and T n Br G–4
SHAEF for G–4, sub: Port Info, 29 Sep 44, SHAEF
G–4 825.1 Piers, . . . 1944 III.
17Ltr, Lord to Chiefs of Gen and Special Stf S e a 21Cbl 281255. CTF 125 to ANCXF, 29 Sep 44.
and Sec Comdrs, sub: Dev of Continental Ports, 27 SHAEF SGS 800 Harbors, Opening, Use, Construc-
Sep 44, EUCOM 400 Supplies, Services, and Equip- tion.
ment 1944, V, o r SHAEF AG 323.3–2 Captured 22Mil Shipments Priority Mtg, 29 Sep 44, SHAEF
Ports. AG 337–18.
18OMAHADistrict Summary of Opns, 25 Nov–2 23Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 1 Sep 44, OPD
Dec, Pt. IV, ETO Adm 231. Exec Office File 9.
19Mil Shipments Priority Mtg, 29 Sep 44, SHAEF 24Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 30 Sep 44, SHAEF
AG 337–18. SGS 800 Antwerp.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 53
had already been in Allied hands for exceeding 30,000 tons despite the fact
four weeks. It was thought at the time that MULBERRY A, the artificial port at
of its capture that it would surely be in OMAHABeach had been abandoned. Ex-
operation some time in October. At the cept for relatively minor unloadings
end of September General Moses, the across the beaches at St. Michel-en-Grève
12th Army Group G–4 made an estimate in Brittany, Normandy’s facilities com-
which proved far more realistic when prised the entire discharge capacity avail-
he suggested that it would be better not able to U.S. forces on the Continent.
to plan on the port’s opening until 1 Early in November (D plus 150), despite
December. 25 the virtual cessation of operations at the
beaches, the intake through the Nor-
(2) T h e Beaches and Minor Ports mandy ports still averaged about 17,000
of Normandy long tons per day and accounted for 63
One of the outstanding features of percent of the total U.S. discharge.
logistic support in the first six months T h e performance of the Normandy
of operations was the unexpected extent ports in terms of percentage of total dis-
to which U.S. supplies and personnel charge is explained by the failure to
were funneled through the Normandy develop the Brittany area. Their per-
ports. OVERLORD plans had envisaged formance in terms of tons discharged
the Normandy area primarily as an in- is explained first by the unexpected ca-
terim base pending the development of pacity of the open beaches, and second,
Brittany. Since the beaches were ex- by the development of Cherbourg to a
pected to have a short-lived usefulness capacity far beyond that contemplated
and Cherbourg a relatively small capac- in plans.
ity, a maximum discharge of less than T h e capacity of the beaches proved a
26,000 tons per day was counted on for godsend in view of the delayed opening
the Normandy beaches and ports.26 This of Cherbourg. I n the first seven weeks
maximum was to be attained at about they constituted practically the only in-
D plus 90, at which time Normandy’s take capacity on the continent. After the
facilities were to account for about 55 opening of Cherbourg and the develop-
percent of the total U.S. port capacity ment of other port capacity the relative
on the Continent. Discharge through the importance of the beaches naturally
Normandy ports was scheduled to de- declined. Nevertheless they continued
cline to about 13,000 tons per day and to account for a significant percentage
account for only 30 percent of the total of the personnel, vehicles, and cargo
intake by early November. brought to the Continent until the end
At D plus go (4 September) the daily of October. After the big storm in June
discharge was actually averaging up- operations at the beaches settled down
wards of 28,000 long tons and frequently to a normal routine. Both beaches were
soon operating as well-organized ports
25Memo, Moses for Bradley, 30 Sep 44, 12 A Gp and, except for occasional bad weather
G–4 Memos of Gen Moses 1944. which halted or slowed down operations
26 Granville is not included as a Normandy port
in these comparisons for reasons explained later. for brief periods, enjoyed relative stabil-
54 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
ity. T h e establishment of beach transfer 20th to the 23d. On the last day of the
points, improvements in the road net- month an all-time high of 25,853 tons
works, the landing of additional truck was unloaded at the two beaches, OMAHA
companies, and the general improvement handling 15,834 tons, 158 percent of its
in unloading and clearance methods target, and UTAH discharging 10,019
brought increased discharge and move- tons, 175 percent of its rated capacity.
ment of supplies, with the result that This record was almost duplicated on
targets were consistently exceeded. In the following day, when 25,303 tons
the week after the storm both beaches were offloaded, and again on 8 August,
surpassed all previous performance, when 25,563 tons were brought ashore.
OMAHAaveraging 13,000 tons as against T h e landing of personnel kept pace,
a target of 10,000, and UTAHaveraging although the record was more erratic.
7,200 tons compared with its goal of T h e largest number of personnel de-
5,700.27 barkations at OMAHABeach, except in
Unloading continued at a good rate
the initial assault, had taken place on
in July, although fog and high winds
23 June, when 24,425 men came ashore.
again interfered in the period from the
That day also established a record for
combined debarkations at the two
27[Clifford L. Jones] NEPTUNE:Training for and beaches, totaling 30,916. OMAHAnearly
Mounting the Operation, and the Artificial Ports,
Pt. VI of the Administrative and Logistical History
equaled this performance again on 23
of the ETO, II, 137–39, MS, OCMH. July, when 24,068 men went ashore.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 55
STUCKIN THETHICK
BULLDOZER MUD on a road near Marigny, France, July 1944.
On the whole, however, unloadings in early days of the landings and were being
September exceeded expectations, and deadlined for repairs an increasing per-
the restrictions on discharge were caused centage of the time. The availability of
as much by the unavailability of loaded trucks was always unpredictable, and
craft and by shortages in trucks, dukws, early in October a substantial with-
ferry craft, and men, as by bad weather. drawal of vehicles to bolster the Red
The last two days of September saw sub- Ball Express led to a downward revision
stantial tonnages discharged at both in the tonnage goals for both beaches,
beaches, totaling 20,933 tons on the 29th the OMAHAtarget reverting to the orig-
and 18,575 on the 30th. inal 10,000 tons and UTAH’Sto 4,000.
But 1 October marked the beginning The most serious limiting factor by
of a definite decline from which the this time was the weather. T h e fog and
beaches never recovered. As before, fac- storms of August and September had
tors other than the weather contributed interfered with operations for only short
to the falling off in discharge, notably the periods, and, with one exception, had
problem of vehicles. It became increas- never closed down all activity at the
ingly difficult to keep adequate numbers beaches, despite the tendency of the
of dukws in operation. Most of them had beach organizations to report “all opera-
been running continuously since the tions stopped” in these periods. The un-
T H E P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 57
ganizations did not come until 4 Decem- move on to the Pacific, and they did not
ber, when the OMAHABeach Command 32
relish their rear-echelon service roll.
was finally dissolved. Several adminis- Another administrative change, ef-
trative changes had taken place which fected in August, had little importance
had altered somewhat the shape and in the over-all organization of the
status of the beach organizations since beaches, but had its significance for the
their arrival in the first days of the in- troop units involved. On 14 August the
vasion. In the main, they reflected the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment (of the
evolution of the Communications Zone’s 1st Engineer Special Brigade) was re-
organization on the Continent. On 7 organized and redesignated the 1186th
August the OMAHABeach Command, Engineer Combat Group. In effect, this
the 1st, 5th, and 6th Engineer Special change ended the Army’s recognition
Brigades, and key assigned and attached of the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment
units were released from assignment to as a specialized organization trained for
First Army and were temporarily as- amphibious work, and also ended the
signed to the Advance Section, to which recognition of this unit as one with an
they had been attached in mid-June. unusual record of achievement. T h e
Within another week they were assigned 531st had participated in four invasions
to the Normandy Base Section, which and consisted of veterans with a profes-
assumed control of the Normandy area. sional pride in their organization and
The engineer brigades and attached their specialty. T h e change consequently
units in the OMAHAarea had already brought an inevitable letdown in morale.
been organized into the OMAHABeach Officers and men alike felt they had lost
Command, and the UTAHarea was now their distinctive identity.33
similarly organized into the UTAHBeach In summarizing the operations at
Command, although the brigades re- OMAHAand UTAH it is appropriate to
tained their original identity. include a note on the British MUL-
In September the areas controlled by BERRY at Arromanches-les-Bains since
the beach commands were enlarged, and that installation operated on U.S. ac-
a final expansion took place in October count for about a month. MULBERRY B
when Normandy Base Section was sub- was operated by British forces through-
divided into districts, the OMAHAand out the summer and was of unquestioned
UTAHCommands respectively becoming importance as a source of discharge ca-
OMAHAand UTAHdistricts under the re- pacity because of the delay in capturing
organization. As the headquarters of suitable ports. Early in August the Brit-
COMZ subdivisions the original brigade ish Chiefs of Staff, encouraged by the
organizations had thus assumed roles far favorable developments following the
removed from the specialized functions breakout, questioned the future value
they had been trained for, and the change and importance of the MULBERRY in
was not universally welcomed. First Bri- view of the prospects for the early cap-
gade troops in particular were somewhat
resentful, for as experts in amphibious 32NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the
Operation, II, 146–48, 152–54.
operations they had half-expected to 33Ibid., II, 145–46.
T H E P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 59
was inclined to agree on the low value weather suddenly broke u p the port. I n
of the MULBERRY, and favored a pro- view of the requirement for the maxi-
posal to use the newly constructed mum possible discharge of cargo, how-
PHOENIXES at Le Havre, where they could ever, Maj. Gen. Robert W. Crawford,
be used to greater advantage, in part be- the SHAEF G–4 believed the risk justi-
cause clearance would be directly by rail. fied, and he recommended on 2 Novem-
On 16 October the whole matter of ber that certain bridging equipment be
the MULBERRY’S future was reconsidered left at Arromanches.42 One pier and
at a meeting at SHAEF over which Gen- pierhead were left for U.S. use, there-
eral Gale presided. T h e conference rec- fore, and the unloading of U.S. cargo
ommended that winterization be aban- continued for a few more weeks. 43T h e
doned. Five PHOENIXES then en route to entire matter of winterization was recon-
the port were to be installed; but no sidered again early in November, Ad-
more blockships were to be sunk off Ar- miral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay recom-
romanches, and ten of the new PHOE- mending that winterization be con-
NIXES were to be sent to Le Havre, the re- tinued because experiments with the
mainder being held in the United King- PHOENIXESat Le Havre had not gone
dom as a reserve. The unloading of cargo well.44 But the earlier decision stood
at MULBERRY B was to continue until 31 firm, and MULBERRY B ceased operating
October, and M T ships were to be ac- on 19 November, the same day on which
cepted as long as conditions permitted. discharge at OMAHABeach came to an
Except for the salvaging of removable end.
equipment, the port would be left to dis- T h e cargo which U.S. forces received
integrate after the end of October. T h e through the British MULBERRY was actu-
SHAEF Chief of Staff approved these ally negligible in quantity, for the total
recommendations
on 18 41
October. intake in the five-week period was a bare
T h e rapid deterioration at OMAHA 20,000 tons, consisting chiefly of ammu-
and UTAHin the last half of October, nition from ships lightened at OMAHA. 45
coupled with the fact that Le Havre and
Meanwhile, the smaller Normandy
Rouen were developing much more slow-
ports made their contribution to the
ly than had been expected, compelled
total tonnage discharged on the Con-
the Communications Zone to make the
tinent, although it was rather short-lived
most of the British MULBERRY. Unload-
and small in terms of the total cargo
ing of Liberties necessitated the use of
unloaded. Grandcamp, Isigny, Barfleur,
pierheads and entailed a risk of losing
St. Vaast, and Carentan were all tidal
part of the WHALEbridging making up
the pier at Arromanches in case bad 42Ltr, Crawford to CAO, sub: Winterization of
MULBERRY,
2 Nov 44, SHAEF G–4 825.1 MULBERRY
II.
41Min Mtg at SHAEF, 16 Oct 44, and Cbl S- 43Memo, Brig W. E. Blakey, Deputy Tn SHAEF,
62823, SHAEF to ANCXF, 2 1 A Gp, and COMZ, 18 sub: MULBERRY, 6 Nov 44, and Ltr, Gale to CofS
Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 800.1 MULBERRY O/CS 11; CAO SHAEF, sub: Winterization of MULBERRY,6 Nov 44,
Mtg, 20 Oct 44, SHAEF AG 337–14 CAO Mtgs; SHAEF G–4 825.1 MULBERRY II.
COMZ G–4 Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl, 44Ltr, Gale to CofS SHAEF, 6 Nov 44.
16 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C. 45G–4 History, I, 53.
T H E P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 61
ports which were practically useless at tional work which the new targets en-
low water; in addition, Carentan was a tailed was completed in the first week
locked harbor at the end of an eight- of August, raising the capacity of the
to ten-mile long channel connecting it former from 1,000 to 2,500 tons, and
with the sea, and Isigny was also several giving the latter a capacity of 4,000 tons.
miles inland. None could accommodate ADSEC engineers also carried out addi-
deep-draft vessels and their use was there- tional rehabilitation at Grandcamp,
fore restricted to receiving coasters. Isigny, and St. Vaast, except for the
OVERLORD plans had contemplated the dredging which was necessary to the
development of these ports, with the development of their full capacity. Since
exception of Carentan, to a combined these harbors dried out at low tide, a
capacity of less than 3,000 tons. dredge capable of resting on the bottom
All five ports were found in good was required. Such a vessel—the French
condition, except for mines, roadblocks, bucket dredge Divette–was found in the
sunken craft, barbed wire, and other British sector, was towed to Isigny, and
obstructions. T h e removal of sunken after some repairs began dredging the
vessels and the cleanup of the debris silt from that port.47 A few days of opera-
was largely completed by the first of tion, however, revealed that craft could
July, and rehabilitation was continued not enter the harbor while the dredge
to develop the planned capacities of the was working. This, plus the prospect
ports. Grandcamp and Isigny were the that Cherbourg would soon be handling
first to be captured and began to receive large tonnages, led to the cancellation of
cargo on 23 and 24 June, respectively. St. the entire program for the three ports,
Vaast discharged its first supplies on 9 leaving them somewhat short of their
July, and Carentan and Barfleur opened maximum development. 48
on the 25th and 26th. Failure to develop these ports to their
Up to the time of the breakout the full capacity actually entailed no loss,
cargo discharged by these small ports for at no time in the course of their
totaled 48,343 long tons, the equivalent operations did their combined discharge
of about three good days at the beaches. equal their rated capacity of 12,000
All these ports were capable of greater tons. T h e utilization of these ports de-
development, however, and the targets pended entirely on the availability of
for both Grandcamp and Isigny had barges and small coasters, which were
already been raised at the end of June. forced to handle a much greater portion
Late in July port plans were completely of the tonnage than planned because of
re-examined in view of the threatened the long delay in developing deepwater
deficit in discharge capacity, and the de- berths for the direct discharge of Liberty
cision was made to develop the minor ships. A variety of difficulties plagued
ports to their maximum capacity, then
estimated at 17,000 tons per day.46
47 This area was under the control of Normandy
At Barfleur and Carentan the addi- Base Section by this time.
48Normandy Base Section, Engineer Section His-
46Normandy Base Section, Engineer Section His- tory, pp. 26-27; Port Construction and Repair, Hist
tory, 8, ETO Adm 596. Rpt 11,OCE ETO, pp. 69–70, ETO Adm.
62 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
major objective of the U.S. forces in the necke for his “exemplary destruction” of
Normandy landings and was scheduled the harbor.51
for early capture and rehabilitation. But The scale of demolitions at Cherbourg
Cherbourg, which in peacetime was pri- was actually no greater than anticipated,
marily a passenger port and naval base, but the opening of the port within a
was expected to develop a capacity of period of three days of capture, as orig-
less than 9,000 tons and to bear a sizable inally scheduled, was clearly out of the
portion of the discharge burden for only question. Some conception of the prob-
a short time. Contrary to these plans, lems which confronted both Army and
and despite the delay in capturing the Navy units at Cherbourg may be gained
port and bringing it into operation, by a brief survey of the damage and ob-
Cherbourg achieved a discharge rate structions in the main port areas, begin-
more than double the goal originally ning at the eastern end of the Petite
set, and until Antwerp was finally Rade, or inner roadstead, and proceed-
brought into operation was the main- ing clockwise around the harbor. (Map
stay of the port system supporting U.S. 4 ) T h e eastern end of the port was the
forces. least-developed area. There the terraces
On the day of its capture late in June known as the Reclamation and the Terre
there was little indication of the great Plein simply formed anchorage for shal-
role that Cherbourg was to have, for low-draft vessels and had suffered little
the picture which the harbor presented damage. T h e masonry sea walls there
when the last major resistance in the were intact, although they were heavily
arsenal area collapsed was discouraging fortified and backed by tank traps and
indeed. As a port Cherbourg had been roadblocks. Just west of the Terre Plein,
destroyed with Teutonic thoroughness. however, some of the worst demolitions
Reconnaissance of the harbor, which be- on the entire port were found at the
gan before the last resistance ended, quays forming the great deepwater Darse
showed that 95 percent of the existing Transatlantique. This dock, built by
quayage capable of handling deep-draft the Germans between 1923 and 1935 as
shipping was destroyed; many of the har- a World War I reparation, was 800 feet
bor buildings, particularly in the arsenal wide and 2,000 feet long. Forming the
area, were demolished; and dozens of eastern side of the dock was the Quai de
sunken ships and smaller craft, ranging Normandie, which had not been com-
from a 550-foot whaler to tiny fishing pleted, about 1,000 feet of it consisting
boats, blocked the entrance channels of unfilled caissons. Before the demoli-
leading to the various basins and docks. tions one crawler crane and five large
In addition, native Frenchmen and cap- gantry cranes weighing about thirty tons
tured prisoners told of wholesale mining
of the harbor. Adolph Hitler himself 51Cherbourg Port Reconstruction, prep by OCE
ETO, 1944, Annex B to History o f the Normandy
appeared well satisfied with the way in Base Section, ETO Adm 596; Cherbourg–Gateway
which his naval commandant at Cher- to France: Rehabilitation and Operation o f the
First Major Port, prep by Hist Sec ETO [1945], Ch.
bourg had carried out his mission, com- I, p. 12, Ch. III, pp. 4–5, Ch. IV, p. 3, MS in
mending Konteradmiral Walther Hen- OCMH.
THEPORTOF CHERBOURG
66 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
had been tipped into the water and the a 400-yard beach, and beyond it a sea-
quay walls then blown in on top of them. plane Base. T h e Nouvelle Plage, since
Forming the western side of the Darse it contained no man-made installations,
was the new Quai de France, a modern suffered no damage, although it had
wharf capable of berthing the largest been fortified with barbed wire and
ocean liners and including the pride of fences. At the seaplane base, however,
the city, the fine Gare Maritime, where all hangars and other buildings were
passengers could alight from transatlan- wrecked, and all cranes had been blown
tique liners and under the same roof into the harbor.
board streamlined trains for Paris. Dem- Off the western side of the Petite Rade
olitions here followed the same pattern lay the most elaborate installations of the
as at the adjacent Quai de Normandie, entire port–the arsenal and naval dock-
although there was much more to de- yard, containing both tidal and nontidal
stroy. More than 15,000 cubic yards of basins and drydocks, workshops, bar-
caisson masonry had been blown from racks, and storage facilities. Destruction
2,000 feet of the quay wall into the to buildings was particularly widespread
Darse. The railway station, a reinforced in this area, some of it caused by Allied
concrete building 787 feet long, while air attacks in the preceding years. All
not totally destroyed, was badly dam- drydock gates were wrecked, every bridge
aged, and its utilities, such as the heat- except one was demolished, including a
ing plant and electric control apparatus, retractable railway bridge, and all portal
were completely demolished. cranes had been blown up. Where facili-
Immediately to the west of the great ties remained standing they had been
pier forming the Quai de France and the prepared for demolition by 500-pound
Gare Maritime a channel led directly bombs. Only quay walls were intact in
south into a tidal basin and wet dock- this entire area.
the Avant Port de Commerce and the Forming the northwest edge of the
Bassin à Flot—lying in the very heart of Petite Rade was the Quai Hornet, a
the city. No damage had been inflicted berth which apparently had been used
on the innermost Bassin à Flot, but in by coal coasters. This quay had been
the Avant Port the eastside Quai de cratered in nine places and the explo-
l’Ancien Arsenal was entirely in ruins, sions had thrown much of the wall out
and a swing bridge known as the Pont of line. Finally, the Digue du Hornet,
Tournant, which spanned the channel the 1,100-yard mole which formed the
between the two basins and was on the western breakwater of the Petite Rade,
principal artery connecting the two had also been systematically demolished.
halves of the city, had been wrecked, T h e Digue du Hornet carried both rail-
half of it lying in the channel and way tracks and oil lines and was quayed
the other half mined. Together with on the port side. All these facilities were
the installations surrounding the Darse unusable, for the breakwater was blown
Transatlantique this area formed the out on the quay side at eleven places,
commercial part of the port. and in two additional places had craters
To the west lay the Nouvelle Plage, more than a hundred feet long extend-
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 67
ing the full seventy-foot width of the entrance, extending across to the tip of
mole. Opposite the Digue du Homet the the Quai de France.
eastern breakwater, known as the Jetée In the Avant Port de Commerce and
des Flamands, had no value so far as the Bassin à Flot about a dozen small
cargo discharge was concerned and was craft had been sunk. These presented no
serious trouble and were removed by
The cratered and crumbling quays, floating cranes. But in the channel lead-
the toppled cranes, the blown bridges, ing to these basins lay sixteen vessels
and the demolished buildings repre- which denied entrance to the Port de
sented only the most evident damage to Commerce to everything but small craft,
the port. Intelligence had already re- such as barges. T h e major obstacle was
vealed that the black waters of the Petite a large coaster, the Normand, the other
Rade and the various basins had been fifteen consisting of old tugs of various
rendered treacherous by hundreds of sizes.
mines, and the first reconnaissance dis- T h e arsenal area had by far the largest
closed that every passage or channel in concentration of sunken vessels. T h e en-
the harbor was blocked by sunken ships. trance to the first basin—the Avant Port
These mines and ships, as it turned out, —was effectively blocked by two barges
proved to be the chief obstacles delaying and an old German-built submarine lift-
the opening of the port. A complete ing vessel of about 1,000 tons. Floating
catalog of the ships, cranes, and other the latter proved impossible, so that
miscellaneous wreckage with which the eventually it was necessary to cut up the
harbor floor was strewn cannot be de- vessel and remove it piecemeal, a task
tailed here, but a few examples will which required almost four weeks. In
illustrate the extent to which the various the Avant Port itself lay eight other
channels were blocked. vessels, the larger ones at the entrances
The principal sinkings had taken place to the inner basins-the Bassin Napoléon
in the entrance channels leading to the III to the west, and the Bassin Charles X
Darse Transatlantique, the Port de Com- to the north. One of the sunken barges
merce, and the arsenal area. T h e Darse in the Avant Port carried a deadly cargo
of sixty-five to seventy contact, magnetic,
Transatlantique, for example, was com-
and acoustic mines, each of which had
pletely blocked off to any deep-draft ves-
to be gingerly removed by divers. Addi-
sels by two large ships which had been
tional vessels had been sunk in the pas-
sunk across its entrance. One was a 550-
sages which led to the inner basins-a
foot whaler of 7,000 to 8,000 tons, the
large trawler in the passage leading to
Solglint, which lay on its side with its
the Bassin Napoleon III, and five vessels
bow against the north end of the Quai
in that leading to the Bassin Charles X.
de Normandie. The other was a rotted
T h e latter contained an additional eight
coaster, the 325 -foot Granlieu, which
craft, including a 110-ton floating crane,
completed the closure of the Darse’s
and the Bassin Napoléon III was littered
with another fifteen barges, tugs, and
52Cherbourg Port Reconstruction, pp. 13–25. trawlers, which denied access to the
68 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
quays. The passage connecting the two tered with motor launches, barges, traw-
inner basins was completely blocked by lers, tugs, and floating cranes.53
four craft and a demolished swing The clearance of some of this wreck-
bridge. Since this passage was too nar- age was obviously one of the first steps
row to be of much service no attempt was required to bring the port into opera-
made to clear it. tion. This task could get under way as
These sinkings constituted the bulk soon as agreement was reached on the
of those obviously calculated to render order in which various sections of the
the port unusable, but there were many port should be rehabilitated. Navy sal-
other craft scattered about the harbor. vage officers and Army engineer and
An armed trawler had been sunk in the transportation officers had entered the
big battleship drydock in the northwest port on the day of its capture and after
corner of the Petite Rade, and several a quick reconnaissance established prior-
trucks had also been dumped into the ities on 28 June for the reconstruction
dock; two barges and three large tugs of certain areas. I n every case both sal-
had been sunk alongside the Digue de vage by the Navy and shore reconstruc-
Homet; a coaster and ten-ton floating tion work by the Army engineers were
crane lay to one side of the Nouvelle required to permit the start of discharge
Plage; and the small basins at the south- operations. Almost all salvage operations,
ern end of the arsenal area, particularly
the Bassin des Subsistances, were clut- 53Ibid., pp. 26–29.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 69
however, required the use of lifting craft, were already well known and were found
pontons, or large floating cranes, and in both the outer and inner roadsteads
none of these could be brought in until and entrances thereto, in the arsenal
the approaches to the various quays and basins, and in the Darse Transatlantique.
channels were clear of mines. Mine clear- T h e Katy mine was new, however, and
ance consequently took precedence over proved the most troublesome. Normal
even the removal of obstacles. mine-sweeping would not set it off, for
The enemy had done as masterful a it was usually planted in the growth of
job in mining the harbor as he had in the harbor floor. Most of the Katies were
demolishing its onshore facilities and sown in the shallow anchorage of Quer-
sinking obstacles in the approaches. Ac- queville Bay at the western end of the
cording to Commodore William A. Sul- Grande Rade or outer roadstead, and
livan, an experienced salvage officer who just off the Reclamation area at the east-
surveyed the port upon its capture, the ern end of the Petite Rade.
mine-sweeping problem which it created Virtually no part of the harbor was
was the most complicated yet encoun- clear, although the mining of the harbor
tered in any harbor clearance work. Vari- apparently had been far from completed,
ous types of magnetic, acoustic, contact, as evidenced by the sunken barge in
and “Katy” mines were uncovered, either one of the arsenal basins that contained
by sweeping operations or through acci- the mines. Twenty-four carloads were
dents to shipping. T h e first three types eventually removed from the debris in
70 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
the Gare Maritime. A narrow lane had discharge; (3) the Reclamation area, for
been left free inside the central outer railway rolling stock and LST’s; and (4)
breakwater-the Grand Digue–from the the Digue du Homet, for Liberty ships
western entrance to a point opposite the and seatrains.
entrance to the Petite Rade. Starting Salvage work actually got under way
with this slender opening, sweeping op- simultaneously with demining opera-
erations got under way on 30 June, the tions where it could be undertaken with-
day after the enemy finally surrendered out the benefit of lifting craft, pontons,
the forts on the outer breakwater. Both and cranes. In many cases it was found
U.S. and British vessels participated in possible to raise undamaged vessels sim-
the clearance operations, all under the ply by pumping the water out of them
direction of Commander John B. G. and then floating them away. Others
Temple of the Royal Navy. A large, were patched at low water and then
roughly rectangular anchorage in the floated at high tide. In this way four of
Grande Rade was cleared first, and the the sixteen vessels blocking the entrance
sweepers then moved into the Petite to the Port de Commerce were removed
Rade and Darse Transatlantique. Lack before the arrival of the heavier salvage
of maneuver space hampered operations equipment, and would have permitted
throughout, and before the dangerous access to the inner basins within a week
work was completed ten vessels, includ- of the port’s capture had it not been for
ing three mine sweepers, were sunk by the delay in mine clearance. No attempt
mines and three others were damaged. was made to remove the biggest obstacle
Most of the casualties were attributed in the channel, the large coaster Nor-
to the unfamiliar Katy mine, which ves- mand, which lay on its port side at right
sels “sat on” and detonated when anchor- angles to the west side of the Gare Mari-
ing or moving about at low tide. Con- time. Its starboard side was approxi-
trary to all expectations mine clearance mately level with the pier of the Gare,
proved the major factor in delaying the and therefore provided a perfect foun-
opening of the port, and eventually re- dation for a pier at which small coasters
quired more than three and one half could unload.
months to complete.
54 Similar use was made of the two ves-
T h e start of discharge operations did sels which had been sunk across the
not of course await the completion of entrance to the Darse Transatlantique.
the demining task. Naval salvage work The whaler Solglint lay on its starboard
and Army engineer construction started side at right angles to the Quai de Nor-
immediately to ready for cargo reception mandie, its port side level with the lat-
four areas of the port which had been ter’s deck and thus forming an excellent
named in the priority program on 28 foundation for an additional pier. Only
June: (1) the Nouvelle Plage, suitable its superstructure was removed so that
for dukws; (2) the Bassin à Flot or wet Liberty ships could moor on both sides.
basin of the commercial port, for barge T h e coaster Grunlieu was utilized in the
54 Ibid., p. 46; Cherbourg–Gateway to France,
same way, but had to be moved since
Ch. III, pp. 1–12. it rested between the stern of the sunken
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 71
Solglint and the northeast corner of the with the least delay. In accordance with
Quai de France, completely blocking the the priorities established on 28 June,
entrance to the Darse. Approximately work immediately started on the Nou-
seventy-five tons of concrete from the velle Plage, the Bassin à Flot, the Digue
demolished buildings of the Gare Mari- du Homet, and the Reclamation area for
time lay atop the Granlieu and had to be the reception of various types of craft,
removed first. Then, by the use of com- ranging from dukws to Liberty ships.
pressed air and tows, the Granlieu was T h e establishment of priorities was de-
swung out in a go-degree arc so that it signed to get work under way immedi-
formed a continuation of the quay. An ately and did not constitute a detailed
army tug promptly sank in the exact plan for the port’s reconstruction. The
spot from which the coaster had been ADSEC engineer worked out such a plan
moved, but it was raised within a few in the succeeding days and presented it
days. On 18 September, eleven weeks to the theater engineer on 4 July. Two
after the port’s capture and seventy-six days later it was approved by the com-
days later than planned, the entrance to manding general of the Communica-
the Darse was finally clear. tions Zone.
Clearance of the arsenal area also T h e plan’s most striking feature was
started, beginning with the removal of the doubling of the original discharge
the submarine lifting craft and barges target for Cherbourg, raising it from
blocking the entrance to the Avant Port. 8,800 tons to 17,000 tons per day. Most
Obstacles were literally piled one on top of the additional capacity was to be pro-
of another in this area, and floating vided by the construction of marginal
cranes and lifting craft eventually re- wharves along the undamaged Terre
moved forty tugs, barges, and cranes Plein and Reclamation area and sea
from the three basins. The arsenal area, walls, and by the construction of “fin-
like the Darse Transatlantique, was low gers” for additional Liberty berths along
on the salvage priority list, and it was the Digue du Homet and along the Quai
not until 7 September, sixty-six days after de France and Quai de Normandie.
the capture of the port, that the first Within a few weeks the growing con-
Liberty ship could be brought into the cern over the port situation led to the
Bassin Napoleon III, and 21 September realization that Cherbourg in all prob-
before the first Liberty could dock in ability would have to bear an even larger
the Bassin Charles X. T h e salvage task portion of the port discharge burden.
at Cherbourg was finally completed on On 24 July, in the first major amend-
29 September.55 ment to the development plan, the port’s
The development of shore facilities reception capacity was raised another
had proceeded simultaneously with sal- 4,000 tons, to 21,800, by the decision to
vage operations under priorities designed develop more fully the quays in the
to open as quickly as possible those areas Darse Transatlantique and by a greater
of the port which could receive cargo development of the arsenal area than
was originally contemplated.
55 Cherbourg Port Reconstruction, pp. 34-39;
Cherbourg—Gateway to France, Ch. III, pp. 12–19. Reconstruction had started under the
72 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
WHARF
MARGINAL CONSTRUCTION
along the Terre Plein, Cherbourg, 24 July 1944.
direction of the 1056th Engineer Port barbed wire and other scattered debris
Construction and Repair (PC&R)Group. there was no heavy wreckage to clear.
The main working force consisted of Engineers blasted three exits in the
several engineer general and special serv- sea wall, graded the beach, and built
ice regiments, although a variety of spe- three concrete roads. This work was com-
cialist units, such as engineer dump pleted in eight days, and would have
truck companies, engineer fire fighting permitted the reception of cargo had it
platoons, bomb disposal squads, and been safe to bring ships into the harbor.
port repair ships were also attached. An Not until 14 July, however, were the
advance party of the 1056th PC&R western ends of the outer and inner
Group, including its commander, Col. roadsteads declared free of mines. Fi-
James B. Cress, arrived at Cherbourg on nally on 16 July four Liberty ships
27 June, and on the following day began loaded with construction supplies and
work on the Nouvelle Plage and the vehicles needed in the rehabilitation of
commercial port. the port entered the harbor and an-
Development of the Nouvelle Plage chored in the Grande Rade. Late that
was not a complicated or elaborate re- afternoon a dukw driven by Pvt. Charles
construction job, since this beach was I. Willis of the 821stAmphibious Truck
simply to be converted into a landing Company brought the first load of sup-
point for dukws and LCT’s. Except for plies, consisting of Signal Corps wire,
T H E P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 73
to the Nouvelle Plage, where a crane out by the 342d Engineer General Serv-
transferred the cargo to a waiting truck ice Regiment, using captured enemy
driven by Pvt. William G. O’Hair of supplies.57
the 3884th Quartermaster Truck Com- Less than twenty-four hours after the
pany (Transportation Corps). A few min- first cargo arrived at the Nouvelle Plage
utes later the first supplies discharged unloading also began in the Bassin à
at Cherbourg were on their way to a Flot, or wet basin of the commercial
depot five miles south of the city. Port port. The heaviest damage in this area
operations were finally under way. 56 had been to the eastern quay of the
Additional construction carried out Avant Port de Commerce (the Quai de
at the Nouvelle Plage during the next l’Ancien Arsenal) and to the Pont Tour-
month, consisting mainly of a concrete nant, which bridged the channel be-
loading platform and a ramp similar tween the two basins. T h e demolished
to the hards built in the United King- swing bridge could not be salvaged, and
dom, brought the beach’s dukw dis- was quickly cut up with torches. I n its
charge capacity to a rated 2,000 tons place engineers improvised a retractable
per day. Most of this work was carried bridge, using Bailey bridging and an
electric hoist.
56Cherbourg–Gateway to France, Ch. II, p. 2, Ch.
IV, pp. 6–7, Ch. VI, pp. 5–6. 57 Cherbourg Port Reconstruction, p. 44.
74 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Before attempting to restore the badly the discharge of vehicles, and three for
demolished eastern quay, engineers con- railway rolling stock, for which purpose
structed a paved LST ramp in the north- rail lines were laid to the water’s edge.
east corner of the Avant Port so that T h e first delivery of rolling stock at this
railway rolling stock could be brought point was made by converted LST’s on
ashore there. Two railway tracks were 31 July.
laid to accommodate two LST’s at the One of the most profitable and ambi-
same time. But the basin was found to be tious construction projects was carried
too small and too crowded with barge out in the basin bounded by the Recla-
traffic to permit maneuvering LST’s, and mation area, the Terre Plein, and the
the facilities were never used for the Quai de Normandie. This area had never
purpose intended. been developed for unloading opera-
Late in August attention shifted to tions, and its sea walls were undamaged,
the eastern quay, the Quai de l’Ancien although a few craters along the terrace
Arsenal, where the concrete pile wharf had to be filled and pillboxes removed.
had been completely demolished. After Once this was accomplished a timber
the removal of much of the debris this platform forty-two feet wide was built
quay was reconstructed, part of it of con- on wood piles directly over and strad-
crete and steel, and the remainder of dling the sea wall to form a wharf at
timber. T h e Avant Port eventually could which barges could discharge. When
accommodate 8 barges and the Bassin à completed this platform extended along
Flot 13 barges and 6 coasters. Together all three sides of the basin and was 4,200
the two basins had a capacity of about feet long. It could accommodate forty-
2,000 tons per day. one barges at a time, and was served by
T h e seaplane base, where a concrete fifty-two stiff-leg derricks, which could
ramp, or hard, already existed, provided transfer cargo directly to railway cars.
facilities similar to those at the Nouvelle At low tide barges dried out in this area.
Plage. T h e ramp there was simply Rehabilitation of the northwest cor-
widened considerably and its craters were ner of the harbor, namely the Digue du
filled. In addition, rail lines were built Homet and Quai Homet, had been given
down to the water’s edge so that rolling high priority, and work began there
stock could be discharged directly from within a week of the port’s capture. T h e
LST’s. When completed the seaplane Digue du Homet was particularly valu-
base was wide enough to accommodate able, for it promised to provide badly
six LST’s discharging simultaneously, needed deepwater berths for Liberty
and could also be used for dukws. ships, which could discharge directly to
Similar accommodations were con- the rail lines running the entire length
structed in the Reclamation area, at the of the mole, and also berths for train
eastern end of the harbor. A concrete sea ferries bringing in locomotives and roll-
wall was first removed there, and a con- ing stock. T h e Digue itself was badly
crete apron 80 feet by 270 feet was then cratered and in two places completely
laid, wide enough to accommodate six breached, permitting the water to flow
LST’s. Three berths were intended for through. T h e first priority was to fill
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 75
these craters and clear away the debris. demined and cleared of the many vessels
This was completed in four days, after and cranes which littered the waters.
which the repair of the railway was Additional berths were provided by con-
undertaken. Since the quay side of the structing timber trestles across the vari-
Digue had an underwater shelf, engi- ous openings, such as submarine and
neers constructed five pile and timber shipbuilding pens and drydocks, and by
platforms to serve as unloading wharves bridging boat slips with standard timber
for Liberty ships. Later they filled in the piling wharf to provide continuous
gaps between them to create a continu- quays. In this way the arsenal area even-
ous quay along 2,700 feet of the 3,300- tually provided berths for eleven Lib-
foot mole. T h e first Liberty ship docked erty ships and five coasters. It was 7
at one of the platforms on 9 August. September, however, before the first
At the shore end of the Digue a por- Liberty could enter the arsenal area, and
tion of the Quai Homet was selected as 21 September before the Bassin Charles
a pierhead to accommodate the Twick- X could discharge a deep-draft ship.
enham Ferry, a British train ferry spe- Last of the port areas to come into
cially built to carry locomotives and roll- operation was the Darse Transatlan-
ing stock. Two berths were provided, one tique. This was the most modern and
of them consisting of a “seat” which best-developed area of the port, but was
could accommodate a ramp lowered into also one of the most thoroughly demol-
position by the ferry, permitting rolling ished. T h e Gare Maritime, for example,
stock to roll from the ferry to the quay, was almost completely useless, and tre-
and the other providing a site where mendous quantities of debris had to be
locomotives could be lifted from the removed before the adjoining quay
ferry to the quay by means of an over- could be reconstructed. Utilization of the
head crane which was part of the vessel Quai de France and of the Quai de Nor-
itself. T h e Twickenham made its first mandie on the other side of the Darse
delivery—several 65-ton diesel electric entailed tremendous engineer construc-
locomotives and other rolling stock–on tion projects. At both quays reconstruc-
29 July, all of the stock being unloaded tion proceeded in two phases. T-head
by means of the overhead crane. ramps at Liberty hatch spacing were
Early rehabilitation plans had not pro- first constructed, and standard pile tim-
vided for any substantial development ber wharf was then filled in to form con-
of the arsenal area. Upon the port’s cap- tinuous quays. T h e full length of the
ture, however, ADSEC engineers imme- Quai de France–2,000 lineal feet–was
diately included the arsenal in their re- reconstructed in this way, providing
construction plan and counted on this berths for four Liberties when com-
area to provide at least one fourth of the pleted. At the Quai de Normandie not
port’s total capacity. Contrasted with only the original quay was rebuilt, but
other sections of the harbor, the quay the caissons of the uncompleted exten-
walls in the arsenal area were undam- sion were leveled off and the gaps
aged, which meant that this area could bridged to form an additional 1,200 feet
receive ships as soon as the basins were of quay. This work went on round the
SEATRAINUNLOADING A GONDOLAonto rail lines laid to the water’s edge,
Cherbourg, August 1944.
THE PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 77
clock for eleven weeks, and when com- the port into operation, and a goal of
pleted providedsix Liberty berths.
58 20,000 tons capacity had been set for
Port reconstruction, mine clearance, development by the middle of Septem-
salvage, and cargo discharge had gone ber. Rehabilitation consistently fell
on simultaneously throughout the sum- short of these targets, in many cases be-
mer. In the course of this work the re- cause of delays in mine clearance and
construction plan and discharge target removal of sunken obstacles. Operations
for the port had been amended still at the Nouvelle Plage, for example,
further. In mid-August the commander which were scheduled to begin on 9July,
of the PC&R Group submitted plans did not get under way until a week later.
which would have increased the port’s Barges and coasters were to start dis-
capacity another 10,000 tons–from 21,- charging in the Bassin à Flot on 26 July,
800 to 31,900–by the construction of a but it was 11 August before coasters
PHOENIX pier, a fuller development of could enter. Use of the tanker berth at
the arsenal, and further extensions to
the Digue de Querqueville was post-
the Quai de France and Quai de Nor-
poned more than two weeks with the
mandie. But these projects were found
result that it was 25 July, the date of
to be infeasible for one reason or an-
the breakout at St. Lô, before the POL
other. Early in September a less ambi-
tious proposal was made, calling for the Major System could come into operation.
development of Cherbourg’s capacity to Similarly, use of the Twickenham Ferry
26,650 tons with a minimum of addi- berths at the Quai Homet began two
tional construction. This proposal un- weeks later than planned.
derwent further modifications in the Deep-draft cargo ship berths were the
course of its examination. The principal last to come into operation. Not until
feature of the plan finally adopted and 9 August, nineteen days later than
carried out was the addition of marginal planned, was the first Liberty ship berth
wharves for two Liberty ships on either —at the Digue du Hornet—ready to be-
side of the battleship drydock off the gin discharge. In the arsenal area it was
Quai Homet. This was to bring the another full month before Liberties
total capacity of the port to 28,300 tons could berth in the Bassin Napoléon III,
through the provision of berths for 28 and 21 September before the Bassin
Liberty ships, 14 LST’s, 75 barges, 13 Charles X was ready. The delay in open-
coasters, 2 train ferries, and 1 tanker ing the Darse Transatlantique to deep-
(the latter at the Digue de Querque- draft vessels illustrated most pointedly
ville). 59 of all how effective the enemy’s mining
Target dates had been established in and demolitions had been in denying
July for bringing the various areas of the Allies the use of the port. Plans in-
itially called for the completion of two
Liberty berths there by 26 July. But
58Cherbourg–Gateway to France, Ch. IV, pp. 6– the Darse was not even clear of mines
16; Cherbourg Port Reconstruction, pp. 44–130.
59 Normandy Base Section, Engineer Section His- until 21 August, and an access channel
tory, p. 28; Cherbourg Port Reconstruction, p. 40. was not opened until 18 September. The
78 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
first Liberty ship finally berthed in the responsibility of the 4th Major Port
Darse on 8 October.60 (Transportation Corps), which had op-
T h e port fell considerably short of erated the Mersey River ports around
its goal of 20,000 tons by mid-Septem- Liverpool, under the command of Colo-
ber. At that time the rehabilitation was nel Sibley. It was originally intended
reported 75 percent complete. But the that there should be a single command
uncompleted 25 percent consisted of all- in the Cherbourg area, including the
important Liberty berthing, or “along- operation of the port and the adminis-
side berths,” where cargo could be trans- tration of the surrounding area. For
ferred directly to waiting trucks or freight about two weeks, however, Colonel Sib-
cars. Only five Liberty berths were then ley was left free to reconnoiter the port
available. The port did not reach its and organize it for discharge operations,
projected development of 28,300 tons and the administration of the area was
for another three months. As late as mid- assumed by the deputy commander of
November seven of the planned Liberty the Advance Section, Col. Claude H.
berths had still not opened. Planned Chorpening. On 11 July the original
facilities were essentially complete by command plan went into effect: Colonel
15 December, but even at that date two Chorpening left Cherbourg and Colo-
berths in the Darse Transatlantique were nel Sibley was designated the com-
not in full use because of difficulties in mander of the newly created Area No. I
dredging to the required depth. of the Advance Section. This arrange-
T h e port had easily surpassed the dis- ment was short-lived. Because of the tre-
charge targets established before D Day. mendous engineering task which lay
By the first week in August, three weeks ahead, the decision was made only a
after the start of operations, it was dis- few days later to separate the functions
charging approximately 6,000 tons per of port operations and area command.
day. By mid-September it was handling On 21 July, as related earlier, Colonel
double this volume. Port operations Wyman took over the Cherbourg Pro-
reached a plateau at that time, and for a visional Command, Colonel Sibley re-
full month thereafter Cherbourg’s per- verted to his more limited role as com-
formance was uneven, at times exceed- mander of the 4th Port. 61
ing 15,000 tons and occasionally drop- On 25 July Colonel Sibley’s organiza-
ping to 6,000 and 8,000. tion was augmented by the attachment
Despite elaborate plans and prepara- of the 12th Port (Col. August H.
tions, the inauguration of discharge op- Schroeder), which moved up from St.
erations at Cherbourg, as at the beaches, Vaast. Colonel Sibley used the personnel
was attended by many difficulties. Opera- of this headquarters mainly to form a
tions went through a considerable shake- Provisional Port Troop Command Head-
down period before they became routine. quarters to handle training, administra-
T h e operation of Cherbourg was the tion, and discipline of the six port bat-
talions and other attached units which
Cherbourg–Gateway to France, Ch. IV, pp. 17–
60
18;Cherbourg Port Reconstruction, pp. 39, 42. 61Cherbourg–Gateway to France, Ch. II, pp. 4–8.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 79
then comprised the 4th Port organi- operations, so that freight cars or trucks
zation.62 could be spotted for the prompt clear-
T h e operation of a port requires the ance of quays, so that the proper cargo-
same high degree of synchronization and handling equipment, such as cranes,
balancing of capacities as do other lo- could be provided, and so that technical
gistic activities. All steps in funneling service representatives could alert depots
supplies through a port are closely and dumps for the reception of supplies.
linked, and each is a potential bottle- Part of the difficulty arose over the fail-
neck. T h e lack of sufficient cranes, for ure of manifests to arrive in time. At
example, can render dozens of ships idle. first the port normally received infor-
Cherbourg had its share of such hitches mation on scheduled arrivals from the
before it became a smoothly run port. Advance Section. But many vessels ap-
Many of them were almost exact dupli- peared in the crowded harbor before any
cates of the early troubles at the beaches. news of their arrival was received, and
T h e proper co-ordination of Army consequently no preparation for han-
and Navy functions, for example, was dling them was made. Shortly after dis-
worked out only after considerable trial charge operations started the port re-
and error. Bringing a vessel into the port fused entry to one of these “ghost” ships
was a Navy responsibility, and as often only to find that it carried top priority
as possible the Army’s wishes were fol- cargo. Lacking manifests and stowage
lowed in determining a vessel’s berth. plans, port personnel frequently had to
Port officials wanted craft carrying suit- board vessels to determine what they
able dukw cargo anchored in the Petite carried and how it was stowed. Naval
Rade, for example, to avoid long hauls officials, who were in direct communica-
from the outer roadstead. In many cases tion with London, were in the best posi-
shore facilities left no choice as to the tion to have advance information on
berthing of a vessel. But communications future arrivals. Again, but only after
and liaison were faulty at first, and port some trial and error, the problem was
officers often were unaware of the arrival partially resolved by maintaining con-
of a vessel until it was about to be stant liaison with the Naval Harbor Mas-
berthed. T h e logical remedy was to sta- ter. 63
tion port representatives in the office of Discharge operations were made diffi-
the Naval Harbor Master, whence in- cult by the initial lack of deepwater
formation on arriving vessels was tele- berths. Until such facilities were avail-
phoned to the appropriate port officials. able all ships had to anchor in the road-
A more basic difficulty, one which had stead and discharge to lighters (dukws
also plagued operations at the beaches, and barges) for movement to the beaches
was the lack of information as to when or the basins of the commercial port,
ships were to arrive and what cargo they where supplies were transferred to trucks
carried. Such information was needed so or freight cars. Because of the double
that sufficient numbers of .port battalion handling involved, such operations were
personnel could be provided for hatch
63
Cherbourg–Gateway to France, Ch. VI, pp. 15–
62History of TC ETO, IV, 4th Port, 7. 19, Ch. VII, pp. 2–3.
80 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
costly in labor and equipment, and in during one storm on 21 August a 30-ton
time. Moreover, the volume of cargo floating crane and two car ferries, each
which could be handled in this way was with a barge, were beached by high
always limited. Dukws had a rated capac- winds.
ity of only two and one half tons, al- All these handicaps indicated an ur-
though as in the case of the 2½-ton gent need for deepwater berths, for only
truck orders were given in mid-August by direct ship-to-shore operations could
to overload
by 100 percent. 64 But the relatively uninterrupted discharge be as-
dukw was still suitable for only relatively sured and the largest volume of tonnage
small items and packaged goods. Barges handled. 65
had greater capacity, but could not han- A variety of other difficulties plagued
dle the most awkward equipment. the early operations of the port. There
Lighterage operations called for the were shortages of all kinds initially-of
closest planning and supervision to make tugs, barges, cranes, and of all types of
the best possible use of the available gear. T h e 4th Port’s gear had been
tugboats, barges, and port battalion per- loaded on twelve ships in the United
sonnel. Dukws could go ashore at the Kingdom and was scheduled to be
Nouvelle Plage at all times, but barges brought in at Cherbourg. Instead the
had to be tied to stake boats in the har- vessels were sent to UTAHBeach, where
bor and await favorable tide conditions, much of the heavier gear was unloaded
for they could be towed into the basins and later had to be searched. Its ar-
of the commercial port and later to the rival in Cherbourg was delayed consider-
Terre Plein area only during a few hours ably. Hatch crews repeatedly lacked
at high tide. T h e control of tugs and of ropes, slings, nets, or other unloading
hatch operations under this type of un- gear. In an effort to keep them supplied,
loading was difficult, since adequate com- three dukws cruised about the harbor at
munications were initially found want- first, taking gear from vessel to vessel.
ing. Both the Navy’s blinker system and Much of the equipment was lost when
the use of a shuttle boat were too slow ships left the port without returning it.
and inefficient for this purpose. T h e an- Most serious of the equipment prob-
swer was finally found in the use of a lems was the shortage of cranes. Crane
small Signal Corps radio which had been operation had been handled largely by
designed for combat but which was civilian workers in the United Kingdom,
found to be excellent for the control of and inadequate numbers of military per-
all offshore activities. Two systems were sonnel had been trained for the con-
installed, one for the control of tugs tinental ports. An intensive training pro-
and one for hatch operations. gram had to be initiated on the spot,
Lighterage operations also suffered conducted by two sergeants who had had
more from the hazards of weather than experience in the United Kingdom. Op-
did ship-to-shore discharge. Bad weather eration of the cranes by inexperienced
frequently prevented dukws and barges workers took its toll in damaged equip-
from venturing out into the harbor, and
65Cherbourg–Gateway to France, Ch. VI, pp. 1–5,
64Ibid., Ch. VI, p. 26. 11, 18.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 81
ment, just as it did in the case of motor complished by rail, for rail transport was
transport operations, and the shortage of more economical than motor transport
spare parts and skilled mechanics con- and capable of handling much larger
tributed to the prolonged deadlining of tonnages. Plans had of course been made
equipment. In this way, for example, a to rehabilitate the existing railway fa-
$15,000 Koehring crane vitally needed in cilities at Cherbourg. Damage to them
port operations was deadlined for three had been fairly extensive, but no greater
weeks because of a broken water pump than expected. Just south of the city a
valued at $2.00. At times as many as 400-foot tunnel on the main Cherbourg–
half of all the assigned cranes were in- Paris trunk line had been blown shut,
operative from such causes.66 and between this tunnel and the Gare
de l’Etat in the city the switches and
Achieving a satisfactory discharge rate frogs had been systematically destroyed.
was only half the problem at Cherbourg. A roundhouse just south of Cherbourg
At least equally important in the long was also largely demolished, mainly as
run was the problem of port clearance, the result of friendly artillery fire.
for it was this aspect of Cherbourg’s op- Within the port itself there were only
erations which proved to be the factor about fifteen miles of trackage, branch-
preventing the maximum utilization of ing out from the Gare de l’Etat to serve
the port’s intake capacity. In one sense the Digue du Homet, the arsenal area,
a port represents the narrow neck of an the Gare Maritime, the Amiot Aircraft
hourglass. Thousands of tons of supply Works, and the Bassin à Flot. The worst
converge upon it from the sea and must damage was evident at the Gare Mari-
be passed through this defile and then time, in the arsenal, and in the area of
distributed to dumps and depots. Within the aircraft works.
the port itself two principal operations All these facilities were required for
are involved-the unloading of ships and the clearance of the port, and rehabili-
the loading of freight cars and trucks. tation began immediately. But the de-
Adequate discharge facilities must be cision to double Cherbourg’s intake ca-
available if the maximum tonnage is to pacity made it apparent that the existing
be received and if ships are to be emptied rail complex would be far from ade-
promptly and not allowed to stand idle quate. Additional lines were needed at
in the harbor. Equally vital, however, the new quays which were being con-
are the complementary facilities re- structed, so that discharge could be di-
quired to dispatch cargo from the port rectly from ship to rail car, and the
in order to keep quays clear. Essentially capacity of storage and marshaling yards
this means that ample transportation had to be greatly expanded to handle
must be available, and an adequate depot the tremendous volume of rail traffic.
structure provided to receive the cargo. Cherbourg was not equipped for large-
It was desirable that clearance be ac- scale freight handling operations. Just as
new discharge facilities had to be de-
66History of T C ETO, IV, 4th Port, 5, V, 4th veloped, therefore, a sizable railway con-
Port, 4; Cherbourg–Gateway to France, Ch. VI, p.
23, Ch. VII, pp. 10–11. struction program had to be undertaken.
82 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
New construction and the restoration about 700 cars, one at Couville, six miles
of the existing system were carried south of the port, with a capacity of
on simultaneously. Existing facilities 1,400 cars, and another at Sottevast, five
were augmented considerably in several miles farther south on the main rail
places, as for example in the yards be- line, capable of holding 2,600 cars.
tween the tunnel and the Gare de l’Etat, All together, these projected expansions
where 11,500 feet of new track were laid, were to provide a gross storage capacity
and along the Digue du Homet, where of about 4,600 cars and marshaling facili-
three lines were extended the entire ties for nearly 2,700.
length of the mole. Additional trackage Construction of the Couville and
was also built along the barge wharves Sottevast yards was undertaken largely
in the Terre Plein area, and along two at the insistence of Maj, Gen. Frank S.
sides of the Bassin à Flot. In the arsenal Ross and was among the most ambitious
area a considerable augmentation of ex- construction projects undertaken by en-
isting facilities was carried out by the gineers in the Normandy area. The Cou-
construction of lines to the inner quays, ville installation was to be a true mar-
and by the construction of additional shaling and classification yard, where
yards. trains were made up and given track
The most urgent need created by the clearance for the eastward run. The fa-
new tonnage target was for storage and cilities there were entirely of new con-
marshaling yard capacity. At the time struction and involved a tremendous
of its capture Cherbourg possessed stor- earth-moving job—287,000 cubic yards
age capacity for only 350 cars, and a of cut, and 177,000 yards for a seventy-
marshaling yard capacity of only 400. foot fill. The heavy equipment needed
Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Burpee, Director for the task was lacking when construc-
General of the 2d Military Railway Serv- tion began on 2 August. But the project
ice, estimated that the projected daily had high priority, and the urgency of the
discharge of 20,000 tons would require job was further emphasized after 20
the loading of 2,000 freight cars per day. August when a heavy rain revealed how
Since a two-day supply of empty cars easily the entire area could be trans-
was required on hand at all times, 4,000 formed into a quagmire. Every effort
cars would be required. Storage facilities was therefore made to augment the or-
for 4,000 cars and marshaling yard fa- ganic equipment of the engineer general
cilities for 2,000 cars were therefore re- service regiment assigned the task, and
quired to clear 20,000 tons of freight work was stepped up, including the op-
from the port each day. eration of a night shift. Mud produced
Transportation Corps officials pro- by autumn rains also forced a change in
posed to meet part of this need by ex- plans for ballasting the tracks and made
panding existing yards. But the larger it necessary to open a rock quarry, re-
part of the requirement had to be met pair its machinery, and haul hundreds of
by new construction. Plans now called carloads of crushed rock to stabilize rail
for the building of three new yards, one beds. The first yard at Couville was com-
at the Terre Plein with a capacity of pleted on 18 September, and received the
T H E P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 83
first train five days later. On 3 Novem- plans for the yard were therefore
ber, three months after work had begun, modified somewhat. When construction
the engineers turned over the completed stopped in mid-December the yard con-
project to the Transportation Corps. tained eighteen miles of track and had
More than 780,000 man-hours of labor a capacity of 2,280 cars. 68
eventually went into the project, which Until these facilities were ready, clear-
comprised 16 miles of track and had a ance capacity was a serious limiting fac-
capacity of 1,740 cars, considerably more tor in developing the maximum flow of
than originally planned. cargo through the port of Cherbourg.
The Sottevast yard, a few miles farther As long as U.S. forces were confined to
south, involved an even greater expendi- a small Normandy bridgehead, and
ture of effort. This yard was intended dumps and depots were within easy
primarily as a storage and classification reach of the port, motor transport was
yard for empty cars, which could be dis- of course the more efficient means of
patched to Cherbourg on call. Construc- clearance. But the railways eventually
tion started on 15 August and continued were expected to handle the bulk of the
until 12 December, although a portion tonnage. It was hoped at first that 60
of the facilities was ready for use in mid- percent of the cargo could be shipped
October. Work on the Sottevast project by rail by early August, and by mid-
was carried on under much the same September approximately 88 percent—
conditions as at Couville. T h e major or 17,500 of the 20,000 tons discharged
handicap was the heavy rains, which at each day.
one time inundated portions of the area These targets could not be met. I n
to a depth of eighteen inches and neces- the first week of August less than 10 per-
sitated extensive rock ballasting. 67 More cent of the cargo was being dispatched
than 2,000 men, including several com- by rail.69 In mid-August
the Transporta-
panies of prisoners, were employed on tion Corps was called on to make emer-
this project in mid-November, and up- gency shipments totaling 25,600 tons via
wards of 1,300,000 man-hours went into rail to the Le Mans area for the Third
it. The requirement for marshaling fa- Army. At the close of the month even
cilities had already declined somewhat larger shipments were ordered to the
by early December, and the original Chartres area. These demands put a tre-
mendous strain on the available supply
of both locomotives and freight cars and
67 Similar difficulties arose at the small marshaling
yard built to serve OMAHABeach. The site of this left little rolling stock for port clear-
yard, along the main rail line between Lison Junc-
tion and Bayeux, was extremely low and difficult to
drain. September rains reduced this area to a quag-
mire before proper ballasting could be accom- 68Normandy Base Section, Engineer Section His-
plished, with the result that the rails gradually tory, p. 25; History of the Couville and Sottevast
sank into the mud, and access roads almost disap- Marshaling Yards, App. XIV of Normandy Base
peared. Derailments consequently became frequent, Section History; Normandy Base Section, Trans-
a record twenty-one occurring in one eight-hour portation Corps History, p. 21; History of T C ETO,
period. Normandy Base Section, Engineer Section IV, 4th Port, 9–10, and V, 4th Port, 12.
History, pp. 24–25; Normandy Base Section Trans- 69History of TC ETO; IV, 4th Port, 18; Cher-
portation Corps History, pp. 20–21. bourg–Gateway to France, Ch. VII, pp. 15–16.
84 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
ance. 70 For the entire month of August tributed further to the delay in releasing
clearance by rail consequently accounted transportation. Depot locations were fre-
for only 38 percent of the total tonnage quently changed, and the services did
moved inland from the port. 71 not always give the port prompt notifica-
Port clearance continued to bear the tion, with the result that drivers at times
main sacrifice imposed by the greater returned to the port with fully loaded
urgency of long-distance hauling. Far trucks after searching unsuccessfully for
from getting motor transport to compen- their proper destinations.
sate for the inadequate rail capacity, port A common complaint, heard fre-
clearance actually lost trucks to line-of- quently during the pursuit, arose from
communications hauling. By the end of the practice of ordering drivers after they
August only three companies remained had arrived at their designated destina-
against a requirement for five or six tions to deliver their loads to another
times this number. By the end of August location farther forward. From the point
the quays at Cherbourg were piled high of view of port clearance this naturally
with cargo which could not be moved, aggravated the transportation situation. 73
averaging upwards of 70,000 tons. T o Port clearance continued to be the
relieve the congestion several of the limiting factor at Cherbourg for some
services were authorized to establish tem- time, mitigating to some extent the fail-
porary subdepots or dumps at the Terre ure to meet discharge goals. T h e port
Plein.72 failed by about 8,000 tons to meet the
Difficulties at the depots contributed discharge target of 20,000 tons per day
to the port clearance problem. T h e by mid-September. Colonel Sibley, the
depots were rarely ideally located or 4th Port commander, had expressed
equipped to receive cargo. Many were doubt in July that Cherbourg could
established in open fields, which became meet the higher tonnage targets estab-
muddy in rainy weather; many lacked lished at that time. He cited in particu-
trucks for internal movements, and also lar the difficulties over mine clearance
cranes. and obstacle removal, and the probable
Lacking transportation, the depots fre- inadequacies of the rail system, especially
quently insisted that trucks from Cher- the shortage of rolling stock, which he
bourg distribute cargo at several unload- thought would probably delay the maxi-
ing points, thus delaying their return to mum development of the port’s capac-
the port. On 1 August the port began ity. 74 Unfortunately these fears were
round-the-clock operations. Some depots, largely substantiated.
lacking either lighting facilities or ade- The seriousness of Cherbourg’s de-
quate personnel, were slow to adopt the ficiencies was increasingly highlighted by
twenty-four-hour schedule and thus con- the delay in bringing Antwerp into use,
and by the declining performance at the
70Cherbourg–Gateway to France, Ch. VI, pp. 16–
17.
71History of TC ETO, IV, 4th Port, 22. 73History of T C ETO, V, 4th Port, II; Cherbourg
72History of T C ETO, IV, 4th Port, 2 2 ; Cher- –Gateway to France, Ch. VII, pp. 20–23.
bourg–Gateway to France, Ch. VII, pp. 17, 21–22. 74
Cherbourg–Gateway to France, Ch. I, p. 18.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 85
beaches, which became a wasting asset ment, such as nets and slings, was also
in October. Cherbourg, it must be re- requested. With this additional comple-
membered, was the only major deep- ment of personnel and equipment Colo-
water port which the Allies possessed nel Crothers believed that Cherbourg
in operating condition at the rime. By could work forty-four ships simultane-
the end of September its disappointing ously,76 each averaging 500 tons per day
performance became of sufficient con- for a total of 22,000 tons. This tonnage,
cern to attract the attention of higher along with another 2,000 tons brought
echelons in the theater, and led to some in via LST’s and car ferries, would en-
reorganization of the port. On 29 Sep- able the port to unload and clear 24,000
tember Colonel Sibley was relieved of tons, which the Communications Zone
command of the 4th Port and was suc- had recently established as the new tar-
ceeded by Col. James A. Crothers. 75 get.77
The new commander promptly sub- Meanwhile officers from both SHAEF
mitted a request to Normandy Base Sec- and the Communications Zone arrived
tion for additional personnel and for to investigate. All of them found much
more rolling stock, which he regarded that needed correction or improvement.
as the two principal deficiencies. T h e T h e SHAEF G–4 representatives–Capt.
main troop requirements listed were L. A. Thackrey of the U.S. Navy and
twelve port companies; an engineer gen- Col. N. H. Vissering–concluded that
eral service company trained to operate neither the port’s facilities nor its labor
cranes, derricks, and other equipment; force were being used to best advantage.
additional prisoners of war to handle Unloading personnel, for example, were
tonnage at quayside; and a battalion of working twelve-hour shifts, and morale
infantry to guard prisoners. He asked was suffering accordingly. Port headquar-
for 1,310 freight cars per day, sufficient ters and port companies were composed
to clear 17,000 tons per day. Another almost wholly of inexperienced and in-
4,000 tons, he estimated, could be moved adequately trained men. Almost without
to local dumps and depots via motor fail, it seemed, once units had learned
transport, and 3,000 tons, consisting of their job they would be transferred else-
vehicles, would move out on their own where, leaving the port with untrained
power. Additional cargo-handling equip- labor. Port companies generally suffered
from poor supervision, and the lack of
supervisory personnel in turn was the
75 History of T C ETO, V, 4th Port I. Colonel
Sibley was relieved by Col Benjamin B. Talley, who main deterrent against changing to eight-
commanded Normandy Base Section during Colonel hour shifts. Furthermore, none of the
Wyman’s temporary absence. There was some dis- port companies then employed at Cher-
agreement over the justification for the relief. Colo-
nel Talley himself regarded Sibley as an able officer bourg had their full allowances of per-
although unsuited for the kind of organization re-
quired at Cherbourg, and agreed that he be relieved
without prejudice. General Ross expressed his con- 76 Twenty-three
at quays, 4 working dukws, 12
fidence in Sibley by giving him an important as- working barges, and 5 coasters discharging coal.
signment in the U.K. Base Section. Interv with 77Ltr, Crothers to CG Normandy Base Sec, sub:
Talley, 6 Mar 51, and Ltr, Ross to Harold Larson, Additional Requirements, Port of Cherbourg, 3 Oct
22 Jan 51, OCMH. 44, EUCOM 800 Rivers, Harbors, and Waterways, I.
86 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
sonnel, with the result that there were resulted in exorbitantly long turn-
not enough hatch gangs in operation.78 arounds. 80
In addition to noting personnel de- Magnifying the entire clearance prob-
ficiencies, both SHAEF and COMZ ob- lem, meanwhile, was the fact that depots
servers felt that the facilities of the port in the Cherbourg area were carrying on
were not being efficiently utilized. Col. retail supply operations. Requisitions
W. E. Potter, logistic planner from the from the armies and even subordinate
Communications Zone, observed that headquarters were being filled in detail
there was considerable misuse of quay- from dumps and depots in the Cher-
age. Engineer Class IV ships, for exam- bourg area, entailing much sorting and
ple, were being discharged at the con- switching of freight cars and segregation
venient Quai de Normandie, while high of small loads, thus adding to the al-
priority cargo like ammunition was be- ready overtaxed facilities of the port area
ing unloaded at less suitable basin quays, and contributing to the congestion there.
which were difficult to work by rail. A Base areas were not intended to carry
few days of good weather invariably on retail issue, except on a small scale
brought congestion on the quays. Plan- to units located in the immediate vicin-
ning had also been deficient, particularly ity. This was another of the unorthodox
in minor details. Even standing operat- practices forced on the Communications
ing procedures were lacking on certain Zone in the pursuit period, when lack
functions which might have been re- of forward depots left no choice but to
duced to routine, such as the provision fill requisitions directly from base dumps
of empty cars at loading sites.79 and depots. T h e port area was ill-
One of the principal bottlenecks equipped for such operations, and it
which all the inspections recognized was was imperative that its operations be
the lack of adequate rolling stock needed limited to wholesale supply, so that com-
to clear the port. But this deficiency, plete train loads of various classes of
in the view of observers, was needlessly supply could be dispatched to depots
aggravated by poor co-ordination be- farther forward in the Communications
tween port authorities and the railways Zone.81
in providing the proper types and num- T h e SHAEF representatives who vis-
bers of cars for loading, and by ineffi- ited the port early in October concurred
cient operations at the depots, where the in general with the new port com-
excessive time required to unload trucks mander’s request for additional troops
and equipment. General Ross, the chief
of transportation, immediately took steps
78 Memo, Thackrey for G–4 SHAEF, sub: Port
Discharge Conditions at Cherbourg Which Can Be
Improved: Recommendations Regarding Their Im-
provement, 9 Oct 44, EUCOM 800 Rivers, Harbors, 80 Potter, Rpt of Inspection, 23 Oct 44, and Memo,
and Waterways, I. Thackrey for SHAEF G–4, 9 Oct 44.
79 Ibid.; Col W. E. Potter, Report of Inspection of 81Memo, sub: Cherbourg, 20 Oct 44, attached to
Cherbourg, 23 Oct 44, EUCOM 800, Rivers, Har- Ltr, Rear Adm Alan G. Kirk to Smith, 21 Oct 44,
bors, and Waterways, I; COMZ G–4 Br Chief‘s Mtg, SHAEF SGS 800 Harbors, Opening, Use, Construc-
24 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C. tion.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 87
to send eighteen additional port com- be raised to about 15,000 tons per day
panies to Cherbourg.82 But the SHAEF by the end of October.
85
representatives were frankly skeptical This estimate actually proved the
over the prospects that the port would more realistic, for Cherbourg’s discharge
soon perform at the rate which Colonel rate at the end of October was averaging
Crothers had predicted. Captain Thack- only 13,000 to 14,000 tons per day. Its
rey pointed out that the port had never performance had been highly erratic
worked more than eighteen ships at a throughout the month, averaging only
time despite the fact that there were 11,750 tons. This was partly attributable
berths for thirty-five, and that only half to bad weather, for high winds and
of them had averaged 400 tons on a rough seas repeatedly hampered or com-
single day. Furthermore, he confirmed pletely suspended barge, dukw, LST,
what had been suspected earlier, that and even crane operations. The shortage
the discharge figures for September, of freight cars also held u p unloading at
which averaged 10,000 tons per day, had times.86
included about 4,000 tons of coal and Cherbourg was hardly less important
railway rolling stock. The actual dead- to the Allies at the end of October than
weight cargo discharged had averaged it had been a month earlier, even though
only about 6,000 tons.83 Such figures,Le Havre and Rouen had been opened
as SHAEF logistic planners had pointed in the meantime. Continued efforts were
out earlier, were worse than useless un- therefore made to eliminate the deficien-
less carefully interpreted.84 Regarding cies which prevented it from realizing
clearance capabilities, Captain Thackrey its maximum potential performance.
estimated that between 8,000 and 9,000 At the very end of the month an
freight cars would have to be put into organizational problem which had been
service between the forward depots and recognized for some time but gone un-
Cherbourg in order to provide the 1,300 remedied, was finally solved. General
cars needed at the port each day. He Stratton, the COMZ G–4, had called
doubted that this number could be made attention early in October to a defect
available before the beginning of De- in command organization which he con-
cember. He was not very hopeful, there- sidered to be at the very root of the diffi-
fore, that the port could achieve either culties at Cherbourg. I n his view too
discharge or clearance of 24,000 tons. many people were interfering with the
With the additional hatch gangs then port commander, who, in a sense, had
being organized, and with additional come to have the position of a mere
supervisory personnel and trucks, he be- executive to the base section commander,
lieved that discharge and clearance could locatedin the same city.87 Essentially,
the difficulty lay in the Normandy Base
82[E. Cutts] American Port Plans, August to No-
vember, 1944, p. 16. 85 Memo,Thackrey for G–4 SHAEF, 9 Oct 44.
83Memo, Thackrey for SHAEF G–4, 9 Oct 44; 86SHAEF G–4 Weekly Logistical Summaries, Oct,
COMZ G–4 Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl, Nov 44, SHAEF G–4 War. Diary/Jnl, Oct, Nov,
4 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C. APPS.
84 Memo, Whipple for Current Opns Br, sub: Plng 87COMZ G–4 Plant and Communications Diary/
Factors, 1 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 Supplies General. Jnl, 4 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C.
88 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
93 Ibid.,V, 4th Port, 25. 95History of TC ETO, Ch. IV, 5th Port, pp. 1–5;
94SeeTable 4, p. 124, below. [Cutts] American Port Plans, pp. 7–9.
90 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
the other small Brittany ports in plans and sufficient unloading facilities to han-
after mid-July. Granville was mainly a dle 5,000 tons, double the earlier esti-
fishing port in peacetime; like Cher- mate. Plans were made to make Gran-
bourg, it had little importance as a ville the number one coal port on the
freight handler, its prewar intake aver- Continent . 96
aging less than 60,000 tons per year. It The 1055th PC&R Group initiated
was a completely artificial port, its har- work at Granville on 3 August by clear-
bor consisting of two basins—an outer ing the debris from the streets and start-
tidal basin known as the Avant Port, ing the repair of the craters in the west-
and an inner wet basin, the Bassin à Flot ernmost jetty forming the Avant Port.
—formed by two jetties and a mole. A On 12 August Normandy Base Section
locked channel 223 feet long connected relieved the Advance Section of respon-
the two basins. T h e Bassin à Flot could sibility at Granville, and two weeks later
maintain a water depth of nineteen feet the 1058th PC&R Group replaced the
by means of the locks, had quays with 1055th. Clearing the lock channel and
cranage facilities all around, and offered stabilizing its torn walls proved one of
quayside accommodations for vessels u p the largest projects. No attempt was
to 4,000 tons. Pre-D-Day plans called for made to repair the lock gates, but the
developing a capacity of approximately channel itself had to be cleared to permit
the passage of vessels into the Bassin à
2,500 tons per day.
Flot, which was to be utilized as a drying
Granville was captured on 30 July,
basin like the Avant Port. The enemy
five weeks later than scheduled. A recon- had blown five tremendous craters in the
naissance party representing the ADSEC massive granite block retaining walls
Engineer, the 1055th PC&R Group, and which in some places reached to the very
the 11th Port, which was to operate channel floor. T h e channel was choked
Granville, immediately surveyed the with masonry and clay backfill from these
port. As expected, they found it badly demolitions, and the removal of this
damaged. T h e gates of the lock channel debris was a time-consuming task, for
had been totally destroyed and the chan- tidal conditions made it impossible to
nel itself blocked by about 7,000 cubic work more than about six hours each
yards of masonry blown into it from the day in the basins. T h e task required ap-
walls. Seven traveling cranes around the proximately seven weeks, after which
Bassin à Flot had been destroyed and there still remained the job of stabilizing
some of the wreckage toppled into the the channel’s ruptured retaining walls.
basin. Craters had been blown in both Parts of the wall were rebuilt with rub-
jetties forming the basins, and all berths ble masonry; the remainder was repaired
in the two basins were obstructed by by building sandbag revetments. Be-
damaged tugs, barges, and other craft. cause of the strong current which the
Finally, all cargo-handling facilities and
rail spurs had been rendered useless.
96Port of Granville History, Annex A to Nor-
Nevertheless it was concluded that the mandy Base Section, Engineer Section History, pp.
port could provide sixteen coaster berths 1–4, ETO Adm 596.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE A N D SHIPPING PROBLEMS 91
ebb and flow of the tide caused in the down on the harbor floor with the reced-
channel, it was also necessary to line ing tide. Repair of the craters presented
the channel with timber fenders to pro- problems similar to those in the lock
vide stout bumpers as protection against channel. Work initially was restricted
vessels moving along the channel. Tidal to periods of low tide, and on stormy
conditions restricted this work to a few days the high tide frequently washed out
hours a day. the preceding day’s progress.
At the same time engineers had begun Meanwhile engineers also repaired
to clear berths and construct cargo-han- existing rail facilities and laid additional
dling facilities in both the outer and track to serve berths in the western part
inner basins. Sunken vessels did not of the harbor, and finally installed light-
present a great problem; they were sim- ing facilities along the quays and at the
ply patched at low tide, pumped out, Granville railhead to make night opera-
and then floated on the high tide and tions possible. Rehabilitation of the port
towed out. T h e biggest problems in the was finally completed on 6 November,
Avant Port were the removal of debris by which time sixteen coaster berths had
from the craters blown in the jetties been provided, as planned, offering a
which enclosed the harbor, and the re- discharge capacity of 5,000 tons per day.
pair of the craters themselves. The whole More than 363,000 man-hours of work
basin was littered with the debris from went into developing the port to this
these demolitions, which had to be re- capacity .97
moved because of the danger of punc-
97Ibid., pp. 4-13: Normandy Base Section, En-
turing the hulls of vessels as they settled gineer Section History, p. 27.
92 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
As was the case at all the ports re- little point in using Granville for any
stored, the reception of cargo at Gran- other purposethan coal.102
ville did not await the final completion Maintenance of equipment was a
of all construction projects. Four berths never-ending problem at Granville, in
were ready by 15 September and on that part because of a lack of skilled labor,
date the first coaster—a Swedish vessel— in part because of the lack of tools. This
enteredthe port.98 Coal deliverieswere problem, plus the difficulties that bad
rather insignificant at first, partly be- weather created in bringing vessels into
cause the better berths in the inner basin the shallow harbor, kept the port’s per-
were not ready, but chiefly because ves- formance disappointingly low. 103 Gran-
ville occasionally topped the 3,000-ton
sels had not been dispatched to the port
mark, but its average discharge rate from
owing to draft limitations. 99 Discharge
the time of its opening to the end of
began to average about 1,000 tons per day January 1945 was under 1,300 tons per
toward the end of October after the day.
opening of additional berths in the Bas-
sin à Flot.100 But stormy weather that The first cargo discharged in Brittany
month kept coaster sailings down and was brought in via open beaches at St.
prevented the port from coming any- Michel-en-Grève, near Morlaix. T h e dis-
where near realizing its 3,000-ton poten- charge of cargo there was purely an im-
tial. 101 provisation to meet an emergency re-
The inability to utilize Granville's quirement for supplies for the VIII
facilities for coal reception more fully Corps in its operations against Brest.
led to the suggestion that other types of Representatives of the 16th Port, which
cargo be sent to the part. It was esti- had been designated to operate the Brit-
mated that beaching, storage, and rail tany ports, had followed closely on the
facilities were such that about 6,000 heels of the advancing forces in the
tons of general cargo could be handled peninsula early in August to reconnoiter
there without interfering with the dis- all the port facilities along the northern
charge of coal. But other ports already coast. They found St. Michel suitable
existed farther forward on the line of as a landing beach, and, lacking usable
communications–Rouen, for example- port facilities, immediately made plans
which could receive all the available to bring LST’s in at this point.
coaster shipping. Consequently there was T h e first three LST’s arrived on 11
August, and unloading began on the
afternoon of the 12th under the proper
98Port of Granville History, p. 9, and Figure 38.
99 Min, Mtg on Port Situation with CofS COMZ.
tidal conditions. A shortage of trucks
G–4, TC, et al., 13 Oct 44, G–4 Plant and Com-
munications Diary/Jnl, ETO Adm 145C. 102Ltr, Col John H. Judd, QM Normandy Base
100At that time the 11th Port headquarters moved Sec, to CO Normandy Base Sec, sub: Full Utilization
to Rouen and the operation of Granville was turned of Granville as a Port, 24 Oct 44, with Inds Nor-
over to the 4th Port. History of T C ETO, V, 4th mandy Base Sec and Hq ETO, 8 Nov 44, EUCOM
Port, 9, and 11th Port, 1. 800 Rivers. Harbors. and Waterways. I.
101G–4 Plant and Communications Diary/Tnl, 26 103CAO Mtgs, 14 and 17 Nov 44,SHAEF AG 337–
Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C. 14; History of T C ETO, V, 4th Port, 9–10.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 93
halted operations temporarily, but un- made at the behest of Lt. Gen. Troy H.
loading resumed with the arrival of addi- Middleton’s VIII Corps for the siege of
tional transport from the VIII Corps, Brest. St. Michel’s record was not spec-
and the discharge of 1,500 tons of ra- tacular in terms of tonnage, but the
tions, POL, and ammunition was com- beaches served their purpose in a time
pleted on the following day. After a of pressing need.
lapse of a few days LST’s began to ar-
rive fairly regularly.104On 19 September The port of St. Brieuc, forty miles
the 16th Port turned over St. Michel to farther east, at first was believed to pos-
the 5th Port, which continued to oper- sess good potentialities, for it had a well-
ate the beaches until the end of Septem- protected landlocked harbor, and was
ber. 105 well situated with respect to the rail and
In the course of their operation the St. road network. It was estimated at first
Michel beaches handled about 60,000 that the port should handle 3,500 tons
tons of supplies, much of it consisting of per day, at least half of this in coal. But
the emergency ammunition shipments St. Brieuc, like all the small ports, could
not receive Liberty ships for direct ship-
104 TUSAAAR, II, G–4, 11; History of T C ETO, to-shore discharge. Shortly after its open-
IV, 16th Port, I, 5–6.
105History of TC ETO, V, 5th Port, 1. ing in mid-September its operations were
94 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
limited entirely to the intake of coal, by the 1057th PC&R Group. When com-
which was to be used for the local gen- pleted, Morlaix-Roscoff provided anchor-
erating plants and railways. In mid- age for six Liberty ships, which were
October the shortages of coasters led to discharged into schuits, LCT’s, and
the decision to close the port.106Its dis- barges. The area initially came under
charge record had been poor, the entire the control of the 16th Port, which op-
cargo handled during its month of op- erated the other small Brittany ports,
eration totaling less than 10,000 tons. On but discharge operations did not actually
9 November St. Brieuc was turned back get under way until after the 5th Port
to the French. 107 assumed control on 5 September.108 Mor-
laix and Roscoff remained in operation
Morlaix and Roscoff, the westernmost until the middle of December and were
of the Brittany ports utilized by U.S. the last of the Brittany ports to be closed.
forces, like St. Michel and St. Brieuc did In the three months of their operations
not figure in plans as of D Day, al- the two ports averaged approximately
though they had been considered earlier. 2,100 tons per day, although they often
After a reconnaissance in mid-August, exceeded their target of 3,000 tons. Their
however, both ports showed sufficient average receipts therefore exceeded those
promise to warrant their restoration and of all the other minor ports, and their
use. Roscoff and Morlaix were two sepa- entire intake totaled over 200,000 tons.
rate ports, the former situated at the tip
of the Penlam peninsula and the latter Had there been any choice in the mat-
about twelve miles up the Dossen estu- ter it is unlikely that the smaller Brit-
ary, but they were consistently linked tany ports would have been opened at
in all plans and were restored and op- all. In many respects they were uneco-
erated by one headquarters. Roscoff was nomical to operate. By the time they
strictly tidal, while Morlaix, like Gran- were sufficiently repaired to begin receiv-
ville, had both a drying-out and a locked ing supplies (mid-September) the front
wet basin. Both had the disadvantage of line had advanced several hundred miles
all minor ports in that they could not eastward. None of them could discharge
accommodate deep-draft shipping except deep-draft ships except by lighters, of
to provide anchorage. which there was never an adequate num-
T h e rehabilitation of the two ports ber to take full advantage of the smaller
consisted in the main of dredging the ports' capacity. Brittany’s ports, which
estuary, removing sunken craft, repair- by plan were to have developed a capac-
ing lock gates, constructing POL recep- ity of 30,050 tons by early November,
tion and storage facilities, and erecting were discharging a mere 3,000 tons per
floodlights. This work was carried out day by that time. This represented but
106Min, Mtg on Port Situation with CofS COMZ, 108Port Reconstruction and Repair, Hist Rpt 11,
G–4, TC, et al., 13 Oct 44, G–4 Plans and Com- OCE ETO, pp. 70–72; History of TC ETO, V, Brit-
munications Diary/Jnl, ETO Adm 145C. tany Base Section, 9, IV, 5th Port, 1–2; [Cutts]
107[Cutts] American Port Plans, pp. 5–6. American Port Plans, 5–6.
T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 95
TABLE
3-DISCHARGEPERFORMANCE
OF THE BRITTANY PORTS
10percent of the 30,000 tons then being need pending the development of deep-
unloaded daily as compared with the 70 draft capacity farther east. Nevertheless,
percent of total capacity which they were they contributed in relieving the deficit
expected to provide. They were useful in port capacity at a time when approach-
in support of the forces operating in the ing bad weather threatened to close the
peninsula, of course, but these forces Normandy beaches, and during the pe-
were relatively insignificant in number riod when Cherbourg’s reconstruction
after September. The. Brittany ports con- was in progress. Their discharge per-
sequently met an almost purely interim formance is summarized in Table 3.
CHAPTER IV
cleared by the same road and rail net weather would also force a stoppage of
which served the port of Cherbourg and imports there. By mid-October, then, it
the Normandy beaches. There was al- had become essential that POL ports be
ready a large enough accumulation of developed which would afford safe berth-
supplies in the Normandy depots to ing in adverse weather.4
saturate the carrying capacity of those Finally, French officials were appeal-
lines for months to come. 3 ing for the use of some of the available
There was also an urgent need for port capacity to meet civil import re-
developing new bulk POL intake facili- quirements. There was small hope of
ties. As of mid-October Cherbourg was meeting such demands in view of the
virtually the only bulk POL port operat- urgent requirements for military pur-
ing on the Continent. It possessed only poses. Military needs of all kinds–rail-
one tanker berth, and that was located way rolling stock and shipping, as well
along the Digue de Querqueville in the as port capacity–so far exceeded the
Grande Rade, where stormy weather available means in October that the allo-
frequently interfered with berthing and cation of port capacity for French civil
discharge. A foretaste of future difficul- needs had to be postponed.5 T h e open-
ties was given on the night of 4 Octo- ing of Le Havre and Rouen nevertheless
ber, when a storm destroyed eight of the aided greatly in halting the deteriorating
ten unloading lines, completely shutting port situation in October by more than
down intake for eight hours and mate- compensating for the diminishing re-
rially reducing it for another twenty- turns at the beaches and by making it
four. A fairly heavy import of gasoline possible to end the uneconomic use of
had been achieved thus far only by the most of the small ports in the Normandy
use of large 15,000-ton tankers, but the and Brittany areas,
advent of bad weather made it extremely T h e Seine ports had figured in Allied
doubtful that such vessels could con- planning from the start. Plans for the
tinue to be handled at the Querqueville period after D plus go had assumed, in
Digue. Early in October operating diffi- fact, that logistic considerations would
culties caused by bad weather, plus shut- require crossing the lower Seine and
downs occasioned by the failure of tank- taking Le Havre and Rouen as a first
ers to arrive, resulted in POL being priority operation after the capture of
withdrawn from the Cherbourg tank the lodgment area. Le Havre was par-
farms faster than it could be replaced, ticularly valuable. With its fourteen
with the result that stocks again be-
came dangerously low. Small tankers 4 Memo, Brig D. H. Bond, Chief G–4 Petroleum,
SHAEF, for Crawford, sub: Dev of the Fort of Le
were still bringing POL into Port-en- Havre, Seine River, and Rouen for Bulk POL, 27
Bessin, but there was danger that bad Oct 44; Ltr, Normandy Base Sec to CG COMZ, sub:
POL Situation, Normandy Base Sec, 17 Oct 44,
EUCOM 463.7 Gasoline and Motor Oil IIB; CAO
3 Ltr, Vissering, Chief of Mov by Land, Mov and Mtg, 27 Oct 44, SHAEF AG 337–14.
T n Br G–4 SHAEF, to Deputy Chief Mov and T n 5 Memo, Maj Gen Charles S. Napier for CAO, sub:
Br, sub: Suggested Plan for Mov of U.S. Cargo French Ports, 27 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers
Through Calais, 16 Oct 44. SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers, . . . , IV, COMZ G–4 Plant and Communications
Wharves, Docks, and Berths, III. Diary/Jnl, 23 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C.
98 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
basins and eight miles of quays, includ- portation, recommended to the G–4 that
ing facilities for the reception of large Le Havre be assigned to the Communi-
oil tankers and a pipeline to Paris de- cations Zone. General Crawford imme-
veloped as the result of a tremendous diately asked the COMZ commander
improvement program a few years be- whether he was prepared to undertake
fore World War I, Le Havre had be- the development of the port on the as-
come the second port of France. Both sumption that a portion of the port's
Le Havre and Rouen, however, were capacity might initially have to be allo-
intended for British rather than Ameri- cated to the British, and on the addi-
can use. They were expected to relieve tional assumption that the Communi-
British forces from dependence on their cations Zone in all probability might
original Normandy landing beaches at still have to open the port of Brest.9
about D plus 120, and were not to be Supreme Headquarters did not wait for
turned over to U.S. forces until about a formal reply to its query, but on Gen-
D plus 210. By that date British lines of eral Lord's statement that the Communi-
communication were to be based on cations Zone could assume the respon-
ports farther up the coast. 6 sibility, notified General Lee on the 13th
T h e rapid developments during the that it had decided to assign Le Havre
pursuit largely invalidated these plans. to the Communications Zone, and in-
As early as 3 September the SHAEF formed him that the Allied Naval Com-
Logistical Plans Branch recommended mander was prepared to send two Royal
that the Seine ports be turned over to Marine Engineer companies to assist
U.S. forces in view of the more than in the work of rehabilitation.10
adequate facilities the British would T h e COMZ commander was still du-
soon have in such ports as Dieppe, Ca- bious about the value of Le Havre. In
lais, and Boulogne, which were already his analysis of the port problem he noted
uncovered, and in view of the imminent that the port would contribute in only
fall of Antwerp (which occurred the fol- a limited degree to the shortening of
lowing day). 7 T h e 21 Army Group did the lines of communication. Only Ant-
not favor the release of Le Havre until werp and the other northern ports, in
it could be certain that Antwerp and his opinion, could satisfy that need and
Rotterdam would be available,8 and for provide the capacity required. He there-
several days there was no decision on fore thought it advisable that Le Havre
the matter. On 11 September, however, be developed solely as an interim port
Maj. Gen. Charles S. Napier, the SHAEF with a capacity of between 8,000 and
Deputy G–4 for Movements and Trans- 10,000 tons, and with a minimum ex-
penditure of effort. 11 Theater officials
6SHAEF Plng Study, sub: POST-NEPTUNE, Course
of Action After Capture of the Lodgment Area, 30 9 Memo, Napier for G–4, 11 Sep 44, and Cbl
May 44 SHAEF G–3 War Diary. FWD–14635, Crawford to Lee, 12 Sep 44, SHAEF
7Memo, Whipple for CAO, sub: Port Dev, 3 Sep G–4 825.1 Piers . . ., III.
44. SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers . . ., III; SHAEF G–4 10Cbl FWD–14711, SHAEF to Lee, 13 Sep 44,
War Diary/Jnl, 3 Sep 44. SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers . . ., III.
8Cbl, 21 A Gp to ANCXF, 7 Sep 44, MA9, 11Ltr, Lee to SHAEF, 14 Sep 44. COMZ G–4 Plans
SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers . . ., III. and Communications Diary/Jnl, ETO Adm 145C.
PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 99
concurred in this view, and embodied gates had been damaged and the basins
the COMZ commander’s recommenda- rendered inoperable. This had the
tion regarding Le Havre in the port de- further result of subjecting all the basins
velopment plan which finally crystallized to tidal action, and the hydrostatic pres-
toward the end of the month.12 sure caused by the tides in turn caused
General Lee’s misgivings as to the many of the quay walls to fail.14 I n addi-
probability of developing a large dis- tion, there were the usual obstructions-
charge capacity at Le Havre in the near the many sunken craft in the various
future stemmed in part from his knowl- channels and basins, demolished cargo-
edge of the port’s condition. T h e enemy handling equipment, and bombed-out
garrison at Le Havre had resisted to the warehousing.15
bitter end, and had forced the Allies to COMZ officials initially established
subject the city to heavy bombardments two general priorities for the rehabili-
from the sea, land, and air for a full tation of the port: the immediate devel-
week before it capitulated. When First opment of tonnage reception of 1,500
Canadian Army forces entered Le Havre tons per day from Liberty ships by the
on 12 September, therefore, they found use of dukws and lighters, and then an
one of the most thoroughly demolished increase in the port’s discharge capacity
ports captured thus far. Port facilities to 7,000 tons, but without a major re-
had been destroyed with characteristic construction effort. 16
thoroughness. In addition, the repeated T h e principal engineer units dis-
bombings had destroyed approximately patched to Le Havre to accomplish this
two thirds of the city’s business and mission consisted of two general service
residential sections and caused an esti- regiments, two PC&R groups, a port
mated 6,000 civilian casualties. T h e repair ship crew, a gas generating unit,
bombings had also created an under- a maintenance company, a dump truck
standable resentment among the city’s company, and two Royal Marine En-
inhabitants toward their liberators, and gineer companies. All were placed under
at best an indifference to the activities the operational control of the 373d Engi-
of the units which shortly arrived to neer General Service Regiment, com-
rebuild the port. 13 manded by Col. Frank F. Bell. Work
The damage to Le Havre’s port fa- began on 20 September under a three-
cilities followed much the same pattern phase program drawn up by the com-
as at Cherbourg and Granville. In one manders of the 373d Regiment and the
sense the destruction was actually more other engineer units, and by the Chan-
serious at Le Havre, for most of the port’s nel Base Section Engineer. 17
facilities had centered around the wet T h e first-phase program consisted
basins, and a quick survey on 13–14
September disclosed that all the lock 14Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, I, 275.
15Port Construction and Repair, Hist Rpt 11,
OCE ETO, 26ff.
12Ltr, Hq ETO to CG COMZ, sub: Alloc of Ports, 16Ltr, Hq COMZ to Chiefs of Svs and Stf Secs,
19 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers . . ., III. sub: Dev of Continental Ports, 27 Sep 44, EUCOM
13Channel Base Section History, I, 207, ETO Adm 400 Supplies, Svs, and Equipment, V.
588; History of T C ETO, V, 16th Port; 40–41. 17 History of T C ETO. V. 16th Port. 8–9.
100 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
further and further into the future. Le bourg, would be the ability to clear.
Havre and Rouen had proved to be the Limitation on clearance resulted from
biggest nest egg since the capture of the fact that all traffic from Le Havre
Cherbourg. 24Early in November, there- had to cross British lines of communi-
fore, the Communications Zone directed cation, from the usual shortage in rail
the Channel Base Section to develop cars and locomotives, and from the lack
still greater capacity at Le Havre, raising of alongside berths where cargo could
the target to 9,500 tons by 1 Decem- be transferred directly to rail. Despite
ber. 25 these handicaps Le Havre continued to
Le Havre’s discharge capacity actually make a handsome contribution to the
exceeded this target by the end of De- total tonnages discharged on the Con-
cember, although full advantage could tinent, averaging more than 5,000 tons
never be taken of its capacity. Port offi- per day throughout November, and
cials had recognized that the crux of 5,400 tons in December. In January the
the problem at Le Havre, as at Cher- port bettered this record with a daily
average of 6,470 tons.
Le Havre never developed the num-
24Memo, Col James McCormack, Chief of Mov Br ber of alongside Liberty berths planned,
G–4 12 A Gp, to Barriger, 31 Oct 44, 12 A Gp
Tonnage 137. for the use of caisson piers proved un-
25Ltr, Hq COMZ to CO Channel Base Sec, sub: successful. An abnormally large per-
Dev of Port Facilities and Port Clearance-Le Havre
and Rouen, 6 Nov 44, EUCOM 825 Tunnels and
centage of the tonnage therefore con-
Pipelines, Docks, Piers, Jetties. tinued to be brought ashore by lighters
102 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
and dukws, the latter alone accounting in the Seine channel between Rouen and
for 33 percent.26 T h e extensive use of Le Havre. T h e principal rehabilitation
lighters had its disadvantages, of course, task consisted of removing these sunken
including multiple handling and inter- craft and cranes and fell mainly to the
ruptions from bad weather. T h e con- U.S. Navy, aided by French civilians.
tinued use of dukws brought its inevi- Storage space at Rouen, both covered
table maintenance problems. One am- and open, was excellent, and the major
phibian company estimated that its ve- engineer task there proved to be clearing
hicles had operated the equivalent of debris, filling bomb craters, erecting
70,000 miles. Inability to replace worn- cranes, and reconstructing railways.29
out vehicles and the lack of spare parts T h e COMZ directive of 27 September
led to widespread cannibalism and other had established a target of 3,000 tons per
expedients, such as the manufacture of day for Rouen. All cargo had to be dis-
propeller strut bearings from applewood charged from coasters, since the port was
and rudders from scrap steel. At times accessible only to ships with a maximum
in November the amphibian companies draft of from nineteen to twenty-five
were operating with 76 percent of their feet. Although the rehabilitation of
vehicles deadlined.27In mid-January the Rouen did not get under way until
port organization was strengthened by the beginning of October, the port was
the arrival of the 52d Medium Port. Le ready to receive cargo on the 13th, the
Havre then reached a peak strength of same day on which Le Havre took its
about 20,000 men, of whom 4,000 were first Liberties. T h e port discharged its
French civilians and an undetermined first supplies three days later. For the
number were prisoners of war. 28 first few days the operation of the port
was carried out by a detachment of the
Meanwhile, the port of Rouen, the 16th Port, sent over from Le Havre. On
ancient Norman capital lying seventy- 20 October the 11th Port, which had op-
five miles up the Seine River, had also erated the minor Normandy ports until
helped relieve the deficit in port capac- a few days before, arrived to take over
ity by developing a discharge of several Rouen.30
thousand tons. Rouen had been cap- By the end of the month Rouen was
tured on 30 August, but obviously could handling well over 2,000 tons per day,
not be utilized until Le Havre had also and in the first week of November aver-
been taken and the Seine estuary cleared. aged more than 4,000 tons. T h e port’s
Damage to this port hardly compared encouraging development soon made it
with that at Le Havre. Fortunately its possible for Le Havre to cease discharg-
quays were largely intact. But its cargo- ing coasters. On 8 November the Com-
handling equipment, such as cranes, was munications Zone went a step further
completely demolished and many vessels
29Ibid., V, 16th Port, 119; Final Report of the
had been sunk, both along the quays and Chief Engineer, E T O , I, 275-76; Engr Hist Rpt 1 1 ,
PP. 37ff.
26History of T C ETO, VI, 16th Port, 119. 30 The 11th Port relinquished control of Gran-
27Ibid., V, 16th Port, 27–28. ville on 24 October, when the 4th Port of Cher-
28Ibid., VI, 16th Port, 119. bourg took charge there.
PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 103
and ordered all coasters except those Le Havre and Rouen together aver-
carrying coal sent to Rouen,31 making it aged approximately 8,500 tons per day
possible to close all the shallow ports in in November, the month preceding the
Normandy and Brittany. At times Rouen opening of Antwerp, and accounted for
took Liberty ships after they had been approximately one third of all tonnage
lightened to the proper draft at Le discharged in that period. T h e total
Havre 32 Meanwhile the Communica- daily discharge on the Continent had
tions Zone raised Rouen’s discharge tar- risen from approximately 25,000 tons
get to 7,500 tons.33
Rouen did not meet per day to 27,300 tons since mid-Octo-
the new target, but did perform very ber. 35Le Havre and Rouen did not pro-
creditably in the next few months, aver- vide the final solution to the port prob-
aging 4,200 tons per day in November, lem, therefore, but they more than made
4,138 in December, and 5,072 tons in up for the loss of the beaches, and placed
January. Early in 1945 the port’s operat- a substantial portion of the total U.S.
ing strength rose to 9,000 Army person- discharge capacity a sizable distance
nel, 9,000 prisoners of war, and 5,000 farther forward on the line of communi-
civilians.34 cations, relieving the desperate shortage
in transport and serving as an important
stopgap pending the opening of Ant-
31[Cutts] American Port Plans, II, 34–35.
32History of T C ETO, V, 11th Port, 2–3. werp.
33Ltr, COMZ to Channel Base Sec, 6 Nov 44.
34History of T C ETO, VI, 11th Port, 58. 35See Table 4, p. 124, below.
104 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
(2) Antwerp and the Other feet. Furthermore, the Schelde was more
Northern Ports than 500 yards wide at Antwerp and
thus permitted easy maneuvering of the
Although it was not to receive cargo largest ships.
for nearly three months, Antwerp be- Antwerp’s port facilities were located
came the master key to all port policy partly along the river itself and partly
and plans after its capture early in Sep- in a complex of wet basins built off
tember. T h e advantages which Antwerp one side of the river. Approximately
possessed over other ports had long been three and one half miles of quays lined
appreciated, and once the port was in the right bank of the Schelde, forming
Allied hands both the 12th Army Group the western limits of the city. T h e
and the Communications Zone lost little greater portion of the port lay to the
time in urging SHAEF to allocate a por- north of the city and consisted of eight-
tion of the port’s capacity to U.S. forces.36 een basins, to which access was obtained
General Bradley strongly hoped that the through four locks. These basins pro-
early opening of the port would assure vided nearly twenty-six miles of quays.
a constant source of supply for the arm- T h e port therefore offered more than
ies and thus obviate the necessity for a twenty-nine miles of quays, and these
long build-up period and postponement were equipped with more than 600 hy-
of the offensive. 37 draulic and electric cranes, plus numer-
Small wonder that Antwerp’s capture ous floating cranes, loading bridges, and
raised hopes of solving the Allies’ long- floating grain elevators.
standing logistic problem. Antwerp Storage accommodations were com-
ranked with Hamburg, Rotterdam, and mensurate with these modern discharge
New York as one of the world’s great facilities. There were nearly 900ware-
ports, even though it did not approach houses, plus a granary with a capacity
the size of those cities in population. In of almost a million bushels, and cold
1938 alone it had registered 12,000 ves- storage chambers with about 750,000
sels and handled almost 60,000,000 tons cubic feet of capacity. Petroleum in-
of freight. take and storage installations were also
Antwerp is an inland port, situated on a grand scale. Pipelines ran directly
on the right bank of the Schelde estuary, from tanker berths to the 498 storage
fifty-fivemiles from the sea. Unlike other tanks, which occupied 208 acres and
ports on tidal streams, it could receive could hold 124,000,000 gallons of POL.
large seagoing vessels at all stages of the Equally important were the excellent
tide, for even the minimum depth along clearance facilities. Antwerp alone pos-
the quays in the river was twenty-seven sessed more than 500 miles of rails, plus
ample marshaling yards, and was well
36Memo, Moses for Crawford, 10 Sep 44, SHAEF tied in with a Belgian transportation
AF 323.3–2 Ports (Captured Ports); COMZ G–4 network consisting of 3,250 miles of rail-
History, I, 45: Ltr, Lee to SAC, 14 Sep 44, EUCOM
800 Rivers, Harbors, and Waterways.
ways and 1,370 miles of navigable water-
37Conf at COMZ, 18 Sep 44, G–4 History, I, 46. ways, including the Albert Canal, which
PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 105
North Sea coast during the September carefully studied during the four-day
drive. T h e Communications Zone had conference. A few of the ports, such as
not lost sight of their possible value, and Dunkerque and Zeebrugge, were still in
in the port plan which it submitted to enemy hands; several others, like Nieuw-
SHAEF on 14 September recommended poort, Gravelines, Blankenberge, and
that all requirements be reviewed when the Calais–Ostend reach, which was con-
the other north coast ports were cap- sidered as a possible landing site for
tured so that an equitable apportion- vehicle-carrying LST’s, were ruled out
ment of their facilities could be made. 43 for one reason or another.
At the end of the month the COMZ Only four ports were accepted as hav-
directive on port development specifi- ing potential value. These were Bou-
cally mentioned Calais, Boulogne, and logne, Dieppe, and Ostend, which were
Ostend as ports which might either be assigned to the British with the reserva-
assigned to U.S. forces or shared with tion that U.S. forces should share in
the British, and announced that the POL reception at Ostend, and Calais
Channel Base Section and Navy would which was assigned to the Americans.
reconnoiter the entire coast east of Le T h e Communications Zone concluded
Havre, particularly to find suitable on the basis of a reconnaissance that
beaching sites for LST’s.44 T h e latter Calais could provide the needed LST
were urgently needed to replace the berths for vehicle discharge, and Chan-
OMAHAand UTAH Beaches as points nel Base Section made preparations for
of entry for tracked vehicles. Channel certain improvements there, including
Base Section reconnoitered four of the plans for the construction of an unload-
ports–Dieppe, Le Tréport, Boulogne, ing ramp. But it failed to carry through
and Ostend–within the next few days. on these plans, and when 21 Army
On 5 October U.S. and British offi- Group requested permission to construct
cials met again, this time at Brussels, a train ferry terminal there, and later
to review the entire port situation in the a hard for a vehicle discharge, SHAEF
northeast and specifically to consider promptly approved. O n 23 October it
how the smaller ports could be utilized designated 21 Army Group as the agency
pending the opening of Antwerp. By henceforth responsible for developing,
this time the optimism over Antwerp operating, and administering Calais, al-
had declined noticeably, and a target though it was understood that the Com-
date of 15 November was accepted for munications Zone would share in the
the opening of the port. Le Havre and use of the port.46
Rouen were still unknown quantities at None of the ports mentioned above
this date. On the basis of either intel- had anything but limited value and they
ligence reports or reconnaissances al- were obviously no substitute for Ant-
ready carried out, therefore, about ten
of the smaller north coast ports were 45[Cutts] American Port Plan, II, 37-45; Cbls, 21
A Gp to GaIe, 18 and 21 Oct 44, SHAEF AG 323.3–2
43Ltr, Lee to SAC, 14 Sep 44. Ports (Captured Ports); Cbl, S–63627, G–4 SHAEF
44Ltr, Lord to Chiefs of Gen and Special Stfs and to 21 A Gp, 23 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers . . .,
Base Sec Comdrs, 26 Sep 44. IV.
P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 107
werp. Small wonder that the Supreme the 21 Army Group commander the ur-
Commander and his logistic planners be- gency of getting the port into operation.
came more and more anxious, therefore, By early October the Supreme Com-
as the supply situation deteriorated in mander had become impatient and
October without any sign that the great alarmed over the protracted attention
port might soon be placed in operation. which Field Marshal Montgomery was
T h e current concept of Antwerp’s im- giving the Nijmegen bridgehead at the
portance was well expressed by Colonel expense of the Schelde operation. Clear-
Whipple, the chief of the SHAEF Lo- ing the Antwerp approaches simply
gistical Plans Branch, early in October. could not be postponed any longer, and
“The failure to open Antwerp,” he in the second week of October General
wrote, “is jeopardizing the administra- Eisenhower insisted that Montgomery
tive soundness of our entire winter cam- give unequivocal first priority to that
paign. T h e placing of this operation as operation. Operations designed to clear
second priority within 21 Army Group the mouth of the Schelde were initiated
had temporary justification while the by the First Canadian Army a week
Northern salient was being reinforced, later, and were completed in the first
but I see no excuse for it now. T h e pres- week of November. 47
ent lack of support of troops of [the] US It was with an obvious sense of relief
3rd and 9th Armies and minimum sup- that the Supreme Commander saw the
port of 1st Army cannot be rectified 21 Army Group finally turn to the
until Antwerp is opened. Fifteen divi- Schelde operation. Eisenhower had pre-
sions are held impotent for lack of suc- dicted that operations would come to a
cess in this relatively small operation, standstill if the port were not in opera-
and this weakness may involve us in tion by mid-November. In fact, he had
winter weather to such an extent that emphasized the importance of Antwerp
our advance into Germany may be de- so frequently that General Marshall ex-
layed until spring.” 46In Colonel Whip- pressed fear that the ETOUSA com-
ple’s view it was imperative that “21 mander was putting all his eggs in one
Army Group be directed to place the basket. Late in October he cautioned
clearing of Antwerp as highest priority General Eisenhower against relying too
and to make such other adjustments as heavily on a single port, particularly in
are essential to insure it will not be view of its vulnerability to rocket at-
further delayed.” tacks. With the large concentration of
General Eisenhower needed no con- shipping and supplies there, particularly
vincing in this matter. He had assessed ammunition, Antwerp offered a lucra-
the true value of Antwerp some time tive target, and enemy attacks would do
before, and had repeatedly impressed on tremendous harm to the war effort if
46Memo, Whipple for G–4, sub: Capture of Ap- 47 CblsS–61466 and S–61621 Eisenhower to Mont-
proaches to Antwerp, 8 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 825.1 gomery, 9 and 10 Oct 44, Eyes Only Cbls, Smith
Piers . . ., III; SHAEF G–4 Log Plans Br Diary/Jnl, Papers; Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Oct 44, OPD
8 Oct 44. Exec Office File 9. Bk 23.
108 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
offensive operations depended on this the time it agreed that Antwerp should
one vital but vulnerable
asset.48 be developed for both U.S. and British
General Eisenhower immediately as- use. General Lee had suggested joint
sured the Chief of Staff that, far from control.52But the Supreme Commander
relying solely on that port, SHAEF was had decided that the port would be
taking steps to develop every other port opened under British control, since ex-
to its maximum capacity.49 Le Havre perience had shown joint operation of a
and Rouen had in fact just come into port to be unsatisfactory. 53
operation; the bottleneck was soon to T h e manner in which this control was
be broken at Cherbourg; and there even to be exercised was first outlined at the
were hopes that before long Marseille Antwerp meeting of 24–26 September.
might develop capacity in excess of the Additional matters, such as the labor sit-
6th Army Group’s needs and help sup- uation at Antwerp, were taken up at
port the Third Army. It was expected, the Brussels Conference on 5 October.
however, that Antwerp’s opening would T h e Communications Zone immediately
provide the additional capacity required thereafter sent qualified personnel to
to build forward reserves and to receive the various Anglo-American committees
and maintain additional divisions in the which were established to work out the
line.50 It would also make possible the detailed plans for the use of the port.
discharge of ships carrying engineer and Planning the clearance alone of a port
quartermaster Class I I supplies and ve- the size of Antwerp was a tremendous
hicles, all of which had had low priority undertaking, for it required close co-
in the preceding months because of the ordination to make the most efficient use
emphasis which had unavoidably been of rolling stock and railway running
placed on the discharge of rations and rights, especially in view of the fact that
ammunition. Finally, the opening of the port was to be used by both the
Antwerp would make it possible to elim- Americans and British.
inate the tremendous backlog of ship- T h e operational plan which Ameri-
ping waiting to be accepted in European can and British experts worked out in
ports. 51 these weeks was finally formalized on 18
In the meantime U.S. and British October in a “Memorandum of Agree-
forces had proceeded with the necessary ment” signed by Miles H. Graham, ma-
rehabilitation of the port, and COMZ jor general in charge of administration,
and 21 Army Group officials worked out 21 Army Group, and by Colonel Jacobs,
detailed plans for administering the port the Channel Base Section commander,
and sharing its facilities. SHAEF had who had been the chief COMZ repre-
settled the issue of control of the port at sentative in the negotiations with the
British. T h e stated purpose of the agree-
ment was to establish the basic plan and
48Cbl W–51862, Marshall to Eisenhower, 25 Oct
44, Eyes Only Cbls, Smith Papers.
procedure for the development of the
49Cbl S–64077, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Oct 44,
OPD Cbl Files.
50Ibid. 52Ltr, Lee to Eisenhower, 14 Sep 44.
51COMZ G–4 History, I, 66. 53Ltr, SHAEF to Lee, 19 Sep 44.
P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 109
maximum capacity of the port, and to to U.S. forces there was to be a U.S.
provide the necessary facilities and con- Army officer designated as port com-
trols for road, rail, and inland water mander. Above him was the Channel
transport in order that the requirements Base Section commander, who was re-
of both forces might be met with mini- sponsible for the “coordination, control,
mum cross-haul and interference, A tar- and the administration” of all U.S.
get date of 15 November was established forces in the area. There were many
for the completion of all work necessary common use” facilities and installa-
for the opening and operation of the tions, of course, such as POL, coal, grain,
port. cold storage, signal, and repair, and
Naval command of Antwerp, which where such facilities were jointly used
included the control of shipping within the commandant of the area specifically
the port, was vested in the Royal Navy; allocated to the British was to co-ordi-
and the Naval Officer in Charge, or nate British and U.S. activities in con-
NOIC, was initially designated as the sultation with the U.S. port commander,
Chairman, Port Executive Committee. A both of whom were members of the Port
British base sub area commander was Executive Committee.
made responsible for the local adminis- T h e great importance of port clear-
tration of the Antwerp area, and the de- ance was recognized in the provision of
fense of the port by air, land, and sea, a joint British-U.S. Movements and
was also a British responsibility. So far Transportation Committee, which was
as berthing facilities were concerned, the to plan and co-ordinate all traffic by road,
port’s inner basins were simply geo- rail, and inland waterway, and handle
graphically divided, the northern sec- all dealings with Belgian transport or-
tion of the port being allocated to the ganizations. T h e agreement of 18 Oc-
Americans, and the southern to the Brit- tober made an initial allocation of trans-
ish. It so happened that each of these portation facilities to the two forces,
areas also had a marshaling yard. T h e however. It gave U.S. forces primary
river berths were unassigned, their al- rights over highways southeastward to
location being left u p to the Port Execu- Liège and Namur, and the British pri-
tive Committee depending on current mary rights to Brussels; assigned to the
needs and on the basis of tonnage alloca- Americans control over railways south
tions established by SHAEF. At the first and southeastward to Liège and (via
Antwerp meeting at the end of Septem- Brussels) to Namur and Luxembourg,
ber a tentative division of tonnage ca- and to the British control over lines run-
pacity had allocated 25,000 tons to the ning to the north and northeast.54
Americans and 15,000 to the British. T h e rehabilitation of facilities re-
This was now changed to 22,500 and quired for maximum operation of the
17,500 tons respectively, exclusive of
POL. 54Memorandum of Agreement on the Operation
Joint use of Antwerp’s facilities was of the Port and the Clearance Therefrom for the
Maintenance of British and U.S. Armies, signed by
thus avoided so far as possible, and in Jacobs and Graham, 18 Oct 44, in History of TC
that part of the port specifically allocated ETO, V, 13th Port, 1–5.
110 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
formance when clearance became a bot- cumulation of more than 15,000 tons
tleneck just as it had at Cherbourg. (less than a day’s intake) would create
Clearance had not become a limiting a serious obstacle to further unloading
factor through oversight. Mainly because and outshipment. Since there appeared
of it, in fact, logistic planners had to be no immediate solution to the prob-
planned a maximum combined import lem, however, it was decided to hope for
at Antwerp of only 40,000 tons per day, the best, and if it proved impossible to
knowing that the port possessed capacity phase in certain types of cargo (particu-
far in excess of this target. T h e principal larly engineer supplies) at the rate at
limitation so far as U.S. operations were which forward depots could receive it,
concerned was in storage. Antwerp, with to “pile the stuff on the ground, and
all its magnificent facilities, lacked suffi- brace ourselves for the repercussions to
cient warehousing to permit any sizable come.” 62
backlogging of cargo in the port itself, Within two weeks of the port’s open-
for it had been the practice in peace- ing about 85,000 tons of cargo had al-
time to clear incoming cargo via rail, ready accumulated in sheds and under
highway, and canal immediately after it tarpaulins back of the quays, threaten-
was unloaded. ing to hamper unloading operations.
It was evident after the first recon- Storage space for 100,000 tons of supplies
naissance that there would not be ade- was being utilized in the U.S. section of
quate covered or open storage in Ant- the port, and space for an additional
werp to satisfy both American and Brit- 50,000 tons was granted in the British
ish needs. Antwerp, lying in the British area in December. It was estimated that
zone, was a logical base for the support in another ten days operations would be
of 21 Army Group, and British officials, entirely dependent on the ability of the
realizing the inadequacy of storage fa- port to clear tonnage as discharged.63
cilities in the area had opposed the es- T h e difficultywas attributable in part
tablishment of U.S. base installations to the shortage of railway rolling stock,
there.61 Only a small amount of storage particularly in the first days after the
space, all of it uncovered, was allocated opening of the port. Clearance by rail
for American use, therefore, purely for improved after the middle of the month,
intransit purposes, on the theory that all and eventually accounted for approxi-
U.S. cargo would be promptly dispatched mately 45 percent of the 313,500 tons
to depots in Liège and Namur or as clearedin the first month. 64 Clearance
near that area as possible. by barge, however, fell considerably be-
COMZ supply planners were under no low expectations. It had been hoped that
illusions as to the probable implications fully a third of the port’s intake could
of this deficiency. Colonel Potter, the
G–4 plans chief, estimated that an ac- 62 Memo, Potter for Stratton, 18 Nov 44, COMZ
G–4 Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl.
63Ltr, Lt Col R. W. Reisner, SHAEF G–4 Mov
61Summary of Events and Decisions 20 Sep to 30 and T n Br, to G–4, sub: Rpt of Trip to Antwerp,
Sep 44, in COMZ G–4 Plant and Communications 20 Dec 44, SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers . . ., V.
Diary/Jnl, ETO Adm 145C; Gratiot, Ports-Develop- 64Channel Base Section History, I, 225; History of
ment of Antwerp. TC ETO, V, 13th Port, 13.
SHIPSDISCHARGING
CARGOFOR CLEARANCE
BY RAIL,Antwerp, 22 December 1944.
P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 113
and causing many people to move into port, that no dumps be permitted even
the country. for sorting, and that special fire-fighting
T h e V-bombs had surprisingly little preparations be made.72
effect on port operations, although their When Antwerp actually opened at the
potential destructiveness forced the Al- end of November the Port Executive
lies to take special precautions in han- Committee asked that all ammunition
dling their most sensitive commodity, be excluded temporarily, and SHAEF
ammunition. Early in November Su- approved this request, specifying that no
preme Headquarters raised the question ammunition would be unloaded at Ant-
of admitting ammunition ships to Ant- werp for fourteen days except in emer-
werp and requested the various inter- gency.73 An exception was immediately
ested headquarters to present their views made, however, in granting a request of
on the matter. T h e Communications 21 Army Group to admit certain British
Zone recommended that ammunition be vessels,74 and a few weeks later ammuni-
excluded entirely, and proposed that all tion began to be received regularly, sub-
Class V supply continue to be handled ject to the restrictions laid down earlier.
at Cherbourg and Le Havre. Neither the I n mid-January the rules for ammuni-
Allied Naval Commander nor the 21 tion acceptance required reconsidera-
Army Group considered it necessary to tion. T h e scale of attacks by V-weapons
exclude ammunition from Antwerp, but had showed no signs of slackening. T h e
did advocate that certain precautions be main area of impact had in fact shifted
taken, including a restriction in the num- to the docks, resulting in greater dam-
ber of ammunition ships permitted in age and increased casualties. In the opin-
the port at one time, the dispersion of ion of the Port Executive Committee the
such vessels, and the prompt clearance current policy simply courted disaster.
of ammunition from the port so that It therefore recommended much more
there would be no accumulation at quay- stringent regulations. T h e problem was
side.71 not serious for U.S. forces, since all am-
T h e policy which the chief administra- munition on American account could
tive officer laid down a few days later easily be handled at other ports; the 21
generally followed these recommenda- Army Group readily agreed to have more
tions. It did not forbid the acceptance ammunition discharged at Ostend and
of ammunition at Antwerp, but re- Ghent. Both the amounts and types of
stricted the quantity to the operational ammunition, to be brought in via Ant-
requirements at the discretion of the werp accordingly were reduced to a min-
Communications Zone and the 21 Army
Group, and specified that it be handled 72Ltr, Crawford to Smith, sub: Acceptance of
in a separate and remote section of the Ammo Ships to Antwerp, 10 Nov 44, and Cable to
Major Commands, SHAEF SGS 800 Antwerp.
73Cbl 301504A, NOIC Antwerp to ANCXF, 30
21Cbl S–65373, SHAEF to Major Commands, 4 Nov 44, and Cbl S–69457, SHAEF to COMZ et al.,
Nov 44; Cbl Ex-61214, Lee to SHAEF, 7 Nov 44; 4 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS 800 Antwerp.
Cble 060910A, ANCXF to SHAEF, 6 Nov 44; Cbl 74Cbl QM–2261, 21 A Gp to SHAEF G–4, 4 Dec
QM–1756, 21 A Gp to SHAEF, 8 Nov 44, SHAEF 44. and Cbl S–69623, SHAEF to 21 A Gp, 5 Dec 44,
AG 323.3–3 (Ports) Port Capacities. SHAEF SGS 800 Antwerp.
PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 115
imum.75 These restrictions were not re- already very bad, became worse. Short-
laxed until late in April, barely two ages of food, clothing, and coal created
weeks before the end of hostilities. Even great distress during the winter, and
then the number of vessels which could finally led to a strike among dock work-
discharge at one time was limited, and ers on 16 January. T h e strike was not
no stacking of ammunition on the quays directed against the Allied port organi-
was permitted.76 zation, but was intended rather as a pro-
In addition to imposing a handicap on test against the arduous working condi-
discharge operations, the V-weapon at- tions and terrible economic conditions
tacks contributed greatly to the distress which forced people to resort to the
of Antwerp’s inhabitants. Antwerp came black market for the barest essentials.
under intensified attack by the dreaded T h e demonstration lasted only one day,
“vengeance” weapons during the enemy and workers returned to their work on
counteroffensive in the last half of De- assurance from the burgomaster that
cember. One of the most disastrous at- more food and coal would be made avail-
tacks occurred on the afternoon of 16 De- able at regulation prices.79
cember, when a direct hit on the crowded Civilian labor was plentiful for the
Rex Theater killed 567 soldiers and most part, although the movement of
civilians and seriously injured another many workers out of the city produced
291. U.S. engineers, aided by other port a transportation problem. There were
units, worked nearly a week recovering the usual difficulties over language, and
bodies from the debris. 77 over reading the complicated markings
Antwerp sustained nearly 4,000 hits on U.S. cargo. But Belgian labor was
before the attacks finally ceased at the both co-operative and industrious, and
end of March 1945. T h e city suffered U.S. forces made the maximum use of
heavy material damage, and sustained the local manpower resources, reserving
more than 10,000 casualties, two thirds their own port battalions for supervisory
of all those caused by the V-weapons on jobs. I n December an average of 9,000
the Continent. Of these, about 82 per- civilian workers were employed in the
cent were civilian, the remainder mili- U.S. section of the port, and on one shift
tary. 78 a record 13,125 men.80
Under these attacks living conditions, Antwerp recovered from the worst ef-
fect of the embargo and clearance hand-
icaps in the second half of January and
75Cbl 131642A, NOIC Antwerp to 21 A Gp, 13
Jan 45, and Cbl MGA–5, 21 A Gp to SHAEF, 15
Jan 45, ETO Cbls, ETO Adm 404 and SHAEF SGS 79Cbl 131642A, NOIC Antwerp to 21 A Gp, 13
393.3 Ports–Allocation and Development; Cbl S– Jan 45, EUCOM 471/1 Ammunition Policy; Ltr, R.
75911, SHAEF to G–4 ETO, 21 Jan 45. ETO Cbls, S. MacTier, Chief Representative British Ministry
ETO Adm 405. of War Transport to Gale, 17 Jan 45, SHAEF SGS
76Cbl S–86010, SHAEF to T C ETO, 24 Apr 45, 323.3 Ports–Allocation and Development; Cbl, War
ETO Cbls, ETO Adm 415. Shipping Adm Antwerp to WSA, 17 Jan 45, ETO
77History of T C ETO, V, 13th Port, 15; VI, 13th Cbls, ETO Adm 405; Cbl 171916, NOIC to SHAEF
Port, 73–74. et al., 17 Jan 45, SHAEF Cable Log IN, Smith
78 [Royce L. Thompson] Military Impact of the Papers.
German V-Weapons, 1943–1945, 31 Jul 53, pp. 9–12, 80History of TC ETO, V, 13th Port, 10–11; VI,
51–53, MS, OCMH. 13th Port, 80–81.
116 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
REMAINS
OF DECANTING
SITE, POL Depot, Antwerp, hit by a German V-weapon.
by the end of the month was again dis- the logistic structure now centered on
charging 18,000 tons per day. With the the transportation system, and even this
help of Le Havre and Rouen, which were was greatly relieved by the shortening of
contributing 12,000 to 13,000 tons, U.S. the lines of communication.
discharge by that time was averaging be-
tween 40,000 and 50,000 tons per day, ( 3 ) Southern France
double the intake in October. Antwerp Providing the necessary port capacity
did not provide the immediate solution for the support of Allied forces in south-
to all logistic difficulties, but its opening ern France proved a far less protracted
at least eliminated port capacity as a and less worrisome problem than in the
limiting factor in the support of the U.S. north. Requirements were considerably
armies. For the first time the Communi- smaller, for one thing, since plans ini-
cations Zone enjoyed a surplus in dis- tially called for the support of a force
charge capacity, which permitted some of only ten divisions via the southern
choice in the use of ports and a more line of communications. T h e problem
economic use of shipping and inland was further simplified by the fact that
transport. It also opened up the prospect there existed in southern France a ma-
of relaxing the prohibition on civil im- jor port, Marseille, the capacity of which
ports. Whatever strain still remained on was known to be ample to meet all Al-
PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 117
FOR CASUALTIES
SEARCHING caused by V-bomb hits in Antwerp.
IN WRECKAGE
lied discharge requirements in that area. launched simultaneously with the Nor-
Port discharge facilities in southern mandy invasion, and then to a prolonged
France had had an important bearing on argument between the British and U.S.
the final decision to launch the DRAGOONChiefs of Staff as to the best way in which
operation. T h e southern France land- to employ Allied forces in the Mediter-
ings had long been planned as an opera- ranean. T h e issue still remained unre-
tion closely linked to OVERLORD, and as solved at the time OVERLORD was
an operation best calculated to utilize launched.
Allied forces in the Mediterranean, par- ANVILhad been envisaged as aiding
ticularly French divisions. Early in 1944 OVERLORD by both drawing enemy forces
the decision to strengthen the cross- away from the northern bridgehead and
Channel operation, which necessitated providing a way by which additional Al-
the withdrawal of landing craft from the lied forces could be committed against
Mediterranean, jeopardized the future the enemy in France. At the end of June,
of ANVIL,as the southern France opera- with Allied forces bogged down in Nor-
tion was then called. T h e decision to mandy hedgerows and bottomlands, the
strengthen OVERLORD at the expense of desirability of a diversion in southern
ANVILled first to the realization that France designed to forestall enemy rein-
the southern operation could not be forcement of the northern defense line
118 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
along with the beaches, could easily han- tending fifty-seven miles to the north-
dle the maintenance and build-up re- west, connected Marseille with the satel-
quired for the consolidation of the lite Port du Bouc, which had important
bridgehead and the advance on Mar- POL receiving and storage facilities, and
seille. They hoped that the port would the Rhône River. Marseille did not
be captured by D plus 20 and that it equal Antwerp in size or facilities, but
would have an initial discharge capacity it was known to have a peacetime dis-
of about 2,000 tons per day.83 charge capacity of 20,000 tons, which was
While Toulon was expected to have ample to meet the estimated daily re-
only passing importance in the mainte- quirement of about 15,000 tons for the
nance of the DRAGOON forces, Marseille DRAGOON forces. 84
was planned to become the main gate- Allied planners in the Mediterranean
way through which the southern forces were under no illusions about the
eventually would be sustained. It was, in chances of capturing either Toulon or
fact, essential for a build-up prerequisite Marseille intact. They had had sufficient
to an exploitation u p the Rhône valley. opportunity to observe the enemy’s de-
Marseille, with a population of nearly a structive ability in that theater, having
million, was the second city of France witnessed one of the best examples of it
and its foremost port. It had long played at Naples. T h e Seventh Army fully ex-
an important role in the commercial life pected that it would have to rehabili-
of the Mediterranean, serving as early as tate both Toulon and Marseille and
the sixth century B.C. as an outpost of scheduled the introduction of both en-
the Greek trading complex and coming gineer troops and equipment for the re-
into great prominence with the develop- construction task which they envisaged.85
ment of the north African colonies and T h e choice of Toulon and Marseille
the opening of the Suez Canal. It is as the first major objectives dictated that
largely an artificial port, consisting of the assault area be within easy striking
ten basins with approximately thirteen distance of these targets. T h e sites finally
miles of quays, almost all of which are selected for the landings lay in the gen-
served by rail. T h e port could accom- eral vicinity of St. Tropez–St. Raphael,
modate all types of shipping, and pos- between thirty and fifty miles northeast
sessed ample facilities for the transfer of of Toulon. Landings were successfully
all types of cargo between ships, barge- carried out in that area on 15 August as
lines, trucks, rail cars, sheds, and ware- scheduled, and engineer shore groups
houses. Clearance facilities were equally
quickly organized the three beaches,
good, for hard-surfaced highways and
standard-gauge railways linked the port
with the major cities of France. In addi- 84Preliminary Rpt, Strategic Engineering Study
tion, the Marseille-Rhône Canal, ex- 84, Port and Terminal Facilities, Vol. III of Mediter-
ranean France, prep by Bd of Engrs for Rivers and
Harbors, Intel nr OCOE, WD, Oct 43, pp. 107–83,
83Hamilton and Smith, Southern France and 249–87: CONAD History, 35 (HD); Report of
Alsace, Ch. II, pp. 20–27; ANVILAppreciation and Operations, Seventh U.S. Army, I, 327 (HD).
Outline Plans, Sec. I and Annex A, 22 Dec 43, 85 SeventhArmy Engineer Staff Section Reports,
AFHQ RG 727, Drawer 1104, G–3 OPs P–122. 1 January–30 September 1944, p. 10.
120 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
GENERAL
DESTRUCTION Note ships waiting in outer harbor.
AT MARSEILLE.
known as ALPHA,DELTA,and CAMEL, the first month the beaches easily met
for the build-up of supplies and troops. this goal, handling 280,000tons.87
T h e small neighboring ports of St. Meanwhile both Toulon and Mar-
Raphael, St. Maxime, and St. Tropez seille were captured earlier than ex-
were also captured and cleared for the pected, providing a welcome bonus in
use of small craft. port discharge capacity. T h e Seventh
For the first two weeks the bulk of all Army’s operational plans had assigned
maintenance supplies for the Seventh to French forces the mission of captur-
Army was brought ashore via the ing the two ports, giving first priority to
beaches, which averaged more than 10,- the seizure of Toulon. T h e unexpected
000 tons per day. Logistic planners had ease with which the landings were ac-
calculated that the support of the DRA- complished made it possible to improve
GOON force would require that about
on this plan. By 20 August French forces
278,000 tons of supplies be passed over had already driven past Toulon to a
the beaches in the first thirty days.86 In point midway between that port and
CLOSE-UP
OF DAMAGED
DOCKFACILITIESand sunken craft, 1 September 1944.
Marseille, creating the inviting oppor- destructive art apparently reached its
tunity of striking at both ports simul- height. Nevertheless, both Toulon and
taneously. Such attacks were immedi- Marseille were useless for the moment.
ately ordered, and after a week of savage T h e first reconnaissance at Marseille in-
fighting Toulon and Marseille capitu- dicated that all channels and entrances
lated on the same day, 28 August. Tou- were completely blocked by sunken
lon was captured a full week ahead of ships. Both the inner harbor and the
schedule, and Marseille almost four waters beyond the outer mole were sown
weeks earlier than expected. 88 with hundreds of marine mines; jetties,
T h e condition of the two ports at- quays, and cranes had been blasted: and
tested once more to the enemy’s appre- the entire port area was mined and booby-
ciation of their value for the Allies if trapped. Toulon had suffered even more
surrendered intact. T h e demolitions and severely, Allied naval and air bombard-
blocking do not appear to have equaled ment having made a contribution to the
those at Cherbourg, where the enemy’s
damage.
Since the two ports had been captured
88 Seventh Army Report of Operations, I, 151, at the same time there was little point
167; Hamilton and Smith, Southern France and
Alsace, Chs. XIII and XV. in following the original plan of giving
122 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
TABLE4—TONNAGESDISCHARGED
A T CONTINENTAL
PORTS: JUNE 1944–APRIL 1945
[Long Tons a]
personnel (chiefly port battalions), the shipping in the early stages of OVERLORD,
remainder consisting of French civilian had allocated 625,000 dead-weight tons
labor, prisoners of war, and a small num- of coasters for the first weeks of the oper-
ber of French Indochinese troops.
98 ation. They had intended that this ship-
ping should gradually be replaced by
( 4 ) T h e Shipping Tie-up ocean-going vessels, leaving about 100,-
000 tons of coasters in cross-Channel
I n the first six months of operations
service after D plus 42. Shortly before
inadequate port discharge capacity on
D Day, OVERLORD logistic planners, fol-
the northern lines of communication
lowing a re-examination of shipping re-
had inevitable repercussions on other
quirements in light of the enlargement
parts of the logistic structure. Its effect
of the operation and the planned ac-
on the use of shipping–both coasters and
celeration in the troop build-up, got per-
ocean-going ships—was particularly seri-
mission to retain an additional 150,000
ous.
tons of coaster shipping after D plus 42.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff, rec-
They had argued that additional shal-
ognizing the great need for shallow-draft
low-draft shipping would be needed for
use inside the MULBERRIES, where ocean-
98 6th Port History, Nov 44–Mar 45, Exhibit A. going ships could not be accepted; for
PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 125
the various special express services, in Channel service, and in November the
which rapid loading and discharging total exceeded 600,000.102
were required; and for taking fuller ad- Poor turnaround performance was the
vantage of the capacity of the small initial cause for the shortage, resulting
ports. Modifications in the invasion plan in part from piecemeal or selective dis-
also led to an increase in the allocation charge on the far shore, in part to inter-
of M T shipping. 99 ruptions from bad weather, diversions
Providing the needed coaster shipping from one port or beach to another, and
for OVERLORD placed an additional strain unexpectedly long deadlining of vessels
on the economy of the United Kingdom, for repairs. An analysis of the worst pe-
which relied heavily on coastal shipping riod, late October and early November,
for the movement of iron, coal, steel, and revealed that sixty-three round trip voy-
other commodities: T h e allocation of ages had required 1,422 ship-days in-
625,000 tons to OVERLORD, representing stead of the planned 606, representing a
about two thirds of the entire British turnaround time 135 percent greater
coaster fleet, caused a drastic curtailment than expected. T h e repair problem be-
in movements and, in turn, a temporary came particularly acute in November
shutdown of about one fourth of the and December when 20 to 25 percent of
United Kingdom’s blast furnaces. Brit- the total coaster fleet was immobilized.103
ish authorities naturally desired that At the root of these difficulties lay the
coaster shipping be released from mili- shortage of deepwater berths on the Con-
tary use as early as possible.100 tinent, which necessitated the extended
From the very start of the invasion use of shallow-draft facilities. Not until
there were shortages in practically every December, after Antwerp came into
category of shipping, and hope quickly operation, was it possible to release 50,-
faded that shallow-draft vessels could be 000 tons of coaster tonnage, and then
returned to coastal service as originally only by withdrawals from support of 21
scheduled. Before the end of June U.S. Army Group. T h e U.S. allocation was
authorities took steps to have additional actually increased during the month.104
LST’s and M T shipping made available T h e need for a large coaster fleet con-
from the United States, and to have the tinued to the very end of the war. Early
release of coasters postponed.101 T h e in 1945 SHAEF refused to accept a re-
shortage remained critical throughout duction of the coaster allocation below
the summer and fall. In September, con- 500,000 tons, which it insisted was the
trary to plans, 560,000 tons of coaster absolute minimum to meet operational
shipping were still engaged in cross- needs. It actually desired a larger alloca-
tion, in part to obtain more flexibility
in the use of ports, and in part because that the shipping situation was critical,
coasters were the most economical means and that the retention of ships under
for coal shipments. At the end of Feb- load for excessive periods only aggra-
ruary SHAEF again asked the Combined vated the world-wide shortage by length-
Chiefs of Staff for additional tonnage, re-ening the turnaround time. General Ross
questing that all of the twenty-six Baltic could not agree that the theater had
type of coasters then under construction been wasteful in the use of shipping, and
in the United States be allotted to the argued that the pipeline must be kept
European theater to augment the avail- full, particularly for the eventuality of
able fleet.105 In March the Combined a breakout from Normandy. “I’m in the
Chiefs promised that all but three would habit,” he said, “of rather seeing a fellow
be sent to Europe.106 spill a little over the side of the bucket
and get his feet wet, than to worry about
T h e dearth of deepwater berths on the
his brocade shoes.” 107
Continent had an even more far-reaching
Before the end of the month the the-
impact on ocean shipping. T h e theater’s
ater modified its requests somewhat, but
inability to berth and discharge all the
deep-draft ships arriving from the United stated that its “irreducible” minimum
States inevitably led to an accumulation for August loading (September delivery)
of shipping in both U.K. and continental was 250 ships, of which 175 were in-
waters-shipping which could be ill- tended for continental discharge, the
spared from the world shipping pool. other 75 for the United Kingdom. It es-
T h e War Department first called the timated its needs for succeeding months
theater’s attention to the problem in as averaging about 265 ships, an increas-
mid-July 1944, pointing to the many ing percentage of which it planned to
commodity-loaders and pre-stowed ships send directly to continental ports. These
being held at anchor in the United King- requirements were based on estimated
dom. Brig. Gen. Robert H. Wylie, the discharge capacities of 27,000 tons per
Deputy Chief of Transportation for Op- day in September, and 40,000 tons there-
erations, presented figures showing that after, estimates which proved far too
the European theater was getting more optimistic. 108
ships than it could handle, and ques- Early in August the War Department
tioned its justification for requesting 285 presented additional figures to show that
ships for August loading. He reminded the theater was building up an exces-
General Ross and other theater officials sively large bank of ships and that its dis-
charge performance did not justify the
estimates of its needs. It pointed out that held at anchor longer than one convoy
of 41 prestowed ships called forward interval, or approximately seven days.109
from the United Kingdom, 10had been The theater defended its shipping pol-
held at anchor from 23 to 30 days, and icy by noting that it was simply impos-
that of 61 commodity-loaders called for- sible to predict the progress of tactical
ward, 31 had been held at anchor more operations accurately enough to sched-
than 7 days and 9 of them from 23 to ule the arrival of shipping in exact con-
30 days. Prestowed vessels thus far had sonance with needs. Weather conditions
averaged 46½ days in European waters were also unpredictable, often interrupt-
between arrival in the United Kingdom ing discharge and delaying the towing of
and return sailing to the United States floating equipment to France. Finally, it
following continental discharge. argued that in the absence of suitable
The War Department argued that this quays, discharge in French ports was
immobilization of shipping hazarded the still essentially a lighterage operation,
support of operations in other parts of which accounted for some of the slow-
the world, and was unjustifiable in view ness in unloading.110
of the frequency of convoys and the Theater shipping officials were well
lessened submarine menace. By the end aware of the serious backlog which was
of September, it pointed out, the theater forming off the beaches and ports of
Normandy, but did not feel justified in
would have received 219 ships for con-
“turning off the tap” in view of the
tinental discharge in that month alone,
planned acceleration in the movement
44 more than ETOUSA had stated as its of divisions to the Continent in Septem-
requirements. T h e theater, it stated, was
ber. T h e Communications Zone ob-
unduly concerned about meeting future jected strongly to any reduction in the
requirements, for sufficient shipping was program, arguing that priority demands
available to support all operations in for supplies could be met only if suffi-
progress or planned if it were properly cient stocks were held offshore.111
used. Once again the War Department T h e current practice was nevertheless
assured ETOUSA that the current pro- recognized as both dangerous and waste-
gram of sailings from the United States ful. The Allied Naval Commander was
would more than match the theater’s concerned that congestion of shipping
most optimistic estimates of discharge would not only invite attack from the
capabilities, and that loading could easily sea and air, but that shipping in open
be stepped up whenever the discharge
rate indicated that the backlog of ship- 109Cbls W–76034, AGWAR to ETO, 5 Aug 44.
W–81787, Gross to Somervell, 16 Aug 44, and W-
ping was being reduced. But it warned 81853, Lutes to Lee, 17 Aug 44, SHAEF AG 400.22–1
that the theater must accept responsi- Shipments and Tonnage Allocations.
bility for deferring shipments from the 110Cbl EX–42044, Lee to Somervell, 8 Aug 44,
SHAEF AG 400.22–1.
United States when it became apparent 111Shipping Note for CAO, G–4 Mov and Tn, 19
that congestion would develop. It spe- Aug 44, SHAEF G–4 Mov and Tn War Diary/Jnl
3014/22 Mov, Folders 13-22; Min, Continental Mov
cifically asked that commodity-loaded and Shipping Committee, Mtg of 16 Aug 44, ETO
vessels be phased so that they were not 001 Meetings.
128 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
anchorage would soon suffer from equi- theater protested vigorously. Rather
noctial gales. He recommended limit- than attempt to justify its earlier re-
ing the number of vessels authorized to quests entirely on the basis of predicted
be in the U.S. area at any one time. port performance, however, it now of-
One of the major causes for the con- fered a truer explanation for its exor-
gestion, selective unloading, was finally bitant demands. Admittedly, the dis-
recognized as a bad practice by both charge rate had failed to come anywhere
SHAEF and COMZ officials. Late in near the 40,000-ton figure which had
August they ordered the practice been predicted a month before. T h e
stopped.112 Apparently encouraged by shortage of inland transportation had
tactical developments, the theater at the aggravated the problem by making it
same time accepted without protest a impossible to move the major continen-
proposed cut of approximately ten ships tal supply reserves out of the Cotentin.
from each of six convoys sailing from Only rations, gasoline, and ammunition,
the United States in the four weeks be- plus a small tonnage of highly selective
tween 12 September and 10 October. items, were being moved forward to the
In the end the theater canceled a total armies. In the absence of adequate dis-
of 600,000 tons of supplies of all classes charge capacity, General Lee explained,
which had been scheduled for delivery the large backlog of ships had been the
by the end of November.113 theater’s only salvation by making it
These measures had no effect in Sep- possible to meet high priority demands
tember, and shipping continued to pile for specific items of supply. In other
up in European waters. Late in the words, the large bank of ships in Euro-
month it was estimated that only 90 pean waters had been the necessary sub-
ships would be discharged that month, stitute for supply depots which should
and the prediction was made that even have been established on the Continent.
if unloadings were increased to 150 T h e loaded ships were in effect serving
there would still be 271 on hand at the as floating warehouses.
end of September.114 While port capacity remained almost
On 6 October the War Department stationary, the theater’s supply needs
announced a further cut of forty ships continued to grow with its troop
from European sailings. This time the strength, and the COMZ commander
now urgently appealed to the War De-
partment to meet what he referred to as
112Ltr, COMZ to Normandy Base Sec, sub: Dis-
charge of Liberty Ships, 20 Aug 44, EUCOM 560 “conservative estimates” of the theater’s
AT, Transports, Vessels, and Boats in General 11; needs. These amounted to 139 more
TWX, ANCXF to SHAEF, 31 Aug 44, SHAEF AG
400.22–1; Mil Shipments Priority Mtg, 26 Aug 44, ships than the War Department offered
SHAEF AG 337–18; Shipping Note for CAO, 19 to dispatch for October, November, and
Aug 44; Memo, Stratton for CofT, sub: Discharge December. Lee estimated that the thea-
of Ocean-Going Vessels on Continent, 6 Sep 44,
EUCOM 400.22 Shipments General. ter’s discharge capabilities would be
113COMZ G–4 History, I, 81. more than doubled by December, basing
114Ltr, Philip D. Reed, Mission for Economic
Affairs, to Lee, 21 Sep 44, ETO 381/560 Shipping
his prediction on the expected perform-
(OVERLORD). ance of Le Havre, Rouen, and Antwerp,
PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 129
and on the transfer of the Arromanches ships had been substantially reduced.118
MULBERRY to American use. He pre- T h e War Department's action ap-
dicted that the backlog would be vir- peared amply warranted by the thea-
tually eliminated by that time and that ter’s performance, for the backlog of
some discharge capacity would actually shipping continued to grow. By 20 Oc-
be wasted by mid-December if the War tober there were at least 240 ships in
Department carried out its proposed re- European waters, of which about 140,
ductions.115In effect, however, the thea- mostly commodity-loaders, consisted of
ter was demanding a bank of shipping Liberties under load in the United
not only large enough to insure full Kingdom.119 In view of this obviously
utilization of all continental berths deteriorating situation the War Depart-
which it forecast would become avail- ment imposed additional restrictions.
able, but, failing the development of On 20 October General Somervell told
adequate discharge capacity, one which the theater that it would get no more
would hold a large portion of the the- commodity-loaded ships with rations,
ater's reserves at anchorage off the ports vehicles, or, with certain exceptions, am-
and beaches and thus permit flexibility munition until it had reduced its bank
in the selection of items for which emer- of such ships to a reasonable level.120In
gency need might develop.116 reply General Lee made his most urgent
This time the War Department could appeal yet, citing figures to show that
not be shaken. T h e retention of s h i p practically all ammunition, ration, and
ping in the European theater, it claimed, vehicle ships had been called forward
was already threatening to strangle oper- for discharge, and repeating the argu-
ations in other parts of the world. T h e ment that the War Department's cuts
War Department could not view with would not only result in a loss of the
composure theater practices which, as selectivity which had made supply of the
related by General Lee himself, had re- armies possible thus far, but result in
cently made it necessary to call forward serious over-all shortages.121
nineteen commodity ships loaded with General Somervell was unmoved. T h e
engineer supplies to obtain an average shipping situation, he said, simply would
of only 150 tons of priority cargo from not permit the use of ships as base depot
each vessel.117 On 9 October it notified storage to the extent of nearly 200 com-
the theater that the new sailing sched- modity-loaders, some of which had been
ules would be followed until ETOUSA “on the hook” more than 60 days. He
had demonstrated a capacity to unload agreed that the theater should have a
at a faster rate and until the bank of safe working margin of ships on hand
at all times—perhaps 75 or 80—to pro-
115Some of Antwerp’s capacity actually went un- 118Cbl WARX–43793, CofT WD to ETO, 9 Oct
used at precisely that time, though not for lack of 44, OPD Cbl Files.
shipping. 119Mil Shipments Priority Mtgs, 7, 13, and 21 Oct
116Cbl EX–53219, Lee to Somervell, 8 Oct 44, OPD 44, SHAEF AG 337–18; COMZ G–4 History, I, 86.
Cbl Files; Ltr, Lee to Reed, 26 Sep 44, ETO 381/560 120COMZ G–4 History, 1, 88.
Shipping (OVERLORD): COMZ G–4 History, I, 81. 121Cbl E-57846, Lee to Somervell, 26 Oct 44, OPD
117Cbl, Lee to Somervell, 8 Oct 44. Cbl Files.
130 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
vide a measure of selectivity. But he re- dent of the United States Lines, to France
jected as entirely misleading the thea- to aid theater authorities in improving
ter’s figures on the number of ships the turnaround of shipping and to
which had been called forward to the gather more realistic estimates on the
continental ports for discharge. T h e fact theater’s future discharge capabilities. 123
remained that projected discharges in T h e War Department’s concern over
terms of completely unloaded vessels shipping was by no means confined to
had not been realized; the theater had the European theater. T h e Pacific areas,
only released about 70 ships for return particularly the Southwest Pacific, had
to the United States in October. In the also consistently overestimated their dis-
War Department’s view the theater had charge capacity and had followed the
consistently overestimated its capabili- same wasteful practice of holding loaded
ties to receive supplies. T h e War De- vessels at anchor. Meanwhile, Mediter-
partment, already under attack from ranean requirements had unexpectedly
shipping authorities for inefficient use risen sharply as civil relief needs claimed
of shipping, refused to accept the thea- attention, contributing to the world-
ter’s assurances of improved discharge, wide shortage.
and saw no alternative but to deny the By the fall of 1944 shipping agencies
theater’s requests until it had demon- in the United States saw the need for
strated its ability to unload ships and drastic measures to impress upon area
restore them to useful service. commanders the necessity of releasing
Two weeks later the War Department shipping and to enforce a more rigid
once more pointed out how unreason- accountability on the handling of ves-
able the theater’s requests had been in sels. On 14 November the War Shipping
view of its reception capacity. It cited Administration brought the problem
the monthly shipping requests since before the Joint Military Transporta-
July, which had they been granted, tion Committee, and a few days later
would have resulted in a bank of 500 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on a
idle ships in European waters. In his proposal of General Somervell, a p
strongest reproof to date General Somer- proved and sent to the President their
vell wrote: “It is necessary . . . that recommendations on the steps to be
your headquarters cease repeating by taken. Included were proposed reduc-
rote figures previously arrived at and tions in allocations of vessels to the
take a realistic view of the situation. To U.K. import program, British and Rus-
do otherwise,” he observed, “destroys sian lend-lease, and civil relief.124
confidence in the estimates, and delays
123Cbls WAR-53834 Somervell to Lee, 28 Oct 44.
our supply of the equipment which you and WARX–56447. 2 Nov 44; Cbl 49595, Marshall
can actually handle.” 122Meanwhile he to Eisenhower, 20 Oct 44, OPD Cbl Files; Memo,
sent Brig. Gen. John M. Franklin, the Gross for OPD, sub: Cargo Shipping for the ETO,
11Nov 44, OPD 400 ETO No. 113, 15 Nov 44 Cargo
Chief of Transportation’s director of Shipping for ETO.
water transportation and a former presi- 124 Memo, Marshall for JCS, sub: Remedies for
Existing and Prospective Shortages in Cargo Ship-
122 Ltr, Somervell to Lee, 18 Nov 44, Hq ASF, ping, 17 Nov 44, with Incl, Study by Gen Somervell,
European Theater-last half 1944. same sub, OPD 560 Section VI, Cases 207–25.
P O R T DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 131
ern France, the War Department cut from 327 to 457 tons per ship per day
nine ships from the December sailings by December.129
to Marseille. At the same time it called These improvements had hardly be-
attention to the fact that of the last two gun to have their effect when they were
convoys arriving in the theater, both partially canceled by tactical develop-
of them loaded with supplies of the ments. T h e German counteroffensive of
highest priority, only two vessels had mid-December resulted in a sudden em-
been called forward for discharge.127 bargo on shipments into the forward
A few weeks later, when, despite the areas. Since few base or intransit storage
recent opening of Antwerp, it appeared facilities were available to U.S. forces
that the northern ports would not in the Antwerp area, this stoppage in
achieve the target. of 200 discharges for movements had its inevitable result in
a saturated port and a partial shutdown
that month, the theater accepted with-
in unloading operations. This again
out protest a proposed diversion of six-
threatened to aggravate the shipping
teen January sailings to Marseille, with
backlog. Foreseeing the chain of effects,
the understanding that it might later the theater on 23 December voluntarily
request an increase if warranted by need requested an immediate reduction of
and discharge capabilities. This left the an additional twenty-four sailings in the
northern ports with 175 instead of the next convoys. 130
scheduled 191 for that month.128 T h e month of December, which had
T h e long-awaited opening of Ant- opened so hopefully, had a daily dis-
werp at the end of November promised charge record of only slightly above 30,-
to solve not only the discharge problem 000 tons, and January’s record was
but the closely related shipping tie-up. hardly better. Consequently the thea-
Meanwhile the theater had also had ter’s earlier requests for 240 commodity-
some success in raising tonnage receipts loaded vessels per month were certain
by increasing the hatch rates. In mid- to exceed its capabilities. Early in Janu-
November, faced with what amounted ary, therefore, on the basis of more con-
to an ultimatum from the War Depart- servative estimates of discharge provided
ment on the use of shipping, port com- by General Franklin, the War Depart-
manders instituted competition between ment cut the allocation for January and
unloading crews, offering special incen- Februaryto 175 per month.131
tives in the form of awards and pass T h e bank of shipping shrank some-
privileges to winners. These measures, what in January—to 116 idle vessels—
in addition to more efficient port or-
ganization and operating procedures, 129COMZG–4 History, I, 89–93.
brought about a rise in the hatch rate 130
Cbl EX-77774, ETO to AGWAR, 23 Dec 44,
ETO In and Out Cbls, Adm 397.
131The theater had discharged 115 in November
and 130 in December. Memo, Gross for Somervell,
127COMZ G–4 History, I, 95. sub: ETO Shipping Situation, 4 Jan 45, Hq ASF
128Cbl E-75769, ETO to AGWAR, 18 Dec 44, Shipping 1945–Somervell file; TWX E-85355,
ETO In and Out Cbls, ETO Adm 397; COMZ G–4 COMZ to SHAEF, 12 Jan 45, SHAEF AG 400.22–1
History, I, 105. Allocation of Tonnages-Policy, I, 1945.
PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS 133
but limited discharges that month led succeeded in getting sixteen ships re-
to the realization that the requested stored to the March allocation. In mid-
schedules would result in added accumu- February, therefore, the sailing sched-
lations of shipping in European waters. ules called for 253 arrivals in that month
On 3 February the theater therefore (177 in the north, 76 in the south), and
asked for a cutback of thirty vessels 306 in March (218 in the north and 88
scheduled for March arrival, and certain in the south). 135By that time—mid-Feb-
diversions to Marseille.132Almost simul- ruary–steady improvement in both dis-
taneously the War Department an- charge and forward movement was
nounced that it was cutting the March evident in the European theater. Un-
allocation by 61 ships, reducing the loadings that month were to exceed
sailings from 233 to 172.133 50,000 tons per day, a jump of about
ETOUSA objected to this drastic re-
20,000 over the record of December and
duction, partly on the basis of antici-
January. With this improvement, less
pated improvements in rail clearance
than three months before the end of
from the port of Marseille, which had
hostilities, both the discharge and -ship-
been the biggest bottleneck on the
southern line of communications,134and ping problems, which had plagued lo-
gistic support of U.S. forces since D Day,
132Cbl EX–74290, G–4 ETO to AGWAR, 3 Feb
finally appeared resolved.
45, ETO Cbls, Adm 400.
133Cbl WARX–30713, AGWAR to ETO, 2 Feb 45,
Adm 407. 135Cbl WARX–37577, AGWAR to ETO, 15 Feb
134Cbl EX–97331, ETO to AGWAR, 11 Feb 45, 45, Adm 408; Cbl E–10453, ETO to AGWAR, 19
Adm 400. Feb 45, Adm 400.
CHAPTER V
Transportation Developments
(1) Motor Transport: The Color Routes but for a long time was unable to meet
the full requirement for long-distance
Of the various results of the pursuit
hauling. Motor transport consequently
the deficit in transportation had both an
continued for another two months to
immediate impact on Allied capabilities
carry large tonnages all the way from
and far-reaching effects on the workings
the beaches and ports to the army areas
of the entire logistic organization. It
over lines of communication that
not only brought the pursuit to a halt,
stretched between three and four hun-
but deranged the entire logistic struc-
dred miles. This it accomplished largely
ture by forcing both combat and service
via the Red Ball Express, which had
echelons to abandon carefully worked
started operating on 25 August, and via
out supply procedures in favor of “ex-
additional express routes organized for
pedients” which upset the systematic
similar missions.
and businesslike growth of the theater
T h e Red Ball Express had completed
logistic organization.
its original mission-the delivery of
Halting the pursuit brought no dim-
inution in requirements for transpor- 75,000 tons of supplies to the Chartres–
tation. Fresh demands, such as the move- La Loupe–Dreux triangle-by 5 Septem-
ment forward of newly arrived divisions, ber. But there was no thought of dis-
the redeployment of the Ninth Army continuing the operation on that date,
from Brittany, and the winterization and the Communications Zone gave it
program, added to the standing re- a new lease to operate indefinitely. On
quirements for the building of forward 10September the route was altered and
reserves, promised to absorb all the the- extended, the outgoing route diverging
ater’s transportation resources for weeks at Versailles, one branch bypassing Paris
to come. T h e nature of operations in to the north and continuing to Soissons
the fall made it necessary that cargo to serve First Army, the other continu-
vehicles which had been withdrawn ing in an easterly direction via Melun
from tactical formations—particularly to Sommesous in support of the Third.
field artillery and antiaircraft units— ( M a p 5 ) A week later the completion
be returned for use in their normal role. of a highway bridge at Chennevières,
Rail transportation showed steady im- southeast of Paris, permitted a more
provement in September and October, direct routing and a saving of sixteen
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 135
Seine a corresponding amount. While fact, tentative plans were made to dis-
this expedient entailed additional han- continue Red Ball trucking beyond
dling of supplies, it promised to increase Paris entirely by 20 October. This goal
the capacity of the available trucks by was not achieved, for engineer supplies
shortening the haul and decreasing the and equipment which were too heavy
turnaround time. for transfer at Paris continued to be
Two transfer points were initially set trucked the entire distance from the
up in the Paris area, one at Aubervillers ports to the army depots beyond that
la Courneuve (for First Army supplies), date. Early in November the policy was
and one at Vincennes-Fontenay (for the laid down that all nontransferable items
Third Army). Both were well-developed would be shipped straight through by
yards where trucks could discharge their rail and that trucks were to be used only
loads directly to empty freight cars. Au- for supplies that could be worked by
bervillers la Courneuve could accommo- hand and therefore transferred to rail at
date 225 cars and work 20 at a time; the Seine. In other words, there was to
Vincennes-Fontenay could hold 400 cars be no more long-distance hauling by
and work 115. Operations at both trans- truck beyond Paris.3
fer points were organized and supervised Less than two weeks later—on 16 No-
by small detachments of officers and vember-the Red Ball Express ceased
enlisted men working in two twelve- operations, its demise occurring on the
hour shifts, the actual transfer of cargo same date the Normandy beaches closed
being carried out by a French labor down. In the course of its eighty-one
force of between 300 and 350 men work- days of operations the express service
ing in three eight-hour shifts. A third carried a total of 412,193 tons of sup-
transfer point was established at Ruilly plies, some of them initially to the
early in October to handle Ninth Army Chartres depot area, some directly to
supplies, With the exception of a single the armies, and in the last stages to the
crane at Vincennes, none of the yards rail transfer points at Paris. In deliver-
was equipped to handle awkward or ing an average of 5,088 tons per day
heavy lifts, hence only supplies that its total ton-mileage came to nearly 122,-
could be manhandled were accepted. 000,000.4
With the inauguration of this plan a Lacking precedent and experience,
diversion point was established on the
Red Ball route at Trappes, about twenty
miles southwest of Paris, where mani- 3History of T C ETO, IV, Jul–Sep 44, OCofT, p.
fests were examined to determine 9; V, Oct–Dec 44, 2d MRS, p. 14, and OCofT, p. 30;
ADSEC T n Off for ADSEC G–4, 9 Oct 44;
whether convoys should be routed to Memo, sub: Weekly Transportation Narrative, ADSEC
the transfer points or to the regulating 319.1 Weekly Narratives, Tn Sec; COMZ G–4 His-
stations serving the respective armies. tory, III, 31–33; Ltr, Lt Col Harold L. Mack, ACofT
for Movs TC, to CofT COMZ, 1 Nov 44, sub: Semi-
Truck-to-rail transfer was an immedi- monthly Activity Rpt–Movs Div, EUCOM (TC)
ate success, making it possible to discon- Semimonthly Reports to CofT Washington; G–4
tinue much of the long-distance motor mary COMZ Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl, Sum-
of Br Chiefs Mtg, 27 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C.
transport hauling beyond the Seine. In 4Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 12.
138 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
RED BALLEXPRESSTRUCKS
leaving a traffic regulating control point, September
1944.
the Red Ball Express was plagued by agreement inevitably arose between the
problems of control and operational pro- Advance Section, Normandy Base Sec-
cedures through most of its history. T h e tion, Seine Section, and Loire Section
problem of control was inevitable in an over maintenance of portions of the
organization operated by one COMZ route, and late in September both the
section whose functioning involved the Chief of Transportation and Seine Sec-
crossing of sectional boundaries. T h e tion complained of unauthorized diver-
Motor Transport Brigade, which oper- sions and of changes in consignments
ated the Red Ball, was an ADSEC or- made by the Advance Section at truck-
ganization. But all the COMZ sections to-rail transfer points.
traversed by the Red Ball routes had Repeated attempts to delineate the
responsibilities affecting the efficient op- responsibilities of the sections fell short
eration of the express service, such as of the goal. T h e essential defect of the
road maintenance, traffic control, and system-the anomalous position of the
signal communications, and these re- Motor Transport Brigade—was finally
sponsibilities were not carried out uni- recognized early in October, when the
formly by the various section com- problem was resolved by transferring
manders. Reconciling the Advance Sec- the control of motor transport operating
tion’s authority to operate the route intersectionally to a higher echelon. On
with that of other section commanders 5 October the Motor Transport Brigade,
proved an important stumbling block a provisional organization in the first
and evidenced a major defect in an place, was dissolved and its personnel
organization which had a COMZ-wide consolidated with the Motor Transport
function to perform. Confusion and dis- Service. The latter, operating under the
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 139
Red Lion convoys began their 300- short hauls compared with the Red Ball
mile runs to Brussels on 16 September and Red Lion systems. T h e White Ball
and continued operations until 12 Oc- Route was organized to take advantage
tober. (See M a p 5 . ) Normandy Base of the shorter lines of communications
Section organized and operated the serv- from the newly opened ports of Le
ice. T h e route turned in a somewhat Havre and Rouen, its mission being to
better performance than the Red Ball, clear those ports, hauling supplies either
profiting from earlier experience and directly to the armies or to rail transfer
enjoying certain advantages. Trucks points at Paris and Reims. A quarter-
carried a high average load of 5.9 tons, master group headquarters (Transporta-
partly because of the density of the tion Corps) exercised operational con-
cargo. In addition, the operation bene- trol of the route, and Channel Base Sec-
fited from the fact that all cargo was tion was made responsible for movement
assembled at one dump in the Caen– control. T h e White Ball Route started
Bayeux area, eliminating delays in pick- operating on 6 October 1944 and con-
up and loading, and all trucks were tinued until 10January 1945, with an
unloaded at a single dump at the termi- average of twenty-nine truck companies
nus of the route. participating. It handled a total of
Red Lion convoys exceeded their tar- 134,067 tons of supplies on an average
get, delivering an average of 650 tons forward run of 113 miles.
per day instead of 500, and handled a T h e White Ball Route was modeled
total of about 18,000 tons. Almost half on the Red Ball Express, but performed
of this consisted of supplies for the two rather poorly. Co-ordination and plan-
U.S. airborne divisions participating in ning were noticeably deficient: depots
the Holland operation, a statistic often were unaware of planned movements,
ignored by the partisans who so heatedly labor was not provided at unloading
criticized this “diversion” of U.S. re- points, both loading and unloading time
sources. Furthermore, the operation was excessive, and neither line mainte-
took place after the pursuit had defi- nance nor traffic control regulating
nitely been halted and both the First points were provided until late in Oc-
and Third U.S. Armies had come up tober. Lack of maintenance was reflected
against the prepared defenses of the in the low rate of truck availability,
West Wall.8 only 32 of the 48 vehicles per company
normally being fit for use as against
Two other express services, one the 40 expected under proper operating
known as the White Ball Route, the conditions. T o make matters worse,
other as the Green Diamond Route, trucks were frequently diverted for local
were organized and placed in operation use.9
early in October. Both were relatively T h e Green Diamond Route was or-
8 Memo,Ravenhill for Vissering, 9 Oct 44, sub:
ganized by Normandy Base Section to
POL Tonnage Lift, and reply, Vissering for Log
Plans Br SHAEF, 12 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 Tonnages 9 COMZ G–4 History, III, 55-56; Opn, Orgn, Sup-
–CI III, POL 137/5/GDP–1; Hist Rpt of T C ETO, ply, and Svs of T C ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 44;
V, MTS, 15-18; COMZ G–4 History, III, 52–55. Hist Rpt of T C ETO, V, MTS, 14–15.
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 141
move supplies from the ports and base depots in the Liège-Mons-Charleroi
depots in the Cotentin area to rail trans- area. Antwerp lay in the British zone,
fer points at Granville and Dol, near the and the prompt clearance of the port
base of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Al- was imperative because of the limited
though plans called for the use of forty storage space available to U.S. forces
truck companies, an average of only there.
fifteen participated. T h e route was in T h e ABC Haul derived its name from
operation only three weeks, from 10 the fact that three nationalities–Amer-
October to 1 November, and delivered ican, British, and Canadian–shared
a total of only 15,600 tons of supplies. many facilities in the Antwerp area.
T h e Green Diamond Route was not a Planning the operation involved the
model of efficiency from the point of highest degree of co-ordination with the
view of either planning or command British on such matters as highway
supervision. In addition, it operated rights-of-way, restrictions on civilian
under a severe handicap imposed by traffic, and circulation routes through
mud, which made it almost impossible cities. T h e basis for this co-ordination
to handle the larger tractor-trailer com- was laid in the Memorandum of Agree-
binations in the depots. They could be ment of 18 October, b y which British
employed only by having cargo picked and American officials had agreed on the
up by the smaller 2½-ton trucks and use of the port. In all other respects
then transferred to the larger vehicles, the ABC Haul was strictly American in
an operation which proved highly un- operat ion.
economical. In a sense the Green Dia- In addition to a high degree of co-
mond operation hardly belongs in the ordination and organization, two fea-
category of the special express routes, tures characterized the operation of the
for it was more of a routine trucking ABC route: the exclusive use of 4/5-ton
operation and did not adopt most of truck-tractors with 10-ton semitrailers,
the special operational procedures which one of the most efficient combinations
characterized the larger express serv- for long-distance hauling; and the use
ices. 10 of a marshaling yard or “surge pool.”
An average of sixteen companies of the
One of the most highly organized and big truck-tractor-semitrailer combina-
efficient motor transport express systems tions was assigned to the ABC Haul,
came into being at the end of Novem- with a ratio of approximately two trail-
ber. T h e ABC Haul was organized spe- ers for every power unit. Two of the
cifically to supplement rail and water truck-tractor companies did nothing but
facilities in clearing the port of Antwerp shuttle between the Antwerp surge pool
and moving the supplies discharged and the quays, moving empties to the
there directly from quayside to advance piers for direct loading from either ships
or warehouses, and bringing loaded
10Hist Rpt of T C ETO, V, Normandy Base Sec, trailers back. At the surge pool fourteen
13, and V, MTS, 22; COMZ G–4 History, III, 52; companies assigned to over-the-road
Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of T C ETO, Gen Bd
Rpt 122, pp. 44–45. hauling picked up loaded trailers which
142 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
TRUCK-TRACTOR
AND SEMITRAILER MUD are pulled out by a D–7
STUCKIN THICK
tractor, Cherbourg area.
had been formed into convoys and made which had plagued the Red Ball Express
the trip to the forward depots, a run was therefore avoided, and long-distance
which averaged ninety miles. A bivouac truck transportation brought to a high
was established at Tirlemont, the half- degree of efficiency.
way mark, where drivers were changed. In January the operation was im-
All the facilities which earlier experi- proved further by the establishment of
ence had shown were necessary for effi- surge pools at Liege, Mons, and Charle-
cient line-of-communications hauling roi, where loaded convoys were received
were provided, including ordnance and then directed to forward dumps
maintenance installations and road pa- and depots in accordance with unload-
trols, signal communications, aid sta- ing capacities. This permitted a close
tions, and so on. Control of truck move- control of movements at the receiving
ments was exercised from the Antwerp as well as the dispatching end, and made
surge pool and the halfway point, and possible better line maintenance of
centralized control of the entire opera- equipment, a more efficient use of
tion was achieved by having the route trucks, and a consequent saving in turn-
operated by a single base section com- around time.
mander–General Jacobs of Channel T h e ABC Haul started operations on
Base–although the route actually ex- 30 November 1944 and continued until
tended into ADSEC territory. T h e con- 26 March 1945. In that four-month
flict of authority and responsibility period it cleared 245,000 tons from Ant-
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 143
werp, the average load per truck total- its place a few days after it ceased op-
ing 8.7 tons and the average round trip erations.13
requiring twenty hours. T h e ABC Haul,
like the use of Antwerp, afforded an Independently of these various spe-
excellent example of a highly organized cially organized and for the most part
and tightly controlled operation involv- short-lived color routes the Motor
ing the crossing of national lines of Transport Service had carried on an-
communications and the joint use of other hauling operation of vital and con-
logistic facilities.11 tinuing importance—the transportation
of gasoline in bulk. T h e so-called POL
All the trucking systems described hauls had started shortly after the Nor-
above were organized to handle large mandy landings, and were to continue
bulk shipments of supplies. In Decem- without interruption till the end of hos-
ber 1944 still another motor transport tilities. They were carried out by a
service, known as the Little Red Ball, special fleet of tank vehicles, consisting
was inaugurated to meet a very special in the main of nine companies of 2,000-
need-the fast delivery of small quanti- gallon semitrailers and five companies of
ties of items urgently needed at the 750-gallon tank trucks. From the begin-
front. T h e requirement for a motor ning the Motor Transport Service,
transport organization to fill this need through a special POL Section, had
arose from the fact that normal rail exercised a highly centralized control
movements from Cherbourg to Paris re- over these operations, units of the tanker
quired three days, while trucks could fleet being attached to the COMZ sec-
make deliveries in a single day. tions for administration only.
T h e Little Red Ball route ran from Most of the POL hauls were rather
Carentan, at the base of the Cotentin routine, did not involve an elaborate
Peninsula, to Paris, following highway operating procedure, and were not fav-
N–13 all the way. T h e service was ored by a special name or by publicity.
designed to deliver only 100 tons per Nevertheless the transportation of gas-
day-mostly medical, signal, chemical oline in bulk accounted for a high per-
and quartermaster Class II items—and centage of the total tonnages handled
was operated by one truck company by truck. In the three-month period
equipped with 10-ton semitrailers. It from October through December alone
approximately 240,000 tons were for-
operated slightly less than five weeks,
warded from ports and pipeheads in this
from 15 December 1944 to 17 January
manner, the daily haul frequently ex-
1945, delivering an average of 106 tons
ceeding 4,000 tons. In addition, substan-
per day.12A fast rail express service took
tial quantities of packaged gasoline and
other POL products were transported
11 COMZ G–4 History, III, 56–59; Hist Rpt of T C
ETO, V, MTS, 18–21; Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs
of TC ETO. Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 45. 13The special rail service, known as the “Toot
12 COMZ G–4 History, III, 59; Hist Rpt of TC Sweet Express,” is described in Chapter XV, Section
ETO, V, MTS, 13. I, below.
144 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
In the fall General Mud stepped in to match the new demand. This deficiency
create additional hazards and hindrances was further aggravated by the lack of
in the forward areas and in many de- such supplies as camelback, an item es-
pots, causing overheated engines and sential in recapping.
shortening the life of brake systems. T h e Intensive efforts to improve mainte-
available maintenance equipment was nance were made in late 1944, partic-
unequal to the suddenly magnified re- ularly in the services needed along the
pair task. Four- and ten-ton wreckers in lines of communications. These efforts
the heavy and medium automotive eventually bore fruit in better vehicle
maintenance companies, for example, availability, which rose from thirty per
had to be augmented by 4-ton Diamond- company at the end of November to
T’s normally used for towing. thirty-five within the next month. Nev-
Finally, lack of spare parts often kept ertheless, the replacement factor for
vehicles deadlined. This was particu- cargo trucks, as in many other items of
larly true of tires. Overloading and lack equipment, proved entirely too low for
of preventive maintenance took a heavy the conditions under which motor trans-
toll, and heavy damage was also caused port was used in the European theater.
by the sharp edges of the cut-off tops of At the end of the year theater officials
C ration cans which were strewn along recommended that the original 2 per-
the roads. Theater reserves were quickly cent factor be raised to 8 in the case of
exhausted and repair facilities could not 2½-ton trucks, and 6 for the 10-ton
146 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
12th Army Group. The plan also pro- tralized control over all movements in
vided for centralized operation of truck co-ordination with the COMZ G-4.19
units through a specially organized for-
ward echelon of the Motor Transport (2) The Railways
Service headquarters, operating under While motor transport operated with
the control of either the main headquar- greater and greater efficiency and gave a
ters or the Advance Section. much-desired flexibility to the theater’s
While the tactical successes of Novem- transportation system, it constituted no
ber did not warrant the implementation substitute for the railways in the sus-
of these plans, the preparations never- tained movement of large tonnages over
theless stood the theater in good stead great distances. I n the long run the rail-
at the time of the German counteroffen- road was the main workhorse of the
sive a month later, and were quickly transportation system, handling the great
adapted to that situation. Port clearance bulk of the tonnages.
operations at Rouen and Antwerp were In mid-September the railways had
not yet assumed a large portion of the
immediately curtailed and motor trans-
transport burden, although the Allied
port was released to meet more urgent
advance had uncovered almost the entire
demands. On 18 December, two days
rail system of France, Belgium, and Lux-
after the start of the attacks, the equiva- embourg. Forward of St. Lô the lines
lent of 274 2½-ton trucks were taken then in operation had been rehabilitated
off the White Ball Route and another in great haste, and only a few lines ten-
258 from Seine Section to rush combat tatively reached forward from the Seine,
formations–principally airborne units- handling but a few thousand tons per
forward from the Reims area. On the day.20Very little additional mileage was
following day the White Ball Route re- captured in the next few months, and
leased another 347 trucks for use in the railway development was therefore con-
redeployment of Third Army units. On fined almost strictly to the rehabilitation
20 December additional diversions, in- of the extensive network already in Al-
cluding 10-ton semitrailers from the lied hands.
ABC Haul, were made to the Reims At the end of September the 2d Mili-
area. By the end of the month more tary Railway Service, which operated
than 2,500 trucks had been temporarily the railways in the north, had under its
withdrawn from port clearance and jurisdiction approximately 2,000 miles
static operations to handle emergency of single track and 2,775 miles of double
troop and supply movements. In some track lines. East of Paris three main lines
cases they evacuated forward dumps in of communications had been opened:
danger of capture, as for example at one in the north to Liège via Com-
piègne, Cambrai, Valenciennes, Mons,
Liège, from which tank trucks removed
400,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. 19Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 8–9, and V,
Throughout these operations the Motor OCofT, 31; COMZ G–4 History,, III, 47, 59.
20 G–4 report for quarter ending 3 Sep 44, Tn Sec
Transport Service ensured an efficient ADSEC, 26 Oct 44, ADSEC 319.1 Supplement to G–4
use of truck units by exercising cen- Periodic Rpt.
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 149
Charleroi, and Namur; one via Soissons, stroyed sixteen highway and five railway
Laon, and Hirson to Charleroi, where bridges and systematically demolished
it tied in with the northern line: and short stretches of track, making extensive
a third extending directly east of Paris use of the mechanical “track router.” 22
via Sezanne and Sommesous to the Bridge repair and reconstruction con-
Nancy–Metz–Verdun triangle. By the stituted by far the major task in railway
end of December additional lines had rehabilitation, even though the footage
been opened to raise the mileage to destroyed averaged only 25 percent in-
3,500 of single track and 5,000 of double stead of the 50 percent expected. Never-
track, which was equal to about one theless, by mid-November 180 damaged
third of all rail mileage in France. 21(See bridges had been repaired, and 125 had
Map 9 below.) been rebuilt. Practically all this work
The condition of the lines varied was carried out by the Advance Section,
greatly. By the end of December the whose engineer units were organized
lines in the original lodgment area and into groups, each with an allotted terri-
in northern Brittany were in fairly good tory. Base and intermediate sections nor-
repair. Northwest of Paris, however, mally only carried out track work and
where both Allied bombings and enemy completed marshaling yard rehabilita-
demolitions had been heavy, much re- tion.
mained to be done. In the Paris area U.S. engineers were initially depend-
itself most of the bridges on either side ent on British-designed bridging, pro-
of the city had been destroyed, forcing duced in both the United States and the
all traffic for some time to use the so- United Kingdom, for the U.S. Army had
called “inner circle” route and the pas- developed no military railway bridging.
senger stations in the very heart of the Shortly after the landings, however,
city. East of the Seine the railways had American engineer units began to use
been left relatively intact, but damage captured rolled steel beams which the
was again heavy in the area where the Germans had manufactured at the Hadir
enemy offered more determined resist- Steel Works in Differdange, Luxem-
ance. In the north one of the two double- bourg, which greatly speeded bridge re-
track lines which converged at Charleroi construction. As soon as the Differdange
had several single-track sections, and be- plant was captured it began producing
yond Charleroi only one double-track for the Allies and eventually provided
line was available to serve the railheads beams for about go percent of all the
of the Advance Section, First Army, and bridges reconstructed on the Continent,
Third Army at Huy, Liège, and Vise. including those for the Rhine, Elbe, and
At Liège itself only one bridge was left Danube crossings.23
standing, creating a bottleneck which Rehabilitation was only one of several
was not relieved until late in January.
In the Metz area alone the enemy de-
22Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 9–10; Opn,
Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt
21Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 8-10; Teletype 122, p. 56.
Conf, Gross et al. in Washington with Ross in ETO, 23Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, I,
10 Oct 44, ETO Tn, 337 ETO, Teletype Confs. 282–83.
150 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
problems which had to be met in bring- T h e rapid advance beyond the Seine
ing the railways to maximum usefulness. had much the same effect on rail plans
T h e Military Railway Service was short as on other features of the logistic plan.
of experienced operating and supervisory Units of the Military Railway Service
personnel to begin with because of the were suddenly extended to a much
inability of the zone of interior to re- greater degree than expected. In addi-
lease men with such training. Less than tion, difficulties in language and in docu-
15 percent of the strength of the operat- mentation of shipments under French
ing battalions consequently consisted of operation, plus the fact that the Cher-
men of “operating caliber” judged by bourg area for a long time remained the
normal standards. This deficiency was main base of supply, made it infeasible
later aggravated by the course of tactical to return the railways to French control
developments on the Continent. T h e Al- as rapidly as planned. T h e northern
lies had never contemplated attempting lines into Paris, in addition to the lines
to operate the railways of liberated coun- to the north, east, and southeast, conse-
tries exclusively with military personnel quently remained under Phase I opera-
for an indefinite period. They had tion, spreading the available operating
planned to return facilities to the respec- personnel much more thinly than
tive countries in easy stages as areas were planned.25
made secure from enemy attack, as near- Far more serious a limiting factor was
normal operating conditions were re- the shortage of equipment, notably in
stored, and as civilian organizations were locomotives and rolling stock. Captured
reconstituted. Under these plans opera- equipment could not be counted on to
tions in the earliest stages during which meet all Allied requirements in view of
the lines were being rehabilitated, the systematic destruction to which the
known as Phase I, were to be handled French railways had been subjected by
by military units, with assistance from the Allied air forces and in view of ex-
civilians wherever possible. Phase I I op- pected German demolitions, T h e Allies
erations were to begin once normal oper- had therefore planned to ferry sub-
ating conditions were restored in a par- stantial quantities of motive power and
ticular area or over a given line. Military rolling stock to the Continent. Allied
officials were to supervise operations and requirements for locomotives were orig-
retain complete control in that period, inally estimated at 2,724 of the 2–8–0
but trains were to be operated by civil- type, 1800 of which were intended for
ian crews. Complete operational respon- American use, and 680 of the 0–6–0 type,
sibility was to be restored to civilian 470 of them for U.S. use, plus a smaller
agencies within a particular area in number of diesels of various types. By
Phase III, although military personnel
were to maintain close liaison with civil- 25Opn, Orgn, Supply and Svs of T C ETO, Gen
ian agencies, and U.S. military require- Bd Rpt 122, pp. 53, 56. At the end of 1944 the 2d
Military Railway Service consisted of 18 operating
ments were to have movement priority.24 battalions, 4 shop battalions, 5 mobile workshop
units, and 10hospital train maintenance crews, or-
24Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 10–11; Military ganized into 5 grand divisions, and had a strength
Railway Service, Gen Bd Rpt 123, pp. 11–12. of 17,526 men. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 35.
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 151
the end of June, 1,358 of the first type and cesses, engendering hopes for an early
362 of the second had been made avail- victory, tended to relieve the anxieties
able in the United Kingdom, leaving a of theater Transportation Corps officials
requirement of about 2,000 to be met over the adequacy of locomotives.27 But
from U.S. production. Four hundred this optimism was short-lived. T h e rapid
and fifty of the locomotives shipped to advance across France only aggravated
the United Kingdom had been tempo- the shortage of motive power. Of the
rarily loaned to the British for use in locomotives found on the French rail-
the United Kingdom with the under- ways west of the Seine only about fifty
standing that they would be released and could be placed in immediate use, and
shipped to the Continent as they were it was estimated that 80 to 85 percent of
needed there. those recovered would be found inop-
Shortly after the landings in Nor- erable.28
mandy General Ross, alarmed over re- Lack of power was partially attributa-
ported cutbacks in the production of ble to the uneconomic use of the avail-
locomotives in the United States, and able locomotives which resulted from
over the failure of the British either to poor management at the boundaries be-
release engines on loan as scheduled or tween operating battalions in Nor-
to deliver locomotives promised from mandy, although this was eventually
U.K. production, informed the War De- corrected. For a time it was necessary
partment that the theater would need to double-head some trains. This not
all locomotives originally requested. T h e only doubled the requirement for mo-
War Department, reluctant to under- tive power but for engine crews as well,
take additional commitments because of creating a shortage of both personnel
interference with new tank production and power. T h e solution to this problem
in the locomotive shops, asked the the- was found in employing French engine
ater to exert all possible pressure on crews to man the second engine; 124
British officials not only to release the crews were recruited by the end of Oc-
450 engines loaned them, but also to tober. 29
make an all-out effort to meet earlier T h e urgency of increasing motive
production commitments. T h e Army power on the Continent meanwhile
Service Forces meanwhile made similar found expression in plans to move 500
representations to the British Ministry locomotives across the Channel in Sep-
of Supply Mission in Washington.26 tember, and at the rate of 20 per day
Late in August, Allied tactical suc- thereafter. Arrangements were made sev-
eral weeks later for the gradual release
and shipment of the 450 U.S. locomo-
26Ltr, Lt Col Frank R. Crom, SHAEF, to Gen
Maxwell, WD G–4, 31 Jul 44, sub: Locomotives for
U.S. Troops in ETO, 1st Ind, CG ASF to G–4, 29 27Ltr, Michael Keith to WD G–4, 31 Aug 44, sub:
Aug 44, and Cbl WAR-83364, ASF to CG ETO, 19 Locomotives for U.S. Forces in ETO, WDGDS 453.3
Aug 44, all in WDGDS 453.3, WDGDS A47–2. Rail- WDGDS A47–2.
road Locomotives and Rolling Stock; Ltr, Lee to 28Mil Shipments Priority Mtg, SHAEF, 2 Sep 44.
Somervell, 24 Aug 44, sub: Locomotive Require- SHAEF AG 337–18.
ments for ETOUSA, EUCOM 453 Railway Equip- 29G–4 COMZ Plant and Communications Diary/
ment 1944. Jnl, Br Chiefs Mtg, 28 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C.
152 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
AMERICAN LOCOMOTIVE
LOWEREDBY CRANE from a seatrain to the rails at
Cherbourg.
tives then in use on the British rail- Late in November SHAEF pressed for
ways.30These schedules proved unattain- the immediate shipment of 50 engines
able, partly because of movement diffi- in the second half of December, followed
culties, and had to be revised.31 Even by 100 per month to the end of March,
more important, however, was the fact holding out the hope that at least a por-
that the release of the 450 “Boleros” was tion of the coaster fleet might be released
closely linked with the problem of Brit- with the opening of Antwerp. T h e Brit-
ain’s coaster fleet, the loan of the loco- ish agreed to release 150 locomotives by
motives compensating in part for the the end of December, and to prepare
extraordinarily extended retention of another 100 for dispatch in January. But
coaster tonnage in cross-Channel serv- they strongly indicated that the release
ice.32 of these and subsequent quotas might
be conditioned on the return of a por-
tion of the coaster fleet. 33
30Mil Shipments Priority Mtgs, 2 Sep 44, SHAEF At the very end of December the re-
AG 337–18; Ltr, Keith to WD G–4, 18 Oct 44, sub: turn of 100,000 tons of coaster shipping
Locomotives for U.S. Forces in ETO, WDGDS 453.3
WDGDS A47–2.
31Mil Shipment Priority Mtgs, 9 Sep and 18 Nov 33
Cbl S–68318, CAO to Br COS, 25 Nov 44, and
44. Cbl 7016, Br COS to SHAEF, 30 Nov 44, SHAEF
32Seeabove, Ch. IV, Sec. 4, G–4 Rail Transportation 117/3 GDP–1.
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMEN T S 153
led the British Chiefs of Staff to offer the limited rolling stock available. As
to dispatch 100 locomotives to the Con- early as mid-August the Communications
tinent during January, February, and Zone took measures to eliminate an evil
March. Together with previous ship- which plagued the operation of the rail-
ments, this promised to complete the ways to the end of the war—namely, the
release of the 450 engines which had tendency to hold loaded freight cars in
been loaned for service on the British the forward areas, thus removing them
railways. 34At the end of the year a total from circulation or at best lengthening
of 1,500 locomotives had been moved to the turnaround time. T h e Communica-
the Continent, and an additional 800 tions Zone impressed upon all the sec-
captured engines—French, German, and tion commanders the necessity of prompt
Italian—had been repaired by French unloading of cars in view of the shortage
and American mechanics and placed in of rolling stock and the limited sidings
service.35 available. At the same time it authorized
T h e same considerations which had the chief of transportation to impose em-
led to the planned shipment of locomo- bargoes and divert shipments elsewhere
tives to the Continent had also led to if congestion developed at unloading
planning substantial importations of points.37
rolling stock. More than 57,000 cars of By November an average of approxi-
various types, including box, tank, re- mately 23,000 tons of supplies was being
frigerator, and flat cars, and cabooses forwarded by rail east of the Seine each
were scheduled for shipment to the Con- day, attesting to a tremendous increase
tinent, approximately 20,000 of which in rail hauling capacity since mid-Sep-
were shipped knocked down from the tember.38 But the very substantial in-
United States and assembled in British crease in the number of freight cars avail-
shops before D Day.36 able to the Allies by the end of Novem-
Movement difficulties—notably the ber brought no final solution to the
lack of reception facilities on the far rolling stock shortage. 39In mid-Novem-
shore—prevented shipment of much of ber, a serious jamming up of trains began
this rolling stock to France in the first to develop in the forward area, and
few months. Although a substantial
amount was captured, shortages began 37Ltr, Hq COMZ to Secs, 14 Aug 44, sub: Un-
to develop as soon as the breakout from loading of Rolling Stock, EUCOM 453 Railway
Normandy imposed the long-distance Equipment.
hauling mission on the railways, Neither 38Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, App. 4.
39 On the basis of French claims, total rolling stock
the condition of the French railways nor available to the Allies, French and Belgian com-
military requirements lent themselves to bined plus 20,000 cars ferried over from the United
Kingdom, should have totaled about 234,000. U.S.
an efficient and economical use of even officials suspected that the French inventory in-
cluded much rolling stock that wouldn't roll. It was
advantageous to the French for purposes of com-
34Cbl 7635, Br COS to SHAEF, 30 Dec 44, SHAEF pensation to include everything on wheels. Memo,
AG 617 Railway Case A, I. Mil Railways Br G–4 SHAEF for Chief Mov and
35Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 30–31, and App. T n G–4 SHAEF, 30 Nov 44. sub: Rail Mov of
7. Freight and Pers to Support A Gp, SHAEF G–4.
36Ibid., V, MRS, 26–27, and App. 7. Rail T n 117/3 GDP–1.
154 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
quickly extended back from the rail- vember. Unloading and storage facilities
heads. By 20 November eastbound trains in the forward areas, including depot
occupied every block from the Belgian personnel, sidings, and switching facili-
border to Namur. Within another few ties, were always at a premium. More-
days the entire Belgian rail system be- over, they were intended for the primary
came so choked with traffic that it was function of issuing supplies to using
necessary to clear selected trains from the units (which entailed the storage of a
main track at stations near the French relatively small portion of the theater’s
border and release their crews and en- reserves and presumed a fairly steady
gines. Similar developments in the Ver- flow of maintenance needs), not that of
dun area, the center of a big advance the classification and segregation of sup-
depot complex, necessitated the side- plies shipped in bulk, a mission normally
tracking of cars to rear areas, resulting assigned to intermediate or base depots.
in congestion, delays in the spotting and T h e opening of Antwerp at the end
unloading of cars, and the tie-up of pre- of November did not help matters, de-
cious rolling stock. Meanwhile rail op- spite the prospect of quicker turnaround
erations at Liège, already a bottleneck on the shorter lines of communications,
because of destroyed bridges, were par- for the lack of storage space in the port
tially disrupted by heavy V-bomb attacks necessitated the prompt forwarding of
carried out in the last ten days of the supplies. On the last day of the month
month. 40 there were already 11,000 loaded freight
Part of the freight car tie-up difficulty cars on the rails east of Paris. Within
stemmed from the tendency of the arm- ten days the number had risen to 14,000,
ies to keep as high a percentage of their which was estimated to be more than
reserves as possible on wheels, with the double the normal operational needs.
result that loaded cars accumulated on Turnaround time for some cars was be-
available sidings and rolling stock was tween twenty and forty days.41
immobilized. T h e Communications Zone T h e Communications Zone, recogniz-
had repeatedly called for “drastic ac- ing the seriousness of the tie-up, on 12
tion” to eliminate this costly practice. December outlined a specific program to
A more immediate cause was the de- relieve the congestion. Included in the
cision to ship large tonnages of supplies instructions to the chief of transporta-
in bulk directly from the ports to ad- tion and section commanders were or-
vance depots, contrary to established ders to unload commodity-loaded cars
doctrine. Neither ADSEC nor army in-
stallations were prepared to accept the
avalanche of supplies which began to 41SHAEF estimated that the total loads east of
the Seine should never be greater than three times
descend on them toward the end of No- the daily unloading capacity. Under existing condi-
tions, with an estimated unloading capacity of 2,000
cars per day, the total cars under load should not
40Hist Rpt of T C ETO, V, MRS, 14–15; Opn, have exceeded 6,000. Memo Concerning Transporta-
Orgn, Supply, and Svs of T C ETO, Gen Bd Rpt tion, unsigned, 13 Dec 44, Hq ASF Official Rpt
122, p. 56; Sgt. Joseph R. Ives, “Buzz Bombs and Mission to ETO 4 Dec 44–13 Jan 45, by Gen Lutes,
the Raids,“ Army Transportation Journal, I (Sep- T a b M; Min, CAO Mtg, 1 Dec 44, App. C, SHAEF
tember, 1945), 6–8. AG 337.14.
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 155
held as a rolling reserve, to reduce out- quiring additional storage space from
loadings at Cherbourg, to build addi- the British, partially by establishing in-
tional sidings in the ADSEC area, to land holding and reconsignment points,
stop and hold at Paris all ration trains particularly at Lille and Cambrai, which
consigned to Verdun, and to make sub- served as a cushion between the port and
stantial cuts in the over-all shipment of the depots, permitting clearance of the
rations, which had averaged nearly 6,000 port to 43 But
continue. General Ross
tons per day in the first days of Decem- later estimated that the counteroffensive
ber. To prevent this program from inter- had had the effect of setting back car
fering with ship unloadings, Channel unloadings and the movement of freight
Base Section was instructed, as a tem- by nearly 14,000 cars or thirty-five ship-
porary expedient, to continue the un- loads of supplies.44
loading of supplies from ships then work- Rail transportation loosened u p once
ing at Antwerp and to place them in more with the turning back of the Ger-
temporary quayside storage or any suit- man drive, and by the end of January
able nearby area. Since this would in the worst effect of the setback had been
turn produce a backlog of supply stocks overcome.45 But the control of move-
west of Paris and south of Antwerp, the ments and the unloading and release of
chief of transportation was instructed rolling stock remained a thorny problem
to initiate a call-up system once normal until the end of hostilities.
shipments were resumed so that depot Damage to rail lines in the area of the
commanders would have some control December counteroffensive took the
over the daily load imposed on them.42 form mainly of destroyed bridges, caused
But the relief promised by this pro- by both Allied and enemy demolitions
gram was postponed. Within a few days and Allied air attacks. At St. Vith the
the enemy counteroffensive in the Ar- yards were completely destroyed. Out-
dennes intervened and further aggra- side the main battle area one major rail
vated congestion on the rails. Approxi- bridge over the Meuse had been de-
mately 35,000 rail cars were allowed to stroyed at Namur. During an enemy air
accumulate in the forward areas and raid on 24 December a lucky hit had
were held there against the possibility of set off charges which Allied forces had
large-scale troop and supply evacuations, placed in preparation for possible demo-
with the inevitable effect of restricting lition. T h e bridge was immediately re-
port discharge and rail movements in
the rear. T h e Communications Zone 43Ltr, Lt Col R. W. Reisner of SHAEF G–4 Mov
met the problem of the backlog and and T n Br, to G–4, 20 Dec 44, sub: Rpt of Trip to
pressure on Antwerp partially by ac- Antwerp, SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers . . ., 1944, V:
TWXs S–73064. SHAEF to COMZ and 21 A Gp, 30
Dec 44, and EX-80904, COMZ to SHAEF, 31 Dec 44,
SHAEF SGS 400.3/1 Supply Problems of Allied Ad-
42 Ltr,Lord to CofT and Sec Comdrs, 12 Dec 44, vance; Channel Base Section History, I, 239; Hist
sub: Reduction of Number of Loaded Cars Be- Rpt of TC ETO, VI, Jan-Mar 45. Base Secs, 15.
tween Paris and Forward Areas, EUCOM 453 Rail- 44COMZ Stf and Comd Conf, 5 Jan 45, EUCOM
way Equipment, 1944; COMZ G–4 History, II, 97– 337/3 Conferences, Staff Weekly, I.
102; Cbl EX-75445, Lee to Base Secs, 17 Dec 44, 45Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of T C ETO, Gen
ETO Adm 397. Bd Rpt 122, p. 56.
156 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
built, and was opened to traffic on 5 In the meantime, the two main lines
January.46 straddling the Rhône had been recon-
noitered as far north as Lyon, where the
Problems of rail development and op- headquarters of the 1st Military Railway
eration in the north were substantially Service, commanded by Brig. Gen. Carl
duplicated in the south. A good rail R. Gray, was established on 14 Septem-
net existed in southern France, double- ber. Restoration of the line on the west
track lines running north from Marseille bank of the river was initially ruled out,
along both banks of the Rhône, supple- for all bridges but one had been de-
mented by another double-track route molished. T h e east bank line was in
branching off at Valence and extending better condition, and steps were imme-
northward via Grenoble and Besançon. diately taken to repair it and use it as
From these main lines an extensive net- the main supply route of the southern
work reached into Alsace via the Belfort armies. Plans were initially made to lo-
gap and into Lorraine. cate the main advance depots in the
Rail operations in the south began Dijon area, and to extend the railways
on a very limited scale as early as 17 eastward from that city to Besancon and
August (D plus 2), when small quantities Belfort.
of supplies were moved inland from the By 25 September the line was open as
St. Tropez beaches on a narrow-gauge far north as Lyon with a capacity of
line. T h e first standard-gauge line was 3,000 tons per day. By the end of the
placed in operation shortly thereafter month the line was in operation north
between St. Raphael and Aix-en-Prov- to Dijon and eastward to Besançon. Re-
ence. From the latter the single-track habilitation of the parallel eastern route
line north to Grenoble was then opened north from Bourg continued, mean-
despite destroyed bridges across the Dur- while, and was completed on 5 October,
ance River at Meyrargues and the when the eastern line joined the other
Buesch River at Sisteron. For a short at Dol, halfway between Dijon and Be-
time supplies were hauled by rail to sançon. At that time SOS Advance Head-
Meyrargues and then trucked to Sisteron, quarters at Dijon was accepting bids for
where they were transferred back to rail. the movement of 8,350 tons per day via
By mid-September temporary bridges rail. Within another week, with the ac-
strong enough to carry loaded rail cars, quisition of additional rolling stock and
but not engines, had been completed motive power, the capacity of the rail-
at both points, and the line was open ways along the southern lines of commu-
as far north as Bourg, 220 miles from nication had risen to 12,000 tons.47
the landing beaches. For a few weeks this By early October operational plans
route served as the principal rail line and the deployment of the Seventh U.S.
of communications, with a capacity of and First French Armies dictated the
1,500 tons per day.
MAJ. GEN.FRANKS. Ross, Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, and Brig. Gen. Clarence L .
Burpee walking alongside an American locomotive.
unloadings dropped to an all-time low. cial trucking operation, known, like that
At the end of the month 5,000 cars were which operated briefly between Cher-
still under load in yards and railheads of bourg and Dol in November, as the
the two armies and of the Continental Green Diamond Route, was organized
Advance Section. T h e supply of both to operate between the CONAD depots
armies reached a precarious state at that and the armies. One thousand vehicles
time, and led officials of the 6th Army were drawn from Delta Base and other
Group and SOLOC to institute an even COMZ sections for the job, including
more rigid control over all transporta- 200 from CONAD itself. On 1 February
tion in order to ensure delivery of the sixteen companies, a majority of them
minimum tonnages of essential mainte- of the 10-ton semitrailer type, and or-
nance items. ganized along the lines of the special
CONAD now began to allocate trains motor transport services in the north,
on a daily basis, specifying the exact began shuttling critically needed sup-
number which were to go forward with plies from Dijon, Langres, and Is-sur-
Class I, III, and V supplies. Preparations Tille to Seventh Army depots and supply
were made to handle Class II and IV points. 49
supplies almost exclusively by motor 496 A Gp G–4 AAR, Jan 45; CONAD History, pp.
transport. For this purpose another spe- 145, 164, 167; History of SOLOC, II, TC, 21: Ltrs,
160 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
These measures, plus a sudden im- the combat elements are to be met. This
provement in rail operations resulting means the allocation of rolling stock and
from better weather and an increase in the matching of facilities–loading,
motive power, quickly relieved the crit- movement, and unloading–in such a
ical supply situation. Within six days way as to avoid waste. Movement control
the backlog of rail cars at Is-sur-Tille was far from perfect in both the north
alone was reduced from 2,242 to 928 and south in the fall of 1944, as attested
despite unrestricted movements into the by the wasteful idleness of rolling stock
yards. In the second week of February and the choking up of rail lines.
deliveries to the armies reached an all- T h e organization and operation of the
time record—52,034 tons by rail and two services differed in at least one
7,853 tons by truck. By mid-February major respect. The 2d Military Railway
the rebuilding of forward reserves had Service in the north was operated by
progressed so well that the special truck- the Chief of Transportation, Commu-
ing operation could be terminated.50 nications Zone, although the various op-
erating units of which it was made u p
Both the 1st and 2d Military Railway were attached to the COMZ section in
Services had experienced trying times in which they operated. By the end of 1944
December and January, having been put movement control had become fairly
to severe tests by both winter weather centralized. T h e chief of transportation
and the demands occasioned by enemy normally received movement require-
offensives. Experience in both the north ments each month from the COMZ G–4.
and south had underscored the impor- In conference with the various divisions
tance of one of the most vital aspects of the Office of the Chief of Transporta-
of military transportation–movement tion, a decision was made as to how to
control. Railway operations in a theater fill the various movement needs, whether
of war can rarely be conducted on a by rail, water, or truck. On the basis
“scheduled” basis. Requirements for of this decision a movement plan was
transport, reflecting the requirement for then drawn up, showing the ports at
supplies, are subject to frequent changes. which certain tonnages would originate
Rail lines, yards, depots, and handling and the depots to which they were to be
equipment are often inadequate or de- shipped. T h e 2d Military Railway Serv-
stroyed. It is difficult to impose penalties ice, having been informed of the rail
for hoarding loaded rail cars. Existing requirements for the plan, then pre-
facilities must therefore be used to the pared a detailed movement plan which
best possible advantage if the needs of was to be carried out through the rail-
way operating battalions in co-operation
with the COMZ sections involved.
Devers to Larkin, 2 Feb 45, and Larkin to Devers, T h e 1st Military Railway Service, un-
4 Feb 45, ETO, Memos for Gen Larkin; Ltr, Brig
Gen 5. L. Scolt, Dir Planning Div ASF, to Lutes in like the 2d, had been established as a
the ETO, 12 Dec 44, sub: Shipment of Locomotive separate subcommand of the Mediter-
Coal from U.S. to Marseille, ASF, Official Rpt Mis- ranean theater, and enjoyed an unusual
sion to ETO, 4 Dec 44, 13 Jan 45 by Lutes.
50 CONAD History, pp. 167–68. degree of autonomy. As such, it possessed
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 161
its own engineers and carried out its (3) Air Transport
own rail reconstruction, procured its No unusual developments took place
own supplies and equipment, had its in the field of air transportation in the
own operating units, and had assigned weeks immediately after the pursuit.
to it the necessary military police units After achieving an average delivery of
to guard and protect supplies in transit. slightly more than 1,000 tons per day in
Movement control was not centralized the second week of September, when
for all modes of transportation as in the troop-carrier and cargo aircraft of the
north. Once the tonnage bids were allo- First Allied Airborne Army and con-
cated, the 1st Military Railway Service verted B–24 bombers from U.S. Strategic
assumed control of its own movements, Air Force plus a small contingent from
which it handled quite independently of the RAF combined in a final effort,
the chief of transportation. supply by air fell off abruptly when
Opinions differ as to whether this type planes of the First Allied Airborne Army
organization had any advantages over were finally withdrawn for the Holland
that adopted in the north. Car shortages airborne operation.52
developed just as they did in the north; For about a week only B–24’s were
backlogs developed through failure to available for air supply in support of
call cars forward; and the armies held the 12th Army Group. These were used
on to loaded cars as rolling reserves. to good advantage in the transportation
Clearing u p the traffic backlog in Febru- of gasoline in bulk from the United
ary was in fact largely attributable to Kingdom. T h e bombers had begun to
the fact that the transportation officer of haul limited amounts of bulk POL on
Continental Advance Section for the first 9 September. Beginning on the 18th
time assumed the function of traffic regu- a major emergency effort was made to
lator. 51Some of the features of the south- haul POL to three fields which the
ern system nevertheless were adopted for Ninth Air Force made available for the
the Military Railway System as a whole purpose on the Continent–St. Dizier,
in the spring of 1945. Clastres, and Florennes. T h e bombers
On 12 February 1945, when the sepa- could carry only 1,600 to 1,800 gallons
rate Southern Line of Communications of gas in four bomb bay tanks, and on
was dissolved and the northern and the first day of the new effort only 11
southern lines were finally integrated planes, carrying 17,580 gallons, made de-
under one command, the two railway liveries. T h e next day 77 planes were
services were also brought under a cen- dispatched to the Continent with 123,-
tral supervisory control–General Head- 414 gallons. T h e lift continued until
quarters, Military Railway Service, es- 30 September. T h e largest delivery was
tablished in Paris under General Gray, made on the 29th, when 197 planes
who became subordinate to General moved 301,376gallons. I n the thirteen
Ross as theater chief of transportation. days of operations a total of 1,601 sorties
were flown and 2,589,065 gallons of gas-
51 Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen
Br Rpt 122, pp. 60–61; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V.
MRS, 15, and VI, MRS, 1–2. 52See Logistical Support I, 578–83.
162 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
oline were delivered to the Continent. meet even the daily maintenance re-
About three fourths of the POL was quirements of the armies, Advance Sec-
flown to the three U.S. fields, the re- tion, and the Ninth Air Force, to say
mainder to a British field for 21 Army nothing of moving forward the 150,000
tons of supplies required to reconstitute
Meanwhile, on 22 September the can- the seven-day supply level authorized
cellation of a portion of the planned re- the armies. Between 6,000 and 7,000
supply missions in Holland made an tons of additional lift were needed if
additional 30 troop-carrier aircraft avail- both maintenance and reserve goals were
able, and the First Allied Airborne Army to be met by the end of the month. Gen-
promised to increase the transport fleet eral Stratton, fully aware that this re-
to 600 craft as quickly as they became quirement was beyond the capacity of
available. During the last week of Sep- the available transport aircraft, never-
tember total cargo deliveries rose to a theless asked the Army Group G–4, Gen-
record 1,525 tons per day, partly through eral Moses, to seek the maximum pos-
the return of troop-carrier aircraft, sible allocation from the SHAEF Air
partly through the continued use of B- 55
PrioritiesBoard.
24’s and some British Halifaxes. Despite Because of its relative extravagance
the constant uncertainty over the avail- as a means of transport, the continued
ability of transport aircraft which char- large-scale employment of aircraft for
acterized operations throughout the supply movement was not approved.
month, Allied planes flew 11,000 sorties T h e use of bombers for this purpose
and delivered more than 30,000 tons in had been uneconomical from the start,
September. This represented 60 percent and at the end of September the B–24’s
of all the tonnage transported by air were withdrawn completely from their
since D Day.54 supply mission. Henceforth all air sup-
T h e Communications Zone, faced ply was to be carried out by aircraft of
with a sizable deficit in transportation, the IX Troop Carrier Command (U.S.)
would have liked to continue utilizing and the 46 Group (British). SHAEF
the airlift to the fullest possible extent. immediately reduced the allocation of
At the beginning of October road and planes for that purpose and attempted to
rail transportation were inadequate to limit their use strictly to meeting emer-
gency needs as originally intended. Bad
53 Min, Mtg, Area Petroleum Office, 14 Sep 44, weather and lack of forward fields fur-
USFET 463.72 Ground Force Gasoline, II; file ther affected the scale of air deliveries
USFET Petroleum Office, Airlift of Gasoline by during the fall, and for about two and
Plane, Cabinet 3007, Drawer 3.
54 Ltr, Wing Comdr C. G. Cradock-Watson to a half months deliveries averaged only
Distrib, 17 Oct 44, sub: Emergency Air Lift–Sep- about 675 tons per day. By allocation,
tember 1944, SHAEF G–4 581.2 Transportation by
Air of Supplies and Equipment II; TWX VX–25382,
First Allied Airborne Army to SHAEF, 22 Sep 44,
SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air 24518/Ops; CATOR 55Memo, Stratton for Moses, 4, Oct 44, sub: Air-
Weekly Load Summaries, Jun–Oct 44, AEAF A-3, lift Requirements for Supply of Firs:, Third, and
505.27–30A, Air University Library. Maxwell Air- Ninth Armies for Period 9–29 October Inclusive, 1 8
field Base. A Gp Supply by Air, No. 133.
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 163
A similar attempt to supply isolated division and weighed 270.5 tons, but
elements of the 3d Armored Division in could be readily augmented with pre-
Belgium miscarried. Of twenty-nine air- packed 76-mm. gun and 155-mm. how-
craft dispatched to the division with gas- itzer ammunition to meet the needs of
oline and medical supplies on 23 Decem- infantry and armored divisions. One ad-
ber, twenty-three dropped their loads in ditional brick was designed and packed
enemy territory as the result of a mis- for a regimental combat team.62
reading of map co-ordinates, and the Supply by air continued at a relatively
remainder were either diverted or lost to small scale throughout the period of the
enemy action. Bad weather frustrated Ardennes battle, partly because of per-
a second attempt on 24 December. 59 sistently bad weather. Deliveries aver-
While the resupply of airborne units aged only 185 tons per day in January,
at Bastogne was regarded as a very cred- the tonnage being divided about equally
itable performance, few of the agencies between12th and 21 Army Groups. 63
involved were properly prepared for the
emergency, and sharp words were ex- ( 4 ) Inland Waterways
changed between the 12th Army Group
T h e OVERLORD planners had not con-
and COMZ staffs before the operation
sidered the inland waterways on the Con-
got under way. 60 After the emergency
tinent of sufficient military value to war-
SHAEF ordered the Communications
rant a large-scale rehabilitation effort.
Zone to maintain balanced stocks of sup-
T h e policy was laid down of restoring
plies required to support type units of
waterways only in cases where minor re-
airborne, armored, and infantry divi-
pairs were required and where a clear
sions in sufficient quantity to load all
military necessity existed. Any opportu-
troop-carrier aircraft for a maximum
nity for the advantageous utilization of
two-day lift.61 Shortly thereafter the
inland waterways for military transporta-
Communications Zone prepared sixteen
tion was counted as a bonus.
“bricks” of supplies at various airfields
By September 1944 a clear-cut need
in the United Kingdom and on the Con-
had arisen to restore certain waterways
tinent, each containing one day of supply
in northern France to relieve the hard-
for a division. T h e basic brick was de-
pressed railways from the burden of coal
signed to meet the needs of an airborne
movements into the Paris area. T h e
Communications Zone at that time ap-
59Operation REPULSE,Rpt of the IX TCC, dated pointed an Inland Waterways Commit-
3 Jan 45, SHAEF AG 581.2–1 Supply by Air; Ltr, tee to recommend priorities for inland
Hq 101st Airborne Div to CG TUSA, 1 1 Jan 45,
sub: Rpt of Air Resupply to 101st Airborne Div at waterway restoration, estimate the man-
Bastogne, SHAEF G–3 24518/Ops Resupply by Air; power and equipment requirements, and
Supply and Evacuation by Air, Gen Bd Rpt 26, pp.
32–33. The 101st Airborne Division listed only 820
planes and 42 gliders as having delivered supplies 62Cbl EX–91351, COMZ to SHAEF, 27 Jan 45,
to the Bastogne area. SHAEF G–3 23518/Ops.
60 Memo,McCormack for Moses, 1 Jan 45, sub: Air 63See 12 A Gp Supply by Air file for statistics on
Resupply of Isolated Units (location unknown). deliveries; also CATOR Weekly Load Summaries
61Cbl S–73225, SHAEF G–4 to COMZ, 31 Dec 44, AEAF A-3 505.46–7, Air University Library, Max-
SHAEF G–3 24518/Ops Resupply by Air. well Airfield Base.
166 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
act as the U.S. agent in all dealings with —with fuel, equipment, and other sup-
the French on these matters. Early in plies. T h e first objective, cutting a single
November, when the inland waterways 40-foot wide channel the entire way, was
began to assume importance in the completed early in November and the
movement of military supplies, an In- first coal barges arrived in Paris on the
land Waterways Division was established 18th.
in the Office of the Chief of Transpor- T h e Seine River, while part of the
tation.64 French coal distribution system, was re-
Four main waterways were eventually stored primarily to facilitate the trans-
rehabilitated–the Oise, Seine, and portation of civil imports from Le Havre
Rhône-Saône Rivers, and the Albert and Rouen. Demolished bridges and
Canal. None of these had been seriously damaged locks and dams blocked traffic
damaged, with the exception of some of on the Seine as on the other waterways.
the locks. But all were clogged with T h e biggest single task was the repair
demolished bridges, which not only ob- of the locks of the Tancarville Canal,
structed barge navigation, but prevented which connected Le Havre with the
the movement of floating equipment. Seine at Tancarville, about fifteen miles
French and Belgian authorities tried to up the river. T h e canal had been built
salvage as many of the demolished to permit barges, loaded directly from
bridges as possible, raising them and ocean-going ships in a basin at Le Havre,
eventually restoring them to rail or high- to reach the Seine without traversing
way use. Civilians carried out the bulk the mouth of the estuary, where strong
of the work, although U.S. troop units tidal currents made navigation difficult.
usually provided the skilled supervisory U.S. engineer units initially were too
personnel and much of the heavy con- occupied with the reconstruction of Le
struction equipment. Practically no pris- Havre to assist in the repair of the locks,
oner of war labor was employed. and the French port authorities there-
First priority was given to the clear- fore undertook the task unassisted. Lack-
ance of that portion of the Oise River ing adequate salvage and engineer equip-
system extending from the Chauny and ment, they made little progress. U.S.
Valenciennes coal fields to Conflans on naval salvage equipment also failed to
the Seine, about thirty-five miles below raise the sunken ebb gates, and the job
Paris. Several locks, including the large was finally assigned to the 1055th Port
one at Creil, had to be repaired, and Construction and Repair Group, which
thirty-four obstructions, mostly blown aided French contractors by furnishing
bridges, had to be removed. T h e 1057th the necessary equipment and trained op-
Port Construction and Repair Group erators. Repair of the lock was not com-
provided the skilled labor for this pro- pleted until mid-March 1945.
ject, and also supplied the French—who French civilian organizations, assisted
performed about 60 percent of the labor by U.S. and British construction units,
meanwhile had restored the Seine to
navigation for both civil and military
64 Final Reportof the Chief Engineer,ETO,I,
277; COMZG–4 History,III, p. 69. traffic. But that traffic for a long time was
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS 167
BARGECONVOY ON ALBERTCANAL
carrying lumber from Antwerp to Liège,
February 1945.
coal. T h e Albert Canal in Belgium had upset transportation plans in the for-
a more direct military value, and its ward areas, forcing an embargo on barge
rehabilitation was the principal inland traffic. Once these difficulties were over-
waterway project jointly undertaken by come, the canal played an important
U.S. and British forces. T h e canal, built role in the clearance of Antwerp, even-
between 1933 and 1939, connected Liege tually handling about 50 percent of the
with Antwerp, a distance of eighty miles. tonnage discharged there.66
Eight groups of locks, each group of The Rhône-Saône waterway was re-
three built to accommodate one 600-ton habilitated almost entirely by the
and two 2,000-ton barges, reduced the French. Except for some local clearance
water level from sixty meters at Liege at Marseille, and a limited traffic in
(on the Meuse) to sea level at Antwerp. POL, however, the Rhône had prac-
U.S. forces were assigned responsibility tically no military value, largely because
for restoring the approximately fifty of the lack of high-powered tugs re-
miles of the canal between Liège and quired for operation on the swift waters
Kwaadesmechelen, British forces the re- of the system. 67
mainder.
T h e Advance Section initially laid out T h e four months’ period after the
twenty-four work projects on its portion pursuit represented a transition so far
of the canal, most of them involving as transportation developments were
bridge removal or repair of locks, which concerned. Its most obvious feature was
would open the canal to 600-ton barges. the gradual assumption of the bulk of
These tasks were carried out under the the long-distance hauling by the rail-
supervision of the 1056th PC&R Group, ways. Motor transport, particularly in
with the assistance of the 355th and the form of the color routes, continued
332d Engineer General Service Regi- to provide a degree of flexibility in per-
ments and Belgian civilian contractors, forming special missions. But the cut-
and were completed early in December, back in motor as well as air transport
as scheduled. Delays in removing the signaled the end of expedients necessi-
Yserberg Bridge at Antwerp at first pre- tated by the emergency conditions in
vented full use of the canal, but barges the summer of 1944 and an eventual
could be loaded just east of that point return to more conventional means of
by trucking directly from the port area. transport.
In any event, transportation on the Al-
bert Canal got off to an unspectacular 66 Port Construction and Repair, pp. 83-90; Final
start. Ice and flood conditions created Report of the Chief Engineer, E T O , I, 278; ADSEC
Operational History, p. 108.
operational hazards as on the Seine, and 67 COMZ G–4 History, III, p. 71; Final Report of
the enemy counteroffensive completely the Chief Engineer, E T O , I, 278.
CHAPTER VI
Forward Movements
(1) The Tonnage Allocutions System were brought forward. In addition, be-
For nearly two months after the end tween 150,000 and 180,000 tons of sup-
of the pursuit in mid-September 1944 plies were needed in the forward areas
the inadequacy of transportation lay at for repairing or replacing Table of
the root of most of the Allies’ immediate Equipment matérial, replenishing basic
logistic difficulties. T h e lack of port dis- loads, building army and ADSEC re-
charge capacity, while a potentially omi- serves, and providing winter clothing.2
nous limiting factor, did not as yet di- Against these requirements the Com-
rectly affect the Allies’ ability to con- munications Zone was delivering only
tinue large-scale offensive operations. about 11,000 tons per day in mid-Sep-
Additional port capacity in mid-Septem- tember, 7,000 of which were earmarked
ber would have relieved the taut logistic for the two armies, the remainder for
situation only if it had resulted in short- the Ninth Air Force, the Advance Sec-
ened lines of communications-in other tion, and various special demands. Only
words, if ports farther up the Channel 40,000 tons of reserves, representing but
could have been brought into use. And a few days of supply, had been moved
while there were shortages of certain forward of St. Lô, and 75 percent of that
items of supply, substantial reserve still lay in dumps west of Paris.3 These
stocks in most categories lay in the Nor- hard facts led inescapably to the con-
mandy depots and in the ships offshore. clusion that, temporarily at least, U.S.
T h e main problem was their movement forces could not be supported at the
forward. For the time being, therefore, desired scales. This meant rationing the
the deficiency in transport was the com- available support in accord with opera-
mon denominator of most of the Allies’ tional priorities.
supply troubles.
T h e prospects of meeting the growing 2 Ltr, 12 A Gp to CG COMZ, 16 Sep 44, sub:
needs of U.S. forces in mid-September Tonnage Rqmts of the Armies, and Memo, M. F.
Hass for G–4 12 A Gp, 21 Sep 44, sub: Estimate of
were dim indeed. Minimum mainte- Tonnage Rqmts, both in 12 A G p Tonnages 137;
nance requirements in the combat zone COMZ G–4 Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl,
already came to more than 13,000 tons 19 Sep 44, ETO Adm 145C.
3 Ltr, Vissering, Deputy G–4 Mov and T n Br
per day, 1 and would rise as new divisions SHAEF, 14 Sep 44, sub: Observations on T r i p to
Paris, SHAEF SGS 617 Railroads; Memo for Record,
1 On the basis of 550 tons per division slice, and Col T. F. Taylor, 12 A Gp G–4 Sec, 6 Sep 44,
including Ninth Air Force needs. Memos-Moses, SHAEF 12 A Gp G–4, Folder 86.
170 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
A rationing system had in effect been day to Third Army and 700 tons to the
instituted on the last day of August Ninth Army, which was scheduled to
when the 12th Army Group commander take over a sector between the Third
divided the available tonnage, initially and First Armies, and assigning the re-
allotting a larger share to First Army mainder to First Army, but with the
than to Third. 4 On 5 September the understanding that it would get a mini-
army group commander made the first mum of 5,000 tons. 7
change in the allocation, dividing the Before the new allocation could be-
first 7,000 tons equally between the two come effective, the transfer of an arm-
armies. By using their own transporta- ored division from Third Army to First
tion both armies were able to supple- resulted in a corresponding shift of 400
ment their meager rations somewhat, tons from General Patton’s forces, giving
but there was no prospect that the Com- the First Army 5,400 tons per day and
munications Zone, unable for the mo- the Third 3,100. 8 T h e new apportion-
ment to deliver even minimum mainte- ment went into effect on 27 September,
nance requirements, might begin to at which time the First Army had ten
forward reserves .5 divisions and the Third Army eight.9
A new allocation issued on 14 Septem- T h e Ninth Army was then in process
ber renewed the equal sharing of the of movement from Brittany, and within
first 7,000 tons, but reflected a slightly the next weeks placed a corps (the VIII)
greater optimism in allocating army ton- of two divisions in the line between the
nage in excess of 7,000 to First Army up First and Third Armies.10
to 1,500 tons and any additional tonnage Forward deliveries roughly approxi-
to the Third Army. T h e Communica- mated the tonnage allocation in the next
tions Zone was authorized at this time to few weeks. Since the allocation consti-
use the trucks of the 104th, 95th, and tuted a starvation diet, the armies con-
26th Divisions for two weeks to haul sumed virtually everything they re-
supplies.6 ceived. Under these circumstances they
Further changes in allocations were were forced to confine their requisitions
made in the next two weeks in accord-
ance with plans to shift the weight of
7Memo for Record, Moses, 21 Sep 44, Memos-
operations to the north and in recogni- Moses, SHAEF 12 A Gp G–4, Folder 86; Diary of
tion of changes in the order of battle the 12 A Gp G–4, 21 Sep 44.
and in the strength of the armies. On 8 A further reduction in Third Army’s share was
contemplated in the event of XV Corps’ transfer to
21 September General Bradley approved the Seventh Army, although Bradley hoped to keep
a new allocation giving 3,500 tons per the corps in the 12th Army Group and support it
via the southern lines of communications.
9Memo for Record, Moses, 23 Sep 44, sub: Conf
4 See Logistical Support I, 491. Held by Gen Bradley This Date, Memos-Moses,
5Memo, G–4 Movs 12 A G p for G–4, 13 Sep 44, SHAEF 12 A Gp G–4, Folder 86; 12 A Gp G–4
sub: Transportation for Replacements, 12 A Gp Diary, 23 Sep 44.
Rolling Stock 106; Memo, Moses for Bradley, 16 10I n view of its limited tonnage allocation, the
Sep 44, sub: Supply Situation, 12 A Gp Supplies, Third Army requested authority to operate a train
Misc, 126. back to the beaches, offering to provide its own
6Memo for Record, Moses, 14 Sep 44, 12 A G p loading details and guards, but the request was
Supplies, Misc, 126. denied. TUSA AAR, II, G–4, p. 18.
FORWARD MOVEMENTS 171
to absolute essentials, for all require- ing 127,000 tons of supplies against a
ments without exception were charged guarantee of only 63,000 tons and against
against the assigned allocations. This requisitions totaling only about 66,000
meant that even mail absorbed tonnage tons.13 General Moses, the 12th Army
whenever the armies desired its delivery. Group G–4, pointed out that these fig-
T h e 12th Army Group refused to make ures were inaccurate and misleading.
any exceptions for special requirements, T h e armies, he noted, had reported re-
as, for example, when Third Army re- ceipt of only 84,000 tons, including 23,-
quested that transportation exclusive of 000 brought forward in their own trucks,
the daily allocation be provided for the indicating that the Communications
movement of winterization supplies and Zone had delivered only the tonnage it
equipment.11 was committed to move under the cur-
In this situation it was naturally of rent allocation. Furthermore, according
the highest concern to the armies that to army and army group figures, 40,000
they get the maximum tonnage allotted tons of the supplies delivered had come
them, and that it consist only of useful from stocks which had been accumulated
items. In the frantic scramble of late
in army service areas west of the Seine
September, however, the unavailabiIity
and which the armies had been forced
of supplies at precisely the time they
to leave behind in their rapid advance.
were requisitioned, and the day-to-day
uncertainty over transportation resulted Credit for the delivery of this tonnage
in something less than perfect function- had therefore been given to the Com-
ing of the allocations system. In addi- munications Zone once before.
tion, the modification of carefully T h e 66,000-ton requisition was ex-
worked out supply SOP’s in the name plained by the simple fact that the armies
of expediency, the hauling of supplies had been compelled to keep requests
in army transportation, and the misdi- within the bounds of the tonnage alloca-
rection and misappropriation of sup- tions. They would have liked to requisi-
plies, the receipt of which was never tion about 120,000
tons for maintenance
acknowledged by anyone, 12 produced alone. “We rationed tonnage,” General
conflicting claims as to what was actually Moses pointed out, “to distribute a scar-
delivered. city, not to comfort CZ [Communica-
Late in September General Lord re- tions Zone] in continuing a famine.” Ac-
ported to SHAEF that in the nine-day cording to General Bradley’s G–4, the
period from 16 to 24 September the armies needed 650 tons per division slice
Communications Zone had far exceeded to fight effectively. Instead, they had re-
its commitments to the armies, deliver- ceived 550 tons per division, 400 of
which were delivered by the Communi-
11 Memo, Wilson for Hodges, 19 Sep 44. and Ltr,
12 A Gp to TUSA, late Sep, sub: Rqmts for
Winterization of TUSA, both i n 12 A G p Tonnage
137. 13Ltr, Lord to Smith, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS
12Notes on the Supply Situation of 12 A Gp, Col 400.3/1 Supply Problems of Allied Advance; Ltr,
Charles W. McCarthy, n.d. [late Sep], SHAEF G–4 Lord to Lutes, 27 Sep 44, EUCOM 400 Supplies,
400.192 Supply Report I. Services, and Equipment, General, V.
172 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
cations Zone, 150 by their own transpor- high daily tonnage records, tended to
tation. 14 overlook the importance which particu-
T h e statistics offered by General Lord lar items might have for the armies, and
were hardly calculated to inspire greater to ship supplies most readily accessible,
confidence in the Communications Zone, although they might have little or no
either as to claims of past performance local value. T h e armies desired that
or predictions of future capabilities. greater efforts be made to provide the
General Moses put it mildly when, in specific items they requested. Under cur-
expressing his doubts on the latter, he rent procedures the Communications
said, “We do not know what we will Zone simply canceled requisitions or the
actually receive but we feel fairly certain portions thereof which could not be
that there will be a number of things filled within two days. T h e result was
requisitioned that will not materialize.”15 that the armies were inadequately in-
Even more exasperating and inexpli- formed as to what supplies they could
cable to the armies was the Communica- expect to receive. No other aspect of
tions Zone’s practice of shipping them supply was quite so frustrating to opera-
supplies which they had not requested tional planning or more conducive to the
and for which they had no immediate padding of requisitions and hoarding.16
need. T o the armies, always suspicious
of the Communications Zone’s mysteri- T h e problem of co-ordinating supply
ous ways and jealous of their meager distribution between the Communica-
ration of tonnage, this was an inexcusa- tions Zone, the army group, and the air
ble waste of the limited lift available to forces, and the need to apportion the
them. But requisitioned items were not available resources in accord with opera-
always within reach of the technical serv- tional priorities determined at the Allied
ices for loading on a particular day, and level made it inevitable that Supreme
because the Communications Zone did Headquarters should eventually become
not want to see the available outloading involved in the allocation business.
capacity go unused it frequently shipped SHAEF prepared to take over the con-
substitute items, for which the armies trol of priorities early in October when
admittedly might not have immediate the supply outlook was still extremely
use, as fillers. dismal. At the time practically no prog-
T h e armies were not inclined to ac- ress had been made in overcoming the
cept such explanations. In fact, they ob- worst effects of the pursuit. Neither First
jected to dealing with supply allocations nor Third Army had been able to ac-
and movements in terms of tonnages at cumulate more than two days of supply
all. They suspected that the Communica- and two units of fire, and Ninth Army
tions Zone, in its enthusiasm to register was getting nothing beyond current
maintenance needs. Motor transport was
14Ltr, Moses to Crawford, 2 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS
400.3/1 Supply Problems of Allied Advance: Memo, 16 Notes on the Supply Situation of 12 A Gp,
Moses for Bradley, 1 Oct 44, 12 A Gp Supplies, McCarthy; Memo, Col T. F. Taylor, Supply Br
Misc, 126. G–4 12 A Gp for G–4, 19 Sep 44, 12 A Gp Tonnage
15Ltr, Moses to Crawford, 2 Oct 44. 137.
FORWARD MOVEMENTS 173
still being operated to the maximum of Ailied line, with the greatest weight be-
its capabilities, and higher echelon re- hind the attacks on the north. T h e 12th
pair had not been performed since the Army Group at this time consisted of
early days of the beachhead. Heavy cloth- twenty divisions, supported by an equal
ing and other winterization equipment number of fighter squadrons. But five
and materials needed for the expected additional divisions were available for
bridging operations were being moved commitment, subject only to the provi-
up, but in nothing like adequate quan- sion of the necessary logistic support.
tities. Logistic planners calculated that the
Allocating the available supplies was commitment of all twenty-five divisions
essentially the responsibility of the and the building of minimum reserves
SHAEF G–4, who announced that allo- for the three armies would require the
cations would be determined on the basis delivery of 22,320 tons per day to the
of estimates of movement capabilities 12th Army Group, based on require-
provided by the commanders of the ments of 840 tons per division (560
three lines of communications (that is, for maintenance 18and 280 for reserves),
the Communications Zone, the 21 Army plus 1,320 tons for headquarters and spe-
Group, and SOLOC), on the tonnage cial troops, coal, and civil affairs sup-
bids submitted by the army groups, and plies.
on the projected scale, nature, and rela- T h e 12th Army Group had actually
tive priority of tactical operations as submitted a bid for 18,000–20,000tons
outlined by the G–3. With this data the per day for the allocation period in ques-
Logistical Plans Branch was to prepare tion, and the Communications Zone
a logistical study and recommend over- had estimated its average delivery capa-
all tonnage allocations. T h e concurrence bilities at 15,000 tons, exclusive of Ninth
of the G–3, as well as that of other in- Air Force and ADSEC maintenance
terested parties, such as Movements and stocks. While forward deliveries prom-
Transportation Branch, was of course ised to be much improved over Septem-
necessary before the recommended allo- ber, therefore, they were certain to fall
cation was finally sent to the G–4 for far short of the needs of an enlarged
approval. 17 combat force. It was clear that there
T h e Logistical Plans Branch sub- would have to be either a reduction in
mitted its first allocations study on 8 the projected scale of support, a limita-
October, covering the two-week period tion in the number of divisions em-
from the 15th to the 28th. Projected
tactical operations in that period called 18Maintenance requirements per division slice in
for continued battering along the entire the army group were divided as follows:
dividing 15,000 tons between its three Tancarville Canal was repaired, and
armies,22only to be told that the Com- partly because it was believed to include
munications Zone had been given a com- overoptimistic estimates on water trans-
mitment of merely 12,500.23 port from Rouen and on rail clearance
SHAEF finally placed its new ration- out of Cherbourg. They did not con-
ing procedure in operation for the pe- sider the Communications Zone capable
riod 5–18 November, the first allocation of delivering more than 21,900 to the
being based on a fresh logistic survey combat zone, or 24,400 beyond Paris.
made late in October. By 5 November This would leave a deficit of at least
the regrouping of the 12th Army Group 5,000 tons.
was expected to be completed, with the In the end the estimate of the Com-
Ninth Army, consisting of three corps, munications Zone’s movement capabili-
deployed north of Aachen, on the First ties was reduced still further, and on the
Army’s left. By the end of the allocation G–4’s recommendation Supreme Head-
period twenty-seven divisions were ex- quarters finally set the Communications
pected to be operational in the 12th Zone a first priority commitment to de-
Army Group. Tactical operations con- liver 20,000 tons per day to the 12th
templated for the period included an Army Group–16,700 tons to the armies
advance to the Rhine by all four U.S. and 3,300 to the Ninth Air Force.
24 The
armies (including the Seventh) and a 12th Army Group in turn suballocated
bridgehead for First Army at Cologne. this tonnage to its three armies in ac-
With these considerations in mind the cord with operational priorities, the ton-
12th Army Group placed a bid for 33,- nages differing for “active” and “quiet”
430 tons per day—28,333 for the ground divisions and for armored and infantry
forces and 5,097 for the Ninth Air Force. units. 25
SHAEF logistical planners considered The disparity between the army group
some of the requests unreasonable and
recommended a cut to 27,000 tons. Add- 24 Ltr, Whipple to Current Opns Br G–4 et al.,
27 Oct 44, sub: SHAEF Tonnage Alloc 1, and Ltr,
ing Advance Section’s requirements to Crawford to CofS, 31 Oct 44, sub: Tonnage Allocs.
this figure brought the total demand for SHAEF G–4 563.59 Tonnages and Estimates of, I,
44. The CAO, General Gale, disapproved the al-
forward deliveries-that is, beyond Paris locations study, insisting that the logistic planners
—to31,200 tons. were in no position to make cuts in the various
The Communications Zone, mean- bids on the basis of comparison with October con-
sumption figures. General Crawford thereupon re-
while, had estimated its movement capa- submitted the study without any analysis of the
bility at more than 30,000 tons. But “reasonableness” of the various bids. But this did
SHAEF planners considered this figure not alter the amount of tonnage available or its
allocation. The only result was an increase in the
unrealistic, partly because it involved deficit–on paper, at least-from about 6,500 tons
relying on fairly heavy movements out per day to 13,500. Ltr, Gale to Crawford, 3 Nov 44,
of Le Havre before the bridge across the sub: Tonnage Allocs, and Ltr. Crawford to Gale,
4 Nov 44, same sub, SHAEF G–4 Tonnage Alloca-
tions, Log Plans Br 153/5, Folder 48.
22 Memo, Moses for Bradley, 22 Oct 44, Memos- 25Breakdown of Current Allocs, G–4 12 A Gp.
Moses, SHAEF 12 A Gp G–4, Folder 86. 12 A Gp Tonnage 137; TWX QX–23075, 12 A Gp
23 Memo, Col Edwin N. Clark for G–4, 24 Oct 44, to COMZ, 3 Nov 4, SHAEF G–4 563.59 Tonnages
sub: Allocs of Tonnage by 12 A Gp. and Estimates of, I, 44.
176 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
requests and the tonnage targets which Seventh Armies pushing toward the
SHAEF regarded as attainable appeared Rhine, and the Third aiming at capture
to reveal a more glaring transportation of the Saar. Tactical priorities went to
deficit than ever, underscoring the need the operations of the First and Ninth
to develop the railways at a faster rate, Armies, then to Third U.S. and Second
to open Antwerp, to utilize inland water- British Armies, and then to the First
ways and local resources, particularly Canadian. Tonnage bids for the period
coal, more fully, and, if possible, to make totaled 30,000 for the 12th Army Group
joint use of the Rhône valley line of and 11,660 tons for the 6th Army Group,
communications. Moreover, supply pol- including requirements for supporting
icy had favored the First Army, particu- air units. After an analysis of the bids
larly in the matter of reserves, and had the SHAEF planners again concluded
resulted in inequities in distribution out that cuts could be made—the 12th Army
of proportion to the tonnage allocations. Group’s combined bid from 30,000 to
Tonnage movements in the period 5– 26,300 and the 6th Army Group’s from
18 November fell short of the targets 11,660 to 11,450. Requirements for the
established by the first SHAEF alloca- Advance Section brought the total for-
tion, averaging 12,400 tons to the armies ward needs on the central (12th Army
and air force units in the 12th Army Group) line of communications to about
Group against an allocation target of 30,000tons.29
20,000, although the Communications T h e Communications Zone estimated
Zone began to lay down increasing ton- its delivery capabilities for this period
nages in the Advance Section.26 at 22,200 tons per day, a figure which
By this time, SHAEF Logistical Plans the SHAEF planners now considered
Branch completed its allocations study conservative. Several factors, including
for the period 19 November—2 Decem- the opening of the Seine for the clear-
ber, for the first time including all three ance of Rouen, the reduction of British
army groups in its survey. By the end rail traffic from the rear maintenance
of that period 12th Army Group was area, the increased availability of POL
expected to have a strength of thirty di- at Rouen, the general improvement in
visions,27 and the 6th Army Group a rail transportation, and the expectation
strength of sixteen.28 Operational plans that Antwerp would soon open, led them
for U.S. forces called for continued at- to raise the COMZ estimate to 24,400
tacks eastward, the Ninth, First, and tons. Even assuming that deliveries could
reach this figure there would be a deficit
26 Deliverystatistics are from COMZ G–4 Weekly of about 5,000 tons. T h e Southern Line
Reports on Status of Supply, from Stratton to 12 A
Gp G–4, 12 A Gp 400.291 Supply Information; of Communications, on the other hand,
ADSEC Operations History, App. D; and TWXs, estimated its capacity as 12,500 tons,
Lee to SHAEF, reporting on movements to armies giving it a surplus of about 1,000.
and Ninth Air Force, SHAEF G–4 563.59 Tonnages
and Estimates of, I, 44, and are not always in exact SHAEF planners recommended that
agreement.
27 Including one at Lorient. 29 T h e total requirements of the three army
2821 Army Group's strength was to remain un- groups, as approved by the planners, came close to
changed at eighteen and one-third divisions. 60,000 tons per day.
FORWARD MOVEMENTS 177
respectively for the ground forces and as Class I, levels were actually excessive,
the NinthAir Force. 32 and the Army Group took steps to halt
T h e third allocation never ran its full the flow into the army areas.
course. Within a week the entire ration- T h e Communications Zone, mean-
ing system, under attack from several while, by mutual agreement with 12th
quarters and rendered largely unneces- Army Group began laying down a larger
sary by the general improvement of sup- percentage of total tonnages in the Ad-
ply, was discontinued. T h e black cloud vance Section, although this was con-
which had hung depressingly over the trary to the allocations laid down by
logistic horizon since mid-September had SHAEF. 35By the time of the fall offen-
actually begun to lift at the end of Octo- sive, which began on 8 November, the
ber, at the very time that logistic plan- Communications Zone was laying down
ners were determining how the meager about 8,000 tons per day in the Advance
resources should be apportioned. Total Section, where stocks had risen to nearly
forward deliveries did not match the 100,000 tons. Army reserves by that time
Communications Zone's predictions, nor totaled about 180,000, bringing the
were the gains necessarily reflected in stocks in the forward areas to a record
the receipts in the army areas. In the last 280,000 tons.36
ten days of October, in fact, the Com- A similar improvement had taken
munications Zone claimed daily deliver- place on the southern lines of communi-
ies of only about 10,000 tons to the arm- cation, where forward reserves, practi-
ies in 12th Army Group, and something cally nonexistent early in October,37had
less than 1,000 tons to the Ninth Air risen to ten days for Classes I–IV, and to
Force.33 Evenwith these tonnages the twenty-five days for Class V by mid-
armies managed to improve their reserve November.38
positions. October was a quiet month Serious shortages of many items con-
operationally, and by stringent control tinued to hamper operations and to
over expenditures the armies were able worry all echelons. Nevertheless, ton-
to accumulate savings. By the end of the nage movements were definitely on the
month stocks in the combat zone of the rise, and the supply picture in both the
12th Army Group totaled more than 6th and 12th Army Groups was much
155,000tons.34 In some categories,
such brighter by mid-November. With cer-
32SHAEF Tonnage Alloc 3, to cover period 3–16 35Memo, Moses for Bradley, 31 Oct 44, sub: Sup-
Dec, Log Plans Br G–4, 25 Nov 44, Ltr, Crawford ply Outlook, 12 A Gp Tonnages 137; Ltr, Whipple
to CofS, 27 Nov 44. sub: Tonnage Allocs, and T W X to Barriger, 11 Nov 44, sub: Comments of Col
S–68947, SHAEF G–4 to Major Comds, 30 Nov 44, Wilson on Tonnage Allocs, SHAEF G–4 Tonnage
all in SHAEF G–4 563.59 Tonnages and Estimates Allocations, Log Plans Br 153/5.
of, I, 44. See also allocations papers in SHAEF AG 36The sources present conflicting statistics. See
400.22–1. No. 2 Shipments and Tonnages Alloca- Memo, Hass for Moses, 5 Nov 44, sub: Info on
tions 1944, and in 12 A Gp Tonnages 137. Supply Situation, 12 A Gp Supplies, Misc, 126;
33See Weekly Reports of COMZ G–4, sub: Supply COMZ G–4 Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl,
Info, 12 A Gp 400.291 Supply Information II, and Br Chiefs Mtg, 8 Nov 44, E T O Adm 145C; and
ADSEC Operations History, App. D. ADSEC Operations History, App. E, p. 3.
34Memo, Hass, Supply Br G–4 12 A Gp, for G–4, 37TWX BX–17225, Devers to Eisenhower, 5 Oct
30 Oct 44, sub: Tonnages in Forward Areas, 12 A 44, SHAEF Cbl Log, Smith Papers.
Gp Tonnages 137. 386 A G p G–4 AAR, Sep–Nov 44.
FORWARD MOVEMENTS 179
tain exceptions, even ammunition, which T h e fact that the armies could set
had been at dangerously low levels aside supplies as reserves at a time when
throughout October, had become a less deliveries to their service areas aver-
critical item of supply with the build-up aged only 11,000 tons against stated
of stocks in the Advance Section. De- requirements for 25,000 to 28,000 bore
liveries to the armies in the second allo- out the suspicion that they had been
cations period—19 November to 2 De- overzealous in their requisitioning. First
cember-averaged about 12,000 tons on Army, in particular, was suspected of tak-
the central line of communications and ing for granted the advantage in supply
between 4,000 and 5,000 tons on the which it had enjoyed, first in its prepa-
southern, and supplies continued to rations for the Normandy landings, and
build u p in the Advance Section at the later in connection with its operational
rate of about 8,000 tons per day.
priority, and had acquired a reputation
T h e general improvement brought
for “asking for the moon.” Lack of con-
with it a natural desire to return to nor-
fidence in the Communications Zone’s
mal supply procedures. T h e allocations
system was inflexible and restrictive at ability to meet its requirements undoubt-
best, and subject to abuse. So long as edly accounted for the heavy demands.
supply deliveries were characterized by. On the other hand, it was hardly surpris-
uncertainty it was natural for the armies ing that the Communications Zone
to seek whatever security they could in should question the dire urgency of army
hoarding and in requisitioning beyond demands which listed as “critically short”
their actual needs. As long as all avail- such items as barber kits and handker-
able tonnage was allocated, the Commu- chiefs. Nor was mutual trust likely to be
nications Zone lacked control over the promoted by the attitude expressed in
flow of supplies, particularly as to the one of First Army’s G–4 periodic reports,
establishment of balanced stocks in the which noted, “The operation will be a
forward areas. Moreover, the system did success providing the Communications
not ensure that the armies would actu- Zone has the ability and is willing to
ally receive the items they most needed, support the combat forces.” 40 T h e
for it tended to give an exaggerated and Third Army, accustomed from the be-
even harmful emphasis to over-all ton- ginning to operating on a shoestring, ac-
nages rather than items of supply, result- cepted the hardships of the fall months
ing in the delivery of supplies for which with more equanimity, sometimes even
there was no immediate need, and in failing to ask for enough. T h e Ninth
the accumulation of unfilled requisitions Army, a late-comer arriving in the midst
for thousands of tons of items on the of scarcity, had a reputation for consist-
critical list. 39 ently professional staff work where sup-
ply was concerned, and could usually
39Ltr, Whipple to Barriger, 11 Nov 44, sub: Com-
ments of Col Wilson on Tonnage Allocs, SHAEF
G–4 Tonnage Allocations, Log Plan Br 153/5; Me-
chanics of Supply in Fast Moving Situations, Gen 40COMZ G–4 History, II, 19. (Italics are the
Bd Rpt 27, pp. 80–81. author’s.)
180 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
(2) The Ardennes Counteroffensive and rail lines from the south or the lines of
Its Effect on Movements communications based on Antwerp, in
either case making it virtually impossible
It is typical of logistic operations that
to support the First and Ninth Armies
the solution of one problem often creates
in combat.48
a new one. T h e acceleration in forward
T h e immediate danger to forward sup-
deliveries soon brought a new limiting
ply installations made it imperative that
factor into play-the inability of the de-
the First Army service area be moved
pots to unload, classify, and store the
out of reach of the enemy, north and
huge tonnages which were being for-
west of the Meuse. This involved super-
warded in bulk. T h e result, as already
imposing army installations on the al-
noted, was a serious congestion on the
ready congested area of the Advance Sec-
rail lines in the forward areas, thousands
tion and a general telescoping of supply
of loaded cars piling up.47T h e Commu-
operations. It posed a special dilemma
nications Zone had just begun to give
because of the unusual character of the
serious attention to this problem when
logistic structure in the north. As pre-
the German counteroffensive struck on
viously observed, the U.S. communica-
16 December, endangering the huge
tions zone lacked storage facilities at Ant-
stocks which had been built u p in the
werp except for small amounts for in-
forward areas.
transit purposes. U.S. supplies conse-
T h e German offensive had particularly
quently had to be shipped in bulk to
serious implications for the logistical sup-
installations in the vicinity of Liège and
port of U.S. forces in the north, for it
Namur, where the Advance Section was
threatened to cut directly across the
forced to improvise base depot opera-
lines of communications based on the
tions as best it could to handle bulk
port of Antwerp, which had just been
cargo and at the same time conduct
brought into operation. In most imme-
retail issues to meet the day-to-dayneeds
diate danger, of course, were the supply of the armies. Superimposing the First
points and depots in the area of the
Army’s service installations on this al-
First Army. But most of the ADSEC lo-
ready cramped area was certain to ag-
gistic structure backing u p the First and gravate the existing congestion. On top
Ninth Armies also lay directly in the of this, First Army now presented the
path of the German drive, heavily con- Advance Section with a formidable list
centrated along the Meuse between
of major combat equipment losses which
Liege and Namur and extending west- required immediate replacement. In the
ward to Charleroi. An advance to the face of these demands it was clear that
Meuse alone promised to overrun many the continued large-scale shipment of
army and ADSEC depots and place most supplies in bulk from Antwerp would
installations north of the river within place an unbearable burden on the Ad-
the reach of enemy artillery; an advance
beyond the Meuse would threaten to cut
48Ltr, Whipple to G–4 SHAEF, 28 Dec 44, sub:
Logistical Support of U.S. First and Ninth Armies,
47See above, Ch. V, Sec. 2. SHAEF G–4 40 0 Supplies General, V.
182 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
vance Section and threaten orderly sup- passed, they were necessary in any event
ply operations. for the organization of a supply system
T h e obvious key to the situation ,was in proper depth. 49
the acquisition of depot space in the vi- In the meantime certain “immediate
cinity of Antwerp which would relieve action” steps had been taken to provide
some of the pressure building u p from prompt relief of congestion in the for-
the forward areas. T h e assignment of ward areas. T h e Advance Section, by
such space to U.S. forces had been dis- agreement with First Army, at once re-
cussed as early as October, when Ameri- duced forward deliveries of major main-
can and British staffs agreed on the ap- tenance items, and the army began to
portionment of Antwerp’s facilities. Brit- sustain itself by drawing on its reserves.
ish officials had been unwilling to release On 19 December the Communications
accommodations to U.S. forces in the Zone in turn placed a temporary em-
north, in part because they considered bargo on all shipments of other than
facilities in that area vital to their own Class II and IV supplies to the Advance
operations, in part because the estab- Section in order to facilitate the evacua-
lishment of U.S. depots there would tion of First Army supplies via Liège in
further contravene the principle of keep- case that became necessary. Ammunition
ing national lines of communications moving forward from Cherbourg, for
separate. T h e Advance Section there- example, was halted at Soissons; POL
after had repeatedly tried to convince shipments out of Antwerp were routed
the Communications Zone of the dan- to Charleroi; rations consigned to Liège
gers inherent in the situation, but the and Luxembourg were redirected to
Communications Zone had not pressed Charleroiand Verdun respectively.50
the matter. Meanwhile First Army supply chiefs
T h e counteroffensive of December fi- placed in operation a plan to move all
nally forced the issue. Late in the month major army service installations to the
SHAEF ordered 21 Army Group and the west of the Meuse. On 18 December the
Communications Zone to provide depot 25th Regulating Station withdrew from
space for U.S. forces in areas that could Spa and a detachment at Liège took di-
be defended in the event of a further rect control of the evacuation of First
enemy thrust. Although 21 Army Group Army’s supplies, reversing the entire sup-
still opposed the move, British officials
at SHAEF admitted the necessity of re-
lieving the pressure on Antwerp and 49 Ibid.; Cbl S–73064, SHAEF to 21 A Gp and
agreed to permit U.S. forces to establish COMZ, 30 Dec 44, Cbl EX–80904, COMZ to SHAEF,
3 1 Dec 44, and Cbl EX-81864, COMZ to Channel
depots in several locations which the Base Sec. 4 Jan 45, all in SHAEF G–4 Maintenance
Communications Zone had already re- of British and U.S. Forces, 153/2/GDP–1; Col Wil-
connoitered. On 4 January 1945 21 Army liam Whipple, “Logistical Problems During the
German Ardennes Offensive,” Military Review,
Group agreed to turn over space in the XXVIII (May, 1948). 19. 23; ADSEC Operations
Lille–Tournai area. While the facilities History, pp. 105–06; Notes on Mtg at SHAEF at-
tended by Gale, Lord, Crawford, et al., 3 Jan 45,
did not come into use until after the SHAEF CAO War Diary.
danger from the counteroffensive had 50COMZ G–4 History, II, 78–79.
FORWARD MOVEMENTS 183
ply procedure by directing empty cars and the remaining supplies were then
into forward railheads and expediting burned.52 T h e Advance Section evacu-
the loading and evacuation of supplies ated some supplies, and lost about 2,700
to depots west of the Meuse. I n the next tons, largely through destruction by V–1
week approximately 5,600 carloads of attacks, which forced the abandonment
supplies were removed to safer locations. of several installations.53
In addition, First Army used 37 truck T h e Advance Section was responsible
companies in constant supply and troop for the support of Third Army as well
movements, clearing 196 convoys in the as the First and Ninth, and the enemy
redeployment of nearly 250,000 men. thrust into Belgium cut the direct wire
T h e evacuation of supplies got under communications between Namur and
way when the army began emptying two the Verdun–Luxembourg area. Fortu-
of its largest POL depots near Malmedy. nately the ADSEC supply complex in
directly in the path of the German drive. the south, centering at Verdun, for some
T h e evacuation of one depot, containing time had been operating fairly independ-
about 1,115,000 gallons of MT80 gaso- ently of that in the north. T h e resulting
line and allied products, began on 17 flexibility in the ADSEC organization,
December. Within forty-eight hours all plus good working relationships with the
stocks had been removed except for 12th Army Group and Third Army
124,000 gallons, which were destroyed G–4’s, permitted this partially truncated
by burning. On two occasions during the portion of the Advance Section to carry
evacuation reconnaissance elements of a out its mission during this critical period
German panzer division advanced to without direct wire communications with
within 1,000 yards of the depot. A second the main ADSEC headquarters in the
installation, containing 2,226,000 gallons, north and without changes in control
was evacuated beginning on the night or responsibility.54
of the 18th and was completely cleared Third Army’s supply installations had
without loss by the morning of the 22d.51 not been endangered, since the German
In a few cases losses could not be pre- counteroffensive was directed away from
vented. T w o ammunition supply points, the Verdun concentration, and Third
one holding 2,000 tons of ammunition Army was now assigned a major role in
and the other about 800 tons, were even- countering the enemy threat. On 18
tually overrun, although U.S. troops con- December General Patton was ordered
tinued to draw on one of them after the to turn over his right flank corps to the
enemy had already reached the opposite Seventh Army, and to reorient the Third
end of the dump. One Class I truckhead Army’s operations from the east to the
issued rations for three days under north. He was also required to take over
sporadic mortar and small arms fire, was the VIII Corps, which could no longer
abandoned, retaken, and drawn down,
be supported or controlled by the First ity of areas other than those under im-
Army as a result of the enemy break- minent danger of German attack, and
through. Third Army thereupon initi- the planning staffs of both headquarters
ated a wholesale redeployment of both immediately studied the possible effects
combat and service units, a task which which the offensive might have on the
called for the closest co-ordination of logistic structure as a whole. T h e Ant-
movements and the efficient use of trans- werp base and its line of communica-
port. Within three days of the order tions to Liege naturally ranked high in
Third Army had turned over twenty- importance because of their role in the
five miles of front to the Seventh Army, support of U.S. forces in Holland and
withdrawn two corps, and completed ad- Belgium. Next in importance were the
ministrative preparations for an offensive adjacent depot concentrations and com-
on the new axis, an accomplishment munications networks, such as Ostend–
which Colonel Whipple, chief logistical Ghent with its POL facilities; the Valen-
planner at SHAEF, characterized as one ciennes–Mons–Charleroi area with its
of the most professional performances POL depots and coal mines; Soissons,
of the entire war, easily ranking with Reims, and Verdun with their large am-
the more spectacular accomplishments of munition stocks; and the rail net north
the preceding August. New supply in- and east of the Seine. General Lee im-
stallations were opened in the general mediately ordered special defense meas-
vicinity of Luxembourg City, Longwy, ures for all vital COMZ installations and
and Esch. In an attempt to re-equip for rail bridges, defiles, and tunnels, and
units of the VIII Corps which had lost the chief engineer issued detailed in-
heavily in the initial enemy onslaught structions on security measures, includ-
Third Army exhausted its reserves of ing demolitions, for POL discharge fa-
many items.55 cilities, pipelines, pumping stations, and
Ninth Army supply installations were tank farms.57
not immediately endangered by the coun- While the Ardennes counteroffensive
teroffensive, but the army made prepa- never achieved sufficient success to en-
rations to evacuate or destroy about 100,- danger COMZ rear installations seri-
000 tons of supplies and equipment. As ously, its effect was nevertheless felt in
in First Army, deliveries were immedi- various ways. Embargoes on forward
ately halted, and levels in the forward movements and the immobilization of
areas were reduced by issue. 56 rail cars soon resulted in backlogs in the
Both the Communications Zone and ports. At Le Havre, for example, cargo
SHAEF were concerned with the secur- held in intransit storage increased by
55Whipple, op. cit., p. 24; TUSA AAR, II, G–4, 57TWX EX-76867, Lee to Sec Comdrs, 21 Dec
37–40, and II, Arty, 17; Memo, Barriger for Moses, 44, and TWX EX-78041. Lee to Sec Comdrs, 23
27 Dec 44, sub: Forward Reserves, 12 A Gp Sup- Dec 44, SHAEF AG 370.2 OVERLORD, 1945; Note by
plies, Misc, 126. Plng Stf G–3 SHAEF, 23 Dec 44, sub: Counter-
56Conquer: T h e Story of Ninth Army, 1944–45. offensive Measures (Final Draft), SHAEF G–3
pp. 121–22. 18008/PIans, 1944; COMZ G–4 History, II, 71.
PASSINGTHROUGH
SUPPLYTRUCKS Belgium, January 1945.
BASTOGNE,
186 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
133 percent by the first week in January, Advance Section by 25 percent. Forward
with the result that the port failed to reserves reached dangerously low levels
meet its discharge goals. At Antwerp during the month. By early February,
tonnages held at the port increased by however, partly as the result of better
78 percent. Some installations came un- operating conditions and partly through
der attack from the air, notably in the the special trucking operation described
Advance Section, where rail lines and in the preceding section, deliveries were
supply depots were subjected to heavy reaching record totals. 60
attacks, particularly by V–1’s. 58 On the T h e oft-repeated hope of providing lo-
whole, however, supply operations were gistic support for the 12th Army Group
not seriously disrupted, and the Commu- via the southern line of communications
nications Zone met the emergency de- was never fully realized, at least not as
mands well, marshaling transportation originally envisioned. SOLOC’s “sur-
for evacuation and troop movements, plus” consisted almost exclusively of port
and handling many special shipments via discharge capacity; the shortage of trans-
rail, truck, and air, some to meet replace- portation was as persistent a limiting
ment needs resulting from heavy losses factor in the south as in the north, and
suffered by units which bore the brunt precluded the shipment of supplies in
of the attack, some to meet the sudden large volume over the Rhône line of
demands for defense materials, such as communications for U.S. forces in the
wire and mines. north. SOLOC provided substantial as-
T h e partial embargo on forward ship- sistance, but it took the form mainly of
ments imposed at the beginning of the direct logistic support, initially of units
Ardennes battle naturally caused deliv- transferred from the 12th to the 6th
eries to the forward areas to fall off some Army Group–as, for example, the XV
in the week of 17–23 December. But Corps, which was shifted at the end of
deliveries were normal again by the last September–and later of additional divi-
week of December, and in January aver- sions brought in via Marseille rather
aged about 15,000 tons per day on the than the northern ports as originally
northern line of communications.59 intended. A shortage of service troops in
In the south, as in the north, a con-
the south eventually limited the extent
gestion of rail cars had developed in
to which SOLOC could assume supply
the forward areas early in December,
responsibility for additional combat
caused in part by hazardous winter op-
forces. Meanwhile, advantage was taken
erating conditions. In an effort to reduce
the backlog SOLOC early in January of the surplus port capacity in the south
instructed Delta Base Section to reduce to bring in vehicles, which were assem-
the tonnage allocation to Continental bled at Marseille and then driven north
with gasoline and other supplies which
had also been discharged at Marseille lem suddenly demonstrated how the
for that specific purpose. 61 elimination of one limiting factor could
create a new one and, incidentally, high-
T h e record of forwarddeliveries lighted another basic deficiency in the
echoes the story of transportation diffi- theater’s logistic structure—the lack of
culties told in Chapter V. T h e frustrat- intermediate depots. Finally, the coun-
ingly restrictive rationing system which teroffensive of December demonstrated
the transport deficiency imposed in the with dramatic force the reverberating
form of tonnage allocations obviously effect which a major tactical event could
pleased no one. T h e solution of the prob- have on movements within the entire
logistic organization.
61See below, Ch. X, Sec. 1, for a discussion of the
troop build-up via SOLOC. History of SOLOC, MS,
Not all the supply shortages which de-
II, QM, p. 3, and II, TC, p. 15; TWX BX–17993, veloped in the fall of 1944 can be attrib-
6 A Gp to COMZ, 17 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 400.3/1 uted to the transportation problem;
Supply Problems of Allied Advance: Memo, G–4
6 A Gp for Current Opns Br G–4, 27 Oct 44, sub:
many in fact persisted well beyond the
Mov From Southern France of 1,000 Tons Per Day period of transport difficulties. What
to Third Army, 6 A Gp G–4 Transportation Sec- some of these shortages were and how
tion General, I: Ltr (draft), Lord to Larkin, 23
Nov 44, EUCOM 560 AT, Transport, Vessels, and they affected operations is described in
Boats in General, II. the next three chapters.
CHAPTER VII
the next few weeks, falling to about ten 5.9 days of supply, Third Army had 4.9,
days of supply. Meanwhile advantage Ninth Army 7.9, and the Advance Sec-
was taken of the general improvement tion 15.03, the armies’ stock totaling
in transportation to rebuild forward 15,700 tons and the Advance Section’s
stocks. Reserves were rapidly rebuilt in 106,720 tons. T h e level in the Commu-
all three armies of the 12th Army Group, nications Zone at that time stood at 23
and by the first week in November actu- days and represented 289,135 tons.5
ally exceeded authorized levels, the First Aside from the tight situation in mid-
Army having built up its Class I stocks September the main problem of Class I
to the unprecedented level of nineteen supply was one of quality rather than
days. At the start of the November of- quantity. During the pursuit tactical
fensive First Army had 13.4 days of sup- conditions dictated that operational ra-
ply, Third Army 5.9, Ninth Army 9.8, tions-that is, C’s, K’s, and 10-in-1’s-
the Advance Section 4.8, and the Com- would be the principal types of rations
munications Zone 10.6. 4 consumed, particularly in the combat
Ration levels were always rather vola- zone. Consumption of operational ra-
tile, but with the exception of the tem- tions in August and September was ac-
porary interruption during the Ardennes tually about double the rate originally
counteroffensive, when First Army re- expected. Consequently theater stocks
duced its reserves by making large issues were being rapidly depleted as the pur-
and then drawing its requirements di- suit came to an end, and the issuance of
rectly from the Liège depot, the flow of operational types to certain groups, such
rations to the combat zone was relatively as prisoners of war, had to be prohibited.
smooth after transportation had become Quartermaster plans from the beginning
adequate in November. After the Ar- had called for an early shift to nonopera-
dennes battle the policy was adopted of tional, or bulk rations-that is, the B and
moving the maximum allowable reserves eventually the A ration. T h e shortage
well forward preparatory to the resump- of operational types thus constituted an
tion of the offensive. By the first week additional compelling reason for the
of February, therefore, First Army had rapid shift which the chief quartermas-
ter ordered upon the reversion to a more
static type of warfare in mid-September. 6
4 FUSA’s 13.4 days was based on a ration strength
of 400,000 men and represented 11,316 tons; cor-
responding figures for TUSA were 320,000 men and
4,353 tons, for NUSA 234,000 men and 4,107 tons, 5 Army levels were based on ration strengths of
for ADSEC 1,050,000 men and 16,556 tons, and for 400,000 in First, 450,000 in Third, and 320,000
the Communications Zone 2,057,000 and 49,483 tons in Ninth. T h e ADSEC and COMZ levels were based
exclusive of about 13,000 tons of perishables. T h e on strengths of 1,290,000 and 2,354,000 respectively.
ADSEC level was based on Advance Section’s own Total theater stocks came to 411,570 tons. 12 A G p
strength plus that of the armies, and the Com- G–4 Periodic Rpts, with attached 12 A Gp QM
munications Zone’s in turn on total theater Rpts, 12 A Gp 319.1 G–4.
strength, so that the combat forces were actually 6 For the more detailed treatment of the sub-
backed by additional stocks equal to the levels in sistence story see Charles F. Romanus et al., The
those organizations, at this time fifteen days. 12 Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War
A Gp G–4 Periodic Rpts, with attached 12 A Gp Against Germany, a volume in preparation for this
QM Rpts, 12 A Gp 319.1 G–4. series.
190 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
have raised the over-all level of balanced As a part of the program to replace the
rations to 19.7 days and the actual num- operational ration with the bulk ration
ber of rations from 17,850,000 (repre- the Quartermaster Corps in the Euro-
sented by 7.6 days) to 46,200,000 (19.7 pean theater also attempted to provide
days); an additional day's supply each perishable items, including meat, dairy
of coffee and sugar would have brought products, and fresh vegetables and fruits,
the theater level u p to 20.7, represent- with the intention of eventually convert-
ing 48,560,000 rations.8 At times this im- ing the B ration into a type A ration.
balance resulted in a drain on opera- T h e chief quartermaster had approved
tional rations, which could be ill-spared. plans to introduce perishables onto the
During the more fluid operations be- Continent as soon as possible after the
ginning in mid-December operational assault, beginning at approximately D
rations again were in great demand, and plus 30 with issues to 40 percent of the
the shortage caused Third Army to con- troops, providing 50 percent of them
serve K rations for front-line troops, lim- with items in the third month, and 60
iting issues to rear area units to 10per- percent by D plus go. Plans called for
cent of the total number of operational all troops to receive the A ration by D
rations requested. Third Army contin- plus 240. Deliveries were to be made
ued to restrict issues until late in Janu- from the United Kingdom at first, but
ary.9 the chief quartermaster hoped to have
Aside from the Ardennes interlude,
ocean-going reefers discharge directly on
steady progress was made during the fall
the Continent by the end of the second
and winter in providing bulk rations
month.
throughout the theater. By the end of
January between 85 and go percent of These plans proved far too ambitious.
all troops on the Continent were re- Planning for the introduction of perish-
ceiving either the B or A ration. T h e ables was dominated from the beginning
percentages were only slightly lower in b y the problem of providing adequate
the combat zone.10 cold storage. Providing perishables, like
delivering POL via pipeline, required a
co-operative effort. T h e Transportation
Corps was to handle reefer shipments to
8Daily QM Situation Rpt, 11Feb 45. attached to the Continent and move stocks in the
Weekly Report on Status of Supply (COMZ), 10 Communications Zone within the capa-
Feb 45, 12 A Gp 400.291 Supply Information. An-
other typical example is afforded by the reduction bilities of the rail system, the Quarter-
of Advance Section's level of rations by four days master Corps was to transport perishables
at the beginning of December because of the lack
of the salt component. 12 A Gp G–4 Periodic Rpt in the Communications Zone and to the
18, for Period 26 Nov–2 Dec 44. army areas in excess of rail capacities in
9 TUSA AAR, II, QM, 13–14. 17. refrigerated trucks, and receive, store,
10TUSA reported 84.4 percent of its troops re-
ceiving the A or B ration in January. FUSA’s con- and issue them at refrigerated ware-
sumption figures indicate that about 86 percent houses, and the Corps of Engineers was
were getting the bulk ration. TUSA AAR, II, QM,
17; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, Bk.
to construct or rehabilitate and maintain
IV. pp. 112–13. static cold-storage warehouses.
192 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
totaled only 23,600 tons at the end of in the nomenclature of the bulk ration
January 1945, the deficit (amounting to from B to A.11
37,800 tons) was partially overcome by Dehydrated foods–mostly in the form
the better use of distribution facilities. of powdered milk, eggs, and potatoes-
Improved unloading techniques and were common components of both the A
more reliable transportation schedules and B field ration, facilitating distribu-
shortened the turnaround time for rail tion and conserving shipping space for
cars. Local procurement of fresh vege- items which otherwise could not have
tables and fruits helped relieve some of been provided. In general, however, mess
the burden on both transatlantic ship- personnel were inadequately instructed
ping and on continental storage. Finally, in their use, and only cooks with imag-
an unexpected development in the use of ination and an inclination to experiment
refrigerated vans helped mightily in off- discovered formulas to make them pal-
setting the shortage of rail cars. Because atable.12
the range of their efficiency was believed
(2) POL
to be limited to about seventy-five miles,
reefer vans were expected to be used Motors as well as men had huge ap-
only for short trips in delivering perish- petites in the type of war fought in 1944.
ables from cold storage in forward areas T h e supply of POL, like that of rations,
to distribution points. Necessity eventu- felt the effects of the pursuit for several
weeks after the halt in mid-September.
ally caused them to be pressed into serv-
In general, improvement in the supply
ice €or long-distance hauls, however, and
of POLhad to await improvement in the
when their operational efficiency was
means of distribution, which meant that
proved through continued use on long
recovery was postponed until November.
hauls reaching all the way back to the Deliveries of gasoline had risen slightly
ports, the decision was made to release for a few days early in September, mak-
all refrigerated vans for such hauling, ing it possible to restore unit reserves
and to use open, nonrefrigerated trucks in some of the front-line formations. 13
for the shorter runs, such as those be- But the improvement was deceptive. By
tween Le Havre and Paris, and between the third week of September the Third
Antwerp and Namur. But mid-Decem- Army, struggling to enlarge its bridge-
ber deliveries had improved to the point heads over the Moselle, reported that it
where 90 percent of: all troops in the had less than a half day of supply on
theater were receiving perishable items. hand and that it was reinstituting
Unbalanced depot stocks continued to
distort the Class I supply picture. T h e 11Romanus et al., Quartermaster Operations in
lack of only a few components, such as the War Against Germany, Ch. VIII, pp. 20–32;
sugar, evaporated milk, or lard, often Quartermaster Supply in the ETO, II, Subsistence,
20–35. In January and February First Army re-
prevented the attainment of the desired ported that fresh meat issues averaged 1.08 meals
levels. Nevertheless, by early 1945 dis- per man per day. FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22
Feb 49. Bk. IV, p. 69.
tribution of fresh meats and vegetables 12QM Supply Opns. Gen Bd Rpt 109, p. 76.
was sufficiently good to warrant a change 13 TUSAAAR, II, G–4, 6–7.
194 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
164.2 by December. 20 Before these fig- 79 percent of all POL would have to
ures were available, however, Col. Elmer consist of MT80 gasoline alone made it
E. Barnes, the chief petroleum officer certain that requirements would exceed
of the theater, on the assumption that the original estimates. In October the
September conditions would prevail for Communications Zone estimated that
several months, recommended a substan- 8,600 tons of motor transport gasoline
tial upward revision of the planning fac- would be needed every day.22
tor. Neither the distribution nor the recep-
Late in November the theater began tion facilities of late September offered
requisitioning its future needs on the any prospects of handling such tonnages.
basis of a new factor of 217 tons per In mid-September the Major Pipeline
division slice.21Revisions in the percent- System was still far from adequate to
age breakdown of the various POL prod- move bulk POL requirements forward.
ucts were made at the same time. Pre- At that time the most advanced of the
invasion estimates had provided that 79 three pipelines was still twenty miles
percent of the total POL tonnages should short of the Seine and was dispensing at
consist of MT80 gasoline (So-octane mo- Chartres; a second line was dispensing
tor vehicle type). T h e experience of the at Domfront; the third (for aviation gas-
first few months showed that motor trans- oline) had reached Alençon. Further
port gasoline accounted for fully 90per- construction had been suspended tem-
cent of all POL products consumed. T h e porarily, and the rail tonnage required
November revisions compromised with for the movement of pipe and other con-
this statistic and raised the percentage of struction materials was sacrificed to more
MT80 to 85. urgent supply movements. This decision
While the consumption of gasoline in was almost immediately reconsidered,
September, when it averaged 6,500 tons and two daily trains were allotted for
per day, proved abnormally high in terms the movement of construction materials
of the number of divisions employed, so that the pipelines could be extended
there was not likely to be any reduction to Coubert, about ten miles beyond the
in the total tonnages required in suc- Seine, where tank storage was available.
ceeding months in view of the steady Progress thereafter was slow. One 6-
build-up. T h e fact that 90 rather than inch line reached Coubert early in Octo-
ber, but the other two lines were not
completed to that point until December.
20Romanus et al., Quartermaster Operations in Plans to extend the Major System to
the War Against Germany, p. 104; Min, Mtg, Metz, and eventually to Mainz, did not
American Petroleum Products Comm, London, 30
Jan 45, dated 2 Feb 45, EUCOM 337 Confs General,
begin to materialize until late in Janu-
III, 44. ary 1945, when construction eastward
21This was later reduced to 192 tons on the basis toward Châlons-sur-Marne was finally
of data which included the fall and winter months.
QM Supply Opns, Gen Bd Rpt 109, p. 152; Memo,
Barnes for OCQM, 26 Oct 44. sub: Supply of
MT80 and Derivatives to Far Shore, and Memo, 22Ltr, Hq COMZ to CGs Base Sec, 26 Oct 44,
Cummings for OCQM, 7 Nov 44, sub: Plng Esti- sub: Forward Shipments of MT80 Gasoline, ADSEC
mates of POL Rqmts, USFET 400.12 Petroleum. 463.7 Gasoline and Motor Oil.
196 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
PORTION
OF THE MAJORPIPELINEpassing over an improvised trestle bridge.
undertaken. Coubert consequently re- the Advance Section, the lines later be-
mained the easternmost terminus of the ing turned over to other COMZ sections
Major System through most of the win- wherever they assumed area control. T h e
ter. Completion of the three lines to resulting divided responsibility for a serv-
that point gave the Major System a total ice which, like the Red Ball Express, had
of 850 miles of pipeline. T h e Major become intersectional in its operations,
and Minor Systems combined consisted had the usual defects, and it soon became
of 950 miles of pipeline and 850,500 bar- evident that centralized control was im-
rels of 23
storage. perative if maximum efficiency was to
An important change had meanwhile be achieved. On 23 September, there-
been made in the operational control of fore, all construction and operation of
the pipelines. As intended, the pipelines the pipelines were brought under the
were constructed by engineer units of control of a single agency of the Office
of the Chief Engineer, ETO, known as
the Military Pipeline Service. Thereafter
23Monthly Rpts Construction Div OCE ETO, all pipeline troop units were attached to
ADSEC Files, 51–104; COMZ G–4 History, V, 14-15;
TWX E-46157, COMZ to SHAEF, 11 Sep 44,
the Military Pipeline Service for opera-
SHAEF SGS 800 Harbors, Opening, Use, Construc- tional control, and to the various COMZ
tion; COMZ G–4 Plant and Communications sections in which they happened to be
Diary/Jnl, 4 Oct 44, ETO Adm G–4 145C; Petro-
leum, Oil, and Lubricants, Hist R p t 13, CE ETO.
located only for supply and administra-
pp. 94–95. tion. T h e new organization permitted
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: RATIONS, POL, AND COAL 197
the chief engineer to exercise effective tanker discharge. T h e planners had fore-
unified control over all planning, con- seen this, and an additional overland
struction methods, and operation. 24 pipeline had been constructed from
T h e inadequacy of the Major and Cherbourg to Port-en-Bessin to ensure
Minor Pipeline Systems, 25 both as a the full use of the storage facilities of the
means of inland transport and as an in- Minor System, which served both U.S.
take facility, became evident as the and British forces. Port-en-Bessin pos-
weather began to worsen toward the end sessed a maximum intake capacity of
of September. Port-en-Bessin, the ter- 6,000 tons per day, but its average per-
minus of the Minor System, was particu- formance could not be counted on to
larly vulnerable because of its depend- exceed 2,000 tons. Clearance difficulties
ence on the submarine TOMBOLAS for at Cherbourg made it imperative that
Port-en-Bessin be used to its maximum
24 Final Report of the Chief Engineer, E T O , I, potential, and POL officials planned to
309; Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, Hist Rpt 13,
CE ETO, pp. 84-85; COMZ G–4 History, V, 19; keep the port in operation as long as
ADSEC G–4 Periodic Rpt for Quarter Ending 30 possible. In mid-September U.S. and
Sep 44, ADSEC 319.1 G–4 Periodic Rpts; Report
on POL Plans and Construction to 8 May 45, n.d.,
British officials allocated one third of
ADSEC Engineer Completion Rpts Bulk POL In- the port’s capacity to U.S. forces, which
stallations. included continuing the transfer of u p
25Beginning in January 1945 the combined fa- to 1,000 tons per day over the line from
cilities of the Major and Minor Systems were usu-
ally referred to as the Western System. Cherbourg. In the first week of October,
198 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
however, bad weather gave a foretaste port and forced tankersto wait offshore.
27
of future difficulties when it caused two Discharge had been rather limited all
TOMBOLA berths to be put out of action along by the fact that only one berth had
and necessitated the diversion of tankers been provided, which, located along the
to Cherbourg. Brigadier D. H. Bond, Digue de Querqueville in the exposed
chief of the G–4 Petroleum Branch at Grande Rade, was unavoidably vacant
SHAEF, foresaw that difficulties in dis- during the periods between tankers. But
charge via ship-to-shore lines might very the Communications Zone refused to
soon sharply reduce the amounts of gaso- authorize the expenditure required to
line that could be made available at provide a second berth and additional
Port-en-Bessin and warned that U.S. offloading lines which Normandy Base
forces should no longer expect a large Section requested in mid-October. 28 By
portion of the Minor System’s reduced that time POL officials had taken steps
output . 26
Although it handled 80 percent of all 27Notes on Conf, Office of the G–4 12 A Gp, 5
the gasoline brought to the Continent, Nov 44, 12 A Gp 463.7 Gasoline and Motor Oil, I;
Min, CAO Mtg, 10 Nov 44, SHAEF AG 337–14;
Cherbourg itself was proving unsatisfac- Memo, Maj J. M. D. Heald, Chief Plng and Rqmts
tory as a POL, port, for its operations Br ETO G–4 POL, for Brig Gen Weaver, 23 Oct
44, USFET Petrol Officer 400.42B Capacity for Bulk
were frequently affected by bad weather, POL on Continent.
and its capacity was limited by inade- 28With two berths Cherbourg, according to Nor-
quate intake and storage facilities. On mandy Base, might have maintained a n uninter-
the night of 4 October a small storm rupted discharge at the maximum rate of 405 tons
per hour. Another source states that the Cherbourg
destroyed eight of the ten intake lines installation could handle 500 tons per hour. Ltr,
at the Digue de Querqueville, stopping Normandy Base Section to G–4 COMZ, 17 Oct 44,
sub: POL Situation Normandy Base Sec, with Ind,
all discharge for eight hours and mate- 3 Nov 44, EUCOM 463.7 Gasoline and Motor Oil,
rially limiting it for another twenty-four. 44, IIb, and Ltr, Lt Col H. C. Ferrell, Chief Stocks
Storage facilities, which totaled about and Shipping Br G–4 Petrol Br COMZ, to ANPB.
30 Sep 44, sub: Shipping Facilities-Far Shore,
250,000 barrels for MT80 and at first USFET Petrol Office 400.42B Capacity for Bulk
appeared ample, proved inadequate. POL on Continent.
Pipeline breaks farther inland, such as T h e PLUTO project, calling for underwater
pipelines from the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg,
occurred when a flood washed out a was largely a failure. Two flexible 3-inch cables
section of the line between La Haye-du- were laid in August, but extreme difficulties were
Puits and St. Lô, slowed clearance of the encountered because of leaks and breaks, and no
gasoline was ever pumped through them. A third
line began delivering gasoline in mid-September at
26Min, Mtg, 21 A Gp, SHAEF, and E T O POL the rate of about 140 tons per day, but the total
Officials at 21 A Gp Rear Hq, 12 Sep 44, SHAEF deliveries were insignificant. In November Briga-
G–4 463.7 Gasoline and Motor Oil (General) 1945; dier Bond reported all lines broken down and
Memo, Bond for G–4 SHAEF, 22 Sep 44. sub: Pro- inoperative, and recommended the abandonment
tection of Port-en-Bessin for Winter Opns, Ltr. of the project. Memo, Bond for G–4 SHAEF, 2 3
Col. H. Goodfellow, 21 A Gp, to G–4 Petrol SHAEF, Nov 44, sub: Abandonment of PLUTO Project—
30 Sep 44, sub: Bulk Imports–MTSo, Memo, Bond Isle of Wight to Cherbourg, SHAEF G–4 463.7
for G–4 POL COMZ, 8 Oct 44, sub: Bulk Imports Gas and Motor Oil; Memo, Col Dan Gilmer for
MT80 Port-en-Bessin, and Memo, G–4 Petrol Gen Hull, 2 Nov 44, sub: Cross-Channel Pipelines,
SHAEF for Bond, 8 Oct 44, sub: Gen Info Tanker OPD Exec Office File 9; SHAEF G–4 Weekly
Position Channel Ports, all in SHAEF G–4 463.7 Logistical Summaries for 10–16 Sep, 17–23 Sep, and
Gas and Motor Oil. 8–14 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 War Diary/Jnl.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: RATIONS, POL, AND COAL 199
to develop additional bulk intake capac- and unloading into storage and decant-
ity elsewhere. T h e first relief was af- ing began immediately. Facilities at the
forded at Ostend, a British-operated port, other two ports were gradually brought
where U.S. forces were initially author- into use, and work on the various instal-
ized to draw 500 tons, later 1,000 tons, lations continued until February.
of MT80 gasoline per day. Discharge at By the end of January 1945 the Seine
Ostend began in the second week of River System, combining tanker berths
October and was uneven because of the and storage, decanting, and loading fa-
vagaries of the weather. Nevertheless, cilities at Le Havre, Petit Couronne, and
deliveries there relieved to some extent Port Jerome, was virtually complete. In-
pressure on Cherbourg. 29 cluded were two 6-inch pipelines from
Petit Couronne to Darnetal, across the
Reception and distribution facilities Seine, taken over from the British.30
were also substantially augmented by the
development of what was known as the While the development of the Seine
Seine River System, based on Le Havre River System had high priority, Allied
and, farther u p the river, Port Jerome planners counted even more heavily on
and a satellite of Rouen, Petit Couronne. Antwerp to bolster continental recep-
Both offloading and storage facilities tion capacity. T h e great Belgian port
were found relatively undamaged at Le was known to have POL facilities match-
Havre, where tankers could discharge ing those for general cargo reception.
either into smaller tanker vessels for Storage capacity alone totaled 2,600,000
transshipment to Rouen, or into shore barrels and was captured virtually un-
storage, whence bulk POL could either damaged. A survey of the port in Sep-
be delivered to Port Jerome through an tember revealed that only minor alter-
existing 10-inch pipeline, or shipped out ations would be required to provide the
via rail or truck. necessary tank truck and tank car load-
Plans were immediately made to de- ing facilities. Antwerp's value was to be
velop Le Havre’s discharge capacity to further enhanced by the construction of
5,000 tons per day, 3,000 of which were pipelines which were eventually to de-
to be shipped to Port Jerome, via the liver bulk gasoline across the Rhine.
pipeline. Engineers of the Military Pipe- Plans which the Military Pipeline Serv-
line Service began rehabilitating existing ice submitted to the COMZ G–4 in Sep-
facilities in mid-October, starting with tember called for laying one 6-inch and
unloading lines and storage at Le Havre, four 4-inch lines from Antwerp to Ko-
and clearing the pipeline to Port Jer-
30Monthly Reports Construction Div OCE ETO,
ome. T h e pipeline was not placed in Sep 44–Jan 45, ADSEC Records; Memo, Bond for
operation until December, but Le Havre G–4 SHAEF, 27 Oct 44, sub: Dev of Port of
received its first tanker on 31 October, Le Havre, Seine River, and Rouen for Bulk POL,
and Memo, Lord for Crawford, 29 Oct 44, sub:
Dev of Bulk POL Import Facilities at Le Havre
29 SHAEF G–4 War Diary/Jnl, Petrol Br, 8 Oct and Along the Seine River, EUCOM 463.7 Gaso-
44; COMZ
G–4 History,22; Quartermaster Supply line and Motor Oil. 1944, IIb: SHAEF G–4 War
in the European Theater of Operations, QM School. Diary/Jnl, 9, 17, and 27 Oct 44: History of the
Camp Lee, Va., IV, Fuels and Lubricants, 46. Channel Base Section, I, 148, ETO Adm 588.
200 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
POL STORAGETANKS,
used by the Americans, Petit Couronne, France, December 1944.
blenz. Subsequent alterations in the plan Work on the pipeline did not begin
named Cologne as the eastern terminus, until 8 December, more than a week
and finally Wesel, much farther north. after the port opened. Construction then
T h e COMZ G–4 approved the plans started simultaneously at several points
for the Antwerp, or Northern, System, along the route, and the lines were com-
as it was called, early in October and pleted to Maastricht by the end of Janu-
instructed the Military Pipeline Service ary, where dispensing of both MT80
to proceed with construction immedi- and aviation gasoline began early the
ately, although there was as yet no pros- next month. Construction was suspended
pect of receiving POL through Antwerp at that point, and Maastricht remained
because the Schelde estuary had not yet the eastern terminus of the Northern
been cleared. Construction was initially System until early in March, when the
held up for lack of materials and equip- extension of the lines northeastward was
ment, but work finally got under way on undertaken. In a minor switch from
loading facilities in Antwerp with the original plans the 6-inch line was even-
arrival of equipment via rail from Cher- tually used for MT80 and two of the
bourg and through the loan of additional 4-inch lines for aviation gasoline. POL
equipment from 21 Army Group. T h e facilities at Antwerp, like cargo-handling
first tanker berthed at Antwerp on 3 facilities, were used jointly by U.S. and
December. British forces, T h e Communications
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: RATIONS, POL, AND COAL 201
Zone had at first bid for 675,000 of the of its requirements in bulk via tank
2,600,000 barrels of storage. By January trucks and tank cars and doing its own
1945 U.S. forces had been allocated a decanting into 5-gallon cans. Third Army
totalof 950,000 barrels.
31Intake of the for a while got most of its gasoline pack-
system eventually averaged more than aged and by rail, but eventually it also
30,000 barrels per day, some of which was set up its own decanting points. Inade-
pumped forward for decanting at Maas- quate decanting facilities at the pipe-
tricht, and later at Wesel.32 heads and other shortcomings of the pipe-
T h e need for additional intake and line also made it necessary to ship gaso-
storage facilities was paralleled by a simi- line, both in bulk and in cans, by rail
lar requirement for more adequate from Cherbourg. 35
means of distribution, of which the pipe-
lines were only a part. T h e ideal method T h e entire distribution problem was
of distribution, as contemplated in POL severely aggravated in October by a grow-
plans, called for the reception and for- ing shortage of 5-gallon cans. T h e lowly
warding of gasoline in bulk to storage “jerrican,”so named by the British, who,
facilities in the Communications Zone, followed by the Americans, had copied
and retail distribution, particularly to the German container after discovering
combat elements, in 5-gallon cans.33 its superior merits, had a role in gasoline
All decanting from bulk and packag- supply hardly suggested by its size.36
ing was intended to be carried out by Gasoline might be shipped from the port
the Communications Zone. But the via pipeline, tank car, or tank truck; but
speed of the pursuit, the lag in pipeline it had to be delivered in packaged form
construction, the condition of the rail- to the ultimate consumer. In the last
ways, and the shortage of 5-gallon cans analysis, therefore, the retail distribution
all combined to upset these intentions.34
In mid-September First and Third Arm-
ies were receiving gasoline mainly by 35Quartermaster Supply in the ETO, IV, Lubri-
cants, 44-43; Study G–4 SHAEF, 28 Sep 44, sub:
trucks hauling from the pipeheads at Mov of POL, SHAEF G–4 463.7 Gas and Motor
Chartres and Alençon to Soissons and Oil, III; History of G–4 POL, Normandy Base
Section Hist Rpts, pp. 3–4, ETO Adm.
Sommesous. By the end of the month 36T h e US.-developed container, sometimes re-
First Army was receiving a large portion ferred to as the “ameri-can” was also essentially a
copy of the German can except for the closure.
T h e jerrican had a simple locked-cap, cam-operated
31Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, Hist R p t 13, spout; the ameri-can had a larger opening with a
CE ETO, pp. 99–105; Monthly Rpts Construction screw cap, to which a flexible nozzle was supposed
Div OCE ETO, ADSEC Files. to be attached for pouring. Quartermaster officials
32Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, II, designed the American container in the belief that
APP. 33–C–4. the gas tank openings on U.S. vehicles, which were
33The 55-gallon drum was never considered sat- either countersunk or flush with the body, could be
isfactory for retaildistribution because of its weight reached only with a nozzle attachment. But com-
and bulk, and its use was therefore kept to a mini- bat experience actually proved this to be its greatest
mum on the northern lines of communications. defect. Nozzles were easily, lost and were difficult
Many cases of hernia were attributed to the at- to replace. Lacking them, or preferring not to
tempts to manhandle the awkward 55-gallon drum. bother with them, drivers often wasted gasoline
QM Supply Opns, Gen Bd Rpt 109, p. 139. through spilling. Quartermaster Supply in the
34QM Supply Opns, Gen Bd R p t 109, pp. 139–40. ETO, IV, 29.
202 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
THOUSANDS OF JERRICANS are filled from railroad tank cars at a decanting area,
Belgium, December 1944.
of gasoline depended in large part on an with the understanding that they would
adequate supply of 5-gallon cans. be turned over to the ground forces after
U.S. forces had built up a stock of their first trip in accordance with the
about 12,000,000 cans before the Nor- practice of using them only once for
mandy invasion. But this number was aviationfuel.37A large portion of U.S.
expected to suffice only for the initial can requirements had already been met
stages of continental operations. Quar- by British production, in part through
termaster planners subsequently con- the shipment of an American plant to
cluded that about 800,000 new cans per England early in 1943.38
month would be required to cover losses Tactical developments in the first three
(estimated at 5 percent per month after months were largely responsible for up-
D plus 60) and to maintain a can popu-
lation commensurate with the troop 37Ltr, Cummings to Gen Peckham, 19 Sep 44,
build-up. T h e chief quartermaster ac- sub: Reqmts for 5-Gallon Blitz Cans, USFET 458.11
Cans 1945–45; Romanus et al., Quartermaster Op-
cordingly placed an order with the Brit- erations in the War Against Germany, Ch. VIII,
ish War Office for nearly 4,500,000 cans 98–99.
to be supplied from U.K. manufacture 38The plant had been set up in Middlesex and
was operated by the firm of Magnatex Limited
by the end of 1944. Nearly 2,000,000 under the control of the Ministry of Supply. Quar-
of them were intended for the air forces termaster Supply in the ETO, IV, 30–31.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: RATIONS, POL, AND COAL 203
setting the chief quartermaster’s plans U.S. forces had counted on as their main
for supplying an adequate number of source after D Day, the British War
jerricans. T h e rapid advance, in addi- Office first advised that it could allocate
tion to increasing the consumption of only 221,000 cans per month to the Amer-
POL, had, by placing Allied forces far icans against the request for 500,000,
beyond planned phase lines, resulted in and subsequently expressed a desire to
a much longer turnaround time-that is, retrain the entire U.K. output for Brit-
the time required to fill, forward, and ish forces.41 In mid-September
the
return cans-than that on which the re- chief quartermaster therefore reluctantly
quired supply of cans had been based.39 turned to the War Department to meet
T h e loss of cans had also been much the theater’s needs, placing a requisition
higher than expected. Retail distribution for 7,000,000 cans. T h e War Depart-
of gasoline in the early phases had been ment offered to provide only 5,400,000
based on the principle of exchanging a of this number. All but two can-produc-
full can for an empty one. Units were ing plants in the United States had been
permitted to draw 100 full cans only closed down, it explained, and it did not
by turning in an equal number of favor reopening idle plants and drawing
empties. This simple but essentially labor away from other urgent produc-
sound SOP was widely disregarded in tion. It would be much more economical,
the heat of the pursuit, resulting in a the War Department suggested, to in-
trail of abandoned or discarded jerricans crease going production in the United
stretching from Normandy to the West Kingdom. 42
Wall. Hundreds of thousands lay in aban- Can production was one of the several
doned dumps and bivouacs; thousands fields in which the United States and
more had been used to build sidewalks Britain eventually found it necessary to
in the mud, or as chairs, and for hun- collaborate closely. Early in the fall,
dreds of other purposes not intended: when it became apparent that require-
others had found their way into French ments were outrunning production facil-
homes. By mid-October the chief quar- ities, British and U.S. officials in Wash-
termaster noted that 3,500,000 could not ington agreed to set up an Allied Con-
be accounted for.40 tainer Advisory Committee to co-ordi-
Meanwhile two of the sources of sup- nate more closely the collection of infor-
ply showed signs of drying up. T h e air mation on requirements and potential
forces had given notice that they could sources of supply and to allocate pro-
not ensure the return of their quota of duction. Late in November, apparently
cans, stating that they were needed for as a result of the committee’s initial
static reserves because of the depletion
of current working stocks. As for pro- 41 Ltr, Cummings to Peckham, 19 Sep 44.
curement in the United Kingdom, which 42 Cbl,ETO to AGWAR, 19 Sep 44 Cbls, ANPB
to COMNAVEU, 19 and 23 Sep 44, Cbl, E T O to
AGWAR, 30 Sep 44, and Cbl CR–1351, ANPB to
39Original plans had been based on a seven-day ETO, 7 Oct 44, all in USFET 463.72 Ground
turnaround. British planners had used a more Force Gasoline, II; Ltr, Barnes to War Office, 21
realistic thirteen-day factor. Oct 44, sub: Supply of Returnable Cans From U.S.,
40Quartermaster Supply in the ETO, IV, 33. USFET 458.1 Containers 1942–45.
204 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
in November. The improvement in POL underscored. One 12th Army Group staff
supply generally paralleled the bright- officer expressed the sentiment of all
ening of the entire supply picture occa- army quartermasters when he noted that
sioned by the opening of Le Havre and “if ever Com Z desired to endear itself
Rouen and the improvement in trans- with the Armies,” one means of doing so
portation. Le Havre possessed four tank- would be to give advance information
er berths, but work was required on of shipments. 54
storage and rail clearance facilities be- T h e opening of Antwerp at the end
fore the port’s full potential could be of November finally gave the desired
realized. Gasoline was at first shuttled flexibility to the POL distribution sys-
up the Seine to Rouen, where tank trucks tem by providing additional intake ca-
were used for clearance. pacity on short lines of communication.
Early in the month the Communica- Although the projected pipelines from
tions Zone stopped shipping jerricans all that port to Maastricht had not yet been
the way back to Cherbourg, thus cutting constructed, both intake and inland
down on their turnaround time and alle- transportation were now quite adequate
viating the can shortage. Except for to meet all Allied needs in the near fu-
movements through the pipelines all ture. With the opening of Antwerp to
shipments out of Cherbourg henceforth POL tankers, distribution of MT80 gaso-
were made in bulk via rail tank car. line was accomplished roughly as fol-
At the same time the Advance Section lows: most of the gasoline discharged at
took steps to provide bulk storage in the Antwerp found its way either to First or
forward areas. T h e largest depots were Ninth Army, or to the Advance Section
established at Liège, which served First for its own use, a large portion of it be-
Army, Luetterode, which served the ing sent in bulk via rail tank car, the
Ninth, and in the vicinity of Verdun, remainder going by way of the Liege
which served the Third. T h e Advance storage depot, where it was first pack-
Section eventually took over decanting aged. The U.S. allocation at Ostend had
from the armies. T h e attempts by the the same destination, being piped to
armies to fill their own cans had not Ghent, then forwarded in bulk by rail
proved entirely successful. Dispensers to Liege, where it was also packaged be-
were initially lacking and often operated fore delivery to using units. Most of the
inefficiently, and the arrival of bulk gasoline entering the Continent at Cher-
trains was highly unpredictable. As an bourg eventually went to Third Army or
example, Col. Andrew T. McNamara, to the Advance Section, going forward
the First Army quartermaster, reported via pipeline to Coubert, and the remain-
that on a single day 109 tank cars had ing distance either in bulk by rail or to
arrived at the First Army railhead with-
out warning. In the absence of adequate 54Memo, Col K. R. Bendetsen, 12 A Gp, to
COMZ Ln Off, 8 Nov 44. sub: Advance TWX No-
dispensing facilities, tank cars, always in tice of Rail Shipments, 12 A Gp 463.7 Gasoline
short supply, consequently were immo- and Motor Oil, I; TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts for
Nov; ADSEC Operations History, p. 121; Notes on
bilized. Once more the desirability of POL Conf, Office of G–4 12 A Gp, 5 Nov 44, 12
getting advance notice of shipments was A Gp 463.7 Gasoline and Motor Oil, I.
208 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
First Army and the Advance Section ties than that of any other item. Coal
which lay directly in the path of the of- was needed for a variety of purely mili-
fensive. Fortunately the First Army’s tary purposes, including space heating,
two main POL dumps in the vicinity of cooking, and hot water, for coffee roast-
Spa and Stavelot, containing 12,300 tons ing, static bakeries, bath units, and laun-
of gasoline, were successfully evacuated, dries, and above all for hospitals and for
and about half of all the POL products the railways. In addition, it was needed
in the ADSEC depot at Liège, under to provide minimum essential public
attack from V–1’s, was also loaded and utilities for the civilian population.
moved back. The Advance Section lost The supply of coal, like that of POL,
about 900,000 gallons of gasoline as the was a responsibility of the Quartermas-
result of fires started by German planes ter Corps, which procured, stored, and
on two successive nights, and First Army issued the fuel to using forces on the
destroyed a small quantity to prevent basis of established priorities and allow-
its capture. But on the whole losses ances. Like POL, coal was a “common-
were small. user” item, but its supply was handled
In view of the close proximity of somewhat differently because of the
reserves from which the armies could source of procurement. All coal used
draw, no attempt was made to maintain by the Allied forces had to come from
authorized levels. First Army, which had Britain or be procured locally on the
reserves of nearly 3,500,000 gallons on Continent. Supreme Headquarters there-
the eve of the attack, allowed its on-hand fore exercised a closer control over the
stocks to drop to less than 400,000 gal- use of coal, screening both military and
lons at the end of December, both civilian requests, and allocating fuel to
through issues and evacuation. Mean- using agencies on the basis of priorities
while all forward shipments were and availability. For this purpose a Solid
stopped, and most trains of bulk prod- Fuels Section had been set up within
ucts were halted and decanted at Charle- the Petrol and Fuel Branch, G–4, of
roi. First Army continued to maintain SHAEF in March 1944. T h e G–4 of the
a reserve of only about one day of supply Communications Zone eventually also
in January as it continued to reduce organized a separate Coal Section within
the “bulge.” But POL again began to its Movements Branch to assemble all
flow into Liège during the month, and U.S. coal requirements, to co-ordinate
decanting was resumed there. By early procurement, shipment, unloading, stor-
February the distribution of POL had age, and distribution, and to maintain
returned
to normal. 57 liaison with Supreme Headquarters on
coal 58
matters.
(3) Coal Supreme Headquarters estimated that
The supply of solid fuels was probably
more consistently plagued with difficul- 58QM Supply Opns, Gen Bd Rpt 109, p. 163;
COMZ G–4 History, V, 2; Col. W. R. Gordon,
57ADSEC Operations History, pp. 12 1-22; COMZ Deputy Chief, Solid Fuels Section, SHAEF, “Coal
G–4 History, V, 24-25; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug in War,” T h e Journal of the Royal United Service
44–28 Feb 45, Bk. IV, pp. 67, 72. Institution, XCI (November, 1946), 564.
210 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
the total Allied requirement for coal in the result of bad weather. I n the first five
the first three months on the Continent days of September Channel storms de-
would be about 111,000tons. Since the layed shipping and no coal was available
landings were to take place far from the at all for discharge at Cherbourg. Shortly
French coal fields, this requirement had thereafter a shortage of rail cars became
to be met entirely through imports from the bottleneck, holding discharge to a
the United Kingdom. In fact, the pre- fraction of the 2,500 tons per day which
D-Day forecast of operations and the Cherbourg was planned to handle. Port
expectation that the Germans would de- discharge capacity was generally unsatis-
stroy mine shafts as they had in World factory. Caen lacked adequate crane fa-
War I made it unlikely that the Allies cilities; Granville, which was planned to
would be able to draw on continental serve almost exclusively as a coal port,
resources until much later. OVERLORDwas still not ready to receive shipping,
plans provided that until D plus 41 all and did not open until the end of the
coal (about 14,000 tons) would be month; and the shortage of shallow-draft
shipped to the Continent in eighty- shipping limited the use of the smaller
pound sacks. Thereafter shipments Brittany ports like St. Brieuc. T h e result
would be made in bulk, with Caen (in was that only a fraction of the current
the British sector), Granville, and the import target of 6,000 tons was being
minor Brittany ports handling most of achieved. 60
the discharge.59 T h e poor import prospects made it
Receipts lagged from the very start. all the more imperative that local pro-
T h e first sacked coal was not unloaded duction of coal be restored as quickly
at UTAHBeach until early in July, and as possible. Early in September members
Cherbourg did not begin to receive ship- of the Solid Fuels Section of SHAEF
ments until later in the month. Fortu- made a reconnaissance of the recently
nately the need for coal was not great uncovered Nord and Pas-de-Calais coal
during the first months. By the end of fields to survey the stock position of coal
August, however, three developments above ground and to determine the con-
had made the supply of coal an increas- dition and the productive capacity of the
ingly urgent problem: a tremendous ex- mines, their supply requirements, and
pansion in rail traffic had begun; Paris, transportation factors in making coal
captured earlier than planned, required available. They found approximately
coal for its utilities; and cold weather 1,000,000 metric tons of coal in ground
was approaching. By early September it stockpiles, another 15,000 tons in loaded
became clear that Allied needs would cars, and about 100,000 tons on barges
not be met by shipments from the which were landlocked in various north-
United Kingdom. Imports had already ern French canals as the result of de-
fallen far behind schedule, in part be- stroyed bridges and other damage. Only
cause of inadequate discharge capacity about 100,000 tons of these stocks were
and a shortage of rail cars, but also as
60Min, Coal Conf Held at the Hotel Crillon,
59 Quartermaster Supply in the ETO, IV, Fuels Paris, 16 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 337 Conf, 1944;
and Lubricants, 70; COMZ E-4 History, V, 3. Gordon, op. cit., p. 564; COMZ G–4 History, V, 3.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: RATIONS, POL, AND COAL 211
of the quality suitable for locomotives that both port discharge capacity and
and gas plants, the types which were shipping were urgently needed to handle
most urgently needed. Production, which other supplies. Moreover, U.K. produc-
before the war had achieved a maximum tion was already strained to the utmost,
of 100,000 tons per day, had recently and, in any event, larger quantities of
dropped to 30,000 tons owing to several locomotive coal could not be made avail-
causes, including a lack of pitwood, able from that source. Consequently the
labor unrest, and inadequate transporta- Allies were now forced to depend largely
tion. But the condition of the mines was on continental resources. Coal and rail-
generally good, rail connections with way wagons had become munitions of
Paris had been restored, there was an war, and in view of their scarcity the
adequate supply of competent labor, and provision and movement of coal for
officials were optimistic about solving the civilian purposes had to be kept to the
labor difficulties. T h e big need was tim- barest minimum.62
ber for pit props, of which there was T h e procurement and distribution of
only a ten-day supply on hand. 61 coal was rapidly assuming the propor-
At the conclusion of the survey tions of a big business. T o administer
SHAEF took immediate steps to pro- the program more adequately SHAEF
mote the fullest possible exploitation reorganized and reinforced the staff deal-
of indigenous resources in the liberated ing with the problem, combining G–5’s
countries and prepared to exercise com- coal section with the Solid Fuels Section
plete control over the allocation of coal of G–4 and thus adding qualified mining
for both military and civilian needs. On engineers to the staff. T h e headquarters
11 September General Eisenhower asked was organized along functional lines to
the SHAEF Mission to France to re- deal with production, requirements,
quest the French Government to pro- shipping, internal transport, distribu-
vide as much coal as necessary to meet tion, and statistics. Subsections were
the needs of the Allied forces in France eventually created for each liberated
on the basis of the recently negotiated country and for Germany. Within six
reciprocal aid agreement, and to grant months the section had a strength of
to the Supreme Commander full author- over 400 British, American, French,
ity to establish priorities for the supply Belgian, and Dutch officers and men. Its
and transportation of coal during the principal missions were to effect a cen-
period of military operations and for tralized control over the procurement
about three months after the cessation and distribution of solid fuels, both to
of hostilities. Similar requests were made military and civil agencies, to keep im-
to the Dutch and Belgian Missions with- ports to a minimum, and to bring about
in the next few days. In making the re- the fullest possible exploitation of the
quest the Supreme Commander noted
62Ltr, SAC to French Mission, 11 Sep 44, sub:
61 Rpt of Reconnaissance of the Nord and Pas-de- French Coal Resources in Allied Expeditionary
Calais Coal fields by Members of the Solid Fuels Force Zone, SHAEF G–4 Coal 137/10 GDP–1. The
Sec, Current Opns Br G–4 SHAEF, 7–11 Sep 44, letters to the Belgian and Dutch Missions were
SHAEF G–4 337 Conf 1944, III. dated 13 and 14 September respectively.
212 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
indigenous resources of the liberated time. Damaged rail bridges and the lack
and occupied areas. Fulfilling these mis- of rail cars now made overland move-
sions required, among other things, that ments difficult, and Marseille lacked the
the section collect fuel requirements proper discharge facilities. As in the
from all the military formations and na- north, there were plenty of coaster
tional authorities, that it screen essential berths but no coasters. Late in Novem-
civil requirements for public utilities ber the British War Office agreed to
and essential industries, that it allocate meet at least a part of southern France’s
fuels after evaluating these needs, and critical need by shipping 25,000 tons
that it take whatever measures were from the United Kingdom.65
necessary, such as requesting mine sup- Continental coal production made
plies and machinery, to increase the pro- some gains during the fall, but was
of coal.63
duction plagued by endless difficulties. In south-
Neither imports nor local production ern France production rose to nearly 70
improved sufficiently to meet the rising percent of normal in November, and in
requirements in the months which fol- an effort to achieve a higher measure
lowed, and the entire coal picture there- of self-sufficiency Allied authorities
fore remained dark. In October unload- rushed repairs on the Tarascon-Beau-
ings came to only about one third of the caire bridge across the Rhône so that
required imports. Early in the month the coal from the southern fields could be
primary cause was the lack of rail cars used on the Rhône line of communica-
to clear the ports. A few weeks later bad tions. T h e southern mines used prisoners
weather was given as the main reason of war with satisfactory results.66
for discharge targets not being met, par- In both the south and north the most
ticularly at Granville and St. Brieuc.64 persistent bottleneck in mining opera-
In southern France, where logistic sup- tions was the shortage of pitwood, of
port depended almost exclusively on the which approximately one ton was needed
military railways over a line of commu- for every thirty tons of coal produced.
nications more than 400 miles in length, Early in the fall SHAEF gave the Com-
the shortage of fuel was especially crit- munications Zone the responsibility for
ical. Stocks dwindled to an eight-day arranging an adequate supply of mine
supply in November. Locomotive coal timber, and the Communications Zone
had always been a problem there; it had in turn dealt directly with French re-
been imported from abroad and from gional authorities. Transportation, as
the northern French fields even in peace-
65Min, Mtg at Versailles on problem of transfer
63Gordon, op. cit., p. 565; SHAEF Stf Memo 119, of solid fuels responsibility for southern France
24 Oct 44. sub: Functions and Responsibilities of from AFHQ to SHAEF, 25 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 337
Solid Fuels Sec, SHAEF, SHAEF SGS 463.3 Coal Conferences, III; Rpt on Survey of the Southern
Supply, I. French Coal Situation, G–4 SHAEF, 2–10 Nov 44,
64TWX S–61191, SHAEF to COMZ, 6 Oct 44, SHAEF AG 463.3 Coal, Case A, I; Cbl S–66487,
SHAEF SGS 463.3 Coal Supply, I; Rpt of Allied- SHAEF to War Office, 12 Nov 44, TWX BWRT41,
French Working Party, 20 Oct 44. SHAEF G–4 21 A Gp to SHAEF, 21 Noy 44, and Cbl 95956Q
Coal 137/10 GDP–1; Min, 17th Mtg, Subcommittee (Ops) 2, War Office to SHAEF, 22 Nov 44, all in
at MOWT on Shipment of Bulk Coal to OVERLORD SHAEF SGS 463.3 Coal Supply, I.
Area, 7 Nov 44, SHAEF G–4 337 Conferences, III. 66 COMZ G–4 History, V, 6.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: RATIONS, POL, AND COAL 213
usual, was one of the major stumbling livery of fuel wood during the fall and
blocks, and in many cases the Commu- winter months. Two logging camps be-
nications Zone had to make trucks,gas- gan operating in the Foret de Cerisy in
oline, or tires available to pitwood con- Normandy as early as September, em-
tractors.67 ploying prisoner of war labor, and addi-
During the winter coal production tional camps were eventually established
and, in turn, transportation were ad- in the Brittany, Loire, and Oise Sections.
versely affected by both bad weather and T h e project was not a spectacular suc-
labor unrest. Lack of adequate foods cess. The program was complicated by a
and clothing led to widespread strikes, lack of tools, equipment, and transporta-
particularly in the Belgian mines, where tion, by the necessity to provide housing
production fell off 40 percent in January for prisoners, by the inaccessibility of
1945.68Severe winter weather added to many of the camps, and, in addition, by
the difficulties that month. Coal deliv- unsatisfactory co-operation from civilian
eries to Paris, a large portion of which authorities. At the end of January 1945
normally were made by water, fell to barely 36,000 cords of an original re-
12,000 tons per day against a minimum quirement of 1,000,000 had been pro-
requirement of 20,000, in part because duced. Considering the labor expended
barge movements were blocked by ice, in the production of a cord of wood, its
and in part because of the shortage of fuel value, and the transportation in-
locomotives. I n mid-January the director volved, as compared with the effort re-
general of the French railways reported quired in the production of coal, the
that 646 trains were delayed for lack endeavor was hardly economic. An at-
of motive power. 69 tempt to supplement the meager supply
As early as the summer of 1944 the of solid fuels by the production of peat
prospects of coal shortages had led Gen- was found to be even less worthwhile
eral Littlejohn to urge the use of wood and was abandoned after a month of
as fuel wherever it could be substituted cutting in Normandy. 70
for coal. Early in the fall the Procure- Although coal imports more nearly
ment Division of the chief quartermas- equaled the targets in February 1945,
ter's office made detailed arrangements combined imports and indigenous pro-
with French, Belgian, and Luxembourg duction never sufficed to meet the mini-
authorities for the production and de- mum essential civilian and military
needs during the winter of 1944–45. 71
67 Ibid., p. 8; Quartermaster Supply in the ETO, SHAEF normally allocated only 65 to
IV, 76; TWX, SHAEF Mission to Belgium to 70 percent of the amounts requested by
SHAEF G–4, 6 Jan 45, SHAEF SGS 463.3 Coal U.S. forces, and deliveries rarely ex-
Supply, I; Rpt of Mtg of Allied-French Working
Party, 11 Oct 44, dated 14 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 ceeded 50 percent of the total needs.
337 Conferences 1944. Conservation measures adopted in the
68Cbl R–57441, ADSEC to G–4 COMZ, 31 Jan 45,
ETO Adm 406, ETO Cbls; CAO Mtg, 2 Feb 45,
SHAEF AG 337–2 CAO Mtgs, 1945. 70
Quartermaster Supply in the ETO, IV, 73. 85–
69 Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VI (Jan-Mar 45), OCofT, 88; QM Supply Opns, Gen Bd Rpt 109, p. 162.
142A; TWX S–75146, SHAEF to COMZ et al., 15 71CAO Mtg, 9 Mar 45, SHAEF AG 337–2 CAO
Jan 45, SHAEF SGS 463.3 Coal Supply, I. Mtgs, 1945.
214 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
fall of 1944 consequently had to be hours of gas and electricity each day. 72
strictly enforced. Original allowances for
space heating were cut in half, and the 72 The original cold-weather factor of eight
pounds per man per day was reduced to four.
use of coal for utilities in cities such as Quartermaster
Supplyin the ETO, IV, 75; COMZ
Paris was rationed to permit only a few G–4 History, V, 7.
CHAPTER VIII
1TUSA AARs, Sep, p. 59. and Oct, p. 55–56. 2TUSA AAR, II, Sig, 10.
216 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
per day, which were being met to the mud–which made some of the stocks i n
extent of only 30 miles. 3 the Normandy depots inaccessible. 4
I n the engineer service the shortage T h e shortage of paper also proved a
of bridging provided an example of un- major engineer supply problem, for the
expected demand arising from the ar- demand for maps exceeded all expecta-
mies’ advanced positions. Third Army tions. French paper stocks were far from
successively crossed the Marne, Meuse, adequate, and engineers eventually
and Moselle in addition to smaller printed about 10,000,000 maps on the
streams in September, and in that one reverse side of captured German maps. 5
month built 52 treadway, 6 heavy pon- I n the quartermaster service clothing,
ton, 2 infantry support, 170 timber tentage, and mess equipment, including
trestle, and 67 Bailey bridges. Demoli- stoves, were the most persistent short-
tions were more and more extensive as ages. T h e supply of quartermaster Class
the advance slowed down, and in the II and IV items, like that in the other
area of the XII Corps, southeast of services, first presented difficulties i n
Châlons, all bridges over the main August with the inability of transporta-
streams had to be reconstructed. tion to meet the demands growing out
Shortages of tactical bridging made it of the unexpected tactical developments.
imperative that Bailey bridges be re- Class II and IV supplies were relegated
placed as rapidly as possible by more to positions low on the priority list as
permanent structures so that the tactical long as gasoline, rations, and ammuni-
bridging could be shipped forward tion remained the more urgent needs.
and reused. Although relatively small I n September, of 54,200 tons offloaded
amounts of tactical bridging were in the ports, only 15,400 were cleared,
needed in October, when operations al- leaving a backlog of nearly 40,000 tons.
most came to a standstill, both First and By December the backlog had grown to
Third Armies took the opportunity to 88,600 tons. 6 Of a total average lift of
replace temporary bridges with more 4,076 tons allocated to the First Army
permanent timber structures. To meet in September, only 102 tons were ear-
the requirements for lumber for this marked for quartermaster Class II and
purpose Third Army alone placed con- IV supplies, and the average daily de-
tracts with twenty-one French mills. Late livery during the month was only 39
in October the armies again called for tons.7
large shipments of bridging and stream-
crossing equipment in preparation for 4TUSA AAR, II, Engr, 6, 10; Ltr, NUSA to 12
a possible break-through to the Rhine A Gp, 4 Nov 44, sub: Supply of Stream-Crossing
Equipage, with Inds, 12 A Gp to COMZ, 6 Nov
in the coming offensive. By that time the 44, and COMZ to 12 A Gp, 24 Nov 44, EUCOM
forward shipment of supplies had been 475, Equipment of Troops, River Crossings.
complicated by an additional factor- 5 COMZ G–4, History, I, 51–52.
6Q M Supply Opns on the Continent, Sec. IV of
Study, Supply of Winter Clothing to ETO, prep
for Col Charles Garside by the CQM ETO, 17 Apr
3 TUSA AAR, II, Sig, 11-13; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 45, with supporting papers as exhibits, in ASF, Dir
1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, Bk. III, p. 178; SUSA Rpt of of Mat, Pur Div.
Opns, III, 878; COMZ G–4 History, I, 51–52. 7FUSA AAR, 1–30 Sep 44. p. 59.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 217
ater G–4 on plans for shipping clothing monious intraservice squabbles of the
from the United Kingdom to the Con- entire war, and finally led to an inves-
tinent and for its movement to the tigation.13
forward areas. T h e operation finally got T h e Washington Post article had
under way in the first week of October, given due recognition to such factors as
and on the 13th General Littlejohn the abnormal severity of the 1944–45
announced that the winter clothing and winter in Europe, the unexpectedly high
equipment then available in the theater attrition of clothing during the summer
had been delivered to the armies. Ap- and fall, and the unfortunate habits of
proximately 6,500 tons of clothing over- American soldiers regarding the proper
shoes, blankets, and other equipment fitting of clothing. But the article struck
were moved forward, 41 percent of it a sensitive spot in implying that the
by air. 12 theater had placed its orders too late to
ensure adequate early winter protection
(2) The Case of the Winter Uniform against wet cold weather and that it had
Transportation was only one aspect failed to adopt combat-tested items rec-
of the winterization problem. Behind ommended by the War Department.
this problem lay more basic shortcom- Most of the controversy over winter
ings, particularly with respect to winter clothing centered on these two closely
clothing. Viewed in retrospect, it is clear related points.14
that planning and decision-making in U.S. forces had already experienced
both the War Department and the the- the distress of operating without ade-
ater, as well as co-ordination between quate clothing. I n the winter of 1943–44
the two, left something to be desired. the Fifth Army in Italy had found the
A controversy eventually developed
over winter clothing that involved ques-
tions of both quality and quantity. In- 13T h e Washington Post article, written by George
adequacies of the winter uniform in Connery and titled “U.S. Western Front Clothing:
A Factual Report,” appeared on 18 February 1945.
Europe on both counts were several Dispatches from other correspondents in Europe
times brought to the attention of the had appeared in various papers beginning in Oc-
public via the newspapers. Critical ar- tober, implying criticism of the War Department,
and had caused General Somervell to ask the
ticles appearing in January and Febru- theater for explanations. Cbl 4102, Somervell to
ary 1945—particularly one in the Wash- Lee, 14 Oct 44, CofS ASF, ETO 1944; Cbl WAR–
ington Post—finally evoked an angry 24746, AGWAR to Somervell, 23 Jan 45, ETO Cbls,
ETO Adm 405; Cbl WAR-38662, AGWAR to Lee,
blast from General Littlejohn, who 17 Feb 45, ETO Adm 408; Ltr, Littlejohn to Somer-
charged that a malicious campaign had vell, 2 Mar 45, Hq ASF, Somervell file, ETO 1945.
been launched to discredit him. T h e 14A follow-up article, written by Edward T. Fol-
liard and titled “Trench Foot Scourge Ends, But
articles precipitated one of the most acri- Many Yanks Still Are Hospitalized,” appeared in
the Washington Post on 4 March 1945 and dealt
12Outfitting the Soldier, Vol. III of Quarter- primarily with the causes of trench foot and the
master Supply in the ETO in World War II, 280– problem of adequate footgear. It included replies
84, and App. XXXIII, MS, OCMH; Sec. IV of by General Littlejohn to the claim that the theater
Study of 17 Apr 45; SHAEF G–4 Basic Statistical had not requisitioned overshoes and shoepacs early
Rpt 2, 14 Oct 44, in SHAEF G–4 War Diary/Jnl, enough, but did not retract statements made in
Exec Br. the Connery article.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 219
then standard field uniform inadequate well as the Fifth Army, with the new
to protect its troops fighting in the clothing. 17
mountains around Naples. 15Meanwhile, T h e main items recommended which
T h e Quartermaster General had devel- distinguished the proposed uniform
oped a simplified uniform, based on the from the one then in use were the
layering principle, and adaptable to M1943 sateen field jacket, the high-
combat wear in cold wet climates, which neck wool sweater, the combat service
the Army Ground Forces had approved boot, the shoepac, and the leather glove
for standardization, “subject to minor with wool insert. General Littlejohn
modifications,” as early as March 1943.16 had already had a preview of the new
Late in February 1944, T h e Quarter- items on a visit to the United States
master General sent Capt. William F. in November 1943, and they evoked
Pounder, an officer in the Research and considerable interest when they were
Development Branch, Military Planning shown to the chief quartermaster and
Division, OQMG, to England to famil- his staff in the United Kingdom. T h e
iarize ETOUSA officials with the new M1943 field jacket, a wind- and water-
items and explain their advantages. T h e repellent garment with a pile liner
items recommended had undergone tests which could be worn over a jacket or
in either the continental United States sweater in cold weather and which be-
or Alaska, and they were now sent to the came the item of greatest controversy,
Mediterranean theater as well where was initially well received, since it was
they were tested on troops of the 3d to replace the unsatisfactory 1941 Par-
Infantry Division in the Anzio beach- sons jacket. But General Littlejohn was
head. While the Italian test was not ex- not satisfied with the production figures
haustive, particularly from the point of which Captain Pounder was able to fur-
view of performance in severe weather, nish and, lacking assurance that the new
the Mediterranean theater found the jacket would be delivered in sufficient
new uniform far superior to the combi- quantities to dress units uniformly,
nation then in use and eventually stated that he would make no special
equipped the three divisions that it pro- effort to procure it.18Pounder continued
vided for the Seventh Army, which op- to press for decisions on various articles
erated in France the following winter, as he had brought with him, and advised
early requisition of accepted items. But
15Ltr, Brig Gen Joseph P. Sullivan, Army QM
Fifth Army, to Littlejohn, 28 Jan 43, Littlejohn 17Rad CM–IN, 1 J u n 44, Protective Clothing, CG
Reading File. U.S. Army Forces in NATO to WD #F–53022,
16 Memo, McNair for CofS, 10 Mar 43, copy of signed Devers, 31 May 44, Copies of this and other
this and other pertinent documents in Supply of papers on supply of winter clothing to NATOUSA
Clothing and Equipment to ETO, 1944, Pt. 4– are in ASF OQMG Folder. Supply of Clothing and
Documentation (Corresp and Special Rpts), dated Equipment to ETO, 5 Apr 45, 205.03 A 45–280,
5 Apr 45; ASF OQMG File A45–280, Drawer 7. Drawer G 1616.
For a discussion of the new winter uniform pro- 18Ltr, Pounder to Col Georges F. Doriot, Chief
posed by TQMG, see Erna Risch, The Quarter- Research and Dev Br, Mil Plng Div OCQM, 29
master Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Mar 44, Study, Supply of Clothing and Equipment
Volume I, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD to the ETO, 5 Apr 45, QMG, ASF Dir of Mat, Pur
WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 88–97. Div.
220 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
been approved and was intended to re- a combat garment; the overcoat pro-
place the old Parsons jacket. Because vided entirely inadequate protection
of decreasing stocks and size shortages against rain and wind, as had been
of the old 1941 jacket, shipments of the amply demonstrated in Italy; and the
M1943were already being set up against combined bulk and weight of the rain-
requisitions from the theater. But the coat and overcoat seriously impaired the
theater now made it clear that it did mobility of the soldier. ETOUSA’s re-
not desire the M1943 jacket, except in jection of both the 1913 jacket and the
limited numbers for parachutists, and high-neck sweater, in Gregory’s words,
it called attention to an agreement “would leave troops [in the European
which General Littlejohn had reached theater] without any garment designed
with General Clay of the Requirements for efficiency in wet cold climates.” 25
Division, ASF, during his visit to the T h e theater nevertheless on 1 June
United States in April under which the confirmed its earlier decision on the
old-type field jackets were to be supplied 1943 jacket, although it now decided to
pending the initial deliveries of the new accept the high-neck sweater. Both Gen-
Eisenhower jacket. 23 erals Bradley and Hodges, according to
Obviously concerned over the possible the theater quartermaster, had con-
consequences of the theater’s decisions, cluded that the overcoat was a necessary
the War Department asked that the mat- part of the winter uniform, and Gen-
ter be checked with Supreme Headquar- erals Smith and Crawford at SHAEF
ters. T h e War Department met General had concurred in these recommenda-
Littlejohn’s original objection by assur- tions. Two weeks later the theater placed
ing the theater that it could have the a requisition for 2,250,000 of the sweat-
1943 jacket, presumably in the needed ers, of which the New York Port agreed
quantities, if it so desired.24 A few days to deliver 1,750,000 by September.26
later Maj. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory, Officers in the Research and Devel-
T h e Quartermaster General, forwarded a opment Branch of the OQMG were
study prepared by the Research and De- clearly disturbed over the theater’s de-
velopment Branch summarizing all the cision. Col. Georges F. Doriot, chief of
data then available from field and lab- the branch, pointing out that the winter
oratory tests on the merits of the various climate of northeastern France and Bel-
items. General Gregory left no doubt of gium was similar to that of Italy, pre-
his misgivings over the adequacy of the dicted a repetition of the experience of
theater’s proposed winter uniform,
which consisted of the wool field jacket, 25Ltr, Gregory to ACofS OPD WD, 25 May 44,
the overcoat, and the raincoat: the rain- sub: Clothing Efficiency, ETO, Study of 5 Apr 45,
QMG ASF.
coat, he said, could not be considered 26Cbl E–30871, ETO to WD, 1 Jun 44, Pt. III
(Documentation), Study of 5 Apr 45, QMG ASF;
23Study, Wind Resistant Jacket, Sec. VI of papers Study, Wind Resistant Jacket, Sec. VI of papers
supporting Littlejohn letter of 2 Mar 45, ASF Div supporting the Littlejohn Itr of 2 Mar 45, ASF
of Mat, Prod and Pur Div; Cbl E–28364, ETO to Dir of Mat, Prod and Pur Div; Cbl, EX 33226, CG
WD, 18 May 44, Study of 5 Apr 45, QMG ASF. ETOUSA to CG NYPE, 15 Jun 44, no sub; ASF
24Cbl WAR–39574, Clay to Lee, 20 May 44, Study Pur Div Files, Supply of Clothing and Equipment
of 5 Apr 45, QMG ASF. to ETO, DRB AGO.
222 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
American troops in Italy during the pre- where mobility was desired. Time was
ceding winter, if ETOUSA persisted in already running desperately short for
adopting a uniform which, in his opin- getting production under way which
ion, had already been proved inade- would meet ETOUSA’s needs for the
quate. Captain Pounder likewise had coming winter.28 But nothing came of
emphasized to the theater quartermaster this exchange, at least for the moment,
the point that the area in which U.S. and a note of resentment at the War
troops could be expected to be operat- Department’s repeated urgings was in-
ing fell into the wet cold classification dicated in General Littlejohn’s remark
and warned that U.S. troops would be early in July that it was not his policy
improperly clothed unless such items “to force these new items down the
as shoepacs, ski socks, and the woolen throat of troops.” 29
sleeping bag, in addition to the 1943 General Littlejohn held high hopes at
jacket, were adopted. In view of first of getting the required quantities
ETOUSA’s recent communications, how- of the much desired Eisenhower jacket.
ever, the OQMG had no choice but But deliveries of both finished garments
to eliminate requirements for the 1943 and cloth from the United States lagged
jacket for the European theater except from the start, and prospects of meeting
for the limited needs for parachutists, the original commitment faded rapidly.
and to divert production 27 Early in July the chief quartermaster
to other items.
On 20 June the theater startled the concluded that it would be at least six
OQMG with an urgent request for all months before a sizable number of
available information on winter cloth- troops could be supplied with the new
ing for operations in cold wet climates, jacket. 30 Nevertheless, he refrained from
information which the War Department making any requests which might divert
had sought with indifferent success to production from that program. Pending
have the theater consider earlier. Colo- receipt of the new jacket, therefore, he
nel Doriot promptly forwarded the de- preferred to take substitutes, such as the
sired data and took the opportunity to obsolescent Parsons jacket and even the
urge the theater chief quartermaster wool serge blouse, rather than accept the
again to accept the M1943 jacket and newer 1943 jacket, receipts of which he
to issue it in addition to the high-neck claimed were already complicating his
sweater and wool field jacket. Without supply situation. Early in July he asked
it, he warned, the front-line soldier the War Department to ship the entire
would not be adequately protected
against cold wet conditions. Both the 28Ltr,Doriot to Littlejohn, 24 Jun 44. sub: Con-
fidential Radio E–39902. Study of 17 Apr 45; Dev
overcoat and the raincoat, he pointed of Cold Climate Clothing, 11 Oct 44, by Pounder,
out, had failed to meet this requirement Study of 5 Apr 45; Study, T h e Supply of Quarter-
master Clothing, Subsistence, and Equipment to the
ETO, 5 Jan 45, prep in OQMG for Somervell, Hq
27Ltr, Doriot to Rqmt Div ASF, 3 Jun 44, sub: ASF QMC Reference Book.
Secret Radiogram CM157 dated 1 Jun 44. Protec- 29Study, T h e Supply of Quartermaster Clothing
tive Clothing; Memo for Record Only, Doriot, n.d.; . . . , 5 Jan 45.
and Ltr, Pounder to Doriot, 30 Jun 44, all in 30Memo, Littlejohn for G–1, 12 Jul 44, Littlejohn
Study of 5 Apr 45, QMG ASF. Reading File.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 223
remaining stock of 479,000 of the old ater chief quartermaster had decided on
1941 jackets to the European theater.31 the basis of an analysis of the climatic
T h e chief quartermaster had also map of Europe that no special cold
placed great emphasis, as had General climate clothing would be needed. A
Eisenhower, on the desirability of hav- comparison of the climatic map with the
ing a dressy uniform, and was hopeful expected rate of the Allied advance
throughout the summer that this re- showed that U.S. forces would not enter
quirement would be met by the new the “cold wet” area, beginning roughly
wool jacket. His concern over appear- with the Ardennes, until D plus 330,
ance in fact led him to protest repeat- or May 1945. But the phase lines on
edly against the shipment of trousers of which those plans had been based rep-
a lighter shade which did not match resented the course of operations as ex-
the jacket.32 pected before D Day and hardly con-
Littlejohn’s determination on this stituted a valid basis for planning in
point was encouraged by the course of mid-August. 34
tactical operations after the breakout at T h e mid-August requisition, accord-
the end of July. T h e mounting optimism ing to the OQMG in Washington, was
of the next few weeks was soon reflected already one month late in arriving,
in theater supply policy. T h e OCQM judged by the theater’s own policy rec-
expressed its confidence as early as 15 ommendation on the requisitioning of
August that the war would not go into winter clothing. 35 More important than
another winter. On that date it sub- the tardiness of the order, however, was
mitted a requisition to the War Depart- its size, which appeared far too small to
ment for winter clothing specially de- the OQMG. But when the War Depart-
signed for severe cold for one field army ment queried the theater and pointed
—353,000 men—but purely as a precau- out that the size of the requisition would
tionary measure and not in anticipation result in production cutbacks, the thea-
of any need arising from tactical devel- ter on 5 September confirmed the re-
opments.33 quisition.36 General Littlejohn expressed
The decision not to requisition spe-
his own optimism at this time in a
cial winter clothing earlier had been
personal letter to General Gregory, in
deliberate and understandable. T h e the-
which he wrote: “You and I know that
31Study, Wind Resistant Jacket, ASF Dir of Mat,
Prod and Pur Div.
32
Eisenhower ltr cited n. 21; Ltrs, Littlejohn to
Gregory, 4 Sep 44, and Littlejohn to Feldman, 14 34Secs. I (Planning) and III (Requisitions), Study
Sep 44, Littlejohn Reading File, Army War College of 17 Apr 45.
Library. 36Study, Cold Climate Clothing, Sec. IV of pa-
33Cbl EX-43895, COMZ to AGWAR, 15 Aug 44, pers supporting Littlejohn ltr of 2 Mar 45, ASF
copy in Outfitting the Soldier, App. XXX; Secs. I Dir of Mat, Prod and Pur Div.
(Planning) and III (Requisitions), Study of 17 Apr 36Ltr, Feldman, DQMG, to CG SOS, 21 Aug 44,
45. The issue of “special winter clothing,” desig- sub: Requisitions and Current Army Supply Pro-
nated as “arctic (cold-wet),’’ was based on a n al- gram Anticipated Shipments, Study of 5 Apr 45;
lowance of such clothing which a theater com- Study, Requisitions, Sec. I of papers supporting
mander was authorized to draw in anticipation of Littlejohn ltr of 2 Mar 45, ASF Dir of Mat, Prod
exceptional climatic conditions. and Pur Div.
224 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
the serious fighting cannot long con- ations gradually dissipated the rampant
tinue.” 37 optimism which had begun to influence
T h e confidence which these messages supply policy. Moreover, the slowing
reflected was not confined to the office down in operations brought to light a
of the ETOUSA quartermaster. Head- new factor to complicate the supply of
quarters, Communications Zone, had clothing-the discovery that maintenance
asked all the supply services to review and replacement factors had been far
their requirements and prepare stop or- from adequate. During the pursuit, Gen-
ders in anticipation of the expected end eral Littlejohn pointed out, it had been
of hostilities. T h e chief quartermaster impossible to obtain accurate data on
even took measures to control the issue either stocks on hand or consumption.
of winter clothing to ensure that occu- Now it was found that wear and tear
pation troops would be the first to get it. had been much heavier than expected
T h e halt of the pursuit in mid-Sep-
in units constantly on the move, and
tember and the prospect of winter oper-
that men had lost or discarded large
quantities of individual equipment de-
37
Ltr, Littlejohn to Gregory, 4 Sep 44, Littlejohn
Reading File. spite attempts to enforce supply disci-
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 225
pline. General Littlejohn estimated that Gregory assured the theater quartermas-
the consumption of major items of cloth- ter that his office would do everything
ing and equipment had been at a rate possible to provide men in the Euro-
two and one half times that prescribed pean theater with a serviceable uniform
by War Department maintenance fac- from stocks available in the United
tors.38 States, although he could not promise
With this additional argument the to provide matched items for “prome-
ETOUSA quartermaster on 18 Septem- nades on the streets of Paris.” He also
ber placed the first of several requests took the occasion to remind the
for large quantities of winter clothing ETOUSA quartermaster of the efforts
and equipment, asserting that he was which the OQMG had made to supply
now confronted with the necessity of the theater with adequate equipment.
completely re-equipping a minimum of “As you know,” he wrote, “my office has
one million men, about 100,000 French on several occasions made definite rec-
territorials, and a large number of pris- ommendations to you as to the proper
oners of war. He asked that the supplies uniform required for the climate in
be made available for distribution on which you are now operating. I n addi-
the Continent not later than 10 Oc- tion to these recommendations being
tober.39 In the next two weeks the the- made from a climatology point of view,
ater made an appeal for additional quan- they were also made from a production
tities of winter equipment, including point of view, considering the over-all
blankets and sleeping bags. T h e shortage size and deployment of the United States
of blankets was especially critical, hav- Army.” 41
ing been aggravated by the large number T h e reference to production sug-
of prisoners (300,000 at the time). On gested that the emergency requisitions
10 October the theater quartermaster for large amounts of winter clothing
indicated that an additional 500,000 would not be easily met on such short
men would have to be re-equipped notice. T h e Requirements Branch of
within the next sixty days.40 OQMG pointed out that between 18
Much as it deplored the theater’s September and 1 October the theater
resort to emergency requisitioning, there had requested 850,000 overcoats after
was little the War Department could indicating in August that it needed only
now do but attempt to meet what appar- 45,000 in addition to those previously
ently were legitimate needs. General shipped. At the end of July the theater
stated a need for 450,000 overshoes for
38Ltr, Littlejohn to Feldman, 4 Sep 44, Ltr, the remainder of the year, which, with
Littlejohn to Gregory, 18 Sep 44, sub: Rqmts of those already in stock would have per-
Winter Clothing for ETO, Ltr, Littlejohn to Col
Ira K. Evans, 1 8 Sep 44, and Ltr, Maj Gen W. M. mitted issue to 75 percent of the troops.
Goodman to Col H. A. Malin, 8 Oct 44, all in But in the last week of September the
Study of 5 Apr 45. theater had suddenly placed a demand
39Memo, Littlejohn for Gregory, 18 Sep 44.
40Teletype Conf between London and NYPOE, for an additional 1,173,000 pairs. Calls
1 Oct 44, Study of 5 Apr 45; Cbl EX–53583, CQM
to AGWAR, 10 Oct 44, EUCOM 400 Supplies, Serv- 41Ltr, Gregory to Littlejohn, 28 Sep 44, Study of
ices, and Equipment, IV. 5 Apr 45.
226 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
were also made for 2,900,000 wool consumption for short periods of time
drawers and 2,500,000 wool undershirts did not warrant radical revisions. Re-
over and above previous requests for placement factors, it emphasized, were
1944.42 not established to meet the needs arising
The War Department was able to fill from temporary fluctuations in con-
the 18 September requisition with little sumption, but rather the average losses
trouble, although it drained U.S. stocks or maintenance needs over a long period
in many items. Filling the subsequent of time. Replacement factors were used
requests required certain substitutions, for procurement or production plan-
includingsome used 43 and led
overshoes, ning, especially for items having a long
T h e Quartermaster General to ask the lead time, and there was an understand-
theater quartermaster to review all able reluctance to change them unless
woolen clothing requirements and to a definite long-term trend was indicated.
make as many reductions as possible. He Excessive losses resulting from unusual
warned that any additional requests and nonrecurring situations, the War
would have to be accompanied by de- Department insisted, should be met
tailed justification. 44 through special requisitions. It was par-
In mid-October the theater submitted ticularly hesitant to permit upward re-
the first of several recommended revis- visions for winter clothing items in
ions of replacement factors and asked which it suspected that initial issue re-
for approval of requisitions based on the quirements had entered into the thea-
new tables. Most of the new factors ex- ter’s demands. Troops were only begin-
ceeded those currently authorized by ning to wear the overcoat, for example,
100 to 150 percent and were greeted for which a 100 percent increase in the
with a critical eye in the OQMG. Re- replacement factor was requested. T h e
quests for such changes almost invari- War Department consequently refused
ably precipitated a long argument be- to give blanket approval to the theater’s
tween the theater and the War Depart- requests for increases. Subsequent rec-
ment. T h e War Department’s hesitancy ommendations submitted by the theater
about approving increases was inspired in November and December were also
in part by the belief that a basic mis- 45
partially rejected.
understanding existed on the part of Deliveries made against the September
theater officials as to the purpose of re- and October requisitions were largely
placement factors. T h e War Department completed by mid-December. Mean-
had repeatedly contended that excessive while, receipts of the wool jacket, which
42 Memo, Chief Rqmts Br Mil Plng Div ASF for 45 Memo,Gilmer for Handy, 16 Oct 44, sub:
Dir of Mil Plng Div, 4 Oct 44. sub: Winter Cloth- Emergency Winter Clothing Rqmt in ETO, OPD
ing and Equipment for the ETO, Study of 5 Apr 400 ETO Sec. III, Cases 109–22; Outfitting the
45; Special Rpt prep by Tech Info Br, 11 Nov 44, Soldier, pp. 50–53, 286-87; Study, Maintenance
Study of 5 Apr 45. Factors, Sec. III of papers supporting Littlejohn
43 Memo,Gregory for CofS, 3 Nov 44. sub: Req- ltr of 2 Mar 45, with atchd documents, ASF Dir of
uisitions for the ETO, OPD 400 ETO Sec. IV, Mat, Prod and Pur Div; Special Rpt prep for
Cases 109–22. Gregory by Tech Info Br OQMG, 11 Nov 44, Study
44Outfitting the Soldier, p. 283. of 5 Apr 45.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 227
most acute in December when the don, the OQMG had consistently in-
weather turned bitterly cold and damp. cluded either overshoes or shoepacs in
Frantic efforts were made to supply its recommendations. On the basis of
clothing which would provide the neces- tests it had recommended the shoepac
sary protection. Uniformity and stand- as the most suitable item for combat
ardization consequently went out the troops under the conditions expected
window, for troops wore what was avail- on the Continent.51
able, including arctic and limited stand- Early in July 1944 General Little-
ard items. Lack of a suitable outer gar- john indicated his awareness of the prob-
ment led them to don additional woolen lem when he wrote to the OQMG that
undershirts and socks. Improvement he unquestionably would be called on
finally came in January with the arrival to furnish overshoes or the equivalent
and distribution of clothing from the thereof to all men in the theater for the
United States. 50 coming winter and indicated that this
would necessitate a substantial requisi-
T h e story of the field jacket was tion at an early date. 52T h e requisition
closely paralleled in the case of the shoe- which he submitted two weeks later,
pac, one of the major items which dif- however, called for sufficient overshoes
ferentiated the uniform recommended to equip only 75 percent of U.S. troops
by the War Department from that on the assumption that the combat boot,
initially adopted by the theater. T h e which was then beginning to replace the
shoepac is essentially a combination rub- old service shoe with leggings, would
ber and leather boot which gives far suffice for a portion of the continental
better protection against water than strength. T h e first request for shoepacs
either the leather boot or cloth overshoe. was made on 15 August as part of the
It was designed to fit over two pairs of requisition for special winter clothing
socks, one of them a heavy ski sock, and and equipment for one field army.
had removable insoles. Later models of With the onset of cold wet weather
the shoepac gave the needed arch sup- in September it was realized that the
port which the combat boot had pro- combat boot, although an excellent dry
vided. weather item, did not offer suitable pro-
In some ways the footwear problem tection against water and mud, and that
was more complex, and there was more 100 percent of the troops on the Con-
room for legitimate differences of opin- tinent would need overshoes. T h e com-
ion as to what constituted adequate bat boot, like the flesh-out service shoe,
protection under winter conditions. I n was not leakproof, and troops used both
all its contacts with the theater on the the authorized dubbing and the forbid-
subject of winter clothing, and during den shoe polish in an attempt to water-
the visits of General Littlejohn to Wash-
ington and of Captain Pounder to Lon- 51 Special Rpt of 11 Nov 44: Study, Overshoes
Arctic and Combat Boots, Sec. VII of papers sup-
porting Littlejohn ltr of 2 Mar 45, ASF Dir of Mat,
50 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns, XII, 201–04: Outfitting Prod and Pur Div.
the Soldier, pp. 292–93. 52Study, Overshoes Arctic and Combat Boots.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 229
proof them. Late in September the thea- November. Trench foot eventually
ter made the first of its supplementary caused more than 46,000 men to be
requisitions, calling for 293,000 over- hospitalized and accounted for 9.25 per-
shoes. Within two weeks it submitted cent of all the casualties suffered on
an additional request for 1,300,000. the Continent. Trench foot is an injury,
Early in December it submitted its needs not an infection. Its cause is long ex-
for the first three months of 1945, calling posure to cold and wet conditions which
for 500,000 overshoes and an equal num- result in crippling injury to the blood
ber of shoepacs. 53 vessels and muscle tissues of the feet.
T h e shortage which the theater faced Trench foot is characterized by discol-
pending the receipt of these supple- oration and painful swelling, and re-
mentary shipments was aggravated from quires evacuation and prolonged hos-
another source. Shoes and boots which pital treatment. A large percentage of
had been fitted during the summer, those affected were unable to return to
when men were wearing light woolen combat duty; some could no longer
or cotton socks, became too tight when perform any military service. T h e high-
worn with two or more pairs of heavy est rates normally occurred among units
woolen socks. The inevitable result was (usually infantry divisions) living under
a demand for larger sizes. This require- wet and cold conditions in relatively
ment led to a demand for larger over- static situations. Cold wet conditions,
shoes as well. Size tariffs did not allow however, were only the most constant
for the needed high proportion of E, factor in the cause of the injury. Failure
double-E, and triple-E widths. T h e to rotate troops, improper foot care, and
OQMG’s adoption of a special winter inadequate footgear and clothing, all
tariff which allowed for greater widths contributed to the high incidence.
in all types of footgear did not meet the T h e European theater had been
theater’s immediate needs. Overshoes in warned about trench foot. T h e experi-
the larger sizes were lacking well into ence of the previous winter in Italy had
January. T o make matters worse, the led the War Department to advise the
cloth-type overshoe tore easily and theater in the summer of 1944 on meth-
leaked badly, and the first shoepacs were ods of prevention and control. Theater
of an early model which lacked a raised headquarters in turn drew up directives
heel and an arch support. Meanwhile which were duly passed down through
many troops adopted the expedient of the various echelons. But the seriousness
wearing overshoes without shoes or of trench foot as a casualty producer was
boots, using several pairs of socks and not widely appreciated outside of a few
improvised cardboard insoles. units which had already had experience
T h e lack of adequate footwear became with it (as in the 6th Army Group, for
inseparably associated with the precipi- example), and the instructions, particu-
tate rise in the incidence of trench foot larly regarding individual care of the
which occurred in the second week of feet, were poorly enforced. Numerous
cases of trench foot were reported during
53 Ibid. the fall. But the problem suddenly be-
230 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
field army, ETOUSA did not request extraordinarily high attrition rates, and
additional quantities of the shoepacs misjudgment with regard to the end of
until December. In the case of footwear, the fighting in the theater.61
therefore, as in the case of other items Maj. Gen. Clinton F. Robinson, chief
of clothing, it was the War Department’s of the Control Division in the ASF,
view that the theater had not given full reviewing the investigating committee’s
consideration to experiential data from findings for General Somervell, did not
other theaters and that the chief quarter- accept them in their entirety. He con-
master had been slow to adopt winter cluded that aside from the unforeseeable
clothing items which on the basis of difficulties both the War Department
both tests and combat experience had and the theater had been remiss in some
been proved superior to the uniform respects, the War Department primarily
proposed by the ETO. for the lateness or inadequacy of re-
search, the theater for improper requisi-
Responsibility for providing adequate
tioning practices and failure to forward
clothing obviously was shared by the
requisitions sufficiently far in advance.62
theater and the War Department, and
responsibility for the shortcomings in T h e controversy over the adequacy
this field must also be shared, although of various items of clothing–that is, the
in precisely what degree it is difficult to question of quality–is more complex.
say. Assigning blame for failures in the To begin with, the Army had been long
supply of adequate winter clothing in in arriving at final decisions with respect
the winter of 1944–45 is not a simple to various development items in winter
matter, for some of the decisions on clothing. There were conflicting schools
winter clothing had complex origins. of thought within the QMC, and the
An investigation of the clothing con- merits of different principles or theories
troversy was carried out by a committee -the layering idea versus others, for ex-
headed by Col. Charles Garside in the ample-were being debated at least as
spring of 1945. T h e investigation dealt late as December 1943, when a new
almost exclusively with the question of Table of Equipment was adopted. Per-
supply–that is, quantity–and not with sonality conflicts clearly account for
the adequacy of the uniform from the some of the controversy which devel-
point of view of protection. T h e results oped between General Littlejohn and
were inconclusive. In general, the com- the OQMG, and these arose at least in
mittee found that both the theater quar- part from the fact that the theater quar-
termaster and the OQMG had planned termaster had personally sponsored and
and acted with intelligence and fore-
sight to meet winter clothing problems,
and explained the difficulties over cloth- 61Investigation, Supply of Clothing to ETO, 1
Jan 44 to 28 Feb 45, DCofS, 420 ETO; see also Ltr,
ing supply as stemming largely from Garside to Brig Gen Albert J. Browning, 12 May
unforeseeable circumstances such as pro- 45, same file.
62Memo, Robinson for Somervell, 21 Jun 45, sub:
duction problems in the United States, Investigation Supply of Clothing in ETO. DCofS
transportation difficulties in the theater, files, 420 ETO.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 233
promoted the ETO jacket in the the- From the theater’s point of view there
ater.63 apparently was enough uncertainty and
To what extent the problem of avail- indefiniteness about the question to per-
ability-that is, production–entered into mit it to plead its own interests and
the theater’s initial rejection of certain preferences. T h e War Department was
items of the War Department’s recom- obviously reluctant to impose its de-
mended winter uniform is hard to say. cisions and judgment on the theater in
General Littlejohn made much of the the matter. Its indulgence in this respect
lack of assurance on this point in ex- was not abnormal. T h e independence
plaining his original decision not to re- which the theater enjoyed in many mat-
quisition some of the new items. The ters was in line with traditional policy.
War Department tended to discount It was one which the War Department
this argument. General Gregory later had reason to regret on occasion, most
pointed out that his recommendations notably, for example, in the handling of
had been made with production capabil- manpower resources. 65 Perhaps this is
ities in mind, and General Lutes also the most serious indictment that can be
later claimed that the new 1943 jacket made in the controversy over winter
was being produced in ample quantities clothing. Whatever the indictment, one
beginning late in 1943. T h e implication incontrovertible fact stands out: the
was that the War Department would not ETOUSA combat soldier wore a uni-
have offered the theater the new items form that was deficient in proper pro-
if they could not have been made avail- tection against the cold wet conditions
able in the required quantities, and that under which he had to fight in the
the theater’s rejection was not justified winter of 1944–45.
on that count. 64
It is clear in any case that the War By the late winter, as the result of
Department and the theater had not substitutions and improvisation, the out-
come to an understanding as to what standing characteristic of the ETOUSA
would be required by, and what should uniform was its lack of standardization
be supplied to, the theater, particularly and simplicity. By that time seventy dif-
with respect to outer garments of the ferent items had been issued, including
winter uniform. It is perhaps surprising six types of jackets and seven types of
that there should have been room for trousers, creating insurmountable sup-
debate about the make-up of the combat ply problems.66 In mid-January General
uniform as late as the spring of 1944. Littlejohn summoned the quartermas-
ters of all the major commands to a
63 See, for example, Ltr, Littlejohn to Gen Max-
conference for the purpose of eliminat-
well, 1 7 Mar 44, and Ltr, Littlejohn to Feldman, ing some of the unsatisfactory items and
7 Jul 44, Littlejohn Reading File; also Ltr, Somer- of reaching an agreement on a single
vell to Robinson in ETO, 6 Mar 49, ASF, ETO
winter combat uniform. Littlejohn had
1945.
64Ltr, Gregory to Littlejohn, 28 Sep 44. Study of
5 Apr 45; Memo, Lutes for Dir of R&SC, 22 Jan 45,
sub: Supply of Winter Clothing to ETO, Lutes file 65See Ch. XI, below.
ETO 1945. 66Gen Bd Rpt 109. p. 127.
234 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
first planned to call such a meeting in the War Production Board.68 T h e con-
December, but the Ardennes counter- ference disclosed a wide range of opin-
offensive caused it to be postponed. ion among the armies on the various
Little was accomplished at the con- items, and there was complete accord
ference which finally met at Paris on 29 on only a few items such as underwear
January, for the quartermasters of the and shirts, and on the demand that
12th Army Group saw no point in dis- leather be reversed on the combat boot.
cussing items with which most U.S. T h e greatest controversy arose over the
forces had had no experience. To the type of jacket to be adopted. Third
First, Third, and Ninth Armies the Army, which had carried out tests in the
M 1943 combat uniform-consisting of 4th Armored and 26th Infantry Di-
the M1943 jacket with pile liner, the visions, particularly favored the ensem-
high-neck sweater, the E T O jacket, scarf, ble designed for armored units, which
and woolen underwear and shirt-was included a widely admired combat
largely an unknown quantity. Col. jacket. But the production of this en-
James W. Younger, the Army Group semble had already been terminated in
quartermaster, expressed astonishment the United States.
that it had not even been made available T h e diversity of opinion on many
for field tests.67 Representatives
of the items led General Littlejohn to appoint
12th Army Group asked for an opportu- a committee headed by Colonel Younger
nity to test the 1943 uniform before to consolidate the many recommenda-
attempting any decision, and the chief tions and summarize the consensus of
quartermaster agreed to make available the conference. On the most contro-
small quantities of the complete uni- versial item the tabulation of prefer-
form for tests in all three armies, in ences was not conclusive, for four of the
the Ninth Air Force, and in the XVIII five armies voted for both the M1943
Airborne Corps. jacket and the armored combat jacket.
These units had hardly had sufficient But the final uniform recommendations
opportunity to test the uniform when of the committee closely resembled the
the second clothing conference met on M1943 uniform that the War Depart-
17 March, attended by representatives ment had repeatedly proposed, which
of the major commands, the chief quar- included the wool field jacket (for dress
termaster, the chief surgeon, and the wear), the M 1943 combat jacket (modi-
OQMG, including a shoe expert from fied somewhat), shoepacs, service boots,
a trenchcoat type of field coat, ponchos,
and leather gloves with wool inserts. 69
67Min, Mtg at 12th A Gp Hq, 22 Feb 45, 12 A Gp T h e conference made certain com-
QM No. 3 Clothing Conf.
68 The WPB representative was Lawrence B. Shep-
pard, Assistant Director of the Leather and Shoe
Division, and formerly of the Hanover Shoe Com- 69Min, Second Clothing Conf, 17–19 Mar 45;
pany, who had come to the theater in response to Memo, Younger for 12 A Gp Stf Secs, 23 Mar 45,
General Littlejohn’s request for a shoe expert. For sub: Winter Clothing Conf; and Memo, Younger
correspondence on this subject see file, Footwear for CG 1 2 A Gp, 14 Mar 45, sub: Winter Combat
and Socks for Use in the ETO, ASF Dir of Mat, Uniform, all in 1 2 A Gp QM No. 1 Winter Combat
Prod and Pur Div. Uniform, and No. 3 Clothing Conf.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 235
promises because of known production plete 1943 uniform. Admitting the pop-
limitations, and was not completely suc- ularity of the armored combat jacket
cessful in deciding on a simple, single and trousers, General Gregory showed
uniform. But it proposed the elimina- that the preponderance of evidence from
tion of 21 items then authorized for those who had used both the M1943
issue in the theater, the reduction in uniform and the former combination
the number of sizes by 59, and a reduc- had indicated a decided preference for
tion in the number of basic fabrics the 1943 ensemble. Only the Fifth and
from 10to 4. 70 Seventh Armies, he maintained, had had
General Littlejohn’s personal report any substantial measure of experience
to T h e Quartermaster General on the with the items comprising the author-
results of the conference, in which he ized uniform, and he found it highly
underscored the armies’ preference for significant that those experienced organ-
the armored combat jacket, only rekin- izations had arrived at the same con-
dled the old controversy between the clusions.71 T h e whole argument had of
OQMG and the office of the theater course long since become academic so
quartermaster. General Gregory’s reply far as the ETOUSA soldier in the winter
strongly suggested that the theater quar- of 1944–45 was concerned.
termaster’s conclusions did not accu-
rately represent those of the clothing (3) Weapons and Vehicles
conference. More important, he consid- Shortages of ordnance equipment
ered General Littlejohn’s conclusions were probably the most serious in the
inadequately supported by experiential Class II and IV category because of the
data, for they were based largely on the immediate and direct effect which the
experience of men who had not had an lack of both tactical and cargo vehicles
adequate opportunity to test the com- and weapons could have on operations.
70Gen Bd R p t 109, p. 128. Another survey of the Shortages ranged from major items such
adequacy of winter clothing in the ETO, made by as tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces to
Maj. Paul A. Siple, a QMC technical observer who tires and tire patches, trailers, automatic
had accompanied Admiral Richard E. Byrd on his
antarctic expeditions, reached conclusions very sim- weapons, fire control equipment, and
ilar to those of the armies o n various individual antifreeze.
items. Siple, in addition to pointing out the de- While transportation affected deliv-
ficiencies of individual items, emphasized that U.S.
troops lacked both discipline and training in the eries in the late summer and fall, short-
proper use of clothing. Many of the difficulties he ages of ordnance equipment were
traced to their insistence on choosing undersized, mainly the result of high attrition and
tight-fitting garments for winter wear in a n effort
to retain the close-fitting characteristics of civilian inadequate receipts in the theater. Early
clothing. British troops were better prepared in this in November SHAEF provided the War
respect, particularly with regard to the care of the Department with statistics to illustrate
feet, having had a costly experience in World
War I. Maj Paul A. Siple, Report on the Adequacy the rate at which supplies were being
of Winter Clothing in the ETO, 1944–1945. 12 May
45, DCofS files, 420 ETO; Memo, Col Rodney H. 71 Memo, Littlejohn for Gregory, 9 May 45, sub:
Smith, Asst Deputy G–4, to DCofS, 30 Jan 45. Winter uniform, and Ltr, Gregory to WDGS, 11
EUCOM ETOUSA G–4 Planning Directives Series Jun 45, both in WDGS G–4 Winter Uniform for
H OVERLORD. Use in the ETO, OCQM, ETO, WDGDS A47–2.
236 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
to expedite the shipment of tanks al- at their authorized strength, to say noth-
ready released. But receipts did not meet ing of reconstituting reserves. At the end
requirements despite the lower losses of September First Army, having oper-
which attended the revision to more ated with approximately 85 percent of
static operations in the next few months. its authorized strength in tanks during
Losses in September came to 16.5 per- the month, adopted the expedient of
cent of the theater’s T/O&E strength as temporarily suspending the Tables of
compared with 25.3 percent in August. Organization and Equipment of ar-
In October the rate fell to 9.8 percent. mored units so far as medium tanks
In November the rate advanced to 11.2 were concerned, and reducing the au-
percent and in December shot u p to 22.8, thorized strengths in order to effect an
reflecting the greatly intensified combat equitable distribution of the available
activity.76 tanks and to establish a small reserve.
Early in October the War Department T h e new T/O&E’s temporarily cut the
had announced an increase in the re- authorized strengths in 75-mm. and 76-
placement factor for the medium tank mm. gun tanks from 232 to 200 for ar-
from 9 to 11 percent. But this revision mored divisions organized under the old
was made on the basis of the combined T/O&E (the 2d and 3d Divisions only),
loss experience of 9.9 percent in the from 168 to 150 for divisions organized
North African and European theaters in under the latest T/O&E (all remaining
the month of July, and did not reflect armored divisions), and from 54 to 50
the experience of August and September. for separate tank battalions. T h e Ninth
By October the cumulative loss rate, Army later adopted the same provisional
according to the 12th Army Group, was T/O&E’s for its armored formations.78
nearer 20 percent in the European the- T h e situation saw no improvement
ater.77Revisions in the replacement fac- during the fall months. By the end of
tor consequently lagged far behind cur- November there were on hand in the
rent experience. theater only 3,344 tanks against a
Under these circumstances the theater T/O&E requirement of 3,409 and an
found it impossible to maintain units authorized on-hand reserve requirement
of 937.79 No true reserve existed, there-
Stock Control Div, n.d., sub: Replacement Factor fore. T h e 12th Army Group reported
for Certain Items in ETO, Incl III to Memo, Wood
for Somervell, 4 Jan 45, sub: ETO Replacement
Factors or Days of Supply for Tank, Medium; 78Ltr, FUSA to Corps, Divs, and Tank Bns, 30
Mortars, Radio Sets, and Ammo, H q ASF Notebook Sep 44, sub: Medium Tank Loss Replacement Pol-
of Memos, Ltrs, etc., on Supply, Somervell file. icy, FUSA 470.8 Armored Cars and Tanks: Ltr,
76 The actual count in 75-mm. and 76-mm. tank I. D. B. to Chief AFV&W Sec ETOUSA, 2 Dec 44,
losses in the 12th Army Group in these months was sub: Status of 75-mm. and 76-mm. Gun Medium
as follows: 318 against a T/O&E strength of 1,927 Tanks, SHAEF G–3 O&E 470.8 Tanks, II.
in September, 199 out of a T/O&E strength of 79Memo, Brig Gen F. A. Heileman for Somervell,
2,032 in October, 280 out of 2,509 in November, 30 Dec 44, sub: Medium Tank Situation in ETO,
and 576 out of an authorized strength of 225in Hq ASF, European Theater–last half 1944. T h e
December. 12 A Gp Rpt of Opns, XI, 67. figure 937 is based on a 75-day reserve. T h e theater
77The records are conflicting. 12th Army Group had actually been authorized to requisition on the
figures are cited, except as otherwise noted, for the basis of a 75-day reserve plus a 60-day shipping
sake of consistency. They are believed to be high. factor.
238 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
that two of its tank battalions had fewer ter’s supply position. Time required to
than ten serviceable tanks, and field com- submit loss reports to the War Depart-
manders in general deplored the fact ment and to obtain releases of replace-
that armored units had to operate at ment tanks, time required to move tanks
from 10 to 25 percent below authorized from factories to ports and to load them
strength. Furthermore, the current the- for shipment, time required for unload-
ater troop basis failed to provide the one ing in the theater in the absence of
tank battalion per infantry division adequate discharge facilities, and delays
which field commanders considered a in reporting losses, including tanks
necessary minimum. As a partial remedy deadlined for lack of spare parts, all
steps were taken to convert two battal- contributed to what must have seemed
ions of the 10th Armored Group to com- an interminable lag between requisition
posite tank battalions for use with infan- and delivery. In addition, the large num-
try divisions. 80 ber of tanks habitually under repair in
T h e field commands had continued to the various echelons appeared to justify
urge the theater to obtain a higher re- increasing the reserve factor. Theater
placement factor, arguing that a larger officials were cognizant of these factors
flow of replacement tanks was impera- in the supply of tanks as well as other
tive if the habitual infantry-tank co-op- items, and it was for this reason that they
eration which had characterized all oper- had requested and been granted a sixty-
ations thus far was to continue. T h e day shipping factor in addition to the
12th Army Group noted that at no time seventy-five-day reserve level. T h e low
since the middle of August had the replacement factor, however, had be-
armies had their full T/O&E allowance come the more vital consideration, and
of tanks, and that not since the early it was the focal point of all attempts to
days of the Normandy beachhead had remedy the situation.
they possessed a reserve. It maintained Improvement finally came in Decem-
that a 25 percent reserve in each army ber, the month of reckoning for several
was an operational necessity. 81 other major logistic problems, partly as
One factor which plagued all supply the result of the first-hand investigation
between the zone of interior and the which Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Director
theater, and which never seemed to get of Operations, ASF, made during his
sufficient consideration, was the time lag visit to the theater. T h e theater pre-
between the submission of requisitions sented the ASF official with an exhaus-
and the eventual delivery of replace- tive analysis of its medium tank situa-
ments. Because of the handling problem tion. It concluded that with currently
involved in the case of tanks, this time scheduled receipts it would meet its
lag had a marked bearing on the thea- T/O&E needs for the next two months,
but predicted that it would be short
80Ltr, I.D.B. to Chief AFV&W Sec, 2 Dec 44, sub: approximately 1,100 tanks against its
Status of 75-mm. and 76-mm. Gun Medium Tanks, authorized reserves. It argued that a
SHAEF G–3 O&E 470.8 Tanks, II.
81Ltr, 12 A Gp to CG ETO, 11 Dec 44, sub: large portion of the reserve must be
Tank Rqmts, NUSA 451 Vehicles. on hand to provide a cushion against
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 239
losses. Additional tanks totaling 22 per- ence. Washington now accepted the
cent of the T/O&E–the equivalent of theater’s computations and agreed to
the sixty-day shipping and order time release 1,010 medium tanks in addition
at 11 percent per month–it stated, to the 250 scheduled for delivery to the
should be on release and in the pipeline port by the end of January.
to ensure adequate maintenance re- Only two days before this the War
quirements. On this basis it asked for Department had raised the replacement
the release of 1,102 tanks for January factor from 11 to 14 percent. On General
lift in addition to those already sched- Lutes’ recommendations it now agreed
uled. T h e analysis and request were also to raise it still further, to 20 percent, but
dispatched to the War Department.82 with the understanding that this was a
As was so often the case, the theater’s temporary concession and was to apply
data conflicted with the picture as seen only during the next critical months,
in the War Department, partly because or until 1 May 1945.84In a memorandum
of the different replacement factors used to General Somervell several days later
and partly because of the War Depart- Lutes admitted that a higher replace-
ment’s habit of considering all tanks, ment factor should have been adopted
whether actually on hand in the theater earlier even though there were doubts
or just released, as part of the theater’s as to whether U.S. production could have
assets. T h e theater and the War Depart- met the demand. T h e theater later re-
ment rarely saw eye to eye on this matter, ported a cumulative loss rate of only
as was also evidenced in the argument 12.8 percent through January 1945.85
over ammunition.83 On the other hand, While the War Department’s action
the theater had used a replacement factor promised to place the theater in a healthy
of only 13.1 percent in its computations,
situation by the end of February, it
far below the exaggerated claims of 25
provided no answer to the plight in
percent which had repeatedly been made
by the armies. which the theater found itself as a result
In any case, General Lutes was now of the Ardennes counteroffensive. First
completely convinced that the theater’s Army’s medium tank losses in Decem-
shortage of medium tanks was much ber were to total nearly 400, three times
more critical than indicated by the War the casualties suffered in the preceding
Department studies, and he agreed that
it was imperative to ship additional tanks 84 Memo, Col R. P. Hollis for Lutes, 10 Dec. 44.
to Europe as quickly as possible and to sub: Critical Ord Items Listed in G–4 Rpt, 12 A
raise the replacement factor. On 17 De- Gp, Memo, Lutes for Lee, 11 Jan 45, sub: Rpt on
the Activities of Lutes Party, and Record of Tel
cember officials in Washington went over Conf Between Paris and Washington, 17 Dec 44,
the entire problem with the Lutes mis- all in Official Rpt of Lutes Mission, H q ASF.
sion in a transatlantic telephone confer- 85 12th Army Group claimed a cumulative loss
factor of 16.4 percent. Memo, Lutes for Somervell,
23 Dec 44, sub: Medium Tanks, ETO, Official Rpt
82Cbl EX–84824, Lee to AGWAR, 15 Dec 44, Tab of Lutes Mission: Ltr, ETO to 12 A Gp, 22 Feb 44,
H to Official Rpt, Mission to ETO, 4 Dec 44-13 Ind to Ltr, 12 A Gp to ETO, 1 1 Dec 44, sub: Tank
Jan 45, H q ASF. Rqmts, EUCOM 470.1 Combat Armored Cars and
83See above, Ch. IX, Sec. 2. Tanks: 12 A Gp Rpt of Opns, XI, 67.
240 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
month.86T o meet its immediate replace- ranean theater announced that it was
ment needs the theater had to seek relief releasing a total of 150 tanks for transfer
closer at hand. On 19 December it ap- to France. 87
pealed to its neighbor to the south, the ETOUSA next asked 21 Army Group
Mediterranean theater, to release sev- to survey its resources to determine
enty-five tanks which had been consigned whether any number of tanks up to 500
to U.S. forces in Italy but which for some could be made available, promising re-
reason had been unloaded at Marseille payment in February. Montgomery re-
and were already in Delta Base Section. sponded by offering to release 351 tanks
ETOUSA proposed to repay this loan to U.S. forces, 254 of which were deliv-
by asking the War Department to divert ered to the First Army and 97 to the
to the Mediterranean an equal number Third before the end of the month.88
then being loaded at New York for ship-
87Cbl S–71959, Smith to McNarney, 19 Dec 44.
ment to Europe. General McNarney, the and Cbl FX–71545. MTOUSA to SHAEF, 20 Dec
MTOUSA commander, readily agreed. 44, SHAEF Cbl Logs 1944–45. Smith Papers; Cbl
In fact, a few days later the Mediter- FX–73970, MTOUSA to SHAEF, 24 Dec 44, SHAEF
G–3 O&E 470.8 Tanks, 11.
88Cbl E-78893, COMZ to 21 A Gp, 26 Dec 44,
86FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, Bk. and Cbl SD–8692, 21 A Gp to SHAEF, 26 Dec 44,
III, p. 64. both in SHAEF G–3 O&E 470.8 Tanks, II.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 241
British forces could easily afford such Efforts to provide the theater with
a transfer, for they held disproportion- armor of better quality continued
ately high reserves—totaling 1,900 Sher- throughout the fall and winter, but
mans—in the United Kingdom. At the with little tangible result for the theater
end of the month General Somervell in this period. Production, and conse-
directed Maj. Gen. James K. Crain, U.S. quently deliveries, of the 76-mm. gun
executive of the London Munitions As- tank fell behind schedule, in part be-
signments Board (LMAB), to bid for cause of design changes in suspension
1,000 of these tanks. Somervell pointed and tracks and because of tooling u p for
out that the establishment of a 35-per- the newer 90-mm. gun tank.90T h e thea-
cent reserve for both U.S. and British ter therefore took no action to request
forces and the restoration of equality be- the complete elimination of the 75-mm.
tween the two would actually require gun tank until January 1945, although
the transfer of 1,147 tanks. priority was given to the loading of the
But these instructions were rescinded. 76-mm. gun model in the New York Port
In view of the measures recently taken whenever possible, While the theater
to meet ETOUSA’s shortages from the received increasing numbers of the 76’s,
United States, it was decided instead to the obsolescent short-barreled 75 con-
assign the entire output of U.S. produc- tinued to be the principal weapon of
tion to U.S. forces until their reserves armored units throughout the fall and
in Europe totaled 2,000, which was ex- winter. 91
pected to require four months. Complete Equipping 300 M4’s with British 17-
parity on a percentage basis was not ex- pounder guns, plans for which had been
pected to be achieved before June, since made in August 1944, was postponed
British forces were promised a hundred again and again because of the shortage
mediums per month beginning in April. of reserves with which to make the con-
Under these arrangements no attempt version.92 Improved ammunition, high-
was to be made to repay the loan of 351 velocity, armor-piercing (HVAP), for the
tanks made by 21 Army Group in De- 76-mm. gun was shipped to the theater
cember. In any event, action had finally in this period, but receipts amounted to
been taken to correct the maldistribution less than two rounds per gun per month
of reserves between the two forces. 89 until March 1945.93
T h e 105-mm. howitzer tank, first
88Cbl WX–84700, Somervell to LMAR, 30 Dec 44,
Memo of Decision on Medium and Light Tanks by
hailed as meeting the need for a tank
Somervell, Crain, Crawford, Lord, Saylor, et al., 10 with better high explosive ammunition,
Jan 45, Cbl LM1–57455. Troopers to 21 A Gp, 5
Jan 45, Chl UKX–22667, LMAU to Shingler in
ASF, 21 Jan 45, and Cbl UK-19942, LMAB to 90Rpt, Hiland G. Batcheller, 14 Nov 44, sub:
SHAEF, 30Dec 44, all in SHAEF G–3 O&E 470.8 Critical Programs: A Rpt to the WPB, Hq ASF–
Tanks, II; Memo, Lutes for Lee, 1 Jan 45, sub: President-White House-Exec Office 1944, Somervell
Medium Tanks, EUCOM 470.8 Combat Armored file.
Cars and Tanks, II; Record of Tel Conf Between 91Final Hist Rpt AFV&W Sec ETOUSA, D Day
Col Hollis (Paris) and H. A. Markle (Washington), to Date of Inactivation, 6 Jun 44 to 24 May 45, p.
28 Dec 44, and Chl WARX–83327, Somervell to 23, ETO Adm 540.
ETO, 28 Dec 44, both in Official Rpt of Mission to 9212 A Gp Rpt of Opns, XI, 48.
ETO, Lutes, H q ASF. 93Final Rpt, AFV&W Sec, p. 23.
242 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
arrived in satisfactory numbers and was had far exceeded War Department re-
never in critical supply. But this tank placement factors and by the end of
did not live up to expectations because November had exhausted continental re-
of its lack of a powered turret traverse. serves. Lack of the desired percentage
A later model contained the desired of heavy duty trucks (over 2½ tons) had
power traverse mechanism, but tanks so accentuated the rapid deterioration, for
equipped did not reach the New York the smaller 2½-ton general purpose ve-
Port until the final month of hostilities hicle was not well suited to long-distance
and never saw combat. hauling, which, along with overloading
T h e 90-mm. gun tank, first known as and improper maintenance, accounted
the T26 and later as the M26 or Persh- for a high mortality rate. Trucks with
ing, and long-awaited as the answer to larger capacity had been in production
the theater’s need for armament that in the United States for more than a
could match the Germans’, did not be- year, partly as a result of pressure ap-
come available for shipment until Jan- plied since the North African campaign.
uary 1945. A token number first saw But heavy duty vehicles had never been
action on 15 February. Theater officials manufactured in large numbers in the
had twice revised their recommendations United States, and production thus far
as to the ratio in which they desired the had fallen short of the goals. Pressure
105-mm. howitzer tank and the newer to turn out heavy duty vehicles mean-
90-mm. gun tank supplied. Before D Day while had a detrimental effect on the
they had advised a ratio of one 90-mm. production of the standard types, with
gun tank to three 105’s. In October, on resulting deficits in the output of 2½-
the basis of combat experience with the ton trucks also. In both cases the foundry
latter, they recommended a ratio of two industry, which was unable to expand
to one. Early in January 1945 the ratio rapidly enough to supply the castings
was further altered to four to one in for the full complements of axles, trans-
favor of the 90-mm. gun tank.94 missions, and engines, was the most per-
sistent bottleneck. 96
T h e shortage of trucks was evident Like most deficiencies, the vehicle
early in the fall and extended well into shortage had many ramifications. More
the winter. All armies reported critical vehicles were actually made available to
deficiencies and a high deadline rate, the New York Port than could be shipped
and in October representatives of to the theater in the fall months of 1944.
SHAEF, ETOUSA, and 12th Army Lack of port capacity on the Continent,
Group met to establish priorities for with its resultant accumulation of ships
the issue of vehicles. 95Operational losses in European waters, had led the War
94Ibid., pp. 9, 16; 12 A Gp Rpt of Opns, XI, 46; (up to 13 Nov 44). No. 141; Ltr, Wilson to CG
Cbl EX–98320, COMZ to Somervell, 14 Feb 45. Cbl SOLOC, 4 Dec 44, sub: Informal R p t for Nov 44,
WX–39078, AGWAR to Lee, 17 Feb 45, and Cbl, H q SOLOC 319.1 CONAD Rpts.
SHAEF to Somervell, 8 Mar 45, all in SHAEF G–3 96 R p t , Hiland G. Batcheller, 14 Nov 44, sub:
O&E Tanks, II. Critical Programs: A Rpt to the WPB, H q ASF-
95Memo, Kibler for G–4 12 A Gp, 11 Oct 44, sub: President-White House-Exec Office 1944, Somervell
Status of Gen Purpose Vehicles, 12 A Gp Vehicles file.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT 243
Department to cut the number of sail- loaded with vehicles for arrival in Feb-
ings to the theater. T h e higher priority ruary. After a more searching review of
given to the shipment of weapons, com- the theater’s future needs, which con-
bat vehicles, tires and tubes, antifreeze, sidered the requirements for operations
and all types of spare parts for the equip- beyond the Rhine and took into account
ment already in the theater left little the civil relief needs and the poor pros-
space for vehicles on the allotted com- pects for local procurement, General
modity-loaders, with the result that vir- Somervell, who was then in the theater,
tually no general purpose vehicles could increased the requisition to thirty ships
be lifted in November and December. for February and directed that an addi-
Paradoxically, the theater claimed late tional fifty be dispatched for March ar-
in December that, despite the over-all rival. Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross, the
port deficiency, unused discharge capac- Chief of Transportation in Washington,
ity actually existed in both the U.K. at first questioned the theater’s ability
ports and at Cherbourg which, though to receive such numbers in view of the
unsuitable for other types of supplies, continuing bank of idle ships in Euro-
could have accepted thirty vehicle ships pean waters. But Somervell was appar-
and thus given the theater about 30,000 ently convinced of the theater’s dis-
badly needed trucks.97 But General charge capacity and ordered the ship-
Lutes, when told of this during his visit ments set u p without further discus-
to the theater in December, found no sion.99 Shipments made against this di-
evidence that theater officials had made rective brought substantial relief by the
a point of this in communications with time of the Rhine crossing in March.
the War Department. 98 Tires were another item in which truly
Early in January the theater claimed critical shortages developed in the fall
shortages of 33,000 vehicles and esti- of 1944. T h e War Department had actu-
mated that with currently scheduled ally warned all major commands of po-
shipments it would still be short about tential shortages as early as December
30,000 on 1 February and 35,000 on 1 1943, and announced its allocations pol-
March. To meet at least part of this icy, just as it had for other supplies in
deficit it initially asked the War Depart- which it was known that production
ment to dispatch twenty-five ships solidly would fail to meet demands. Headquar-
ters, ETOUSA, passed this information
97Vehicle assembly facilities were more than equal
on to its subordinate commands and
to discharge capacities and, with the completion of directed them to enforce rigid compli-
arrangements with the Ford Motor Company at
Antwerp, reached a monthly capacity of 31,500 by
the end of the year. 99 CblE–84296, ETO to G–4 to SHAEF, 9 Jan 45,
98Unsigned Memo, 2 I Dec 44, Memo, Chief Ord Cbl WARX–89701, ACWAR to ETO, 10Jan 45.
Off ETO for G–4 COMZ, 26 Dec 44, sub: Supply Cbl E–84558, ETO to AGWAR, 10 Jan 45. Cbl
of GPVs, Memo, Hollis for Lutes, 25 Dec 44, sub: WARX–90495, AGWAR to ETO, 12 Jan 45, Cbl
Deficit of GPMV for Initial Equipment of ETO S–74716, SHAEF to CCS, 1.3 Jan 45, Cbl WARX-
Units, and Memo, Lutes for SAC, 26 Dec 44, sub: 20354. Gross to ETO, 13 Jan 45. Cbl E–86337,
Vehicles for Equipping Units, all part of Tab G to Somervell to AGWAR, 14 Jan 45, and Cbl EX-
Official Rpt of Mission to ETO, 4 Dec 44, 13 Jan 86788, ETO to AGWAR, 15 Jan 45, all in ETO
45, Lutes, Hq ASF. Adm 398 and 404, IN and OUT Cables.
244 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
on the Continent and allocate a fair T h e theater had also launched a vigor-
share of the tires produced to civilian ous campaign to enforce preventive
and military needs. Representatives from maintenance. Tire inspections had shown
the G–4 and G–5 Divisions of both that 40 percent of all replacement needs
SHAEF and the Communications Zone, could be laid to underinflation, over-
SHAEF Mission to France, the General loading, or other abuses. T h e widest
Purchasing Agent, and the theater ord- possible publicity was therefore given
nance officer were appointed to the com- to the importance of preventive main-
mittee, which immediately took steps to tenance, including such points as proper
restore the tire industry to production. tire pressure, maximum speeds, rotation
T h e program did not promise sub- of tires, proper wheel alignment, avoid-
stantial relief in the immediate future. ance of overloading, and daily inspec-
As was the case in several other attempts tions for cuts and bruises. Both T h e
at local procurement, it created as many Stars and Stripes and the Armed Forces
problems as it solved. Production in
Network radio were enlisted in the cam-
France and Belgium depended on the
paign to make vehicle drivers conserva-
import of raw materials and on the allo-
tion conscious, and a slogan contest was
cation of transportation and power, all
held, with prizes in the form of War
of which were critically short, and in
addition entailed the division of the Bonds and two-day passes to Paris.105
product between military and civilian T h e War Department meanwhile had
needs. T h e program got under way in been bending every effort to increase its
good time, however, and bore the first shipments to the theater. To meet emer-
fruit on 4 January, when the first tire gency needs it combed the zone of inte-
was turned out from American synthet- rior for extra tires, collecting all stocks
ics at the Goodrich plant in Paris. Be- from posts, camps, and stations, remov-
fore the end of the month the Goodrich ing tires from all unserviceable vehicles
plant was producing at a rate of 4,000 that were not immediately repairable,
tires per month and the Michelin plant and stripping spares from all vehicles
at the rate of 2,000. Before long six except for minimum emergency pools
plants were in operation in France and for convoy operations. Increasing pro-
Belgium. T h e War Department also con- duction proved a thorny problem, partly
sidered the possibility of procurement because of material and manpower short-
in Spain, but the shortage of carbon ages, but also because of bad labor rela-
black made this impossible. In fact, lack tions in the rubber industry. Labor and
of this vital component forced cutbacks management eventually signed an agree-
in U.S. production and threatened to ment which brought about a moratorium
force suspension of the program in in labor disputes affecting tire produc-
Europe. 104 tion. T h e War Department at the same
104Ltr, COMZ to SAC, 6 Jan 45, sub: Rubber
Committee, and Cbl W–60623, AGWAR to COMZ,
29 Mar 45. SHAEF AG 451.92–1 Tires and Tubes; 105
Comd and Stf Conf, Hq CZ, 8 Dec 44; COMZ
COMZ G–4 Hist, V, 45–47. G–4 Hist, V, 46, 48–49.
246 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
time released skilled workers to tire T h e War Department had taken meas-
plants to ease the manpower shortages.106 ures to counteract this trend with a de-
By these expedients the desperate theater termined drive to stimulate production.
shortage was gradually eased. In an attempt to ease the manpower
shortage General Somervell in the sum-
Production shortfalls in vehicles and mer of 1944 first secured the release
tires were fairly symptomatic of the diffi- of servicemen to foundries, and then se-
culties which had plagued munitions cured authorization to furlough u p to
output in general. I n both cases the 2,500 men for ninety-day periods to aid
shortages had been foreseen for several in the manufacture of 105-mm. shells.
months, for they had resulted in part At the same time the ASF enlisted the
from a general slackening of effort in help of the War Production Board, the
the United States. T h e production of War Manpower Commission, and the
munitions had fallen off as early as No- Military Affairs (Mead) Committee of
vember 1943 and had remained for sev- the Senate to impress upon labor the
eral months at levels unequal to ex- need for greater output. General Eisen-
pected demands. T h e contagious opti- hower had already made an appeal via
mism growing out of the midsummer the press in August for the maximum
pursuit in France encouraged this trend, flow of munitions. Early in January Gen-
causing workers to leave factories turn- eral Somervell asked the Supreme Com-
ing out badly needed munitions to seek mander to send a message to both man-
other employment. These developments, agement and labor emphasizing the crit-
combined with the increasing demands ical needs of the European theater.107
arising from unexpected consumption
and attrition in the active theaters, in- 107Ltrs, Somervell to Lee, 4 Aug 44 and 1 Dec 44,
Ltr, Somervell to Eisenhower, 12 Dec 44, and Memo,
evitably led to critical deficits. Lutes for Somervell, 17 Dec 44, all in Hq ASF
European Theater-last half of 1944; Memo, Somer-
106Memo, Somervell for Dir Office of War Mobili- vell for Clay, 7 Dec 44, H q ASF–President–White
zation and Conservation, 7 Dec 44, H q ASF–Presi- House-Exec Office 1944, Somervell file; Cbl, Somer-
dent-White House-Exec Office, 1944, Somervell vell to Eisenhower, 3 Jan 45, Cbl S–73675, SHAEF
file; Memo, no signature and n.d. [c. December], to WD, 4 Jan 44, and Cbl WAR-87134, Marshall
sub: Heavy Duty Truck and Bus Tires, H q ASF to Eisenhower, 5 Jan 45, all i n H q ASF, E T O 1945,
Notebook of Memos, Ltrs, etc., re Supplies; Byron Somervell file; Cbl E-81755, COMZ to AGWAR. 5
Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, T h e Army and Jan 45, and Cbl W–22616, AGWAR to COMZ, 19
Industrial Manpower, UNITED STATES ARMY Jan 45, all in SHAEF AG 451.92–1 Tires and Tubes,
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959). 1945.
CHAPTER IX
draw most of the remaining ammunition Drastic measures were obviously need-
into the area of the First Army.10 ed to forestall disaster. On 11 October,
COMZ officials had recognized the seri- on the recommendation of the conferees,
ousness of the unloading situation ear- 12th Army Group forced the most strin-
lier, and in the last days of September gent economy in ammunition expendi-
the G–4 and ordnance officials had tures yet imposed on U.S. forces by can-
worked out a plan calling for the un- celing the allocation already in effect
loading of eight Liberties at a time, six for the period 5–13 October and reallo-
of them at Cherbourg and the remainder cating the available ammunition to the
at the beaches.11 T h e Communications armies with the warning that no addi-
Zone had obviously counted on this pro- tional amounts would be issued until 7
gram in presenting its availability fig- November. 13
ures on 1 October. But circumstances be- In some cases the amounts now au-
yond its control intervened to upset its thorized for the thirty-three day period
schedule and discredit its predictions. were less than those originally author-
First, higher authority (presumably ized for the eight-day period; and since
SHAEF) ordered berths at Cherbourg the allocation was retroactive to 5 Octo-
freed to give priority to troop debarka- ber some of the ammunition had already
tions. Then storms virtually stopped op- been expended. In making the new al-
erations at the beaches, with the result location the army group included only
that an average of only two ships had unobligated balances in base depots,
been worked at a time and barely a thou- stocks in the continental pipeline, and
sand tons of ammunition per day had stocks which were expected to be in field
been discharged in the first week of force depots. Because of the uncertainty
October. This precipitate drop in un- of discharge it refrained from counting
loadings, combined with the generally as assets all stocks afloat off the Nor-
poor discharge record for most of Sep- mandy beaches and ports, quantities
tember, had had its inevitable effect on which the Communications Zone had ill-
COMZ depot stocks, which were reduced advisedly included as available for pur-
practically to zero in all critical items poses of allocation.14 First Army actually
through shipments to the armies.12 had to give up some of the stocks it had
built up under the previous authoriza-
10Memo, Hinds for G–3 12 A Gp, 10Oct 44, Gen
Bd file 471/1 Ammunition Supply for Field Artil-
lery. 13TWX’s, 12 A Gp to Armies, 11 Oct 44, SHAEF
11 Memo, Clark for G–4 SHAEF, 11 Oct 44, sub: G–3 O&E 471 Ammunition; Gen Bd Rpt 58, p. 25.
Ammo Allocs to Central Group of Armies for Pe- T h e available ammunition was divided between
riod 13 Oct–7 Nov, SHAEF G–4 471 Ammunition. the armies on the basis of activity factors which
1212 A Gp Ord Sec Jnl, 9 Oct 44; Etr, Capt W. E. gave 55 percent to First Army, 35 percent to Third
Gunther, SHAEF G–4 Div, to Chief Current Opns Army, and I O percent to Ninth Army. Ltr, Gunther
Br G–4, g Oct 44, sub: Rpt on Ammo Mtg; Memo, to Chief Current Opns Br G–4, 9 Oct 44, sub: Rpt
Hinds for G–3 12 A Gp, 1 0 Oct 44, Gen Bd file on Ammo Mtg, Gen Bd file 471/1 Ammunition
471/1 Ammunition Supply for Field Artillery; Supply for Field Artillery.
Memo, Clark for G–4 SHAEF, 9 Oct 44, and un- 14Memo, Clark for G–4 SHAEF, 11 Oct 44, sub:
signed tabulation of statistics on ammunition ships Ammo Allo to Central Group of Armies for Period
working, discharging, etc., in SHAEF G–4 471 Am- 13 Oct–7 Nov, SHAEF G–4 471 Ammunition; TUSA
munition. AAR, II, Ord, 14.
250 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
tion to accumulate five units of fire in November as the date until which the
order to bring about a more equitable armies would have to get along on stocks
distribution. 15 already on the Continent was predicated
Meanwhile the Communications Zone on the successful achievement of the pro-
agreed to step up unloading at once, set- posed schedule. Not until that time was
ting a target of 6,000 tons per day. TO it believed that the continental pipe-
meet this goal General Lee informed lines could be filled and a continuous
General Bradley that he was taking ac- flow of ammunition assured.17
tion to ensure the working of at least Pending the acceleration of unload-
12 ships at all times, and promised a ings, the Communications Zone at-
continuous flow of the required ammuni- tempted to provide some relief by col-
tion by not later than 24 October. At lecting scattered remnants of ammuni-
this time there were 35 loaded ammuni- tion long since left behind by the arm-
tion ships in European waters. T h e Com- ies in the base area. Approximately
munications Zone actually gave imme- 4,000 tons of the types desired by the
diate priority to the discharge of 16 field commands, which had not been
ships—6 at Cherbourg and 10 at the picked up on COMZ records, were re-
beaches. But bad weather was expected covered in this way in old dumps in the
to hold down unloading at the beaches vicinity of St. Lô, Mortain, and Alençon.
to the equivalent of 2 ships, so that cur- Additional quantities were collected and
rent priorities actually assures an ef- shipped forward from an ammunition
fective discharge of only 8. General Strat- supply point recently used by the VIII
ton proposed to better this program in Corps in Brittany.18
the near future by assigning additional In the south the 6th Army Group,
berths at Cherbourg, adding berths at which still depended on the North Afri-
Morlaix, working additional ships at the can theater for logistic support, faced
beaches, and transferring ammunition to similar difficulties as it approached the
LST’s in the United Kingdom for dis- borders of Alsace. In mid-September the
charge at Le Havre. These measures en- artillery officer of the Seventh Army re-
tailed a temporary sacrifice in the dis- ported that if, as expected, that command
charge of other supplies. They also ne- met stronger resistance in the near fu-
cessitated forwarding ammunition to the ture it would be “in a hell of a fix for
armies in bulk, and this would result
in receipts of some items not requested.
But it was expected that the net effect SHAEF G–4 471 Ammunition; Ltr, Col H. A.
would be to expedite the delivery of Nisley, 12 A Gp Ord, to G–4 12 A Gp, 30 Oct 44,
sub: Estimate of Ord Class V Situation, ADSEC 381
needed items too.16 T h e selection of 7 Supply Plan; Col Rapport in COMZ G–4 Plant
and Communications Diary/Jnl, 11 Oct 44, ETO
Adm G–4 145C.
15Memo, Hinds for G–3 12 A Gp, 10Oct 44, Gen 17Ltr, Gunther to Clark, 9 Oct 44, sub: Rpt on
Bd file 471/1 Ammunition Supply for Field Artil- Ammo Mtg, SHAEF G–4 471 Ammunition.
lery. 18Ltr, Nisley to G–4, 30 Oct 44, sub: Estimate of
1612 A Gp Ord Sec Jnl, 9 Oct 44, TWX E-53841, Ord Class V Situation, ADSEC 381 Supply Plan;
Lee to Bradley, 12 Oct 44, and Memo, Stratton for Memo, Clark for G–4 SHAEF, 9 Oct 44, SHAEF
Crawford, 12 Oct 44, sub: Discharge of Ammo Ships, G–4 471 Ammunition.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: AMMUNITION 251
ammunition.” 19 As in the north, lack when the first restrictions were imposed.
of adequate transportation and discharge Under this system First Army had pre-
were the most immediate causes for the scribed, usually for four-day periods, the
shortages, and in mid-October the un- number of rounds of each type of am-
loading of certain critical types of am- munition that each corps could fire.
munition was given the highest priority Until the end of July First Army’s con-
at Marseille. T h e 6th Army Group, trol was all-embracing, for, as the highest
like the 12th, imposed severe limitations U.S. command on the Continent, it en-
on expenditures in order to conserve joyed complete control over the entire
stocks for the November offensive.20 At supply machinery from the water’s edge
the same time 6th Army Group at- to the front line, determining priorities
tempted to obtain ammunition from in discharge and the location and level
ETOUSA for the recently transferred of reserves. When the 12th Army Group
XV Corps on the ground that the ammu- became operational on 1 August it con-
nition requirements for that corps, until tinued to allocate ammunition in es-
recently assigned to Third Army, must sentially the same manner, although it
have been requisitioned from the War increased the rationing period to eight
Department by the European theater. days. Under the system an Ammunition
But the 12th Army Group insisted that Allocation Committee composed of rep-
it had agreed to the transfer of the XV resentatives from the G–3, G–4, artillery,
Corps, including considerable artillery, and ordnance sections of 12th Army
only in the belief that the 6th Army Group (later augmented to include rep-
Group was better able to support it. In resentatives from SHAEF and the Com-
view of ETOUSA’s own desperate situa- munications Zone), met periodically and,
tion there was no prospect of its coming on the basis of availability forecasts pre-
to the aid of the forces in the south.21 sented by the Communications Zone,
established expenditure rates which
T h e October crisis had precipitated would provide ammunition for tactical
a long overdue reform in the system of missions and the build-up of the desired
control over ammunition issues and ex- reserve. Army group then authorized
penditures. T h e procedure in operation the armies to draw whatever ammuni-
up to this time was essentially the one tion was required to build their reserves
adopted by First Army in mid-June, to the authorized level, but prohibited
them from firing more than a specific
19Gen Bd Rpt 58, p. 23, citing Ltr to Arty Off 12
A Gp, 17 Sep 44. number of rounds of each type during
20Memo, Lt Col G. E. Nichols, Arty S–4 SUSA, the allocation period.
22 Nov 44, in Sixth Army Group History (mimeo);
History of Delta Base Section, III, App., p. 14; 6th
This system, though a model of sim-
A Gp G–3 Sec Final Rpt World War II, pp. 92–93. plicity, had several weaknesses and did
21Ltrs, Hinds to Maj Gen John A. Crane of not conform to doctrine laid down in
AFHQ, 13 Oct 44, Wilson to Hinds, 19 Oct 44,
and Hinds to Crane, 30 Oct 44, all in 12 A Gp 471 field service regulations. For one thing,
Ammunition General; Cbl F–43310, McNarney to with a Communications Zone established
Eisenhower, 24 Oct 44, and Cbl S–63913, SHAEF on the Continent, the army group, unlike
to AFHQ, 25 Oct 44, SHAEF Cbl Logs, Smith
Papers. the First Army in the first two months,
252 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
lacked control over the physical distribu- depots, a step expected to be completed
tion of ammunition and the disposition early in November. Under this system
of reserves. While it prescribed maxi- the army group proposed to continue
mum expenditure rates and supply levels, making allocations from time to time as
it had to depend on the Communications before on the basis of activity factors de-
Zone for figures on ammunition avail- termined by the G–3. Using these alloca-
ability. If those figures proved unreliable tions it intended to establish credits for
and shortages developed, the army which each command in designated COMZ de-
first learned of the threatened deficit pots, copies of the credits being furnished
might monopolize most of the stock of a each command and the regulating sta-
particular item by requisitioning the tion serving it. T h e system’s main fea-
quantities needed to achieve its author- ture, in contrast with past practice, was
ized reserve, as had actually occurred that credits would henceforth be written
in the case of First Army. Secondly, the only against ammunition physically pres-
system made no provision for informing ent in forward depots. In other words,
the armies on supply beyond the next allocations would be based on stocks
allocation period, with the result that actually available for issue and not on
all long-range planning was clouded with quantities on manifest or on expected
uncertainty. Finally, the system pro- deliveries. For the next few weeks the
vided no incentive for conserving am- armies’ tonnage allocations were to be
munition during quiet periods. It thus used to rebuild ADSEC ammunition de-
encouraged wasteful firing, for all am- pots-mainly at Liège, Verdun, and Sois-
munition unexpended at the end of an sons-from which the armies were then
allocation period reverted to army group to draw on their accounts. T h e new sys-
control. Those that did not shoot u p tem gave the army group a more com-
their ration felt justified in falsifying plete control of the distribution of avail-
their expenditure reports in order to able stocks and gave reasonable assur-
carry over their savings into the next ance to the armies that ammunition allo-
period as a rainy day reserve.22 cated to them would actually be avail-
Twelfth Army Group took the first able. T h e new procedure also provided
step in overhauling the entire control an incentive to save, and thus encouraged
procedure on 11 October, when it allo- prudent shooting, for all ammunition
al-
cated the existing stocks of critical items locatedto the armies remained to their
on the Continent and established credits credit whether expanded or not. 23
for the three armies in the various depots. T h e armies still regarded the system
T e n days later it announced the adoption which the army group outlined on 21
of a credit system on a permanent basis, October as defective in two respects:
to become operative as soon as stocks like the earlier rationing system, it did
had again been rebuilt in the forward not provide the armies with informa-
tion on future supply, so necessary for
planning purposes; and, because the Each forecast was divided into three ten-
army group still imposed maximum ex- day periods. T h e amounts shown for the
penditure rates, it gave the armies little first period constituted a firm commit-
latitude in the use of their ammunition. ment. This was divided between the
Under the system just announced, ra- three armies and credits for each were
tioning was to be retained as part of the established in the forward depots. T h e
credit system. This meant in effect that amounts shown for the two succeeding
the armies would be given allocations of periods constituted estimates of resup-
ammunition but told that they could ply issuedfor planning purposesalone.
25
only fire at certain rates. Ammunition could still be drawn only
T h e army group artillery section, against established credits. Forecasts
headed by Brig. Gen. John H. Hinds, therefore had to be issued every ten days,
had repeatedly recommended that am- consisting of an actual allocation in the
munition be allocated on a credit basis form of credits, and revised estimates
and without limitation on its use. Gen- on future supply. In its first forecast,
eral Hinds argued that rationing was issued on 6 November, only a few days
contrary to the basic principle of giving before the November offensive, the army
a commander a mission and the means group informed the armies that it did
without dictating the details of method. not plan to establish any reserves of its
T h e armies, he maintained, were closer own and warned that they must now
in both time and space to the battle use their own discretion in determining
than the army group headquarters, whose the scale of firing and in establishing
only justification for continuing ration- reserves to take care of fluctuations in
ing was its knowledge of resupply pros- the flow of supply and to meet emergen-
pects. He urged the elimination of ex- cies.26
penditure limitations, therefore, and pro- Neither the credit system nor its ac-
posed instead that the armies be kept companying forecast procedure guaran-
fully informed of the resupply situation, teed an adequate supply of ammunition.
and that they be permitted to use their But a true credit system had at last been
own judgment as to how to expend the worked out along the lines prescribed in
ammunition made available to them.24 field service regulations in which allo-
On 5 November the army group cations were based on actual availability,
adopted this proposal and replaced the in which the army group possessed ade-
former limitation on expenditures with quate command control over the distri-
a periodic forecast of future supply. It bution of ammunition, and in which the
now began issuing thirty-day forecasts
to the armies, taking into account all
ammunition on hand and becoming due. 25Credits and forecasts were based mainly on ac-
tivity factors prescribed by the G–3 and by the
distribution of weapons.
24
Memo, Hinds for G–3, G–4, and Ord Sec 12 A 26Ltr, 12 A Gp to FUSA, 6 Nov 44, sub: Ammo
Gp, 4 Nov 44, sub: Ammo Estimates, and Ltr, Hinds Supply of FUSA, FUSA 471 Ammunition 1Ar–15,
to Brig Gen C. E. Hart, FUSA Arty Off, 8 Nov 44, Drawer 2; Ltr, 12 A Gp to NUSA, 6 Nov 44, sub:
12 A Gp 471/1 Ammunition Allocations; 12 A Gp Ammo Supply of NUSA, 12 A Gp 471 Ammunition,
Ord Sec Jnl, 4 Nov 44: Gen Bd Rpt 58, pp. 58–59. V; 12 A Gp Ord Sec Jnl, 5 Nov 44.
254 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
STREETFIGHTING
IN AACHEN, 15 October 1944.
most of the major items of field artillery in the 12th Army Group, expenditure
ammunition.33 reports show that Third Army operated
under the severest handicap. In one of
The crisis in ammunition supply left the worst weeks of the ammunition fam-
its mark on the fighting in October. T h e ine-from 15 to 21 October–firing by
shortage of ammunition, more than any the 105-mm. howitzer, the main artillery
other factor, determined the character support weapon of the division, was held
of tactical operations that month. Gen- to 1.1 rounds per gun per day of action
eral Bradley had immediately recognized against a desired expenditure rate of
that major offensive operations were out 60, and a total of only 3,401 rounds was
of the question until minimum reserves fired. First Army, by comparison, fired at
were reconstituted and a steady flow of the rate of 30 rounds per weapon per
ammunition was assured. Except for the day and expended a total of 109,469
action leading to the capture of Aachen rounds. Third Army’s 155-mm.howitzers
by the First Army, therefore, and minor fired at the rate of .4 rounds per day,
probing attacks, activity was relatively expending a total of 553 rounds, while
light along the entire front occupied by First Army’s fired at the rate of 15 rounds
U.S. forces. per gun per day, expending a total of
While the ammunition shortage re- 24,341 rounds. Much of First Army’s
stricted the operations of all three armies heavier firing was done in the attacks
38 ADSEC Operations History, App. E; Gen Bd
on Aachen, and Third Army’s only major
Rpt 58, p. 29. action in October–the attack on Metz—
256 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
a No data.
Source; Memo, Col T. B. Hedekin, 12 A Gp Arty Sec, for G–3 12 A Gp, 19 Nov 44.12 A Gp 471 Ammunition General
had to be called off for lack of ammuni- ies turned to tank destroyers, tanks, and
tion. antiaircraft weapons for employment in
Comparative expenditure figures for their secondary role as artillery. 36
the major artillery weapons in the three Both First and Third Armies also
armies for that week are given in Table made maximum use of captured enemy
5. In the period from 11 October to 7 guns and ammunition, in some cases
November Third Army’s expenditure in equipping American units with German
all calibers, which totaled 76,325 rounds, weapons, like the 10.5-cm. howitzer, and
barely equaled its expenditures on a firing captured ammunition, in others
single day at the height of the Ardennes using enemy ammunition in American
battle in December.34 weapons, as was successfully done in the
T h e small ration necessarily forced case of the 155-mm. howitzer and the
drastic restrictions on the employment 81-mm. mortar. In the last week of Octo-
of field artillery. In the XX Corps (Third ber 80 percent of all the ammunition
Army), for example, the artillery com- fired by the XX Corps in Third Army
mander issued instructions enjoining the consisted of captured ammunition. On
use of artillery for anything but counter- 10 October XX Corps in the course of
attacks endangering the battle position, its attacks on Maizieres les Metz fired a
counterbattery against active enemy time-on-target mission using German 88-
guns, and observed fire on only the most mm. guns and 105-mm. howitzers, Rus-
lucrativetargets.
35 Since 75-mm., 76-mm.,
3-inch, and 90-mm. tank and antitank
36Ibid.; Ltr, Kean to Corps Comdrs FUSA, 15
ammunition and 40-mm. antiaircraft am- Oct 44, sub: Fld Arty Firing, FUSA 471 1Ar–20;
munition were fairly plentiful, all arm- TUSA AAR, II, Ord, 14; Ltr, Lt Col John Ray,
FUSA Ammo Off, to FUSA Ord Off, 12 Nov 44,
sub: Ammo Supply Rpt, Western Europe, 1–31
34 TUSA AAR, II, Arty, 32. Oct 44, Gen Bd file 471/1 Arty Sec, Entry 39, Box
35Gen Bd Rpt 58, p. 28. 43.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: AMMUNITION 257
sian 76.2-mm. guns, and French 155-mm. port and discharge capacity which had
howitzers, in addition to American 155- resulted from the dash across France.
mm. guns and tanks and tank destroy-
ers.37 (2) Contention With the War
Despite these expedients the shortage Department
was seriously felt all along the American
Theater officials, while attempting to
front. Unit after unit reported its in-
solve the immediate crisis by accelerat-
ability to take targets of opportunity
ing the unloading of ships, realized that
under fire, and complained that the in-
the ammunition problem had another
ability to use its artillery took the teeth
side. A more ominous shortage threat-
out of its attacks. T h e artillery officer of
ened, particularly in the heavier calibers
the 35th Division (Third Army) re-
and in mortar ammunition, because of
ported that one of the division’s regi-
inadequate shipments from the United
ments had been twice repulsed for lack
States.
of artillery support in attempts to take
T h e theater had forewarned the War
an objective.
38 The commanding gen-
Department of rising requirements for
eral of the VI Corps (Seventh Army), ammunition as early as March 1944,
operating in the St. Die area in northern when it raised its estimates of future
Alsace, reported that he could provide needs substantially over the figures it
adequate artillery support in the attack had presented in January, and again in
to only one division at a time.39Artillery May, when the tactical commands had
support was particularly important dur- adopted new “agreed rates,” which the
ing bad weather because of the absence theater thereafter used to substantiate
of air support. Bad weather also resulted its requests for future shipments. Just
in more unobserved fire, which in turn before D Day the War Department had
involved greater expenditure. given assurance that it would meet the
In the entire period of operations on theater’s “initial requirements,” al-
the Continent the month of October pro- though it predicted shortages in 60- and
vided the clearest case of supply defi- 81-mm. mortar, 105-mm. howitzer, 8-
ciency thwarting tactical operations. In inch, 240-mm. howitzer, and 155-mm.
one sense the ammunition shortage epit- gun ammunition at D plus 30 and con-
omized the dire effects of the pursuit, tinued shortages in certain categories at
for its immediate causes were largely at- D plus 60. T h e Communications Zone
tributable to the inadequacy of trans- in turn had informed the tactical com-
mands that they could depend on re-
ceiving their requirements in virtually
37Ammunition Supply and Operations, European all types of ammunition through D plus
Campaign, Gen Bd Rpt 100, p. 23 and App. 7;
TUSA AAR, II, Arty, 1 1 ; Gen Bd Rpt 58, p. 28.
70.40
38See observer reports submitted to Maj. Gen. As early as July the theater had been
Everett S. Hughes by Lt. Gen. Ben Lear on the forced to request additional shipments
adequacy of supply arrangements in the ETO.
ETO 400 Supplies, Services, and Equipment.
39Rpt, Col Louis T . Heath, G–3 Arty Sec 6 A 40See Logistical Support I, 537–38, and Gen Bd
Gp, to G–3, 23 Nov 44, Sixth Army Group History. Rpt 58, pp. 9–10.
258 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
of several types, and early in August the fall far short of the requirement for 8-
Supreme Commander made a personal inch gun ammunition, in which produc-
appeal for additional releases of the two tion was very low.43 With these releases
most critical types—155-mm. howitzer the War Department left no doubt that
and 81-mm. mortar ammunition. T h e it was according the highest operational
War Department was able to provide priority to the European theater, for
some relief in these categories, but by these shipments exhausted the stocks of
mid-September U.S. forces faced more these items in the zone of interior and
serious shortages, mainly as the result of entailed the diversion of all October and
their tactical successes. Late in the month November commitments to other thea-
the theater, pointing out that U.S. forces ters and the suspension of training of
had advanced much faster than expected newly formed heavy artillery units in the
and now faced the heavily fortified United States.
44
West Wall, reported an urgent need for T h e late September releases in the
ammunition in the heavier calibers—8- heavy calibers went far toward alleviat-
inch howitzer and gun and 240-mm. how- ing the shortage in the theater and, to-
itzer. All three types had already been gether with the speed-up in unloadings,
rationed for several weeks and, accord- put the theater in a much improved posi-
ing to the theater, if expended at the de- tion for the November offensive.
sired rates—that is, in concentrations re- Two weeks later-on 14 October—the
quired to break through the German theater submitted its requirements for
defenses—would be exhausted in from November loading and thereby precipi-
fifteen to twenty-five days.41T h e theater tated a new and more voluminous ex-
concluded that only the immediate ship- change with the War Department over
ment of ammunition already set up for the reasonableness of the requests. T h e
future loadings would alleviate the cur- theater, recalling an argument which had
rent shortage. It asked that approxi- begun in August over ammunition requi-
mately 90,000 rounds be dispatched on sitioning practices, and apparently antici-
two fast freighters without delay.42 pating difficulties, took pains to empha-
Within twenty-four hours of the re- size that its requirements had been care-
quest the War Department announced fully computed and that they should not
that it would meet the demand for 8-
inch howitzer ammunition in full and 43T h e War Department announced shipments of
56,250 rounds of 8-inch howitzer ammunition
would come withina few hundred
against the request for 55,511, 21,490 rounds of
rounds of filling the need for 240-mm. 240-mm. howitzer ammunition against the request
howitzer ammunition, but that it would for 22,130 (a shortage of 640 rounds), but only
3,848 rounds of 8-inch gun ammunition against
the requirement of 11,023. Total production of the
41T h e Twelfth Army Group had asked for a last in Septembercameto only 5,000 rounds.
supply adequate to permit firing 8-inch howitzer, 44Cbl, Marshall to Eisenhower, 24 Sep 44, Memo,
8-inch gun, and 240-mm. howitzer ammunition at Marshall for Byrnes, 25 Sep 44, and Memo for
the rate of 25, 15, and 15 rounds per gun per day, Record, 24 Sep 44, sub: Request for Heavy Arty
respectively, as against the current ration of 13, 10, Ammo (ETO), all in OPD 471 ETO Sec. I, Cases
and 11 rounds. 1-16; Cbl WX–41189, AGWAR to Larkin, 4 Oct
42Cbl EX-49415, COMZ to AGWAR, 23 Sep 44, 44, SHAEF AG 471–5 Summary of Ammunition
12 A G p Ammunition, Allocations and Credits, I. Position.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: AMMUNITION 259
be judged on the basis of past expendi- releases could not be increased substan-
tures, since firing had been restricted tially without serious detriment to other
from almost the beginning because of theaters. Finally, ignoring the theater’s
the nonavailability of ammunition. It ad- explanation of its unloading difficulties,
mitted that the shortages had resulted it again pointed to the excessive number
primarily from unloading and transpor- of vessels awaiting discharge in Euro-
tation difficulties within the theater. But pean waters.
46
it was confident that these problems The theater promptly responded with
would soon be overcome and predicted a more detailed justification of its de-
that expenditures would certainly in- mands. Regarding the problem of idle
crease. 45 ammunition ships, it noted that under
T h e War Department was not im- the recently inaugurated speed-up pro-
pressed with the theater’s explanations gram all vessels in European waters
and proceeded to deny a large portion would be unloaded in twenty or thirty
of its requests on the ground of either days. It explained, furthermore, that al-
unavailability or lack of justification for though quantities of certain items pres-
the demands. In the case of 155-mm. ently afloat–particularly 105-mm. howitz-
howitzer and gun ammunition the War ers, 155-mm. howitzer, 8-inch gun, and
Department stated that it was providing 240-mm. howitzer ammunition–were suf-
only 56 and 36 percent respectively of ficient to meet current shortages, this was
the theater's requests because they were only because past expenditures had
in excess of both the authorized theater either been limited by rationing and in-
level based on the War Department day adequate transportation, or had been
of supply and the War Department allo- low because of the nature of operations
cation of those two critically short items. during the pursuit. Ordnance officials
For the same reasons it offered to ship presented figures to show that quantities
only 26 and 51 percent respectively of afloat would not be sufficient to cover
the theater's requests for 81-mm. mortar shortages had expenditures not been re-
and 105-mm. howitzer ammunition. In stricted, and that expenditures at the
some cases the hard fact of nonavailabil- armies' desired rates, or even the author-
ity simply precluded shipments in the ized War Department day of supply
amounts desired. The War Department rates, could not have been supported
pointed out that the theater was already from War Department releases. In brief,
getting all the 8-inch gun and 240-mm. shipments from the United States had
howitzer ammunition and almost all the fallen far short of the theater’s requests.
8-inch howitzer ammunition being pro- T h e SHAEF G–4 estimated that all
duced, and that its request for 105-mm. ammunition then afloat would be ashore
howitzer ammunition–5,328,000 rounds by 3 November, but that there still
–was two and one-half times the total would be shortages in all categories at
October production. In other categories that time. On that date, in other words,
the immediate cause of the deficit would conclusive experiential data at that
shift from inadequate discharges to short- time. T h e War Department granted
ages in the theater. In a memorandum some of the desired revisions in August,
for record General Crawford noted that but it rejected others as unjustified either
the theater had begun to warn the War by expected combat activity or by ex-
Department of expected shortages in penditure reports from the Mediter-
81-mm. mortar and medium artillery ranean area.48
ammunition as early as January 1944, In a sense all subsequent discussion of
and expressed the opinion that the War changes in the day of supply rates was
Department should b y this time have academic, for dominating the War De-
taken action to increase production. partment’s attitude was the grim fact
Most exasperating of all from the point that current production in the United
of view of the theater was the War De- States simply could not meet the mount-
partment’s repeated reference to the fact ing demands from overseas theaters. In
that past expenditures had been below fact, the August revisions did not in
the day of supply rate, which ignored the reality go into effect. T h e War Depart-
theater’s argument that past expendi- ment approved them with the warning
tures had been restricted and should not that ammunition was not immediately
be used as a measure of future needs.47 available in sufficient amounts to permit
T h e War Department’s challenging shipments at the new rates, and cau-
questions were inspired in part by its tioned the theater that the increases
knowledge of production shortages in should in no way be considered as a
the United States and in part by the sus- basis for requests to achieve maximum
picion that the theater’s requests were authorized levels in the theater. 49 More-
not fully justified. T h e theater had re- over, there had been no real test of the
peatedly agitated for higher day of s u p adequacy of current rates, for ammuni-
ply rates—the rates on which ammunition tion was never supplied at the estab-
requisitions and the accounting of stocks lished rates. Late in September, when
in the theater were based. Both theater the 12th Army Group asked the armies
and War Department officials had recog- for recommended changes in the supply
nized that operational experience on the rates based on their combat experience
Continent would probably dictate revi- thus far, First Army replied that it did
sions for some items of ammunition. T h e not feel competent to propose changes,
theater, after consulting with the field for there was no way of knowing whether
forces, had recommended certain changes the authorized rates would have been
as early as 21 J u n e despite its lack of adequate in view of the fact that ammu-
nition had never been supplied at those gued, was not an asset until received.
rates.50 To achieve even the minimum level re-
Fundamental to the arguments over quired for adequate support of the field
the adequacy of ammunition supply, and forces necessitated that shipments be
tending to confirm War Department based on the seventy-five day author-
doubts as to the legitimacy of the thea- ized level plus anticipated expenditures
ter’s requests were the differences in through the date of arrival in the theater.
interpretation of the ground rules gov- Since requirements were placed three
erning the calculation of requirements months in advance, therefore, they in-
to cover shipping and distribution time cluded not only quantities needed to
and, to a lesser extent, the accounting of achieve the authorized level, but ex-
stocks actually in the pipeline. T h e same penditures expected from the time the
problem had arisen in connection with requisition was placed until the time of
major Class II and IV items in which delivery. This explained why requests
the loss rates were unpredictable, such exceeded the level based on the War
as tanks.51 T h e War Department had Department day of supply rate.52
authorized ETOUSA to have between Furthermore, the theater had not
forty-five and seventy-five days of supply counted basic loads of ammunition-the
of ammunition on hand in the theater. amounts which individuals and unit ve-
Experience in the first two months, as hicles were allowed to carry-as part of
the theater had pointed out as early as the theater’s assets. T o include them, the
August, had shown that a minimum of theater argued, only distorted the true
fifteen days was required for discharge status of ammunition supply. Ammuni-
and shipment to a depot before ammuni- tion in the hands of troops, it main-
tion could be considered available for tained, was lost insofar as theater stock-
issue. Interruptions in supply, losses from ages were concerned, for it was a frozen
enemy action, and variations in expendi- asset which could not be moved from
ture further reduced the quantities avail-
able in the forward areas. Thus, al- 52Ltr, ETO to ASF, 31 Aug 44, sub: Ammo
though as many as seventy-five days of Rqmts for October Loading, EUCOM 471 Alloca-
tions of Ammunition, II; Cbl WARX–26353, WD
supply plus the number of days of supply to ETO, 6 Sep 44, Cbls, SS&P Plng Div 201.02,
representing the shipping time might be A46–371; Cbl S–63033, SHAEF to AGWAR, 19 Oct
released to the port of embarkation, 44. A later analysis of ammunition shipments cover-
ing the period July 1944–January 1945 showed that
there was no assurance that the mini- an average of 54 days elapsed between the sub-
mum of forty-five days of supply would mission of a requisition on the zone of interior and
actually be available for issue on the the arrival of the first rounds in theater waters,
and that a n additional 24 days elapsed before the
Continent. Ammunition in the zone of ammunition actually became available for issue: 14
interior or on manifest, the theater ar- to discharge, 7 to move to a n intermediate o r ad-
vance section, and 3 to inventory and transmit rec-
ords to the army group. An average of 78 days
50Ltr, 12 A Gp to Armies, 23 Sep 44, sub: Day therefore elapsed before the first round was issued
of Supply for Ammo, with replies, 12 A G p 471 as the result of a theater. request. Memo, Lt. Col.
Ammunition Day of Supply. J. B. Goodell, Deputy Chief, Ammo Supply Div 12
51See Logistical Support I, 522–23, and see above, A G p Ord, for ExO, 29 Jan 45. sub: Levels of
Ch. VIII, Sec. 3. Supply in ETOUSA, 12 A G p 319.1 Reports.
262 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
one unit to another to meet changing essing orders and shipping. By its own
tactical conditions. Moreover, basic loads calculation the War Department con-
represented substantial quantities when tended that there already was enough
compared with the seventy-five-day level, ammunition en route or scheduled for
ranging from five to ten days in the case loading to maintain the theater’s level
of artillery ammunition and from ten until 1 December.54
days upward in the case of small arms For the moment, at least, this argu-
ammunition. T o count these as part of ment was unresolved. In the meantime
the total theater supply level would limit General Eisenhower, faced with the de-
the actual reserves to a dangerous level. mands for the November offensive, per-
T h e theater protested strongly against sonally cabled General Marshall on 20
policy. 53 and 22 October in an attempt to con-
These interpretations of the rules were vince the War Department of the gravity
unacceptable to the War Department. It of the theater’s ammunition situation. I n
agreed with the theater that ammunition the view of the Supreme Commander,
afloat between the port of embarkation three facts stood out: Certain types of
and ETOUSA ports should not be ammunition were unavailable because-of
counted against the theater’s authorized insufficient production in the United
level. For accounting purposes it con- States; the War Department in the past
sidered ammunition as part of the thea- had not released the quantities re-
ter’s stocks only after the vessels had quested; and now the War Department
come under theater control. But it did was also cutting down on the lift allo-
not agree with the theater’s insistence on cated to the European theater.55
maintaining a level of forty-five to sev- Once more General Eisenhower em-
enty-five days physically on the Conti- phasized that the theater could not be
nent, and it rejected the argument that assured of an adequate supply as long
basic loads should not be included as as shipments were based on past expendi-
part of total theater stocks. T h e War tures in view of the necessity to ration
Department had intended that the au- heavy calibers since shortly after D Day.
thorized maximum level-seventy-five It appeared clear to him that every ex-
days in ETOUSA’s case-should repre- pedient must be applied to step u p pro-
sent all stocks under the theater’s con- duction. Referring to the speed-up in
trol whether afloat or in depots. It ap- unloadings, he stated that that program
peared that for each thirty-day period could be supported for the time being
the theater was requisitioning three with the ships then on hand and the
months’ requirements without taking twenty arriving in November, but not
into account the War Department’s own beyond the end of the month in view of
system for keeping in the pipeline the the cut in sailings. General Eisenhower
amounts necessary to offset time for proc- stressed that the uncertainty of ammuni-
tion supply was worrying commanders
53Cbl EX-60321, Lee to AGWAR, 4 Nov 44,
SHAEF AG 471–5 Summary of Ammunition Posi- 54Cbl W–49721, AGWAR to SHAEF, 20 Oct 44,
tion; Cbl E–52905, Lee to AGWAR, 7 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 471 Ammunition.
EUCOM 471/1 Ammunition Policy. 55See above, Ch. IV, Sec. 4.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: AMMUNITION 263
at all levels, and that tactical plans for and, in the case of critical items, might
the immediate future hinged on the as- result in unnecessary deficiencies else-
surance of an adequate supply. He urged where. He asked that requisitions sub-
the immediate shipment of 75,000 tons mitted by General Devers to the North
of mortar and artillery ammunition, African theater for the southern armies
promising the highest unloading priority be cleared and approved by the European
and a speedy turnaround of shipping.56 theater before submission to the War
Once more the Supreme Command- Department. Better still, he suggested
er’s personal appeal brought results. T h e that a unified supply system with undi-
Army Chief of Staff promptly assured vided responsibility would be welcome. 57
General Eisenhower that everyone in the Meanwhile he assured General Eisen-
War Department was cognizant of the hower that the top officials of the War
theater’s problem and realized the need Department from the Secretary of War
for “generous supply and firm commit- down were personally working on the
ments.” General Marshall saw no pros- ammunitionproblem.
58
pect of increasing the October and early
November loadings in the critical cali- ( 3 ) T h e November Offensive and the
bers-that is, 105-mm. and larger and Bull Mission
81-mm. mortar ammunition. But he be- In the meantime Generals Bradley and
lieved that substantially all of the the- Devers launched the November offen-
ater’s needs to the end of December sive with the ammunition which the
could be met, and he promised that armies had so painstakingly accumu-
ETOUSA would get the maximum quan- lated and husbanded during October.
tities becoming available, subject only Early in the month the 12th Army Group
to meeting the minimum operational re- announced the activity factors which
quirements of other theaters. were to govern the distribution of all
Two aspects of the problem still con-
cerned him. He pointed to the fact that 57Special shipments had only recently been made
the nineteen ships already in European to southern France for overland delivery to troops
waters plus those en route would give in the north, and additional shipments were made
to that area for troops transferred from the 12th
the theater 3,000,000 rounds of 105-mm. to the 6th Army Group. T h e War Department be-
ammunition and 1,200,000 rounds of 81- lieved these to be duplicate requisitions. Responsi-
mm. mortar ammunition, implying that bility for the supply of the 6th Army Group was
actually assumed by the Communications Zone on
the situation was not as desperate as 20 November, and requisitions from the two army
suggested. In addition, the Chief of Staff groups were henceforth to be consolidated and sub-
deplored the divided responsibility for mitted by the Communications Zone. Memo for
Record, unsigned, 17 Oct 44. sub: Status of Arty
supply of the northern and southern Ammo, OPD 471 ETO Sec. II, Cases 17–30: Ltr,
forces in the theater. Requisitioning by COMZ to SAC, 25 Nov 44, sub: 6th A Gp Ammo
the North African theater for the 6th Supply, SHAEF AG 471–5 Summary of Ammuni-
tion Position.
Army Group made duplication possible, 58Cbl W–50677, Marshall to Eisenhower, 22 Oct
44, Eyes Only Cbls, Smith Papers; Cbl W–51013,
Marshall to Eisenhower, 23 Oct 44, and Ltr, Lutes
56Cbls S–63259 and E-56546, Eisenhower to Mar- to Crawford, 25 Oct 3 in SHAEF G–4 471 Am-
shall, 20 and 22 Oct 44, OPD Cbl Files. munition.
264 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
eral Eisenhower’s appeal, the War De- prospects. In view of the War Depart-
partment notified the theater that the ment’s previous warnings the latest fore-
recent demands from the European as cast therefore should hardly have occa-
well as other theaters had completely sioned surprise. But the argument in
drained zone of interior stocks of certain October over the reasonableness of
items. In some cases releases had actually ETOUSA’s requests had obviously ob-
obligated total anticipated production scured, for the theater at least, the fact
through 10November because of unfore- that ammunition simply was not avail-
seen shortfalls in October production. 64 able in the desired quantities. Theater
A week later the War Department officials were incredulous over the latest
spelled out its warning in greater detail, forecast, and in expressing their disap-
informing the theater that despite in- pointment repeated their previous argu-
creasing production, it had grave doubts ment that past expenditures should not
about meeting ETOUSA’s demands in form the basis for computing the the-
the next three to six months. Current ater’s needs, ignoring the hard fact of
shipments, it noted, were being sched- production shortfalls. 66
uled directly from production lines to A few days later the theater, seemingly
dockside, and did not equal the theater’s unaware of the recent communications
anticipated rates of expenditure. Stocks from the War Department, submitted
already in the theater plus quantities en its requirements for December loading
route thus represented total resources. on the basis of rates which it had recom-
T h e theater, the War Department cau- mended more than a month before. Gen-
tioned, must plan its expenditures in the eral Somervell made no attempt to con-
light of these facts, and with the full ceal his annoyance with the theater’s
understanding that any expenditures in action which, he said, “had been taken
excess of the department’s announced re- without any regard whatsoever to the
supply rate must be supported from the- information which had been supplied
ater reserves and could not be replaced you.” He suspected that either the the-
from the United States. T h e War De- ater was refusing to face reality or that
partment saw little possibility of im- its left hand did not know what its right
provement within the next ninety days, was doing, and he asked that it recom-
for it estimated that any increase in pro- pute its needs on the basis of minimum
duction would be matched by the the- needs rather than optimum supply con-
ater’s rising troop strength. 65 ditions.67
T h e War Department’s response to T h e theater in the meantime had
the recent appeal had obviously been a passed the War Department’s 6 Novem-
stopgap measure which had required ber forecasts on to the army groups,
scraping the barrel of U.S. ammunition
stocks. It had not altered long-range 66 Cbl E-62083, ETO to WD, 10 Nov 44, Cbls,
SS&P Planning Div 201.02, A46–371.
67Cbl E-63957, ETO to WD, 15 Nov 44, and Cbl
64 Cbl WARX–54796, WD to ETO, 30 Oct 44, WARX–64914, WD to ETO, 18 Nov 44, Cbls,
Cbls SS&P Planning Div 201.02, A46–371. SS&P Planning Div 201.02, A46–371; Ltr, Somervell
65 Cbl WX–58388, Somervell to Eisenhower, 6 to Lee, 18 Nov 44, Hq ASF European Theater-1st
Nov 44, SHAEF G–3 O&E 471 Ammunition. Half 1944.
266 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
TABLE
6—12THARMYGROUP ARTILLERYAMMUNITION
EXPENDITURES,
6 JUNE–2 OCTOBER WITH
1944, COMPARED
DAYOF SUPPLYRATES
Source: Memo, Hinds for Moses, 19 Nov 44,Memos-Moses, SHAEF 12 A Gp G–4, Folder 86.
able to the theater and to obtain data theater day of supply rate and in most
on supply in the combat zone. cases had been only one third to one
T h e reaction was a familiar one. Pre- half of the desired expenditure rates.
senting detailed statistics and charts, the (Table 6) General Bradley still hoped
6th Army Group showed how miserly it to be provided with sufficient ammuni-
had had to be in its expenditures for tion to permit firing at the “desired
weeks in order to build u p the three rates” during the current offensive, or
units of fire necessary for the November until mid-December. But the desired
offensive, and how, after firing these rates, on which the 12th Army Group
stocks in the initial attacks, it had again had based requirements in the past, were
had to tailor its operation to the small obviously unattainable for long-range
trickle of supply. Continued resupply supply and actually had little relation-
at the same rates, it maintained, would ship to the average expenditures over
permit nothing better than an active a long period. Considering the number
of inactive divisions and the periods of
General Moses had gathered together regrouping and light fighting, General
the 12th Army Group expenditures rec- Bradley estimated that a long-term main-
ord in the main types of artillery ammu- tenance rate, if maintained for several
nition for the entire period from 6 June months, would permit the accumulation
to 22 October to show that in no case of ammunition in sufficient quantities
had expenditures been possible at the to cover the heavy requirements during
periods of offensive operations. He im-
74Memo, 6 A Gp for Bull and Clay, 23 Nov 44, mediately queried the armies on this
sub: Ammo Consumption Rqmt Analysis, EUCOM,
SHAEF Plans and Operations, 23 Nov 44–26 Jan
proposal and then recommended the fol-
45; 6 A Gp G–3 Sec Final Rpt, p. 95. lowing long-range maintenance rates in
268 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
place of the old desired expenditure rates Generals Bull and Clay flew to Wash-
for the four most critical items: ington at the end of November, and
within a few days General Bull reported
generally satisfactory results for the mis-
sion. T h e theater’s immediate crisis was
to be resolved by three expedients: some
In every case the rates recommended ammunition found by the ASF which
by the 12th Army Group commander could be rapidly reconditioned was to
still exceeded the resupply potential an- be shipped promptly; by various short-
nounced by the War Department. More- cuts and special handling the delivery
over, the army group also wanted four- time for all ammunition was to be re-
teen days’ reserves established in ADSEC duced; and an all-out effort was to be
depots. Considering the need for a the- made to assemble all components on
ater reserve and working margins in the hand and thus increase the total produc-
Communications Zone, General Moses tion output for December and January.
concluded that the outlook was “pretty These measures promised to improve the
sad.” T h e history of ammunition supply supply potential in all calibers, and par-
thus far indicated to him that the theater ticularly in 105-mm. howitzer ammuni-
had been permitted to embark on Opera- tion, in which the increase was expected
tion OVERLORD without any certainty of to sustain the desired maintenance rate
receiving sufficient ammunition to carry through April 1945. In addition, the
on operations against continued stiff re- War Department was to make an effort
sistance. He suspected, furthermore, that to bring new capacity then under con-
the War Department, despite the the- struction into production at an earlier
ater’s repeated protestations, had fallen date than then scheduled. General Bull
into the habit of editing the theater’s reported excellent co-operation from the
requisitions on the basis of past expendi- staffs of General Somervell and the Chief
tures. These, he maintained, had no bear- of Ordnance, and returned to the theater
ing whatever on the problem of future satisfied that the War Department was
supply, and he strongly opposed having making every effort within its power to
General Clay use such data in his dis- meet ETOUSA’s needs. 76
cussion with the War Department or T h e War Department’s steps to boost
having him attempt any estimate as to the production of field artillery ammuni-
what the armies could or could not do tion actually antedated the theater’s most
with the ammunition made available at recent appeal by several months. In the
the new rates. In Moses’ opinion Gen-
erals Clay and Bull should do no more Memo, Moses for Bradley, 22 Nov 44, and Memo
for Record, Moses, 26 Nov 44, sub: Visit of Bull
than present the theater’s stated require- and Clay, all in Memos—Moses, SHAEF 12 A Gp
ments and assert that failure to meet G–4 Folder 86; Ltr, Moses to Bull, 26 Nov 44,
them would seriously hamper or halt OPD 471 ETO Sec. I, Cases 1–16.
76General Clay did not return to the theater.
offensive operations.75 Cbl W–71199, Bull to Smith, 1 Dec 44, SHAEF
G–4 471 .Ammunition; Memo, Bull for Eisenhower,
75Memo for Record, Moses, 21 Nov 44. sub: 3 Dec 44, sub: Critical Ammo Items, Gen Bd file
Ammo Rates, Memo, Moses for Bull, 21 Nov 44, 471/1 Ammunition Supply for Field Artillery.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: AMMUNITION 269
fall of 1943 the War Department had such jobs, as the lag in production of
ordered a cutback in production under 8-inch ammunition had shown. Mean-
the pressure of criticism from a Congres- while the War Department pressed for
sional committee because of excess ac- the maximum output with existing fa-
cumulations of stocks, particularly in cilities, making the necessary manpower
the North African theater. T h e excess in deferments and even furloughing men
North Africa had resulted from the auto- from the service to work in munitions
matic shipment of ammunition on the plants. 77
basis of empirical day of supply data These measures were only beginning
which failed to reflect the relatively in- to be reflected in production increases
active status of weapons over long pe- when the theater made its urgent ap-
riods of time. Early in 1944 the demands peals in November, and the actions which
for ammunition rose precipitately as the the War Department could take to effect
result of the increased tempo of fighting an immediate acceleration in the flow
on all fronts, and particularly as the re- of ammunition were limited to the ex-
sult of unexpectedly high expenditures pedients mentioned above. Earlier in
in Italy and ETOUSA’s upward revisions November, in an attempt to provide ad-
of its requirements for the coming in- ditional incentives to production in exist-
vasion. These developments led the Plan- ing facilities, and to publicize the ur-
ning Division of the ASF, after a thor- gency of the ammunition situation, the
ough survey of the ammunition situa- Secretary of War had suggested that the
tion, to predict a critical shortage in theater send back artillery crews as spe-
mortar and medium and heavy artillery cial emissaries for a tour of production
ammunition by November. centers. Late that month, during the Bull
On this forecast the War Department mission, the theater responded by flying
in April began allocating ammunition one mortar crew and two artillery gun
on the basis of the number of active crews, comprising twenty-seven enlisted
weapons in each theater. Within another men, to the United States. 78
month, after additional studies and rec-
ommendations from the various ASF di- (4) Ammunition Supply in December
visions, the War Department General and January
Staff assigned the highest priority to the T h e emergency measures taken as a
construction of additional production fa- result of the Bull mission were to have
cilities for ammunition, and also for
guns. T h e War Production Board im- 77 Historyof Planning Division ASF, App. 18–A,
mediately issued the required directives Ammunition Supply for the European and Medi-
terranean Theaters, prep by ASF, 15 Aug 45, pp.
to make basic materials and machine 2.5, 32, 242–45; Cbl 302158Z, AGWAR to SHAEF,
tools available. Tooling up for ammuni- 30 Nov 44, EUCOM 471 Ammunition, General,
tion production was a complicated pre- III; Rpt, Hiland G . Batcheller, Critical Programs:
A Report to the WPR, 14 Nov 44. Hq ASF, Presi-
cision job, however, the manufacture of dent-White House-Exec Office 1944, Somervell file.
the 155-mm. shell alone requiring about 78Cbl WX–58187, AGWAR to SHAEF, 6 Nov 44,
and Cbl EX-62078, COMZ to AGWAR, 24 Nov 44,
forty separate operations. Even experi- both in SHAEF AG 471–5 Summary of Ammuni-
enced manufacturers ran into trouble on tion Position.
270 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
ammunition turned over to it by the cal calibers averaging 29.6, 23.4, 13.3,
Communications Zone. T h e captured and 5.5 respectively. 84
guns and ammunition were used to good But the supply potential continued to
effect in harassing and interdictory mis- fall short of desired maintenance rates,
sions during the Ardennes fighting. First and the entire ammunition situation re-
Army’s 155-mm. gun battalions also made mained tight. Early in January General
use of approximately 7,500 rounds of Somervell, after a personal survey of the
captured 15.5-cm. ammunition.81 Mean- situation in the theater, appeared fully
while the Communications Zone ar- convinced of the theater’s needs and
ranged with 21 Army Group for the asserted in no uncertain terms that the
loan of one hundred 25-pounders along resources of the United States must be
with sixty days’ supply of ammunition applied to whatever extent was necessary
to the 12th Army Group, which divided to the urgent production of as much am-
them between the three armies. 82 munition of critical calibers as could be
While the additional shipments ar- produced in the shortest possible time.
ranged for by General Bull helped shore “There are not enough ‘A’s’ in all the
up the theater’s ammunition position, alphabets in the United States,” he
they were insufficient to permit firing at cabled Washington, “to point u p the
the 12th Army Group’s desired long- necessity for this too strongly.” 85 T h e
range maintenance rates. In December critical need for ammunition in the Eu-
the theater informed the field commands ropean theater had a direct influence on
that the supply potential for 105-mm. the War Department’s decision, made
howitzer ammunition would be 26 only a few days later, to cancel plans for
rounds per gun per day as compared the mass production of pilotless aircraft
with the desired 45, for the 155-mm. (the JB–2), intended for use against in-
howitzer 19.5 as against the desired 33, dustrial targets in Germany, because of
for the 155-mm. gun 13 instead of 25, the inroads such a program would have
and for the 8-inch howitzer 5.5 rather made on labor and materials then com-
than 25. 83In practice the theater actually mitted to the manufacture of field artil-
bettered this forecast somewhat in the lery ammunition. 86
three months beginning with January,
the maintenance rates for the four criti- T h e adoption of the long-range main-
tenance rate as a means of forecasting
81FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, Bk. 81For the 8-inch howitzer the figure 5.5 is de-
III, p. 28. ceptively low, for the rate is based on a large num-
82The loan was renewed for another sixty days ber of weapons which were never active. Expendi-
at the end of February. Cbl EX–85176, COMZ to tures by the 12th Army Group in this caliber ac-
21 A Gp, 11 Jan 45, Cbl SD–1159, 21 A Gp to tually averaged 13 rounds per active gun per day.
COMZ, 4 Mar 45, Memo, Arty Sec 12 A Gp for Gen Bd Rpt 58, pp. 37–38.
G–4, 4 Jan 45, and Memo, Arty Sec to Ord and 35Memo, Marshall for Byrnes, 13 Jan 45, and
G–4, 26 Feb 45, all in 12 A Gp 472 Cannons and attchd Cbl, Somervell to Styer, 11 Jan 45, CofS
Field Pieces. 400. Sec. I, Cases 2–35.
83Gen Bd Rpt 58, pp. 35-36; Ltr, Gen Leven C. 86Memo for Record, Lt Col C. E. Hutchin, 24
Allen to CG ETO, 16 Dec 44, sub: Long-Range Dec 44, Cbl 82397, Marshall to ETO, 24 Dec 44,
Maintenance Rate of Supply of Mortar and Arty and Cbl 25880, Marshall to Eisenhower, 23 Jan 45,
Ammo, 1 2 A Gp 471 Ammunition, V. all in OPD 471.6 T S Sec. II, Cases 33–37.
272 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
future supply was accompanied by fur- lished maintenance rates were not as high
ther changes in the control of ammuni- as desired, they were actually somewhat
tion distribution within the theater. better than the resupply predictions of
After discussions earlier in the month, the War Department because of the
SHAEF on 20 December announced that spreading out of existing stocks in the
it was assuming control of all ammuni- theater. Furthermore, the system pro-
tion resources in the theater, and pro- vided a guaranteed rate of resupply to
posed to exercise its control by estab- the army groups and thus provided a
lishing a maintenance day of supply rate sound basis for expenditure planning.87
and a reserve for each weapon. T h e re- Meanwhile the 12th Army Group had
serve, it was proposed, would be held by decided to establish a reserve of its own.
the theater and would be made available It will be recalled that under the credit
to SHAEF to meet unforeseen contingen- system adopted in November it had been
cies or to reinforce the operations of a agreed that the armies should create their
specified army group. T h e maintenance own reserves on the basis of the thirty-
day of supply was in reality the available day forecasts issued every ten days, and
day of supply potential for each weapon that no ammunition should be held back
and was calculated by considering as by the army group. Early in December
available all stocks then in the Communi- General Moses proposed that the army
cations Zone and SOLOC and the antici- group assume responsibility for “assess-
pated future supply from the zone of in- ing the hazards” of ammunition supply
terior. SHAEF at first attempted to es- behind the armies and thus leave the
tablish its control retroactively to 1 De- army commanders freer to consider
cember. This placed the 6th Army Group purely operational problems. Under
in the position of having already over- Moses’ proposal the army group, after
drawn its allocations for the month, and reviewing the expected rates of supply
much of its ammunition had already announced by the War Department,
been fired. General Devers protested would establish a minimum reserve of its
that the control had been imposed too own of seven days in ADSEC depots,
abruptly and had caused dislocations, and credit the armies with all other avail-
and asked for special allocations. SHAEF able ammunition u p to the total of the
therefore postponed inauguration of its expected supply rate in accordance with
control to January. T h e SHAEF reserve operational activity factors. When avail-
was actually established by the middle able, additional ammunition would be
of that month. credited to the armies to enable them to
T h e new system established a main- establish a seven-day reserve of their
tenance day of supply for each weapon own. Under this procedure the armies
in the theater, thereafter known as the
SHAEF Maintenance Rate. In effect, the 87 Memo,Twitchell for Bull, 7 Dec 44, sub: Avail-
ability of Ammo, Memo, Bull for Crawford, 7 Dec
inauguration of the system recaptured 44, Memo, Twitchell for Bull, 20 Dec 44, sub: Conf
all ammunition in Army supply points on Availability of Ammo, and TWX S–75735,
SHAEF to A Gps, 19 Jan 45, all in SHAEF G–3
and redistributed all ammunition on a O&E 471 Ammunition; 6 A Gp G–3 Sec Final Rpt,
weapons basis. While the newly estab- pp. 97–99.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: AMMUNITION 273
would be told that they could expect to and the armies then made withdrawals
learn about ten days in advance the as needed against these credits. 91
amounts to be credited to them: the prac- In January the supply of ammunition
tice of advising them of credit expec- for the 4.2-inch chemical mortar was
tancy for a thirty-day period was to stop. placed on an allocation and credit basis
Moses believed that this system would similar to that set up for artillery am-
afford greater safety and flexibility to munition. Ammunition for this weapon
the army group commander in the use had never been plentiful, but the short-
of critical items in planned operations, age was seriously aggravated during the
and would also relieve the armies of winter when large quantities in both the
worry about supply in the rear of the theater and the zone of interior were
forward depots. It would also eliminate found to be defective and had to be
the troubles arising from predictions of impounded. T h e defect was found to
future supply which often could not be be in the fuze, causing barrel explosions.
88
fulfilled. Pending the receipt of reconditioned
General Bradley approved the system stocks from the United States, im-
outlined by his G–4. On 16 December the pounded shells in the theater were re-
army group submitted to theater head- leased only when absolutely necessary,
quarters its desired long-range mainte- and for a time the weapon was fired
nance rates, which henceforth took the only by use of the lanyard.92
place of the old desired expenditure rate
in calculating requirements.89 One of the most troublesome prob-
T h e army group reserve was not actu- lems which plagued ammunition supply
ally established until mid-January.90 At through the entire period of operations
that time the ammunition control sys- was the problem of the segregation of
tem worked roughly as follows: On the ammunition by lot number. Under a
basis of resupply forecasts furnished by system of mass production in many
the War Department and weapons lists plants there is no guarantee that all
provided by the Communications Zone, ammunition of a single type will have
SHAEF computed the current mainte- the same ballistic characteristics. Am-
nance rates. T h e quantities actually to munition must therefore be segregated
be made available to each army were or grouped according to performance
determined by the number of each type characteristics, particularly with regard
of weapon with the armies and by the to range. It is desirable of course, to
activity factors established by the army keep the number of lots delivered to a
group. T h e Communications Zone wrote single battalion as small as possible and,
credits on ADSEC depots for each army, conversely, the number of rounds per lot
as large as possible.
88Memo, Moses for Bradley, 11 Dec 44, sub: Lot segregation was not a new prob-
Notes on Ammo Supply, Memos-Moses, SHAEF 12
A Gp G–4 Folder 86.
89 Memofor Record, Moses, 13 Dec 44, sub: Ammo 91Gen Bd Rpt 100, p. 27.
Supply, Memos-Moses, SHAEF A Gp G–4 Folder 92 Memo,for G–4, 23 Jan 45, SHAEF G–4 471
86. Ammunition 1945; 12 A Gp G–4 AARs for Jan and
90 D i a r yof 12th A Gp G–4, 12 Jan 45. Feb 45.
274 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
lem, and attempts had been made to First Army undertook to segregate and
cope with it before the invasion. Tests record by lot number all ammunition
carried out in the United Kingdom had under its control, a task which involved
shown that variations between lots and an expenditure of 25,000 man-hours of
even within lots were too great for safety labor. It attempted to segregate ammu-
in the close support of infantry, and nition as far as possible into multiples
some nonstandard lots were therefore of 150 rounds. But the stock of 105-mm.
rejected. Some 800,000 rounds of 105- howitzer ammunition alone contained
mm. howitzer ammunition, the type more than 1,200 lot numbers. Ordnance
used in greatest quantity for close sup- officials finally concluded that the me-
port, were classified before the invasion. dium battalions would simply have to
But this quantity was quite inadequate, accept a proportion of unsegregated am-
and units eventually had to be provided munition with each issue of segregated
classified, unclassified, and even previ- shells.94
ously rejected ammunition.93 On the This highly unsatisfactory situation
Continent the extended discharge over naturally brought complaints from- the
beaches, the continued receipt of many field. Artillery commanders reported
small mixed lots from the United States, that it was impossible to determine the
the lack of transportation needed for behavior of ammunition by registration.
the rehandling of ammunition once it T h e resulting inaccuracy of firing con-
was on the ground, and the October sequently necessitated the adoption of
speed-up in unloading, accompanied by a safety factor certain to prevent short
the forwarding of ammunition in bulk, rounds from falling on friendly troops.
all militated against the maintenance of But such measures also voided the bene-
lot integrity. fits of close supporting fires.
T h e 1st Army Group had originally I n one respect the problem of ammu-
set as a goal the delivery of ammunition nition handling resembled the problem
in lots of at least 500 rounds to indi- of handling bulk rations. Care had to be
vidual battalions. But this was rarely if exercised at every stage along the lines
ever achieved. I n October Third Army of communications to maintain the in-
found that one supply point with 7,445 tegrity of original loads or blocks of
rounds of 105-mm. howitzer ammuni- supply. As in the case of balanced
tion contained 308 lot numbers; a tabu- rations, the Communications Zone had
lation of receipts in a single depot in first tried to eliminate a major cause of
a period of three days revealed that 545 trouble at the loading end where ammu-
separate lots had been received. I n an- nition was often stowed without refer-
other three-day period late in September ence to lots. This fault was largely
one field artillery battalion reported eliminated by the fall of 1944, and ships
drawing 131 lots of ammunition averag- arriving in the theater carried sizable
ing only eighteen rounds each. quantities of individual lots, which were
Just before the November offensive block stowed. I n November, with the
94Ibid., p. 76; Gen Bd Rpt 100, p. 22; FUSA Rpt
93Gen Bd Rpt 58, pp. 11–12, 76. of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, Bk. III, p. 27.
SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: AMMUNITION 275
to exploit the favorable situation then Zone earlier had announced a minimum
developing in France, promptly accepted requirement for 285 shiploads of cargo
the offer. He recognized that there plus the equivalent of another 27 loads
might be administrative difficulties, for on tanker decks and in War Shipping
there were doubts about the capacity Administration ships for September ar-
of both the British ports and continental rival. T h e War Department had already
beaches and ports to handle additional indicated in July that it could provide
divisions before the end of September, only 2 0 0 of that number because of the
but it was agreed that the difficulties shortage of shipping. Protests from the
could be overcome somehow.2 theater were of no avail. In fact, early
The advancement of two divisions by in August, coincident with the first ac-
two weeks hardly constituted a radical celeration in divisional movements, the
alteration in plans. But the War Depart- War Department announced a further
ment quickly followed up with a pro- cut of 21 ships, reducing the allocation
posal much more far-reaching in its im- to 179 cargoes. Within a few days, to
plications. On 11 August, two days after the astonishment of the theater, it pro-
the theater had agreed to the first speed- posed to cancel another 20, which would
up, the War Department proposed to have reduced the September arrivals to
ship in September not only the three 159.
divisions which remained on the sched- T h e Communications Zone vigorously
ule for that month, but all five divisions protested these proposals, arguing that
on the October schedule as well, thus the intended cancellations would result
advancing the entire build-up by a in withholding supplies and equipment
month and five divisions. I n offering the of the highest operational priority from
speed-up it indicated that in most cases the theater. It now asked the War De-
the only limiting factor was the time partment to restore as many ships as
needed to pack equipment and move it possible up to 250, which it regarded
to the ports for loading.3 as an irreducible minimum. General
General Eisenhower was elated with Eisenhower supported this request, at
the prospects for a speedier build-up of least to the extent of restoring the two
additional combat strength. But supply most recent cuts, totaling 41 ships. He
officials received the offer with strong was anxious to have the additional
misgivings, claiming that it threatened speed-up in the flow of divisions, how-
serious complications in the cargo ship- ever, and indicated that the theater was
ping situation. T h e Communications prepared to accept the difficulties it
would entail.4
2 Cbl WAR–57333, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8
Transportation officials in Washing-
Aug 44, Cbl S–67204, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 ton did not share ETOUSA’s anxieties
Aug 44. both in OPD 370.5 Sec. XIII, Cases 448–86; over cargo shipping, pointing out that
Cbl S–57189, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 Aug 44,
Eyes Only Cbls, Smith Papers; Ltr, Bull to Smith,
current sailing schedules would more
9 Aug 44, sub: U.S. Build-up, SHAEF G–4 320.2
Strength 44, I. 4CbI EX–43086, Lee to Lutes, 13 Aug 44. and
3 Cbl 79344, Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 44. Cbl S–57530, Eisenhower to Marshall, 13 Aug 44,
OPD 370.5 Sec. XIII, Cases 448–86. Cbls, SS&P Planning Div 201.02, A46–371.
278 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
than match the theater’s most optimistic which the speed-up would have on the
forecasts of its discharge capabilities. theater’s balance of service and combat
They assured the theater that they could troops, for the War Department had
easily step up sailings at any time if its given no assurance that the divisions
discharge rate indicated that the port would be accompanied by adequate serv-
backlogs were being reduced. Neverthe- ice troops. In fact, it had repeatedly
less, the War Department relented and told the theater that it could not in-
met a large part of the theater’s request, crease the flow of engineer, medical, and
raising the September allocation to 220 signal units in line with the shipments
ships plus an equivalent of 35 loads on of combat units. General Eyster, the
tanker decks.5 ETOUSA G–3, estimated that the pro-
At this time—mid-August—the War posed shipments would lower the di-
Department also forecast the availability vision slice to about 38,000 men by the
of divisions for later shipments–that is, end of October and would cause a serious
beyond September—and asked the the- thinning out of logistic support. Colonel
ater whether it wanted the gains ex- Whipple, the SHAEF logistic plans
tended by advancing the sailing dates of chief, supported this view, asserting that
divisions originally scheduled for later such a reduction would be acceptable
shipment. In fact, it actually offered a only if the new divisions were to relieve
further acceleration in the flow, for it combat-weary units, which would there-
proposed to ship in October all 3 di- fore not have to be supported at full
visions originally scheduled for Novem- combat scales. General Stratton, the
ber and, in addition, 3 of those sched- G–4, predicted in addition that critical
uled for December. This would advance shortages of supplies, notably in ord-
the build-up by almost two months and nance and signal Class II items, and in
by a total of 6 divisions, and would ammunition, would develop.7
bring the U.S. build-up in Europe to 42 T h e speed-up also had serious impli-
divisions sometime in November. Again cations with regard to the continental
the War Department asked for a prompt ports. Receiving, staging, and equipping
decision because of the need to start the sixteen divisions which would arrive
the reconditioning, packing, moving, in the nine weeks between 9 September
and loading of equipment.6 and 12 November would impose a heavy
As could be expected, the latest pro- administrative burden in the port areas,
posal aroused new fears among those involving troops which were badly
responsible for the logistic support of needed to support the forces already in
U.S. forces. COMZ staff officers were par- the field. Shipments arriving directly
ticularly apprehensive over the effect from the United States would have to
be accepted either at the beaches or at
5 Cbl WAR–80524, T C Planning Div WD to Lee,
14 Aug 4 4 , Cbl WAR-81787, Gross to Somervell
(in ETO), 16 Aug 44, and Cbl WAR–81853, Lutes 7 Ltr, Eyster to Theater Comdr, 19 Aug 44. sub:
to Lee, 16 Aug 44, all in Cbls, SS&P Planning Div Increased Divisional Flow for Sep and Oct 44. and
201.02, A46–371. Memo, Whipple for SHAEF G–4. 19 Aug 44. sub:
6Cbl W–82481, AGWAR to SHAEF, 17 Aug 44. U.S. Troop Flow, SHAEF G–4 Troop Flow 1 2 1 / 1
SHAEF G–4 Troop Flow 1 2 1 / 1 GDP–1, Folder 64. GPD–1, Folder 64.
T H E T R O O P BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944-MARCH 1945 279
the end it requested the best possible ping implications, replied on the fol-
flow schedule, subject only to the con- lowing day that the switch could be
dition that units be fully equipped.12 On made, and presented alternate schemes
this basis the War Department offered for carrying out the suggestion. Much
revised build-up schedules indicating depended on whether the theater de-
the readiness dates for divisions with sired general-purpose vehicles to accom-
varying levels of training. It revealed pany the units, for the vehicles of the
that the major equipment shortages October divisions had already been re-
were in combat ordnance items and leased for preshipment and were con-
would affect mainly the readiness of ar- signed to northern ports. T h e War
mored divisions.13 With this informa- Department suggested that ETOUSA
tion the theater decided on a somewhat arrange a loan of vehicles from the
accelerated flow, which called for 1 di- North African theater, which it could
vision in November, 5 in December, repay later. But General Devers pro-
3 in January, 3 in February, and 1 in posed to solve the problem by providing
March.14This schedule made it possible vehicles from stocks already available
for all divisions shipped after October in southern France and by borrowing
to have the equivalent of one month’s from other units.
maneuver training at their home sta- Meanwhile the War Department had
tions.15 emphasized that it must have a decision
Apparently anticipating some of the within four days ( 1 0 September) in
internal difficulties which might attend order to implement the plan. On 7
the accelerated flow of divisions, the the- September SHAEF cabled its acceptance
ater commander meanwhile considered of the plan to ship the 11th Armored
the possibility of diverting two or three Division and the 99th and 103d Infantry
divisions from northern France and Divisions through Marseille. Transmis-
routing them through Marseille, where sion of the message was delayed an en-
port capacity was expected to be more tire week, partially as the result of the
adequate. T h e War Department, when disruption in communications occa-
queried on 5 September as to the ship- sioned by the movement of both COMZ
and SHAEF headquarters to the Conti-
12 Cbl FWD–13393, SHAEF to Marshall, 29 Aug nent at this time. On 13 September,
44, SHAEF AG 370.5–6 General 1944. having received no word from ETOUSA,
13Cbl WAR–24823, 2 Sep 44, OPD Cbl Files. Washington notified the theater that its
14One of the 9 divisions in the undeployed re-
serve, the 10th Light Mountain, was deleted from proposal to divert the above-named di-
the ETOUSA troop basis at this time at the the- visions was no longer possible. T h e War
ater’s request. This accounts for the scheduling of
13 instead of 14 divisions. Another division was
Department offered to divert four other
submitted later. divisions, however, if notification was
16Cbl FWD–14659, SHAEF to AGWAR, 12 Sep received by the 21st. ETOUSA asked
44, SHAEF AG 307.5–6 General 1944; Cbl 28646,
Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 Sep 44, OPD 370.5 Sec. that three of the four divisions be
XIV, Cases 487–510; Cbl, Marshall to Eisenhower, shipped to Marseille as proposed, and
13 Sep 44, and Note for Record, OPD, 1 Sep 44,
sub: Divisional Flow and Theater Troop Basis,
the War Department accordingly made
both in OPD 370.5 Sec. XIII, Cases 448–86. arrangements to divert the 14th Ar-
T H E TROOP BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944–MARCH 1945 281
TABLE
7—OVERLORD DIVISIONALBUILD-UP
D PLUS 90TO D PLUS 210 a
a Exclusive of the three divisions in Operation DRAGOON. c Exclusive of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, which had
bSee Logistical Support I , 454–55. returned to the United Kingdom.
mored and the 100th and 103d Infantry with elements of the 26th and 104th
Divisions, scheduled for early October Infantry Divisions. These arrivals raised
shipment, to southern France.16 T h e the theater’s strength to 33 divisions on
three divisions arrived at Marseille be- D plus 120 (4 October), 4 divisions
tween 20 and 29 October. above the build-up originally planned,
T h e stepped-up flow of divisions in and brought the continental strength up
the north soon brought its problems, as to 30for a gain of 5 over the build-up
supply officials had predicted. Eight di- scheduled for that date. (Table 7)
visions arrived in France in September. Increasing difficulties attended the in-
Three of them crossed over from the troduction of this extra combat strength
United Kingdom; 5 came directly from onto the Continent in the face of the
the United States, the first troop convoy acute transportation shortage and the
arriving at Cherbourg on 7 September failure to take Brest. T h e wisdom of the
policy was soon questioned in view of
the inability of the theater to support
16Cbl FWD–13887, SHAEF to WD, 5 Sep 44,
Cbl WARX–26901, Handy to SHAEF, 6 Sep 44, additional units in combat. Four of the
Cbl WAR–29983, Handy to SHAEF, 13 Sep 44, Cbl divisions (the 104th, 44th, and 102d
FWD–14996, SHAEF to WD, 16 Sep 44, Cbl WAR-
32604, WD to ETO, 18 Sep 44, Cbl FWD–15279,
Infantry and the 10th Armored) did not
ETO to WD, 20 Sep 44, all in Cbls, SS&P Planning see action for at least five weeks, and one
Div 201.02 United Kingdom, A47–6; TWX BX– (the 9th Armored) remained uncom-
16089; Devers to SHAEF, 10 Sep 44, SHAEF AG
370.5–6 General 1944; Cbl 27747, Marshall to Eisen-
mitted as a unit until mid-December.
hower and Devers, 9 Sep 44, Note for Record, 6 Lack of equipment, some of which had
Sep 44. sub: Diversion of Divs Through Marseille, to be discharged in the United King-
Note For Record, 13 Sep 44, sub: Diversion of Div
to Southern France, Chl 32284, Marshall to Eisen-
dom, was a major contributing cause.
hower, 17 Sep 44, Cbl 34375, Marshall to Eisen- Divisions continued to cross over to
hower, 21 Sep 44. and Note for Record, 17 Sep 44, the Continent from England in the next
sub: Diversion of Div Through Marseille, all in
OPD 370.5 Sec. XIV, Cases 487–510; Mil Shipments
months. Except for the three diversions
Priority Mtg, 9 Sep 44, SHAEF AG 337–18. to Marseille, however, not a single di-
282 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
TABLE
8—DIVISIONAL BUILD-UPI N THE EUROPEAN
THEATER,
1942–1945
T H E T R O O P BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944-MARCH 1945 283
aFirst arrived in European T h e a t e r of Operations 7 August 1942 Infantry regiments of 63d, 42d, and 70th Divisions arrived early in
a n d participated in N o r t h African and Sicilian operations. T h e 1st December 1944 a n d saw action in advance of t h e divisions proper.
Armored and 34th Infantry Divisions also came to the European f All arrival dates—for both t h e theater a n d Continent-are t h e
theater in 1942 and, like the 1st Division, went to North Africa in dates on which t h e main echelon of t h e division headquarters closed.
November of t h a t year. Neither of t h e m ever saw action in t h e T h e arrival of a division usually extended over several d a y s and in
European T h e a t e r of Operations, however, a n d they a r e excluded some cases several weeks. T h e r e are minor discrepancies between t h e
from this list. arrival d a t e s given here and those given o n page 457 of Logistical
bS a w action earlier in N o r t h African theater. Support I for the m o n t h s of June a n d July 1944 because different
c Landed in southern France from N o r t h African theater as part sources were used.
of DRAGOON invasion force. Source: Order of Battle: Divisions, European T h e a t e r , prep b y
dEntered northern France directly from t h e United States. Hist Sec ETOUSA, 1945.
eEntered southern France directly from t h e United States.
vision was again accepted directly from the organic supporting and service troop
the United States in continental ports units of the divisions would arrive later
until January 1945. (Table 8 ) and eventually marry up with the in-
In October the War Department pro- fantry. Marshall proposed advancing the
posed a further modification in the shipment of the regiments of all twelve
build-up plan. Inspired in part by plans of the infantry divisions remaining to
which the Combined Chiefs of Staff were be shipped.
considering for an all-out effort to end T h e theater immediately approved
the war before the winter, and in part the scheme for the infantry elements of
by the desire to relieve combat-weary three divisions (the 87th, 75th, and
infantrymen with fresh troops, General 106th), portions of which were already
Marshall suggested an immediate speed- loading. But it was not enthusiastic
up in the shipment of the infantry regi- about applying the idea to all the re-
ments of divisions scheduled for later maining divisions. General Bradley, in
shipment. T h e idea was that the units particular, raised objections in the con-
be rotated with regiments of divisions viction that it was bad practice to break
already in the field. Under this plan up units, and that it would create both
284 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
relief regiment for each of the 25 infan- and the 65th and 89th Infantry) to
try divisions in France plus 2 extra, and northern France on the assumption that
would also provide a strategic reserve Antwerp would then be open. This
of at least 3 infantry divisions in the would complete the shipment of the resi-
United Kingdom in addition to what- dues of all nine divisions whose in-
ever armored units were not com- fantry had been preshipped. ETOUSA
mitted.21 This schedule General Eisen- asked that all February shipments, in-
hower considered the maximum allowed cluding one airborne, one infantry, and
by the theater’s tight logistic situation. two armored divisions, be sent directly
Any plan calling for a faster flow, he to northern France. Three of the twelve
asserted, would necessitate receiving divisions whose infantry elements the
units on the Continent, where they War Department had urged be ad-
would have to be held near the ports.22 vanced were to be shipped as whole di-
T h e theater commander asked the visions according to this plan, although
War Department for a week‘s deferment the theater agreed to accept the infantry
on a decision regarding the three di- elements of these three divisions as well
visions remaining in the United States if arrangements for their preshipment
and on the shipment of the heavy equip- were already too far advanced. But the
ment of those whose infantry elements War Department agreed to follow the
were being accelerated. O n 1 November suggested 23
schedule.
he made known his wishes regarding As of this date–1 November–there
those units. Because of continuing ad- were 41 divisions in the theater, 34 of
ministrative difficulties, particularly the them (exclusive of the original 3 in
delay in the opening of Antwerp, he the DRAGOON force) on the Continent
asked that the residues of only three and 7 in the United Kingdom. T h e
divisions (the 66th, 69th, and 76th) be effect of the earlier accelerations was
shipped to the United Kingdom in De- strikingly evident, for the over-all build-
cember. For January he requested the u p was now ahead of its original sched-
shipment directly to southern France ule by 7 divisions. Logistic difficulties
of the residues of the three divisions on the Continent had forced several of
(42d, 63d, and 70th) whose infantry the divisions to stop over in the United
elements were already being preshipped Kingdom temporarily, however, and the
to Marseille, and the shipment of three 34 divisions on the Continent thus far
complete divisions (the 13th Armored actually represented a gain of only 4
over earlier build-up plans. (See Table
21T h e plan, as accepted by the War Department, 7.)
called for the following schedule of shipments: the T h e shipping schedule outlined by
infantry regiments of the 87th, 75th. and 106th
Divisions in October and the residues of these the theater early in November was fol-
units to the United Kingdom in November; the
infantry regiments of the 69th, 66th, and 76th
Divisions to northern France and the infantry regi- 23Cbl S–64961, SHAEF to AGWAR, 1 Nov 44,
ments of the 63d, 42d, and 70th Divisions to south- OPD Cbl Files; Cbl 57703, Marshall to Eisenhower,
ern France in November. 2 Nov 44, and Note for Record, 2 Nov 44, sub:
22Cbl S–63876, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Oct Shipment of Divs to ETO, OPD 370.5 Sec. XV,
44, OPD Cbl Files. Case 511.
286 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
lowed substantially as agreed in the the United States, both of them ear-
next two months. But not all of the marked for the Pacific. T h e Joint Chiefs
preshipped infantry regiments were nevertheless approved the allocation of
committed in a relief role as originally the two divisions to the ETOUSA troop
conceived. Theater officials, none too basis. Both divisions (the 86th and 97th
enthusiastic over the idea from the start, Infantry) arrived early in March, com-
did not consider the experiment suc- pleting the build-up and raising the
cessful. Removing infantry regiments theater’s final strength to sixty-one di-
from their parent organizations and visions.24 Of this total, one—the 13th
placing them under strange headquar- Airborne—was never committed, and
ters, even temporarily, created problems two—the 16th and 20th Armored Di-
of both command control and supply. visions-saw only a few days of combat.25
In the end the theater reconstituted at
least two of the nine divisions as com- T h e speed-up in the shipment of U.S.
plete units in England before trans- forces to the European theater had its
ferring them to the Continent. repercussions in the United Kingdom as
Two final changes were made in the well as on the Continent. ETOUSA had
theater build-up, one involving an addi- expected to close out U.S. installations
tional acceleration and one a further in the United Kingdom fairly rapidly
augmentation of the troop basis. Early after the launching of OVERLORD in
in January 1945 the War Department accordance with the Reverse BOLEROor
offered to advance the sailing dates of RHUMBA plan. T h e transfer of supplies
the four divisions on the ETOUSA to the Continent had lagged from the
troop list still in the United States. start, however, and had made it neces-
T h e theater accepted the proposal, and sary for U.S. forces to retain depot fa-
the 71st Infantry, 13th Airborne, and cilities in England much longer than
the 16th and 20th Armored Divisions, planned.26 T h e stepped-up flow of di-
previously scheduled for shipment in visions from the United States created
February, each eventually gained about more serious complications, for many of
a week in its departure. This brought
the number of divisions shipped to the 24Cbl S–74039, Eisenhower to CCS, 7 Jan 45,
SHAEF SGS 381 Post-OVERLORDPlanning; Cbl
European theater to fifty-six, plus the WARX-88482, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 Jan 45,
three of the DRAGOON force. OPD 381 1943–45; Cbl WAR-88705, Hull to Eisen-
Meanwhile General Eisenhower, im- hower, 8 Jan 45, OPD Cbl Files; Memo, Leahy for
FDR, early Jan 45. OPD Exec Office File 9; Cbl
pressed by the offensive spirit the enemy S–74327, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 Jan 45, OPD
was displaying in the Ardennes and Cbl Files; and Memo, J. F. M. Whiteley, Deputy
Asst CofS G–3, for CofS, 9 Jan 45, sub: Allocs of
alarmed over the possibility of enemy Additional Inf Divs to the ETO, SHAEF G–3
reinforcement from the east, made an 370.01 Troop Build-up, II.
urgent appeal for additional combat 25Forty-two U.S. divisions were shipped to France
in World War I, and an additional one was or-
strength, even suggesting the consid- ganized in France. Of the total, thirty-one saw
eration of diversions from other thea- combat.
26See Chapter XIV, Section 4. below, for an
ters. Only two divisions not already al- account of the progress in clearing the U.K. supply
located to ETOUSA still remained in depots.
T H E T R O O P BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944–MARCH 1945 287
the units had to be diverted to the the next three months twelve divisions
United Kingdom, where handling of had to be accepted in the United King-
their equipment added to the burden dom-in fact, all the divisions shipped
of English ports and inland transport, from the United States in that period
and where many troop accommodations except for those diverted to Marseille.
had already been turned back to the Early in October British officials, rec-
British. ognizing the operational necessity there-
On the assumption that divisions for, reluctantly agreed to make addi-
would proceed from the United States tional facilities available so that seven
directly to the Continent beginning in divisions could be accommodated. By
September, the RHUMBA plan had pro- the end of the month they had been pre-
vided that U.S. field forces should be vailed upon to increase the number to
completely cleared out of the United nine. I n the meantime, however, they
Kingdom and that the total U.S. asked the Combined Chiefs to defer sail-
strength there should be reduced to ings in order to limit the number accom-
about 650,000 (including an expected modated in the United Kingdom at any
137,000 hospital patients) by the end one time to six. T h e diversions had al-
of October 1944.27 Shipments to France ready caused port discharge as well as
proceeded more or less according to accommodations problems, for they in-
schedule throughout the summer, and volved the handling of vehicles and
at the end of September only 34,000 other equipment as well as personnel.28
field force troops, including only one It was partly because of these consid-
division, remained in England. Total erations that SHAEF urged the War De-
U.S. strength there was down to about partment not to carry out the accelera-
688,000 men. (Table 9 ) T h e acceptance tion of infantry regiments which it pro-
of eight divisions in France that month posed in October. In submitting its
completely saturated Continental port, counterplan on 1 November SHAEF
beach, and transportation facilities, how- noted that to keep more than six di-
ever, and when two more divisions (the visions in the United Kingdom would
84th Infantry and 12th Armored) ar- necessitate the withdrawal to the United
rived in European waters at the end Kingdom of service troops badly needed
of the month there was no choice but on the Continent.29 The number of
to divert them to the United Kingdom. divisions in the United Kingdom actu-
Both U.S. and British officials had ally rose to seven at one time in October.
foreseen the possibility that a few di- Transfers to the Continent improved
visions might have to be accepted in somewhat in November. But there still
the United Kingdom in view of the new were five divisions in the United King-
schedule of shipments, and they had dom at the end of the month, and U.S.
made arrangements to accommodate u p
to three at a time. But they hardly ex- 28Cbl 85685, Troopers to SHAEF, 20 Oct 44,
SHAEF AG 370.5–6 General 1944; Mil Shipments
pected the flood which was to follow. I n Priority Mtgs of Sep and Oct 44. SHAEF AG
337–18.
27 RHUMBAPlan, Hq ETO, 3 May 4, EUCOM 29Cbl S–64691, SHAEF to AGWAR, 1 Nov 44.
381 Rhumba Special File. SHAEF G–4 381 Troop Unit Basis 1944, I.
288 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
TABLE
9—THEATERSTRENGTHBY MAJORCOMPONENT
MAY1944—APRIL
1945 a
aSource: Progress Reports, Hq ETOUSA Jun 44–May 45, ETO ber of divisionson the Continent and in the United Kingdom are ac-
Adm. U.S. Forces in Southern France, including the three divisions in counted for by the fact that divisions were often split as of the end of
Operation DRAGOON, are included for the first time in the 30 Novem- the month. Dates of arrival in Table 8 are for headquarters, regard-
ber figures. These data are preliminary, unaudited figures prepared less of the location of the bulk of the division.
for command purposes and, while differing slightly from the audited e Does not include 14,430 men in Iceland on 31 May 1944.
DA AG strengths, have been used throughout this volume because of f Included in nonoperating total for this date.
the subdivision into air, ground, and service troops. This breakdown gDoes not include 13,444 men in Iceland on 30 June 1944.
is unavailable in DA AG reports. h Breakdown unavailable for June.
b Mainly hospital patients. i Includes the two airborne divisions which had returned to the
c Ground Force Replacement System. United Kingdom.
d Discrepancies between these figures and Table 8 as to the num-
T H E TROOP BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944–MARCH 1945 289
troop strength there at one time during D Day predicted with remarkable accu-
that month exceeded 700,000, of which racy that port discharge and transporta-
165,000 comprised field forces.30 The tion deficiencies rather than the availabil-
situation did not improve noticeably ity of divisions would be the factors limit-
with the opening of Antwerp. In De- ing the strength that could be com-
cember the Communications Zone, mitted against the enemy beginning at
strained to meet urgent operational com- about D plus 120 (early October). Sev-
mitments attending the sudden change eral divisions consequently remained
in the tactical situation when the Ger- idle after arriving in the theater, some
mans broke through in the Ardennes, of them in the United Kingdom, and
asked the British to accept additional some on the Continent in the vicinity
troop convoys. T h e request did not en- of the ports.
tail the release of additional accommo-
dations, but it did mean postponing (2) Service and Supporting Troops
relief for the congested British ports and Part of the problem of accelerating
railways. British officials agreed to accept the build-up lay in the inadequacy of
an additional convoy as a matter of physical facilities on the Continent-
paramount military necessity. No addi- mainly ports and transportation. Almost
tional divisions actually were routed as important was the shortage of service
through England. T h e last division to troops. Plans had called for a division
be accepted in the United Kingdom (the slice of about 40,000 men, 15,000 of
76th Infantry) debarked on 21 Decem- which were to consist of corps and army
ber, and by mid-January 1945 all U.S. troops (both service and supporting
divisions had been transferred to the units) and 10,000 of communications
Continent .31 zone troops. On this basis the War De-
T h e difficulties attending the accelera- partment in February 1944 had au-
tion of the divisional build-up demon- thorized a theater troop strength of 2,-
strated rather pointedly the futility of 390,000 men, including air forces.
attempting to commit more combat T h e War Department had insisted
strength than was logistically support- that requests for service troops be kept
able. For at least three months in the fall at the absolute minimum when the
of 1944 U.S. administrative resources troop basis was prepared in 1943 and
were simply unequal to the task of sup- the technical service chiefs considered
porting all the available divisions in com- their final allotments inadequate in
bat. Logistic planners had in fact before many categories. Moreover, there was no
certainty that they had requested the
30Mil Shipments Priority Mtg, 4 Nov 44; Conf of various types of troop units in proper
24 Nov 44, Chorpening for Vaughan, SHAEF G–4 proportion, for requirements could not
337 Comd and Stf Conf 1944, I.
31Mil Shipment Priority Mtgs, 23 and 30 Dec 44, be accurately foreseen. T h e troop basis
SHAEF AG 337–18; Min, U.K. Base Stf Mtg, 26 therefore had little stability, and liter-
Dec 44, First Army 337; Office of the Theater His- ally hundreds of changes were eventually
torian, Order of Battle of the United States Army,
World War II, European Theater of Operations,
made to meet the shifting needs.
OCMH. As could be expected, many deficien-
290 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
cies and some surpluses developed. Every adequate supporting tails. COMZ offi-
service chief had to resort to the ex- cials had voiced their fears that the di-
pedient of using units in work for which vision slice would suffer a reduction
they had not been organized or trained, when the transfer of divisions from the
and in some cases had to deactivate units United Kingdom was suddenly accel-
in order to get manpower for more erated in July. Their fears were hardly
urgently needed types. T h e experience justified at the time, for the continental
of the engineers was fairly typical. Lack slice at the end of that month came to
of sufficient depot troops forced the well over 43,000, and the theater slice
Corps of Engineers to assign an engineer to more than 50,000. T h e proportion
general service regiment to depot opera- of service troop support in France actu-
tions even before D Day. Failure to close ally rose somewhat in August, when only
out the depots in the United Kingdom two divisions were added to the conti-
after D Day aggravated the shortage nental strength. This did not necessarily
and led to the assignment of additional mean that the slice was in proper bal-
construction units to depot and mainte- ance as to types of units, and acute
nance operations. Twelve base equip- shortages were in fact already develop-
ment companies likewise were employed ing, particularly in transportation, depot,
entirely in depot and maintenance op- and maintenance units.
erations and never performed the func- Added misgivings over the adequacy
tions for which they were trained. of service troop support arose as the
Shortages of petroleum distribution result of the War Department's aug-
companies, resulting from the rapid ex- mentation of the theater's troop basis
tension of the pipelines, were also met by nine divisions, and as a result of the
in part by the assignment of general decision made in August to speed the
service regiments to assist in the opera- shipment of divisions from the zone of
tion of the pipelines, and finally by the interior without assurance that they
conversion of engineer combat bat- would have their required complement
talions. Similarly, to meet a severe short- of service and supporting troops. T h e
age of forestry companies, the engineers Communications Zone at first estimated
relied increasingly on general service that the theater would need about 80,000
regiments and combat engineer bat- additional service and supporting troops
talions to help in logging operations, for the 33
increased divisional strength.
and on civilian labor and prisoners of I n mid-August it submitted a longer list
war to augment availableunits.32 to SHAEF, admitting that it had in-
T h e entire problem had been greatly cluded certain increases not justified
aggravated in the summer and fall of by the additional divisions because
1944, at first by the sudden and rapid they were needed to remedy existing
extension of the lines of communication, shortages.
and then by the speed-up in the ship-
ment of divisional formations without 33[Capt. John E. Henderson] T h e Procurement
and Use of Manpower in the ETO, Pt. IX of
32 Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, I, T h e Administrative and Logistical History of the
131–33, 316–17. ETO, Hist Div USFET, 1946, p. 187.
T H E T R O O P BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944–MARCH 1945 291
General Bull, anticipating the objec- greater need.35T h e theater agreed, and
tions these requests would raise in Wash- shortly thereafter reduced its require-
ington, asked the G–4 and the medical, ment for antiaircraft artillery to 146
signal, and engineer officers at SHAEF battalions. It also informed the War
to go over them carefully in light of Department that it was considering
operational experience thus far and op- other reductions and that it intended to
erations planned for the future. T h e convert certain units already in the the-
G–3 was especially conscious of the sev- ater, such as smoke generator units, to
eral warnings which the War Depart- other use. 36
ment had sounded on manpower limita- T h e cancellation of antiaircraft artil-
tions, and felt that every effort should lery units represented a saving of about
be made to limit requests for additional 38,000 men, which ETOUSA expected
personnel by exploring the possibilities to apply as a credit for units which it
of converting units in which there were needed to meet deficiencies in the troop
surpluses and in utilizing liberated man- basis. It particularly desired additional
power for service activities. Any aug- truck drivers and counterintelligence
mentation of the existing troop basis, troops, for which it had already sub-
he felt, would have to be met by the mitted a request. But the War Depart-
conversion of units already in the ment promptly disabused the theater of
theater or by the elimination of a like any such idea, and informed ETOUSA
number of personnel from the troop that it was simply deleting the 38,000
men from the troop basis. By War De-
basis.34
partment calculations, the European
Only a few days later the War De-
theater as of 1 August already had an
partment in fact pointed out where overstrength of nearly 145,000 men,
ETOUSA could make an important sav- which constituted nearly half of the en-
ing in manpower. T h e troop basis tire overstrength of the Army. ETOUSA,
agreed to earlier had authorized the the War Department pointed out, still
European theater 198 antiaircraft artil- enjoyed a high priority for men and
lery battalions, 111 of which were either supplies, even at the cost of withholding
already in the theater or en route. T h e badly needed units from other theaters.
War Department felt that in view of But in view of the fact that U.S. re-
the air superiority which it enjoyed sources were insufficient to meet all
ETOUSA could well afford to cancel
some of the flow scheduled for the next 35Cbl W–88018, AGWAR to SHAEF, 28 Aug 44,
few months so that the surplus could be SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.5 Troop Basis 1944, I.
converted into units for which there was 36Cbl FWD–14526, SHAEF to Marshall, 11 Sep
44, SHAEF AG 370.5–6 General 1944. Early in
October the theater was permitted to restore six
battalions of antiaircraft artillery to the troop basis
34Ltr, COMZ to SAC, 20 Aug 44, sub: Additional from surplus declared by the North African theater
Sv and Supporting Troops Made Necessary by o n the plea that needs for the defense of Antwerp
Additional Divs, SHAEF AG 370.5–6 General 1944; had reduced theater resources to a dangerously
Ltr, Bull to G–4 et al., 22 Aug 44, sub: Troop low level. Cbl S–62891, SHAEF to AGWAR, 10
Basis for ETO, SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.5 Troop Oct 44, and Cbl WX–50722, AGWAR to SHAEF,
Basis 1944, 1. 23 Oct 44, SHAEF AG 350.5–6 General 1944.
292 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
requirements, the theater would here- Department was unmoved by these ex-
after have to submit detailed justifica- planations. Once again it called atten-
tion for any requests for augmentation tion to the generous way in which the
of its existing troop basis.37 European theater had been treated with
Theater officials were plainly cha- respect to the world-wide allocation of
grined by the War Department's refusal. manpower. T h e simple fact was that
They had understood that the theater savings had to be made. Where units
would get additional units by present- originally authorized were no longer
ing justification for them and by offering required there was no choice but to
cuts in existing allotments, conditions recover such resources for the satisfac-
which had been met. Now the War De- tion of other needs. I n accord with this
partment had offered nothing in return necessity the War Department an-
for its sacrifices. Why, it asked, were nounced that it was placing the recently
further deletions necessary, and pre- canceled antiaircraft artillery units in
cisely what was the War Department's the undeployed reserve to help meet the
policy? 38 need for service and supporting troops
General Bull supported the Commu- for the additional nine divisions recently
nications Zone in its stand. T h e need allotted the European theater. It as-
for additional service and supporting serted, moreover, that there was nothing
troops, he argued, had been clearly inviolate about troop bases; they could
established by the experience of the be reduced as well as augmented. And
past few months, in particular by the it made clear that it had no intention
unexpected extension of the lines of of relinquishing its authority to control
communication. T h e pursuit across activation, inactivation, augmentation,
northern France, for example, had neces- and reorganization in such a way as to
sitated the overstrengthening of all truck ensure the maximum exploitation of the
and troop transport companies. This, nation's manpower resources. T h e im-
the theater felt, was certainly sufficient plication was clear that the theater still
justification for the request for addi- did not appreciate the seriousness of the
39
tional drivers. nation's manpower difficulties. 40
For the moment, at least, the War Meanwhile the theater had revised its
requirement for service and supporting
troops needed for the nine additional
37Cbl WAR-38881, AGWAR to ETO, 29 Sep 44,
OPD 370.5 Sec. XIV, Cases 487–510; Memo, Brig
divisions, the amended request totaling
Gen O. L. Nelson, Asst Deputy CofS to OPD, about 100,000 men. ETOUSA claimed
2 Sep 44, sub: Strength of the ETO 31 July 44. that it no longer possessed an over-
OPD 320.2 Sec. XX, Cases 365–90; Ltr, SHAEF
to COMZ, 13 Sep 44, 1st Ind to COMZ Ltr of 2 0
strength from which the needed units
Aug 44. Chief of Staff 400, Sec. I, Cases 2–35. might be formed, for it had absorbed
38Cbl EO52674, ETO to AGWAR, 6 Oct 44. and all surplus manpower in the process of
Cbl WAR-41104, AGWAR to ETO, 4 Oct 44,
SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.5 Troop Basis 1944, I.
39Ltr, Bull to Smith, 8 Oct 44, sub: Theater 40
Cbl WAR-46185, AGWAR to ETO, 13 Oct 44,
Troop Basis, and Cbl E-51516, ETO to AGWAR, SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.5 Troop Basis 1944, I; Memo,
1 Oct 44, SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.5 Troop Basis Handy for Hull, 18 Oct 44, OPD 370.5 Sec. XIV,
1944, I. Cases 487–510.
T H E TROOP BUILD-UP, AUGUST 194.4-MARCH 1945 293
ranean theater, for a total of 23,083. the 6th Army Group, and also by the
Minor adjustments led to a slightly dif- problem of distribution within the thea-
ferent allocation, but agreement was ter caused by the transfer of combat
finally reached with War Depart- strength from one area to another. T h e
ment officialsearlyin 54 The
February. problem of properly apportioning serv-
sacrifice of the field artillery battalions ice troops between the north and the
proved the proper decision. German re- south arose as soon as the DRAGOON
sistance was completely broken by mid- forces came under SHAEF’s control, in
March, and the theater’s most urgent connection with both the transfer to the
need thereafter was for service support, 6th Army Group of three divisions al-
particularly in transportation. ready in the theater and the proposed
Little hope remained that the theater diversion to Marseille of three divisions
would get the 153,100 men estimated scheduled for arrival in October.
as needed to fill out the troop basis for A misunderstanding immediately arose
all sixty-one divisions. General Bull as to the intent of the diversion to
concluded that on the basis of past ex- Marseille. T h e 6th Army Group as-
perience the theater could expect no sumed that the three divisions were to
additional help from the zone of in- be added to the forces in southern
terior, and guessed that it would have France, and its G–4, Brig. Gen. Clar-
to meet the deficit from its own re- ence L. Adcock, went to Paris in mid-
sources.55General Crawford believed the September to submit a list of the service
shortages might be offset by more exten- troops required by the 6th Army Group
sive use of civilians and prisoners of war, to support the units in combat. T h e
and by additional conversions of the less 12th Army Group was under the impres-
critical military units into the types sion that the three divisions were being
needed. T h e theater had, in fact, already routed through Marseille only because
taken steps to utilize prisoners on a of congestion on the northern lines of
bigger scale.56 communication, and naturally opposed
the loss of combat units originally sched-
T h e theater’s service troop problem uled for assignment to its control, to say
had been aggravated by basic weaknesses nothing of the prospect of sacrificing
in the composition of French forces in service and supporting units as well. I n
view of its own logistic difficulties, how-
54 Ibid.; Ltr, Whiteley to Smith, 4 Feb 45, sub:
Augmentations to Units on Theater Troop Basis
ever, it could hardly deny the logic of
and Atchd Study of Rqmts and Credits for Aug- committing those divisions in an area
mentations to U.S. Forces in ETO, 4 Feb 45. TWX where there was greater likelihood of
E–95086, COMZ to 12 A Gp, 6 Feb 45, Cbl S–79719,
SHAEF to COMZ, 11 Feb 45, Ltr, Twitchell to Bull,
providing adequate support, although
12 Feb 45, sub: Augmentations to Theater Troop the diversion entailed a delay in the
Basis, Cbl EX-87333, COMZ to AGWAR, 12 Feb build-up of the newly arrived Ninth
45, all in SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.5 Troop Basis.
55Ltr, Bull to Crawford, 14 Feb 45, sub: Troop
Army. As COMZ and SHAEF supply
Basis for ETO, SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.5 Troop
Basis.
56Memo, Crawford for Bull, 21 Feb 45, sub: 24 Feb 45, sub: Troop Basis for ETO, both in
Troop Basis for ETO, and Ltr, Crawford to Eyster, SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.5 Troop Basis.
298 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
officials pointed out, the divisions could of each type that were to be transferred
well be spared, since they were in excess to southern France.59
of the number that could be supported In the course of the conference Gen-
in the north.57 eral Devers’ chief of staff, Maj. Gen.
Of much greater concern to supply David G. Barr, admitted that the re-
staffs was the proposed transfer of serv- quests originally made by the 6th Army
ice and support units. Such transfers Group included units required to meet
obviously could have no other result earlier shortages in the DRAGOON troop
than to reduce the scale of support in basis. These were quickly discounted,
the north, where supply was already for the conference had no authority to
strained, and would therefore be con- remedy basic deficiencies or compensate
trary to SHAEF’s declared policy direc- for original shortages. Moreover, 12th
tive giving operations in the north the Army Group certainly would have ob-
highest priority. With these considera- jected to such adjustments, or would at
tions in mind Colonel Whipple, the least have countered with claims of its
SHAEF chief of logistical plans, recom- own. Nor was there, in view of the over-
mended that the transfers of service all shortages in the theater, any thought
troops southward for the support of of providing the diverted units with any-
more than the ten divisions originally thing like “normal” administrative tails
allotted to operations in southern France specified in logistical planning factors.
be approved only insofar as they could Instead, the principle was generally fol-
be spared without impairing the efforts lowed of considering the total number
of the 21 and 12th Army Groups. 58 of units of particular types available in
SHAEF meanwhile confirmed the 6th the theater and making an equitable
Army Group’s claim that the three dis- redistribution so as to provide approxi-
puted divisions were intended for use in mately equal support to all divisions in
the south. Both the Communications the theater. On this basis SHAEF on 29
Zone and 12th Army Group had already September ordered the transfer of a
drawn up tentative lists of units which specific number of service and support-
they were willing to have transferred ing troop units, totaling about 29,000
in the event SHAEF should so decide, men, to 6th Army Group for the sup-
and on 22–23 September representatives port of the six divisions scheduled for
of SHAEF, the Communications Zone, transfer or diversion to southern France
and the two army groups met at Lyon —that is, the XV Corps, consisting of the
to agree on the exact number of units 2d French Armored and the 79th U.S.
Infantry Divisions, plus one division to
57
Memo, Col B. A. Holtzworth, Chief Orgn Br
be designated later,60 and the three di-
G–3 12 A Gp, 14 Sep 44. sub: DRAGOON SvC Troop
Rqmt; Memo, Osmanski for Whipple, 16 Sep 44,
sub: Mtgs in Paris on Diversion of Troops to 59Memo, Osmanski for Whipple, 24 Sep 44 sub:
Marseille, SHAEF G–4 Diversion of Service Troops Discussion With Hq 6 A Gp–Diversion of Support-
DRAGOON, Box 1, Folder 51. ing Sv Troops, SHAEF G–4 .Diversion of Service
58Memo, Whipple for G–4, 19 Sep 44, sub: Troops DRAGOON,Box I, Folder 51.
Diversion of Log Resources for Support of DRAGOON 60 The 12th Armored Division, which did not ar-
Forces, SHAEF G–4 381 ANVIL. rive until November.
T H E TROOP BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944–MARCH 1945 299
visions which were to arrive at Marseille that they could not be spared without
the next month (the 100th and 103d seriously affecting the support of the
Infantry and 14th Armored Divisions). 61 12th Army Group. Operations in the
Hopes were high at this time that the north had higher priority than those in
southern line of communications might the south, and the Communications
develop surplus capacity which could Zone was making every effort in October
help sustain forces in the north. General to rebuild the supply structure support-
Adcock, in arguing for additional serv- ing the 12th Army Group so that the
ice units for the southern army group, offensive could be resumed early the
had asserted, in fact, that the ports and next month.
Line of communications of southern Supply officers at SHAEF reacted
France had a potential capability of sup- similarly. Colonel Whipple, after a re-
porting the entire Third Army in addi- study of the respective troop bases of
tion to the recently augmented DRAGOONthe northern and southern forces, con-
force of sixteen divisions. 62 With this cluded that any additional diversions
prospect in mind, COMZ officials of would provide the southern forces with
both the European and Mediterranean more nearly adequate logistic support
theaters met at Dijon on 11–12 October than those in the north. Completion of
to consider additional transfers of service the transfers and diversions then in
troops for the purpose of developing the progress, he calculated, would result in
maximum capacity of the Rhône line division slices of about 39,000 and 34,-
of communications. SOLOC planned to 500 men respectively for the OVERLORD
develop rail facilities in southern France and DRAGOON forces. These were admit-
sufficiently to handle 20,000 tons per tedly short of the 40,000 and 42,500
day, 4,000 of which would be in excess respectively originally planned for the
of its own needs. For this purpose it two areas.64
badly needed engineer and signal troops, Two developments had occurred,
truck companies, and port battalions, however, which were completely dis-
its total requirement coming to about rupting plans for the adequate support
38,000 men. 63 of U.S. forces in the north. T h e recent
SOLOC's bid again raised the ques- accelerations in the flow of divisions
tion as to the relative adequacy of logis- from the United States were so unbal-
tic support in the two areas. Although ancing the troop basis that forces in
it considered the request reasonable, the northern France would be short five
Communications Zone at first opposed average administrative tails by Decem-
any additional transfers on the ground ber. Furthermore, the rapid extension
of lines of communications in August
61Ltr, SHAEF to COMZ, 29 Sep 44, sub: Transfer and September had so thinned out the
of Supporting and Sv Units, SHAEF G–4 Diversion
of Service Troops, DRAGOON, Box 1, Folder 51; 64The planned 40,000-man slice was made up as
Notes on Conf at Hq SOLOC, 17 Jan 45, ETO 334 follows: 14,953 men in the division, 6,666 support-
Confs at SOLOC. ing combat troops in the army and corps, 8,028
62 Memo, Osmanski for Whipple, 24 Sep 44. service troops in the army and corps, and 10,263
63 Notes on Conf, 11–12 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4 337 service troops in the communications zone, not
Conference 1944, I. including those in the United Kingdom.
300 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
available logistical resources that the Although the 12th Army Group had
planned slice, designed to operate a road avoided a major raid on its own re-
line of communications of no more than sources, it realized that transfers from
150 miles, could no longer adequately the Communications Zone would ulti-
support a division at the German bor- mately have their effect on the combat
der. Colonel Whipple estimated that zone. It was particularly concerned
thirty divisional tails were adequate to about the loss of ordnance maintenance
support only about twenty divisions in units, and stated that the effect would
the existing circumstances. On the other soon be evident unless replacements
hand, twelve tails in southern France, were provided. Moreover, it suspected,
he argued, could support an equal num- with some justification, that the 6th
ber of divisions in the Belfort gap, as Army Group bid had again included
planned. Summing up, he asserted that troop units which were not required
the 12th Army Group must get first solely for the planned development of
consideration as long as its operations the Rhône line of communications, but
had higher priority. 65 to correct original deficiencies in its
T h e Communications Zone, probably troop basis. If such was the case, the
because it better appreciated the logistic 12th Army Group requested that the
straits of the theater and the value of theater ask the War Department for
any additional line-of-communications additional service troops to compensate
capacity that might be developed, was for reductions in the planned propor-
willing to meet at least part of the 6th tion of service to combat troops. But
Army Group request. It suggested the ETOUSA disapproved this request, hav-
transfer of about 15,000 men, some of ing only recently been turned down on
them to come from its own resources, the matter of the credit for the deleted
some from the 12th Army Group. But antiaircraft artillery battalions.
protests from the latter resulted in the T h e recent transfers continued to
major portion of the allotment being worry the 12th Army Group, which
made from the Communications Zone. feared future raids. In its view, the the-
T h e SHAEF G–4 finally determined ater was not facing u p to the basic
exactly what units were to be transferred deficiencies in the troop basis, and it
on the basis of operational priorities, was dissatisfied with what it considered
and on 21 October ordered the trans- a haphazard manner of meeting crises
fers.66 by shuffling resources between the vari-
ous areas in the theater. Uncertainty as
65 Memo, Whipple for Crawford, 12 Oct 44, sub: to future action on service troops obvi-
Diversions of Sv Troops to DRAGOON, and Draft
Memo, Crawford for CofS (apparently drafted by
ously troubled the field commands, just
Whipple), n.d., sub: Sv Troops for DRAGOON Force, as uncertainty over supply was also af-
both in SHAEF G–4 381 ANVIL1944, I. fecting operational planning at this time.
66Ltr, Lord to CG COMZ NATO, 14 Oct 44,
sub: Additional COMZ Troops Required in South-
ern France, Ltr, Lord to SHAEF, 15 Oct 44, same and Ltr, SHAEF to COMZs ETO and NATO, 21
sub, Memo, Whipple for G–4, 17 Oct 44. sub: Oct 44, sub: Sv Troops for DRAGOON,
all in SHAEF
Diversion of Sv Troops to DRAGOON, Ltr, Whipple G–4 Diversion of Service Troops DRAGOON, Box I,
to G–4, 18 Oct 44, sub: Sv Troops to DRAGOON, Folder 51.
T H E T R O O P BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944-MARCH 1945 301
balance, totaling 38,000 in the north and minus their normal divisional service
39,000 in the south. support. Later in the month the 6th
But there were other factors to con- Army Group acquired another division
sider. T h e ETOUSA G–3 pointed out (the 87th Infantry) as the result of the
in December that the SOLOC totals did shift in the army group boundary arising
not include about 20,000 men in the out of the situation in the Ardennes.
Italian service units, which were em- Sixth Army Group’s strength thus rose
ployed in support of the forces in south- to twenty-one divisions. T h e latter
ern France. Their inclusion, on the basis acquisition turned out to be temporary;
of the nine U.S. divisions then opera- but the nine infantry regiments, al-
tional in the 6th Army Group, raised though initially intended for employ-
the slice of the southern France forces ment on a rotational basis, were the
from 8,600 to 10,800.72 General Larkin advance elements of three full divisions.
was quick to challenge the basis on SOLOC and 6th Army Group therefore
which this comparison had been made. took the occasion to request additional
For one thing, it had taken no account service troops.
of the eight divisions of the First French As of mid-January nothing had yet
Army, the support of which was fully come of this request, and General Devers
as much a responsibility of SOLOC as again appealed for additional service
was the support of the Seventh U.S. troops, noting that the separate infantry
Army, but for which the French had regiments had been employed constantly
thus far provided only 18,300 service since their arrival without adequate serv-
troops. Moreover, he noted that Italian ice or combat support, and that the
service units could not be counted as arrival of the remaining elements of the
having the same effectiveness as trained divisions within the next few days would
U.S. military units. More properly, shortly necessitate the support of the
Larkin maintained, SOLOC, with a complete units. Members of the SOLOC
strength of 106,464 service troops (88,- staff repeated this plea at a conference
164 U.S. and 18,300 French) was sup- with Generals Lee and Somervell a few
porting 17 divisions (9 U.S. and 8 days later, and noted that additional
French), the COMZ slice thus averaging French divisions were also scheduled for
only 6,262 men. 73 activation and commitment. SOLOC
I n the meantime two further augmen- officials claimed that the COMZ service
tations of the 6th Army Group’s com- troop slice in southern France had
bat strength, one of them temporary, dropped to 4,425 men, and argued that
had added to SOLOC’s service troop dif- southern France was critically short of
ficulties. Early in December the nine service troops despite the maximum use
infantry regiments of the 42d, 63d, and of prisoners, Italians, and civilians. 74
70th Divisions arrived at Marseille SHAEF at this time made an addi-
tional allocation of service units based
72Ltr, Eyster to Larkin, 18 Dec 44, SOLOC Gen
Larkin Out File. 74Cbl B–22667, 6 A Gp to SHAEF, 13 Jan 45,
73
Ltr, Larkin to Eyster, 27 Dec 44, SOLOC Gen ETO Cbls, ETO Adm; Notes o n Conf at Hq
Larkin Out File. SOLOC, 1 7 Jan 45, ETO 334 Confs at SOLOC.
T H E TROOP BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944–MARCH 1945 303
on the assignment of 12 U.S. divisions divisions in the 6th Army Group and
to the 6th Army Group. Almost simul- forty-five in the 12th.
taneously it transferred the equivalent T h e service troop allocation was again
of another corps to the 6th Army Group under revision when hostilities came to
for the Colmar operation, which gave an end. At the end of April the 6th
the 6th Army Group a strength of 16 Army Group had a combat zone slice
U.S. and 9 French divisions. SHAEF of 30,500 as against a slice of 26,500 in
made a supplementary loan of service the 12th Army Group. T h e over-all
units for the support of this additional COMZ slice at that time came to 8,919
combat strength, ordering the 12th on the Continent, and to 10,700 in
Army Group to release about 12,000 the theater as a whole. 77
troops for this purpose with the assur-
ance that they would be returned.75 Effecting an equitable distribution of
Upon the completion of the Colmar service troops within the theater was dif-
operation in February 6th Army Group ficult at best. Varying local conditions
asked that it be permitted to retain cer- and circumstances on the two principal
tain of the units, especially combat engi- lines of communication made it impos-
neers, which had been attached when it sible to assign units purely on a mathe-
had taken over a portion of the Third matical basis, and the ratio of combat
Army front in December. But SHAEF strength between the two army groups
refused, and by the end of February the was constantly being upset. Both army
divisions temporarily attached to 6th groups, and particularly the 6th, were
Army Group, along with the accom- understandably impatient with the in-
panying service and support troops, were terminable delays in adjustments which
returned northward.76 were called for with the shifts in combat
In the meantime ETOUSA completed units, and argued for a procedure which
the theater-wide reallocation which had would provide a more automatic shift
been undertaken some months before in logistic support with the alterations
at the urging of both army groups. By in combat strength. T h e difficulties at-
the end of February, therefore, a satis- tested, moreover, to the fact that the
factory redistribution was under way on southern forces had not been completely
the basis of a strength of twelve U.S. integrated into the European theater
structure. In logistic matters SOLOC
75Cbl S–74958, SHAEF to 6 A Gp, 14 Jan 45, had long maintained ties with the Medi-
SHAEF G–3 War Diary; 6 A Gp G–4 AAR for terranean theater. In some respects com-
Jan 45, p. 5; Cbl S–77528, SHAEF to A Gps, 3 Feb plete integration with the European
45, ETO Cbls, ETO Adm.
76CblEX–24137, 6 A Gp to SHAEF, 10Feb 45, theater was never accomplished.
and Cbl S–78852, SHAEF to 6 A Gp, 13 Feb 45,
ETO Cbls, ETO Adm 407–08; 6 A Gp G–4 AAR 77[Henderson] Procurement and Use of Man-
for Feb 45, p. 9. power in the ETO, pp. 249, 252–55.
CHAPTER XI
lishment in the zone of interior with Adjutant General’s Office, made of the
a view to releasing unneeded personnel entire replacement situation in the Eu-
for more urgent assignments. Visitors ropean theater. Evans urged the Commu-
from the War Department to overseas nications Zone to direct all its units and
theaters, he said, reported the impres- installations to survey their personnel
sion that there was an unnecessary with the aim of identifying individuals
extravagance in the use of manpower physically qualified for field duty (other
in service installations, and he deemed than those occupying key or highly tech-
it essential that there be a continuing nical positions) who could be replaced
review of the theater’s needs relative by men physically disqualified for full
to changing missions so that manpower field service. T h e Communications Zone
could be transferred and utilized more was to earmark such men for assignment
efficiently, or recovered and transferred to field force units as physically handi-
to more urgent tasks.2 capped individuals were made available
In January 1944 Marshall had again for reassignment to the Communications
called attention to the critical manpower Zone.4
situation developing in the United States, In April 1944 at a G–1 conference in
suggesting additional measures the the- Washington attended by representatives
ater could take to help solve the prob- from both the European and North Afri-
lem. Marshall observed that the man- can theaters,5 War Department officials
power shortage was being aggravated by tried to impress even more strongly upon
the mishandling of two groups of men: the theaters the necessity for action along
physically imperfect men who could still these lines. General McNarney, the Dep-
render useful service were being dis- uty Chief of Staff, rightly suspecting that
charged, and men physically qualified the theaters still did not appreciate the
for general assignment were being used seriousness of the manpower shortages,
in limited assignment positions. T h e again made it clear that the Army had
Army, he said, would simply have to reached its authorized strength of 7.7
make better use of the manpower it al- million men and that the acquisition of
ready had. Basically, this meant con- new troops henceforth would be re-
serving and properly using the important stricted to the numbers required to main-
resource which it possessed in limited tain that strength. This meant that new
assignment personnel.3 demands for men not already provided
T h e necessity for action along these for in the troop basis would have to be
lines was again emphasized in February met by reduction elsewhere. T h e day
1944 as the result of a survey which Col. had passed when personnel could be
George R. Evans, chief of the Classifica- obtained for the asking.
tion and Replacement Branch of T h e
4Memo, Evans for G–1 ETOUSA, sub: Observa-
tions and Recommendations, FFRS, ETOUSA, 31
2 Cbl R–3412, Marshall to CG ETO, 23 Sep 43, Jan 44, ETO GFRC Planning file.
ETO 381 Troop Basis 1943. 5 The ETOUSA representatives were Brig. Gen.
3 Ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Jan 44, ETO Oscar B. Abbott, the G–1, Brig. Gen. Ralph B.
GFRC 3009 Circulars, Hq Replacement System Lovett, the adjutant general, and Maj. Gen. Paul
1944. R. Hawley, the chief surgeon.
306 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
War Department officials were partic- other to postpone such distasteful work.
ularly critical of the North African the- General Devers, who was still theater
ater, which apparently had been extrava- commander in the fall of 1943, had
gant in its use of manpower for rear area originally opposed the idea on the
services and which had failed to take ground that operational plans had not
effective measures to transfer able-bodied crystallized sufficiently to permit a thor-
men from the supply services and retain oughgoing survey of troop requirements.7
them for combat. They were determined In June 1944 Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker,
that the experience in that theater should the SHAEF G–1, offered a plan for
not be repeated in Europe, and insisted a comprehensive survey of manpower
that the theater not only adopt the War problems, covering not only the matter
Department’s policies on the conserva- of more effective utilization of limited
tion of manpower, but that it organize assignment men, the release of general
its replacement system along lines pre- assignment personnel, and the use of
scribed by the War Department so that prisoners of war and liberated man-
those policies could be carried out effec- power, but involving a thorough exam-
tively. Later in April NcNarney went ination of the theater’s organization with
to the United Kingdom and repeated a view to uncovering and eliminating
these warnings at a theater command duplication of function and responsibili-
and staff conference.6 ties. As part of the plan he proposed
Despite these admonitions, plus strong the establishment of a theater manpower
criticism of General Lee for his opposi- board which would operate directly un-
tion to the War Department’s recom- der the theater commander with wide
mendations, the theater did not take powers to investigate all the ramifica-
effective action. ETOUSA had already tions of the manpower problem and
adopted the policy of retraining limited make specific recommendations as to
assignment men who were physically able where savings should be carried out.8
to serve usefully in some other military T h e G–1’s proposal appears to have
capacity. But it shrank from taking the been made in the true spirit of the War
necessary measures to remove general Department’s directives, and was the first
assignment men from service units and attempt to come to grips with the prob-
retrain them, and it resisted pressure to lem realistically. General Bull, the G–3,
establish the kind of agency which Gen- concurred in the plan. But General
eral Marshall had originally recom- Crawford, the G–4, expressed strong dis-
mended to scrutinize the use of man- approval of the idea, arguing that such
power in the theater. a job was a command function, and that
ETOUSA found one reason after an- no “committee” could carry out such a
survey which would not use u p more
6 Remarks by McNarney and Transcript of G–1
Conf on Repls and Pen Control, 3 Apr 44, and
Ltr, Abbott to Lee, 15 Apr 44. sub: Rpt on Conf 7 Cbl W–5527, Devers to Marshall, 8 Oct 43,
Held in Washington, D. C., both in SHAEF AG ETO 381 Troop Basis 1943.
200.3–1 Replacements 1944: Notes on Comd and 8 Memo, Barker for Smith, 28 Jun 44, sub:
Stf Conf ETO, 18 Apr 44, EUCOM 337/3 Confer- Theater Manpower Bd, SHAEF G–1 320/2 Man-
ences, Staff Weekly 1944, I. power, Establishment, Equipping.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944-FEBRUARY 1945 307
manpower than it might save. 9 An expected. For the time being, the Com-
amended proposal, which Barker sub- munications Zone preferred to postpone
mitted in answer a few weeks later, also the difficult business of screening gen-
encountered objections from the G–4, eral assignment men out of the service
and for the moment, at least, the matter forces, and confined itself to issuing gen-
was dropped.10 eral pronouncements that the “wastage
Personnel officers at General Lee’s or improper use of manpower will not
headquarters also opposed the creation be tolerated in this theater,” and tooth-
of a manpower board, mainly on the less injunctions that men would be “as-
ground of uncertainty as to the future signed to positions in which they can
COMZ organization on the Continent. render the maximum service.” Such
Late in July they found additional sup- directives, while outwardly conforming
port for this argument as the result of with the War Department’s prodding on
the addition of eight divisions to the the subject, were hardly specific enough
ETOUSA troop basis, which was ex- to be enforced, and were in fact easily
pected to involve the activation of addi- circumvented.
tional service units within the theater.
In any case, the Communications Zone T h e crisis of July provided the the-
preferred to leave to the section com- ater with a dramatic reminder of its man-
manders the responsibility for combing power problem, and the War Depart-
out general assignment men and replac- ment took the opportunity to express its
ing them with limited assignment per- impatience with the theater for what
sonnel.11 it regarded as poor planning as well as
It was a misreading of human nature, poor administration of manpower re-
to say the least, to expect commanders to sources. T h e War Department’s main
carry out measures which would obvi- criticism at that time focused on the suc-
ously be to their own disadvantage, and cession of revised requisitions which had
it was a policy which in the end proved followed the discovery of shortages in
totally inadequate, as might have been infantry. T h e War Department regarded
this as evidence of poor planning, 12 and
9Memo, Crawford for G–1, 30 Jun 44 sub: The- McNarney at the time expressed doubts
ater Manpower Bd, SHAEF G–1 320/2 Manpower. as to the competence of Lee’s G–1.13
10Memo, Barker for G–3 and G–4, 11 Jul 44, T h e theater’s actions were partially
sub: Conservation of Manpower, and Crawford’s
reply, 14 J u l 44, SHAEF G–1 320/2 Manpower. defensible, at least so far as the short-
11 Memo,Franey for Lee, 13 J u l 44, ETO GFRC ages in July were concerned. Lee could
file on Replacements. T h e view that the screening point to two extenuating circumstances:
out of able-bodied men should be left to the
section commanders was also held by the Replace- the prolonged hedgerow fighting had
ment Section of the Adjutant General’s Office, taken a toll of infantrymen which the
ETO. Memo, AG Repl for G–1, 7 May 44, in field commands had not foreseen; and
reply to proposal by ETO G–1 (29 April 1944,
subject: Disposition of Limited Service Men), that shipments from the zone of interior had
a board be established to conduct continuous sur-
veys of the SOS for this purpose, to be directly 12See Logistical Support I, 461–63.
responsible to the deputy theater commander, 13Ltr,McNarney to Lee, 9 Aug 44, CofS 322 Sec.
EUCOM 322 Replacement Units, II (a). I, Cases 1–30.
308 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
been unbalanced as to type, even by ac- foolproof formula for estimating replace-
cepted War Department planning fac- ments needs. T h e Deputy Chief of Staff
tors-the infantry shipments of May, acknowledged this, asking only that the
June, and July containing only 35, 58, theater adjust the estimates of its needs
and 50 percent respectively of riflemen as promptly as possible to actual experi-
as against a previously accepted factor of ence. 16
64.3. Lee maintained, in addition, that Behind the frustration over the un-
the troop build-up had been more rapid reliability of planning estimates lay the
than planned, although this was a tenu- suspicion that the theater was not making
ous argument insofar as the months of the best use of its men. T h e War De-
June and July were concerned.14 partment therefore continued to prod
McNarney admitted that the Euro- ETOUSA on the subject of using its
pean theater had been shortchanged on available manpower to better advantage.
infantry riflemen, and explained the un- Late in August it notified all theaters
balanced make-up of the May–July ship- that it would be able to meet replace-
ments by the necessity to meet the North ment requirements as currently esti-
African theater’s expected requirements mated through December 1944, since
for the southern France operation, and replacements scheduled for shipment in
by the fact that the War Department had that period were already in training. But
been forced by popular demand to place it gave unequivocal warning that begin-
certain restrictions on the age at which ning in January 1945 it would be able
combat replacements would be shipped to provide only a portion of the theater’s
to overseas theaters. 15 estimated needs. It reminded the the-
Washington’s concern over the unre- aters, moreover, that War Department
liability of the European theater’s esti- policy required that they provide a train-
mates of future requirements was under- ing and assignment system for men no
standable. It was on the basis of these longer physically capable of performing
that the output of the training centers their previous duty assignments, for men
had to be planned, normally five to six physically capable of performing combat
months in advance of actual need. Again duty who were withdrawn from COMZ
and again, according to McNarney, the units, and for the conversion of surpluses
theater’s forecasts of needs had proved in particular arms and services.17
inaccurate, with the result that the War Basically, the theater’s problem boiled
Department was forced to resort to pain- down to one of finding enough physi-
ful improvisation in order to meet the cally qualified men to meet its combat
theater’s needs. There was, of course, no losses, and it had three possible sources
which it could exploit to meet this need:
14Ltrs, Lee to McNarney, 25 Aug and 23 Sep 44, (1) overages in types other than infantry
CofS 322 Sec. I. Cases 1–30. which it might retrain; (2) theater over-
15 Ltr, McNarney to Lee, 29 Sep 44. CofS 322 strength; and (3) general assignment men
Sec. I, Cases 1–30. See Robert R. Palmer, Bell I.
Wiley, and William R. Keast, T h e Procurement
and Training of Ground Combat Troops, UNITED 16 Ltr,McNarney to Lee, 10Oct 44, CofS 322.
STATES ARMY WORLD WAR II (Washington, 17 Ltr, WD to Theaters, 23 Aug 44, sub: Overseas
1948), pp. 205–09. Repls, SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforcements 1944.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 309
in the supply services of the Communi- system for these purposes. It was realized
cations Zone and Air Forces who could from the start, however, that the num-
be withdrawn for conversion to a com- ber of men who would become available
bat arm and replaced by men no longer for limited duty by return from hospitals
physically qualified for such assignment. would far exceed the Communications
T h e theater had already had some ex- Zone’s normal losses, and that limited
perience in the retraining of men, albeit assignment personnel could be absorbed
a very limited one. In April 1944 agree- only through the release of able-bodied
ment had been reached with the War men for combat. Exactly how this was
Department to raise the proportion of to be accomplished was a matter of con-
infantry in the replacement pool from siderable disagreement.19
64.3 percent to 70.3. Since it was already Policy on limited assignment men was
too late at that time to make adjustments further clarified and developed during
in the May shipments, the theater took the first months on the Continent. T h e
steps to retrain as infantrymen approxi- armies agreed, for example, to absorb
mately 2,500 men, representing overages limited assignment men up to 5 percent
in other branches and replacements be- of their strength, some of whom would
ing improperly used, in an effort to of course have to be retrained for new
establish what it regarded as a safe level duties. Limited assignment troops from
of infantry replacements by D Day.18 the Communications Zone were to re-
Meanwhile the theater had also laid turn from hospitals and rehabilitation
down the first outline of a policy on the centers directly to their former units
utilization of limited assignment men. without requisition and be carried as
Shortly before the invasion, on the sug- temporary overstrength until absorbed
gestion of the theater G–1, arrangements by nurmal attrition. Limited assignment
were made to establish machinery with- men from the combat zone were to be
in the replacement system to receive, retrained for new assignments and ab-
classify, and redistribute all personnel sorbed by the Communications Zone.20
returning from hospitals and rehabili- Everyone thus apparently appreciated
tation centers, to retrain limited assign- the necessity to utilize limited assign-
ment men, and to distribute to appro- ment personnel. But no truly effective
priate branch replacement depots all measures were as yet being taken to with-
recovered general assignment men who draw general assignment men from the
were to be retrained for combat assign- Communications Zone to make room for
ments. T h e theater commander approved
setting aside certain facilities at the 19 Memo, G–1 for AG Repls, 29 Apr 44, sub:
Disposition of Limited Sv Men: AG Repl reply,
American School Center at Shrivenham, 7 May 44, EUCOM 322 Replacement Units, II (a);
England, to be used by the replacement Memo, G–1 for G–3 ETO, 23 May 44, sub: Reas-
signment Center, Replacement System, Ltr, Hq
ETO to SAC, 1 Jun 44, sub: Facilities at American
18History of the Ground Force Replacement Sys- School Center for Repl System and 1st Ind from
tem, ETO, Pt. I: T h e Replacement System From SHAEF, 9 Jun 44, all in EUCOM 322 Replace-
the Date of Activation to D Day, prep by the ments, II (b).
GRFC, ETO Adm, Ch. III, Sec. III, pp. 10–11, 20 Memo,Lee for Lord, 9 Jul 44, sub: Man-
ETO Adm 334. power Board, GFRC File on Replacements.
310 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
them. This was the crux of the entire greater urgency. T h e theater not only
manpower problem, for the Communi- made frantic appeals to the War Depart-
cations Zone and the air forces consti- ment for emergency shipments and for
tuted the largest sources of able-bodied a much higher percentage of infantry-
men in the theater. trained replacements, but also took addi-
Up to the beginning of July there ap- tional steps to produce replacements
parently was no serious concern within from its own resources. Since the the-
the theater over a possible replacement ater's need was urgent, the quickest divi-
shortage in the near future. In fact, the dends obviously promised to come from
theater actually reduced its September the conversion of men from combat arms
replacement requisition by 15,000 men other than infantry, of which there was
at that time, and also canceled its requi- an excess of more than 20,000, rather
sition for August in all branches except than from service personnel. T h e first
infantry. Its efforts to recover personnel step, therefore, was to take approxi-
for use as replacements was limited to mately 4,000 replacements representing
initiating a survey of the Communica- overages in the branches of field artillery,
tions Zone to determine whether any ex- tank destroyer, and antiaircraft and con-
cess of personnel existed, and to issuing vert them as quickly as possible to
a directive to section commanders to in fan try.23
release such overstrength or excesses.21 Shortly thereafter in accordance with
Section commanders were understand- earlier War Department directives to
ably reluctant to release men at this reduce the number of basic privates in
time in view of the uncertainty as to re- T/O units, the theater ordered that men
quirements in connection with the or- so released, regardless of arm or service,
ganization of the Communications Zone also be made available for retraining as
on the Continent. Consequently the re- infantry rifle replacements. U p to that
lease of men to the Replacement System time the services and major combat com-
both in number (about 4,800) and qual- mands had been allowed to activate new
ity was disappointing. Brig. Gen. Walter units utilizing the personnel made avail-
G. Layman, chief of the Replacement able through such reductions. 24 In addi-
System, complained that many of the tion, the theater notified the Replace-
men were not fit for training as riflemen. ment System25 that men originally
Section commanders obviously were not
releasing their best men for conversion.22
T h e July crisis suddenly made the 23
History of GFRS, Part 11: D Day to V-E Day,
replacement situation a matter of much Ch. IV, pp. 1–2.
24Memo, Hq ETO to Chiefs of Gen and Special
Stf Secs, 4 Sep 44, sub: Use of Repls for Local
Activations of Units and Installations, EUCOM
21 Memo,Franey for Lee, 13 Jul 44, GRFC File 322 Replacements Units, II (a).
on Replacements. 25For convenience, the term Replacement System
22 Ltr, GFRS to Deputy Theater Comdr, 17 Jul is used throughout in reference to the command
44, sub: Shortage of Inf Repls, as cited in [Capt. variously designated as the Field Force Replacement
Robert J. Greenwald] Human Logistics, a study System, the Ground Force Replacement System,
of the reinforcement system, prep in Hist Sec ETO, the Replacement System, and the Ground Force
Jan 45. p. 82. Reinforcement Command.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 311
garded as the worst type of wastage.29 170,000, which, it insisted, had been au-
Late in September General McNarney thorized before D Day, in contrast with
sent the Army Inspector General, Maj. the War Department’s figure of 70,000.
Gen. Virgil L. Peterson, to the theater to T h e theater actually reported a re-
survey the manpower situation person- placement strength of nearly 200,000
ally. General Peterson reported that the men, although this included replace-
theater’s replacement pool had a strength ments on requisition for October and
of about 119,000, nearly 49,000 men in November, men in transit, and replace-
excess of the 70,000 authorized. An addi- ments for the air force. O n the basis of
tional 20,000 men who formerly had an authorized ceiling of 170,000 it ad-
been replacements had been assigned as mitted to an overstrength of slightly
overstrength to various units, including less than 30,000 as compared with the
10,500 with truck companies, 6,700 in War Department’s claim of 49,000, o r
airborne divisions, and 2,250 with the en- even 69,000 counting the former replace-
gineer special brigades, which continued ments now listed as overstrength in vari-
to operate the Normandy beaches.30 ous units. In any case, the theater felt
As was so typical wherever statistics that the War Department should take
were involved, War Department figures cognizance of the fact that a large portion
were widely at variance with those of the of its personnel classed as replacements
theater. Its total overstrength, the the- at any given time consisted of “dead
ater claimed, actually stood at 68,000 stock” in that it was not actually avail-
on 30 September, as compared with the able for use as replacements. Included
War Department’s figure of 131,000
for in this category were air force troops,
31 July. General Eisenhower admitted referred to as “happy warriors,” who
that the difference did not result from were either awaiting shipment to the
any reduction in strength over the two- zone of interior or were en route to or
month period, but rather from “lack of from the United States; men being re-
a common basis of calculation.” Once trained; and men earmarked for activa-
again, as demonstrated in the case of tion of new units. At the end of Septem-
ammunition, it was clear that the the- ber, according to theater figures, men
ater and the War Department were not in these categories accounted for 52,000
following uniform accounting practices. of the 125,000 ground force replacements
In the matter of replacements, moreover, physically present in the theater. Only
the theater had been operating on the about 73,000 men were actually avail-
basis of an allowed replacement pool of able for replacement purposes. Because
of this, General Eisenhower asked for
29 Remarks by McNarney at Gen Council Mtg, a “certain tolerance” between the au-
Office of the DCofS, 4 Sep 44, and Ltr, McNarney
to Eisenhower, 5 Sep 44, both in SHAEF G–4 thorized ceiling and actual stockages. 31
320.2 Strength 1944, I; Memo, OPD DCofS, 8 Sep But the War Department was not con-
44, sub: Strength of ETO, and Memo, Gen Henry, vinced that the theater was making the
G–1, for CofS, 9 Sep 44, sub: Reduction of Army
Overstrength, both in OPD 320.2 Sec. XX, Cases best use of its manpower resources. That
365–90.
30Memo, Peterson for DCofS, 5 Oct 44, WD 31Ltr, Eisenhower to Handy, 17 Nov 44, SHAEF
CofS 322 Sec. II, Cases 1–30. G–3 O&E 320.2 Theater Overstrength, I.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944-FEBRUARY 1945 313
the “word” on manpower conservation signment troops out of jobs that could
had not reached everyone concerned, or be performed equally well by men no
at best was not thoroughly understood in longer physically qualified for combat.
the theater, was indicated by the fact Anticipating the opposition which the
that commanders continued to request latter would undoubtedly evoke, he told
authorization to activate new units using top commanders that they would simply
manpower available to them in the form have to break down the natural resist-
of overstrengths despite the theater’s ance of subordinates to the withdrawal
measures designed to recapture such of personnel.
34
men. Early in September the theater
again expressly forbade the use of per- During October the theater continued
sonnel for such purposes, and empha- to direct its efforts toward rebuilding its
sized that all troops in the theater in depleted infantry pool and toward cor-
excess of T/O’s were to be considered recting the maldistribution produced by
as replacements regardless of whether the casualty experience of June and July.
they were in the Replacement System, Early in the month it learned from the
attached to units and installations, or War Department that shipments from
assigned as overstrengths. It again pro- the United States would total less than
hibited the use of such personnel for 19,000 in November, representing a re-
any purposes other than as loss replace- duction of about 10,000 in ETOUSA’s
ments, and served notice that it would requisition for that month. This allot-
not approve requests for local activations ment was to include a high percentage
involving use of such men.32 General of infantry, however—15,000 in regular
Peterson particularly questioned the the- infantry plus 1,400 infantry paratroops
ater’s authority to legitimize the over- and 400 nisei infantrymen for the 442d
strengthening of units with replace- Infantry Regiment. T h e War Depart-
ments, as it had done in the case of ment justified the reduction on the as-
truck drivers, and its taking advantage sumption that ETOUSA would as pre-
of deletions from its troop basis to acti- viously planned fall heir to about 10,000
vate other units from manpower avail- replacements which the Seventh Army
able to it within the theater, as it was was to turn over when ETOUSA as-
trying to do in the case of the forty-nine sumed responsibility for the logistic sup-
antiaircraft battalions. 33 port of forces in southern France on 1
With the report of such practices in November.35
mind, General McNarney in mid-Octo- ETOUSA first concluded that the re-
ber again pressed the theater to retrain duction would not necessarily be critical,
as infantry all surplus replacements in although it would lower the infantry
other branches and to force general as- pool level which the theater considered
essential. Much depended on whether
32Memo, Hq ETO to Gen and Special Stf Sea,
4 Sep 44 sub: Use of Repls for Local Activations
of Units and Installations, EUCOM 322 Replace- 34Ltr, McNarney to Lee, 10 Oct 44, ETO GFRC
ment Units, II (a). 370.092 Reinforcements.
33See Ch. X, Sec. 2, above, on the matter of the 35Cbl WARX–41410, AGWAR to ETO, 5 Oct 44,
antiaircraft artillery units. SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforcements 1944, I.
314 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
2,200. 43T h e Fifth Army’s need was ur- By the end of October the theater’s
gent, however, and it appeared that ship- replacement situation appeared appreci-
ments coming from the United States ably brighter, thanks in part to the meas-
would not reach Italy before the end of ures which the theater had taken to re-
wouldnot reach Italy beforethe end of train men as riflemen, but also to the
Smith conferred with the G–1’s of both somewhat larger shipments from the
NATOUSA (General White) and 6th zone of interior and to the substantially
Army Group (Brig. Gen. Ben M. Saw- smaller losses of infantrymen which at-
bridge), and decided that ETOUSA tended the highly mobile warfare of
should and could help the Fifth Army August and September and the lull in
through the critical period. He recom- operations in October.
mended to the War Department that As requested by the theater, riflemen
ETOUSA be allowed to go ahead with comprised a higher percentage of the
the shipment.
45 Handy then gave his total infantry replacements in the next
approval to the proposal, and within the few months, the percentage rising to 68
next few days approximately 3,000 re- in August and over 80 in September.47
placements were air transported to Italy. Meanwhile, battle casualties, after total-
Handy notified ETOUSA that the War ing 51,400 in July, dropped to 42,500 in
Department was adding 5,000 infantry August, to 42,000 in September, and to
replacements to its November requisi- 31,600 in October, despite the increasing
tion, which would more than compen- size of the forces committed. 48 Opera-
sate for the proposed diversion and tions during the pursuit brought a heavy
would also compensate in part for the demand for armored force replacements,
fact that ETOUSA was assuming respon- particularly tank commanders, and for
sibility for the support of Seventh Army vehicle drivers rather than infantrymen.49
earlier than planned. At the same time Throughout August and September
he warned that the War Department the branch distribution of replacements
would be hard pressed to meet antici- in the theater’s pool had continued to be
pated December requests, and again en- badly out of balance, and there were
joined the theater to practice the utmost substantial surpluses in branches other
economy and to accelerate its retraining than infantry. In mid-August, for exam-
program . 46 ple, of a total stockage of 67,000 replace-
ments available to the theater, only 20,- nounced target, and despite War De-
000 (30 percent) were infantry-trained, partment injunctions and warnings, the
and of these only 3,250 were riflemen. At theater authorized a substantial cutback
the time about 9,000 infantrymen were in the retraining program for Novem-
in the process of conversion to riflemen.50 ber. 52
In October the Replacement System T h e balance that had been reached
continued its efforts to correct this mal- was actually a very precarious one. It
distribution. T h e theater’s aim was to had been achieved largely by the retrain-
establish and maintain at all times a ing of other replacements—that is, sur-
pool of 70,000 replacements. On the basis pluses in infantry other than riflemen
of the casualty experience u p to Septem- and in other combat branches. T h e the-
ber it had decided that 78.3 percent ater had as yet made no real effort to
(54,800) of this pool should consist of tap its principal remaining source of
infantrymen, as compared with the ear- general assignment men—that is, the air
lier 64.3, and that 70 percent of the in- force and the Communications Zone.
fantrymen (or about 38,000 men) should Viewed in the light of the measures which
be rifle-trained. On 1 September the eventually had to be taken, those of the
branch distribution was badly out of summer of 1944 hardly constituted more
balance, although some progress was than stopgap measures and failed to go
made in rebuilding the pool of rifle- to the heart of the manpower problem.
trained replacements. On that date the
theater’s stockage of infantrymen had (2) T h e Storm Breaks, November–
risen to about 42,000 as against its an- December 1944
nounced requirement of 55,000. Of these If there was any complacency over the
only about 15,000 had the much needed manpower situation at the end of Octo-
MOS 745 classification, the occupational ber it vanished quickly in the next few
specialty number of a rifleman.51 weeks. T h e launching of major Allied
T h e retraining of an additional 14,- offensives in November under condi-
400 men in September and October, tions of cold, wet weather had a dual
combined with the smaller losses of those impact on casualty figures: battle casual-
months, did much to bring the branch ties, which had come to only 31,600 in
distribution of the theater’s pool into the preceding month of relative inactiv-
better balance. By 1 November the the- ity, rose to 62,400 in November; mean-
ater had built up its stockage of infan- while, nonbattle casualties, which had
try riflemen to 30,000. Despite the fact totaled 28,400 in October, suddenly re-
that this did not represent the an- flected a high incidence of trench foot
and rose to 56,300. Total casualties for
the month thus exceeded 118,000 men.
50Memo, Statistics Br SGS ETO, 14 Aug 44, (Table 10)
ETO Adm 235 Ordnance Ammo.
51Memo, G–1 COMZ for CG COMZ, n.d. [Sep].
Before this trend had become evident
sub: Repls, USFET 322 Replacements; Replace- the theater had received discouraging
ment Study, August 1944–April 1945, prep by G–1
ETO, n.d., EUCOM 322 Replacement Studies 1944– 52Stf and Comd Conf, COMZ, 5 Jan 45. EUCOM
45. 337/3 Conferences, Staff Weekly 1944, I.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944-FEBRUARY 1945 317
ater had desired a pool of that size over of requirements and the requisitions it
and above the “dead stock” which nor- finally submitted. T h e requisition for
mally accounted for a large percentage December, for example, represented an
of the total replacement population of increase of 10,000 over the estimates sub-
the theater. T h e War Department re- mitted in August, and for January the
fusedto authorizesucha pool.63 theater had finally asked for 67,000 men
War Department and theater officials as compared with its earlier estimates
finally ironed out their differences over that it would need about 40,000. Taking
accounting procedures. But the War De- all the theaters together, these discrep-
partment took the opportunity to express ancies had been as high as 100 percent
its dissatisfaction with the theater’s re- for ground forces and 140 percent in
training program, making special note infantry alone. Such increases posed an
of the continuing large surplus in obvious dilemma for the War Depart-
branches other than infantry. Again it ment, which had to plan the training of
made clear to ETOUSA representatives replacements several months in advance.
that the theater’s requirements simply In the end the War Department agreed
could not be met from the zone of in- to add about 18,000 men to ETOUSA’s
terior. The War Department could show January shipments, which raised the al-
that it had definitely made greater efforts location for that month to 54,000. T h e
to recapture personnel for replacement theater on its part acknowledged the
purposes than had the theater. All newly need to expand its retraining program
inducted men qualified for overseas serv- in order to convert the excessive sur-
ice were already being trained as re- pluses in branches other than infantry,
placements; every man in the Army and also agreed to meet more of its in-
Ground Forces and Army Service Forces fantry officer requirements through ap-
whom it was practicable to withdraw pointments from the ranks and by re-
from other jobs was undergoing conver- training from other arms and services.
sion to infantry; and 40,000 men were The War Department agreed to con-
at this time being withdrawn from the sider shipping limited assignment men
Army Air Forces for the same purpose. to the theater should this be necessary
Even with these efforts the War Depart- to meet the withdrawals of general as-
ment estimated that it could barely meet signment men from service units, and
overseaslosses
in the next few months. 64 also to provide training cadres for the
“This personnel business,” as General theater’s conversion program and for an
Handy put it, “is one of the worst head- officer candidateschool. 65
aches we have.”
Washington officials were also highly Exec 65Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 27 Nov 4, OPD
Office files: Memo, Henry for Bull, 2 Dec
critical of the gross discrepancies be- 44, sub: Repls SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforcements
tween the theater’s long-range estimates 1944, I; Memo, Henry for CofS, 3 Dec 44, sub:
Repls, CofS 320.2 Sec. IV, Cases 126–75; Summary
63Cbl EX-61989, COMZ to AGWAR, 10Nov 44, of Conclusions Reached and Actions Taken With
and Cbl WX–64610, AGWAR to COMZ, 17 Nov Respect to the ETO Replacement Problem [ca. 5
44, OPD 370.5 ETO Sec. XIV, Cases 471–95. Dec 44], CofS 322 Sec. II, Cases 31–45; Ltr, Handy
64For the efforts made in the zone of interior, to Eisenhower, 5 Dec 44, ETO Special File prep
see Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, op. cit., pp. 200–225. by G–1 Adm 17 Nov 44–1 Jan 45.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 321
Shortly after General Bull returned signments, and (2) a twelve-week basic
to the theater General Eisenhower in- infantry course for the conversion of
structed the major commands of the officers in other arms and services to
theater to comb out men who could be infantry.68Approximately 16,000 enlisted
replaced by limited assignment troops men and 500 officers were in training
or from units which could operate at under this program in mid-December,
less than T / O strength.66T h e Commu- although the output for the month actu-
nications Zone initially planned to meet ally came to less than 6,000.69
its commitment under these orders by This program was now due for a sub-
releasing about 15,000 men from service stantial expansion. T h e main impetus
units, in some cases at least making them came from an unexpected direction. In
temporarily understrength. Section com- mid-December the German counteroffen-
manders were enjoined to comply fully sive in the Ardennes suddenly shocked
with the order, particularly as to report- the theater into action which it had re-
ing positions which could be filled with peatedly postponed. Losses in the first
limited assignment men.67 two weeks were to raise battle casualties
At this time the ETOUSA Replace- to 77,700 for the month of December.
ment System had three major retraining Nonbattle casualties totaling 56,700 were
courses under way designed to produce to bring the total losses to 134,400 men.
additional infantry rifle replacements (See Table 10.) T h e replacement situa-
from the theater's own resources: (1) a tion consequently became more critical
twelve-week basic infantry course or- than ever.
ganized to convert men from arms and An accelerated conversion program
services other than infantry to infantry offered no solution to the immediate
riflemen; (2) a three-week refresher problem, and the theater therefore was
course for general assignment men with- forced to take drastic emergency meas-
drawn from the three line-of-communi- ures to meet the heavy losses which at-
cations regiments; and (3) a six to eight tended the battle raging in the Ardennes.
weeks' basic infantry course for the re- Field commanders immediately voiced
training of infantrymen other than rifle- their concern over the heavy losses,
men. Two courses were then being con- which rose to an estimated 50,000 men
ducted for officers: (1) a three-week basic in the 12th Army Group within the first
infantry refresher course for infantry week, more than 40,000 of which were
officers withdrawn from noncombat as- infantrymen.70
66Cbl S–70984, Eisenhower to Handy, 15 Dec 44, 68Ltr, GFRS to G–3 COMZ, 6 Dec 44, History
OPD Cbl Files. of GFRS, Ch. V, p. 61.
67 Memo,Lee for G–1, 15 Dec 44, sub: Reinforce- 69Memo, GFRS for G–1 ETOUSA, 15 Dec 44.
ment Strength, and Memo, Franey for Lord, 16 History of GFRS, Ch. V; p. 64; [Henderson] Pro-
Dec 44. EUCOM 322 Replacement Units 1944–45. curement and Use of Manpower in the ETO, p. 45.
3B; Stf Mtg, 19 Dec 44, EUCOM 337 U.K. Base 70Memo, Bull for Smith, 25 Dec 44, sub: Repls,
Stf Mtgs. SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforcements 1944, I.
322 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
Staff, and General Porter, the G–3, got special consideration on the claim that
under way at the Pentagon on 23 De- Germany’s defeat had the highest prior-
cember. ity, and that victory in the European the-
Essentially, the conference covered no ater within the next four or five months
ground that had not been covered in the hinged on the support which the War
meeting held earlier in the month. De- Department would give ETOUSA. Bar-
spite the desperate plight of the theater ker pleaded for special consideration at
resulting from the heavy fighting in the least through March, when the acceler-
Ardennes, ETOUSA officials actually ated retraining program would be in full
found themselves more on the defensive swing and producing results. General
than ever. T h e ETOUSA representatives Handy pointed out that the War De-
argued with some validity that the Ar- partment had given the European the-
dennes battle was seriously aggravating ater favored treatment all along. T h e
its manpower shortage. General Barker War Department’s allocations showed,
showed, for example, that the theater moreover, that the European theater
would be short about 17,000 riflemen by was scheduled to continue to get the
the end of the month and that divisions lion’s share of the available manpower
would be down to about 78 percent of for the next four months. In infantry
their rifle strength by that time. Beyond alone ETOUSA’s share would average
this, however, ETOUSA’s case was weak nearly 75 percent of the world-wide
and vulnerable. The claim, for example, allocation.
that ETOUSA’s replacement problem It was precisely by virtue of this fa-
had been aggravated by the necessity to vored treatment, Washington officials
go to Fifth Army’s aid in Italy and to argued, that ETOUSA now had the big-
assume responsibility for the support of gest and best remaining pool of man-
the Seventh Army sooner than planned power on which to draw. T h e bulk of
had no validity, for, as Pentagon offi- potential combat replacement material
cials were quick to point out, the War was now overseas. There no longer was
Department had more than made good any reserve of combat troops in the
these losses. T h e claim that ETOUSA United States on which the War De-
had had a retraining program in opera- partment might depend in an emer-
tion for some time and that it was draw- gency, for all major formations were
ing on COMZ units for general assign- now committed for deployment over-
ment men and even reducing the seas. Moreover, the War Department had
strengths of service units could hardly already withdrawn all potential replace-
be supported. ETOUSA’s conversion ment material from the air force and
program actually had gotten under way service forces in the zone of interior and
in earnest only within the past month. was in the process of doing the same in
The ETOUSA representatives admitted, the outlying defense commands.
in fact, that the theater had not appre- Practically the only source remaining
ciated the seriousness of the manpower in the United States was the manpower
situation until November. becoming available through induction.
T h e theater based its main plea for This was actually a dwindling asset so
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 325
far as providing able-bodied men was strength when the theater’s T / O units
concerned, for the pool of men in the and overhead were nearly 20,000 men
18–26 age group which had not been overstrength?
deferred for industrial or farm purposes It was plain that War Department offi-
was now depleted, and only a limited cials considered the theater wasteful in
number of men was entering that age its use of manpower, and they were more
group every month. T h e War Depart- pointed than ever before in their re-
ment had in fact agreed with Selective marks concerning its failure to take more
Service to re-examine about 30,000 men timely action on the retraining of its
previously rejected as borderline cases, overstrengths and the general assign-
and was contemplating relaxing physical ment men in its noncombat units. T h e
standards. T h e quality of replacements, warnings had been clear as to the War
in other words, would not be as high Department’s declining capability to
as in the past. furnish replacements. How, they asked,
Earlier in the month the War Depart- could the theater wait until late in No-
ment had agreed to increase shipments vember to accelerate its retraining pro-
to the theater by about 18,000 men, but gram? In General Handy’s view, the
it now explained that it had been able solution was obvious: “You just have to
to do so only by cutting the training comb them out.”
cycle from seventeen to fifteen weeks and In the end the conference produced
by shortening the furloughs customarily only one important offer of assistance to
given men scheduled to go overseas. In the theater: the War Department offered
increasing the January commitment, to provide the nucleus of a training
therefore, the War Department warned cadre for an officer candidate school in
that it was “borrowing from the future,” France. Beyond this it said only that the
for it was merely speeding u p the deliv- European theater would continue to get
ery of men in the replacement pipeline the largest share of the 80,000 replace-
and not increasing the total number ments which the War Department hoped
available. 82 to provide to meet world-wide require-
War Department officials could not ments each month. It had made un-
refrain from contrasting the relatively equivocally clear—this time by refusing
drastic steps taken in the United States to make any further concessions–that the
to recover manpower with the rather theater henceforth must look to its own
unimpressive performance of the theater. resources and ingenuity. In effect, there-
General Handy noted that in terms of the fore, the problem was thrown back into
ratio of combat units to their support, the theater’s lap.83
ETOUSA’s divisions were the most ex-
pensive of any theater. And why, he 83Min, Mtg to Discuss ETO Repl Situation, 23
asked, was it necessary for any unit in and 28 Dec 44, ETO Special File prep by G–1
Adm, 17 Nov–I Jan; Memo, Gilmer, Chief Euro-
the European theater to be under- pean Sec Theater Gp OPD, for Hull, 27 Dec 44.
sub: Repl Status of ETO, OPD 230.3 Sec. XXVII,
32It had done the same with field artillery am- Cases 516-53; Cbl 77780. Lee to WD, 23 Dec 44,
munition in response to the theater’s pleas late in and Cbl 82668, Marshall to Eisenhower, 27 Dec
November. See Ch. IX, above. 44, OPD 370.5 ETO Sec. XV, Cases 496–513.
326 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
and morale, under one office, and created the head of the Reinforcement Section
the new position of Deputy Theater of G–1 ETOUSA, as chief of the Theater
Commander for that purpose, naming Manpower Section, and of reinforcing
Lt. Gen. Ben Lear to the position. Lear the section as necessary with other officers
had commanded the Second Army in the from both the SHAEF and ETOUSA
United States from 1941 to 1944 and G–1 Divisions.87
had succeeded Lt. Gen. Lesley J. Mc- T h e Communications Zone questioned
Nair as commanding general of the this interpretation, objecting particu-
Army Ground Forces in July 1944 when larly to the loss of control over the Rein-
McNair was killed in Normandy. Gen- forcement Section of its G–1 Division,
eral Marshall had put Lear at General which did much of the staff work on
Eisenhower’s disposal to carry out his manpower–gathering data on require-
invigorated replacement training pro- ments and availability and determining
gram. T h e theater commander specifi- the number of men that had to be with-
cally delegated to Lear the authority to drawn for retraining. General Lee nat-
“coordinate, control, and direct” the ac- urally desired to retain control over
tivities of the Theater Manpower Sec- this important part of the entire man-
tion, which in effect meant authority power machinery. T h e matter was finally
over all matters dealing with the eco- brought to General Eisenhower’s atten-
nomic use and proper handling of men.86 tion, and the Supreme Commander re-
T h e creation of the Theater Man- ferred the entire problem to his G–1,
power Section and the appointment of General Barker.88
General Lear to supervise all manpower General Barker believed strongly in
activities immediately raised questions the need for an agency at the highest
regarding the role and authority of the level that would impartially and vigor-
theater G–1, which already was handling ously prosecute the manpower program
much of the staff work on manpower. now contemplated, and for an agency
General Lear promptly announced that that should not be subject to control by
he intended to establish the Theater any interested party. He also considered
Manpower Section as a completely sepa- it necessary that all theater-level staff
rate entity operating directly under his work on the manpower problem be
jurisdiction, and that he intended to brought under the control of one agency.
avail himself of the assistance of the T h e Replacement System had already
various agencies of the theater staff al- been placed under the supervision of
ready concerned with manpower, in line General Lear. General Barker consid-
with this interpretation of the theater ered it logical that the Reinforcement
commander’s desires. Lear announced his Section of the ETOUSA G–1 Division,
intention of naming Colonel Shannon, which was closely tied u p with the func-
86Ltr, CG ETO to Major Comds, 23 Jan 45, sub: 87 Memo,Lear for Lee, 29 Jan 45, sub: U.S. The-
Duties and Responsibilities of the Deputy Theater ater Manpower Sec. EUCOM 322 Manpower.
Commander, EUCOM 322 Manpower. See also Ch. 88 Memo, Lord for Franey 30 Jan 45, and Memo,
XIII, Sec. 3, for Lear’s position and authority, Lee for Lord, 1 Feb 45. EUCOM 322 Manpower.
328 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
tions of the Replacement System and the tion and granting it undisputed authority
new Theater Manpower Section, should in the field of manpower represented a
also pass to Lear’s control. In his opinion, triumph for General Barker’s ideas, for
leaving it with the Communications the SHAEF G–1 had argued with little
Zone would defeat the intent of the success for such an agency as early as
whole program, for it would deny Gen- June 1944. General Barker had clearly
eral Lear control over a vital element of seen the danger of having the Communi-
the entire structure and result in divided cations Zone, by virtue of its alternate
responsibility. role as theater headquarters, possess a
General Eisenhower approved his major voice in a matter in which it had
G–1’s recommendations. On 5 February, an important vested interest and which
therefore, General Barker notified Lee now required vigorous and impartial
that Lear was to have control of all ac- treatment. T h e entire argument once
tivities concerned with the direction of again pointed up the anomalous position
the Theater Manpower Section and the of one headquarters attempting to play
Replacement System. In line with this a dual role, and indicated the need for
decision the theater-wide function of the a disinterested agency which would exer-
Reinforcement Section of G–1 ETOUSA, cise real theater-wide surveillance and
with the necessary personnel, were now control.
to be transferred to the Theater Man-
power Section. T o be included in the In the meantime the theater had also
transfer was the section’s current head, taken action to get the expanded re-
Colonel Shannon, who was to become training program into operation, laying
chief of the Theater Manpower Section. down policy on withdrawals and eligi-
A suitable cadre was to be left with bility, specifying the objectives of the
ETOUSA G–1 to carry on the work on retraining program and the kind of train-
the Communications Zone’s own man- ing to be given, and issuing the first di-
power problems. On 24 February Gen- rectives on the release of general assign-
eral Lear officially announced the recon- ment men to the replacement system.
stitution of the Theater Manpower Sec- With one exception, the training courses
tion as a separate staff section responsible to be given remained the same. But the
directly to himself as Deputy Theater Replacement System now ordered a sub-
Commander, and outlined-its duties and stantial shortening of the courses in an
responsibilities.89 effort to speed u p the delivery of replace-
Creating the Theater Manpower Sec- ments. T h e three-week refresher course
previously specified for men taken from
the three line-of-communications regi-
89 Ltr, Osborne to Lear, 2 Feb 45, sub: G–1 ments, for example, was now shortened
SHAEF Conf on Manpower, and Ltr, Barker for to one week; similarly, the six- to eight-
Eisenhower, 2 Feb 45, sub: Theater Manpower Sec,
ETO 322.01/3 Manpower Board and Manpower week course for the conversion of infan-
Section; Memo, Barker for Lee, 5 Feb 45, sub: try other than riflemen to MOS 745 now
Status of Theater Manpower Sec, and Ltr, Lear
to Major Comds, 24 keb 45, sub: Manpower, became a two-week course: the course
EUCOM 322 Manpower. for conversion from other arms and serv-
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 329
highly specialized skills, who were not Army Ground Forces, and the Army
in excess of minimum requirements, and Air Forces.
95
who could not be suitably replaced, as ETOUSA also asked the Mediter-
well as medical enlisted men in infantry ranean theater if it possessed any surplus
and armored regiments and battalions, limited assignment men it could release.
were exempted. Men who had passed General McNarney offered to make 3,000
their 31st birthday and were serving in men in this category available, and sched-
combat units were not to be removed uled the first shipment early in February.
from combat units, nor were physically In fact, MTOUSA, after a War Depart-
qualified men to be reassigned to non- ment inquiry regarding its overstrength
combat units after hospitalization solely in replacement, also offered to provide
for reasons of age.93 ETOUSA with an additional 3,000 gen-
In each case the theater planned to eral assignment replacements, thus recip-
replace the men withdrawn with limited rocating ETOUSA’s favor of the preced-
assignment men. It hoped to ease the ing October. Needless to say, ETOUSA
transition at least partially by authoriz- accepted with alacrity, and the shipment
ing the assignment of limited assignment was scheduled for 15 February.96
men for on-the-job training for a week The officer shortage constituted a spe-
to a month before the withdrawal of men cial problem, and the Officer Candidate
for conversion training. It realized from School was the major addition to the re-
the start, however, that this objective training program which ETOUSA al-
would probably not be attained, and ready had placed in operation. T h e in-
warned the various commands to be pre- fantry officer replacement problem had
pared to operate understrength pending grown progressively worse during the
the receipt of replacements.94 Meanwhile, war. As in the case of enlisted replace-
it notified the War Department that it ments, the War Department had warned
would need about 25,000 limited assign- the theater in October that it could not
ment men in addition to those available
in the theater in order to expedite the 95Cbl EX-84377, 9 Jan 45, and Cbl W–21658,
release of general assignment personnel AGWAR to ETO, 16 Jan 45, both in SHAEF AG
for retraining. The War Department 200.3–1 Reinforcements (Requisitions, Availabili-
ties, Training); Note for Record, OPD, 14 Jan 45.
could not promise to meet the require- sub: 25,000 Limited Assignment Repls Desired by
ment in full, but it took immediate ac- ETO, and Memo, Henry for CGs Major Comds, 22
tion to recover personnel for this pur- Jan 45, sub: Limited Assignment Requirements
for CZ ETO, both in OPD 370.5 ETO Sec. XVIA,
pose in the United States, assigning Case 521.
quotas to the Army Service Forces, the 96Cbl S–76296, SHAEF to MTOUSA, 23 Jan 45,
Cbl FX–91140, MTOUSA to SHAEF, 25 Jan 45,
Cbl EX-93002, COMZ to MTOUSA, 31 Jan 45.
and Cbl FX–19843, MTOUSA to COMZ, 2 Feb
45, Cbl FX–22498, MTOUSA to COMZ, 7 Feb 45,
93Ltr, Hq ETO to Major Comds, 17 Jan 45, Cbl EX-95983, ETO to MTOUSA, 8 Feb 45, Cbl
sub: Manpower, ADSEC 320.2 Strength. FX–26639, MTO to ETO, 14 Feb 45, all in SHAEF
94Ibid.; Ltr, Hq ETO to CG USSTAF, 16 Jan AG 200.3–1 Reinforcements (Requisitions, Avail-
45, sub: Reinforcement Training, SHAEF AG abilities, Training); Cbl WX–26191, AGWAR to
200.3–4 Reinforcements (Reconversion Program- McNarney, 24 Jan 45, SHAEF G–3 370.092 Rein-
Policy) 1945. forcements 1944.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 331
continue to fill ETOUSA requisitions, This trend led the Replacement Sys-
for the training of officer candidates was tem to recommend the establishment of
actually being curtailed for lack of quali- an Officer Candidate School in the the-
fied candidates. Consequently it had ater. In January, as part of the greatly
warned the theater that it must meet a expanded retraining program, the the-
greater and greater portion of its needs ater commander ordered the establish-
through conversions and direct appoint- ment of an Officer Candidate School cap-
ments.97 able of training 1,900 infantry officers
T h e theater actually had one of the per month. With assistance from the
best possible sources of officer material War Department in the form of a badly
in its combat-tested and experienced non- needed training cadre dispatched from
commissioned officers. But it had not the Infantry School at Fort Benning,
fully exploited this resource, in part Georgia, the theater Replacement Sys-
because of the policy which did not as- tem announced the establishment of an
sure commanders making battlefield ap- officer training center at Fontainebleau,
pointments that they could retain such France, on 21 January, naming Col. Har-
men in their own commands. Casualties old E. Potter as commandant. T h e train-
rose sharply in November, and the the- ing schedule provided for three classes,
ater estimated that officer losses would each of 240 men, to start every week.99
total 2,500 per month if operations con- Field commanders were urged to take
tinued at the current pace. Approxi- advantage of their authority to make
mately 40 percent of casualties could be more direct appointments. T h e heavy
expected to return to duty, leaving a net losses of December, plus a change in pol-
loss of about 1,500. With the War De- icy which allowed units to retain the
partment promising only 600–700 re- officers they commissioned, overcame
placements per month, this meant that some of the earlier reluctance. 100But the
the theater would have to furnish 800– number of appointments continued to be
900 from its own resources. T h e 12th disappointingly low, and replacement
Army Group G–1 painted an even more officials forecast sizable shortages in the
pessimistic picture, forecasting officer infantry officer category in view of the
casualties of nearly 3,700 for the month fact that the officer candidate program
of December. Appointments had aver- could not begin to graduate officers until
aged fewer than 400 per month for the May. Early in March, at the urging of
entire theater.98 his G–1, General Eisenhower again
urged both army group commanders to
appoint more officers from the ranks,
97Cbl WX–49282, AGWAR to SHAEF, 20 Oct
44, SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforcements 1944.
pointing out that this was the only
98Ltr, H q ETO to A Gp and Army Comdrs, 30 method of meeting the shortages in the
Oct 44, sub: Inf Off Repls, 6 A Gp 322.96–1:
Memo, Barker for Bull, 22 Nov 44, sub: Repls, 99 History
of GFRC, Ch. II, p. 136; History of the
Memo, O’Hare for Bull, 22 Nov 44, and Memo, Col Theater Manpower Section, pp. 7–8, ETO Adm
F. J. de Rohn, Chief Training and Experiments 560.
Sec G–3 SHAEF, for G–3, 22 Feb 45, sub: Bat- 100 Memo,Twitchell for G–3, 2 Mar 45, sub:
tlefield Appointments, all in SHAEF G–3 370.092 Off Reinforcements, SHAEF G–3 370.092 Rein-
Reinforcements 1944. forcements 1944.
332 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
next few months.101 T h e Replacement lined. But the program did not achieve
System had earlier instituted a three- real momentum until the next month.
week indoctrination course at the Fon- At the end of January 13,600 men were
tainebleau training center for officers in training; a month later the number
who had been commissioned directly.102 had risen to 33,400. T h e actual conver-
sions in these two months totaled 7,685
By mid-January the goals of the con- and 8,193 103 The fruitsof
respectively.
version program had been clearly out- the program were still some way off, and
the replacement situation therefore re-
101Ltr,Barker to Smith, 7 Mar 45, sub: Off Repls, mained tight.
and Ltr, Eisenhower to Bradley and Devers, 11
Mar 45, both in SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforce- Meanwhile, replacement requirements
ments 1944. continued high. Battle casualties, which
102Ltr, H q ETO to CG GFRC, 7 Feb 45, sub:
Retraining Program, ETO 353 Training; Gen Bd
Study 3, Reinforcement System and Reinforcement 103[Henderson] Procurement and Use of Man-
Procedures in ETO, p. 26. power in the ETO, p. 140.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 333
had risen to 77,700 in December, dropped System estimated that its needs in the
to 69,100 in January, but nonbattle cas- three months beginning with March
ualties rose from 56,000 in December would average 90,000 men. Seemingly
to 67,600 in January. Total casualties, unaware of the recent announcements
coming to 136,700 men consequently ex- from Washington, it recommended that
ceeded the losses of the preceding the War Department be asked to furnish
month. 104 91,300 in March, 88,375 in April, and
Late in January the theater estimated 51,300 in May.107
that the shortage of infantrymen within T h e theater had continued to allocate
the armies alone totaled 82,000, of which replacements between the two army
nearly 50,000 were in riflemen. 105 T h e groups on the basis of their relative di-
outlook for the future was hardly en- visional strengths and operational mis-
couraging despite the special efforts now sions. Early in January, in the midst of
being made. Earlier in the month the the Ardennes battle, SHAEF ordered
War Department had again relented the available infantry riflemen replace-
somewhat, revising its capabilities up- ments allocated to the 12th and 6th Army
ward to 44,000 men for May and 46,000 Groups in the ratio of 8 to 1. Armored
in June. T o achieve these figures, how- replacements, in which the shortage was
ever, it noted that it would have to call also serious at this time, were allocated
upon the Army Air Forces for an addi- between the two commands in the ratio
tional 15,000 men. These would consist of 10 to 1. 108
largely of students in training for air T h e 6th Army Group considered this
crews and of highly trained technicians, division inequitable, particularly in
and the Army Air Forces warned that view of the intensified fighting that had
their transfer would seriously affect air attended the enemy’s offensive in the
operations in the European theater. T h e south beginning on New Year’s Day.
War Department preferred not to make General Devers immediately asked for re-
these withdrawals. ETOUSA manpower consideration, therefore, claiming short-
officials insisted on the additional re- ages of 15,000 enlisted men and 500 offi-
placements, however, pointing out that cers in the Seventh Army. SHAEF de-
the theater's conversion capabilities fended its original allocation on the basis
would begin to diminish after June. 106 of operational priorities, although it noti-
Early in February the Replacement fied the 6th Army Group that it would
get 3,000 men which the Mediterranean
theater had offered to ship; this would
104Ibid., p. 45. and Army Battle Casualties and in effect change the ratio from 8 to 1 to
Nonbattle Deaths in World War II, p. 32.
105Memo, Bull, 26 Jan 45, sub: Repls, EUCOM 5.7 to 1. Hospital returnees did not figure
SHAEF Plans and Operations 23 Nov 44–26 Jan 45.
106Cbl W–30564, Handy to Eisenhower, 1 Feb
45. and Cbl S–77790, Lear to AGWAR, 4 Feb 45, 107Memo, GFRC for G–1 ETO, 8 Feb 45, ETO
both in SHAEF AG 200.3–1 Reinforcements CFRC 200.3 Personnel Requisitions File B.
(Requisitions, Availabilities, Training); Memo, Os- 108 Whiteley, Deputy G–3 SHAEF, Stf Study, 3
borne for Lear, 5 Feb 4.5, sub: Manpower Rein- Jan 45. sub: Allocs of U.S. Reinforcements, with
forcements From U.S., ETO AG 319.1/1 Daily approval by Smith, 7 Jan 45, SHAEF G–3 370.092
Progress Reports I. Reinforcements 1944.
334 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
in the allocations, for they automatically portionately greater support to the 12th
went back to their original units.109 Army Group, allocating infantry re-
As had happened so frequently be- placements, totaling 60,000 men, at a
fore, the calculations of the two com- 5 to 1 ratio and armored replacements,
mands were based on conflicting claims. totaling 2,100 at a 4 to 1 ratio.111
SHAEF had referred to shortages of
only 5,200 infantry riflemen in the 6th ( 4 ) T h e Replacement System in
Army Group, while the latter claimed Operation
a deficiency of 13,300 Moreover, 6th
For the most part U.S. forces in the
Army Group entered an additional bid
European theater attempted to keep
for approximately 5,000 officers and
units at their full T/O&E strength
men, representing losses which the 42d,
through the provision of individual re-
63d, and 70th Divisions had suffered as
placements, delivered to units either
the result of emergency releases in De-
while they were in action or when they
cember.110 SHAEF refused to alter the
were out of the line and refitting. T h e
allocations for January at so late a date,
relief of battle-weary regiments by units
and promised instead to make adjust-
shipped in advance of other divisional
ments in the February allocations if they
components had only a limited applica-
were warranted.
tion and did not constitute a significant
Late in January SHAEF and 6th
exception to this policy.
Army Group reconciled their conflicting
T h e provision of replacements was
claims. SHAEF acknowledged that its
the mission of the Replacement System,
previous allocations had been inequi-
a separate command operated by the
table. In compensation it now assigned
SOS/COMZ under the staff supervision
the February allocation of approxi-
of the theater G–1. Planning for such
mately 50,000 infantry replacements to
an organization got under way in the
the 12th and 6th Army Groups on a
spring of 1943, and ETOUSA directed
3 to 1 ratio. Armored replacements were
the SOS to establish a replacement sys-
to be divided equally between the two
tem the following fall. O n 24 November
commands. T h e 6th Army Group’s situ-
the SOS announced the establishment
ation improved greatly in the next few
of the Field Force Replacement System,
weeks, owing mainly to smaller losses.
naming Col. Walter G. Layman as its
I n March, therefore, SHAEF, taking
chief. One replacement depot, with five
into consideration the new operational
battalions, located at Lichfield, was al-
priorities and missions, again threw pro-
ready in operation in England, but the
newly created Field Force Replacement jobs who were physically qualified for
System, as such, did not actually come field duty, and that these men be ear-
into operation until January 1944. T h e marked for assignment to field force
command was subsequently redesignated units as limited assignment men were
Ground Force Replacement System, made available to replace them. As
then the Replacement System, and in shown earlier, this recommendation met
December 1944 its name was finally with little enthusiasm in a theater fe-
changed to Ground Force Reinforce- verishly preparing for the Normandy in-
ment Command.112 vasion.
T h e War Department showed an early Evans’ main criticism dealt with the
interest in the newly established organ- matter of the Replacement System’s
ization. Increasingly concerned over the place in the command and organiza-
manpower shortage developing in the tional structure. T h e order establishing
United States, it was determined that the system had provided for a “chief”
the Replacement System in the Euro- of the Field Force Replacement System
pean theater should be established along and had left its position in the command
lines that would insure the best possible structure somewhat nebulous. Certain
manpower management. As noted above, supervisory powers over the depots, for
in January 1944 it sent Colonel Evans, example, had remained with the various
chief of the Classification and Replace- base section commanders. T h e latter,
ment Branch of T h e Adjutant General’s according to Evans, were not confining
Office, to survey the theater’s progress their supervision to the functions orally
in establishing adequate replacement agreed to. Moreover, there appeared to
handling machinery. be no central staff agency, such as T h e
Evans found several faults with the Adjutant General’s Office in the War
policies which the theater had laid down Department, through which all direc-
for the embryo replacement system and tives, requests, and information would
made several recommendations, based be routed. In short, Evans thought
on experience in the Mediterranean, for the command and staff channels were
the operation of the system on the Con- vaguely defined, and he argued strongly
tinent. In line with the warnings which for giving the chief of the Replacement
the War Department was beginning to System command status so that he would
issue at this time regarding the devel- have complete and sole authority over
oping manpower shortage, he also rec- all ground force replacement troops. As
ommended that all units and installa- an example of the inflexibility of the
tions of the SOS be directed to survey system as it was then being operated,
their personnel to identify men occupy- he cited the practice of earmarking all
ing other than key or highly technical replacements arriving in the theater for
either field force or SOS assignments,
with no provision for interchange of
112SOS GO 122, 24 Nov 43, EUCOM 322 Replace- men with specialties common to two or
ment Units II (a). For the history of the planning
of the replacement system see file ETO SOS AG more arms or services, a policy which
322.96 Replacement Troops Jun 42 to Aug 43. did not permit the maximum utiliza-
336 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
tion of skills when and where they were lengthy cable to General Eisenhower.
needed. 113 T h e North African experience had con-
ETOUSA officers who attended the vinced him of the absolute need for a
War Department conference on man- single commander with sole responsi-
power early in April 1944 took excep- bility for the operation of the theater’s
tion to the requirement that the theater Replacement System in conformity with
accord command status to the Replace- both theater and War Department poli-
ment System, and asked that the theater cies. It was imperative, he maintained,
be allowed to establish the Replacement that the commander of the Replacement
System as it thought best. Brig. Gen. System have control of all casual per-
Oscar B. Abbott, then the ETOUSA sonnel; that he direct and co-ordinate
G–1, explained that the theater com- training programs for the recovery and
mander, through the chief of the Field proper utilization of men coming out
Force Replacement System, exercised ef- of hospitals and for the retraining of
fective control over the location, train- able-bodied men in the Communications
ing, and assignment of units and per- Zone to make them available for duty
sonnel of the system and over the flow with combat units; and that he take
and distribution of replacements, and aggressive action to prevent the accumu-
denied that the base section commanders lation and stagnation of men in depots.
had any control over such manpower. Furthermore, he must exercise control
He saw no need to give the chief of the of loss replacements sent to the theater
system any additional powers, such as to prevent their diversion for other
court-martial jurisdiction or supply, and purposes.
asked that no changes be made at that These lessons, according to the Chief
late date. of Staff, had been learned at high cost
War Department representatives did in North Africa and were based on a
not press the issue for the moment, a p mass of cumulative evidence. Referring
pearing satisfied with assurances that the to the opposition which the theater had
head of the Replacement System, what- so recently expressed to the War Depart-
ever his title, possessed sufficient powers ment’s views, he noted that he would not
to exercise a centralized control over the tolerate a “stiff-necked attitude” in op-
handling of replacements and to pro- position to an essential change dictated
duce the desired results.114 General by experience with which ETOUSA
Marshall was not satisfied with this ar- officials were not acquainted.115
rangement, however, and a few days General Eisenhower assured the Chief
after the conclusion of the conference of Staff that his wishes would be carried
stated his desires in the matter in a out, and noted that Colonel Layman,
the chief of the Replacement System, ex-
113Memo, Evans for AG ETOUSA, 13 Feb 44, sub: ercised complete control over the system,
Observations and Recommendations, FFRS, SHAEF and for all practical purposes actually
AG 200.3–1 Replacements (Replacement Require-
ments) 1944; Memo, Evans for Lovett, 12 Feb 44,
s u b Final Rpt, GFRC Planning File.
114Notes on Conf, 8 Apr 44, SHAEF AG 200.3–1 115CblW–22651, Marshall to Eisenhower, 13 Apr
Replacements 1944. 44, ETO Eyes Only Cbl File.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 337
was a commander, for the base sections accordance with the plan, however, con-
retained supervision over the depots only trol of all replacement units reverted
in matters of housekeeping and sup- to the Replacement System after the
ply.116 Earlyin May General Marshall’s drawing of an army rear boundary early
views on the whole matter were em- in August, so that centralized control
bodied in a formal directive to the thea- was once more established over the en-
ter, which specifically laid down War tire system.
Department policy on the subject. On Four depots were then in operation
18 May the theater headquarters in turn on the Continent. By mid-September
announced these policies as effective the Replacement System in France had
within the theater and gave the Replace- grown to six depots, with twenty-six
ment System commandstatus. 117 battalions. By mid-November the trans-
fer of all but two of the depots remain-
By D Day there were thirteen depots ing in England, and the incorporation
in the Replacement System, comprising of the depot which had arrived via
fifty-three battalions and 168 compa- southern France in support of the Sev-
nies. T h e OVERLORDbuild-up plan enth Army, raised the strength of the
called for the transfer of five of these Replacement System on the Continent
depots to the Continent by D plus go. to ten depots. No further expansion of
I n general, the scheme provided for a the system was contemplated. But the
depot in support of each army, one bat- inauguration of the big retraining pro-
talion in direct support of each corps, gram in January 1945 led to the activa-
and additional depots to operate recep- tion of two additional depots on a pro-
tion centers or to serve as stockage or visional basis, which raised the Replace-
training installations. ment System’s strength on the Continent
Deployment to the Continent took to twelve depots. Two depots remained
place substantially as planned. In line in England throughout the period of
with the general scheme of command for operations. 118
the early phases of the invasion, how- There were five types of depots. One
ever, control of the Replacement System type provided direct support to the
in France was initially decentralized. armies and was located well forward. At
For the assault stage one battalion was the end of January 1945 there were four
attached to each corps. In mid-June of these: the 18th Replacement Depot, lo-
First Army took control of the replace- cated at Tongres, Belgium, serving the
ment units which had arrived in Nor- Ninth Army; the 3d Depot, at Verviers,
mandy. First Army tried, in fact, to Belgium, serving the First Army; the
retain indefinite control over the re- 17th Depot at Angervillers, France, serv-
placement units which supported it. In ing the Third Army; and the 2d Depot,
at Thaon, France, serving the Seventh:
116Cbl E-24656, Eisenhower to Marshall, 23 Apr a separate battalion, the 51st, at Charle-
44, ETO Eyes Only Cbl File.
117
Ltr, WD to ETO, 4 May 44, sub: Opn of Thea-
ter Repl System, and Ltr, Hq ETO to Major Comds, 118History of GFRS, Pt. II: D Day to V-E Day,
18 May 44, sub: Opn of Repl System ETO, both in Ch. IV, pp. 1–2; [Henderson] Procurement and Use
SHAEF AG 200.3–1 Replacements. of Manpower in the ETO, pp. 17–26.
338 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
the December crisis. But they often ward battalion supporting a particular
stayed much longer, and the delays at corps, and finally to a specific unit.120
this stage were the source of much of T h e operation of this human pipeline
the dissatisfaction of the individual re- was bedeviled by many difficulties and
placemen t. became the target of endless reproach.
From the stockage depot the replace- In general, complaints fell into two
ment went next to an army depot. If broad categories. Those originating with
he came from the 14th Depot at Neuf- the field commands generally dealt with
château, for example, he next found such subjects as the unsatisfactory qual-
himself at either the 17th Depot, which ity of replacements, endless equipment
supported the Third Army, or the 2d, shortages, and theater policy on such
which supported the Seventh. I n gen- matters as requisitioning and returning
eral, the processing at this stage of the casuals. Those originating with the in-
journey was simply a continuation of dividual replacement dealt mainly with
that already begun, and included a the subject of the physical discomforts
check of a man’s medical record and and mental distress attending the inter-
the filling of remaining equipment minable delays involved in moving from
shortages. When directed by the army, 120Ibid., pp. 28-40; [Greenwald] Human Logistics,
the replacement moved on to the for- pp. 7–48.
340 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
reception depot to the unit of final on the morale of new men, the Replace-
assignment. ment System eventually adopted the pol-
The lot of the individual replacement icy of separating casuals from new re-
was not an enviable one at any time, placements during their stay in the
and it was particularly hard in the first system. 121
several months of operations on the Con- Most of the depots forward of the
tinent. Housing facilities at the depots ports eventually offered training to re-
offered little or nothing in the way of placements in transit. But such training
creature comforts, and transportation was often makeshift and pointless, and
for a long time took the form of either not always of a high caliber, for its con-
open trucks or slow-moving trains made duct depended largely on officers who
up of unheated and crowded “40 and themselves were replacements or casuals
8’s” neither of which permitted ade- and who gave only grudging co-opera-
quate sanitation or messing facilities. tion. Meanwhile much of the processing
Most replacements accepted the physical at each stage along the replacement’s
discomforts of the forward journey with- forward journey, involving endless paper
out complaint in anticipation of quickly work, interviews, and short-arm inspec-
reaching the unit of their ultimate tions, seemed meaningless and unneces-
assignment. Thousands of replacements, sary. 122
particularly infantry riflemen, did in fact T h e speed with which a replacement
pass through the system with relative might finally be assigned and delivered
speed and quickly found “homes” with to a unit and thrown into combat often
units. Contrary to theory, however, contrasted sharply with the protracted
thousands of others found themselves de- delays in the depots. Common sense sug-
tained for unconscionably long periods gested that a man should be integrated
at some point along the way. into his unit while the unit was a t rest
For the latter, life in a “repple depot” or in reserve. Field service regulations
was a constant battle against boredom, had in fact once advocated such a policy.
frustration, and worry. The Replace- But it was common practice for replace-
ment System was ill-prepared, particu- ments to be absorbed into a unit without
larly at first, to keep men occupied or knowing much more than its name. In
comfortable. Time therefore hung heav- fact, replacements often joined their
ily on their hands. Left with nothing to units at night, without even seeing the
do, and without knowledge as to his faces of the men with whom they were
future assignment, the replacement pic- to fight, and in some cases without learn-
tured a black future for himself and ex- ing the names of their squad or platoon
panded every rumor. Association with
casuals usually did not help matters, for 121
[Henderson] Procurement and Use of Man-
power in the ETO, pp. 40, 91–92; [Greenwald]
casuals, unfortunately, often delighted in Human Logistics, pp. 34-37; Ltr, Hq, GFRS to COs
feeding the new man’s imaginary fears Repl Depots, 27 Nov 44, sub: Segregation of Casuals
with tall tales about the enemy’s cun- and Repls, in History of GFRS, Ch. VI, pp. 290–91.
122[Henderson] Procurement and Use of Man-
ning and the small chance of survival. power in the ETO, pp. 40–43, 170–72; [Greenwald]
Realizing the bad effect which this had Human Logistics, p. 18.
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 341
leaders. Such practices not only multi- orient him on the habits of the unit,
plied the confusion and anxiety for the and check his equipment.123
individual replacement, but created an T h e problem of the morale of the
additional hazard for the unit as a whole. individual replacement received increas-
Proper guidance and orientation of the ing attention during the fall of 1944
replacement at this stage of his journey and was one of the factors which even-
was undoubtedly more important than tually led to the creation of a separate
at any other, for it was at this stage office for the control of all manpower
that he became a member of an or- affairs under General Lear. T h e Re-
ganized group and had to meet the first placement System itself was aware of
test of combat. Many units appreciated many of the deficiencies in the handling
of replacements. I n November Brig.
this and made special efforts to facilitate
Gen. Henry J. Matchett, who had suc-
the integration of new men and help
ceeded General Layman as commander
them make the necessary psychological
of the Replacement System upon the
adjustment. Some divisions established latter’s death in England on 24 Septem-
permanent processing agencies designed ber, invited constructive criticism and
to introduce the replacement to his unit,
acclimate him to his new surroundings, 123 [Greenwald]Human Logistics, pp. 52–56.
342 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
suggestions for improvement in the op- of heating rations, and permanent train
eration of the system. Late in December commanders and medical noncommis-
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, chief sioned officers to take the place of those
of the Inspectorate Section under Lear, previously drafted from the ranks of
with the aid of other officers, conducted casuals and replacements. These meas-
a systematic investigation of the many ures, while alleviating some of the physi-
complaints over the handling of replace- cal hardships attending the journey
ments. 124 through the replacement system, actu-
Some of the deficiencies were outside ally did little to ease the replacement’s
the power of the Replacement System to mental anxiety. T h e handling of thou-
remedy. In the case of others, such as sands of men was unavoidably an imper-
the inadequacy of training at the depots, sonal matter, and most replacements did
the Replacement System was undoubt- not overcome the feeling that they were
edly severely handicapped by the lack orphans until they finally found a home
of training units and equipment, and by with a unit.125
its necessity to rely on casuals and re- T h e very term “replacement,” in the
placements for actual instruction. Nev- view of some, had a bad psychological
ertheless it made a conscientious effort effect on those to whom it was applied,
late in 1944 to alleviate the hardships for it had a connotation of expendabil-
attending the replacement’s progress ity. In an attempt to overcome this,
along the replacement route, including theater headquarters late in December
the organization of more meaningful ordered the use of the term discontinued
training programs, provision of better and the term “reinforcements” substi-
housing and recreational facilities, and tuted on the ground that replacement
the provision of somewhat better facil- personnel should be considered as a com-
ities during the trip forward. Included bat reserve. T h e War Department had
in the latter were kitchen cars capable no objection to the change, but it re-
jected the suggestion that it adopt the
124Early in October 1944 General Matchett au- new term for use throughout the Army,
thorized Maj. Arthur Goodfriend, Editor in Chief and reminded the theater that the
of The Stars and Stripes, to survey the workings
of the Replacement System from within. Posing as
treatment of replacements before their
“Private Arthur Goodwin,” and furnished with entry into combat was more important
orders as an infantry replacement, Goodfriend en- to morale than calling a “rose by another
tered the system via the 2d Transit Area a t OMAHA
Beach on 8 October and went the entire route of
name.” It was at this time that the thea-
a replacement, ending with assignment to the 26th ter also redesignated the Ground Force
Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division. His observa- Replacement System the Ground Force
tions are contained in, Rpt to the CG of the Re- Reinforcement Command.126
placement System, 27 Oct 44, sub: Experiences in
Army Ground Force Replacement System, EUCOM At the suggestion of the War Depart-
322 Replacement Units 1944–45. IIIB. T h e later ment, ETOUSA in March took a more
reports of General Bonesteel and other officers can
be found in EUCOM GFRC 333.3 Inspections by 125[Greenwald] Human Logistics, pp. 16–21.
General Inspectorate Section ETOUSA. See also Ltr, 126Memo, Franey for Hughes, 1 Dec 44. EUCOM
Matchett to Armies, Corps, and Divisions, 9 Nov 322 Replacement Units, II (a); ETOUSA GO 131,
44, History of GFRC, Ch. IV, pp. 286–89, and 28 Dec 44, SHAEF AG 200.3–1 Replacements 1944;
[Greenwald] Human Logistics, pp. 99–102. [Henderson] Procurement and Use of Manpower in
T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY 1945 343
porting the army from which they had were to be considered free replacements
come, which increased to some degree and used to fill any requisition received
the chances that men would return to by the depot.133
their former units.131 In actual practice some replacement
T h e theater's policy on casuals was battalions tried to return all casuals
closely tied up with theater requisition- from divisions to their former units,
ing policy. Under the terms of requisi- even though this often entailed holding
tioning regulations a division was pro- men beyond the authorized time limit
hibited from requesting replacements and thus violated theater policy. Many
for an understrength regiment if the felt that it was better to do this than to
division as a whole was overstrength, al- assign men to new units and risk having
though former members of the regiment them go AWOL. Failure of the armies
needing the replacements might be lan- to enforce theater policy encouraged
guishing in the Replacement System mento do exactlythis.134
after their dischargefrom 132 In any case, the manpower crisis
hospitals.
Transferring men from one unit to an- brought on by the enemy onslaught in
other within the division was obviously December finally changed all this. Early
no solution. in January 1945, on General Devers’
Field force commanders appealed suggestion, SHAEF authorized the auto-
again and again for the abandonment matic return of all casuals to their
of this policy and asked that casuals be former units in the 6th Army Group.
returned to their old units automati- Later in the month it suspended the
cally. T o the casuals themselves, detain- policy requiring requisition for such
ment in the replacement depots was casuals for the 12th Army Group as
incomprehensible. In desperation many well. 135
a casual took matters into his own hands T h e suspension of the policy requir-
and returned to his unit at the risk of ing requisitions for casuals applied only
being charged AWOL rather than sweat to enlisted men. Field grade officers had
out official orders. Nevertheless the the- been excepted from the rule earlier. One
ater in November reaffirmed the stand- group of casuals therefore still remained
ing policy on casuals: they were to be subject to the theater’s original policy—
held in forward depots only ten days. that is, company grade officers. Later in
If no requisition justified by actual va- February the replacement system, recog-
cancies was forthcoming from the men’s nizing the bad effect which prolonged
former units within that period, they
133Ltr, Hq GFRS to COs of Depots, 25 Nov 44,
131Ltr, 12: A Gp to Army Comdrs, 8 Sep 44, sub: sub: Return of Casual Pers, GFRC Hospital Pers
Priorities for Returning Hospital Returnees to Returning to Duty; Memo, Franey for CofS GFRS,
Their Former Units, as cited in History of GFRS, 22 Nov 44, GFRC 370.092 Reinforcements May 44–
Ch. VI, pp. 379–80. Apr 45.
132Memo, Col Waine Archer, Chief Combat Les- 134 [Greenwald]Human Logistics, pp. 49–50.
sons Br G–3 ETOUSA for CG GFRS, 1 Dec 44, 135Cbl EX-22330, 6 A Gp to SHAEF, 4 Jan 45,
GFRC 322 Combat Observer’s Report 1944–45. See and Cbl S–73767, SHAEF to 6 A Gp, 5 Jan 45, ETO
also Ltr, Bull to Chief Training Sec G–3 SHAEF, Cbls, ETO Adm 403; Cbl EX-88999, SHAEF to 12
13 Nov 44, and AGF Observers’ Rpts in OCT, both A Gp, 21 Jan 45, in History of GFRS, Ch. VI, pp.
in SHAEF G–3 Reinforcements. 383–86.
346 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
ter G–1 early in November. T h e main savings which had implications for both
concern, as always, was the problem of the efficiency of units and the morale
keeping units at authorized strength of individuals—were significant in com-
in view of the theater’s existing regula- parison with the savings which might
tions. Some commanders frankly ad- have been effected through an earlier
mitted that they had circumvented thea- implementation of War Department in-
ter regulations, requisitioning men in junctions with respect to the recovery
advance of actual need in order to and conversion of able-bodied men in
overcome the lag in delivery. General the Communications Zone and air force,
Eisenhower’s own representative, Maj. and in various theater overstrengths and
Gen. Everett S. Hughes, agreed that ex- surpluses.
isting regulations only invited subter- Providing replacements suffered from
fuge. In fact, he favored the kind of the handicap of most military logistics
dubious bookkeeping which some units, in that requirements are not easily cal-
like First Army, had already resorted to culated and “production” is not readily
in order to accomplish the desired adjusted to changing demands. But the
end.141 handling of the manpower problem was
Shortly thereafter the theater legiti- handicapped, in addition, by a basic flaw
mized the practice which some units in the theater’s command and organiza-
obviously were already following by au- tional structure. Giving the Replace-
thorizing units engaged in combat to re- ment System command status failed to
quisition replacements forty-eight hours ensure the kind of personnel manage-
in advance of expected losses. But it ment the War Department had in mind,
refused to permit units to compute re- for the Replacement System had no
placement needs on the basis of effective authority to recover general assignment
strength.
142 men from the major subcommands for
conversion training and to replace them
The theater’s regulations on casuals with limited assignment men. Man-
and requisitioning were probably a nec- power management was a problem
essary part of any over-all manpower con- which touched every command in the
trol and accounting system designed to theater. It needed to be handled at the
conserve and economize. In actual prac- highest command level, not by a com-
tice, however, it became clear that policy mand with an important vested interest
on stocking, requisitioning, and use in the situation. T h e fact that no
could not be applied as arbitrarily to effective measures were taken until the
men as to supplies and equipment. Supreme Commander personally inter-
Moreover, it is questionable whether the vened indicated that no true theater
savings effected by these regulations- headquarters existed which could en-
force War Department policy. Unfortu-
141Min, G–1 Conf at Hq ETO, 3–4 Nov 44,
EUCOM 337 G–1 Conf, 3–4 Nov 44, I. nately the manpower problem, like the
142TWX EX-62284, Eisenhower to Major Comds, ammunition problem, was needlessly
10Nov 44, GFRC Requisitions Nov 43–May 45; Ltr
(1st Ind), ETO to CG SUSAG, 25 Nov 44, sub:
aggravated by the lack of mutually un-
Combat Repl, 6 A Gp 322.96–1. derstood rules on accountability.
CHAPTER XII
both he and Somervell eventually found They made little attempt to conceal
much to criticize in the theater’s logistic their suspicions, and on occasion voiced
structure. 1 their dissatisfaction openly to the COMZ
T h e Lutes and Somervell observations staff, condemning what they referred to
fell into two broad categories: (1) Those as the “lethargy and smugness” of some
concerning the general lack of confidence of its members.3 It is noteworthy that
in the Communications Zone which was dissatisfaction with the service elements
widely prevalent in the field commands, never reached such proportions on the
and (2) those concerning the shortcom- southern line of communications.
ings in logistic management, or what T h e attitudes of the field commands
might be termed the field of business varied, undoubtedly reflecting in some
administration in supply. degree their training in the understand-
Lack of confidence in the Communi- ing of supply problems. First Army had
cations Zone was hardly a new phenom- always been the most outspoken in its
enon. Suspicions engendered by the dif- criticism of the Communications Zone.
ferences over organization and planning General Hodges himself was intolerant
in the U.K. period had never subsided, 2 of any supply deficiency and, according
and relations between the Communica- to Lutes, the least disposed to make any
tions Zone and the field commands were attempt to understand logistic problems.
never completely cordial. Part of the General Patton frankly stated that he
mistrust undoubtedly stemmed from the trusted no one to the rear of the Advance
traditional and probably unpreventable Section and usually planned his opera-
feeling that rear area troops were better tions in partial defiance of supply diffi-
supplied than those at the front, par- culties, making the most of available
ticularly in such items as clothing and resources. Lutes believed that of the
food. T h e sudden famine in the more army commanders Simpson had the best
popular brands of cigarettes in the com- understanding of supply. Perhaps be-
bat zone in November, brought about cause of this the Ninth Army com-
by distributional difficulties, was but one mander did not expect miracles and
of several examples of COMZ indiffer- trusted in the Communications Zone to
ence and inefficiency, in the view of support him. General Bradley was cred-
the front-line soldier, which confirmed ited with being logistically minded, al-
this attitude. However unwarranted though conservative and disposed to
such feelings may have been, the field make doubly sure of his supply by asking
commands never were completely satis- for large reserves, as he did in the case
fied that the Communications Zone ap- of ammunition. T h e field commanders
preciated the urgency of their needs or in the 12th Army Group were unani-
showed the proper zeal in meeting them. mous in expressing confidence in the
ADSEC commander, General Plank,
1Ltr, Somervell to Lee, 1 Dec 44. Ltr, Lutes to
Somervell, 7 Dec 44, and Memo, Lutes for Somer-
vell, 8 Dec 44, all in Hq ASF European Theater- 3Memo, Col James MacCormack, Chief Mov Br
Last Half 1944. G–4 12 A Gp, for Moses, 1 Dec 44, 12 A Gp G–4
2 See Logistical Support I , 264–68. Letters and Memos Assorted, 1944.
350 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
who had always maintained the closest many of the complaints from the field. 5
liaison with the combat commands and More important than any personality
who apparently had to their satisfaction differences, and the source of at least
instilled in his entire command an some of the distrust between the field
urgency about meeting the needs of the and service forces, was the continued
combat forces. General Somervell felt dissatisfaction with the command struc-
that this “spirit of urgency” was lacking ture as it affected supply. Although tech-
at other echelons of the Communica- nically General Lee no longer held the
tions Zone and suspected that the lack title of deputy theater commander, his
of it was sensed by the armies and was position had not really changed. While
one of the major sources of the distrust he himself no longer legally wore two
expressed by them. He emphasized this hats, his staff did, for it doubled as the
strongly at a staff conference in January, COMZ and ETOUSA staff. It had a
pointing out that the Communications dual role, therefore, and the army group
Zone existed for one purpose alone— commanders could not help feeling that
serving the combat forces—and that it it could not be counted on to give the
must convince the field commands that desired priority to the demands of the
it appreciated this. “A lack of confidence combat forces where such demands con-
or antagonism,” as Somervell put it, “has flicted with those of rear area troops.
no place in a situation of that kind. I T h e thought that the Communications
do not care who is right or who is Zone, a command co-equal with the
wrong, the point is that we have to army groups, might be passing on the
satisfy our customers and do so in a validity of their requests was particu-
way which pleases them.” 4 larly distasteful to them. They strongly
As in the past, some of the difficulties suspected, in fact, that the COMZ-
could be attributed to a clash of per- ETOUSA staff had been responsible for
sonalities. This had been most evident the “arbitrary” paring down of their
in the relations between the Commu- recommended replacement and expendi-
nications Zone and Supreme Headquar- ture factors and was therefore respon-
ters, for the relations between Generals sible for the current shortages in ammu-
Lee and Crawford had never been com- nition and such items as radios and
pletely free of strain. That the dealings tanks.
between the two headquarters had im- T h e basic difficulty with the arrange-
proved some over the months was at- ment was likewise illustrated in the
tributed largely to the diplomacy of problem of allocating supplies between
Lee’s chief of staff, General Lord, who the two army groups. It appeared logical
personally conducted much of the busi- that theater headquarters should make
ness with SHAEF and also handled such allocations. But the field commands
considered the COMZ-ETOUSA staff a
4 Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 17 Dec 44, sub:
doubtful authority for that purpose and
Preliminary Rpt, and Ltr, Somervell to Lutes, 27
Dec 44, in Hq ASF European Theater-Last Half 5Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 8 Dec 44, sub: Rpt,
1944; COMZ Stf and Comd Conf, 19 Jan 45, and Ltr, Lutes to Somervell, 7 Dec 44, both in Hq
EUCOM 337/3 Confs Staff Weekly I. ASF European Theater-Last Half 1944.
T H E LOGISTIC STRUCTURE UNDER SCRUTINY 351
preferred to look to the U.S. element in the United States was falling short of
at SHAEF for such decisions. Most of demands in about 600 major items pro-
them would have preferred a setup cured by the ASF, and there was little
which had been proposed several times prospect of raising the output of most
before—that is, a strictly American of these within the next six months. T h e
GHQ, separate from SHAEF and pri- only means by which supply to the com-
marily tactical in nature, but equipped bat zone could be increased in the near
to give over-all direction to the logistic future, therefore, was by accelerating the
effort as well.6 flow of supplies already available or be-
coming available-that is, by shortening
(2) Expediting S u p p l y Deliveries the delivery time of supplies already in
At the time of General Lutes’ arrival the pipeline or coming off production
early in December the theater’s two most lines. A time analysis of recent ammu-
pressing problems were (1) the serious nition shipments had revealed that an
supply shortages, notably in ammuni- average of 46 days elapsed between the
tion, tanks, tires, general purpose vehi- date on which ammunition arrived in
cles, and field wire, and (2) its inability the theater and the date on which it was
to handle, particularly in the forward finally laid down in forward depots—
areas, the large tonnages which the ports 23 days awaiting discharge in U.K. and
were now able to discharge and the rail- continental waters, 15 days in actual un-
ways to move forward. General Lutes loading, and 8 days in movement from
was able to give immediate and mate- shipside to forward depots. Movement
rial assistance on the former. As a top- from U.S. depots to the theater required
ranking official of the ASF assessing the approximately 50 days. Total pipeline
theater’s situation at first hand he was time from zone of interior depots to
in a position to add great weight to the combat zone consequently averaged
theater’s requests. While confirmation nearly 100 days.
of the theater’s needs should not have T h e time consumed in waiting in Eu-
been necessary, General Lutes neverthe- ropean waters was already being cut,
less was invaluable in obtaining addi- and theater officials estimated that both
tional releases, particularly of such items unloading and intransit time could also
as tanks and trucks. be reduced by special handling. The re-
But additional allocations and releases sult would be a saving of as much as
could solve only part of the problem, for thirty days, or 65 percent of the pipeline
they promised to meet the theater’s de- time previously required within the the-
mands in only a limited number of ater. General Lutes believed that time
items. It was estimated that production consumed in shipment from U.S. depots
to the theater could also be materially
6 Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 17 Dec 44, Memo, reduced by both special handling and
Lutes for Somervell, 24 Jan 45, sub: Final Rpt on
Visit to the ETO, and Memo, Lutes for Somervell, speeded shipments. He pointed out that
8 Dec 44, sub: Rpt, all in Hq ASF European for each ten days that the pipeline could
Theater-Last Half 1944; Memo, Maj J. R. Green-
wood, OPD Observer for Hull, 6 Dec 44, OPD
be shortened and kept shortened for
919.1 Sec. VIII, Case 2. critical items, an additional ten days of
352 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
production could be made available in service and thus ensure the most ex-
the combat zone. This he believed peditious handling of high priority sup-
would be of substantial assistance to plies throughout the supply pipeline
the theater, at least in the immediate General Lutes meanwhile had proposed
future. General Lutes proposed that a to theater officials that a fast rail service
major saving in time could be made in be established between the ports and
this portion of the pipeline by the in- forward depots to handle small tonnages
auguration of an express shipping serv- of urgently needed items. Such a service,
ice, using either fast unescorted vessels known as the “Toot Sweet Express,” was
or small fast convoys. T h e War Depart- also established in January.8
ment had already undertaken to ex-
pedite the shipment of certain critical (3) Supply Planning Procedures
types of ammunition via fast freighter. T h e critical supply shortages of De-
Lutes now proposed that this service be cember had again called attention to two
expanded to include other highly critical or three other aspects of theater logistics
items of supply in order to meet the which had long been of direct concern
theater’s most urgent needs in the next to the War Department. From the point
few months. He also suggested that the of view of the ASF the theater’s tardy
delivery of other important supplies planning reflected a lack of appreciation
could be improved by a more careful of the time factor involved in procure-
selectivity in loading and by special han- ment. Both the Communications Zone
dling. Greater selectivity in the loading and the 12th Army Group were found
of ships would prevent high priority to be remiss in this regard. General
items from being buried in slow-moving Lutes saw no evidence of planning by
cargo, as had often occurred in the past. the army group beyond April 1945.
General Somervell approved the idea Plans which extended barely four
of a rapid shipping service on 1 January months forward really constituted noth-
and laid down the ground rules which ing but current plans so far as sup-
were to govern its use. A few days later ply was concerned and corresponded
General Stratton, the COMZ G–4, in roughly to the time required to fill
turn announced to the theater supply requisitions and deliver supplies from
services the establishment of the rapid existing stocks in the United States.
express service, known as REX, explain- They made no allowance for any lead
ing its purpose and prescribing the con- time involved in special procurement.
ditions and procedures which were to Forward planning had to be projected
govern its use.7 T o complement this a minimum of nine to twelve months in
7 See Chapter XIV, Section 3, below, for the later advance, Lutes pointed out, for items
history of REX. Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 23 the need for which the ASF could not
Dec 44, sub: Supply of Critical Items to Combat
Theater, Cbl WARX–84997, Somervell to Lutes and foresee.9
Lee, 1 Jan 45, and Memo, Stratton for Chiefs of
Svs COMZ, 5 Jan 45, sub: Rapid Express Shipping 8See below, Chapter XV, Sec. 1.
Sv, all in Hq ASF Official Rpt, Mission to ETO, 9Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 17 Dec 44, sub:
4 Dec 44–13 Jan 45; Memo, Lutes for Somervell, Preliminary Rpt, H q ASF European Theater—Last
17 Dec 44; COMZ G–4 History, I, 131–36. Half 1944; Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 24 Jan 45,
T H E LOGISTIC STRUCTURE UNDER SCRUTINY 353
Closely related was the matter of the jective.” 10T h e services should have in-
theater’s requisitioning practices. War cluded as due in, for example, quantities
Department circulars had long since pre- requisitioned on the New York Port
scribed the ground rules governing re- although not yet delivered, quantities
quisitioning by the theaters, and had expected from other theaters, expected
specified a form designed to provide an deliveries from local procurement, and
accurate monthly picture of the theater’s also salvaged or reclaimed items re-
stock position and to facilitate the edit- turned to depot stocks. But the services
ing of the theater’s requests. T h e thea- followed no standard procedure in such
ter’s failure to follow the prescribed reporting.
procedures had long complicated the T h e same lack of uniformity was ap-
editing job at the New York Port, ac- parent in the troop bases which the
counting for at least some of the delays services used to calculate requirements,
of which the theater so frequently com- and in the order and shipping time they
plained. It undoubtedly explained why used. Manpower figures frequently
the War Department and the theater varied, depending in part on the troop
were so often at odds over the quantities basis used, and in part on conflicting
of supplies ETOUSA was entitled to. totals of Allied military personnel, dis-
Early in 1945 ASF officers assigned to placed persons, civilians, and prisoners
the COMZ staff made a thorough exami- of war. Order and shipping times ranged
nation of the requisitioning practices from 60 to 124 days, and a study of
of the theater’s supply services and re- actual shipments revealed that the time
ported an utter lack of an adequate or between the submission of a requisition
uniform system of computing require- and the first deliveries of supplies in
ments. As a result, their analysis showed, COMZ depots ranged from a minimum
the theater was requisitioning improper of 47 days in the case of medical sup-
quantities of supplies. plies to a maximum of 145 days in the
T h e principal shortcoming of the the- case of quartermaster supplies. T h e cor-
ater’s practices, and one which all the responding figures for the delivery of
services shared, was the failure to pro- 75 percent of the supplies against a
vide the New York Port with the data particular requisition were 60 and 234
it needed to edit requisitions intelli- days respectively.
gently as to quantity-that is, stock status Although the War Department had
data as to quantities of supplies “on frequently called the theater’s attention
hand,” “due in,” and “due out,” and to irregularities in requisitioning meth-
the additional information needed to de- ods, the theater apparently had never
termine the theater’s “requisitioning ob- made a serious effort to enforce the
rules. In February, inspired by the find-
sub: Final Rpt on Visit to the ETO, and Memo,
Lutes for Eisenhower, 25 Dec 44, sub: Rpt on 10T h e requisitioning objective is the total quan-
Supply Situation-Northern France, both in Hq ASF tity of an item authorized to be on hand and on
Official Report, Mission to ETO; Somervell’s re- order in the theater. Quantitatively it represents
marks at Comd and Stf Conf, COMZ, 25 Jan 45, the sum of the maximum level of supplies and the
Hq ASF ETO 1945, Somervell files. order and shipping time.
354 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
12Ltr, Robinson to Somervell, 19 Mar 45, Memo, would not have been so serious had
Brig Gen T. M. Osborne, Dir of Rqmts and Stock there been a system of true base depots.
Control Div, for Lutes, 27 Mar 45. Hq ASF 400.312
SAFE DCofS, SC, and Control Div; Ltr, Hq ETO
But a large portion of the supplies in
to CG ASF, 9 Apr 45, sub: Necessity for Prompt the port areas really lay in huge dumps,
Rev of WD Repl Factors, with 1st Ind, 21 Apr 45. in which no facilities for segregation or
EUCOM 400 Supplies, Services, and Equipment
(Policy), VII.
classification existed, and in which the
13 Memo, Lutes for Eisenhower, 25 Dec 44, sub: exercise of any degree of selectivity in
Rpt on Supply Situation-Northern France; for forward shipments was therefore ex-
weekly figures on distribution of supplies see also
Summaries of Br Chiefs’ Mtgs, COMZ G–4 Plant
tremely difficult. T h e attempt to move
and Communications Diary/Jnl, ETO Adm 145C. some of these large stocks forward as
356 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
transportation improved during the fall, With the bogging down of operations
and to clear some of the rising port late in September the Communications
backlogs, led to huge bulk shipments Zone made plans to establish interme-
in December which the forward depots diate depots in the Reims, Soissons, and
were unprepared to handle. Paris areas. For many weeks, however,
Theater officials had actually planned shipments to those areas were on a
a depot structure along more orthodox negligible scale. Throughout the month
lines. The existing structure’s lack of of October all available transport was
resemblance to original plans they at- absorbed in the build-up of army and
tributed in large part to the effects of ADSEC stocks in preparation for the
operations in August and September. November offensive. No true base depots
T h e speed of the advance and the re- were established either. When such in-
sulting absorption of transport in the stallations were proposed for Le Havre
movement of the barest essentials had and Rouen in October, the chiefs of the
precluded the planned build-up of stocks supply services protested that they pos-
at Rennes, Le Mans, and Chartres. In sessed insufficient personnel to man
fact, supply installations at those places them. They also feared that the estab-
never developed into true intermediate lishment of such depots would result
depots, and were quickly relegated to in a relaxation in the efforts to keep the
the role of local issue depots, in which ports cleared.16
capacity they served for the remainder Early December therefore found the
of the war.14 theater lacking adequate base and inter-
T h e shape which the depot system mediate depots and its supply stocks
ultimately took reflected in large meas- poorly distributed. This could be at-
ure the tactical thinking and the pre- tributed in part to decisions made in a
vailing optimism of the late summer. In period of greater optimism, in part to
the expectation that Allied forces would the fact that the day-to-day needs of the
continue the drive to and beyond the theater, including the necessary build-
Rhine, SHAEF instructed the Commu- up for planned offensives, had absorbed
nications Zone not to build large depots all the energies of the Communications
in the Paris area. The Communications Zone throughout October and Novem-
Zone therefore decided to forego the ber and had precluded any major ad-
establishment of sizable intermediate justment designed to effect a proper
depots and to build u p large installa- echelonment in depth of the theater's
tions in the Advance Section instead. supplies. The poor distribution of sup-
T h e principle of depth consequently plies was well illustrated early in Decem-
gave way to the desire to be in the best ber when Third Army requisitioned
possible position to exploit an early
7,000 rounds of 155-mm. smoke shells
break-through to the Rhine.15
which it required for a river crossing, they could be located and identified for
only to find that half of them would selective forwarding.18
have to be trucked from a dump at
OMAHABeach, involving a round trip of An adequate depot system was but
about 800 miles.17 T h e inadequacies of one link in the logistic chain, albeit a
the depot system-particularly the lack vitally important one. Inseparably a part
of intermediate installations-were even of the structure and essential to its effi-
more pointedly demonstrated when the cient functioning were such things as
enemy’s December counteroffensive en- movements planning and control, stock
dangered the heavy concentrations of records keeping, requisitioning pro-
supplies in the forward areas.
cedures, and documentation. Lutes and
Meanwhile, the absence of true base
Somervell pointed out shortcomings in
depots with an efficient stock records sys-
all of these fields. As will be shown later
tem meant that no selectivity in ship-
ments could be exercised. T h e ports in detail, movements planning did not
themselves frequently had to serve as ensure the most efficient use of all the
retailers, although they were never in- means of transportation in the theater,
tended to segregate and classify supplies. and failed to co-ordinate transportation
In December and January, with em- with the capacities of the depots. No
phasis being placed on port clearance, detailed plans had been made at all,
huge quantities were forwarded in bulk Lutes found, for the transfer of supplies
to whatever depots could receive them from Normandy Base Section to the Oise
and with little regard for actual needs Intermediate and Advance Sections in
in the forward areas. Under these cir- the fall when the improvement in trans-
cumstances high priority items often portation made possible a drawing down
were lost in the shuffle. It was partly of the large base dumps. Such plans
because of this that Lutes had recom- would have entailed a study of the local
mended a red ball railway service be- labor needed to unload freight cars, and
tween the ports and advance depots. of depot capacities in the forward areas,
The heavy movements of January re- and should have prevented the current
moved all doubts about the Communi- congestion on the railways east of Paris
cations Zone’s ability to forward large and the tie-up of loaded rail cars in
tonnages. Its main problem now, as forward depots. Somervell felt, more-
both Lutes and Somervell emphasized, over, that the control of movements
was in exercising the necessary selec- should be more centralized and should
tivity in its shipments. T h e prerequisite be vested in the transportation service,
for this was the organization of base
depots capable of receiving, sorting, and
classifying supplies in such a way that 18 FinalRpt of Chief Engr, ETO, I, 200-01, 215–
19; COMZ G–4 History, II, 10–11; Stf and Comd
Conf COMZ, 19 Jan 45, EUCOM 337/3 Confs Staff
17 Memo, Col Lee A. Denson for Lutes, 11 Dec 44, Weekly; Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 24 Jan 45,
sub: Ammo Supply ETO, H q A S Official Report, sub: Final Rpt on Visit to ETO, H q ASF Official
Mission to ETO. Report, Mission to ETO.
358 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
versions along the lines of communica- October, for example, the armies had
tions, the armies sought various ways, made it a common practice to employ
some of them extra-legal, to ensure expediters to hand carry their requisi-
themselves against the uncertainties of tions to Paris and to follow shipments
supply. Most of the field commands, for through to final delivery. Many a service
example, padded their requisitions and chief in the field commands, despairing
attempted to build larger reserves than of getting a requisition filled via the
were desirable from the point of view prescribed channels, sent personal repre-
of mobility as a cushion against unpre- sentatives to COMZ headquarters to
dictable deliveries. Some resorted to learn first hand about shipments long
requisitioning practices which were overdue and presumed lost. This prac-
clearly contrary to existing SOP’s. In tice had reached its extremes in the First
the period of tonnages allocations, for Army, whose ordnance officer alone em-
example, the Communications Zone ployed about one hundred men as field
had specified that requisitions be proc- agents to follow through on ordnance
essed through command channels so that requisitions to ensure the delivery of
the G–4’s could exercise a more effective supplies. In General Somervell’s opin-
control. But many army service chiefs ion, this was the severest indictment that
circumvented this channel and requisi- could be made of the Communications
tioned directly through the technical Zone, for it indicated that its entire
services. logistic management was faulty.
I n October the irregularities in re- T h e Communications Zone strongly
quisitioning were finally aired in the denied the armies’ need for such ex-
course of an official investigation of the pediters, particularly by ordnance,
First Army engineer’s practices, with the which had one of the better stock con-
result that the theater commander or- trol records in the theater. General
dered the First Army not to honor Somervell nevertheless felt that the use
requisitions which were improperly of such “bloodhounds” reflected seri-
processed and routed. Both First Army ously on the Communications Zone’s
and the 12th Army Group protested the performance. 24
ruling. In any case, the abolition of
gation of Unauthorized Acts in Filling Requisi-
tonnage allocations in December per- tions, with 2d Ind, FUSA, 28 Nov 44, 3d Ind,
mitted a return to the procedures origi- TUSAG, 2 Dec 44, and 44th Ind, ETO to 12 A
nally laid down in SOP’s—that is, re- Gp, 13 Dec 44, all in 12 A Gp 400.312 Requisition
for Supplies, II, Gen Bd Rpt 110, p. 9.
quisitioning through supply service 24Memo, Lutes for Eisenhower, 25 Dec 44, sub:
channels, as the armies preferred.23 Rpt on Supply Situation-Northern France; Memo,
T h e uncertainties of supply mani- Somervell for Lee, 24 Jan 45; Stf and Comd Conf,
COMZ, 19 Jan 45; Memo, Lord for Eisenhower,
fested themselves in still other ways. By 2 Jan 45, sub: Comments on ‘Rpt of Supply Situa-
tion-Northern France’; COMZ G–4 History, I, 2–
23 Memo, Stratton for CofS COMZ, 4 Oct 44; 21, II, 21; History of Normandy Base Section, pp.
sub: Investigation of the Inspector General of Di- 82–83, ETO Adm; TUSA AAR, II, Sig, 13; Rpt,
version of Supplies, Ltr, Col James H. Day to CG Day to CG ETO, 20 Oct 44, sub: Rpt of Investiga-
ETO, 20 Oct 44, sub: Rpt of Investigation of Un- tion 12 A Gp 400.312 Requisitions for Supplies, 11;
authorized Acts in Filling Requisitions, Ltr, CG FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, Bk. IV,
ETO to CG FUSA, 8 Nov 44, sub: Rpt of Investi- p. 155.
T H E LOGISTIC STRUCTURE UNDER SCRUTINY 361
sufficient attention to the details of logis- concerned with the details of logistic
tic management mentioned above. Too administration. In any event the COMZ
often, in their judgment, the Commu- commander had a reputation for attach-
nications Zone had let things drift, with ing more importance to the outward
the result that it was constantly rushing appearance than to the substance of
to put out fires which it should have things. He tended to underplay the “sev-
had the foresight to prevent. This was eral small deficiencies in supply meth-
clearly demonstrated in the necessity to ods” which Lutes and Somervell had
rush service troops from the base areas discovered, and to emphasize the “basic
to forward depots when it was found soundness” of the Communications
that the latter could not handle the Zone’s organization and operating pro-
increased flow of supplies late in the fall. cedures.27 To the field commands this
General Lutes had undertaken his attitude, plus his personal unpopularity,
mission to ETOUSA with some trepida- unfortunately tended to magnify the
tion, realizing that the COMZ staff, to inefficiencies of the Communications
whom General Lee was intensely loyal, Zone.
was a “tight corporation,” sensitive to Both Lutes and Somervell were deter-
criticism. But, as he explained to the mined that the “several small deficien-
COMZ commander on his arrival, he cies” should be corrected. SHAEF sup-
felt obliged to determine whether any ported them in this resolve and asked
of the supply deficiencies in Europe the Communications Zone to make peri-
could be laid to failures in the United odic reports on its progress on the Lutes
States, and to ensure that the field com- and Somervell recommendations. Gen-
mands, whose complaints had reached eral Lord submitted the first report on
the War Department, did not blame the 23 January and continued to make
ASF for deficiencies for which the thea- weekly reports until early in March.
ter was responsible. 26 Meanwhile General Somervell also in-
Lee himself never ceased to be a con- sisted that the Communications Zone
troversial figure. General Eisenhower, re-establish a Control Division within
like others on the SHAEF staff, was its headquarters to regularize reporting
aware of the attitude of the field com- procedures and to keep the commanding
mands toward the Communications general informed on the progress made
Zone and continued to have misgivings toward the various objectives. On Lee’s
about the supply organization of the own suggestion, Somervell designated
theater. Despite this uneasiness, the Su- Brig. Gen. Clinton F. Robinson, who
preme Commander chose not to make a had accompanied the ASF commander
change in the COMZ command in view on his visit, to organize the division.
of the lack of sufficient evidence of Robinson worked hard at his assign-
specific failures. Lee was probably un- ment, and eventually reported that the
aware of many of the procedural de- COMZ staff had achieved a much more
ficiencies, for he was not normally professional standard in its work. Early
26Memos, Lutes for Somervell, 20 and 22 Dec 44, 27Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 31 Dec 44, Hq ASF
H q ASF European Theater–Last Half 1944. European Theater-Last Half 1944.
T H E LOGISTIC STRUCTURE UNDER SCRUTINY 363
in February these efforts were aided this effort in the final months of the
when General Gilland came up from war. 28
the disbanded Southern Line of Com-
munications to become the new G–4. 28Ltrs, Robinson to Somervell, 7, 16, and 25 Mar
General Gilland brought with him sev- 45, and Ltr, Somervell to Robinson, 12 Mar 45,
eral members of the SOLOC G–4 Di- both in H q ASF 321 European Theater, A47–81;
Memo, Robinson for Lee, 8 Mar 45, Program (sic)
vision, including his deputy, Col. R. W. Made on Items in Gen Somervell’s Memorandum
Colglazier, his chief of plans, Col. Carter of 24 Jan 45, EUCOM 400.192 Miscellaneous Re-
Page, and his chief of operations, Col. ports, VII; Memo, Vissering for Current Opns Sec
G–4 SHAEF for Current Opns Br, 25 Jan 45, sub:
Charles Cobb. Carrying out the Lutes Gen Lutes’ Memo to Supreme Comdr, and Ltrs,
and Somervell recommendations was not Crawford to Smith, 8, 15, and 25 Feb 45, sub:
Rpt on Maj Gen Lutes’ Memo Dated 25
easy, for there were many limiting fac- Weekly
Dec 44, all in SHAEF G–4 319.1 Reports on Gen
tors and conflicting demands. But the Lutes, I; Ltr, Somervell to Styer, 17 Jan 45, H q
Communications Zone made a conscien- ASF 201 Styer, A47–81. See EUCOM 400 Supplies,
tious effort to overcome its earlier diffi- Services, and Equipment (Policy), VI, for weekly
reports by Lord to SAC, 23 January to 26 Feb-
culties and made substantial progress in ruary 1945.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE
FEBRUARY–MAY 1945
CHAPTER XIII
MAP 6
TACTICAL, LOGISTICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 369
on the first day. After several days of more dramatic event on the same day
hard fighting General Simpson’s forces farther south in the First Army zone
broke out of the bridgehead and began when the 9th Armored Division seized a
making excellent progress. On 2 March railway bridge intact over the Rhine at
elements of one corps reached the Rhine, Remagen. First Army promptly estab-
and on the following day elements of lished a bridgehead there and reinforced
another joined with British forces at it as rapidly as possible.
Geldern. By 5 March the Ninth Army By this time operations to close to
had closed to the Rhine in its entire the Rhine were also under way still
sector. farther south. Third Army, beginning
Farther south First Army also crossed with probing attacks in accordance with
the Roer on 23 February and within an injunction from higher authority to
another five days the Erft River as well. limit its action to an “aggressive defense”
General Hodges’ troops pushed rapidly during 21 Army Group’s operation,
eastward in the next few days and closed steadily chewed its way through the
to the Rhine. By 5 March most of the Siegfried Line fortifications in its sector.
west bank of the Rhine north of Cologne By 23 February, the date of the Roer as-
was in Allied hands, and on the 7th Co- saults farther north, Third Army had
logne itself fell. T h e capture of this im- battered through the enemy’s main de-
portant prize was overshadowed by a fenses in the western Eifel, the area of
370 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Army crossed both north and south of First and Ninth Armies immediately
Worms, and on 31 March, when the began regrouping in preparation for the
First French Army crossed near Speyer. final elimination of the huge pocket, the
By the end of the month, therefore, five Ninth Army once more reverting to 12th
Allied armies were firmly established east Army Group control, and on 4 April
of the Rhine, the enemy’s last great General Bradley issued instructions for
natural bulwark. Two U.S. armies, the attacks by the three U.S. corps which
First and Third, were already advancing contained the large enemy force from
up the Frankfurt corridor into the heart the south, east, and north. A corps of the
of the Reich. Fifteenth Army had already assumed re-
In the first days of April all efforts sponsibility for the area west of the
were focused on the encirclement of the Rhine. T h e encircled enemy forces coun-
Ruhr. Contrary to the scheme of ma- terattacked repeatedly in the next few
neuver originally envisaged, tactical de- days, and heavy fighting ensued at some
velopments now favored a major effort points. But all attempts to break out of
in the center, where both armies of the the pocket proved abortive, and the ring
12th Army Group had already made was steadily drawn tighter. On 14 April
deep thrusts beyond t h e Rhine, rather First and Ninth Army forces met at
than in the north, where the bridgehead Hagen, splitting the pocket in two. Two
was still small. Accordingly, the First and days later the eastern half collapsed, and
Third Armies were now ordered to ad- on 18 April all resistance came to an
vance shoulder to shoulder in a north- end. T h e Ruhr pocket had yielded nearly
easterly direction, the Third on the axis a third of a million prisoners.
Hersfeld–Kassel, and the First on the T h e advance eastward had continued
axis Marburg–Paderborn, to make con- after only a brief pause for reorganiza-
tact with 21 Army Group. General tion. On 2 April General Eisenhower
Devers’ 6th Army Group was to protect had issued instructions for the drive into
the southern flank of this drive. central Germany, specifying that the
These missions were largely accom- main effort was to be made in the center
plished within two days. On 1 April the with the intent of splitting the Reich
Third Army reached Kassel, and then and then destroying enemy forces on
shifted its attacks eastward across the either side. T h e 12th Army Group, with
Werra River. In the meantime the First twenty-two divisions initially available
Army, while guarding with its left along for the eastward drive, surged forward
the Sieg River and the rough Rothaar on 6 April on a 150-mile front. Resist-
Gebirge, jabbed due north through the ance thereafter diminished rapidly, and
Hessian hills with its armored and mo- the enemy’s central front soon lost all
torized right to join u p with armored semblance of cohesion. Armored units
elements of the Ninth Army at Lippstadt. now slashed forward at will, leaving
On 1 April the Ruhr “pocket,” an area pockets of resistance to be eliminated by
of 4,000 square miles and containing the the infantry. Only in the Thuringian
entire German Army Group B, was fi- Forest and the Harz Mountains did the
nally a reality. enemy offer serious opposition. By 18
372 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
April, the day on which the Ruhr pocket to Luebeck, Third Army drove into
was eliminated, all three armies had Austria and western Czechoslovakia, and
reached the restraining line drawn along General Devers’ two armies drove south-
the Elbe and Mulde Rivers and through ward and made contact with the Fifth
the cities of Chemnitz and Bayreuth. Army at the Brenner Pass. First Army
British forces in the meantime had in the meantime had overcome the re-
cleared a part of the coastal area in the maining pockets of resistance in the cen-
north and were not far from Bremen and ter, capturing Leipzig and closing up to
Hamburg. General Devers’ forces, in the Mulde in its sector, and had made
addition to protecting Third Army’s contact with Russian forces at Torgau.
flank, had driven southeastward as far On 7 May Generaloberst Alfred Jodl,
as Nuremberg. Well over a million pris- representing the German high command,
oners had been taken since the Rhine signed the Act of Surrender which finally
crossings. brought an end to hostilities in Europe.
These swift advances brought the Al-
lies into imminent contact with Russian (2) Logistic Factors in Planning
forces, which were fast approaching the the Last Offensive
Elbe River from the east, and which T h e problem of crossing the Rhine
were also driving up the Danube. With was inevitably the central feature of all
Germany virtually split in half, General planning for the spring offensive, and
Eisenhower now halted the advance in its logistic aspects had a prominent place
the center in order to reinforce and in all such planning. Detailed planning
provide logistic support for drives to the for the Rhine crossings had begun early
southeast and the north. Assigning both in the fall of 1944, and every operation
the First and Ninth Armies a largely envisaging a possible break-through to
defensive role along the Elbe and Mulde the Rhine gave fresh impetus to such
Rivers, General Bradley now swung the preparations.
Third Army southeastward and launched In all the planning for the Rhine
a powerful thrust down the Danube Val- crossings the SHAEF staff invariably con-
ley. Simultaneously with this operation sidered three areas in which crossings
General Devers’ two armies also drove were deemed feasible—the Emmerich–
southward to destroy the myth of a Ger- Wesel area, the Cologne–Koblenz area,
man redoubt in the Alps, and far to and the Frankfurt–Mannheim area. Ter-
the north Field Marshal Montgomery’s rain considerations and the importance
two armies continued their sweep of the of the Ruhr as a major military objective
north German plain. had led to the early assumption that
Resistance melted away rapidly in the the major effort would be made in the
final weeks, and by the end of the month Emmerich–Wesel sector, north of the
the once formidable German war ma- Ruhr. One of the early appreciations
chine lay broken and overpowered. In spoke of committing twenty-seven divi-
the first days of May the 21 Army Group sions in the northern bridgehead, leav-
completed clearing the north German ing a slightly smaller number for a sub-
plain westward to Holland and eastward sidiary offensive, either in the Cologne–
TACTICAL, LOGISTICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 373
directive, and differed on only one major a subsidiary to the attack north of the
point. Apprehensions growing out of past Ruhr, or a larger effort assuming the
experience led the Army group to ask use of less than maximum forces in the
for 650 tons per division slice per day north. A study of logistic implications
as insurance against what it termed “mis- indicated that as many as fifty divisions
deliveries,” admitting that the smaller could be supported in a southern bridge-
figure more nearly represented actual head if it was developed to maximum
consumption needs. SHAEF, the Com- capacity. This assumed, as in the north,
munications Zone, and 12th Army Group that railways would be pushed close to
all based their estimates on the assump- the Rhine and that motor transport
tion that there would be no rail service would be reserved for use forward of
into the bridgehead until about D plus rail and pipeheads.5
63, and that the armies would be able to General Eisenhower’s plans, which
transport their own supplies east of the contemplated offensivesby both First and
river until D plus 50. T h e 12th Army Third Armies, raised fears among Brit-
Group figured that it might require ish officials that a northern offensive
truck support by the Communications might be prejudiced, and led them to
Zone before that date only under condi- insist on a more unequivocal commit-
tions of rapid advance—that is, if points ment on a northern operation and a
of delivery were thirty miles beyond the promise that an assault north of the
Rhine and fifty-five miles beyond the Ruhr would not await the closing to the
service areas. POL pipelines over the Rhine along its entire length. After dis-
Rhine were counted on to be in opera- cussions between Generals Eisenhower
tion by D plus 21.4 and Marshall at Marseille, and between
T h e SHAEF planning staff had also General Smith and the Combined Chiefs
studied the logistic implications of an at Malta at the end of January, the Su-
offensive in the south. An offensive north preme Commander early in February
of the Ruhr would employ less than half issued a new directive for long-range
of the divisions expected to be available planning designed to dispel any doubts
for the spring offensive; logic seemed to as to his intentions. In it he announced
dictate that preparations should be made his intention of carrying out the main
for an offensive in the south to achieve offensive north of the Ruhr, and he also
the maximum strategic flexibility. A gave assurances that crossings would be
planning appreciation prepared in mid- made as soon as feasible and without
January considered two possible alter- waiting to close to the river along its
natives for a southern offensive—either entire length. He made clear, however,
that the possibility could not be ignored
4 Ltr, Lord to Smith, 24 Jan 45, sub: Adm Plans that circumstances might compel a switch
and Preparations for Future Opns, EUCOM 381/2 of large forces to the Mainz–Karlsruhe
War Plans General, I; Ltr, 12 A Gp to SAC, 25
Jan 45, sub: Adm Support and Preparations for
area, and he considered it prudent to
Future Opns, and Ltr, Osmanski to Whipple, 6
Feb 45, sub: Adm Plans and Preparations for Fu- 5 Logistics of Operations in the Southern Bridge-
ture Opns, both in SHAEF G–4 Logistical Implica- head-Spring Offensive, G–4 SHAEF, 27 Jan 45,
tions Future Operations–1945. SHAEF SGS 381 Post-OVERLORDPlanning.
TACTICAL, LOGISTICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 375
southern forces from the Verdun–Nancy– tives in the Giessen area, and to an even-
Toul–Langres–Dijon installations. T h e tual link-up with forces in the southern
Communications Zone had from the be- bridgehead area, where support could
ginning had apprehensions about sup- more easily be given by rail from the
porting U.S. forces in the Wesel area Metz–Verdun depots. POL pipelines
because of congested communications never extended to the Rhine in the
and conflict with British installations, Remagen area, but a short pipeline was
and had asked for additional depot space eventually built at Mehlem to pump
in the north and for running rights over gasoline from a west bank terminal to the
some of the British-controlled railways. storage tanks near the Autobahn east
While some pause for regrouping and of the river. Plans now called for a build-
gathering of supplies was recognized as up of thirteen to eighteen divisions in
possible before the actual Rhine assault, the Remagen bridgehead. Sixteen divi-
the Communications Zone wisely di- sions were eventually supported on the
rected that for planning purposes ad- central axis.9
ministrative preparations should assume Barely two weeks after the First Army’s
that bridgeheads would be established crossing at Remagen the Third Army’s
immediately upon closing to the Rhine.8 surprise assault raised the question of
Ironically, fate decreed the capture of the advisability of strengthening the
the first bridgehead in the area least southern bridgehead at the expense of
favored in all the planning estimates, the northern. No decision was immedi-
partially upsetting the carefully laid ately made, although it was decided that
plans for the spring offensive. Neverthe- the operation north of the Ruhr should
less, commanders at all echelons acted not fall below twenty-four divisions in
swiftly to exploit the unexpected cap- strength. T h e build-up in the north
ture of the Remagen bridge, and imme- eventually reached thirty-one divisions,
diately studied its logistic implications. and that in the south 35.10
Plans were promptly made to extend rail T h e actual course of operations be-
service to the site from both the north- yond the Rhine strikingly emphasized
west (via Dueren) and the southwest the conservatism and caution of the plan-
(via Trier). Preparations for the latter ners, despite SHAEF’s injunction against
were almost immediately canceled as the “over-insurance” in the matter of logis-
result of the collapse of the captured rail tic support. T h e Allied build-up in the
bridge. T h e build-up went ahead, never- Rhine bridgeheads eventually totaled
theless, and the bridgehead was quickly
exploited eastward along the axis of the
9 Memo, Vissering for G–4 Exec, 10 Mar 45, sub:
Autobahn, which led directly to objec- Outline Plan for Adm Support, of Spring Offensive
in the South, Memo, Whipple for G–4, 12 Mar 45,
sub: Remagen Bridgehead, Memo, Osmanski for
8 Ltr, Hq ETO to SvC Chiefs, CONAD, and Mov and Tn Sec G–4 SHAEF, 18 Mar 45, sub:
ADSEC, 8 Feb 45, sub: Plng Directives, EUCOM Railroad Dev, all in SHAEF G–4 381 War Plans
381/2 War Plans General; Outline Plans for Ad- Gen 1945, II.
ministrative Support of Spring Offensive in the 10 Appreciation of Effect of UNDERTONE’S
Success
North and South, Hq COMZ, dated 2 and 3 Mar on Future Operations, SHAEF G–3, 2 1 Mar 45.
45, respectively, 12 A Gp 370 Operational Planning. G–3 Plans L Saar Operations.
TACTICAL, LOGISTICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 377
ters.15 In mid-February the Communi- posed a similar transfer in the south. But
cations Zone thus consisted of eight sec- General Larkin, the SOLOC com-
tions-two advance sections providing mander, opposed such a step, arguing
direct support to the two U.S. army that port, signal, rail, and highway op-
groups, three base sections controlling erations in the south were too critical
the coastal areas and operating the ports, to risk the possible interference of civil
and, in addition, the U.K. Base, Seine, authorities. General Lee supported the
and Oise Sections. SOLOC commander, and the proposed
Steps were also taken early in 1945 transfer was postponed.16
to form a separate French line of com- T h e last changes in COMZ territorial
munications to support the First French organization were occasioned by the ad-
Army in the south. On 19 February Base vance across the Rhine. Early in March
901 was officially activated as a subcom- plans for the spring offensive announced
mand of the Communications Zone with the principle that the two advance sec-
the mission of assisting CONAD and tions would move into Germany with
Delta Base Section in co-ordinating and the armies and continue under COMZ
supervising the supply of French forces. control, but that they would have no
French units attached to CONAD and area responsibility there. Both Oise and
Delta Base Section actually remained Channel Base Sections were to extend
under the control of these commands their control in the north, Oise absorb-
for operations, but for administrative ing all French territory, part of Belgium,
purposes they now came under the con- and the Duchy of Luxembourg, and
trol of Base 901,which was commanded Channel taking over the remainder of
by Brig. Gen. Georges Granier. It was Belgium and whatever area was neces-
intended that Base 901 should eventually sary in the Netherlands, In the south
assume complete responsibility for the Burgundy District was to become part
support of French forces, but that stage
was never reached.
16 SHAEF finally decided to extend the French
French authorities had long agitated zone of interior early in April 1945, when it trans-
for the establishment of a French zone of ferred eleven additional departments to French con-
interior, and SHAEF had promised as trol, some in the north, some in the south, and
expressed the intention of turning over all French
early as August 1944 to turn over control territory to French authorities in the near future
of French territory to the French Com- except for the departments actually lying within
the combat zone. Allied military installations, how-
mittee of National Liberation as rapidly ever, were to continue in those departments as
as possible for that purpose. It took the long as needed, and the Communications Zone in-
first step late in October 1944, turning sisted, on the basis of experience with all-French
railway operations, that military control over the
over the control of eight departments railways and communications facilities was also to
in the north to the French national au- continue. General Larkin protected the extension
thorities. In accord with promises made of the French line of communications even with
these provisos, arguing that complete control of all
to General Charles de Gaulle, the Su- logistic facilities was needed for both t h e conduct
preme Commander at that time pro- of the war and for the redeployment program. In
any event, hostilities ended before the intended
transfer was made. Organization and Command in
15See Ch. II, Sec. 2, above. the ETO, II, 221–22, 271–72, 283–86.
380 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
of Oise Section and take over the ter- introduction of an intermediate section
ritory released by CONAD, and Oise in line with the recommendations of
itself was to become an “intermediate” Generals Lutes and Somervell hardly
section, stretching the entire length of constituted more than a change in names,
the front. for the organization of a system of depots
Implementation of the plan began on in depth was only partially realized.
21 March, when Burgundy District was Command of the various COMZ sec-
absorbed by Oise. On 2 April Oise was tions had remained relatively stable, ex-
redesignated Oise Intermediate Section cept in the case of Normandy, and only
in line with the aim of establishing inter- two changes were made in the final
mediate depots which were intended to months, one of them only a few days
hold the major portion of the theater’s before the end of hostilities. In mid-
stocks of supplies, as urged by General March Brig. Gen. Egmont F. Koenig
Somervell. Oise subdivided its huge ter- came up from North Africa to take com-
ritory into three districts—Burgundy, mand of the U.K. Base from General
Luxembourg, and Marne, Burgundy Vaughan, who was given a new assign-
shortly thereafter being renamed Lor- ment. And, in the only other change,
raine District. General Aurand, the commander of Nor-
Meanwhile the process of freeing the mandy Base Section, was succeeded on
two advance sections of all territorial re- 4 May by Brig. Gen. Jesse A. Ladd, who
sponsibility was also completed. On 1 had been his deputy.”
April, with large forces operating east Internally, the COMZ sections on the
of the Rhine, the Advance Section re- Continent developed along much the
linquished its territory to the Channel same lines as had the former base sec-
Base and Oise Intermediate Sections, tions in the United Kingdom. Not all
continuing to carry out its supply re- of them developed a district organiza-
sponsibility to the 12th Army Group in tion, although such territorial subdivi-
Germany without area control. A week sion was authorized. T h e Advance Sec-
later CONAD likewise turned over its tion, operated two fairly distinct lines
territory to Oise, although certain sta- of communications and depot complexes,
tions remained exempted to CONAD’s one, known as ADSEC North, in sup-
control. Both the Advance Section and port of the First and Ninth Armies, and
Continental Advance Section now estab- one, known as ADSEC South, in support
lished headquarters in Germany, the for- of Third Army. CONAD’s operations
mer initially at Bonn and later at Fulda, were fairly well channeled along one
and the latter at Kaiserslautern. (Map 7) line of communications. Oise Interme-
Such was the COMZ territorial or- diate Section’s organization into three
ganization until V-E Day. Except for districts has already been mentioned.
boundary changes and the establishment T h e old conflict over the division of
of the principle that the Communica- authority between the section command-
tions Zone should exercise no area con- ers and the chiefs of the technical serv-
trol in Germany, no major alterations 17Organization and Command in the ETO, II,
had taken place since February. T h e 266–67, 274–81.
F. Temple
MAP 20
382 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
ices was never fully resolved and caused Changes in the organization and func-
grief to the very end. General Lee had tioning of the COMZ headquarters itself
consistently favored the division of au- resulted in part from the Lutes-Somervell
thority along territorial lines and pre- visit, in part from the necessity to meet
ferred to delegate maximum responsibil- certain ad hoc requirements, in part
ity to section commanders in the direct from the absorption of SOLOC, and in
chain of command. As late as mid-April part from the anticipation of necessary
1945, for example, a circular delineating posthostilities adjustments. T h e estab-
COMZ organization and functioning at- lishment of a control division followed
tempted to fix more clearly the authority directly from the criticisms and recom-
of section commanders over the “alloca- mendations of General Somervell. Cer-
tion, assignment, transfer, and com- tain of the staff sections and services al-
mand” of all COMZ personnel and units ready possessed control divisions, but no
assigned to the sections. T h e control of agency had existed to enforce uniform
depot operations, on the other hand, re- practices and procedures for the entire
quired a more nearly equal division of command. Such an agency, established
authority between section commanders early in 1945, now undertook to keep
and technical service chiefs. T h e opera- a close check on progress in carrying
tion of depots was the responsibility of out the Lutes-Somervell recommenda-
the section commanders, and all matters tions, and made frequent studies of the
relating to operating policies, procedures, progress of the Communications Zone.
and reports on operations were handled On the recommendation of the ASF
through command channels, while the commander the Communications Zone
technical control of stock and reporting also took steps to remove the G–4 office
procedures remained the responsibility from the field of operations and restrict
of the chiefs of the supply services. In it to its more proper role as a staff sec-
some matters, notably intersectional tion. Late in February the G–4’s Trans-
movements via rail and highway, and portation Section was transferred to the
in the operation of the pipelines, the Office of the Chief of Transportation,
tendency was toward less control by the which was thereafter given more com-
sections and for greater centralization of plete control over all movements. T h e
authority. In a system in which territorial Office of the General Purchasing Agent
and functional organization existed side was also removed from G–4 control and
by side there obviously was no single was again given separate general staff
guiding principle which could be con- status. General Somervell’s recommenda-
sistently applied. Many differences there- tion regarding the appointment of an
fore had to be considered on individual assistant chief of staff for plans on the
merit and resolved on a pragmatic basis. COMZ staff was not carried out as
Personal co-operation and teamwork ob- promptly. After some delay the theater
viously counted for much in a system finally created the position of deputy
which was administratively imperfect.18 chief of staff for planning early in April,
placing him directly under the chief of
18Ibid., II, 287–91. staff and charging him with broad co-
TACTICAL, LOGISTICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 383
announcing his functions specifically lim- once commanded the Iceland Base Com-
ited General Lear’s duties and responsi- mand, was appointed head of the General
bilities to the field of manpower and Inspectorate Section late in December
morale and made it clear that his func- 1944. Field teams appointed by the sec-
tions did not extend to any authority tion made trips of inspection and had
over the theater chiefs of services. Most the authority to correct certain condi-
important of the various manpower and tions on the spot. But for the most part
morale functions brought within Lear’s the section confined itself to reporting
cognizance was the problem of the re- conditions, at first to the SHAEF chief
conversion training which was at its most of staff, and then to the deputy theater
acute stage at this time. Concern with commander, General Lear.
this problem brought within Lear’s pur- T h e U.S. Theater Manpower Section,
view the Ground Force Reinforcement which had been established early in Jan-
Command, which underwent several uary 1945 to cope with the serious in-
changes in command late in 1944 and fantry manpower shortage in the theater,
early in 1945. In addition, the assign- was charged mainly with making alloca-
ment gave Lear direction and control tions of critical personnel and with im-
of the General Inspectorate Section, the plementing the recommendations of the
U.S. Theater Manpower Section, and the ETO Section of the War Department
ETO Section of the War Department Manpower Board headed by General
Manpower Board. Also included under Gasser. T h e section had operated at first
his general supervision were the func- under the supervision of the U.S. element
tions then being performed by Brig. Gen. of the G–1 Section at SHAEF. Late in
Benjamin O. Davis in connection with February it was reconstituted as a special
Negro affairs, and by General Hughes, staff section of ETOUSA directly under
who was specially assigned to the deputy the deputy theater commander. Colonel
theater commander on matters of man- Shannon, who had headed the section
power, morale, and Negro troops. under General Barker at SHAEF, re-
T h e General Inspectorate Section, not mained as chief of the section under
to be confused with the Office of the In- Lear.
spector General, had been created as a The control and discipline of Negro
special staff section of ETOUSA late in troops had always been a special prob-
1944 as the result of complaints reach- lem in the theater, particularly in the
ing the War Department of poor treat- Communications Zone, because a large
ment of soldiers overseas. General Mar- percentage of Negro troops served with
shall had asked the theater commander service units. General Devers had taken
in October 1944 to investigate the con- cognizance of the problem in 1943 and
ditions reported. After considering two had instructed each subordinate com-
or three alternative methods of dealing mand to appoint an officer to study Ne-
with the problem General Eisenhower gro troop problems. T h e SOS at that
created a special staff section which re- time had appointed a special deputy pro-
ported directly to his chief of staff, Gen- vost marshal to co-ordinate all matters
eral Smith. General Bonesteel, who had concerning such troops in the SOS. No
TACTICAL, LOGISTICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 385
22 Organization and Command in the ETO, II, 23See Pogue’s Supreme Command for details on
312–20. the occupation organization.
386 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
organization and to plan for the time Services, continued in charge of these
when the port would be turned over to activities.24
U.S. forces. T h e Communications Zone
was to assume other occupation respon- T h e theater’s command and organiza-
sibilities, but these were not added until tional structure presented something of
after V-E Day. a puzzle to the very end, particularly in
One other change in the ETOUSA- regard to ETOUSA-COMZ’s position
COMZ staff organization took place as and its relationship with other com-
the end of hostilities approached. In an- mands. Much of the difficulty stemmed
ticipation of the need to keep troops from the fact that no genuine U.S. GHQ
occupied after V-E Day, the theater had ever really developed. At best, the-
planned a great expansion in special ater headquarters retained a kind of ec-
service activities, one feature of which toplasmic character. Until the end of
was an enlarged information and edu- 1944 the functions of a GHQ had been
cation program involving the use of Eu- divided between SHAEF and ETOUSA-
ropean schools and universities as well COMZ. With the appointment of Gen-
as Army facilities. Early in April, on eral Lear as deputy theater commander
the recommendation of Maj. Gen. Fred- those functions were divided between
erick H. Osborn of the Information and three agencies.
Education Division of the War Depart- Residing at SHAEF were the theater
ment, the theater separated information commander, his chief of staff, and several
and education activities from Special influential general staff officers, who de-
Services, creating a separate special staff termined over-all policy and rendered
many decisions normally made by a the-
section for the former. Information and
ater staff. T h e official theater staff, how-
education, or I&E, was to come under
ever, resided with the commanding gen-
the supervision of the G–3 and was to
eral of the Communications Zone at
be responsible for information, educa- the ETOUSA-COMZ headquarters and
tion, and orientation, including such served also as General Lee’s staff. While
organs as the American Forces Network, the COMZ commander no longer held
Stars and Stripes, and Yank magazine. the title of deputy theater commander
General Osborn himself served as the for supply and administration, his au-
first chief of I&E, but returned to the thority had not really changed, for his
United States in mid-April and was headquarters handled virtually all sup-
succeeded by Brig. Gen. Paul W. ply and administrative matters for the
Thompson. Special Services, as before theater, including correspondence with
under the supervision of the G–1, was the War Department, and it continued
to handle the more purely recreational to issue theaterwide instructions on ad-
activities such as motion pictures, music, ministrative matters in the form of
the USO, theatrical entertainment, ath- ETOUSA orders and circulars. T h e au-
letics, library services, and vocational
arts and crafts. Brig. Gen. Oscar N. Sol- 24Organization and Command in the ETO, II,
bert, the incumbent chief of Special 322–29.
TACTICAL, LOGISTICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 387
sary, they explained, because of lack of moved some of the administrative setup
confidence in the Communications Zone of the theater from General Lear’s con-
and lack of direction from a true theater trol.
headquarters. T h e field commands could Early in March, in anticipation of the
never regard the decisions emanating eventual elimination of the combined
from ETOUSA-COMZ headquarters as command at SHAEF, the Supreme Com-
anything but the decisions of General mander and his chief of staff formulated
Lee’s Communications Zone–decisions a plan which called for a clear-cut sepa-
which in some instances, they felt, af- ration of COMZ and ETOUSA head-
fected the field commands adversely. quarters. It provided that the U.S. com-
They took the view, moreover, that if ponent at SHAEF was to become the
the over-all co-ordination of adminis- theater general staff, and that the tech-
trative matters could not be performed nical service chiefs would thereafter be
by the theater commander or a U.S. resident at the new theater headquarters.
commander who was clearly superior to T h e Communications Zone’s mission, as
the three major commands of the the- before, was to provide administrative
ater, it should logically be performed by support for all U.S. forces on the Conti-
the field force (army group) commander, nent and in the United Kingdom and
since he was most directly responsible service functions in connection with re-
for the success of operations. 26 deployment; the theater would have the
A genuine theater headquarters even- normal role of over-all direction.
tually emerged in Europe, but only as In mid-April, three weeks before V-E
the result of the adjustments incident Day, the theater commander actually is-
to the end of hostilities. Beginning about sued orders designating the U.S. staff
March 1945 there was an increasing ten- members at SHAEF as the acting general
dency to recognize that, technically at staff of ETOUSA, which included Gen-
least, there was a difference between eral Clay as deputy chief of staff, Gen-
COMZ and ETOUSA headquarters, for eral Barker as G–1, General Betts as
the U.S. element of SHAEF assumed G–2, General Bull as G–3, General Craw-
more and more the role of the real U.S. ford as G–4, and Brig. Gen. Frank J.
theater headquarters, and General Lee’s McSherry as G–5. No change in missions
headquarters more and more that of a or in the method of doing business ac-
strictly COMZ headquarters. T h e ap- tually occurred at this time. T h e pre-
pointment of General Lear as deputy the- vious incumbents of the above positions
ater commander can be regarded as the now became acting deputies on the the-
first step in that direction, for it had re- ater general staff. They continued to
serve in dual capacities, however, for
26Memo, Moses, n.d. (c. Feb 45), SHAEF 12 A they were almost immediately designated
Gp G–4 Memos for Record, File 77; Memo, G.A.C. chiefs of the respective general staff posi-
of G–4 Sec 12 A Gp for G–4, 3 Jun 45; Memo,
Col McCormack, Chief Plans Br G–4 12 A Gp, for tions in the Communications Zone. Most
G–4, n.d., and Memo, Col R. C. Kyser, Chief M&I of the ETOUSA special staff offices re-
Br G–4 12 A Gp, for G–4, 21 May 45, sub: Func-
tions of A Gp, all in 12 A Gp Functions of Army
mained for the time being as part of
Groups, File 98A. the Communications Zone.
TACTICAL, LOGISTICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 389
A modified dual staff setup contin- functions of the deputy theater com-
ued, therefore, and did not come to an mander, General Lear. Effective 15 May
end until after V-E Day. On 12 May a the Ground Force Reinforcement Com-
theater general order announced a fairly mand began to report directly to the
complete separation of the theater and theater commander, the Theater Man-
COMZ staffs, although certain of the power Section reverted to the supervi-
special staff officers were still to serve sion of the theater G–1, and the General
in a dual role. T h e new arrangement Inspectorate Section formed the nucleus
did not go into effect until 1 July, how- for the office of the theater Inspector
ever, when ETOUSA was officially re- General, absorbing also the functions
designated U.S. Forces, European The- of Generals Davis and Hughes.27
ater (USFET). T h e Communications T h e closing months of the war had
Zone came to an official end on 1 August, also brought a final change in the the-
when it was redesignated the The- ater’s boundaries. Late in January Lt.
ater Service Forces, European Theater Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, commander
(TSFET). of the Mediterranean theater, had rec-
Headquarters, USFET, established in ommended the transfer of Spain, Portu-
Frankfurt, Germany, became the true gal, and the Azores to ETOUSA on the
theater headquarters, maintaining a gen- ground that the European theater was in
eral control over all subordinate ele- a better position to control those areas
ments, including 12th Army Group, the in the event operations ever became nec-
Theater Service Forces, the U.S. Group essary there. General Eisenhower con-
Control Council, and U.S. Strategic and curred in the recommendation, and the
Tactical Air Forces (now redesignated War Department ordered the change
U.S. Air Forces in Europe, or USAFE). effective 1 March. T h e Azores, which
TSFET headquarters, which remained had been a separate command under the
for the time being in Paris, was made Eastern Defense Command and a month
responsible primarily for administration before had come under administrative
outside Germany and Austria, for carry- control of the North Atlantic Division
ing out the redeployment plan, for the of the Air Transport Command, con-
shipment of supplies and personnel into tinued to be administered by the Air
Germany, and for the liquidation of U.S. Transport Command.28
installations in the liberated countries.
T h e end of the war meanwhile had 27Organization and Command in the ETO, II,
337–41:
brought about the liquidation of the 28 Ibid., II, 347–49.
CHAPTER XIV
ments were frequently made without re- turn proposed a program for the move-
gard for the capacity of depots or of ment of their allocated tonnages to the
particular rail lines, with resulting con- desired destinations. T h e G–4, after re-
gestion at some points and inefficient viewing and consolidating these requests,
utilization of facilities at others. “The forwarded them to the chief of trans-
essence of movement control,” as one portation. He, after estimating transport
member of General Ross’ staff remarked, capabilities, then recommended a spe-
“is to limit movements to the capacity cific movement plan for port clearance
of the ‘bottlenecks’ of the system and and shipments to depots, specifying the
to press constantly for the elimination points of origin, daily tonnages by class
of such bottlenecks.” Under existing of supply, destinations, and the types of
practice the chief of transportation ob- transport—rail, water, or motor—to be
viously could not effectively co-ordinate used. T h e G–4, after final approval, then
freight traffic in the theater because the published the plan as the Monthly Move-
Freight Branch of the Movements Di- ments Program on the 25th of the month
vision, Office, Chief of Transportation, preceding that in which it was to be
was restricted largely to an advisory role. effective. Although issued in the form
The Transportation Service was particu- of a directive, the program was intended
larly handicapped so long as section com- to serve mainly as a guide and was sub-
manders were free to use movement ject to change. T h e first program,
capacity left over after the G–4’s priority worked out under the direction of Col.
allocations had been met, for this often Hugh A. Murrill, chief of the Control
resulted in shipments to depots already and Planning Division, Office, Chief of
overburdened. 1 Transportation, went into effect on 1
T h e need for better integration of January 1945.2 (A typical Monthly Move-
movements was eventually recognized, ments Program, that for March, is shown
and in December 1944 the COMZ G–4 graphically on Map 8.)
and the chief of transportation agreed In essence the movements plan at-
on the first step in overhauling the tempted to accommodate the require-
existing system. All movements there- ments of the services to movement capa-
after were to be “programed” a month bilities and schedule all forward move-
in advance, taking into account the re- ments in such a way as to make the most
quirements and the capacities of both economic use of transport facilities. T h e
transportation and depots. Preparation new procedure properly went beyond
of the monthly movement plan was the integration of inland transport and
carried out roughly as follows: T h e depot reception facilities. T h e Trans-
COMZ G–4 first consolidated all data portation Corps also allocated shipping
on the supplies available for movement to the ports in such a way as to econo-
from the ports and allocated tonnages mize on land transportation and prevent
to the technical services. T h e latter in wasteful back-hauling. Early in February
1Rpt to Ross by Movs Div OCofT, quoted at 2 The southern line of communications was not
length in Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VII, Ch. II, 60–61. included in movement plans until March.
392 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
the chief of transportation elaborated Division, noted that the movement plans
on this by instituting shipping allocation thus far had been based less on a deter-
meetings for the purpose of preallocat- mination of the armies’ needs than on a
ing supplies to their final depot desti- desire to clear the ports, with the result
nations. that supplies were being shipped forward
T h e adoption of the new system was regardless of the need for them in the
undoubtedly a step in the right direction forward areas.5
from the point of view of the Transpor- T h e implication was that require-
tation Corps. In outlining the new pro- ments in the forward areas were being
cedure the COMZ commander empha- subordinated to the convenience of
sized that the success of the new proce- movement facilities. Moreover, as orig-
dure would depend on the channeling inally established, the movements pro-
of all supply movement matters through gram provided for no control of inter-
the chief of transportation, who was to depot movements, the curtailment of
control the program through his Freight which became increasingly necessary as
Branch.3 Base section commanders no freight cars began to accumulate at for-
longer were free to ship wherever and ward depots in the final months of opera-
in whatever volume they desired. Fur- tions. T h e authority to handle such situ-
thermore, planning movements a full ations by embargoing shipments re-
month in advance permitted some flexi- mained in the hands of the COMZ G–4.
bility in the use of transportation and in T h e chief of transportation could re-
making necessary adjustments. quest such stoppages, but effective con-
T h e Monthly Movements Program trol over movements was partially nulli-
nevertheless proved an imperfect instru- fied by the necessity to process requests
ment of control and only partially ful- through command channels, which pre-
filled its purpose. Six weeks after the cluded timely action. In March the G–4
inauguration of the first program Gen- finally agreed to a compromise solution
eral Burpee, commander of the 2d Mili- which provided that all nonprogramed
tary Railway Service, complained that movements should be cleared through
the services were ordering the shipment the Freight Branch of the Movements
of supplies which the depots were un- Division, Office, Chief of Transportation,
able to accept. Moreover, some depots which was to co-ordinate such move-
had been established without considera- ments with the G–4. In another conces-
tion of rail trackage.4 General Robin- sion the Office, Chief of Transportation,
son who had accompanied General Som- was granted authority to impose em-
ervell to the theater and had remained bargoes without awaiting confirmation
to help organize the ETOUSA Control from the G–4. T h e Transportation Corps
thus moved another step nearer the goal
3 Ltr, Lee to Gen and Special Stf Secs and Sec
Comdrs, 23 Jan 45, sub: Procedure for the Control
of Supply Movs on the Continent, EUCOM 400/1 5 Memo, Robinson and Col Charles R. Broshous,
Procedures for the Control of Supply Movements. Chief Control Div COMZ, for Lee, 8 Mar 45, sub:
4 Conf on Transportation in COMZ in Burpee’s Program [sic] Made On Items in Somervell’s Memo
Office, 15 Feb 45, EUCOM 337 Confs Gen, III. of 24 Jan 45, EUCOM 400.192 Misc, Rpts, VII.
P O R T DISCHARGE AND CLEARANCE 393
it had long sought—complete control period to 716in March and April; Mar-
over military freight traffic. seille achieved a daily discharge rate of
T h e monthly movements program un- 910 tons per ship in the final months.7
doubtedly represented an improvement T h e average daily discharge of 43,800
over the relatively un-co-ordinated move- tons in January had reflected a slight
ments of 1944, for it ensured a more effi- drop owing to the embargoes on for-
cient use of all line-of-communications ward movements imposed during the Ar-
facilities and consequently a more or- dennes battle. In February daily unload-
derly flow of supplies. But the Transpor- ings at the continental ports, including
tation Corps’ control proved inadequate those of southern France, rose to 53,100
in the final months, for, as will be seen, tons, but still fell short of the target of
it was unable even by use of the em- 58,200. In March the ports more than
bargo to halt the accumulation of freight met the target of 53,375 announced in
cars under load in the forward areas and the monthly movements program with a
serious congestion at other points.6 daily average of nearly 60,000 tons, and
in April the ports continued to outdo
(2) Discharge and Clearance themselves with average unloadings of
63,000 tons per day against a target of
While limiting factors of one kind or
54,000. (See Table 4 for monthly dis-
another plagued the logistic support of
charge figures.) They chalked up their
U.S. forces until the very end of hostili-
peak performance on 13 April, when
ties, port discharge capacity had ceased
discharges exceeded 77,000 tons. Planned
to be one of them. Discharge targets were
coal imports in the last few months
not consistently met in the last three or
ranged from 8,000 tons to 10,000 tons
four months of operations, but this re-
per day and bulk POL imports from
sulted mainly from restrictions forced
14,000 to 18,00 tons.8
by the inability to clear the ports and
All the ports continued to make im-
not by the lack of unloading capacity.
provements in their discharge facilities
By the end of January 1945 all the
during the winter. But few major re-
major ports–the 4th at Cherbourg and
construction projects were undertaken
Granville, the 6th at Marseille, the 5th
to enlarge unloading capacity. Only one
and 13th at Antwerp, the 16th at Le
Havre, and the 11th at Rouen–had be-
come seasoned organizations and were 7 All discharge figures are exclusive of bulk POL,
demonstrating increasing efficiency in coal, and vehicles. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V (Oc-
tober-December 1944). App., Chart 14, VI (Jan-
their operations. At Antwerp, for exam- uary-March 1945). App., Chart 14, and VII (April-
ple, the speed of discharge in tons per June 1945). App., Chart 14.
ship per day rose from 456 in December 8Ltrs, Col Page, COMZ G–4 Plans Div, to CG
COMZ, 17 Feb and 7 Mar 45, sub: Estimate of
1944 to 1,100 in the final two months of COMZ Supply Situation (Rpts 1 and 2), Tab A to
hostilities; at Cherbourg the unloading Plans for Opn of COMZ Through Jun 45, no sig-
rate increased from 384 in the earlier nature, EUCOM 381 Projected Operations of COMZ
ETOUSA, 14 Mar 45; Supply Movement Program
for March and April, 26 Feb and 25 Mar 45, re-
6 Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VI,. Ch. II, 58, 114, and spectively, EUCOM 400.22 Shipments Gen, 1944–45;
VII, Ch. II, 64-67; COMZ G–4 History, II, 47. SHAEF G–4 War Diary/Jnl.
394 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
new port—Ghent—was placed in opera- defenses in all the rear areas of the
tion. Communications Zone. Granville was
Cherbourg, whose discharge had been turned over to the French at the end of
pushed to an average of 14,300 tons per April.10 Its discharge record is summar-
day in November, had a gradually dimin- ized in Table 3.
ishing role after the opening of Ant- T h e port of Marseille averaged about
werp. Its discharge target was set at 7,000 13,500 tons per day in February, March,
tons in January, raised to 10,350 the next and April, although unloadings ex-
month, and then lowered to 7,600 tons in ceeded 19,000 tons on three occasions,
March and to less than 3,000 tons in and on one of these–15 March—topped
April. These targets were usually met the 21,000-ton mark. T h e capacity of
and often bettered. On 11 April a small the port was actually estimated to be
enemy party from the Channel Islands about 24,000 tons, but the limited rail
landed on the west coast of the Cotentin net of the Rhône valley consistently pre-
with the intention of blowing a bridge vented full utilization of Marseille’s
on the main rail line and thus disrupt- facilities. Late in February General
ing clearance of the port, but the at- Somervell expressed concern over this
tempt was defeated by an alert defense. failure to take advantage of Marseille’s
By V-E Day Cherbourg had handled up- surplus. But in the final months of oper-
wards of 2,600,000 tons of general cargo ations there was ample port discharge
in addition to locomotives, rolling stock, capacity on shorter lines of communica-
vehicles, and bulk POL.9 tions, making it uneconomic to use Cher-
Granville continued to operate as a bourg or Marseille any more than neces-
subport of Cherbourg confining its op- sary. Even vehicle ships, many of which
erations almost exclusively to the un- had been assigned to Marseille, could
loading of coal. Its performance was er- now be provided berths and assembly
ratic, and daily discharges averaged only facilitiesat the northern ports, nearer the
about 1,500 tons in the last months. On ultimate destination of the equipment.
9 March the tranquillity and boredom Limitations of inland transport rather
of the port was suddenly broken by a than discharge capacity determined the
surprise raid by an enemy force from the selection of ports.11
Channel Islands. Striking shortly after Neither Le Havre nor Rouen ranked
midnight, the well-armed party, esti- with Cherbourg, Marseille, or Antwerp
mated to have a strength of about 150 in capacity or performance. Neverthe-
men, succeeded in completely surprising less, they helped meet a desperate need
the port command, causing about eighty for discharge capacity on shorter hauls,
casualties and inflicting fairly heavy dam- particularly in the fall of 1944, and Le
age on port facilities and coasters. T h e
Granville raid led to the general reor-
10Ibid., VI, Ch. III, 2–4, 22.
ganization and tightening up of local 11 SHAEF G–4 War Diary/Jnl; Ltrs, Somervell to
Lee, 26 Feb 45, and Lee to Somervell, 9 Mar 45,
EUCOM 800 Rivers, Harbors, and Waterways, II;
9 Hist Rpt of TC ETO, VI, Chs. III, 12–20, and Hist Rpt of TC ETO VI, Chs. III,
36–37, 45, and
VII, Pt. I, 113–14. VII, Pt. I, 116.
P O R T DISCHARGE AND CLEARANCE 395
Antwerp, with tension relieved by the charge rate of 53,375, and the April plan
cessation of V-bomb attacks in March, a clearance of 61,000 tons per day as
gained in efficiency in the final months against unloadings of 53,000. Cherbourg,
and by V-E Day was accounting for fully for example, was given a discharge goal
one third of all the general cargo dis- of less than 3,000 tons in the hope of
charged on the Continent. Operations reducing its port stocks. But little or no
there illustrated most pointedly how progress was made in March, for dis-
the problem of clearance rather than charges generally exceeded the estab-
that of unloading capacity had come to lished targets, in part because of the
dominate port operations on the Con- program of accelerated shipments from
tinent. Antwerp had felt the effect of the U.K. depots, and thus nullified what-
the embargo on forward movements im- ever gains were realized in clearance.
posed during the Ardennes counteroffen- Toward the end of the month the pro-
sive because of the shortage of intransit gram was completely disrupted when
and depot storage facilities in the area, Allied forces, after crossing the Rhine,
and was almost immediately forced to lunged forward in the final drive into
decelerate its unloading. Large quan- central Germany. T h e support of combat
tities of supplies nevertheless began to elements over rapidly extending lines of
accumulate there and in other port areas communications necessitated the with-
as well. At the beginning of February drawal of more and more transport from
the backlogs at the various ports totaled port clearance operations. T h e ABC
373,000 tons. An additional 312,000 tons Haul, operating out of Antwerp since
lay in ships awaiting discharge. late in November, was suspended on 26
Beginning in February monthly move- March, for example, and its trucks were
ments plans took cognizance of this transferred for use in the forward areas.
trend, and deliberately set port-clearance At the end of March port backlogs had
targets higher than discharge targets. In risen to 300,000 tons.
February, for example, the chief of trans- Discharges meanwhile continued to
portation established a clearance goal of rise, averaging 63,000 tons per day in
59,800 tons per day as against a discharge April, with the inevitable result that
target of 58,200. Some progress in this supplies continued to pile u p in the
program was made that month, when ports. By the end of April port backlogs
daily movements out of the port aver- exceeded 400,000 tons.14 T h e accumula-
aged 59,344 tons and unloadings aver- tion at Antwerp alone accounted for 70
aged 57,000. At the end of February percent of the lag in clearance, supplies
port backlogs totaled 294,000 tons, in intransit storage there rising from
and supplies awaiting discharge totaled 96,000 tons at the end of March to
225,000 tons. Antwerp alone accounted 283,000 tons at the end of April. At that
for 128,000 tons of cargo in port storage. time, with Antwerp’s discharges rising
For the next two months plans called to 25,000 tons per day, SHAEF stepped
for a further reduction of port backlogs.
T h e March plan set a clearance target 14G–4 Confs, SHAEF, beginning 24 Mar 45, 12 A
of 59,800 tons per day as against a dis- Gp Supply Misc, No. 133.
PORT DISCHARGE AND CLEARANCE 397
in and directed that 5,000 empty freight properly echeloned in depth, was listed
cars be transferred to the port from by both Lutes and Somervell as one of
France and Belgium at the rate of 500 the major deficiencies of ETOUSA’s
per day. T h e first of these cars arrived on logistic structure. Like most limiting fac-
2 May. But the backlog continued to tors, its effect echoed in several direc-
grow for a few more weeks. On 23 May tions. Inadequate reception capacity in
Antwerp's quays and sheds held 340,000 the forward areas affected rail transpor-
tons of supplies. At that time the ABC tation by immobilizing freight cars, and
Haul resumed operations, and clearance this in turn threatened to hold port
finally began to match imports.15 discharge down and to force embargoes
Failure to clear the ports could be at- on base depots. 16 Lackof depot capacity
tributed largely to the inadequacies of also tended to perpetuate the maldistri-
the depot system. T h e lack of depots, bution of theater stocks, too large a
portion of which was consistently held in
15Ltrs, Page to CG COMZ, 17 Feb and 7 Mar 45, rear areas.
sub: Estimates of COMZ Supply Situation (Rpts
1 and 2); Supply Movement Programs for March
By far the most serious difficulties
and April, 26 Feb and 25 Mar 45, respectively, were on the northern lines of communi-
EUCOM 400.22 Shipments Gen, 1944–45; Hist of cations. T h e focal point of the trouble
T C ETO, VI, Chs. VI, 8–9, 17–18, and VII, Pt. I,
18, 169, 263; Comd and Stf Conf, COMZ, 5 Mar 45,
was in the Antwerp area. As shown
EUCOM 337/3 Confs, Staff Weekly, I; SHAEF G–4
War Diary/Jnl. 16Hist Rpt of TC ETO, VI, Ch. II, 142n.
398 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
earlier,17 the Communications Zone had mally in base sections) which were to
not at first appreciated the need for base receive and classify supplies cleared from
depot facilities in the Antwerp area and the ports and to store excess theater
had acquired only minimum storage fa- stocks. T h e Communications Zone made
cilities there. T h e lack of such base some progress in carrying out this pro-
depot space meant that all cargo had to gram, although the depots which it estab-
be dispatched whether it was needed in lished often performed missions other
the forward areas or not, and a needless than those intended. By mid-April it
expenditure of transportation and tying had established base depots for Le Havre
up of rolling stock often resulted.18 and Rouen, and also for Ghent and
T h e Ardennes counteroffensive forced Antwerp. At Le Havre most of the port
the issue of providing additional space storage was simply converted to base
for U.S. forces in Belgium, and the depot operations. Additional filler depots
Lutes and Somervell criticisms on the were established at Toul and Metz. Early
depot problem in general gave addi- in April the Advance Section turned
tional urgency to the problem in Janu- over most of its installations to Oise
ary and February. But progress was Intermediate and Channel Base Sections.
extremely slow. Early in March the From that time the Advance Section had
COMZ Control Division, reporting on no real depots, since the Communica-
the progress on the Somervell recom- tions Zone exercised no area control east
mendations, noted that only in the of the Rhine. T h e improvements of
Dijon–Nancy area had intermediate March and April undoubtedly eased the
depot sites been selected and a few depot problem, but the attempt to estab-
depots placed in operation. At that time lish an adequate structure was belated,
no base depots had yet been provided and it was never completed as con-
to serve the ports of Le Havre or Rouen. ceived. 19
Late in March the Communications
Zone issued a plan for an echeloned (3) Shipping
depot structure, providing for issue, T h e elimination of the port discharge
filler, base, and key depots as recom- bottleneck meanwhile had been followed
mended by the ASF commander. T h e by marked progress in the solution of
scheme called for issue depots (in the two closely related problems—the ship-
Advance Section) which were to move ping tie-up, and the transfer of supply
forward in the rear of the armies, filler stocks from the United Kingdom to the
depots (normally in intermediate sec- Continent. T h e shipping backlog, which
tion) which were to hold the main por- had mounted to 2 3 3 vessels in Novem-
tions of theater stocks and replenish the ber, had already been substantially re-
issue depots, key depots for the storage duced by the end of the year. T h e War
and issue of certain items requiring cen- Department nevertheless continued to
tralized control, and base depots (nor- pare the theater's requests for sailings
17See above, Ch. VI, Sec. 2. 19 COMZG–4 History, IV, 115, 145–47, 151–52;
18Ltr, Larkin to Gen Graham, MGA 21 A Gp, Mechanics of Supply in Fast Moving Situations,
26 Mar 45, EUCOM 323.3 Depots. Gen Bd Rpt 27, pp. 38–41.
PORT DISCHARGE AND CLEARANCE 399
until early in February, when for the serious congestion had already developed
first time the number of ships being in the base areas and notified him that
worked in the ports exceeded the num- additional withdrawals of trucks from
ber awaiting discharge. At the end of port clearance might force a reduction
February, with less than one hundred in the sailings from the United States
idle ships in the theater, General Ross in order to prevent the formation of
felt that ETOUSA was finally “out of another backlog of shipping. T h e G–4
the woods” on both discharges and for- was giving advance warning that he
ward deliveries. Within another month might soon ask that convoys be phased
the bank of ships had fallen to fifty-seven. back by five days, or possibly ten. Set-
General Somervell had noted the im- ting back the sailing of a convoy by five
provement with satisfaction and, with days would temporarily relieve the north-
his confidence in the accuracy of the ern ports from handling about 60,000
theater’s estimates of shipping require- long tons of cargo.
ments restored, agreed to schedule future T h e New York Port was willing to
sailings as requested by the theater. T h e postpone sailings as long as necessary,
surplus port capacity promised to pro- but asked for a fifteen-day notice so that
vide a much needed flexibility to the the flow of cargo into the port could be
entire supply reception procedure, for adjusted to prevent the same kind of
it made possible the allocation of ships congestion which the theater G–4 was
to the ports best adapted to the handling attempting to prevent in the continental
of particular types of supply, and nearest ports. On 3 April the theater requested
their ultimate destination, thus shorten- a five-day deferment of convoys sched-
ing both the line-of-communications uled for May arrival except for certain
hauls and the turnaround time for ship- loads of vehicles, ammunition, bombs,
ping. 20 rail cars, and locomotives.21
Late in March the requirements of Apart from this expedient, which was
U.S. forces beyond the Rhine began to designed as an accommodation to a
draw transportation away from the port temporary limiting factor, arrangements
clearance operations, and this in turn had long since been made to adjust the
threatened to limit discharge. In fact, flow of supplies to the requirements of
tactical developments beyond the Rhine the posthostilities period, In October
quickly caused reverberations along the 1944 the War Department had directed
lines of communications all the way back the theater to mark all requisitions to
to the depots in the zone of interior. On indicate whether, upon the cessation
1 April General Gilland, the COMZ of hostilities, they were to be filled
G–4, informed the New York Port that and shipped or canceled. Requisitions
marked STO (for stop) were to be auto-
matically canceled with the arrival of
20Comd and Stf Conf Notes, Hq COMZ, 23 Feb
45, EUCOM 337/3 Confs, Staff Weekly, I; Ltr, Lord
V-E Day, and those marked SHP (for
for Lee to Somervell, 17 Feb 45, and Ltr, Somervell ship) were to be filled and dispatched.
to Lee, 23 Feb 45, both in ASF 200.02 DCofS, S/C
and Control Div, A47–6; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, VI,
OCofT, 144. 21COMZ G–4 History, I, 145–49.
400 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Many items, for which the need would about the likelihood of an early V-E
continue after the end of the fighting, Day. Estimates of the SHAEF staff, he
such as rations, packing and crating ma- said, did not support such a view.
terials, medical supplies, and post ex- SHAEF had opposed any cutbacks in
change items, were to be arbitrarily ammunition requirements, even sug-
marked SHP. gested the possibility that large-scale
Early in April 1945 General Lord, fighting might still be in progress “at
anticipating an early end of hostilities, this time next year.” General Gilland
proposed an immediate review of sched- therefore opposed an embargo. Mean-
uled shipments with the thought of cut- while he listed the plans which the
ting back the flow of supplies even be- various supply services had made to re-
fore the end of hostilities. If the theater duce shipments from the zone of interior,
waited until V-E Day, he pointed out, although most of these entailed no cuts
large quantities of supplies would still until V-E Day. 23
be in the pipeline and would continue T h e theater made a few cancellations
to arrive at continental ports. Prompt in this period, but it followed a conserva-
action would prevent the accumulation tive course. Most of its requests were
of unneeded supplies and also facilitate for deferments, with “holds” on most
redeployment. He asked the G–4 to con- supplies to prevent their diversion else-
sider the advisability of asking the New where. T h e result was mounting con-
York Port to halt immediately the load- gestion in the New York Port, which
ing of all supplies marked STO for repeatedly called for more specific can-
thirty days. Supplies already in the pipe- cellations. In mid-April the theater
line, he figured, would easily maintain agreed to the release of forty fast am-
theater levels until 1 May, and if V-E munition vessels which were needed
Day was declared by 10May the embargo elsewhere, but it did not cancel ammuni-
would become permanent and no fur- tion shipments. On 25 April, however,
ther action would be necessary. This on the urging of the War Department
course of action would have substantially that the theater again review its requisi-
reduced shipments of such items as tanks, tions in the light of the current tactical
ammunition, and artillery, and chemical, situation, SHAEF finally approved a
engineer, and Transportation Corps sup- reduction in ammunition shipments
plies, including much special project from 6,300 tons per day to 4,500 tons
equipment. General Lord also directed in the period 15 May–15 June.
that requisitions thereafter be based on T h e War Department continued to
post-V-E-Day consumption requirements prod the theater for cancellations in the
and specified that zone of interior re- final weeks, pointing out that its requisi-
placement factors be used in all com- tions for ordnance, engineer, medical,
putations. 22 and signal supplies far exceeded con-
T h e G–4 was much less sanguine sumption rates. Finally, on 5 May, only
22Ltr, Lord to G–4, 6 Apr 45, sub: Reduction of 23Memo, G–4 for CofS, 8 Apr 45, sub: Reduction
Shipments to ETO, EUCOM 400.22 Shipments Gen- of Shipments to ETO, EUCOM 400.22 Shipments
eral 1944, II. General 1944, II.
P O R T DISCHARGE AND CLEARANCE 401
three days before the end, the ETOUSA requisition, totaling about 35,000 long
G–3 asked that all shipments marked tons, consisted of ordnance equipment,
STO which were consigned to the Euro- the bulk of it comprising special purpose
pean theater be canceled. These can- vehicles. ETOUSA and the New York
cellations were estimated to involve Port immediately disagreed on the meth-
about 1,280,000 tons of supplies. All od of stowing REX supplies and on the
STO supplies in zone of interior filler distribution of such cargo between dif-
depots or at the port awaiting loading ferent types of ships. More important,
at the time of the cancellation were it soon became apparent that the theater
returned to base depots; all such cargo and War Department held conflicting
already stowed on vessels was allowed concepts of the use to be made of the
to go forward, but was eventually re- new shipping service. Included in the
turned to the United States; STO items first requisition were such items as chap-
which had already been unloaded in the lains’ flags, folding organs, hymnals,
theater were kept segregated at ports Purple Heart medals, and alarm clocks.
and base depots and were ordered re- Technically such items probably came
turned on the first available shipping. within the category of supplies to which
On 8 May the COMZ G–4 imposed an the Communications Zone itself had re-
embargo on inland movement of such stricted the use of REX procedure—that
cargo, and ordered the supply services is “items . . . for which there is an
to furnish shipping instructions for its established and urgent requirement by
return to the United States. STO- the Armies”-for they had been con-
marked supplies in the United Kingdom, sistently included in the armies’ “critical
whether in ports or depots, were like- items” list, “the shortage of which is
wise ordered shipped back to the United likely to affect operations.” T o the War
States. Shortly after V-E Day, the G–4 Department, however, the inclusion of
reported that seventy-five ships had such items was in clear violation of the
either been returned to the United States intended purpose of REX, at least as
intact or reloaded and returned under conceived by General Lutes, the ASF,
the STO procedure. 24 and the New York Port, and the War
Department quickly enjoined the theater
T h e rapid express shipping service to exercise more care in its selection of
known as REX, inaugurated in January items and to impose some restraint on
in accordance with General Lutes’ pro- its requisitioning agencies. General
posal, had only a brief usefulness. Lutes left no doubt in the minds of
ETOUSA made its first request for ship- theater officials that the REX procedure
ments under the REX procedure on 20 was being abused, pointing out that sup-
January. More than half of the first ply chiefs had been allowed to request
express shipments for more and more
24Cbl EX–35274, G–4 ETO to SHAEF, 20 Apr 45,
and Cbl FWD–19863, SHAEF to ETO Ordnance, items which could not possibly be legiti-
25 Apr 45, ETO Adm 402 (ETO Cbls); Cbl mately considered critical.
WARX–71085, AGWAR to Lee, 21 Apr 45. SHAEF
AC 400.22–1 Allocation of Tonnages—Policy, No.
Early in February the New York Port
2; COMZ G–34 History, I, 150–60. spelled out in somewhat clearer language
402 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
the ground rules governing the use of there was no point in moving stocks to
REX, specifying that the procedure be the Continent which were not needed
limited to items immediately required there. This might actually result in dou-
for front-line combat operations, and, ble handling in case they later had to
so far as practicable, to packaged sup- be returned to the zone of interior.
plies. Under these terms the first REX General Eisenhower assured the Chief
shipments left the United States late of Staff that all requisitions to the War
in March and arrived in the theater early Department would be critically exam-
in April. Approximately 120,000 long ined and that all supplies usable on the
tons of REX cargo, 90 percent of it Continent would be transferred from
consisting of ordnance and signal sup- the United Kingdom as rapidly as pos-
plies, were delivered to the theater be- sible.26 Plans at the time provided that
fore V-E Day, when the system was U.S. stocks in Britain should be reduced
discontinued. A small amount of REX to 1,500,000 tons by 1 August 1944,
cargo, made up primarily of spare parts and to 870,000 tons by 1 December.
and medical supplies, went to Europe T h e planned reduction lagged from
by air.25 the start. O n 1 August the level of sup-
plies in the United Kingdom stood at
( 4 ) B O L E R O in Reverse nearly 2,000,000 tons. On 1 December
T h e clearance of U.S. supplies from there still were 1,750,000 tons of supplies
depots in the United Kingdom in ac- in U.S. depots in Britain, double the
cordance with the Reverse BOLEROor planned level. Failure to draw down the
RHUMBA plan had been frustrated time U.K. stocks were attributable in part
and again. As early as July 1944 Gen- to the fact that substantial tonnages-
eral Marshall, foreseeing a possible tend- averaging about 275,000 tons per month
ency on the part of theater officials -continued to arrive in the United King-
to requisition supplies directly from the dom throughout the fall because of the
United States once they possessed ports limited capacity of the continental ports.
on the Continent, enjoined the theater Equally important, however, was the
commander to “roll u p the rear” as poor turnaround rate of coasters, which
quickly as possible by first using u p handled most of the cross-Channel traf-
supplies available in the United King- fic. An analysis of the performance of
dom. This would save shipping and also sixty-three coasters in the period 22
simplify the liquidation of the American October–4 November, for example, re-
establishment in Britain at the end of vealed that the average round trip re-
the war. T h e War Department subse- quired 22.5 days against a planned 9.6.
quently made clear, however, that it did Selective discharge, the inability to clear
not want an indiscriminate mass trans- the ports of Le Havre and Rouen, where
fer of supply stocks to the Continent, for 26 Ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 1 Jul 44, SHAEF
SGS 400.3/1 Supply Problems of Allied Advance;
25Teletype Conf, Lutes (in Washington) with Memo, Lee for Chiefs of Supply Svs, 7 Jul 44, sub:
Heileman (in Paris), 27 Jan 45, ASF 319.1 ETO OVERLORD Tonnage Allocs, SHAEF G–4 Supplies
Transportation (Tel Convs), No. 1 1944–45; COMZ General: Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 20 Jul 44,
G–4 History, I, 131–43. OPD Exec Office File 9.
P O R T DISCHARGE AND CLEARANCE 403
many of the coasters were unloaded, bad Section commander, General Vaughan,
weather, and extended lay-ups for repair doubted whether more than half that
contributed in varying degree to the poor amount could be moved to the Conti-
record. There was some improvement nent and estimated that about 1,000,000
during the winter, but performance was tons would either be left on the ground
erratic, and at the end of February 1945 or later shipped to other places. More-
the turnaround time still averaged 17.5 over, the shipment of 300,000 tons per
days. 27 month, he pointed out, would not result
Early in October, in an attempt to in a net reduction of stocks by that
meet some of the more critical supply amount, for supplies were continuing to
shortages on the Continent, the Commu- arrive in England.29
nications Zone inaugurated a cross-Chan- In any case General Lee's program,
nel express service similar to the Red which required the shipment of 10,000
Ball procedure used in the early days tons per day, necessitated the acquisition
of the invasion.28 Three LST’s were of additional shipping. Available at the
reserved for expedited shipments from time were twelve Hog Islanders 30(which
the United Kingdom to Le Havre. But had been substituted earlier for Liber-
this service involved only small tonnages ties for cross-Channel use), with a capac-
and made no dent on the large supply ity of about 2,000 tons per day, and
stocks in U.K. depots. coasters with an effective lift of 3,200
T h e clearance program finally got a tons per day. To make up the deficit
major shot in the arm as a result of the chief of transportation asked for
the January visit of General Somervell, thirty-six Liberty ships. His plan called
who was highly critical of the failure to for the bulk of the shipments (7,000 tons)
reduce the U.K. stocks. January itself to discharge at Ghent, and the remainder
proved to be one of the poorest months, (3,000 tons) at Rouen. In support of the
for supply transfers that month came to program the G–4 again directed the
only 154,000 tons as compared with supply services not to requisition items
258,000 in November and 200,000 in from the United States which were
December. General Lord at the time di- knownto existin U.K. depots. 31
rected the chief of transportation to give February saw only a partial imple-
his personal attention to the problem mentation of the plan, owing in part
and to plan for the daily shipment of to the fact that the War Shipping Ad-
7,500 tons to the Continent. A few days ministration allocated only seventeen of
later, on 1 February, General Lee made the thirty-six Liberties requested, and
known that he desired the substantial in part to the shortage of British labor
closing out of the U.K. depots by the in the depots. T h e result was that only
end of May, and asked for the movement
of 300,000 tons per month for four
29
Comd and Stf Confs, COMZ, 9 and 23 Feb 45,
months to meet that goal. His U.K. Base EUCOM 337/3 Confs, Staff Weekly 1944, I.
30 The World War I equivalent of the Liberty
ship, built in large numbers at Hog Island, Phila-
27COMZ G–4 History, I, 119–22, 127. delphia.
28See Logistical Support I, 309–10. 31COMZ G–4 History, I, 117–18.
404 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
180,000 tons were outloaded. Before the 1944, supplies were being shipped that
end of the month, however, additional were not needed on the Continent.33
coasters and Liberties were made avail- Shortly after V-E Day the COMZ chief
able. Also, General Ross agreed to leave of staff, General Larkin, placed an em-
in the United Kingdom ten port bat- bargo on the shipment of all supplies
talions which had been scheduled for except those for which there was an
transfer to the Continent.32 As a result, essential need on the Continent. This
March dispatches rose to 330,000 tons. list initially included packing and crat-
T h e high rate of shipments continued ing materials and equipment needed for
in April, when 392,000 tons were moved. redeployment, rations, POL, coal, and
Despite this improvement, U.K. stocks vehicles, and later, civil affairs, Amer-
still exceeded 1,000,000 tons on V-E Day. ican Red Cross, and special service sup-
Late in April the Communications plies. T h e May and June shipments to
Zone had planned to step u p the clear- the Continent totaled 270,000 and
ance program still further to 450,000 150,000 tons, respectively. Earlier an em-
tons per month. But this goal was be- bargo had been placed on shipments of
yond the available lift, which could not certain supplies from the United States
be augmented. In fact, such a program to the United Kingdom, the results of
hardly squared with the findings of the which became apparent in May, when
supply services in late April that only receipts in the United Kingdom fell
550,000 tons of the supplies still in the from an average 150,000 tons to 90,000.
United Kingdom could be used on the Discharges in June dropped to 35,000.
Continent. General Hughes, who had At the end of September 1945 there still
long served as a trouble shooter for the were slightly more than 500,000 tons of
theater commander, got the impression U.S. supplies in U.K. depots.34
from a personal survey that, contrary to
33Memo, Hughes for Larkin, 25 Apr 45, and Ltr,
the policy enunciated in the summer of Larkin to Hughes, 9 May 45, EUCOM 400.22 Ship-
ments General 1944.
32Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VI, Ch. II, 65T. 34COMZ G–4 History, I, 118–19, 122, 128.
CHAPTER XV
rated, its northern terminus was changed Aachen both north and east. With the
to Liège, and later its southern terminus completion early in March of VERITABLE
was moved to Bad Kreuznach. Although and GRENADE, the operations of the 21
it handled relatively small tonnages, the Army Group in the north, work was
Toot Sweet Express filled an important immediately begun to push railheads
need and continued to operate for sev- even closer to the Rhine in preparation
eral weeks after V-E Day. 1 for the crossing of that obstacle. Con-
T h e tactical situation prevented any struction proceeded generally in accord
important forward extension of the rail with the current tactical plans. It was
lines in February, although some re- planned to provide a double-track line
habilitation was carried out northward and a single-track bridge over the Rhine
from Liège toward Roermond and from for each of the armies in the 12th Army
Group. On this basis the Advance Sec-
1 Another special delivery service dubbed the
“Meat Ball Express” delivered perishables, chiefly
tion completed engineer plans in Janu-
meat, from Namur to the First and Ninth Armies ary for the restoration of the follow-
on alternate days beginning early in March. COMZ ing lines: for the Ninth Army the
G–4 History, II, 108–09; ADSEC Operations His-
tory, pp. 113–14; Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VI, Ch. IV, line Aachen–Muenchen–Gladbach–Gel-
10, and VI, Ch. VI, 85; Memo, Gilland for Craw- dern–Wesel; for the First Army the
ford, 20 Apr 45, sub: Lutes’ Memo for the Supreme
Comdr Dated 25 Dec 44, SHAEF G–4 400.192
line Aachen–Dueren–Cologne; and for
Supply Reports, I. the Third Army the line Thionville–
TRANSPORTATION AND FORWARD DELIVERIES 407
Trier–Koblenz. Rail bridges were in- All rail traffic in support of the First
itially planned at Wesel, Cologne, and and Ninth Armies had to be funneled
Koblenz. 2 through the narrow bottleneck at Liège
ADSEC Engineer Groups A and C and was therefore extremely vulnerable
began rebuilding the rail bridges over to disruption by a few well-placed enemy
the Roer near Baal and Dueren respec- bombs. Aerial bombing, strafing, and
tively as soon as the First and Ninth V-bomb attacks did in fact cause some
Armies had crossed that river, complet- damage and interrupted work on the
ing them on 11 March. Meanwhile the Renory Viaduct, one of the three bridges
1056th Port Construction and Repair in Liège, during reconstruction in De-
Group, which had had so prominent a cember and January. SHAEF G–4
role in the restoration of Cherbourg and planners had advocated the opening of
more recently had had its first experi- at least one additional rail route across
ence in rail work with the construction the Meuse farther north, preferably at
of the bridge over the Meuse at Maas- Maastricht. A bridge was rebuilt there,
tricht, began restoration of the railway but a through route from the west via
northward from Baal toward Geldern Hasselt was not restored. 4
and Wesel. Engineer Group C in the Farther south railroads were still some
same period began extending the lines distance from the Rhine at the begin-
eastward from Aachen toward Cologne. ning of March, although rail support
This project was suspended when, with extended well forward into the Third
the capture of the Remagen bridge, pri- and Seventh Army maintenance areas.
ority shifted to the reconstruction of T h e collapse of the enemy in the area
the line running southeastward from east of the Moselle later that month
Dueren to the Remagen crossing. Plans finally opened the way for an extension
were also made to open a single-track of the railways to the Rhine, although
line to the bridgehead from Trier, but rail service was not immediately avail-
the collapse of the Remagen rail bridge
on 17 March nullified these plans. T h e other hand, would eventually lead to a link-up
line from Dueren to Remagen was re- with the Mainz–Mannheim area where support
could more easily be given by rail and pipeline
stored and then extended southward to from the Verdun–Metz depots. See note by G–3
Koblenz along the west bank of the Div SHAEF on Developments From the Remagen
Rhine. 3 Bridgehead, First Draft, 9 Mar 45, and Memo,
Osmanski for Whipple, 12 Mar 45, sub: Remagen
One feature of the rail net in the Bridgehead, both in SHAEF G–4 Operations East
north had long been a cause of worry. of the Rhine and Remagen Bridgehead 162/12/7;
Memo, Whipple for G–4, 12 Mar 45, sub: Remagen
2 ADSEC Operations History, p. 134. Bridgehead, and Memo, Osmanski for Mov and T n
3In any case, SHAEF logistical planners consid- Br G–4 SHAEF, 18 Mar 45, sub: Railroad Dev,
ered a n exploitation of the Remagen bridgehead SHAEF G–4 381 War Plans Gen 1945, II; FUSA
northeastward toward the Ruhr as infeasible for Rpt of Opns, 23 Feb–8 Mar 45, I, 42; Hist Rpt of
both tactical and logistical reasons. Supporting op- T C ETO, VII, Ch. IV, 23–24.
erations northeastward from Remagen would have 4 Study,
Mov and T n Br SHAEF G–4. 14 Dec 45,
put a n added burden on the northern line of sub: Rail Lines of Communication, SHAEF G–4
communications and, in addition, had the disad- Rail Transportation GDP–1, Folder 61; Rail-
117/3
vantage of poor communications and terrain. An road Reconstruction and Bridging, Hist R p t 12,
advance southeastward from the bridgehead, on the OCE ETO, pp. 81–82.
408 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
able to the Rhine by the time of the Bridging the Rhine proved to be one
crossing as it was in the north. Recon- of the major engineering tasks of the
naissance of the area then revealed that war in Europe, ranking with the engi-
the line from Thionville eastward neer aspects of the Normandy assault
through Saarbruecken and Bad Kreuz- and the reconstruction of the ports in
nach to either Bingen or Mainz could magnitude and complexity. Planning
be restored with a much smaller engi- had begun early in October 1944, when
neering effort than the line northeast- the chief engineer, Maj. Gen. Cecil R.
ward to Koblenz. Engineer Group B Moore, held the first meeting with engi-
began work on the line on 25 March neers of all the major headquarters to
and completed a single-track line to discuss Rhine bridging problems. Gen-
Mainz on 1 April. 5 eral Moore’s office immediately there-
5 ADSEC Operations History, p. 134; Memo, Os- after began to prepare the long lists of
manski for Mov and Tn Br G–4 SHAEF, 18 Mar materials and equipment, and to dis-
45, sub: Railroad Dev, SHAEF G–4 381 War Plans
Gen 1945, II; Comd and Stf Conf Notes, Hq COMZ,
seminate intelligence and technical in-
23 Mar 45, EUCOM 337/3 Confs, Staff Weekly, I. formation. Because of the peculiarities
TRANSPORTATION AND FORWARD DELIVERIES 409
RAILROAD
SINGLE-TRACK BRIDGEAT MAINZconstructed by Engineer Group B.
of the big river, even a flood prediction Advance planning and careful prepa-
service was established. T h e assembly ration had its reward in the dispatch
of construction materials at the proper with which the Rhine bridges were in-
places was in itself a formidable job, stalled. Starting on 29 March and work-
involving the inland movement of naval ing round the clock, the 1056th PC&R
craft and the handling of steel beams up Group, using two engineer general serv-
to ninety-two feet in length and more ice regiments, a construction battalion,
than a yard in depth, and pilings up and several smaller units, completed the
to a hundred feet in length. Transpor- first rail bridge across the Rhine at Wesel
tation of these “out-of-gauge” materials i n ten days. Ground reconnaissance im-
inland required the careful selection of mediately after the assault crossing had
routes and taking into consideration the resulted in the selection of a site farther
turning radius of trailer loads and of upstream than planned, and required
bridge and underpass clearance. 6 the bridging of the Lippe River as well.
6 Final Report of the Chief Engineer, E T O , I ,
But plans were flexible, and the change
170, 224–25. was made without difficulty. T h e main
410 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
crossing over the Rhine was a twenty- Logistic plans did not contemplate
three-span structure 1,753 feet long, the any substantial reliance on supply by
shorter bridge over the Lippe a six-span rail beyond the Rhine until after mid-
structure of 463 feet. Completion of the April. Army and ADSEC engineers nev-
Wesel bridges immediately opened up a ertheless began the rehabilitation of lines
rail line of communications to Haltern, east of the river immediately after the
twenty-five miles east of the Rhine, and crossing, and made limited use of these
shortly thereafter to Muenster. lines to haul forward supplies trans-
Engineer Group B in the meantime ferred from trucks. In the north the
had reconnoitered three sites in the line Muenster–Soest–Paderborn–Kassel
Third Army area, and on 4 April began was already in operation when the Wesel
construction of a railway bridge at bridge was completed on 9 April, pro-
Mainz. T h e 3,445-foot structure, 2,100 viding a continuous rail line of commu-
feet of which was of new construction, nications deep into Germany in support
was also completed in ten days. In dedi- of the Ninth Army. First Army operated
cation ceremonies held on 14 April the a line from Sarnou to Ingringhausen for
bridge was named for President Roose- five days beginning on 7 April, and then
velt, who had died two days before. T h e transferred operations to a new line from
bulk of the material used in its con- Kirchhain to Kassel to Ingringhausen.
struction was brought forward about 150 In the area of the Third Army the line
miles from dumps in Luxembourg. Frankfurt–Friedberg–Giessen–Kassel was
Farther south, in the area of the 6th also open by 9 April. Rail extension
Army Group, engineer units of the Sev- almost kept pace with the armies in the
enth Army, working under the direc- next few weeks, and by V-E Day rail-
tion of the 1st Military Railway Service, heads were already in operation at
began construction of a 937-foot rail Stendal and Magdeburg in the north, at
bridge at Mannheim on 12 April and Leipzig on the central line of communi-
an 851-foot bridge at Karlsruhe on 17 cations, and at Regensburg and Stuttgart
April. T h e two structures were com- in the south.8 ( M a p 9 )
pleted on 23 and 29 April, respectively. Rail traffic over the Rhine, which
Construction of a fifth Rhine railway began on a small scale on 8 April,
bridge, at Duisburg in the Ruhr, was quickly overtook motor transport as the
ordered late in April, but was not com- main long-distance carrier. Within ten
pleted in time to play any part in the days the railways were handling about
support of U.S. forces before the end of
the fighting. After careful planning and
Hist Rpt 12, OCE ETO, pp. 86-94; Seventh U.S.
assembly of materials, engineer units of Army Rpt of Opns, III, 888.
Group A started construction on 2 May 8 Annex K to G–4 Rpt, Cbl R–50547, ADSEC to
and completed the thirty-eight-span, TC ETO, 9 Apr 45, ETO Adm 413; FUSA Rpt of
Opns, 23 Feb–8 May 45, II, 66, and I, 68; Ltrs,
2,815-foot structure in a record six and Whipple to G–4, 22 and 31 Mar 45, sub: Rail Dev
one-half days. 7 in Support of the Southern Bridgehead, and Memo,
Crawford for AG, 21 Apr 45, same sub, SHAEF Rail
7 ADSEC Operations History, pp. 147–50; Final Transportation 116/3 G–4 Folder 50; Hist Rpt of
Report of the Chief Engineer, E T O , I 284–85; TC ETO, VII, Ch. IV.
D. Holmes, Jr
MAP 9
412 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
12,000 tons over the Rhine bridges, to handle the remainder of the First
which approximately equaled the ton- Army traffic in addition to the Third’s.
nage hauled by truck. By V-E Day, when Moving supplies for two armies over a
they were handling 20,000 to 25,000 tons single bridge inevitably raised problems
per day, they were accounting for fully of priority, and was further complicated
three fourths of the total tonnage.9 At by the multiplicity of agencies involved,
that time twenty-six general service regi- including the Advance Section, its regu-
ments, supplemented by PC&R groups, lating stations, and the armies. Proper
dump truck companies, and engineer movement control was lacking at first,
combat battalions, were engaged in re- and a remedy was not found until con-
construction work, fifteen of the regi- trol agencies were established–initially
ments with the Advance Section and the at Thionville and then at Mainz, on the
1st Military Railway Service, and the southern route, and at Muenchen-Glad-
remainder in other COMZ sections. T h e bach in the north–on which all inter-
1st and 2d Military Railway Services at ested agencies were represented. 11
that time were organized into 7 grand Other factors complicated operations
divisions, with 24 railway operating bat- on both lines and initially prevented the
talions, 7 shop battalions, plus mobile development of their full potential. In
workshops, MP battalions, and other the south poor signal communications
ancillary units, and had 11,000 miles of caused delays in calling trains forward
track under their jurisdiction. 10 and resulted in congestion beyond Saar-
T h e rapid extension of rail traffic bruecken. In addition, the bridge over
through narrow bottlenecks and under the Main River at Hanau had only a
conditions of extremely mobile tactical limited capacity and caused many trains
operations soon brought their operating to be sidetracked in the Mainz area.
difficulties. Both of the major Rhine T h e bridge at Wesel had a potential
bridges—at Wesel and Mainz–were capacity of 7,000–8,000 tons per day, and
single-track structures and soon became was initially reserved exclusively for
serious traffic bottlenecks, in part simply American use. For nearly two weeks
because they lacked the capacity to han- after its opening, however, it handled
dle the volume of traffic demanded for only about 4,500 tons per day, and to
support beyond the Rhine, in part be- make matters worse British forces almost
cause of poor traffic control. Both bridges immediately appealed for an allocation
were required to handle traffic for two of running rights. T h e 21 Army Group
armies. T h e Wesel bridge had to handle requests were denied at first, but after
a part of the traffic for First Army as several appeals, SHAEF on 23 April al-
well as the Ninth; the Mainz bridge had located one train path per day for 500
tons. Within another week the allocation
9 TC Progress Rpts for April and May 1945, was increased. Traffic over the bridge im-
Charts 26 and 22, respectively, App. 7, of Hist Rpt
of TC ETO, VII, Apps.
proved late in the month, and in the
10 Hist Rpt 12, OCE ETO, pp. 29–30; Hist Rpt
of TC ETO, VII, Ch. IV, 25–26, 45-46; Ltr, Page, 11ADSEC Operations History, pp. 151–52; Cbl
13 May 45, sub: Estimate of COMZ Supply Situa- R–51743, ADSEC to G–4 ETO, 28 Apr 45, ETO
tion (Rpt 4). ETO 381/400 Supplies (OVERLORD). Adm 415.
TRANSPORTATION AND FORWARD DELIVERIES 413
week before V-E Day averaged about under load continued. At the end of
10,000 tons per day. It was because of the April 2,000 loaded cars were still on
inability of the Wesel bridge to meet hand at former army railheads west of
both U.S. and British requirements that the Rhine alone, and the number of
the construction of another at Duisburg freight cars dispatched beyond the Rhine
was ordered on the 25th.12 exceeded by more than 12,000 the num-
Rail traffic suffered even more seriously ber of empties returned.13
from the failure to unload freight cars T h e difficulties at the Rhine bridges,
at the railheads in the forward areas and the accumulation of loaded rail cars at
from the practice of selective forwarding. other points on the lines of communica-
T h e congestion resulting from the latter tions, and the attempt by the armies to
was particularly serious in the south, institute partial acceptance or selective
where Third Army representatives, at- forwarding, all highlighted an old move-
tempting to expedite the shipment of ment control problem-that is, the prob-
urgently needed supplies, accepted only lem of controlling traffic between the
portions of the army’s requisitioned sup- Communications Zone and the combat
plies for forward dispatch, sidetracking zone, which were separate and co-
others to what amounted to dead storage. ordinate commands. T h e point at which
This practice eventually had its effect in supplies passed from one command to
the base and intermediate sections, where the other—that is, the army rail and
large numbers of loaded cars accumu- truckheads—was a critical point on the
lated. T h e tendency to hold supplies on supply lines and a potential source of dif-
wheels in the forward areas was common ficulty. Any consideration of the problem
in both army groups and produced an in- inevitably involved the regulating sta-
creasingly acute shortage of rolling stock. tions, whose basic mission was the control
ETOUSA twice attempted to force the of traffic into the combat zone. A postwar
discharge of cars in the forward areas by review of their functioning revealed that
temporarily restricting loadings in the there had been little uniformity in the
Oise Section, and Supreme Headquarters concept which the various commands had
also issued a warning about the possible as to their role or method of operating.
effects of the critical shortage of cars on In some cases the regulating officer be-
both military operations and the civil came what amounted to an agent of the
economy. But these measures had little army with which he was serving and was
effect, and the accumulation of cars
13Cbl FWD–19080, SHAEF to G–4 ETO, 1 Apr
4.3, Cbl E–32949, G–4 ETO to SHAEF, 15 Apr 45,
12Ltr, Crawford to Smith, 19 Apr 45, sub: Logis- Cbl EX–34381 G–4 E T O to COMZ Sea, 1 9 Apr 45,
tical Picture of Pending Opns, SHAEF G–4 381 Cbl EX-38785, G–4 ETO to COMZ Secs, 29 Apr
War Plans Gen 1945, II; Note of Mtg at SHAEF 45, all in ETO Adm 402 ETO Cbls; T W X FWD–
Fwd, Gen Napier, 15 Apr 45. and T W X MGA–10, 19974, SHAEF to A Gps and COMZ, 26 Apr 45,
2 1 A Gp to SHAEF G–4, 16 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS SHAEF AG 617 Railway Case A, I; COMZ G–4
400.3/1 Supply Problems of Allied Advance; Cbl History, II, 103–04; Comd and Stf Conf, COMZ,
R–51616, ADSEC to Larkin, 27 Apr 45, ETO Adm 20 Apr 45, EUCOM 337/3 Confs, Staff Weekly, I;
415; ADSEC Operations History, p. 154. See also the Memo, Transportation Sec 12 A Gp to G–4 12 A
SHAEF G–4 File 400.22, Shipments, Exchanges, and Gp, 29 Apr 45, sub: Loaded Rail Cars, 12 A Gp
Transfers, I. Rolling Stock, No. 106.
414 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
utilized virtually as a transportation sec- uary, when as many as 800 trains were
tion of the army headquarters. In some held up at one time for lack of motive
cases the regulating stations exercised the power, despite the receipt by that time
greatest control over movements within of about 1,200 locomotives from the
the army service area rather than over United States. This situation saw sub-
movements into the combat zone itself. stantial improvement in the succeeding
In any case, movements were often initi- months. T h e United States shipped more
ated without their authority or contrary than 500 additional engines to Europe
to their instructions, and embargoes were between January and the end of April.
imposed without their knowledge. How- These shipments, plus the large num-
ever useful they were as expediters and ber of rehabilitated French and Belgian
in a liaison capacity between the armies engines, and a few hundred German
and the Communications Zone, it is clear units, brought the total number of loco-
that they did not operate as contemplated motives in use at the end of April to
in field service regulations. As agents of about 11,500 .15
the Advance Section rather than the T h e Allies had originally planned to
theater commander, as contemplated ship 50,000 freight cars to the Continent.
in regulations, the regulating stations About 20,000 of these had been delivered
lacked the necessary authority to control by the end of 1944, and a total of 234,000
movements where conflict arose either cars was then in use on the French and
between the armies (as it did at the Rhine Belgian railways. At that time schedules
bridges) or between the armies and the called for the delivery during 1945 of
Communications Zone. As agents of the 28,000 U.S. cars, which American and
Advance Section, moreover, they were British forces planned to assemble at
unable to control reserves on rail cars in Marseille and Brussels. But while there
the army areas and were limited to re- were sufficient cars in the United States
questing command action to expedite the to meet the planned build-up, insufficient
release of cars, requests which had to go shipping was allocated to move them.
through the Advance Section, the Com- Partly because of inadequate receipts, as-
munications Zone, and the army group, sembly of cars also fell far short of the
to the armies. 14 targets.
T h e shortage of both locomotives On V-E Day there were approximately
and rolling stock had been a persistent 250,000 cars in use on the Continent, of
limiting factor in rail operations. T h e which 29,000 had been provided from
most desperate shortage occurred in Jan- the United States. These proved far from
adequate under the conditions existing
14T h e postwar review of their employment re-
in April. T h e rapid extension of the lines
vealed different opinions in the various commands. of communication into Germany that
Continental Advance Section, for example, con- month suddenly drained thousands of
sistently opposed the establishment of regulating cars from France and Belgium and im-
stations on the southern line of communications,
insisting that they were superfluous organizations,
and established one in March 1945, only after pro-
testing an order from the Communications Zone 15Of these, 1,736 were U.S.-built, and 7,717 were
that it do so. See Gen Bd Rpt 27, pp. 51–59. French.
TRANSPORTATION AND FORWARD DELIVERIES 415
mobilized additional thousands under rectly responsible for both operations and
load. Concern over the dire effect which maintenance of way and equipment.
this development threatened to have on Railway construction continued to be the
both military operations and the civil responsibility of the Engineer Service.
economy led to General Eisenhower’s Under the new operating procedure only
personal intervention near the end of the minor administrative authority was left
month. Fortunately relief was in sight to be exercised over the Military Rail-
with the arrival of V-E Day shortly there- way Service and its attached units by
after.16 the COMZ sections. This was confined
In the last month of the war the 1st to matters of supply of common items,
and 2d Military Railway Service had con- general court-martial jurisdiction, hos-
tinued to operate the continental rail- pitalization and evacuation, and financial
ways. Co-ordination of the two systems transactions. In accord with the SOP,
was provided through General Head- troop assignments were issued relieving
quarters, Military Railway Service, which Military Railway Service units from at-
had been established under General Gray tachment to the sections and assigning
at the time SOLOC was integrated with them to Headquarters, Military Railway
the Communications Zone in February. Service, which in turn assigned them to
As of that date, however, the railways either the 1st or 2d Military Railway
were still operated in accordance with an Service. In an attempt to bring the pil-
SOP of July 1944, which had limited the ferage problem under better control the
authority of the Transportation Corps to Transportation Corps also assumed re-
“technical supervision.” T h e Transporta- sponsibility for the security of supplies
tion Corps had long striven for undis- in transit. Military Police units pre-
puted theaterwide control over opera- viously assigned to the sections were ac-
tions in view of the intersectional nature cordingly assigned to Military Railway
of rail operations. Early in April 1945 it Service.17
finally realized this goal when a new SOP
clarified the Transporation Corps’ au- (2) Motor Transport–XYZ
thority by unequivocally making it di- Motor transport operations had be-
come fairly routine in February. T h e
16Ltr, Crawford to Gale, 28 Dec 44, sub: Avail- bulk of the COMZ truck units were then
ability of Railroad Rolling Stock to Meet Pres and engaged in port clearance, rail transfer,
Long Term Requirements, Cbl S–76142, SHAEF to
CCS, 22 Jan 45, Cbl 885 COS (W) 619, AMSSO
and interdepot hauls. Of the various ex-
to JSM, 4 Feb 45, Cbl W–49694, CCS to SHAEF, press services which had been organized
8 Mar 45, Memo, Napier for CAO SHAEF, 20 Apr from time to time by the Motor Trans-
45, and Ltr, Gale to Mayer, 1 May 45, all in
SHAEF AG 617 Railway Case A, I; CAO Mtgs, 19
port Service, only the ABC Haul was
Jan, 2 Feb, 16 and 30 Mar 45, SHAEF AG 337–2 still in operation.18
CAO Mtgs; Memo, Robinson, Dir Control Div
ASF, and Cbl, Broshous, Chief Control Div COMZ 17 E T O SOP 32, July 44, App. 10to Ch. IV, Hist
ETO, for Lee, 8 Mar 45, sub: Program [sic] Made Rpt of T C ETO, V, and ETO SOP 32, 3 Apr 45,
on Items in Somervell’s Memo of 24 Jan, EUCOM App. 4 to Ch. IV, pp. 19-20, Hist Rpt of TC ETO,
400.192 Misc Rpts, VII; COMZ Progress Report for VI; see also Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VI, Ch. VI, 24
April 1945 (Transportation Section), App. 2 of and VII, Ch. IV, 4–5.
Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VII, Pt. III. 18See above, Ch. V, Sec. I .
416 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
local operational missions, and in the each highway transport division con-
physically less favorable areas. It aimed sisted of a quartermaster group (TD)
at having forty vehicles per company in headquarters, augmented with personnel
service at all times. T h e bulk POL fleet from the Motor Transport Service. In
was to consist of seventeen companies, the period before the haul became inter-
some of them of the 2,000-gallon type, sectional the divisions were to be under
some of the 750-gallon type, and a few the direct control of the transportation
10-ton companies with skid-mounted officer of the advance section in which
tanks, with four 750-gallon tanks to a they were operating.
trailer.23 Operating and maintenance proce-
T h e planned organization and control dures also reflected the influence of
of this transport was a vital feature of the earlier trials and errors, bearing a strong
XYZ Operation, and reflected the experi- resemblance to the SOP’s which had been
ences and lessons of the earlier express worked out for the successful ABC Haul.
services. There was no longer any ques- At points of origin, for example, mar-
tion as to the desirability of providing an shaling-yard type of operations was to be
effective centralized control over a service in effect,with all trailers handled in the
which promised to be intersectional in same manner as were freight cars by the
nature. All motor transport used in XYZ Military Railway Service. All movements
was assigned to the 6955th Headquarters would be made in serials consisting of
and Headquarters Company of the Motor tractors operating in platoon convoys.
Transport Service (Col. Ross B. War- Quartermaster detachments attached to
ren), which remained the ultimate au- each H T D were to operate marshaling
thority for control of the entire opera- yards and dispatch vehicles at the point
tion. To permit flexibility in operations of origin, operate road patrols for over-
over the several routes the Motor Trans- the-road discipline, control, vehicle re-
port Service delegated the actual control covery, and route reconnaissance, and en-
over field operations to subordinate sure the prompt turnaround of vehicles
agencies known as highway transport di- at points of destination. Only the HTD’s
visions (HTD), provisionally created for were to issue movement instructions.
this purpose. Two highway transport di- T h e HTD’s were thus intended to be the
visions were initially activated, the 1st contra1 operating agencies in the field,
H T D to operate the two routes in sup- co-ordinating loading and movements
port of the First and Ninth Armies, in from point of origin to point of destina-
the north, the 2d H T D to operate the tion and issuing all movement instruc-
two routes in support of the Third and tions on the basis of over-all orders of the
Seventh Armies in the south. Basically, advance sections. Each truck company
was made responsible for full preventive
maintenance, and, reminiscent of old
23AdmO 1, 6955th Hq and Hq Co MTS (Provi-
sional), 3 Mar 45, in Hist Rpt of TC ETO, VI,
cavalry practice with respect to animals,
Ch. V, 10–13; see also, p. 3; for detailed plans on drivers were ordered to carry out before
the organization and operation of XYZ see Annexes resting specified maintenance procedures
A–F to AdmO 1 in Hist Rpt of TC ETO, VI, App.
5, Pt. 1. in bivouac, at servicing points, at halts,
TRANSPORTATION AND FORWARD DELIVERIES 419
and at loading and unloading points time averaged at least 15,000 tons per
under the supervision of serial detach- day.
ments. A mechanic was to ride each Shortly after the operation got under
serial, carrying a small supply of high way it was realized that, largely because
mortality parts. Mobile ordnance mainte- of the lateral distance between routes,
nance units from the advance sections one H T D could not efficiently handle the
were to provide road patrols, make major transport for two armies. Early in April,
repairs, and provide replacement vehi- therefore, a third H T D was organized to
cles. support the First Army, and in the south
T h e XYZ service was mobilized with a reinforced quartermaster group (the
unexpected speed. T h e operation got 469th) was assigned to the Continental
under way on 25 March, and the first de- Advance Section to serve in similar
liveries were made to the Third Army fashion in support of Seventh Army. T h e
over a line of communications averaging latter truck service, operating under
about 120 miles in length. Within a few CONAD, was known as the Yellow Dia-
days trucks of the Motor Transport Serv- mond Route. 25
ice were rolling forward with supplies XYZ was in constant flux, with loading
for the other three armies. At the end of points repeatedly moving forward as rail-
the first week the operation had already heads could be advanced, and unloading
shifted into Phase Z and was making de- points moving forward as the armies ad-
liveries of approximately 12,000 tons per vanced deeper into Germany. Starting
day. Motor transport had been marshaled points were initially at Liège for the
with unprecedented speed, truck com- Ninth Army, at Dueren for the First, at
panies in the various COMZ sections Luxembourg City for the Third, and at
having been earmarked early in March both Saarbruecken and Nancy for the
and alerted for movement on twenty- Seventh. Hauls in the first week ranged
four-hour notice. Movement orders had in length from eighty miles in the case
been placed on file for every unit nomi- of Ninth Army to 160 miles in the case
nated for XYZ, and were simply fed to of the Third. By V-E Day loading points
teletypists in the Office of the Chief of had been established as far forward as
Transporation when the need for the Bielefeld in support of the Ninth Army
units arose.24 and Wuerzburg in support of the Third,
T h e marshaling of transport did not although trucks of the 3d H T D (First
stop with the implementation of the Army) were still returning all the way
to Dueren to pick u p their loads. (Map
third phase of the plan, and the opera-
10) Trucks of the 1st H T D (Ninth
tion eventually far exceeded the planned
Army) by that time were delivering their
scale of operations. Toward the end of
loads as far forward as Magdeburg, and
April the number of truck companies on
those of the 2d H T D (Third Army) were
XYZ hauls rose to the equivalent of 244 carrying supplies beyond Regensburg.
2½-ton companies, and deliveries for a
MAP 10
TRANSPORTATION AND FORWARD DELIVERIES 421
While hauls sometimes exceeded 200 lon tankers created one of the most diffi-
miles (mainly in the First Army), the cult maintenance problems, for they de-
average was nearer 140. T h e distances in- veloped many leaks on some of the twist-
volved on the XYZ runs were therefore ing routes, and were deadlined for vary-
generally much shorter than on the Red ing periods for repairs. Replacement
Ball Express. This resulted largely from vehicles were slow to arrive on all four
the speed with which railheads were routes because of the distance to vehicle
opened in the wake of the armies. By V-E pools, which were located in intermediate
Day the XYZ trucks had hauled 630,000 and base sections. In addition, there were
tons to the armies,26 averaging 14,000 the usual difficulties over communica-
tons per day. The operation continued tions, aggravated by frequent moves, and
until the end of May. By that time it had with bottlenecks at bridges, many of
handled a total of 872,000 tons for an which were one-way ponton structures.29
average of about 13,000 tons per day.27 Some observers believed that the or-
T h e XYZ Operation was a highly ganization was still defective in some re-
creditable performance, although it also spects. A few considered that the high-
had its hitches. Maintenance of vehicles way transport divisions were superfluous
was the biggest problem, as usual, despite agencies, some that control of the POL
the advance preparations and precau- tanker companies had not been clearly
tions. On the Third Army route, for ex- established, and others that the transport
ample, a mechanic accompanied every divisions should have been organized on
convoy, four hours of maintenance were the task force principle, with all ancillary
given to all vehicles before they were re- units needed in the operation, such as
leased for dispatch, and ordnance main- signal, ordnance, and MP units, attached
tenance companies were assigned to serv- to the controlling headquarters.30 But
ice specific truck battalions. But spare there was more general agreement that
parts were often lacking, with the result the command and administrative ar-
that the goal of a serviceability rate of rangements had been sound and effective.
forty vehicles per company was never Colonel Warren, who headed the Motor
quite achieved. On the Yellow Diamond Transport Service, considered the opera-
Route the fortuitous capture of 1,000 tions of the 2d HTD, which supported
German tires relieved one of the more Third Army, particularly successful. T h e
serious shortages, and prisoners of war commander of the Advance Section had
were extensively used to relieve drivers in appointed the regulating officer at Third
preventive maintenance.28T h e 2,000-gal- Army as his deputy for all ADSEC troops
supporting General Patton’s forces, and
26Including relatively small tonnages to the First had arranged to have all H T D opera-
French Army in the last two weeks.
27Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VII, Ch. V, and App. 5.
28 Drivers were provided another comfort on the
Yellow Diamond Route in the form of hot food. 29Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VI, Ch. V, 14, and
T h e Special and Information Services of CONAD VII, Ch. V; CONAD History, pp. 188–94, 213–16.
set up “GI Joe Dinners” at fifty-mile intervals, 30ADSEC Operations History, pp. 135, 139; Rpt
where truck drivers could exchange cold rations for of Truck Opns in the Battle of Germany, 6957th
hot at any time of day or night. CONAD History, H T D (Provisional), in Hist Rpt of T C ETO, VII,
pp. 151–52. Ch. V, 17–26.
422 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
snow and ice, and then, in February, be- February, First Army assigned all en-
cause of an early thaw which extended gineer battalions to road work, and in
over all of Belgium, Holland, Luxem- addition used 4,000 men from the 7th
bourg, and northern France as far as the Armored Division and 1,300 men from
Seine, and which damaged about 1,250 the 3d Armored Division on drainage
miles of the military network. Unfor- work, filling potholes, and repairing
tunately the thaw came at a time when shoulders.
heavy troop movements were being car- In March emphasis shifted back to
ried out in preparation for the closing to bridge construction, the Rhine getting
the Rhine. At that time the force em- the major attention. Planning the Rhine
ployed in road maintenance in the Com- highway spans, like planning rail bridges,
munications Zone rose to about 17,000, had begun in the fall of 1944. In all,
and remained at that level until the end fifty-seven highway bridges were built
of hostilities. Approximately 40 percent over the Rhine, fifty-two of them by the
of this force consisted’of military person- armies. T h e major fixed bridges were at
nel, 25 percent of civilians, and 35 per- Wesel, Cologne, Neuwied, Mainz, Op-
cent of prisoners of war. In the combat penheim, Gernsheim, Frankenthal, and
zone road maintenance became the major Ludwigshafen. T h e 1,050-foot Oppen-
preoccupation of engineer units in these heim bridge, constructed by the 1301st
months. During the two-week thaw of General Service Regiment of Third
424 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
Army, was considered by the chief en- it might have been in the last months, for
gineer to be the best designed and con- more and more of the capacity of the
structed bridge built by a field force unit. inland waterways was assigned to civilian
Most of the twenty-six treadway and movements. Such movements naturally
heavy ponton bridges, having served aided military operations to the extent
their purpose, were no longer in use by that they relieved the railways of this
V-E Day. Of the five structures built by burden.
35
the Communications Zone, two were not
opened until 15 May.34 ( 4 ) Air Transport
Air transport operations in 1945,
(3) Inland Waterways
like long-distance trucking operations,
T h e inland waterways experienced showed marked improvement over the
many operating difficulties throughout previous summer, and made a notable
the winter, and handled disappointingly contribution toward maintaining the mo-
small tonnages until March and April. mentum of the final offensive. At least
Most of the waterways were frozen tight two factors in addition to the obvious
during the severe cold of January, al- advantages of experience favored a
though a limited traffic was maintained smoother air support operation in the
on the Albert Canal by the use of sea final drive into Germany. In contrast
mules as ice breakers. In February, early with the summer of 1944, continental air-
thaws created flood conditions, par- fields were plentiful in April, so that
ticularly on the Seine, where barge traffic there was none of the competition over
remained at a standstill until late in the the use of fields for tactical or administra-
month. Supply movements by water im- tive purposes which had characterized the
proved considerably in March, and the earlier airlift. Equally important, there
Transportation Corps established inland was no withdrawing of aircraft for air-
ports at Paris, Reims, Lille, La Louviere, borne operations such as had given the
and Liège. Most of these were operated 1944 airlift its on-again-off-again char-
by regular Transportation Corps port acter, although such a withdrawal of
companies, aided by civilian and prisoner craft was considered at one point.
of war labor. Port clearance by barge Supply by air had reached a low ebb
totaled 177,000 tons in March, which after the emergency missions during the
was equal to 8 percent of total clearances Ardennes counteroffensive. During Feb-
(2,090,000 tons). It rose to 410,000 tons ruary and March barely twenty-five
the next month, equal to 23 percent of sorties per day were flown to the 12th
all clearances. The heaviest shipments Army Group area, and deliveries, consist-
were made out of Antwerp, Ghent, and ing almost exclusively of medical sup-
Marseille. Military traffic on the inland plies, averaged only about fifty-five tons.
waterways was not in as great volume as
35
Hist Rpt of TC ETO, VI, Ch. II, 65K, 161–64,
34 Final Report of the Chief Engineer, E T O , I, Ch. VI, 16–18, 55–56, 65, and App., Chart II; see
288–306; Road Maintenance and Highway Bridg- also, Vol. VII, App., Chart 11; ADSEC Operations
ing, Hist Rpt 14, OCE ETO, pp. 67–79. History, p. 141.
TRANSPORTATION AND FORWARD DELIVERIES 425
Early in March the 12th Army Group ments were defective even at this date.
bid for a lift of 800 tons per week for it- That they still left something to be de-
self and the Communications Zone, and sired was revealed on the very first day
asked in effect for a guarantee that planes of the expanded airlift, when planes had
allocated for this purpose not be with- arrived at forward fields and it was found
drawn for airborne operations or train- that no arrangements had been made to
ing. Modest as this demand was, SHAEF unload them. On this particular occasion
turned it down on the ground that addi- CATOR (Combined Air Transport
tional lift could not be allocated for Operations Room) had been at fault, for
needs that were not of a truly emergency it had authorized the flights on the basis
of reconnaissance reports on the condi-
Before the end of the month, however, tion of forward airfields without giving
SHAEF had authorized the maximum sufficient advance notice to either the
possible use of air in support of forces Communications Zone or Third Army.38
beyond the Rhine, and on 27 March the T h e Communications Zone had only
Third Army made the first bid for air recently recommended certain changes
supply, asking for a 2,000-ton lift. Bad in the handling of air supply. Although
weather prevented the use of air for an- responsible for the support of the field
other two days, but on 30 March the IX forces, it lacked the direct control of air
Troop Carrier Command, using 329 transportation which it considered essen-
planes, inaugurated the stepped-up lift tial to orderly and expeditious supply of
with the delivery of 197,400 gallons of the armies. In mid-March it asked
gasoline to General Patton’s forces.37 SHAEF to place all aircraft allocated for
On the following day General Craw- air supply under the direct control of
ford met with representatives of all inter- the Communications Zone for loading,
ested agencies to review the administra- unloading, and routing, proposing that
tive procedure for supply by air in order such supervision be delegated to the chief
to ensure that all headquarters fully of transportation, who exercised move-
understood their responsibilities. De- ment control over other forms of trans-
spite repeated attempts at clarification portation. SHAEF gave little encourage-
and simplification, the procedures in- ment to this proposal, but the entire pro-
volved in requisitioning supplies by air cedure was overhauled at the meeting of
and in co-ordinating the actual ship- 31 March.
39OnGeneral Crawford’s sug-
gestion it was agreed that the armies
36Ltr, 12 A G p to SHAEF, 6 Mar 45, sub: Airlift should henceforth submit all bids for
for Supply and Evacuation, and 1st Ind, 18 Mar
45, SHAEF AG 581.2–1 Supply by Air.
37All statistics on deliveries by air from CATOR 38Memo, L t Col William A. Stephenson, COMZ
Weekly Load Summaries, are either in SHAEF Ln Off at 12 A Gp, for G–4 COMZ, 31 Mar 45,
G–4 551.2 Transportation by Air of Supplies and sub: Airlift Mtg at Crawford’s Office, SHAEF, 31
Equipment, II, or in SHAEF Air Staff, A–3 Mar 45, 1400 Hours, 12 A G p Supply by Air,
505.46–7, Air University Library, Maxwell Air No. 133.
Force Base, except as otherwise noted. Memo for 39Ltr, H q COMZ to SAC, 15 Mar 45, sub:
Record, Col Hopkins, Chief Supply Br QM 12 A Supply by Air, and Memo, SHAEF G–4 Mov and
Gp, 3 Apr 45, SHAEF 12 A Gp G–4 Memos for Tn Br for AG, 19 Mar 45, SHAEF AG 581.2–1
Record; Diary of G–4 12 A Gp, 27 Mar 45. Supply by Air, No. 1.
426 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
supply by air directly to CATOR, desig- pated drive beyond the Rhine, negotiat-
nating the airfield at which they wanted ing directly with CATOR on the subject.
delivery after clearing with the tactical One important feature of its plan was
air command. CATOR was to co-ordinate the arrangement to have the 2d Engineer
the entire operation, making arrange- Aviation Brigade follow closely behind
ments with the Communications Zone advancing infantry and armor to re-
and notifying the armies in advance of habilitate landing fields. Aviation en-
the estimated delivery time. Further- gineers were attached directly to each
more, because of the expected fluidity of corps for this purpose. Once they re-
operations in the forward areas and the ported a field ready to receive planes, a
inadvisability of dispatching ADSEC pilot of the Troop Carrier Command
units to widely scattered airfields, it was stationed with the IX Tactical Air Com-
agreed that the bidding agencies–nor- mand then reconnoitered the field and
mally the armies–should thereafter be checked its suitability. In this way Third
responsible for unloading supplies from Army alone used some thirty fields for
aircraft and clearing airheads of supplies, supply and evacuation, in many cases
although they might call on the Advance abandoning them after using them only
Section for assistance. The Communica- a few days. Motorized “flying supply
tion Zone itself expected to man certain points” moved from field to field as new
airfields, particularly in the Giessen area, ones were opened farther forward, often
north of Frankfurt, where it planned to moving at night, and normally issued
build up supply stocks by air. SHAEF supplies to using units directly from the
issued a directive outlining the new pro-
field.
cedure on 1 April.40
General Patton’s forces eventually
Supply by air expanded rapidly in the
pushed into Austria and Czechoslovakia,
first days of April as the full resources of
and therefore had the most extended
the IX Troop Carrier Command were
committed to the airlift. Deliveries supply lines of any of the armies. In ac-
reached their peak in the second week, cord with its greater requirements, Third
when more than 6,200 sorties were flown Army was made the greater beneficiary
and more than 15,000 tons of supplies of the airlift. Between 30 March and 8
were set down on forward fields. As May it received about 27,000 tons of sup-
could be expected, the great bulk of this plies via air, more than half of all the
tonnage (about 80 percent) consisted of tonnage moved by that means. Of its
gasoline. By design, the lion’s share of the total receipts, 22,500 tons consisted of
lift went to the First and Third Armies, gasoline (6,000,000 gallons), and ac-
whose requests were given first priority. counted for 22 percent of all the gasoline
Third Army had begun to plan early Third Army issued in that period. In ad-
in March for the air support of its antici- dition, Third Army received an average
of 50,000 rations per day by air, equal to
11 percent of its total issues, plus small
40 Memo, Stephenson for G–4 COMZ, 31 Mar tonnages of critical Class II and IV items
45; Supply and Evacuation by Air, Gen Bd Rpt 26,
pp. 22–23. like field wire, cable, dry cell batteries,
TRANSPORTATION AND FORWARD DELIVERIES 427
bogie wheelsand tires.41 SeventhArmyon much shorter notice than either rail
called for supply by air only a few times or motor transport.
when units were extended and supply Airlift planes played an unprecedented
routes were threatened. The main in- secondary role in evacuation in the final
stances occurred on 9–10 April, when the month of operations. During April ap-
10th Armored Division was resupplied proximately 40,000 casualties were re-
near Crailsheim, and on 26–27 April, moved from the combat zone in the
when the VI Corps had to be supported planes which had brought supplies for-
by air.42 ward. Even more spectacular was the
Although planes were never with- evacuation of Allied prisoners, who were
drawn from the airlift for other purposes uncovered in increasing numbers as the
during the final offensive, there was con- armies overran enemy camps deep inside
stant uncertainty as to the number of Germany. Seemingly endless “sky trains”
craft that would be available from day of RAMPS (Recovered Allied Military
to day. The ETOUSA G–4 complained Personnel) moved westward in the last
of this, but SHAEF refused to make a days of hostilities. Third Army alone
specific daily allocation for any par- evacuated 135,000 men in the last
ticular force.43 It followed the policy of month.45
making the maximum number of aircraft
available for this purpose, however, and (5) Forward Deliveries
the IX Troop Carrier Command aver-
Although the theater still faced serious
aged more than 650 flights and 1,600
problems in port clearance and depot
tons per day throughout the month of
storage in February 1945, its supply situ-
April. At the height of the airlift in Sep-
ation was more satisfactory than it had
tember 1944 approximately 1,000 tons
been for many months. Stocks of supplies
per day had been shipped by air, about
in the Communications Zone had
half of it going to the First and Third
reached an all-time high of 4,027,250
Armies.44 Aside from the large tonnages tons, exclusive of backlogs in the ports
of gasoline which the airlift handled in
and cargo awaiting discharge from ships.
April, its great value lay in the respon-
T h e distribution of these supplies was
siveness to demand which it provided in
not yet ideal, since stocks in the U.K.
the last sustained push, for it was able to
depots still accounted for more than 40
meet urgent demands for specific items
percent of this tonnage. But some im-
provement had been made in the redis-
41Supply of Third Army by Air Supply and tribution of stocks on the Continent,
Evacuation During the Crossing of the Rhine and where too large a percentage had here-
Beyond, 30 March to 9 May, by Gen Muller,
TUSA G–4, and Memo, Kyser for Counts, 13 tofore been held in the base areas, par-
Apr 45, sub: Air Supply to Ninth Army, both in ticularly in Normandy. T h e movements
12 A Gp Supply by Air, No. 133. program of February brought about some
42SUSA Rpt of Opns, III, 783–84, 893.
43Cbl E-31233, ETO G–4 to SHAEF, 11 Apr
45, ETO Adm 402; Cbl FWD–19094, SHAEF to
ETO G–4, 14 Apr 45. ETO Adm 414. 4512 A Gp Rpt of Opns, XIII, 60; Gen Bd Rpt
44See Logistical Support, I , pp. 580–82. 26, pp. 37–38.
428 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
reduction in the Normandy stocks. Of had risen to 414,000 tons in the Advance
the 2,323,000 tons of supplies on the Con- Section and 143,000 tons in CONAD.46
tinent, approximately 313,000 tons were Forward movements continued in
located in ADSEC and 100,000 in about the same volume to the combat
CONAD depots. In addition to COMZ zone in March, averaging more than
stocks, 357,000 tons lay in army depots, 5,000 tons per day to each of the four
ranging from 34,000 tons in the mainte- U.S. armies, including the Third and
nance area of the First French Army to Seventh, which carried out major offen-
95,000 in that of the Ninth U.S. Army. sives in closing to the Rhine. COMZ
In the forward areas the greatest con- depot stocks meanwhile also continued
centrations of supplies were in the Liège– to register net gains, rising to 4,790,000
Namur–Charleroi–Lille area in the tons by the end of the month, of which
north, and in Verdun and the Dijon– the two advance sections held an un-
Langres–Epinal area in the south. Stocks precedented 684,000 tons. 47
were not in proper balance in any of Much of the heavy movement in
these installations, and a selective build- March was in preparation for the offen-
up of Class II and IV items was required. sive which was to carry Allied armies
But supplies were considered adequate across the Rhine and deep into Ger-
for the offensives planned for February. many. Plans provided that the Advance
COMZ movement plans called for a Section was to turn over its depots in
heavy build-up in the Nancy–Toul area the Namur–Liège–Maastricht area to
for the future support of the Seventh Channel Base Section and that the Con-
Army, the supplies for which were to tinental Advance Section should transfer
come from the large classified stocks in its installations in the Verdun–Nancy–
Delta Base Section. This build-up got Toul–Metz area to the Oise Intermediate
under way in February, although move- Section once the offensive got under way
ments on the southern line of communi- and then establish mobile dumps or
cations continued to be limited by inade- depots in support of the armies. In ac-
quate rail transportation. T h e comple- cord with these plans, both advance sec-
tion of a rail bridge at Avignon was ex- tions turned over their installations in
pected to permit the opening of the line these areas immediately after the Rhine
on the west bank of the Rhône, but this crossings and thereafter held only small
was again delayed early in February tonnages in depots taken over from the
when a French barge crashed into the armies just west of the Rhine, since
partially completed structure.
Deliveries nevertheless set a good
46 Ltrs,Page to CG COMZ, 17 Feb and 7 Mar
record in February, totaling 25,000 tons 45, sub: Estimate of COMZ Supply Situation (Rpts
per day to the five armies supported by 1 and 2), EUCOM 381 Projected Operations of
the Communications Zone and averaging COMZ ETOUSA, 14 Mar 45; Weekly Rpts of Ton-
nages in Storage in U.S. COMZ Depots and Br
5,600 tons for each of the four U.S. GHQ Depots, G–4 SHAEF, SHAEF G–4 137/13/1
armies. At the end of the month army COMZ Tonnages in Storage.
47 Ltr, Page to CG COMZ, 11 Apr 45, sub: Esti-
stocks had risen to 495,000 tons for a net mate of COMZ Supply Status (Rpt 3), SHAEF G–4
gain of more than 130,000 tons. Stocks Estimate of Supply Situation Reports–COMZONE.
TRANSPORTATION AND FORWARD DELIVERIES 429
neither of them exercised territorial Army Groups placed Nancy and Toul,
jurisdiction in Germany. then in the Third Army service area, in
All the. armies attempted to move sup- the area of the Seventh Army. Third
ply stocks as far forward as possible be- Army turned over some of its installa-
fore the Rhine crossings. The Ninth tions in this area to the Continental Ad-
Army, for example, moved more than vance Section and evacuated others to its
100,000 tons of supplies and equipment own maintenance area, which it then
from the Maastricht area to Muenchen– concentrated in the Metz–Thionville and
Gladbach in March, using more than Luxembourg City areas. In March a sec-
forty assigned truck companies, plus ond boundary change placed Metz in the
several borrowed from the Advance Sec- Seventh Army area, necessitating further
tion and provisional companies which it adjustments in Third Army’s administra-
formed from antiaircraft units. T h e First tive structure.
49
Army meanwhile had chosen Euskirchen In anticipation of the inevitable bot-
as its next maintenance area in prepara- tlenecks at the Rhine bridges all the
tion for the Rhine crossings. T h e cap- armies attempted to ensure as high a de-
ture of the Remagen bridge on 8 March gree of self-sufficiency as possible for
did not seriously disrupt these plans, and forces operating beyond the river in the
the army quickly shifted supply to ex- first few days. T h e Ninth Army, for ex-
ploit this success, putting in bridges and ample, specified that unit trains were to
initially employing dukws to support the be loaded to capacity for the crossings,
III Corps. Within two days it had estab- issued certain replacement items, such as
lished ration, POL, and ammunition sup- tanks, in advance to meet initial losses,
ply points on the opposite shore.48 and restricted all traffic in the first forty-
Both the Third and Seventh Armies eight hours to tactical movements. As ex-
carried out major offensives during pected, the Wesel highway bridges,
March and then forced the Rhine with- which were shared with the British,
out attempting a deliberate supply build- proved serious strictures to the desired
up in positions which would have af- build-up east of the Rhine, and carried
forded closer support. Support of the the heaviest traffic in the north, partly
Third Army’s drive had entailed supply- because they were served by the most
ing units on two axes-one through the favorable road net to the east. At the
Saar and one north of the Moselle, both height of the traffic on 9 April, the day
of them over poor lines of communica- the rail bridge was opened, a traffic count
tion. Twice after the first of the year the showed that the three highway bridges-
logistic support of Third Army was a Bailey, a 25-ton ponton, and a tread-
further complicated by lateral boundary way-carried more than 1,500 vehicles
changes. Late in January a shift in the per hour.50
boundary between the 6th and 12th Although logistic support in the final
month was more orderly and far more
48FUSA Rpt of Opns, 22 Feb–8 May 45. Bk. II, adequate than it had been in August and
p. 59; FUSA AAR, March, pp. 59, 87-89; Conquer:
The Story of Ninth Army, 1944–45, pp. 212, 221–25; 49 TUSAAAR, II, G–4. 57–58.
NUSA AAR, G–4 Rpt for 1–15 Mar 45. 50Conquer, pp. 255–56, 264, 320–21.
430 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
ply requirements for “normal combat” experience in the First and Third Armies
conditions, for which maintenance re- closely approximated the revised factors
quirements were figured at 540 tons per in most classes of supply, although Third
division slice per day.53 Army consumed somewhat higher quan-
By April it had become clear that tities of gasoline (202 tons as compared
operations would more nearly resemble with the planned 180). Ninth Army con-
those of a “rapid advance,” and mainte- sumed both ammunition and Class II
nance factors were accordingly revised. and IV supplies at a higher rate than was
Based on a study of operations in March, normal for rapid advance conditions (100
a new factor of 450 tons rather than 462 and 90tons respectively), and correspond-
was actually adopted, reflecting reduc- ingly smaller quantities of gasoline (153
tions in Classes I, II, and IV, and a tons). For the three armies in the 12th
greater allowance of ammunition than Army Group, over-all maintenance rates
earlier mobile type operations had in- averaged 455 tons per day as compared
dicated. T h e new factors were: 54 with the planned 450. Seventh Army’s
consumption record deviated most mark-
edly from the planning figures, showing
ammunition expenditures (171 tons)
more nearly equal to normal combat
scales (180 tons) and gasoline consump-
tion at rates in excess of rapid advance
Supply consumption in the final scales (192 tons as against 180). Its over-
month varied from army to army, reflect-
all consumption rate was 5 13 tons per di-
ing the differing operational conditions vision slice as compared with 455 tons
encountered. (Table 12) Consumption for the armies of the 12th Army Group.
53Of the supplies consumed in the combat zone In the last month the average field
under conditions of normal combat (541 tons) strength of the two army groups, includ-
about 40 percent is consumed by the divisions ing the First French Army, was 1,525,700
themselves (223 tons as against 318 consumed by
corps and army overheads). T h e Communications men, and the average consumption per
Zone accounts for another 201 tons, which raises man was 30.38 pounds per day. 55
the total theater slice (exclusive of air forces) to
742 tons per division. I n other words, of the 742
tons per theater slice, the division accounts for 223 T h e supply performance of the last
tons, or 31 percent, and overheads for 519 tons, three months of hostilities clearly demon-
or 69 percent. Under conditions of rapid advance strated the greater maturity of the
the corresponding factors are 178 tons for the
division itself, 284 tons for corps and army over-
heads, and 231 for COMZ overheads, and a total factor of 450 tons represented a n estimate which
theater slice of 693 tons. Under conditions of re- assumed slightly different conditions in the final
grouping or negotiating natural obstacles the fac- drive. Consumption Rates of U.S. Forces in the
tors are 166 tons for the division, 260 tons for Final Advance to the Rhine, 24 Feb to 23 Mar
corps and army overheads, and 201 for COMZ 45, prep by Statistical Sec G–4 SHAEF, 25 Apr
overheads, and a total theater slice of 627 tons. 45. SHAEF G–4, G–4 Basic Statistical Reports
54 Operationsin the period 24 February–23 March 102/3/2 2 .
1945 had revealed the following average consump- 55Study by Statistical Sec G–4 SHAEF, Consump-
tion factors: Class I, 81.4 tons; Classes II and tion Rates U.S. Forces from the Rhine to the
IV, 92.8; Class III, 123.9; Class V, 123.8. for a Elbe, 23 Mar–25 Apr 45, SHAEF G–4 Basic Sta-
total of 422 tons per division slice per day. T h e tistical Reports 102/3/22.
432 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
TABLE
12—COMBATZONECONSUMPTIONEXPERIENCE
APRIL1945
23 MARCH–25
[Long Tons per Divisional Slice]
Source: Study by Statistical Sec G–4 SHAEP, Consumption Rates U.S. Farces from the Rhine to the Elbe, 23 Mar–25 Apr 45, SHAEF
G–4 Basic Statistical Reports 102/3/22.
theater’s supply organization and a tre- and better transportation. Eight months
mendous improvement in the theater’s of operations had also given supply of-
over-all logistic potential. In the field of ficers the experience which now was re-
movements and distribution, in par- flected in the greater self-confidence and
ticular, the last three months contrasted expertness with which the final drive
markedly with the summer and fall of was planned and carried out. This was
1944. T h e period of relatively static evident in all aspects of logistic support
operations had, of course, given the Com- in the last few months, including mar-
munications Zone an opportunity to im- shaling resources, building the Rhine
prove its operating procedures and to bridges, using motor and air transport,
build the basic capacity in port discharge and extending rail service.
CHAPTER XVI
1 T h e troop total included sixty-one U.S. and 2 Ltr, Page to CG COMZ. 17 Feb 45. sub: Esti-
eleven French divisions. French forces supported mate of COMZ Supply Situation (Rpt I), EUCOM
by the United States totaled about 350,000, most 381 Projected Operations of the COMZ ETOUSA,
of them in the 6th Army Group. 14 Mar 45.
434 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
not appear in quantity before the end of great in terms of tonnages. Ration levels
hostilities.3 in the armies rose slightly in the third
Theater ration levels continued to rise week, to 2.3 days in the First Army, 4.3
for several weeks, and by the time of the in the Third, 4.4 in the Ninth, and 4.1
Rhine crossing were equivalent to forty- in the Seventh, but the 12th Army Group
two days of supply. Army levels were considered Class I supply increasingly
somewhat erratic. Fluctuations in the critical because of the tightness of trans-
army levels did not necessarily indicate portation. In the final weeks the ration
a deterioration in the supply position. problem was aggravated by the necessity
They reflected the changing tactical situ- to feed large numbers of prisoners and
ation and, at times, the transfer of stocks displaced persons, although prisoners
to the Advance Section, as was the case in subsisted largely on captured stocks.
the period of rapid movement in March. The rapid advance also brought the in-
Or, as was the case later, they resulted evitable shift from bulk to operational
from the decision to defer receipts until rations, which were supplemented when-
direct rail shipments could be made to ever possible with fresh bread, butter,
new depots. Sometimes they resulted and meat. T h e changeover was greatest
from an increase in the ration strength in the First and Third Armies, in which
without a corresponding build-up of re- operational rations accounted for 70 to
serves. At the time of the Rhine crossings 80 percent of all issues as compared with
reserves in the combat zone were excel- 10 to 15 percent in preceding months. In
lent, totaling 31,365 tons and averaging the theater as a whole operational rations
five days of supply.4 comprised 26 percent of the total issues
Deliveries were good in the week after in April. Generally, while Class I levels
the crossings, and all the armies pro- in the combat zone threatened to become
ceeded to build up a reserve east of the critical late in April, they never reached
river. By the second week of April, how- the precarious lows of August and Sep-
ever, army levels had begun to feel the tember 1944, and U.S. forces did not suf-
effect of the lengthening lines of com- fer any want for subsistence. In the last
munications. Meanwhile the Advance week of operations no army had less than
Section turned over its large depot stocks three days of supply on hand, and the
to other COMZ sections and thereafter First Army had built up a seven-day sup-
moved forward in close support of the ply. Ration consumption in the final
armies, acting mainly as transporter and month had ranged from 71 tons per di-
transfer agent and retaining no reserves vision slice in the First Army to 118 in
under its own control. Reserves east of the Ninth, and had averaged 87.75 tons
the Rhine consequently were never very as compared with the planned 80.5
3 Army and Army Group G–4 Periodic Reports POL supply was generally excellent
for February 1945; QM Supply in the ETO, II
(Subsistence), App. XXXI. For more detail on ra- G–4 Estimate of Supply Situation Reports—COM-
tions see Romanas et al., Quartermaster Operations ZONE, No. 59.
in the War Against Germany. 5 Armyand Army Group G–4 Periodic Rpts for
4 Ltr, Page to CG COMZ, 1 1 Apr 45, sub: Esti- March and April; Report on Consumption Rates
mate of COMZ Supply Situation (Rpt 3). SHAEF U.S. Forces From the Rhine to the Elbe, 23 Mar–25
SUPPLY IN T H E LAST MONTHS 435
throughout the last three months of oper- and bury large sections of pipe in the
ations. Reserve levels in the forward towns. Beyond Sittard the right of way
areas dropped somewhat in the final days was found to be heavily mined. Finally,
of hostilities, as could be expected during at Roermond, floods made it necessary to
a rapid advance, but shortages never suspend the pipelines over the Roer by
actually caused the final drive to falter. cables.
POL stocks had reached an unprece- Extension of the Major System had
dented 560,000 tons in the Communica- been resumed at the end of January, and
tions Zone by February, far exceeding within a month all three 6-inch lines had
the authorized sixty-day level. Combat reached Châlons-sur-Marne. In March
zone depots held an additional 35,000 engineers laid one 6-inch line beyond
tons, with levels varying from 2.5 days that city to Thionville.
in the First Army to 8.3 days in the Construction on the Southern System
Third. POL was being discharged at the meanwhile had advanced the 4-inch line
rate of about 13,000 tons per day, mainly to Sarrebourg by mid-February. This
at Antwerp, Cherbourg, Le Havre, and brought a noticeable improvement in
Port du Bouc.6 Seventh Army's gasoline supply. T h e
Although the three main pipeline sys- 6-inch line had only reached St. Jean de
tems at this time operated only as far as Losne by that time and did not extend
Maastricht, Coubert, and Epinal, addi- to Sarrebourg for another two months.
tional construction was then under way Because of a shortage of 6-inch pipe the
on both the Major and Southern Sys- Southern System beyond that point took
tems. ( M a p 11) On the Northern System, the form of three 4-inch lines. One of
based on Antwerp, Maastricht remained these was completed to Saaralbe by late
the forward terminus until late in March. Late in February all construction
March. Extension of the system north- and operation of the Southern System
northeastward to Wesel was finally had been taken over by the Military
undertaken on 3 March and completed Pipeline Service. At the time of the
and in operation by the 28th. Construc- Rhine crossings, therefore, the most ad-
tion difficulties were numerous on this vanced pipeheads of the three main pipe-
section of the system. On the initial line systems were at Maastricht, Thion-
stretch from Maastricht to Sittard con- ville, and Saaralbe.7
struction was slowed by deep mud, In preparing for the final offensive to
which forced engineers to hand-carry be launched late in March logistic
much of the pipe, by a shortage of 6-inch planners estimated POL requirements
couplings, and by the necessity to weld for sixty U.S. and French divisions at
approximately 10,300 tons per day. To
Apr 45, prep by Statistical Sec G–4 SHAEF, 11 meet this requirement they planned
May 45, 12 A Gp, Supplies-Backlog and Requisi- eventually to extend all three pipeline
tions, No. 128.
6 Ltr, Page to CG CZ, 17 Feb 45, sub: Estimate
of COMZ Supply Situation (Rpt 1), SHAEF G–4 7 Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, Hist Rpt 13.
Estimate of Supply Situation Reports—COMZONE, OCE ETO, pp. 94–105; Monthly Rpts, Construc-
No. 59; 12 A Gp G–4 Periodic Rpt for Week 4–10 tion Div OCE ETO. ADSEC 51–104: Seventh Army
Feb 45. Rpt of Opns, III, 880.
D. H o l m e s , J r .
MAP 11
SUPPLY IN T H E LAST MONTHS 437
systems across the Rhine–at Wesel in was used only temporarily, for it had
the north, at Mainz in the center, and at been laid on a wrecked rail bridge and
Worms in the south. Motor transport proved to be unsafe. Two new lines
would of course have to deliver packaged were subsequently laid across the newly
POL to the Rhine bridgeheads in the constructed rail bridge.
first few days. T o lessen the burden Farther south, in the Seventh Army
which this would impose on the Rhine area, engineers constructed three lines
highway bridges supply officers planned across the Rhine at Frankenthal, a few
the construction of pipeline crossings at miles south of Worms, and established
the above-named locations and also in the east bank pipehead at Sandhofen, a
the vicinity of Remagen before the links few miles north of Mannheim. Construc-
with the main pipeline systems were tion of the first line, supported by a
completed. Gasoline could then be Bailey bridge, began on 7 April and the
shipped to all four crossings via tank car line started carrying gas across the Rhine
and pumped across to the east bank, thus on the 15th. Two additional lines were
alleviating congestion on the bridges.8 constructed later, one of which was laid
Such pipeline crossings were even- on the river bed.
tually constructed at all four locations. Construction of the Wesel crossing
Engineers started the one at Mehlem, had begun on 21 March and was com-
near Remagen, on 25 March and com- pleted in the first week of April. But
pleted it three days later, using a foot- this line never operated independently
bridge to support the line. Gasoline be- of the main pipeline. By the time it was
gan flowing across the Rhine before the installed, the lines from Maastricht had
end of the month, the western terminal also reached the Rhine, the first gasoline
being supplied from Maastricht first by arriving at the tank farm on the west
tank truck and later by tank car. On the bank on 28 March. T h e two systems were
east bank the pipeline was eventually ex- immediately linked, and on 3 April gaso-
tended ten miles to the Autobahn, where line began flowing across the Rhine to
storage tanks were erected and whence Wesel. Consequently gasoline did not
gasoline was shipped in tank trucks to have to be shipped to the west bank by
Giessen and there decanted. rail, but could be pumped through the
Construction of a similar crossing at pipelines directly from Antwerp. T h e
Mainz could not begin until 30 March completed Northern System consisted of
because of the tactical situation. T h e one 6-inch and four 4-inch lines from
east bank pipehead there was completed Antwerp to Maastricht, and one 6-inch
on 8 April, two weeks before the line and two 4-inch lines beyond that city to
from Thionville reached the river. It Wesel . 9
began operating a few days later, carrying
gasoline brought to the west bank ter- 9Memo, Gilland for Crawford, 31 Mar 45, sub:
Current POL Supply Program, SHAEF G–4 463.7
minal by rail from Thionville. T h e line Gasoline and Motor Oil (Gen) 1945, II; Comd and
Stf Conf Notes, COMZ, 5 May 45, EUCOM 337/3
8Memo, Petroleum Br G–4 SHAEF, 26 Mar 45, Confs, Staff Weekly, I; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 22
sub: Future Opns–POL Plan, SHAEF G–4 463.7 Feb–8 Mar 45, Bk. III, p. 49; COMZ G–4 His-
Gasoline and Motor Oil (Gen) 1945, II. tory, V, 28.
438 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Work on both the Major and Southern been. T h e Communications Zone at the
Systems also went forward. On the Major time had nearly 600,000 tons of Class III
System only one 6-inch line was laid to supplies in its depots, of which the pack-
Mainz, arriving there on 22 April. A aged portions alone—262,000 tons—con-
second line between Châlons and Thion- stituted 22.8 days of supply. Army depots
ville was laid by early May, completing held another 65,000 tons, with levels
the system. All the lines on the Major (or ranging from 5 days of supply in the
Central) System were 6-inch lines. One First Army to 9 days in the Ninth.11 Sup-
was extended to Mainz, two as far as plying the armies with POL was there-
Thionville, and three to Châlons. On the fore purely a transportation problem,
Southern System three 4-inch lines were and the attention which the planners had
eventually constructed forward from given to that problem paid good divi-
Saaralbe, the first arriving at Frankenthal dends. Deliveries were fully adequate in
on 20 April, the other two at the end of the first weeks. In the second week of
the month. By late April, therefore, gaso- April the armies had an average of six
line was being pumped directly from the days of supply on hand, and each had
ports to pipeheads on the east bank of succeeded in moving at least 1,000,000
the Rhine–from Antwerp to Wesel in gallons into forward areas east of the
support of the Ninth Army, from Cher- Rhine. T h e Ninth Army, which had a
bourg to Mainz in support of the Third, total of 4,500,000 gallons or 8.2 days of
and from Port du Bouc to Frankenthal in supply on hand, already enjoyed the
support of the Seventh. A fourth line, benefits of the Wesel pipehead, and was
served by rail car, bridged the Rhine at building up a reserve east of the Rhine at
Mehlem in support of the First Army. a good rate. Daily issues of gasoline rose
Delivery capacities at the pipeheads were to between 600,000 and 700,000 gallons
2,500 long tons per day at Wesel, 1,500 in each of the armies by mid-April, and
tons at Mainz, and 1,200 tons at Sand- on occasion exceeded 1,000,000 gallons.
hofen, opposite Frankenthal. An addi- Deliveries came close to matching these
tional 4,800 tons could be delivered to requirements throughout most of the
Maastricht, Thionville, Châlons, and month. Much of the gasoline moved for-
Saarbourg. On its completion the con- ward from the pipeheads in tank trucks
tinental network–including the Seine and was decanted by the Advance Sec-
and Minor Systems, the latter of which tion in the forward areas. But a large
was no longer in operation–had a route portion also moved via tank car from the
distance of 1,412 miles and had 3,577 pipeheads west of the Rhine. Theater
miles of pipe. Storage facilities totaled stocks had continued to rise, and totaled
7,619,116 barrels.10 nearly 700,000 tons on 25 April. T h e
At the time of the Rhine crossings late armies at that time still had reserves
in March both COMZ and army stocks totaling 47,000 tons.
of POL were the highest they had ever Deliveries finally began to fall short of
10 Monthly Rpts, Construction Div OCE ETO, 11Ltr, Page to CG CZ, 1 1 Apr 45, sub: Estimate
ADSEC 51–104; Final Rpt of the Chief Engr, ETO, of COMZ Supply Situation (Rpt 3), SHAEF G–4
II, App. 33A–C. Estimate of Supply Situation Reports—COMZONE.
SUPPLY IN T H E LAST MONTHS 439
daily consumption in the last days of Despite the fairly consistent intensity
April, and levels in the combat zone con- of offensive activity in the last three
sequently dropped off. Air deliveries had months of operations, POL consumption
been a major factor in meeting daily re- experience brought a downward adjust-
quirements until that time, but these also ment in the factor of 192 tons per di-
fell off at the end of the month. All the vision slice which had been adopted in
armies felt the effect of the increasing January. Consumption in March had
difficulties in transportation, and in the actually averaged barely 124 tons per di-
Seventh and Third Armies reserve levels vision slice in the U.S.-supported armies,
for the first time fell below two days of due mainly to low consumption in the
supply. Third Army considered its POL Ninth U.S. and First French Armies.
situation critical enough to impose Logistic planners had ignored this statis-
rationing for the last three days of opera- tic in estimating the requirements for
tions. But POL shortages did not delay the final drive, using the factor of 180
the final surrender.12 tons, which the experience of 1944 in-
12 Army and Army Group G–4 Periodic Rpts for
April; Memos for Record, Maj. James R. Howton, G–4 Memos for Record, File 77; Cbl C–3167, TUSA
Supply Br 12 A Gp, reporting on visits to army to SHAEF, 28 Apr 45, SHAEF G–4 463.7 Gasoline
quartermasters to survey Class I and III situation, and Motor Oil (Gen) 19.15, I; TUSA AAR, II QM,
5 and 12 Apr 45, and Memos for Record, Hopkins, 26; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 22 Feb–8 May 45, Bk. III,
12, 21, and 26 Apr 45, all in SHAEF 12 A Gp p. 49.
440 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
dicated would apply in mobile opera- deeply into the meager reserves of coal
tions. Consumption in the combat zone and brought about the fall of the Belgian
actually averaged 175 tons in the final Government. 15
month. 13 T h e coal situation was aggravated from
the start by the necessity to provide the
T h e supply of coal saw some improve- minimum needs of the French economy,
ment in the final months, but remained which was experiencing extreme hard-
unsatisfactory until the end of hostilities. ship. Military requirements obviously
Neither imports nor indigenous produc- had to take priority, and the French de-
tion had been satisfactory. T h e import mands for greater concessions to the civil
program, which called for shipments of economy, including greater imports and
more than 200,000 tons per month, had priority for coal movements over purely
fallen behind for a variety of reasons, in- military movements, had to be denied.
cluding shortages of coal in the United T h e Communications Zone’s requested
Kingdom, bad channel weather, a lack of allocations from French production,
shipping, and shortages of rail cars on the averaging 170,000 tons in February and
Continent. Meanwhile, indigenous pro- March, were consistently pared down by
duction faced endless difficulties. SHAEF SHAEF. Meanwhile, French efforts to
had taken steps to prime local produc- restore coal production were disappoint-
tion, including the acquisition of mine ing; in February the French delivered
supplies and equipment from the United only 58 percent of the tonnage allocated.
States, and had established close liaison Relations with the Allies over the mat-
with national authorities through its ter of coal allocations became strained
Solid Fuels Section, which had a staff of in April when the French threatened to
mining experts. 14 But the industry of withhold coal from U.S. and British
France, Belgium, and Holland was slow forces. T h e COMZ reaction was a pro-
to recover, suffering from many short- posal to stop the flow of imports of raw
ages, particularly pit timber, from severe materials for local industry and to end
winter weather, which closed the canals, the allocation of POL to the French.16
and from labor unrest resulting from
bad living conditions. T h e most critical 15Cbl G–4 SF-127, Belgian Solid Fuels Sub-Sec-
tion to SHAEF, 7 Feb 45, ETO Adm 400; Min,
stage was reached in January, when a CAO Mtgs, 26 Jan and 2 Feb 45, SHAEF AG 337–2
two-week strike by Belgian miners cut CAO Mtgs; Ltr, Crawford to CofS, 4 Mar 45. sub:
Coal Production, SHAEF SGS 463.3 Coal Supply,
II; Cbl FWD–17879, SHAEF to AGWAR, 15 Mar
13Included in this average is the low consumption 45, App. to Current Opns Br, SHAEF G–4 War
experience of the First French Army, in which only Diary/Jnl; Ltr, Plank to CG COMZ, 21 Jan 45,
113.6 tons per division slice per day were con- and 1st Ind, COMZ to ADSEC, 15 Feb 45, and
sumed. Average consumption in the four U.S. Memos, Stearms for CG COMZ, 1 Feb 45, sub:
armies was 183 tons. Consumption Rates of U.S. Solid Fuel Situation, Belgium, Stearns for CG
Forces in the Final Advance to the Rhine, 24 COMZ, 5 Feb 45, sub: Coal Situation, Belgium,
Feb–23 Mar 45, dated 25 Apr 45, and Consumption and Stearns for Lord, 10 Feb 45, sub: Coal Situa-
Rates U.S. Forces From the Rhine to the Elbe, 23 tion, Belgium, all in EUCOM 463.3 Coal 1944–45,
Mar–25 Apr 45, dated 11 May 45, both prep by II.
Statistical Sec G–4 SHAEF, SHAEF G–4, G–4 Basic 16Ltr, Minister of Industrial Production to SAC,
Statistical Rpts, 102/3/22. 2 Feb 45, sub: Coal Situation, and Memo, Gale
14See also below Chap. XVIII, Sec. 3. for CofS, 8 Feb 45, sub: Coal Situation in France,
SUPPLY I N T H E LAST MONTHS 441
sult of the Bull mission in December, rationing, it noted, had it been possible
and, for the field commanders at least, to establish a small reserve.20
remained a cause for anxiety until after These deficiencies could be attributed
the Rhine crossings late in March. Both only partially to inadequate receipts
army groups complained of inadequate from the United States. Shipments in
receipts early in February. T h e 6th Army some categories had actually exceeded the
Group had made heavy expenditures estimates provided General Bull, and
during January, caused in part by the theater stocks of most of the major types
Seventh Army’s defensive operations and of artillery ammunition actually were at
in part by the elimination of the Colmar better levels at the end of January than
Pocket, and asked for additional credits. at the end of December. T h e deficiencies
But SHAEF answered that it could not could be traced in part to SHAEF’s de-
authorize additional allocations in view cision deliberately to withhold at least a
of expected receipts from the U.S., and portion of the receipts from the United
refused to release ammunition from its States in order to build u p working mar-
own reserve, which had not even reached gins to levels recently authorized—that is,
the specified seven-day level and in any twenty-seven days in the army groups and
event was intended only for operational seven days in SHAEF at current SHAEF
emergencies. T h e 6th Army Group con- maintenance rates of supply. At the end
sequently had no choice but to effect of January, however, the ASF admitted
savings from its own resources, and for that shortfalls in December production
a time limited expenditures to half the of some of the heavier calibers—specif-
authorized maintenance rates in order to ically 155-mm. gun, 8-inch howitzer, and
rebuild its reserves.19 240-mm. howitzer ammunition—had
T h e 12th Army Group reported that necessitated revisions in its January al-
its receipts had not even equaled the location of those types. A few weeks later
established SHAEF maintenance day of the Communications Zone pointed out
supply rates, and that consequently there that the quantities released for January
were insufficient quantities of most mor- loading had not been shipped as sched-
tar and artillery ammunition items avail- uled, and that releases for February and
able in forward depots to meet the com- March shipment were not living u p to
mand’s accrued allowances. Deficiencies expectations either.21
came to 31 percent in the case of 60-mm.
mortar ammunition, 22 percent in the 20TWX QX–26875, 12 A Gp to SHAEF, 10 Feb
case of 8-inch howitzer ammunition, 39 45, and Ltr, 12 A Gp to CG COMZ, 11 Feb 45,
sub: Ammo Status for Month of Jan, EUCOM 471
percent in that of 240-mm. howitzer am- Allocation of Ammunition, III; Memo, Holtzworth
munition, and 84 percent in that of 4.5- for G–4. 19 Feb 45, sub: Ammo Forecast 19 Feb
to 1 Mar 45, 12 A Gp 471/1 Ammunition Alloca-
inch gun ammunition. Only by strict tions.
21TWX Conf Between SHAEF and WD, 16 Mar
45, 12 A Gp 471 Ammunition General; Cbl WARX—
19 TWX BX–23700, 6 A Gp to SHAEF, 30 Jan 29114, ASF to SHAEF, 30 Jan 45, SS&P Planning
15, and TWX S–77391, SHAEF to 6 A Gp, 1 Feb Div 201.02 Ammunition, A46–371: Memo, Styer for
15, Cbl Log, Smith Papers: Seventh Army Rpt of Lutes et al., 13 Feb 45, sub: Production, ASF
Opns, III, 882–83. 200.02 Gen Somervell’s Inspection Trip Eto. 333;
SUPPLY IN T H E LAST MONTHS 443
quest ran directly counter to current the estimated figures; for 240-mm. how-
thinking in the War Department, which itzer ammunition they had come to only
desired reductions rather than increases. 24 percent, for 155-mm.gun ammunition
Shortly thereafter the War Depart- they were 51.7 percent, for 155-mm.how-
ment asked the theater for a careful re- itzer ammunition 51.8 percent, and for
view of its long-range ammunition needs. 105-mm. howitzer 59.9 percent. Accord-
T h e War Department at this time faced ing to War Department calculations the
a final decision as to whether it should theater already had eight months of fire
drive ahead on the expansion program in sight in the 105-mm. category.
or hold productive capacity in line with As usual, the theater challenged these
what it believed would be reduced re- figures. T h e War Department, as theater
quirements in the European theater and, officials pointed out, had overlooked the
before long, with the requirements of a fact that ammunition had been made
one-front war in the Pacific. T h e ex- available to the army groups at restricted
pansion of production facilities promised rates in January and February so that re-
to cut deeply into the amounts of steel serves could be replenished. Expendi-
needed for other military purposes, par- tures consequently bore no relationship
ticularly for tanks and trucks. Moreover, to the estimates made in December nor
the War Department, which had been to the releases and shipments made by
criticized in December for the ammuni- the War Department. Despite the many
tion shortage, was being subjected to in- exchanges and visits, it appeared as late
creasing criticism from both Congress as March that the War Department and
and industry for what was regarded as an the theater had come little nearer speak-
unwarranted expansion of production fa- ing the same language on ammunition,
cilities for ammunition. for the theater continued to state its re-
In any event, much water had flowed quirements in terms of desired expendi-
over the dam since December, and Gen- tures and the War Department continued
eral Lutes felt that the combat experi- to argue from expenditure statistics rep-
ence of recent months should have pro- resenting restricted firing. Needless to
vided the theater with far more realistic say, ETOUSA officials were exasperated
data on which to base future ammuni- to find that the War Department was
tion requirements. T h e War Depart- continuing to assess the theater’s requisi-
ment’s own study of ETOUSA expendi- tions on the basis of rationed expendi-
ture reports for the period November tures. In the opinion of one SHAEF staff
through February appeared to substan- officer, the basic difficulty in all the ne-
tiate the belief that the theater’s requests gotiations over the ammunition problem
were due for radical revision, for it in- lay in the fact that the War Department
dicated that actual expenditures in the had never really accepted the theater’s
critical types nowhere near approximated increased expenditure rates.24
the figures presented by the Bull mission
in December. In the case of 8-inch how- 24 TWX Conf Between SHAEF and WD, 16 Mar
45, 12 A Gp 471 Ammunition General; Ltr, Lutes
itzer ammunition, for example, expendi- to Larkin, 20Mar 45, SHAEF G–3 O&E 471 Am-
tures had come to only 22.2 percent of munition.
SUPPLY IN T H E LAST MONTHS 445
On the other hand the tactical outlook rate so that it would have adequate stocks
in the theater had changed substantially upon closing to the Rhine. General
since the critical days of December and Devers asked that current rates not be
January, when the army groups had esti- reduced.26
mated their needs for breaching the Sieg- General Bradley’s response likewise
fried Line on the assumption that their emphasized the extent to which expendi-
attacks would continue to meet deter- tures in the 12th Army Group had been
mined resistance. T h e request in March curtailed by nonavailability and the
that ETOUSA take another look at its necessity to create minimum reserves,
long-range ammunition needs proved and the extent to which his command
fully justified by events. In accordance had been forced to supplement its
with that request, SHAEF on 18 March meager supply with captured ammuni-
asked both army groups to reconsider tion and with ammunition and guns bor-
their long-range needs, recognizing that rowed from the British.27T h e 12th Army
supply in the past had not been all that Group commander volunteered certain
was desired, but emphasizing the desir- reductions, but he repeated the point
ability of reducing requirements in view which the theater had emphasized again
of the more optimistictactical outlook. 25 and again in its communications with the
Both army groups were understand- War Department, that past expenditures
ably reluctant to volunteer reductions in were no criterion for estimating future
their estimates in light of the persistent needs. Rationing, as one of his artillery
deficits of past months. Both groups, officers noted, had constantly been in the
moreover, were about to cross the Rhine, background of all firing, and had made it
and were naturally hesistant to predict impossible to say what ammunition ex-
what the scale of resistance would be be- penditures might have been had they not
yond that obstacle. Both commands again been restricted.28
cited the handicap under which they had T h e limited availability of the major
long operated. General Devers pointed types of ammunition had in fact made it
out that his forces repeatedly had been impossible to determine precisely what
forced to conserve ammunition for vary- quantities the theater actually required.
ing periods in order to permit proper T h e army groups had previously sub-
support for major offensive operations. mitted desired expenditure rates in an-
He noted that supply had rarely been
adequate to permit the desired freedom 26
TWX EA-25381, 6 A Gp to SHAEF, 23 Mar 45,
of action to both armies simultaneously. SHAEF AG 471–1 Ammunition Status Reports, No.
Forced economies had persistently handi- 2.27The 12th Army Group had borrowed 100 25-
capped his forces, and for five weeks after pounders and 300,000 rounds of ammunition from
the elimination of the Colmar Pocket 6th the British and since 1 December had fired about
75,000 rounds of captured field artillery and mortar
Army Group had restricted expenditures ammunition.
to about half the SHAEF maintenance 28 TWX QX–31452, 12 A Gp to SHAEF, 24 Mar
45, SHAEF AG 471–1 Ammunition Status Reports,
No. 2; Memo, Hedekin of Arty Sec 12 A Gp for
25 TWX FWD–17983, SHAEF to A Gps, 18 Mar G–3, 22 Mar 45, sub: Ammo Rqmts, Note 2, 12 A
45, G–3 O&E 471 Ammunition. Gp 471 Ammunition General.
446 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Sources: aLtr, W D to ETO, 1 Sep 44, Sub: Day of Supply of d Ltr, ETO to WD, 10 Apr 45, Sub: Ammo Expenditures, Levels,
Ammo, ADSEC 381B Day of Supply and Unit of Fire. and Day of Supply, EUCOM 471 Ammunition (General), IV.
b Ltr, CG ETO to WD, 3 Mar 45, Sub: Ammo Day of Supply, e Ltr, W D to ETO, 30 Apr 45, Sub: Day of Supply for Ammo
ADSEC 381B Day of Supply and Unit of Fire. ETO, SHAEF AG 481–1 Ammunition Status Reports (Day of
c Ltr, Bull to CofS, 2 Apr 45, Sub: Determination of Ammo Supply), No. 2.
Rqmts for U.S. Forces, SHAEF G–3 O&E 471 Ammunition.
engaged in later months against moderate tion picture had begun to brighten by
resistance, and that the forces actively late February, and supply proved ade-
engaged could therefore be supplied at quate for all purposes in the final offen-
the desired rates. Consequently, current sives. Theater stocks continued to rise
rates of production would easily meet even during the February–March offen-
ETOUSA’s needs. sives which carried all the armies to the
Allied forces were already across the Rhine. First and Third Army levels re-
Rhine at the time the new rates were dis- mained practically unchanged in this
cussed, and there were positive indica- period despite firing in excess of current
tions at last that enemy resistance was maintenance rates. Seventh Army grad-
diminishing. These considerations un- ually rebuilt its reserves, benefiting from
doubtedly encouraged General Bradley periods of relative quiet and excellent
to concur in the proposed reductions. On receipts. Early in March, for example,
3 April SHAEF notified the War Depart- issues for a time declined to a low of 585
ment that it considered current produc- tons per day for the entire army. By the
tion rates adequate to support future middle of the month they temporarily
operations and that it would not require rose to 2,335 tons per day coincident
the completion of additional manufactur- with the drive to the Rhine, but re-
ing facilities. 29 On 10 April the theater ceipts about equaled expenditures even
followed this up with new recommended in that period.31 On 22 March, with all
day of supply rates and estimated future the armies poised for the Rhine assault,
requirements. With previous difficulties ammunition stocks were excellent in all
in mind, it emphasized that its estimates areas. Total theater stocks at the time
represented minimum requirements and came to approximately 843,000 tons, of
asked that they be approved and shipped which 675,000 were in COMZ depots and
without delay even if they might in some 168,000 in army installations. At the cur-
instances appear excessive. Justification rent SHAEF maintenance rates these ton-
could be provided later.30 nages represented an average of fifteen
T h e April requisition proved academic days of supply of all major types of
so far as the outcome of operations in ammunition in field force depots and
Europe was concerned, but it illustrated an average of forty-five days in COMZ
the theater's continuing apprehension depots.32
over the War Department’s response to
3112 A Gp R p t of Opns, XII, 151, VI, 61, SUSA
its requests. Actually, the entire ammuni- G–4 Periodic Rpts for Feb and Mar 45.
32Army group personnel reports actually show
29Ltr, Col Stewart to G–4 SHAEF, 26 Mar 45, army reserves averaging about twenty-five days of
sub: Determination of Future U.S. Ammo Rqmts supply for most types. One possible explanation for
for This Theater, SHAEF G–4 471 Ammunition the discrepancy: army group figures may include
1945; Teletype Conf Between ETOUSA and WD, obligated stocks still in COMZ depots. Ltr, Page to
30 Mar 45; Ltr, Bull to CofS, 2 Apr 45, sub: De- C O M Z G–4, 11 Apr 45, Estimate of COMZ Supply
termination of Ammo Rqmts for U.S. Forces, and Situation (Rpt 3), EUCOM 381 Projected Opera-
Cbl FWD–18510, SHAEF to Somervell, 3 Apr 45, tion of COMZ ETOUSA, 14 Mar 45; Memo, OCOO
SHAEF G–3 O&E 471 Ammunition. for CG COMZ, 22 Mar 45 sub: Days of Supply in
30Ltr, E T O to WD, I O Apr 45, sub: Ammo Ex- COMZ Depots and Armies as of 22 March, EUCOM
penditures, Levels and Day of Supply, EUCOM 471 471 Ammunition (General); 12 A G p G–4 Periodic
Ammunition General, IV. Rpt, 18–24 Mar 45.
448 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
T h e last heavy expenditures of am- could be expected, the need for the
munition occurred at the Rhine crossings heavier caliber ammunition declined
themselves, and in the case of the Ninth rapidly, and as early as 31 March Third
Army proved to be the most tremendous Army asked that no further allocations
outpouring of any action during the war of 8-inch gun and 240-mm. howitzer am-
in Europe. Ninth Army had carefully munition be made.35 First Army’s total
conserved its ammunition for several expenditures averaged only goo tons per
weeks before, as it had for the Roer cross- day in the first half of the month, and
ing operation in February, and then Seventh Army’s fluctuated between 500
poured forth its savings with crushing and 1,200, depending on the resistance
weight in a short period in order to encountered. Expenditures throughout
achieve the maximum support of the two the four U.S. armies had actually aver-
divisions in the assault. In a period of aged 115.3 tons per division slice in
twenty-nine hours on 24–25 March Ninth April, slightly exceeding the planning
Army artillery units fired 6,470 tons of factor of 100 tons adopted at the begin-
ammunition at five to twelve times the ning of the drive beyond the Rhine.
current maintenance rates of supply. Its Seventh Army’s expenditures had far ex-
105-mm. howitzers, for example, fired at ceeded those of the other armies, totaling
the rate of 132 rounds per gun per day, 171.2 tons per division per day. (See
its 155-mm. guns at the rate of 166 Table 12.) Deliveries in most cases
rounds, 8-inch guns at 112 rounds, 240- matched issues, and at the end of April
mm. howitzers at 89 rounds, and 25- stocks in army depots were only slightly
pounders (borrowed from the British) at lower than at the start of the offensive,
the rate of 563 rounds.33 totaling 130,000tons.36
Any anxieties which field commanders COMZ stocks had continued to in-
still had over ammunition supply in crease, meanwhile, rising to nearly 800,-
March disappeared with the successful 000 tons by mid-April.37 Imports had
crossing of the last major obstacle. Am- averaged more than 9,200 tons per day
munition was no cause for worry in the since the first of February as against aver-
final month of operations except for the age expenditures of only 5,090 tons. De-
means of transporting it. All armies re- spite this excellent position the theater
ported complete satisfaction with de- at first opposed any cancellations of ship-
liveries in the days immediately after the
Rhine assault, and in the first week of 3512 A Gp Ord Sec Jnl, 31 Mar 45.
April the 12th Army Group noted that 36Ltr, Page to CG COMZ, 13 May 45, sub: Esti-
ammunition supply was adequate for the mate of COMZ Supply Situation (Rpt 4), EUCOM
381 Projected Operation of COMZ ETOUSA, 14
first time since August 1944.34 As in Mar 45; 12 A Gp G–4 Periodic Rpt, 22–28 Apr 45:
August and September 1944, Class V re- Consumption Rates U.S. Forces From the Rhine to
quirements were small during April. As the EIbe, 23 Mar–24 Apr 45, prep by Statistics Sec,
G–4 SHAEF, 11 May 45, SHAEF G–4 Basic Sta-
tistical Reports, No. 31.
33Gen Bd Rpt 58, pp. 38–39. 37On the basis of the current weapons popula-
34 12 A Gp Ord Sec Jnl, 27 Mar 45; Monthly Rpt tion the authorized seventy-five-day reserve per-
of Activity, Arty Sec 12 A Gp, 8 Apr 45, 12 A Gp mitted the theater to have about 900,000 tons of
3 19. I Reports. ammunition.
SUPPLY I N T H E LAST MONTHS 449
ments from the United States, par- tions of accrued credits. Within the next
ticularly of the traditionally “critical” week the Communications Zone in turn
items.38After having been urged repeat- asked SHAEF’s approval to cancel all am-
edly by the War Department to review munition which had been deferred plus
its stock position, however, the Com- all future shipments scheduled to arrive
munications Zone on 20 April recom- after 1 June, and asked for authority to
mended that loadings in the United declare as excess to theater requirements
States be reduced from 6,300 to 4,500 all ammunition exceeding the seventy-
tons per day beginning on 15 May, the five day level, which at the end of April
balance to be held to the credit of the totaled 98,000 tons. SHAEF immediately
theater. Representatives of SHAEF, the approved the latter; it also authorized
army groups, and Communications Zone the Communications Zone to release to
accepted this proposal at a conference at the War Department half of all future
Supreme Headquarters on the 24th. production scheduled for release to
Army Group stocks were higher at this ETOUSA, the remainder to be held to
time than they had ever been, and it was the theater’s credit pending later instruc-
proposed that these could be safely re- tions.40
duced. General Devers’ spokesman re-
fused to concur, despite the fact that the Distribution problems had plagued
6th Army Group’s level at that time ammunition supply until the last. Stock
was equal to forty-five days of supply. accounting and allocation were complex
Both army groups indicated they would administrative problems at best, and they
be satisfied if expenditures could be re- did not always guarantee the delivery or
placed. T h e Communications Zone esti- distribution of ammunition as intended.
mated that it could do this with the In February, for example, activity factors
reduced imports. T h e restriction on load- of 45, 30, and 25 percent assigned to the
ings entailed a cancellation of approxi- Ninth, First, and Third Armies had
mately 60,000 tons for the period 15 given the smallest share of ammunition
May–15 June.39 to General Patton’s forces. In actual fact,
Meanwhile the War Department, however, Ninth Army had been inactive
pointing out that theater stocks would early in February and Third Army had
soon reach maximum levels if expendi- done the heaviest firing of any of the
tures followed their current trend, asked armies. As a result, Third Army’s re-
the theater for more outright cancella- serves had been quickly drained while
those of the other armies, particularly the publication of a new day of supply
the Ninth, had risen. Third Army’s at a lower rate, and would only upset the
stocks of 155-mm. gun ammunition, for formula then being used and to no one’s
example, had fallen to 5.4 days by mid- advantage. SHAEF accepted the logic of
February while Ninth and First Armies this argument and ruled against the in-
possessed between 23.3 and 25.9 days; its clusion
of the disputed mortars.
42
stocks of 81-mm. mortar ammunition T h e Communications Zone’s attempt
stood at 2.4 days while those of the Ninth to calculate the SHAEF and army group
and First Armies respectively stood at reserves alone involved much compli-
12.7 and 16. Army Group recognized this cated bookkeeping in view of the peri-
inequity by the middle of the month and odic revisions in the maintenance day of
acted to resolve it by substantial revisions supply. I n mid-March the Communica-
in the activity factors for the remainder tions Zone proposed to ease its task some-
of the month. 41 what by stabilizing the current twenty-
T h e constantly changing weapons seven day army group reserve and ten-
strength, on which ammunition alloca- day SHAEF reserve at the existing level
tions were based, also complicated ac- based on the March weapons strength
counting procedures. Ground rules were and maintenance day of supply rate.43
not always clear on how the weapons Using these figures, it proposed to specify
population was to be counted. I n Jan- a fixed number of rounds due each of the
uary, for example, 12th Army Group dis- army groups, which would not be altered
covered that the Communications Zone except upon sizable transfers of troops
had not been including in its weapons from one to another.
44 But the distribu-
basis the 81-mm. mortars on tank re- tion of reserves between the armies, army
covery vehicles and protested the dis- group, and SHAEF, and the physical dis-
crepancy. T h e Communications Zone did position of ammunition between army
not consider these as combat weapons. In depots and the forward and rear depots
any case, it pointed out that their in- of the Communications Zone, plus the
clusion in the weapons basis would not
make any more ammunition available,
since the maintenance day of supply rate 42 T W X QX–26507, 12 A Gp to COMZ, 30 Jan 45,
T W X EX–93877, COMZ to 12 A Gp, 2 Feb 45.
was already computed on the basis of T W X EX–10532, COMZ to SHAEF, 19 Feb 45, TWX
every round on hand or due to arrive. FWD–17224, SHAEF to COMZ and A Gps, 21 Feb
45, all in SHAEF AG 471–1 Ammunition Status
Their inclusion would simply result in Reports (Day of Supply), 194.5.
43Early in March SHAEF raised the reserve under
its own control from seven to ten days in order to
41Monthly Rpt of Activity (Feb), Arty Sec 12 A provide an additional means of influencing a par-
Gp, by Col Hedekin, 13 Mar 45, 12 A Gp 319, ticular operation, particularly in the event of a
Rpts; Memo, Arty Sec 12 A Gp for G–3, 12 Feb 45, sudden strengthening of one of the army groups.
sub: Ammo Allocs, Memo, Col Holtzworth, Supply Memo, Holtzworth for G–4 12 A Gp, 10Mar 45,
Br G–4 12 A Gp. for G–4, 14 Feb 45, sub: Revised 12 A Gp 471/1 Ammunition Allocations.
Ammo Forecast, 9 to 19 Feb 45, Memo, Arty Sec 44 Ltr,COMZ to SAC, 17 Mar 45, sub: Stabiliza-
for G–3 12 A Gp, 18 Feb 45, sub: Ammo Estimate, tion of A Gp and SHAEF Reserve, SHAEF AG
and Memo, Arty Sec 12 A Gp for G–3, 22 Feb 45, 471–1 Ammunition Status Reports (Day of Supply)
all in 12 A Gp 471/1 Ammunition Allocations. No. 2.
SUPPLY I N T H E LAST MONTHS 451
fact that large amounts were always in day periods 1–10, 11–20, and 21 to the
the pipeline, made stock accounting dif- end of the month, the allocations to be
ficult at all times. T h e vagaries of the sys- published so as to reach them three or
tem were further illustrated as late as the four days before the start of the period—
end of April when SHAEF found it that is, on the 27th, 7th, and 17th re-
necessary to instruct the army groups to spectively-and to present estimates or
have the various armies report not only forecasts of the amounts to be allocated
the status of ammunition physically on for succeeding periods u p to ninety days.
hand in their own depots but the quan- Allocations were to be based, as before,
tities on credit to them in the Communi- on weapons strengths as computed by the
cations Zone, for COMZ reports in- Communications Zone. T h e army groups
cluded only unobligated stocks on hand were to specify the amounts to be credited
in COMZ depots. Unless obligated stocks to each army, and the Communications
were reported by the armies they were Zone was then to set up credits in specific
not reported at all.45 advance depots and notify the armies of
T h e ammunition allocations pro- the location of the ammunition.
cedure underwent one final change in In effect, the new system represented
mid-March designed in part to provide a the theaterwide application of the credit
uniform system for the two army groups. and forecasting procedure which the 12th
Up to this time the armies of the 6th Army Group had adopted for a while in
Army Group had followed the practice of November. Opinions were divided as to
submitting requisitions twenty days in the efficacy of the new system. T h e 6th
advance, the requests being filled by Con-
Army Group found the new procedure
tinental Advance Section as ammunition
something less than satisfactory, claiming
became available. T h e 12th Army Group
wrote credits for only the ammunition that allocations were habitually late in
which it expected would be on the arriving and the channels for acquiring
ground at the time the armies called am- credits too devious. T h e 12th Army
munition forward from the Advance Sec- Group was satisfied that ammunition
tion. On 14 March, after discussing pro- supply had finally been placed on a firm
posed changes with representatives of the basis. Supply was so satisfactory in April
army groups and the two advance sec- that the army group discontinued the
tions, the Communications Zone out- practice of furnishing the armies with
lined a new procedure. Beginning on 21 estimates of future supply at the end of
March the Communications Zone was to the month. A few weeks earlier the im-
allocate specific quantities of ammuni- proved supply prospects had led the Com-
tion to the two army groups for the ten- munications Zone to propose a change in
the allocation period from ten to thirty
days and also the elimination of the time
45 Ltr, Col Stewart, Chief of Current Opns Br
G–4 SHAEF to G–4, 1 Feb 45. sub: Ammo Status limitation by which credits expired at
Rpts, SHAEF G–4 471 Ammunition; TWX FWD– the end of thirty days if not used, in both
20178, SHAEF to 6 A Gp, 29 Apr 45, SHAEF AG
471–1 Ammunition Status Reports (Day of Supply)
cases to ease its bookkeeping burden. But
No. 2. a decision was postponed, and the recom-
452 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
mendations were not adopted before V-E the final months. Shortages which had
Day.46 reached genuinely critical proportions in
Operations in April, when ammuni- December, attributable to production
tion was plentiful, were hardly repre- difficulties in the United States, had
sentative of the entire eleven months’ either been resolved by February or were
experience. Since ammunition was ra- being overcome as the result of the
tioned for most of that period there was various measures taken in December and
no adequate test of the validity of War January. Shortages of one kind or an-
Department day of supply rates, and the other plagued U.S. forces until the last
theater never really determined precisely day of fighting, but relatively few of the
what quantities would have been satis- hundreds of thousands of Class II and IV
factory. Possibly such figures were be- items of supply were classed as “critical”
yond determination anyway, for it is after the beginning of March.
axiomatic that field commanders rarely As before, the main supply problems
consider that they are adequately sup- concerned the engineer, signal, and ord-
plied with ammunition. In any case, the nance services. T h e demand for engineer
theater did not cease until V-E Day to equipment was unusually high in the last
emphasize to the War Department that few months because of the numerous
releases of ammunition must not be pre- water obstacles and because of additional
dicted on past expenditures where such special requirements for the Roer and
expenditures had been limited by non- Rhine crossings. For the Rhine crossing,
availability.47 as an example, the 12th Army Group’s
bill of materials included the following:
(3) Equipment 120 Bailey bridge sets of various types,
Class II and IV supply, like the supply 20 treadway bridges, 40 25-ton ponton
of rations and POL, was largely a trans- bridges, 1,200 assault boats, 200 utility
portation and distribution problem in power boats, 1,800 outboard motors, 46
ponton barges, 47 LCM’s, 72 LCVP’s,
46 Ord Stf Offs Mtg, OCofOrd ETOUSA, 24–25 and 490 anchors. Much of this equip-
Feb 45, SUSA File 34, Supply Sec G–4, Supply Rpt ment had to be obtained through special
From ETOUSA; 12 A Gp Ord Sec Jnl, 27 Feb and procurement projects (PROCO), which
18 Apr 45; Memo, 12 A Gp G–4 for Ord, Arty,
and G–3, 13 Mar 45, sub: Forecast of Ammo Sup- the theater submitted to Washington in
ply to the Armies, 12 A Gp 471 Ammunition Gen- the fall of 1944. Early in January the
eral: Ltr, ETO to Major Comds, 14 Mar 45, sub: deputy chief engineer returned to the
Alloc of Ground Force Ammo to Major Comds,
SHAEF AG 471–1 Ammunition Status Report No. United States to expedite the delivery of
2; 6 A Gp G–3 Sec Final Rpt, pp. 104–05; Memo, several items, including assault boats,
12 A Gp Ord for G–4, 28 Apr 45, 12 A Gp 471/1
Ammunition Allocations, 12 A Gp Rpt of Opns,
utility power boats, and ponton boats.
XII, 153; Gen Bd Rpt 58, pp. 63–66. Late in January the engineer service con-
47 Ltr,CG ETO to Gen Reileman, Div of Supply tracted with five French firms for 700 ply-
ASF, 14 Apr 45, 1st Ind to Ltr of 21 Mar 45. sub:
Projected Supply Status of Ammo, EUCOM 471 wood storm boats, which were built in
Ammunition (General), III: ETO G–4 Quarterly record time.
Periodic Report for quarter ending 31 Mar 45, 6
May 45, EUCOM 319.1 G–4 Periodic Rpts ETO
Assembling the needed equipment in
Quarterly. forward parks proved an unprecedented
SUPPLY I N T H E LAST MONTHS 453
undertaking because of the out-of-gauge gradually eased in March, when the ASF
size of much of it. With few exceptions, began releasing about 100,000 miles per
however, the supplies were on hand in month. Forward depot stocks remained
time for the assaults. T h e main de- low in March, but the armies received
ficiency was in maintenance supplies for large quantities and made heavy issues
truck-mounted cranes, which were in as the result of improved deliveries,
great demand in all the armies. Third which averaged 1,100 miles per day in
Army stocks had to be brought all the the First Army and about 800 in the
way from Luxembourg. Movements east Third. T h e supply of wire, and of radios
of the Rhine later entailed a heavy com- and spare parts, was often unpredictable
mitment of truck transport. First Army, in the final month, causing nervousness
for example, used seven 2½-ton com- in the field commands. But this was fairly
panies, two 10-ton semitrailer companies, characteristic of all supply in a highly
three engineer dump truck companies, mobile situation, since it was rarely pos-
the tractor trucks of an engineer heavy sible to build u p substantial forward
ponton battalion, and 100 5- to 7-ton stocks. Shortages sometimes became mo-
tractor trailers to haul bridging ma- mentarily “critical” overnight, as on 20
terials. T h e 5- to 7-ton trailers were April, when Third Army’s reserve of wire
loaded and spotted in forward dumps dropped to 238 miles. Three days of sup-
and thus constituted a moblie dump and ply (1,900 miles) arrived on the follow-
were unloaded only as needed. Third ing day, however, and another seventeen
Army was one of the heaviest users of day’s supply was en route. At the end of
river bridging equipment in the last April all the armies had from twelve to
three months, building 225 bridges in eighteen days of wire either on hand or
February, 341 in March, and a peak num- en route. Some of the most urgent needs
ber of 394 in the final month, which saw -batteries, for example–were met via
the crossing of the Danube and the Inn. air. On the whole, signal supply was
Most of the timber for fixed bridges was better in April than it had been for
procured locally, and steel I-beams came several months.
49
from mills operated under the super- Ordnance Class II and IV supply prob-
visionof the Advance Section.48 lems in the last few months were con-
In signal supply the shortage of field cerned largely with maintenance. Short-
wire remained chronic throughout Feb- ages of major items, such as tanks and
ruary, and the armies continued to en- general purpose vehicles, which had be-
force strict rationing to ensure active come so critical in the fall, were largely
units an adequate supply. This deficiency eliminated by February. T h e losses of
the Ardennes had also been replaced by
that time. I n March the armies were re- T h e theater as a whole had a reserve of
porting for the first time in months 1,119 tanks and lacked 721 to meet its
that items such as small arms, artillery full authorized reserve of 1,840 tanks.51
weapons, and fire control and sighting In January the War Department had
equipment were in sufficient supply to refused the theater's request for an in-
cover losses. T h e main shortages that crease in its on-hand reserve of medium
were to persist to the end were in spare tanks to 70 percent. It agreed instead to
parts, accessory items, major replacement a 35-percent reserve on the basis of the
assemblies such as truck engines, axles new 14-percent replacement factor, and
and transmissions, hot patches, brake agreed to create an additional 35-percent
fluid and lining, batteries, and, to some reserve in the zone of interior on which
extent, tires and tubes. Shortages of tank the theater could draw if necessary. T h e
tracks and bogie wheels became especially theater in turn had authorized the armies
acute in the final week. Lacking spare to have the bulk of the reserve—28 per-
parts, forward maintenance units made cent, or a sixty-day level-in their own
it a common practice in the final months areas.52 Under these arrangements the
to strip salvage vehicles of all serviceable War Department had scheduled ship-
parts. Ninth Army, for example, ob- ments of about 1,200 medium tanks per
tained about 30 percent of all the auto- month beginning in February. Receipts
motive spare parts requirements for under this program greatly improved the
Operation GRENADEby systematically tank situation in the theater. On the eve
stripping damaged vehicles.50 of the Rhine crossings theater stocks
T h e supply of combat vehicles was un- totaled 7,620, only 159 tanks short of the
usually good in the final months. T h e total T/E and reserve requirement of
medium tank shortage had been solved 7,779. Against a T / E requirement for
once and for all by the allocations which 5,477 the armies actually had 6,606 on
General Lutes had arranged in December hand, giving them a reserve of 1,129
and by the increase in the replacement against an authorized reserve of 1,535.
factor. Some improvement was already While the armies’ stocks included nearly
noticeable by early February, when 600 unserviceable tanks, the armies had
theater resources totaled 6,374 medium another 600 in reserve, and additional
tanks against total theater requirements tanks intended for the army reserves were
for 7,095. Against a T/E requirement for in theater pipelines. 53
5,255 there were actually 5,434 on hand
in the armies. T h e armies thus possessed 51Ltr, Craword to Smith, 7 Feb 45. sub: Weekly
only a small reserve of 179 tanks, but an Rpt on Lutes’ Memo, SHAEF G–4 319.1 Rpts Gen
additional 940 were in theater pipelines. Lutes, 1945, I.
52Cbl E-84778, Somervell to Styer, 10 Jan 45. and
Cbl WARX–20645, AGWAR to Somervell, 14 Jan
45, both in EUCOM 470.8 Combat Armored Cars
50 TUSA AAR, II, Ord, 24; Conquer; The Story and Tanks.
of the Ninth Army, pp. 162-63; NUSA Ord AAR, 53Rpt on Status of Medium Tanks, prep by
1–15 Mar 45; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 22 Feb–8 May AFV&W Sec ETO. 2 0 Mar 45, SHAEF G–3 O&E
45, Bk. III, pp. 7, 9–10. 470.8 Tanks, III.
SUPPLY I N THE LAST MONTHS 455
PERSHINGTANKS
M26 mounting the new 90-mm. gun move through Wesel,
Germany.
assess its needs with a view toward can- Even before the first token number
celing certain releases not already had been tried in battle the theater had
shipped.55 urged the War Department to provide
Field commanders had long looked for- the maximum number of the new heavy
ward to the arrival of the new 90-mm. tanks, as the T26’s were then classified,
gun T26, or Pershing, in hopes that they and the War Department had assured it
would at last have a tank to match Ger- that both production and shipment of
man armor. T h e first shipment to the the new tank was being given the highest
theater contained only twenty tanks, all priority. T w o weeks after the first com-
of which went to the 3d and 9th Armored mitment of the new weapon Maj. Gen.
Divisions in the First Army and first saw Gladeon M. Barnes, one of the ASF ord-
action on 23 February. While no addi- nance officers who had gone to the theater
tional receipts were expected before to introduce the T26 and observe its per-
April, General Eisenhower specified in formance, reported an enthusiastic recep-
mid-March that all T26’s arriving in tion for the tank among combat com-
April should be assigned to the 12th manders and asserted that its 90-mm. gun
Army Group, and that a portion of May was far superior to any tank gun the
receipts would go to the 6th Army Germans then had in use. There was
Group. General Bradley in turn allocated little doubt that the new weapon repre-
the expected 126 tanks in approximately sented a great improvement over the
equal numbers to his three armies. By Sherman. But Brig. Gen. Joseph A.
mid-April 185 of the new tanks had ar- Holly, head of the theater’s armored sec-
rived, of which 110 were then with tion, felt constrained to correct any im-
armored divisions. Whether the remain- pression that the T26 was superior to the
ing 75, or additional tanks, saw action German Tiger and Tiger Royal. T h e
beforeV-E Dayis unknown.
56 Pershing’s 90-mm. gun, he pointed out,
was superior to the German 88 only when
55A report by the Armored Fighting Vehicle and firing the new high velocity armor-pierc-
Weapon Section, ETOUSA, gives conflicting al-
though incomplete figures: 5,626 tanks on hand in ing (HVAP) ammunition, and was still
the armies as against a total requirement for 5,129 definitely inferior to the enemy’s gun
which would give the armies a reserve of 497 as
against an authorized one of 1,436. Another source
when using ordinary armor-piercing am-
indicates there were 1,100 additional tanks in COMZ munition. In extension of this sobering
depots, but these, pIus the 5,626 on hand in the fact, he noted that the better ammunition
armies (6,726) would not have matched the over-all
theater requirement of 7,283. Rpt, Status of Me-
was being manufactured in very limited
dium Tanks, AFV&W Sec ETO, 20 Apr 45, SHAEF quantities because of the shortage of
G–3 O&E 470.8 Tanks, III, and Cbl EX-39080, tungsten carbide, a critical metal used in
COMZ to 6 A Gp, 30 Apr 45, SHAEF AG 480.8–1
Allocation of Tanks, 1945; Memo, Gilland for the core of the projectile. As if to deflate
Crawford, 20 Apr 45, sub: Lutes’ Memo to the
Supreme Commander, dated 25 Dec 44, SHAEF G–4 28 Mar 45, and Ltr, Bull to CofS, 17 Apr 45, sub:
400.192 Supply Reports, I; 12 A Gp AAR, XI, 67; Alloc of Heavy Tanks T26, SHAEF SGS 470.8
Losses of Medium Tanks for Period 13 Mar–28 Tanks, II; Ltr, Bull to Twitchell, 26 Mar 45,
Apr 45, T a b C to missing Ltr, 6 A Gp G–3 Armd SHAEF G–3 O&E 470.8 Tank III; Teletype Conf
Sec 252, Medium Tank Correspondence, RG 914. Between Maj Gen G. M. Barnes and Maj Gen
56Ltr, Bull to CofS, 15 Mar 45, sub: Alloc of Levin H. Campbell, 5 Mar 45, EUCOM 470.8 Com-
Heavy Tanks, TWX QX–28443. 12 A Gp to SHAEF, bat Armored Cars and Tanks, II.
SUPPLY I N T H E LAST MONTHS 457
any unwarranted optimism as to the armor had already been crippled, pre-
availability of the new tanks, he ob- cluded any adequate test of their worth.
served, moreover, that they were not O n the other hand, the M24, the new
scheduled for production in large num- light tank with the long-barreled 75-mm.
bers until the third and fourth quarters gun, had been furnished in larger num-
of 1945.57 bers and tried over a longer period, and
While these observations were per- had proved its excellence more conclu-
tinent to any eventual evaluation of the sively. 58
new tank, they proved of little conse- Meanwhile the theater continued try-
quence to the outcome of the fighting in ing to replace the obsolescent 75-mm.
Europe, for hostilities soon came to an gun medium tank with 76’s, and to get
end. First Army, which had been the first more HVAP ammunition for the latter.
to receive the new tanks, later concluded Production difficulties limited the s h i p
that the delayed arrival and commitment ments of the improved ammunition,
of the T26’s plus the fact that German however, to less than two rounds per gun
57Ltr, Barnes to Campbell, CofOrd, 6 Mar 45, 58 FUSA Rpt of Opns, 22 Feb–8 May 45, Bk II,
sub: Rpt of Heavy Tanks Mission, and Ltr, Holly p. 147. The new M6 gun on the M24, although a
to Deputy Theater Comdr, 2 Apr 45, sub: Com- 75-mm. gun, was commonly referred to as a 76-mm.,
ments on Rpt of Heavy Tank Mission, EUCOM to distinguish it from the short-barreled 75-mm. on
470.8 Combat Armored Cars and Tanks, II. the medium tank.
458 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
per month. Late in February the theater proved weapons presented, the supply of
made plans to convert 75-mm. gun tanks tanks typified fairly well the general im-
into 76’s. But the program was slow to provement in Class II and IV supply by
get under way, and the theater subse- February 1945. On the whole, supply in
quently canceled the project in view of all classes was better in the last three
the high rate of receipts from the United
months than it had been at any time since
States and the declining loss rate. At the
July 1944. Testifying to this improve-
time of the Rhine crossings about 40 per-
ment was the statement which appeared
cent of all medium tanks in the theater with increasing regularity in the G–4
were of the 76-mm. gun type.59 periodic reports of the field commands:
A project for installing 17-pounder “There are no . . . items in critical
guns in some of the Shermans, charac- short supply which will adversely affect
operations.”
terized by several false starts, was never
completed. U.S. tank reserves had finally T h e marked improvement had in fact
improved sufficiently by mid-February toled theater officials themselves to con-
permit the release of M4’s for this pur-sider the possibility that ETOUSA was
pose, and arrangements were made with requisitioning and stocking supplies in
the British to convert 160 tanks, the excess of its needs. Early in March the
maximum number which the supply of G–4 instructed the supply services to re-
17-pounder ammunition would support. view their position with a view toward
reducing imports. T h e War Department
T h e first of the modified tanks were de-
livered in March and were assigned to had long suspected the theater of over-
the Ninth Army. But in mid-April the stocking. As late as April it pointed out
program was cut from. 160 to 80, again that ETOUSA was asking for quantities
because of ammunition shortages, and of signal, engineer, medical, and ord-
few of the tanks ever saw action.60 nance supplies far in excess of consump-
tion rates.61 T h e memory of past diffi-
Aside from the complications which culties made supply officials cautious to
the development and introduction of im- the last, however, and there were few
cancellations until the end of hostilities
was a certainty.
59 Ltr, Holly to Deputy Theater Comdr, 2 Apr 45;
Ltr, ETO to A Gps, 25 Apr 45. sub: Cancellation
of 76-mm. Gun Conversion Program for 300 75-mm. SHAEF G–4 471.1 Cannon, Mortars, and Ammuni-
Gun Tanks, M4 Series, EUCOM 470.8 Combat tion; Final Hist Rpt, AFV&W Sec ETO, p. 22,
Armored Cars and Tanks, 11; 12 A Gp AAR, XI, ETO Adm 540; 12 A Gp AAR, XI, 54.
54. 61Cbl WX–71085, AGWAR to COMZ, 21 Apr 45,
60Ltr, Crawford to Maj Gen J. A. M. Bond, Dir SHAEF S S 400.3/1 Supply Problems of Allied Ad-
of Ln and Munitions, War Office, 16 Apr 45, vance.
CHAPTER XVII
army groups effective at the end of the units being used for control duties.6
month. 4 T h e War Department considered the
In its communications with the War needs of the Pacific area more urgent. It
Department regarding requirements pointed out, moreover, that ETOUSA
from the United States, meanwhile, would still get 26,000 men in May even
ETOUSA pursued a more cautious after allowing for the diversion of 19,000,
course. Early in the month the War De- and that 16,000 of this number would
partment asked the theater to release consist of infantrymen to be used in
19,000 men per month from scheduled building up its MP units for military gov-
shipments beginning in May in order to ernment duties. It noted that the theater
bring units in the Pacific area up to was already employing combat divisions
strength and also build u p stockages for such duties. In view of these develop-
which would permit the release of men ments it informed the theater that it
there when redeployment under the planned to go ahead with the diversions
point system went into effect.5 ETOUSA unless there were other reasons for not
objected strongly to the proposed cut, doing so.7
insisting that it could not get along with- ETOUSA agreed to cut the 19,000 for
out the scheduled shipments. T h e theater May. But it asked the War Department
admitted that casualties had fallen off to reconsider carefully any additional di-
substantially, but it argued that an urgent versions. On the basis of current casualty
new need had arisen for units to control rates it estimated that its own resources
the masses of displaced persons and —that is, the present stockage and the
prisoners of war which the armies were output of retraining—would be ex-
uncovering in their advance. At this time hausted by late August, for it could not
approximately 30,000 prisoners were continue the withdrawal of specialists
being captured every day, and between from service units for retraining without
800,000 and 1,000,000 displaced persons impairing the efficiency of those units. It
had also been uncovered. As an emer- therefore wanted the flow of men from
gency solution the theater had already the zone of interior maintained.8
begun withdrawing from the Replace- At the very moment that ETOUSA
ment System infantrymen whose training was painting this relatively gloomy pic-
had been only partially completed to ture it was accumulating replacements
provide overstrengths for MP, antiair- far in excess of its immediate needs, and
craft artillery, and heavy field artillery actually faced a problem of how to use
the surpluses. Two developments had
6 Cbl FWD–19314, SHAEF to AGWAR, 16 Apr
45, ETO Adm 414 Cable Files; Memo, Lear for
4Ltr, Barker to G–3, 19 Mar 45, sub: Summary Smith, 16 Apr 45, sub: Reinforcements, and Memo,
of Present Reinforcement Situation, Ltr, Shannon Shannon for Howland, 9 Apr 45, both in ETO
to Lear, 20 Mar 45, sub: Alloc of Reinforcements 200.3 Manpower.
for Apr 45, and Ltr, Bull to Smith, 23 Mar 45, 7Cbl WAR–72080, AGWAR to Smith, 23 Apr 45,
sub: Reinforcement Situation, all in SHAEF G–3, ETO Adm 4 1 4 Cable Files.
370.092 Reinforcements, 1944. 8Cbl FWD–19883, SHAEF to AGWAR, 25 Apr
5 Cbl WAR–65819, Marshall to Eisenhower, 10 45, SHAEF AG 200.3–1 Reinforcements (Requisi-
Apr 45, ETO 200.3 Manpower. tions, Availabilities, Training).
END OF T H E REPLACEMENT PROBLEM 461
placed with limited assignment men, and ing. T h e main question was whether a
because the prospects of getting replace- sufficient number of replacements could
ments from the zone of interior were de- be supplied to offset withdrawals and also
teriorating. As a safety measure, he pre- ensure that efficiency of the service forces
ferred to ensure the maximum flow of would not suffer. COMZ officials claimed
replacements for at least a few months. that the efficiency of many service units
Nevertheless, Lear asked for a restudy of had already been impaired by the ex-
the entire replacement picture, specify- change of untrained limited assignment
ing that it take into consideration the personnel for trained general assignment
above factors, plus such factors as the men, and insisted that the units could
smaller rate of hospital returnees in not stand additional losses. Furthermore,
recent months, the need to continue re- they argued that service units would
training in order to permit the absorp- have to operate at maximum efficiency
tion of limited assignment men becoming even after V-E Day, and that the theater
available in numbers in excess of normal would have to furnish well-trained units
replacement needs, and the possibility of for early deployment to the Far East.12
heavier casualties.11 Section commanders and the technical
COMZ officials generally favored a sus- services provided ample documentation
pension of the retraining program. There for these arguments. I n fact, to judge
was no denying, as both General Eyster from the tenor of their claims it would
and General Larkin pointed out in their appear that the entire Communications
appraisal of the situation, that casualties Zone was approaching collapse. General
were now running considerably below Plank claimed that over-all efficiency in
the estimates on which replacement re- the Advance Section had already been
quirements were being calculated. They reduced by an estimated 18.8 percent in
thought there was no longer much dan- the supply services, and by as much as 30
ger of another strong counteroffensive by percent in the signal and ordnance serv-
the enemy, or even the probability of a ices. T h e Office of the Chief Quarter-
very determined defense. Replacement master stated that quartermaster units
requirements were therefore definitely had suffered a 40-percent decrease in ef-
on the decline. ficiency through the exchange of limited
T h e main consideration in deciding assignment for general assignment men.
whether retraining should continue was It cited as a specific example bakery com-
an estimate as to the effect which with- panies, in which heavy lifting required
drawals were having on the service forces. able-bodied men.
There was no question as to the number For the most part the withdrawal of
of qualified troops available for retrain-
critical specialists had been avoided. provide specialist training in certain job
There were instances where a single sec- categories, such as truck drivers, cooks,
tion of an installation took the heaviest and bakers, at schools in Shrivenham,
loss of men because the other sections England, and at the 19th Replacement
were staffed with specialists. I n a single Depot on the Continent, also fell short.
depot company, for example, the loss fell These training centers simply lacked the
almost completely upon the storage and capacity to handle the thousands of men
issue sections because all the men in the thrust upon them, beginning in Feb-
repair section were classed as key per- ruary, and the pressure to fill the va-
sonnel.13 cancies in units led to the assignment of
Meanwhile the claim was made re- many men before they were prepared to
peatedly that the limited assignment men occupy positions.15
who were supposed to replace the men T h e loss of efficiency occasioned by the
withdrawn did not arrive until long after exchange of untrained limited assign-
vacancies had occurred. T h e ADSEC ment replacements for trained general
commander claimed at the beginning of assignment men was, at best, diffcult to
March that white units in the Advance measure. T h e Communications Zone it-
Section were understrength by an aver- self tended to reject the claims of the
age of 16 percent, and that some units sections as unfounded, insisting in the
were as much as 34 percent under- case of the Advance Section that it had
strength.14 Plans had provided that actually gained rather than lost in the
limited assignment replacements should exchange of personnel,16 that its quotas
be assigned to service units as much as thus far had necessitated no surrender of
thirty days before the actual withdrawal specialists, and that the number of key
of the men they were to replace, and that specialists in at least two technical serv-
they be given on-the-job training. But ices—ordnance and signal-had actually
these intentions were not always fulfilled. increased.17
Withdrawals of general assignment men COMZ officials nevertheless supported
actually exceeded allocations—to say the general argument that further with-
nothing of actual deliveries—of limited drawals would be harmful, and recom-
assignment replacements until late in mended that they be discontinued, and
March, and there were over-all shortages that all limited assignment men in excess
in both the Communications Zone and of normal requirements be assigned to
the Air Forces until at least that time.
Consequently many replacements did not
get on-the-job training from the men
whose jobs they inherited. An attempt to 15 [Henderson] Procurement and Use of Man-
power in the ETO, pp. 115–18; Memo, Renfroe.
G–1 ExO. for Lord, 29 Mar 45, EUCOM 220.3 As-
signment and Transfer 1943–45.
13Ltr, Plank to CG COMZ, 31 Mar 45, sub: Re- 16It claimed that the Advance Section had re-
lease of Gen Assignment Pers, EUCOM 322 Re- ceived 6,437 limited assignment men in exchange
placement Units, II (a); [Henderson] Procurement for 5,480 withdrawn up to 31 March.
and Use of Manpower in the ETO, pp. 105–08. 17 Ltr (1st Ind to Ltr of 31 Mar 45). COMZ to
14 TWX R–58561, ADSEC to Theater Manpower ADSEC, 12 Apr 45, EUCOM 322 Replacement
Section, 1 Mar 45, ETO Adm 410. Units, II (a).
464 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
18Ltr, Eyster to Larkin, 16 Apr 45, sub: Curtail- 21Memo, Shannon for Lear 17 Apr 45, summariz-
ment or Cessation of Present Retraining Program ing SHAEF Conf on P e n of 14 Apr 45, ETO 200.3
for Inf Riflemen, ETO 353/1 Retraining; Ltr, Manpower: Ltr, Bull to Smith, 19 Apr 45, sub:
Larkin to Eisenhower, 14 Apr 45, sub: Withdrawal Alloc of Reinforcements to Meet Manpower Rqmt
of Pers From COMZ Units for Retraining as Inf, of Armies, T W X FWD–19470, Bull to Lear, 19
SHAEF AG 200.3–4 Reinforcements (Reconversion Apr 45, SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforcements: Cbl
Program–Policy) 1945. BAX–25788, 6 A Gp to SHAEF, 13 Apr 45, SHAEF
19Stf Study, Shannon, 20 Apr 45, ETO 353/1 Re- G–4 381 War Plans General, 1945, II; Memo, Lear
training. for Porch, 21 Apr 45. ETO 200.3Manpower Memo,
20Memo, Shannon for Barker, 13 Apr 45, sub: Porch for Shannon, 23 Apr 45, ETO 353/1 Re-
Reinforcements, SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforce- training: T W X EX-36982, Lee to Sea, 25 Apr 45.
ments. GFRC 353 Training, May 44 to Jan 45.
END OF T H E REPLACEMENT PROBLEM 465
conversion training. At the same time it days later it released another 15,000 to
ordered the theater Manpower Section the 12th Army Group for similar duty.23
to revert to its original status as a section While the expanded retraining pro-
of the G–1 Division of the theater gen- gram thus more than met the need for
eral staff effective 15 May. T h e G–1 was infantry riflemen, the shortage in at least
thereafter to assume responsibility for the two other rather critical categories—
staff supervision of all matters concern- armored force enlisted men and infantry
ing the morale, welfare, and proper use officer replacements—was never com-
of manpower, responsibilities which had pletely eliminated. T h e shortage of
been exercised by the deputy theater armored replacements, particularly tank
commander, General Lear. Meanwhile crewmen, became especially acute in
the trend of events largely nullified the March and April 1945, when deficits
work of the ETO Manpower Board, ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. T h e War
which was still conducting detailed job Department insisted that it could no
analyses in the theater designed to save longer furnish armored replacements in
personnel. On 4 May General Lear ap- the numbers desired except by diversions
proved a proposal to dissolve the Man- from infantry training as well as di-
power Board upon the completion of the versions of replacement tanks, conditions
surveys it was then conducting, estimated which the theater was reluctant to ac-
at about1 June.22 cept. T h e Replacement System itself was
T h e relatively low casualties in April, ill-equipped to offer the required train-
plus a record retraining output of nearly ing. A proposal by General Eyster, the
25,000 that month, had resulted in the COMZ G–3, to use recently arrived
continued accumulation of replacements armored divisions like the 16th and 20th
in the depots of the Replacement System. as training units, or to withdraw other
Toward the end of April the stockage armored units for use as training cadres,
reached a total of 86,000 men, and was found little favor with the field com-
beginning to exceed the capacity of the mands. Rather than release units for
Replacement System’s accommodations. that purpose, both army groups pre-
Partly to relieve the burgeoning Replace- ferred to conduct their own training, con-
ment System, partly to meet the needs of verting either their own armored in-
the armies in their occupational role, the fantrymen or other infantry replacements
theater late in April made two additional into tank crewmen. Divisions in the First
allocations to the 12th Army Group as Army attempted to meet their require-
overstrengths. On 27 April it ordered the ments by transferring men to their at-
release of 10,000 infantry replacements tached tank battalions for training. But
for attachment to the 106th Division to this proved impracticable, and the army
serve as prisoner of war guards, and two
23Memo, Theater Manpower Section for Lear,
22Ltr, Hq ETO to Major Comds, 4 May 45, sub: 27 Apr 45, SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforcements:
Duties and Responsibilities of the Deputy Theater Teleprinter Conf, ETO/SHAEF, 28 Apr 45, ETO
Comdr, Ltr, Rodgers to Lear, 3 May 45, sub: ETO Adm 402; T W X FWD–20096, SHAEF to Lear and
Manpower Board, ETO 322.01/3 Manpower Board 12 A Gp, 27 Apr 45, and T W X FWD–20181,
and Manpower Section; History of the Theater SHAEF to 12 A Gp, 29 Apr 45, ETO 200.2 Man-
Manpower Section, p. 10, ETO Adm 560. power.
466 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
finally established its own training center the necessity to increase the number of
for the conversion of new infantry re- direct appointments as the only means of
placements into tank crewmen.24 quickly alleviatingthe acute shortage. 25
T h e training of infantry officer re- T h e 6th Army Group had possessed an
placements had got under way late in especially good source for appointees to
February, the officer candidate school at officer candidate school in the several
Fontainebleau beginning on the 23d and thousand ASTP students and preflight
the course for the conversion of officers cadets who had been distributed among
of other branches on the 24th. T h e several of its divisions before they left
theater planned to meet by far the great- the United States.26
est portion of its needs through the officer T h e outlook on infantry officers soon
candidate school, which was scheduled to took a turn for the better, mainly because
start three classes of 240 men each per of lower casualties in the last months.
week, each class graduating about 200 T h e number of battlefield appointments
men. T h e officer conversion course was never lived up to expectations, despite
planned to start classes of approximately the change in policy which permitted
200 officers each at two-week intervals. units to retain the officers they ap-
Early in March the outlook for elimi- pointed. Meanwhile the entire officer
nating officer shortages was still gloomy. training program proved too belated to
Officials predicted a shortage of nearly have any effect in relieving the theater’s
5,000 as late as the end of May, even shortage. Neither the officer candidate
taking into consideration the eventual school nor the conversion program, both
output of the training program. Person- of eight weeks’ duration, produced any
nel officers saw only two possibilities of infantry officer replacements until the
reducing the deficit earlier—by shorten- last week of April, less than two weeks
ing the officer candidate course, and by before the end of the fighting in
increasing the number of direct commis- Europe. 27
sions. Any results from the first would
obviously be deferred several weeks. 25Memo, Col F. J. de Rohan, Chief Training and
Nevertheless, General Lear in March Experiments Sec G–3 SHAEF, for G–3, 22 Feb 45.
sub: Battlefield Appointment, Ltr, Barker to Smith,
ordered the officer candidate school 7 Mar 45, sub: Off Replacements, Ltr, Eisenhower
course shortened from twelve to eight to A Gps, 11 Mar 45, Memo, Shannon for G–1, 22
weeks, effective with the first class. At the Mar 45, sub: Estimated Off Situation Through Aug
45, and Memo, Twitchell for Bull, 20 Mar 45, sub:
same time the theater commander again Off Shortages, all in SHAEF G–3 370.092 Rein-
urged on both army group commanders forcements: Memo, Lear for G–1 SHAEF, 26 Mar
45, sub: Combat Off Reinforcements, ETO AG
24Memo, Eyster for Lear, 11Apr 45, Memo, Shan- 319.1/1 Daily Progress Reports, II.
non for Lear, 14 Apr 45, sub: Conf with WD G–1 26T h e developing manpower shortage had led the
re Reinforcements, ETO 200.3 Manpower; Stf Study, War Department to discontinue the Army Spe-
Bull for Smith, 15 Apr 45, sub: Armd Replace- cialized Training Program and transfer 10,000 stu-
ments, Cbl WX–23158, AGWAR to COMZ, 19 Jan dents, plus 30,000 preflight cadets to combat forma-
45, and Cbl WX–27725, AGWAR to COMZ, 27 Jan tions about ten months earlier. Ltr, Devers to Eisen-
45, all in SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforcements; hower, 17 Mar 45, SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforce-
[Henderson] Procurement and Use of Manpower in ments.
the ETO, pp. 74–76; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 27[Henderson] Procurement and Use of Manpower
44–22 Feb 45, Bk. II, p. 142. in the ETP, p. 133.
END OF T H E REPLACEMENT PROBLEM 467
(3) Results of the Retraining Program Not the least of these was the haste with
Statistically, the results of the emer- which men were withdrawn from service
gency conversion program were impres- units before their replacements could be
sive enough. Between 1 February and 30 properly trained. In most cases there was
April, when ETOUSA suspended the no time for formal training in the schools
withdrawal of general assignment men established for that purpose, and in any
from the Communications Zone and the case the facilities for such training were
Air Forces, 78,708 men were transferred limited. When the conversion program
to the Replacement System for retrain- got under way in earnest the demand for
ing as infantry riflemen. About 30,000 of replacements in service units became so
these had come from the Air Forces, and great that men had to be assigned im-
49,000 from the Communications Zone. mediately and given on-the-job training.
Approximately 70,000 out of this total T h e noncommissioned officers with-
eventually completed retraining, at least drawn from service units posed a special
half of them after V-E Day. Adding the problem. I n many cases the noncommis-
conversions carried out between August sioned officer held his rating because of
1944 and February 1945 raises the technical qualifications. H e often had no
cumulative withdrawals to 147,600 men experience in command except in an ad-
and the total completing retraining to ministrative setting. As a trainee under
28
113,700. the conversion program he had to learn
to be an infantryman and also how to
T h e training of infantry officers, un-
lead a squad or platoon. I n the early
like the enlisted conversion program, was
stages of the program in 1944 noncom-
almost wholly a product of the emer-
gency program begun in February 1945. missioned officers were given every op-
portunity to retain their ratings. If they
T h e officer candidate school at Fontaine-
did not meet the minimum standards
bleau, the twenty-ninth and last class of
aften ten weeks of training they were
which finally completed training on 14
turned over to classification and assign-
July, Commissioned a total of 4,171 sec-
ment officers for reassignment. Under
ond lieutenants out of a total of 6,614
the accelerated and expanded program in
candidates. In addition, the Replacement
1945 noncommissioned officers were ex-
System gave conversion training to 560
amined at the end of six weeks. Those
officers of other branches, organized into
who did not meet the minimum standard
five classes, and indoctrination courses to
were immediately enrolled for another
about 500 men commissioned in the field,
period. Those who did not qualify after
organized into four three-week courses.29
the second period were subject to reduc-
Organized and expanded in great haste
tion in grade. Many of the retrained non-
and under pressure, the conversion pro-
commissioned officers did not meet the
gram suffered several shortcomings which
test of battle.30
it would not have suffered had planning
Opinions vary as to the quality of the
and preparation been more deliberate.
men trained under the emergency pro-
28 Ibid., p. 140.
29Ibid., pp. 132–37. 30Ibid., pp. 157–59
468 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
gram of 1945. Both the officer candidate it was not prepared, from the point of
program and the enlisted conversion pro- view of either equipment, personnel, or
gram were organized in great haste and sites, for the sudden expansion early in
under definite handicaps. T h e fact that 1945. T h e Replacement System at that
none of the officers trained after January time had a training capacity of approxi-
1945 were tested in combat makes it mately 18,000 men. T h e new program
hazardous to guess at the state of their required that it increase its capacity for
training and preparation to lead other infantry retrainees to 40,000, and, in ad-
men in combat. Since the candidates for dition, provide facilities to train nearly
the officers’ course were selected men, 6,000 officer candidates and officers simul-
many of whom had had experience in taneously. General Matchett estimated a
combat; since instruction was modeled need for 3,200 training personnel for
on that given at the Infantry School at the expanded program. Two provisional
Fort Benning; and since instruction was depots, the 6900th and 6960th, were in
actually given by an experienced cadre fact established early in 1945, but the
dispatched from that center, it is reason- Replacement System was consistently
able to assume that the products of the handicapped by lack of both training per-
school at Fontainebleau would have met sonnel and equipment.32
the test of combat creditably. There is no doubt that the quality of
Opinions vary as to the caliber of the manpower released for retraining to in-
infantrymen trained under the conver- fantry was distinctly inferior to the aver-
sion program. Divisional commanders age of personnel sent to the replacement
generally agreed that it did not match training centers in the United States.
that of replacements trained by the re- Commanders of both the Communica-
placement centers in the United States.31 tions Zone and the Air Forces saw in the
T h e two factors mainly responsible for emergency retraining program an oppor-
this were: (1) the lower standard of train- tunity to rid their units of misfits and un-
ing which the Replacement System was desirables, and the absence of any quali-
obliged to offer, and (2) the poorer ma- fications other than physical fitness and
terial which the Communications Zone a maximum age limitation led many a
and Air Forces released for such training. commander to make the most of the op-
Training was not one of the major duties portunity to “clean house.” T h e results
originally assigned the Replacement Sys- which such practices could have were
tem, for it had been established policy strikingly illustrated by a survey of re-
that the theater should avoid duplicating placements in one of the First Army’s
the training function performed in the
United States. T h e Replacement System
had been called upon to offer some con- 32Ltr, Matchett to CG U.K. Base, 10Jan 45, and
version training in the summer of 1944, Ltr, Matchett to Lee, 10 Jan 45, both in History of
GFRS, Ch. V, pp. 72–73. 77; Ltr, Matchett to Lee,
and thus had had some experience. But 15 Jan 45, sub: Retraining Program, and Ltr,
Matchett to Lee, 15 Jan 45, sub: Pers Rqmts for
Activation of Units, GFRC 353 Training, 1945;
31Reinforcement System and Reinforcement Pro- [Henderson] Procurement and Use of Manpower
cedures in ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 3, pp. 24–25. in the ETO, pp. 126, 147–54.
END OF T H E REPLACEMENT PROBLEM 469
1942 generally applied only to procure- ponent parts. This clause subsequently
ment in areas then under the control of caused difficulties for U.S. authorities in
those governments. Agreements were the procurement of items such as coal,
later signed covering U.S. procurement which was in critically short supply. T h e
on the Continent. T h e agreement cover- French later insisted that coal used by
ing Metropolitan France was concluded U.S. forces either be purchased with cash
on 28 February 1945, retroactive to 6 or replaced through imports from the
June 1944; those with Belgium and the United States, even though such ship-
Netherlands were signed on 18 and 3 0 ments were precluded by the shortage of
April 1945 respectively, and were also shipping.4
retroactive and superseded earlier agree- Experience in the United Kingdom
ments. T h e United States never entered had indicated some of the administrative
into a formal reciprocal aid agreement problems involved in the procurement of
with Luxembourg. U.S. forces received both labor and supplies, and ETOUSA
aid from it under the sponsorship of attempted to establish policy on such
the Belgian Government, which paid matters several months before the in-
Luxembourg for supplies and services vasion and to estimate its needs. At the
furnished by that country. 3 Allied level SHAEF established a Com-
All the agreements covering the Con- bined Military Procurement Control Sec-
tinent recognized the limitations of the tion within its G–4 Division early in
economies of the occupied countries, and April 1944 to formulate policy on local
foresaw that local procurement might de- procurement and to supervise its execu-
feat its own purpose if it necessitated tion. Later that month it laid down
compensating imports to support the policy on local procurement in neutral,
civilian populations. They specifically liberated, and occupied areas, directing
prohibited local requisition of certain the maximum resort to local procure-
items like medical supplies and soap, ment of “supplies, facilities, billets, and
most foodstuffs, and POL, and expressly services.”
forbade Allied personnel to purchase T h e actual implementation of local
food in restaurants. A preliminary procurement policy lay with the respec-
“Memorandum Relating to Lend-Lease tive national forces, each operating its
and Reciprocal Aid” entered into by own program on the Continent. O n the
French and U.S. authorities in Washing- U.S. side over-all supervision of local pro-
ton included a provision that supplies curement was the responsibility of the
and materials in short supply for the theater General Purchasing Agent
civilian population requiring replace- (GPA), first designated in 1942.5 T h e
ment b y import through dollar purchase GPA held special staff status in the Serv-
would not be furnished as reciprocal aid ices of Supply until the consolidation of
except in minor quantities or as com- January 1944, when the position became
subordinate to the G–4 Section. Brig.
3History of Reciprocal Aid, 9 May 1941–31 De-
cember 1945, prep by International Div ASF, pp. 4 lbid., pp. 45–46.
1–6, 50, 52–53, 99, MS OCMH. 5 See Logistical Support, I, 80, 254.
472 LOGISTICAL, SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Gen. Wayne R. Allen, a purchasing of- the ground that it would be the first
ficial for railroads in civilian life, and agency requiring civilian labor on the
the deputy director of purchases for the Continent. T h e Office of the Chief En-
ASF before going to Europe, had suc- gineer, ETOUSA, in collaboration with
ceeded Col. Douglas MacKeachie in the the G–1 and G–4, then drafted an outline
position in January 1943 and was to con- policy on all procurement, utilization,
tinue in the post until deactivation of the and administration of civilian labor in
agency late in 1945. both liberated and occupied areas, which
In general the functions of the GPA was published as ETOUSA SOP 29 on
were to formulate procurement policies 2 6 May 1944. In essence, the SOP de-
and procedures, negotiate standard ar- clared that local civilian labor was to be
rangements with designated representa- utilized to the greatest possible extent
tives of the European governments for “consistent with security,” that labor was
the purchase of needed supplies and pro- not to be procured by contract with a
curement of labor, and issue regulations civil agent or labor contractor, and that
to ensure co-operation between purchas- wages were to be paid directly to the in-
ing agents of the United States in the dividual laborer.
theater and thus prevent competition Labor officials in the Engineer Service
among them for locally procured sup- soon realized the difficulties in attempt-
plies. Within the office of the GPA a ing to anticipate the problems involved
Board of Contracts and Adjustments was in the use of civilian labor. Estimating
established to prepare agreements be- requirements alone was hardly better
tween the supply services of the Com- than guesswork, and there were many un-
munications Zone and the governmental knowns regarding the availability of
agencies concerned regarding the rental labor in the occupied countries, the
or use of materials, shipping, docks, rail- rates of pay, and the difficulties in the
ways, and other facilities, to assist con- administration of labor whose customs
tracting officers in negotiating contracts, and laws on social benefits, insurance,
and to aid in the settlement of obliga- and the like were strange.
tions arising out of agreements with gov- Late in May the theater engineer pub-
ernment or private agencies.6 lished a detailed plan for organizing and
Acting on experience gained in the administering the whole civilian labor
United Kingdom and the North African program. Essentially it called for the ad-
theater, the office of the GPA began ministration of the program through a
drafting a set of operating procedures on civilian labor procurement service,
the use of indigenous labor and the local which was to operate through regional
procurement of supplies and services and local labor offices in the various
early in 1944. On the GPA’s recom- COMZ sections. In line with the rest of
mendation General Lee charged the En- the OVERLORD administrative plans, the
gineer Service with responsibility for the engineer labor procurement service set
actual procurement of labor, partially on up regional organizations for each of
the COMZ sections then planned. Each
6 History of Reciprocal Aid, pp. 8–9. was to have a town major office located
LOCAL, PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 473
in the vicinity of the heaviest concentra- procurement service. Local and regional
tion of troops or supply installations, and offices, it specified, were to investigate all
suboffices in other locations where U.S. static and mobile labor, prepare employ-
installations were likely to have need for ment contracts before turning the work-
civilian labor. Town majors, who were ers over to the using service, and prepare
to handle the real estate and labor func- individual records containing informa-
tions for the Engineer Service, were tion on illnesses, accidents, forfeitures,
initially assigned to several French towns deductions, and so on. Mobile workers
in the original lodgment area in the were, in addition, to be given physical
vicinity of the beaches and Cherbourg, examinations to guard against com-
and were given specific instructions in municable diseases and physical handi-
their duties at schools in the United caps which might result in claims against
Kingdom. Many of the town majors were the U.S. Government.
engineers or lawyers. Labor was to be allotted to the various
T h e engineer labor service anticipated using services, which in turn would
some of the problems which were to arise requisition against such allotments
in connection with the employment of through the nearest regional labor offices
civilian labor, but it could not possibly and determine where the men would
foresee all of them. For procurement pur- actually be used. Emergency labor could
poses, two types of labor were defined— be employed on an oral basis; all other
static and mobile. Static labor comprised workers were to be employed on individ-
those workers who were employed in the ual written contracts setting forth con-
area of their residence and for whom ditions of employment and signed by the
U.S. forces expected to assume no re- using services on behalf of the U.S. Gov-
sponsibility for food, clothing, or hous- ernment. Practically all civilian labor
ing. Mobile labor comprised those work- initially was to be regarded as unskilled.
ers who were organized into units and Using services were to classify workers
could be moved from place to place as after their skill had been determined on
needed, and for whom U.S. forces took the job.
the responsibility for providing food, Setting wage scales promised to be a
clothing, and shelter. T h e basic unit was troublesome task even before the first ex-
to be the mobile labor company, consist- perience on the Continent. In general,
ing of a military cadre of 5 officers, 23 theater and SHAEF at first refrained
enlisted men, and 300 laborers. from declaring any definite wage scales,
On the method of procurement the en- announcing simply that every effort
gineer manual specified that until a would be made to conform to local rates
definitive administrative procedure was of pay and conditions of work. Job as-
established, representatives of the using signments were to determine the rate of
services should procure labor from any pay irrespective of qualifications, and
available source. Eventually, however, workers were to be classed as soon as
labor was to be procured through local possible according to ability. Just before
employment offices designated by the re- D Day, however, ADSEC published
gional labor office of the civilian labor maximum and minimum wage rates for
474 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
four classes of workers according to zone, and contracting officers who were spe-
communities of less than 20,000 persons cially designated by the field commands
having one scale of wages and communi- and sometimes by the COMZ sections.
ties of more than 20,000 another. Rates T h e First Army made local procure-
for women were set at 75 percent of those ment a responsibility of its G–5, or Civil
for men, and monthly rates were set for Affairs Section. T h e Third Army as-
clerical and supervisory workers and for signed similar responsibility to the Fiscal
hotel, mess, and hospital employees. T h e Branch of its G–4 Section.
policy was generally adopted that food By D Day, then, U.S. forces had taken
and clothing would not be provided important steps in preparation for local
workers. Finally, the General Purchasing procurement on the far shore. SHAEF
Agent compiled an estimate of U.S. re- had established general policy at the
quirements for civilian labor, which Allied level, declaring its intention of ex-
totaled nearly 50,000 at D plus 41, and ploiting local resources to the maximum
rose to 273,000 at D plus 240. within the restraints designed to protect
the war-torn economies; it had negotiated
T h e GPA’s draft of operating pro- agreements with several of the refugee
cedures on the procurement of supplies governments regarding the requisition of
and services appeared as ETOUSA SOP supplies, facilities, and services within
10on 1 April 1944. It made clear that their borders; ETOUSA had issued regu-
the GPA was to act primarily as a staff lations regarding local procurement and
agency, supervising and co-ordinating the had a supervisory staff agency, the GPA,
purchases by the operating services and in being; and many purchasing officers
major headquarters, and disseminating had received at least basic instruction in
information on the possibilities of local the methods and regulations on local
procurement. T h e actual procurement of procurement via the schools operated by
supplies was to be undertaken by the the GPA at army and various logistical
technical services and COMZ sections, headquarters.
and by the field commands, including
the army groups, armies, corps, and di- It remained to be seen, of course, to
visions, all of which were authorized to what extent the Allied forces might be
engage in local procurement. Each of the able to draw on the local economies for
supply services of the SOS organized pro- support. T h e area to be liberated-
curement offices early in their history, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
and each of the COMZ sections likewise Luxembourg–was one of the most highly
named officers to serve as purchasing industrialized regions of the world. But
agents. In general, the purchasing offices all four countries had already been
of the supply services and the COMZ sec- through nearly five years of war and oc-
tions dealt primarily with long-range re- cupation; much of their industry and
quirements, known normally as head- transport had been bombed, first by the
quarters procurement. Meeting short- Germans, and then in some cases more
range needs was known as field procure- intensively by the Allies. Labor could be
ment, and was handled by purchasing expected to be relatively plentiful, al-
LOCAL PROCUREMENT O N T H E CONTINENT 475
though the French were eventually to to be imported, were at low levels if not
make their own claims on manpower for entirely depleted.
the rearmament which they planned. In With minor variations, the deficiencies
general, food, coal, transportation, and noted above applied also to Belgium, the
raw materials were the most serious de- Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Of the
ficiencies in all the areas the German three, the Netherlands, most of which
Army had occupied. T h e shortage of was occupied by the enemy until the end
food at first overshadowed all others. of the war, had the least to offer. T h e
France had been nearly 90percent self- Dutch people had resisted the Nazi in-
sufficient in food products before the war. vader bitterly, and the Germans re-
With the German occupation, however, taliated savagely, destroying ports, remov-
imports of food, fertilizer, and animal ing industries and transportation, and
feeds stopped, heavy requisitions were systematically starving the people. Bel-
imposed, and shortages in agricultural gium suffered an even greater food short-
labor developed. In some areas inade- age than France, although in some other
quate transportation aggravated the situ- respects the enemy dealt less harshly with
ation further. Belgium. Ports, for example, were left
T h e movement of grain, meat, and largely intact, and industrial plants, coal
potatoes from surplus areas to the cities mines, and public utilities were ready to
became a problem of the first order. T h e resume operations, given raw materials.
transport system naturally became a T h e rail system had suffered badly, how-
priority target for Allied bombers, par- ever, losing more than half of its loco-
ticularly in the months just before the motives and one third of its freight cars.
invasion. Combined with the German U.S. forces had of course planned to
requisitions, the Allied attacks reduced provide aid to the liberated areas, at
the locomotive and freight car popula- least to meet their most urgent needs.
tion to less than half of its prewar total. But these plans were based on purely
Greatly reduced auto manufacturing and military requirements, which were
the shortage of spare parts and gasoline shaped largely in terms of the “disease
depleted the highway transport capacity and unrest” formula. For the most part
even more drastically. Part of the trans- they did not provide items needed to re-
port problem could be laid to the short- habilitate the economies of the liberated
age of coal. Although a leading coal pro- areas. This policy was to have serious re-
ducer, France imported more than one sults for local procurement.
third of her needs in peacetime. Despite
prodigious efforts to restore the industry (2) The Use of Nonmilitary Labor
following the liberation, French mines T h e first use of indigenous manpower
were to produce less than two thirds of occurred four days after the landings in
their peacetime rate by late 1944. T h e Normandy, when the Provisional En-
shortage of this vital commodity was to gineer Special Brigade at OMAHABeach
have direct bearing on potentialities for hired thirty-seven civilians to pick up
producing military supplies. Finally, raw salvageable scrap. Their only pay was
materials, particularly those which had food. T h e first major need for labor arose
476 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
with the capture of Cherbourg, where gradually relieved the shortage, and by
civilian labor was essential to the huge the end of September the deficit was com-
task of clearing away the debris, enlarg- pletely eliminated. From that time on
ing the port’s capacity, and handling in- there was no attempt to replace French
coming supplies. Within two days of the laborers who left their jobs.
capture of the city civil affairs officials Cherbourg was virtually the only city
moved through the streets of Cherbourg in northern France in which the labor
in a sound truck announcing the opening shortage became serious. After the break-
of a branch of the French labor office and out from Normandy early in August the
offering jobs. In the first week the labor rapid liberation of the rest of France and
office placed about 200 men in jobs with Belgium uncovered a more than ade-
military units. quate supply of labor. In general, re-
T h e lack of governmental authority in quirements did not even approach those
the lodgment area made it difficult to estimated in plans, partly because of the
follow policy regarding procurement large numbers of prisoners of war who
through government agencies. Military became available, and partly because of
officers consequently hired French civ- the course of operations. In Brittany, for
ilians directly and without resort to the example, the decision not to restore the
labor exchange, or neglected to notify port of Brest and develop a major logistic
the exchange that laborers sent them by base as planned almost completely
the exchange had been hired. T h e 4th voided plans for the use of indigenous
Port, which operated Cherbourg, pre- labor. Instead of the 12,000 men which
ferred to deal with French contractors the using services originally estimated
for stevedore labor, in direct violation of they would need in Brittany by D plus
procurement policy laid down before 90, therefore, less than 2,000 civilian
D Day. Civil affairs officials regarded this workers were actually employed on that
as the simplest and most satisfactory date. At the peak, in December 1944,
method. Under it, workers were paid the Brittany Base Section employed less than
rates prevailing in the area, and the con- 4,000 men.
tractor received a flat fee per ton of all In other areas, meanwhile, the number
cargo handled as payment for taking care of civilian employees steadily rose, even
of the recruiting and preparing the pay- though it did not reach the expected
rolls. Meanwhile, an engineer real estate volume. T h e Advance Section, whose
and labor office opened in Cherbourg on area of operations was forever changing,
12 July and eventually established a uni- employed an average of less than 3,000
form procedure for requesting labor. throughout the summer and fall. But in
T h e engineer officealso began to allot the spring of 1945, when its activities em-
the available labor to using services, for braced parts of Belgium, Holland,
the supply was soon inadequate. By the Luxembourg, and Germany, it employed
beginning of August a shortage of about as high as 17,000 men. Seine Section,
2,500 men had developed against current which included COMZ headquarters,
requests by the various using agencies. was by far the biggest user of civilian
T h e use of prisoners of war in August labor. In the fall of 1944, when the total
LOCAL PROCUREMENT O N T H E CONTINENT 477
TABLE14—CIVILIANSEMPLOYED
I N THE COMMUNICATIONS
ZONE IN
WEEKS, 1944–1945
SELECTED
a Base not in existence. Supplies, UK and Continental, Part X of The Administrative and
b Figures lacking. Logistical History of the ETO, Hist Div USFET 1946, MS, OCMH'
pp. 99–100.
Source: [Henry G . Elliott], the Local Procurement of Labor and
number of civilian workers in the Com- ment. In these fields, as in the matter of
munications Zone was averaging about procurement, U.S. forces found it neces-
45,000, Seine Section accounted for fully sary to accommodate the policies laid
half, and at the end of the war was em- down before D Day to the realities of
ploying between 75,000 and 80,000 per- local conditions. Preinvasion policy di-
sons. rectives had specified, for example, that
Southern France was the major excep- only minimum wages would be paid. A
tion to the general rule that labor was wage committee began to reconsider this
adequate. Continental Advance Section, policy within the first two weeks after D
in particular, suffered shortages, and em- Day. It also proposed that the Allied
ployed an average of only about 5,000. forces pay family allowances, an impor-
On the whole, however, France, with its tant feature of the French pay structure,
economy at low ebb for lack of raw ma- so that civilians working for the Allied
terials and power, and with no military forces would enjoy the same advantages
establishment to speak of (the French di- as other civilian workers.
visions raised in North Africa were T h e system of family allowances made
largely equipped and supplied by the the wage structure a complex one, and
United States) provided a relative abun- U.S. officials were reluctant to undertake
dance of manpower. Table 14 indicates the additional administrative burden in-
the number of civilians employed in the volved in paying allowances. While
COMZ sections at selected dates. French labor was hired through the en-
Administrative problems involved in gineer service, payment was the responsi-
the use of French labor eventually proved bility of the employing unit, which
to be much more worrisome than any lacked the personnel and facilities to han-
shortages. T h e two most onerous were re- dle the involved computations. SHAEF
lated to wage scales and methods of pay- nevertheless ordered the payment of
478 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
family allowances, specifying that pay- the administration and payment of all
ments begin on 1 August. French officials French civilians employed by U.S. forces
agreed to administer the system, making should be assumed by the French as soon
payments from funds equal to 10percent as possible, and ETOUSA made plans for
of the total payroll, which U.S. forces the transition beginning in mid-October.
were to provide. Whenever possible, the engineers were
New wage rates, established in agree- thereafter to procure laborers through
ment with the Provisional French Gov- the representatives of the French Serv-
ernment, also went into effect at the ices à la Main d’Oeuvre. French au-
same time, and on the basis of six zones thorities were to begin the changeover
rather than four. Zone 1 comprised by paying social insurance, workmen’s
metropolitan Paris and paid the highest compensation, and family allowances.
wages in recognition of the higher living Putting the agreement into practice
costs in that area. Six grades of workers proved a long and involved process.
were established, ranging from “un- French administrative machinery, for
skilled,” which required no special train- one thing, simply did not exist for the
ing nor physical aptitude, to “very purpose in many areas, with the result
skilled,” which required professional that U.S. officials had no choice but to
training. Regulations on overtime were continue performing the main adminis-
also changed at this time to provide for trative tasks connected with employing
higher rates only where employees French civilians. Secondly, wage rates
worked more than forty-eight hours in proved to be a major stumbling block to
one week. An agreement reached late in a smooth transition. I n many cases it was
August specified that overtime rates found that the official SHAEF rates were
would also be paid for work on the ap- still badly out of line with local rates. In
proved French holidays, ten in all. the case of hotel employees, U.S. policy,
At the time the new wage rates went which specified “no tipping,” was com-
into effect Cherbourg was still the only pletely at variance with French custom
city where civilian workers were em- whereby employees received a low wage
ployed in important numbers, and the and depended on tips for a substantial
new rates actually involved a reduction portion of their income. Hotel managers
in wages for most workers. But these re- resisted proposals to raise wages to com-
ductions were offset by more liberal rates pensate for the loss of tips for fear that
for night work and b y the payment of employees would not be willing to return
family allowances. Failure to inform to the lower rate after U.S. forces turned
workers of the latter change led to a two- hotels back. This particular dilemma was
hour strike on 6 August in an ordnance finally resolved by transferring all hotel
project near the port. workers to the employ of the French
T h e change by which the French took Ministry of Labor.
over the administration and payment of In the first stages of the transition U.S.
indigenous labor was a more gradual one. forces continued to meet payrolls, and
SHAEF and the French Ministry of the French initially took over the pay-
Labor agreed late in September that ment of only social insurances and taxes.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 479
French officials gradually took over the gium, Holland, and Luxembourg gen-
job of paying, but it was December 1944 erally paralleled that in France. In Bel-
before they assumed full administrative gium and Holland, in particular, the
responsibility in the Paris area, and Feb- main problems were those connected
ruary 1945 before they assumed respon- with the establishment of wage rates, and
sibility in eastern France. with the transfer of administrative re-
U.S. forces no longer determined wage sponsibility to national authorities.
rates once the French assumed responsi- SHAEF published wage rates for Bel-
bility for the administration and pay- gium in July 1944. But these were in-
ment of workers. Theoretically, the tended to serve only as a temporary
French Government enforced maximum guide, and ETOUSA made efforts soon
pay rates for all skills, so that U.S. forces after Allied forces entered Belgium in
would not be at a disadvantage in com- September to have the Belgian Govern-
peting with French industry for the avail- ment take over responsibility for the pay-
able labor. In actual practice, French of- ment of civilian workers employed by
ficials were often unable, and sometimes U.S. forces. Belgian authorities agreed to
unwilling, to keep wage scales within the begin paying employees of U.S. forces on
established ceilings, and substantial dis- 15 October. But the government issued
crepancies developed between the rates no over-all guide or directives on pay
paid by the U.S. forces and by French in- scales, and many burgomasters were hesi-
dustry, with a resulting high rate of turn- tant or unwilling to establish rates with-
over. Some private employers circum- out guidance from above.
vented regulations by offering other in- In practice, therefore, differences over
ducements, such as bonuses and meals. wages and working conditions had to be
ETOUSA policy directives had ori- ironed out locally, and this was often
ginally specified that neither food, cloth- done in meetings attended by local gov-
ing, nor shelter would be provided static ernment officials, trade union representa-
workers. But U.S. forces eventually were tives, U.S. and British military repre-
forced to make exceptions, in part be- sentatives, and an official representative
cause of the above-mentioned practice of from the interested ministries of the cen-
French industry. Late in November 1944 tral government in Brussels. Not until
the theater directed that static employees early in March 1945 did ETOUSA issue
might be furnished one meal per day a comprehensive directive covering the
when they were unable to obtain meals procurement and handling of Belgian
through normal civilian facilities, when labor. It announced that procurement
malnutrition resulted in loss of effective was to be effected wherever possible
work output, or when the civilian food through the local burgomaster, who
ration was such that it could not be would also be responsible for the ad-
broken down to permit employees to ministration and payment of wages, in-
carry meals to the place of work. De- cluding social insurance, family allow-
mands for clothing were more success- ances, and taxes. It also established policy
fully resisted. on the provision of meals and overtime.
Experience with civilian labor in Bel- At the same time the Belgian govern-
480 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
assurances of action on the grievances, had done in the case of liberated coun-
particularly as to the provision of coal tries.
and food. German labor was not used in impor-
In the Netherlands and Luxembourg, tant quantities until January 1945, when
as in France and Belgium, SHAEF pub- the Advance Section began operating
lished a temporary guide to wage rates within the enemy’s boundaries. T h e
for labor, with the intention that adjust- Geneva Convention and Rules of Land
ments would be made later and the actual Warfare restricted the use of enemy na-
administration and payment taken over tionals to activities not directly con-
by national or local authorities. T h e nected with combat operations. In any
liberation of Holland proved much case, U.S. forces had an immediate source
slower than that of France, and Allied of labor in the many displaced persons
forces administered and paid for civilians uncovered. By January a study of local
employed by them for fully six months wage rates had revealed that the tem-
after they entered the country. Dutch au- porary rates established in October were
thorities unertook to procure labor for higher than those in effect before the
U.S. forces through the burgomasters in Allied entry. Moreover, it was discovered
January 1945, and to administer the pay- that there was no national system of wage
ment of social insurance, family allow- zones such as existed in France. Instead,
ances, and workmen’s compensation, but labor trustees in twelve regional labor
they were unable to administer and pay offices had considerable freedom in de-
wages. T h e usual regulations on the pro- termining working conditions and rates
vision of meals applied, but Allied au- of pay, thus producing substantial wage
thorities found it necessary in February differentials among various localities.
1945 to provide overcoats from military These discoveries eventually led Allied
stocks to keep Dutch workers on their authorities to publish revised schedules
jobs. U.S. forces never employed more based on the most recent German wage
than about 2,500 civilians in Holland as tariffs covering personnel in public em-
compared with 13,000 employed by ployment. As progress was made in re-
British forces. U.S. forces employed patriating displaced persons, U.S. forces
about 2,600 at the peak in Luxembourg. gradually employed more and more Ger-
SHAEF laid down the basis for the mans. But the numbers so employed were
employment of indigenous labor in Ger- not very great until after the end of hos-
many in mid-September 1944, only a few tilities. As of 1 May 1945, the Advance
days after U.S. forces crossed the German Section was employing approximately
border, and in mid-October ETOUSA 14,000 persons in Germany, displaced
issued a detailed directive on the pro- persons included.
curement and payment of labor recruited Plans to organize mobile labor units,
within Germany. Lacking specific data on as contrasted with the static labor de-
German wage scales, ETOUSA issued scribed above, were not very successful.
temporary wage schedules based on a T h e entire program got off to a slow
zoning system and the division of various start. T h e Advance Section organized
classes of labor into grades, as SHAEF about 600 men as a mobile labor force in
482 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
July, but this force consisted entirely of displaced persons. Their use was dis-
former Todt Organisation workers ob- couraged, however, except where prison-
tained through prisoner of war channels. ers could not be used, because of the
T h e first efforts to organize French civ- greater expense involved and because of
ilian workers actually met with failure. the likelihood of losses through repatri-
French authorities estimated in August ation.
1944 that they could furnish between Establishing wage scales was a problem
20,000 and 35,000 men for mobile units. with mobile as well as with static labor.
But the offer carried the condition that SHAEF decreed a method of establishing
U.S. forces provide clothing and various wage scales for mobile labor in August,
supplies, which the War Department re- based on the zone system which had been
fused to allocate for that purpose. Re- adopted. But French authorities chal-
cruiting for mobile labor units went lenged these rates immediately, and both
ahead in the Brittany area. Only kitchen U.S. and British forces agreed to re-
equipment and rations were made avail- visions. Early in 1945, in response to
able. Sufficient laborers to form one com- complaints over the practice of basing
pany were medically examined and proc- pay rates on the zone in which workers
essed by early September. By that time, were hired, U.S. forces agreed to pay
however, the demand for labor was al- workers transferred from one zone to an-
ready being fairly adequately met either other at the scale of the higher zone.
through static labor at the places where Difficulties also arose from the desire
it was needed, or through the increasing of U.S. forces to move mobile labor units
number of prisoners. There were distinct across national boundaries. T h e problem
advantages in using mobile labor units, first arose when U.S. forces transferred
the most obvious being that they could interpreters hired in France to Belgium.
be moved about as needed. They also T h e Belgian Government would assume
possessed an advantage over prisoners in no responsibility for paying these work-
that they required no guards and could ers under reciprocal aid. Pending settle-
be used in handling ammunition. But ment of the issue, therefore, U.S. forces
there were continuing difficulties in or- undertook to pay such workers. More
ganizing such units, particularly in get- serious difficulties arose when U.S. forces
ting sufficient equipment, and the num- attempted to move civilian workers into
ber of men thus employed did not exceed Germany, the problem first arising in
4,000 until February 1945. T h e theater the case of Belgians employed by the
found greater use for such labor in the First Army and the Advance Section. Ne-
late stages of the war and, via a Military gotiations with the governments con-
Labor Service which it had activated in cerned through the various SHAEF mis-
December 1944, it had organized about sions eventually resulted in authorization
20,000 men into 108 mobile companies to move the nationals of Belgium, the
by the time hostilities ceased. Ample Netherlands, and Luxembourg into Ger-
quantities of civilian labor became avail- many. But French labor officials declined
able in the closing stages of the war such permission except for the workers
through the liberation of thousands of who had already accompanied U.S. forces
LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 483
nearly reached the total number au- them was a large number of artisans,
thorized. Most of the units were initially particularly skilled mechanics, whose
employed in southern France, although productivity and efficiency were generally
Oise Intermediate Section also became a rated as superior to those of the Italians.
heavy user, and along with Delta Base All of the Slav units were used in Delta
Section eventually accounted for 28,000 Base Section.
of the 38,000 employed in the last month Prisoners of war constituted an even
of hostilities. larger source of labor than civilians, and
Italian co-operators, as they were plans for their use proved far too con-
called, enjoyed a special status. Legally servative. Before D Day the services esti-
they remained prisoners of war: but they mated requirements for only 14,000
were released from stockades (although prisoners up to D plus 90. On that date
placed in custody of American officers they were already employing nearly 40,-
attached to their units), and certain pro- 000. At the end of April 1945 U.S. forces
visions of the Geneva Convention were were using approximately 260,000, which
waived, notably the restrictions against comprised nearly one quarter of the total
the use of prisoners on work having a work force in the Communications Zone.
direct connection with combat opera- As in the case of civilian labor, Cher-
tions. In general, they could be used in bourg was the first place where U.S.
any type of work except in actual com- forces employed prisoners in large num-
bat, in handling classified materials, in bers. Approximately 1,000 prisoners ar-
close proximity to other prisoners, or in rived at the port early in August, and
areas where they would be in danger of were immediately put to work with en-
capture by the enemy. Among the types gineer units in reconstruction of the port.
of units formed and transferred to the In accordance with the Geneva Conven-
ETO were engineer general service regi- tion, and Rules of Land Warfare,
ments, ordnance heavy automotive main- ETOUSA had specified that prisoners
tenance units, and quartermaster service would not be employed on work involv-
companies. U.S. supervisory personnel ing the handling of arms or munitions,
were attached to each unit, the senior nor in fact any work the primary pur-
U.S. officer acting through Italian officers pose of which was the support of combat
and noncommissioned officers. Special operations. ETOUSA did not lay down
regulations were issued on such matters detailed instructions on the organization
as pay, remittances to Italy, compensa- and use of prisoner labor until October
tion for injury, the dispatch of mail, off- 1944. It then specified that prisoners
duty privileges, and so on. should be formed into labor companies
In addition to the Italian service units, of approximately 250 men each, and it
twenty-seven Slav service units were also outlined the responsibility of section
eventually shipped to France, most of commanders and the using services with
them in the last month of hostilities. regard to the administration of prisoner
These units were made up of Yugoslavs of war units, including such matters as
who had served in the Italian army and enclosures, medical care, purchase of post
had not been taken prisoner. Among exchange items, and the handling of es-
LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 485
capees and deaths. The original tendency biggest users of prisoner labor as hos-
had been for using units to form 212- tilities ended, employing 92,000 and 87,-
men companies modeled roughly on the 000 respectively and accounting for 84
T / O of the quartermaster service com- percent of the total employed at the time.
pany. Such units provided 160 common U.S. plans did not at first contemplate
laborers in addition to supervisory and the employment of British civilians on
overhead personnel and training cadres. the Continent. But with the approach of
In the first months after the landing D Day one agency after another pleaded
most of the prisoners came from combat the need for the continued use of British
units. Few of these men possessed tech- civilians on the Continent on the ground
nical skills, and they were used mainly that highly skilled and experienced work-
on tasks calling only for common labor. ers could not be replaced. SHAEF agreed
T h e wholesale captures of later months to authorize the transfer of civilians to
extended to enemy service units and un- France, and in agreement with British
covered more men with the desired tech- officials established 1,000 persons as the
nical training. T h e need for such trained maximum number that might accom-
men became especially great with the in- pany U.S. forces to the Continent.
auguration of the conversion program in Theater headquarters early in August
January 1945, when large numbers of 1944 specified the manner of selection, in
men were withdrawn from service units general limiting it to key specialists for
for conversion to infantry. ETOUSA whom no replacements from either mili-
then encouraged the formation of tech- tary personnel or continental civilians
nical service units from prisoners and might be found, the age limits of em-
sought War Department approval for ployees, salary scales, leave, medical and
equipping such units under T/E’s simi- post exchange privileges, and so on.
lar to those under which Italian service British civilians were required to pass
units were being formed. Plans had physical examinations similar to those for
originally anticipated that the bulk of enlistment in the U.S. Army, were re-
the prisoners captured would be shipped quired to wear a prescribed uniform, and
to the United Kingdom and the United were subject to the Articles of War. Sev-
States. The discovery that prisoners were eral problems arose in carrying out these
an excellent source of labor and that provisions. A suitable uniform was not
they could even fill the need for technical available in sufficiently large quantities,
service units caused the theater to alter for example, and arrangements had to be
quite radically its earlier estimates re- made for a supply of British ATS uni-
garding the number to be retained on the forms and for paying for them. British
Continent. T h e decision to use prisoners insurance and compensation laws, it de-
more extensively naturally created a veloped, did not cover personnel in for-
much greater demand for accommoda- eign countries, and British civilians had
tions and placed an unexpected burden to be put under the protection of the
on commandants of prisoner enclosures. U.S. Employees Compensation Act of
Oise Intermediate Section and Nor- 1916.
mandy Base Section were by far the ETOUSA began processing British
486 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
employees for movement in the first week end of the war approximately 172,000
of August, and about 500, mostly women, of the 237,000 employed by U.S. forces
were transported to France by air within were being paid by their respective gov-
the next two months. U.S. forces in the ernments under reciprocal aid or reverse
United Kingdom continued to employ lend-lease.
about 40,000 British civilians there, al-
though this figure began to fall off during (3) Local Procurement of Supplies
the fall as port and storage operations Compared with the eventual scale of
shifted to the Continent. local supply procurement, acquisitions
Utilizing prisoner of war and civilian in the first three months of operations on
labor posed exasperating administrative the Continent were relatively insignif-
problems. Some of them would have icant. U.S. forces, leaving little to chance
been obviated had decisions been made in the early months, brought with them
earlier as to the planning responsibilities, nearly everything they needed that was
and had better information been as- transportable. Moreover, the area initi-
sembled as to continental wage scales ally uncovered was primarily an agri-
and employment regulations and cus- cultural region, and had relatively little
toms. Some of the problems attending to offer. Even Normandy, however, could
the use of civilian labor, such as the provide certain very necessary and useful
shortage of food and clothing, were an items. These at first took the form mainly
inescapable product of wartime condi- of real estate, certain fixed installations,
tions. Nevertheless, both prisoner of war particularly signal communications fa-
and civilian labor served an important cilities, and construction materials.
need which probably could not have Procurement of supplies and facilities
been filled any other way in view of the began within the first few days after the
increasing U.S. manpower shortage and landings, when engineers requisitioned a
made an important contribution to the sawmill at Isigny and Signal Corps of-
Allied victory. By V-E Day, civilian and ficials took over telephone facilities and
prisoner of war labor and Italian service the underground cable, plus various sig-
units working for U.S. forces totaled 540,- nal supplies such as copper wire and
000 and comprised 48 percent of the total cable. Real estate was by far the most im-
COMZ force of 1,121,650 men. Civilian portant single type of acquisition in the
laborers alone totaled 240,000 at the end first months, a natural development aris-
of the war, and added 4,000 men to the ing from the requirements for bivouac
normal division slice of 40,000. Civilians, areas for troops pouring into the bridge-
prisoners of war, and Italian service units head and for land and buildings for
combined raised the size of the ETOUSA dumps, depots, and headquarters. By the
division slice by nearly 9,000 men. end of June property had been acquired
In addition to meeting a vital man- for one purpose or another in 110towns
power requirement, civilian labor pro- in the restricted beachhead, and within
vided an important means by which three months of the landings U.S. forces
Allied nations were able to pay the had requisitioned upwards of 15,000
United States for wartime aid. At the separate pieces of property. In addition,
LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 487
GERMAN
PRISONERS
OF WARFILLING50-GALLON
OIL DRUMS
from railroad tank cars.
T h e biggest beneficiary of this de- COMZ heavy maintenance units did not
velopment was the Ordnance Service, yet possess the necessary fifth echelon
whose requirements had been most af- rebuild capability. Investigating facil-
fected by t h e rapid advance to the Ger- ities in the Paris area, First Army
man border. Mid-September found all found the Gnome-Rhône motor works
U.S. units which had taken part in the well equipped for the task, and negoti-
drive across northern France badly in ated a contract with the plant for the
need of maintenance and replacements, overhaul of about 200 continental-type
far beyond the capabilities of the ord- radial engines for the medium tank,
nance heavy maintenance units available which was to include disassembly, in-
to the theater. This applied particularly spection of gaskets and rings, reassembly,
to combat vehicles and trucks. Hundreds and run-in. Tank transporters delivered
of engines had to be rebuilt as quickly the first engines, together with gas and
as possible. Thousands of trucks were oil for testing, to the Paris plant within
threatened with deadlining for lack of forty-eight hours after the contract had
replacement tires which the United been signed, and the plant overhauled a
States could not supply in the numbers total of 252 engines.
now needed. In addition, a heavy re- With the completion of First Army’s
quirement had developed for spare parts contract early in October the Ordnance
and other ordnance items, and for Section of the Communications Zone as-
weapon overhaul and modification. One sumed responsibility for further work,
of the most prominent modification and overhaul continued at the Avenue
projects, as it turned out, was the fabrica- Kellerman Branch of the Gnome-Rhône
tion for tanks of a device known as an plant. Under the early contracts only
extended end connector, which was de- “top overhaul” was performed, partly be-
signed to widen tank tracks and thus give cause of the urgency of the program and
tanks better flotation in soft terrain. This partly because of the lack of spare parts.
project, the engine-rebuild program, and When only a small fraction of the engines
the attempt to manufacture tires con- so rebuilt met a test, civilian officials de-
stituted the “Big Three” of the ordnance cided that a more thorough overhaul
local procurement program on the Con- would have to be given, including the in-
tinent. spection of bearings, bushings, and seals.
Engine rebuild for combat vehicles, Meanwhile, Ordnance Service had sur-
the first of the major industrial projects veyed rebuild and maintenance require-
on the Continent, was undertaken by ments for other combat vehicles and for
a tactical command—the First Army— various types of trucks, and decided to
rather than at theater or COMZ level. expand the program. With the help of
First Army found its tank situation information provided by the Automotive
critical as it approached the German Society of France, Ordnance soon en-
border early in September. More than listed the services of other plants in the
2 0 0 engines had already been evacuated Paris area, including, such well-known
to the United Kingdom for rebuild and names as Citroen, Renault, Simca,
an additional 170 awaited evacuation. Peugeot, Hotchkiss, Salmson, and Gen-
LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 489
eral Motors, and gave top priority to the Europe to explore local procurement as
overhaul of such work horses as the a possible solution. General Minton,
2½-ton 6x6 truck, the jeep, the ¾-ton aided by another officer who was experi-
weapons carrier, and later to armored enced in the rubber field and had long
cars, scout cars, half-tracks, and tractors. lived on the Continent, surveyed eight
T h e program got under way slowly, major rubber plants, six in France and
mainly because of spare parts shortages. two in Belgium, checking mold inven-
Many an engine arrived at the rebuild tories and condition of machinery,
plant ingeniously cannibalized. Even- and consulting with other American and
tually Ordnance contracted with a large British tire experts and with French man-
number of small firms in both France agement. General Minton concluded that
and Belgium to produce such items as local production was practicable and, on
pistons, rings, and gaskets, and rebuild approval by the ASF in Washington,
firms were also encouraged to subcontract took steps to get the program under way
for parts. T h e rebuild rate was low in as promptly as possible. On his recom-
the first few months, but it gained mo- mendation the theater immediately
mentum early in 1945. T h e production formed a Rubber Committee, consisting
rate, which barely exceeded 800 engines of the theater ordnance officer as chair-
per week early in January, nearly man, the General Purchasing Agent, and
doubled by the end of the month, and representatives of the G–4 and G–5 di-
in the weeks just preceding V-E Day be- visions of both the Communications
gan to exceed 3,000. A grand total of Zone and SHAEF and of the SHAEF
slightly more than 45,000 engines of all Mission to France, and made an agree-
types eventually was overhauled through ment with the French on the allocation
local procurement. of the finished products between U.S.
T h e three months of uninterrupted of- Army and French civil requirements.
fensive operations since D Day had re- T h e actual supervision of the program
sulted in a high mortality in tires as well was placed in the hands of a Rubber
as engines. Theater ordnance officials, Branch organized within the Industrial
taking into account the poor prospects of Division of the Ordnance Section of the
relief from the zone of interior, where Communications Zone.
tire production was already proving in- T h e key factor in the entire project
adequate, and the shortage of repair and was the supply of raw materials. At the
retreading units in the theater, predicted time of the survey the eight plants were
a deficit of some 250,000 tires by the end operating with materials left by the Ger-
of January 1945 and feared that as many mans, but these stocks were nearly ex-
as 10percent of the theater’s vehicles hausted. It was clear from the start that
might be deadlined by that time. Early production would continue only through
in October the ASF, fully aware of the the importation of raw materials from
developing shortage, and concerned over the United States and Britain. T h e Min-
its own inability to meet the theater’s ton mission recognized this and proposed
needs, sent Brig. Gen. Hugh C. Minton, both the quantity and schedules of ship-
director of its Production Division, to ments as part of its recommendations.
490 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
About one third of the rubber was to be a large share of the production eventually
synthetic. went to meet critical French needs rather
Late in December a small quantity of than U.S. military requirements. T h e
raw materials was flown in from Eng- original agreement with the French
land, and a trial run was made at the Ministry of Production had allocated 50
Renault plant in Paris. By the first week percent of the tire production to the
in January sufficient material was on French. But the dire straits of the French
hand to begin a production program on transport led to a revision of this alloca-
a small scale in two plants, and within tion by which only a third of the entire
the next month all eight plants were in production was to go to U.S. forces, the
operation. Priority was given first to the remaining two thirds to be shared equally
manufacture of tires for the 2½-ton 6x6 by French armed forces and French civil
(size 750x20) and the ¼-ton 4x4 jeep transport. Reliable statistics o n the pro-
(size 600x16). duction and distribution of tires to the
T h e tire production program had only end of hostilities are not available, but
a limited success insofar as U.S. forces it appears that something less than 200,-
were concerned. All raw materials had 000 tires were produced under the pro-
to be imported, and some components, gram.
like carbon black, were in short supply More successful than the tire program
even in the United States. Furthermore, and probably more publicized than
LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 491
either of the other major ordnance proj- tested in the United States. T h e zone of
ects was the local procurement of ex- interior tests were not entirely successful,
tended end connectors for tanks, a project but the field commands in ETOUSA
which had an importance hardly sug- were faced with an immediate require-
gested by the size and simple design of ment for some expedient which would
the item. T h e extended end connector, improve the flotation and maneuver-
or “duck bill,” was merely a piece of steel ability of their tanks and asked that the
about four inches square, designed to be item be shipped in sufficient quantity
welded to the end connectors of each to modify their tanks. T h e theater soon
track, of which there were 164 on each learned that the zone of interior could
track of a medium tank. Its importance not provide the device in sufficient quan-
lay in the fact that in widening the track tity. As was frequently the case in local
it added greatly to the flotation of a tank procurement programs, a field command
by reducing ground pressure, and there- —in this case the Third Army—took the
fore increased traction in mud and soft first steps to acquire the duck bills, con-
terrain. tracting with local firms for their fabrica-
T h e problem of reducing ground pres- tion. Shortly thereafter the Advance Sec-
sure in the medium tank had been recog- tion undertook a greatly expanded pro-
nized for some time, and the expedient gram, contracting with twenty plants in
of the extended end connector had been the Liège–Charleroi area and with a
492 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES
similar number in the Paris area, for a by the end of February. All together, the
total of nearly 1,000,000 of the plates. French and Belgian factories turned out
T h e Ordnance Section of the Communi- more than a million and a half extended
cations Zone eventually assumed respon- end connectors for the medium tank,
sibility for the entire program, and in about 70 percent of which were of the
the end contracted for more than a welded type, the remainder of the cast
million and a half. type.
Two frabricating processes were pos- Similar attempts to modify the track
sible in manufacturing the extended end of the light tank were unsuccessful. After
connector. By a casting, it could be made tests by the First Army in November, the
from a single piece of steel. This method Communications Zone placed orders
had obvious advantages, but was rela- with a Belgian firm in Charleroi, first for
tively slow. T h e fastest and least compli- 250,000 of the duck bills, and then for
cated process was simply to weld an ex- an additional 150,000. When actually em-
tension to the existing end connector. ployed in combat late in December the
T h e disadvantage in this method lay in extensions were found to be imprac-
the fact that the manufacturers had to ticable, either causing the track to b e
have end connectors to which they could thrown or chewing u p the rubber on the
affix the extensions. Theoretically, field bogie wheel and thus creating a bad
units were supposed to disengage tracks, maintenance problem. Attempts to
remove the 164 end connectors from each further modify the duck bill for the light
of them, and then attach extended end tank failed, and the armies decided to
connectors provided by the makers, so scrap the bulk of them.
that there would be no loss of time. While engine rebuild and the manu-
Under combat conditions the field units facture of tires and duck bills constituted
found this installation process difficult the most ambitious ordnance local pro-
enough in itself, and often failed to for- curement projects, the ordnance sections
ward the removed end connectors. Con- at both field command and COMZ level
sequently factories frequently exhausted engaged in a multitude of smaller pro-
their stock of end connectors, while curement undertakings designed to meet
building up large stocks of the exten- urgent requirements fulfillment of which
sions. As a result, modifications were not would have entailed unacceptable delays
accomplished as rapidly as planned. In if requisitioned from the zone of interior.
the case of the First and Ninth Armies Many of these projects were undertaken
some of the trouble was eventually elimi- by the armies. T h e First Army was par-
nated by the inauguration of a shuttle ticularly favored in the procurement of
service between the armies and the Fabri- ordnance items because of its proximity
que Nationale wherein an exchange took to the highly developed weapons indus-
place on a one-for-one basis. T h e delays try in Belgium. Faced with a shortage of
in getting end connectors to the fac- 60-mm. mortars early in the fall, it turned
tories generally constituted a bottleneck. to the weapons firm of J. Honres i n
T h e program was highly successful, Charleroi and contracted for 220 com-
nevertheless, and was largely completed plete weapons, which were delivered in
LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 493
000 general purpose vehicles and 7,500 jewelry, and books—andboth individuals
trailers at the port of Antwerp. and clubs bought substantial amounts of
T h e Chemical Warfare Service turned liqueurs. But U.S. personnel were ex-
to plants in France, Belgium, and Lux- pressly forbidden to eat in French restau-
embourg to produce a variety of parts rants. T h e restriction did not apply to
for the popular 4.2-inch mortar, includ- night clubs.
ing base plates, shock-absorber slides, There were violations of the restric-
base cups, and so on, and contracted with tions on food purchases, to be sure, par-
eight French firms to convert some 350,- ticularly among forward units, which
000 gas masks, replacing defective syn- sometimes could not resist the oppor-
thetic rubber face pieces which lost their tunities to obtain fresh beef or veal. It
pliability in cold weather, with natural was such acts, undoubtedly, that inspired
rubber face pieces. One of its most im- some of the grumbling in the editorial
portant finds was the discovery of a plant columns of certain French newspapers
that could manufacture premixed flame- that Allied forces were aggravating
thrower fuel, which obviated the need France’s serious food shortages. In actual
for mixing in the field. fact the opposite was true, for American
Of the various quartermaster procure- deliveries to the French through civil
ment efforts, the most outstanding were affairs channels far exceeded the amounts
those involving subsistence and winter procured locally. In April 1945 French
camouflage garments. Local purchase of authorities finally interceded to scotch
foodstuffs continued in sizable amounts the rumors.
after the front had moved far from Nor- T h e ETOUSA quartermaster at-
mandy. For the most part, these pur- tempted to institute the manufacture of
chases involved fresh fruits and vege- winter clothing on the Continent, but
tables, such as potatoes, apples, cabbages, like most of the local procurement proj-
onions, carrots, and turnips, and did not ects which depended on the importation
violate the spirit of SHAEF injunctions of raw material–in this case wool–it was
regarding the purchase and consumption largely unsuccessful. Only about 50,000
of food, particularly where transporta- wool trousers, 40,000 wool headgear,
tion was not available to move perish- 2,000 wool jackets, and 25,000 blankets
ables to city markets. T h e quartermaster were turned out locally. T h e same was
eventually also contracted with both true of the items requiring cotton, such
French and Belgian firms for the delivery as towels, handkerchiefs, and duck yard-
of salt and yeast, and with food processing age, requirements for which ran into the
plants for the roasting and grinding of millions. Except for projects to manu-
coffee. In the main these represented facture tents and sleeping bag liners,
surplus items and facilities, and in some under which 20,000 and 200,000 were de-
cases U.S. forces provided items like livered respectively, most remained un-
sugar, lard, and coal in exchange. Allied fulfilled.
personnel were permitted to shop for cer- Far more successful was the project to
tain categories of luxury items in French produce winter camouflage garments.
shops—perfumes, cosmetics, handicrafts, Plans of the Engineer Service, like those
FIRSTDIVISION TROOPS WEARINGWINTERCAMOUFLAGEGARMENTSmoue along
a snow-covered road in Belgium, January 1945.
496 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
of the Quartermaster Service, had not Ninth Army, like the First, relied mainly
anticipated an advance into the “cold- on civilian firms to produce camouflage
wet” areas in the winter of 1944–45 or garments, using factories in Holland,
that snow camouflage would be a prob- Belgium, and Germany. It acquired the
lem. But U.S. forces had already entered cloth partly by purchase in Belgium and
such an area in September, and by mid- partly by having military government
November it became evident that they personnel drive through German towns
would continue to operate in an area of in its area and call on civilians via a pub-
fairly heavy snowfall for some time. T h e lic address system to turn in white sheet-
effort to procure snow camouflage cloth- ing, for which receipts were given for
ing was basically a “crash program,” later redemption. Through these various
which suddenly acquired great urgency. means the three armies in the 12th Army
Both the Engineer and Quartermaster Group produced nearly 170,000 suits.
Services participated in the program, al- Other Quartermaster procurement
though the Quartermaster early assumed projects included the manufacture of
responsibility for the program at the tent stoves and mess gear, field ranges,
theater level, acquiring white cloth from lanterns, immersion heaters, and jerri-
meager French stocks and arranging for cans. But these projects, most of them
the manufacture of garments by many involving the importation of raw ma-
civilian firms. Under the Quartermaster’s terials, were only partially successful and
program, about 130,000 garments were in some cases were almost a complete
eventually produced, either of the short failure.
snow cape type with hood, the snowsuit For the Engineer Service the major
type, which consisted of a jacket and item of local procurement continued to
trousers, or the long cape or “night- be real estate. This was to be expected,
gown” type. Of the three, the last was for U.S. forces, exceeding 3,000,000 at
least favored because it hampered move- the height of the build-up, required
ment. either land or buildings for a variety of
In the meantime the field armies or- purposes, including headquarters, depots
ganized their own programs. T h e First and dumps, bivouacs, repair shops, hos-
Army assigned the job to the 602d En- pitals, rest and leave centers, replacement
gineer Camouflage Battalion, which was depots, and training sites. Undoubtedly
already supervising civilian factories in the most outstanding case of real estate
Verviers and Liège in the manufacture acquisition took place in the Paris area
of various camouflage materials like nets. after it was freed at the end of August
Third Army employed both military 1944. Paris itself, with its excellent hous-
units and civilian factories to fabricate ing and accommodations, facilities, and
snowsuits. Military units consisted pri- supply of labor, was a logical site for a
marily of a chemical maintenance com- major headquarters, and the COMZ
pany and several quartermaster units, headquarters and its subordinate head-
including a salvage repair company quarters area command, the Seine Sec-
which turned out 700 capes in less than tion, lost no time in establishing them-
twenty-four hours on one occasion. The selves there. Initially, the Communica-
LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 497
tions Zone simply requisitioned most of Dinant, Liège, Namur, and Brussels in
the hotels and other facilities which the Belgium. T h e favored spots were of
Germans had occupied. Eventually it course Paris and, later, the French
took over considerable additional prop- Riviera. By February 1945, 8,400 U.S.
erties, and by October the COMZ and and 700 British troops were arriving daily
Seine headquarters occupied nearly 1,100 in Paris on seventy-two-hour passes. Ex-
pieces of property, including 300 hotels, cellent entertainment was provided in
hospitals, schools, theaters, warehouses, some of the finest Parisian theaters. The
vehicle parks, and so on. American Red Cross maintained at least
SHAEF headquarters took over a large ten clubs for enlisted men and four for
part of Versailles, establishing offices for officers, the best known rendezvous for
the general staff in the Trianon Palace, the former being the Hotel de Paris,
for the special staff in the Grandes better known as “Rainbow Corner.”
Ecuries, for the air staff in the Petites U.S. forces also needed sizable tracts
Ecuries, and for miscellaneous agencies of land. Two of the more highly de-
in other hotels like the Reservoir, the veloped tracts were the Red Horse Stag-
Royale, and the Vittel. Satory Camp and ing Area and the Assembly Area Com-
several schools accommodated troops, mand. Channel Base Section organized
and officers were billeted in homes in the Red Horse Staging Area in Novem-
neighboring villages. In all, Allied forces ber. It consisted of Camps Lucky Strike,
took over about 1,800 pieces of property Twenty Grand, and Old Gold, in the Le
in Versailles and nearby towns, in which Havre–Rouen area. T h e three camps,
some 24,000 officers and men were with a capacity of 138,000 men, were in-
housed. American town majors mean- tended primarily as staging areas for
while found living quarters for thousands units arriving from the zone of interior.
of troops in other French cities, the port T h e Communications Zone also be-
cities alone providing accommodations gan to plan for the redeployment of
for at least 110,000 men, troops at the end of hostilities. For this
T h e need for leave centers and rest purpose it activated an Assembly Area
camps resulted in the acquisition of ad- Command in April 1945 in the vicinity
ditional buildings, particularly hotels, in of Reims, embracing an area 50 by 100
many cities. First Army established the miles. Plans called for laying out seven-
first of such centers at Barneville, on the teen camps, each with a capacity of about
west coast of the Cotentin in Normandy. 15,000 men and named for an American
But after the breakout at the end of city. Establishment of these enormous
July this facility was quickly left far to temporary installations involved the con-
the rear, and no attempt was made to set struction of some 5,000 huts and the erec-
up other centers until the front again be- tion of more than 30,000 tents, in addi-
came relatively static in September. Most tion to the construction of roads and
of the major field units, including di- hardstandings. But it was soon apparent
visions, thereafter situated rest camps that the Assembly Area Command would
near the front, and major leave centers not be ready when hostilities came to an
were established at places like Spa, end, and the Communications Zone
498 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
therefore planned alternative facilities. Steel Production Control Committee.
In mid-April it began negotiating for ad- Production of steel was restricted to only
ditional land in the neighborhood of the a few mills because of supply and trans-
Red Horse Staging Area. Resistance from portation difficulties. T h e Hadir Works
the French over release of the land was alone eventually produced about 50,000
finally overcome and two camps were tons of beams, enough for all army,
added to those already existing in the Le ADSEC, and British projects, including
Havre–Rouen area. T h e two camps, the bridging of the Rhine, Elbe, and
along with those which until then had Danube Rivers, plus some civilian proj-
served in staging units arriving from the ects. In addition, U.S. forces obtained
United States, were also named after rails, light structural shapes, wire, sheets
well-known brands of cigarettes–Camps for oil drums, stoves, jerricans, and
Philip Morris, Pall Mall, and so on–and hutting from the mills operating in the
soon began staging American troops in area.7
the opposite direction–that is, either Lumber and crushed rock comprised
home or to the Far East. two other major items of engineer pro-
Most of the Engineer Service’s other curement. Quarries were first opened
local procurement efforts related to its near Cherbourg to meet port reconstruc-
various construction activities. One of tion needs and for the construction of
the more outstanding projects was the railway marshaling yards south of the
fabrication of steel I-beams for use in port. Later in the fall the Advance Sec-
highway and bridge construction. After tion alone placed about twenty quarries
investigating several possibilities the en- in operation, mainly to meet the need
gineers chose the Hadir Steel Works at for crushed rock in road repair. Lumber
Differdange, Luxembourg, partly be- was needed for many purposes, par-
cause of its location near the source of ticularly in the fall when the engineers
iron ore and the areas where steel was began to replace floating bridges with
needed, and partly because of its capacity fixed bridges over the Marne and Meuse
to roll beams of the desired gauge and Rivers. ADSEC engineers alone operated
length. The Hadir plant began opera- some thirty sawmills, employing forestry
tions in October 1944 and operated companies and general service regiments,
steadily thereafter except for temporary and the armies also used engineer units
interruptions caused by labor troubles to run sawmills in the combat zone, the
and by enemy artillery during the De- Ninth Army operating as many as thirty-
cember fighting. five mills at one time in January. All to-
Early in December the deputy GPA gether, it is estimated that about 284,-
established an office in Brussels to co- board feet were produced by
000,000
ordinate the various procurement pro- these various means. In addition, the En-
grams in Belgium, the Netherlands, and gineer Service procured a variety of other
Luxembourg and took over responsibil- supplies and equipment in varying
ity for co-ordinating the steel require-
7History of the Office of the GPA, May 1942–
ments of the supply services, officially October 1945, prep by Samuel I. Katz, Hist Off,
representing U.S. forces in the Belgian OGPA, pp. 125–28, ETO Adm 556.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON T H E CONTINENT 499
amounts, including such items as pickets notable case being sodium metal. Before
for airfield landing mats, plywood storm it could get production under way, how-
boats, compressors, asphalt kettles, pile ever, it first had to provide several com-
drivers, drafting instruments, transform- ponents, through imports from the
ers, fire fighting equipment, hospital United States, and to transfer clothing,
hutting, cranes, wrenches, jacks, forestry steel drums, and chemicals from Army
tools, paint, and various hardware and stocks in the theater.
mill supplies. Finally, SHAEF in October also gave
The Signal Service’s main local ac- the GPA responsibility for the procure-
quisition was of course the use of the ment of coal mine supplies which were
French communications network, includ- so vital to getting the mines back in pro-
ing the underground cable net. In addi- duction. Items required included rubber
tion, the Signal Corps procured a limited belting, miners’ lamps, bearings, power
quantity of supplies, the major purchases transmission belts, medical supplies,
of which were signal ground panels (10,- tires, cables, tools, chemicals, and cloth-
000), vacuum tubes (17,000), telephone ing. GPA obtained some of these s u p
repeaters (300), 35-mm. film (5 million plies from theater stocks, some. from
feet), and telegraph repeaters (220). Local Britain, and some, notably mine timber,
procurement of medical supplies, re- from neutral countries in southern Eu-
stricted by policy, was limited to certain rope. GPA procured some 82,000 tons of
biologicals, vaccines, and antitoxins, and supplies in this way, about half of it for
totaled less than $250,000 in value in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais mines.8
France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. U.S. procurement in countries out-
While the GPA acted mainly as a staff side the area of ground operations, such
agency to supervise and co-ordinate pro- as Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and
curement by the supply services and the Sweden, did not achieve much volume
purchasing and contracting officers, it until the spring of 1945, and contributed
operated directly as a procurement little to the support of U.S. forces in the
agency for certain organizations which period before V-E Day. U.S. purchasing
had no machinery for that purpose, such missions were established in Berne,
as the American Red Cross, the Office of Switzerland, and Lisbon, Portugal, late
Strategic Services, the U.S. Information in January 1945, and later in Madrid,
Office, Special Services, Information and Spain. Each consisted of a representative
Education, and the U.S. Navy. In this of the GPA and a representatives of the
capacity it obtained supplies and equip- U.S. Commercial Company, a civilian
ment for Red Cross clubs, “doughnut governmental agency already operating
dugouts,” motion picture units, public in other areas of the world. Requests for
address equipment, broadcasting and purchases in the neutral countries were
printing facilities, musical instruments, transmitted to the GPA representative
phonograph records, and the like. on the appropriate purchasing mission,
T h e GPA also engaged in direct pro- which investigated bids, negotiated con-
curement to obtain certain supplies for
export to the United States, the most 8 Ibid., pp. 163–67.
500 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
area so that employers could provide ing certification of invoices. In this way
workers with a noon meal. It was also manufacturers could repay short-term
necessary for the Ordnance Service to loans which had enabled them to under-
haul steel to the Paris area for the ex- take production. In a few instances the
panded end connector program. An en- GPA authorized the advance of funds
gineer project to procure wooden hutting from U.S. sources to keep production
virtually failed for lack of means to move going, as on two occasions at the Hadir
raw material, and a shortage of coal de- Steel Works. But this practice was gen-
layed the opening of two Belgian tire erally avoided.10
factories for several weeks. In some cases T h e shortages of coal and raw ma-
French manufacturers agreed to commit terials undoubtedly placed the severest
themselves to production for the U.S. limitations on potentialities for local
Army only on the promise of gasoline, procurement. In addition, they were
oil, and tires, of packing and crating ma- partly responsible for preventing the
terials, or of other supplies. French from producing the equipment
Added to the economic paralysis to which they had committed themselves
which characterized much of western for the Metropolitan Rearmament Pro-
Europe was the factor of political in- gram agreed to late in 1944. T h e per-
stability. On the whole, the continental formance in local procurement raises the
governments were eager to contribute to question as to whether Allied plans for
the Allied effort, but they did not im- aiding the liberated countries should
mediately possess effective control over have gone beyond the provision of pure
their respective economies, and there relief and included rehabilitation sup-
were many frustrating changes in per- plies needed to revive industry, agricul-
sonnel and policies within the various ture, transport, and communications.
ministries. One of the most troublesome Whether such a program could have
administrative difficulties centered on the been carried out in view of the shipping
payment of suppliers. T h e problem be- situation is of course questionable. T h e
came particularly acute in Belgium, chronic shipping shortage and the lack
where long delays in payment led some of adequate port discharge facilities on
suppliers to withhold deliveries. It ap- the Continent certainly precluded any
pears that the main difficulty arose from expansion of imports before the end of
the attempt to make payments through 1944. Deficiencies in these two fields pre-
local burgomasters, who were unpre- vented even the purely military needs
pared to assume the administrative bur- from being met, and resulted in the
dens involved. Arrangements were even- backlogging of civil relief needs. Late in
tually made whereby burgomasters were 1944 the French, anxious to make an
to be responsible for the payment of labor early start in rehabilitating their econ-
only; the payment for supplies was trans- omy and to assume a larger role in the
ferred to the Office of Mutual Aid in the war, presented an import program and
central government. Similar difficulties
in France led to an arrangement under
which payment could be advanced pend- 10 Ibid., pp. 141–44.
502 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Retrospect
A renowned British soldier has ob- premature acceleration of the divisional
served that for every ten military stu- build-up, as on the Continent in the
dents who can tell how the Battle of summer and fall of 1944.
Blenheim was fought there is only one Operations in Europe demonstrated
who has any knowledge of the adminis- with probably greater force than ever be-
trative preparations that made the march fore the extent to which logistic factors
to Blenheim possible. In most military have entered into all strategic and tactical
books, he noted, strategy and tactics are planning. To cite only the most obvious
emphasized at the expense of logistics. He examples, logistic considerations domi-
left no doubt of his conviction that the nated the selection of the place for the
emphasis should be reversed. T h e prin- Normandy invasion, determined the time
ciples of tactics and strategy, he said, can when it could be launched, and clearly
be apprehended in a short time by any influenced the tactical decisions of Sep-
reasonable intelligence. It is in the field tember and October 1944.
of movement and supply that “most Recognition of logistic requirements
critics and many generals go wrong.” 1 was obviously sufficient to achieve victory
Developments of the last hundred in Europe. Some outstanding feats were
years have caused an inexorable en- accomplished in the field of supply. T h e
croachment by logistics on tactics and most noteworthy probably were the lo-
strategy. Resistance to this trend has been gistic aspects of the assault itself and the
futile, and commanders had reason to subsequent support over the Normandy
regret attempts during operations in Eu- beaches. It can hardly be claimed that
rope in 1944–45 to ignore the iron laws U.S. forces operated on a shoestring. In
of logistics, notably in such cases as the fact, few armies in history have been as
effort to acquire combat strength with- bountifully provided for.
out giving sufficient consideration to the T h e European theater nevertheless ex-
logistic requirements for its support, as perienced many difficulties in supplying
in the U.K. build-up in 1942, and in the its forces, and at times the shortages
reached truly critical proportions. It
1 Field Marshal Earl Wavell, in a lecture on “Gen- might be said that two fundamental
erals and Generalship,” delivered at Trinity Col- problems explain the theater’s logistic
lege, Cambridge, 1939, published as part of his
Soldiers and Soldiering (London: Cape, 1953), pp.
difficulties. One was the problem of the
21–22. theater’s command and organizational
504 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
structure, which defied solution to the and more the aspect of a U.S. theater
very end. T h e other, and more impor- headquarters. T h e ultimate result was
tant, is to be found in “limiting factors,” really to divide the theater headquarters
which also defied elimination to the end. between ETOUSA-SOS (or ETOUSA-
COMZ) and SHAEF, leaving the former
In retrospect, it is safe to say that the in a difficult position in which it might
thorniest command and organizational be said that it ceased to be a genuine
problem which the theater had to face theater headquarters.
was that of the proper place of the lo- General Eisenhower apparently recog-
gistical function vis-à-vis other functions nized some of the difficulties inherent in
of the theater. This would have been a this arrangement and at the time when
vexing problem in any case, but it was the transfer to the Continent began took
complicated by the presence of U.S. pains to emphasize that the staff mem-
forces in what was predominantly an bers resident with him at SHAEF were
Allied theater of operations, and by Gen- not to be regarded as members of the
eral Eisenhower’s dual role as American theater staff. He obviously intended to
theater commander and Supreme Allied preserve as far as possible the integrated
Commander. control of supply and administrative
In 1942–43 the basic problem was the matters in the theater which had been
relationship between theater headquar- achieved through the consolidation of
ters and the SOS in controlling the lo- the ETOUSA and COMZ headquarters.
gistical function during a time when the But the intent was at least partially
theater was mainly occupied in preparing voided by the simultaneous revocation of
for combat operations. A viable solution General Lee’s status as deputy theater
to this problem had been reached early commander for supply and administra-
in 1944 in the consolidation of the the- tion, which relegated the Communica-
ater and SOS headquarters with General tions Zone to a position coequal with
Lee designated the deputy theater com- that of the top air force and ground force
mander for supply and administration. commands.
T h e introduction of SHAEF as an T h e position of ETOUSA-COMZ
over-all Allied headquarters under an headquarters thereafter was anomalous.
American who was also the U.S. theater In the sense that it contained the official
commander altered the position of the theater staff,including the chiefs of tech-
new ETOUSA-SOS headquarters and in nical services, who exercised theater-
effect relegated it to a more subordinate wide control in their respective fields, it
position, even within the strictly U.S. was a true theater headquarters. General
command setup. Since the top U.S. com- Lee continued to issue theaterwide in-
mander resided at SHAEF, and since he structions on administrative matters in
had with him a staff of influential and the form of ETOUSA orders and cir-
high-ranking U.S. officers, many de- culars. But he actually held no position
cisions on U.S. supply and administrative in the strictly theater setup, for his au-
matters were made at Allied headquar- thority as deputy theater commander had
ters. SHAEF consequently assumed more been terminated. His staff, meanwhile,
RETROSPECT 505
periential data from other theaters of cedure inaugurated early in 1945, and
war in World War II, did not always fit the interpretation of War Department
experience in the European theater. On policy with regard to the replacement
the whole, replacement and reserve fac- pool. On some issues, notably ammuni-
tors were designed to meet average ex- tion and replacements, the argument
penditures and losses over a long period. dragged on for months, and it appeared
T h e War Department, its demands al- that there would never be a meeting of
ways subject to close Congressional minds. In some cases the theater had just
scrutiny, was understandably reluctant ground for exasperation, as, for example,
to increase allowances in response to the War Department’s persistence in
every demand from the theater, par- editing theater requirements for ammu-
ticularly when it suspected that the de- nition on the basis of past expenditures
mands did not represent average ex- that had been limited by nonavailability,
penditures of losses over an extended and its habit of ignoring certain requests
period. Moreover, supplying a force of for increases in replacement and con-
several million men over sea lines of com- sumption factors.
munication several thousand miles long Despite the uniformity of Army train-
involved tying u p huge quantities of sup- ing and indoctrination, relations between
plies in transit. T h e order and shipping the theater and the War Department at
time for most supplies averaged about times betrayed a surprising need for a
120 days. T h e time involved between common language.
placing a requisition for a tank and de- Normally, while insisting that the the-
livering it to a using unit required that ater follow established doctrine and
135 days of supply be in the pipeline at policy, the War Department leaned over
all times. With a replacement rate of 11 backward in trying to meet the theater’s
percent and a T/O&E allowance of ap- demands and, in accord with long-stand-
proximately 4,000, this meant that nearly ing command policy, granted the theater
2,000 tanks were constantly tied u p in a large degree of independence of de-
the pipeline. cision, particularly in matters where
Unfortunately, relations between the the theater presumably was in a better
War Department and the theater often position to judge its needs. In at least
suffered from misunderstandings or argu- two instances it had reason to regret its
ments arising from conflicting interpreta- indulgence. In both the winter cloth-
tions of ground rules. In more than one ing controversy and the replacement
case the War Department had ample problem, the War Department un-
reason to believe that the theater’s read- questionably possessed superior knowl-
ing and application of War Department edge based on experience in other the-
policy and regulations were contrary to aters. ETOUSA ignored its advice in
the original intent. This was most clearly both cases, and important lessons learned
evident in such matters as the policy on in other areas consequently went un-
ammunition reserves, the application of heeded.
the term critical as used in requisitioning T h e theater’s logistic difficulties were
supplies under the express shipping pro- often aggravated by the unexpected
508 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
which led to a major tactical victory and requisition supplies beyond their needs
at the same time upset logistic plans so as insurance against possible future sup-
drastically. T h e pursuit which followed ply failures.
entailed a sacrifice of future capabilities, T h e varying demands of the combat
however, that eventually had to be recti- forces and the shifting course of tactical
fied. T h e damage to logistical capabilities operations naturally aggravated the eter-
was eventually recognized in such things nal problem of achieveing proper balance
as: (1) the costly attrition of equipment, in the logistic structure. T h e efficiency
particularly motor transport which had with which the supply mechanism oper-
to be relied on heavily for long-distance ated depended to a large degree on the
hauling at the sacrifice of proper mainte- efficiency with which its various com-
nance; (2) the failure to establish a pro- ponents or parts were employed in rela-
per depot system: (3) the suspension of tion to each other. T h e capacity of the
other activities, such as port clearance, system could never be measured in
with its inevitable repercussions on re- terms of any one of its parts, and the
lated activities such as ship unloading: capacity of any one component, like port
and (4) the inability to establish stocks in discharge, was always the sum of many
forward areas. For several months there- variables. Port discharge might be af-
after the logistical structure had prac- fected by a combination of many fac-
tically no resiliency to meet unexpected tors, including congestion in the British
demands, and was in fact hard put to ports, lack of berths on the far shore,
meet minimum operational needs. The improper stowage, or shortages of am-
events of August and September pre- phibious craft, service troops, or ship-
cluded an orderly development of the ping. T h e shortages, in turn, could be
Communications Zone, and at the end of laid to a chain of factors, such as low
1944 it still suffered from major weak- serviceability rate (that is, repair time on
nesses as the result of its premature ex- ships), long turnaround, selective unload-
ertions, an important one being the lack ing, or the use of ships as floating storage.
of a proper depot system. Port clearance, in turn, depended on a
It was this last deficiency, in fact, multitude of related capacities, such as
which largely accounted for the Com- the availability and condition of rail
munications Zone’s inability to ensure transportation from the quays, the main-
the kind of selectivity and certainty of tenance of trucks and the availability of
resupply so important to the field armies. drivers, the efficiency of traffic control,
T h e test of a good supply system is not the prompt unloading and release of rail
in amassing huge quantities, but in the cars or trucks and trailers at the destina-
certainty of replenishment and in selec- tion, and so on.
tivity. Nothing concerned the field com- T h e movement of supplies from ship
mands quite so much as the lack of as- to army depot, in other words, entailed
surance that they could count on getting a series of highly synchronized functions,
the items they wanted within the ton- the failure of any one of which could
nages allocated. Uncertainty over future have a resonant effect, reverberating
deliveries inevitably led the armies to along the entire line of communications.
510 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
At no time were all the components of and desirous of providing perfect serv-
the structure in perfect balance. Indeed, ice, naturally tended to exaggerate its
the elimination of one limiting factor own needs and asked for the largest slice
sometimes created another at a different of the manpower pie which it could
point. T h e elimination of the deficiency justify. T h e sum total of “minimum” re-
in rail transport in November, for ex- quirements invariably exceeded the au-
ample, made the forward depots one of thorized troop ceiling. Resolving such
the main strictures, for they were unable conflicting demands usually calls for an
to receive the large tonnages which the arbitrary decision. Unfortunately the
railways had become capable of for- wisdom of the allocation must always
warding. T h e history of logistic opera- await the test of operations.
tions in the European theater, in fact,
seems characterized by a succession of T h e difficulty of achieving balance in
alarums over one critical deficiency or the theater’s logistic structure and troop
another, and the theater was occupied at basis and the time element involved in
all times with efforts to eliminate some preparing for large-scale operations
bottleneck and to bring the system into underscore two fundamental characteris-
balance. tics of the modern system of logistic sup-
T h e problem of balance applied with port for large ground forces-its size and
equal force to the troop basis. T h e objec- complexity. T h e logistic base required
tive at all times, of course, was to main- for the support of U.S. forces in Europe
tain the highest possible ratio of combat was a huge complex of ports, depots, rail
to service forces in order to achieve the lines, repair and maintenance shops, and
greatest possible combat potential. T h e hospitals, much of it of a semipermanent
War Department, always fearful that the nature and representing a prodigious ef-
theater might become top-heavy in serv- fort in planning and organization and an
ice troops, never stopped urging the the- enormous material investment. It was
ater to “comb its tail” and “sharpen its also an intricate system, requiring the
teeth.” But achieving the perfect balance synchronization of many activities and
was an elusive goal. T h e ratio naturally the satisfaction of unpredictable de-
will vary with circumstances. Combat mands.
commanders, although recognizing that Organizing and operating such a sys-
developments in warfare of the past cen- tem has all the attributes of “big busi-
tury have reduced the proportion of a ness” and requires managerial ability of
total force that can be put into the front the highest order. Success in battle now
line, never ceased to demand a larger depends as much on the “generalship” of
slice of the total manpower allocation, as those who plan and organize the logistic
was evidenced in the premature accelera- system and control its various functions
tion of the divisional build-up on the as on the command exercised in the field.
Continent in the late summer and fall of That this may not have been fully recog-
1944. Within the Communications Zone, nized in the European theater is evi-
meanwhile, each technical service, con- denced by the complaint often heard in
cerned primarily with its own mission the Communications Zone that it was
RETROSPECT 511
mental Records Branch, AGO, in Alex- gon. Limited use was made of the diary
andria, Va. T h e records of the more kept for General Eisenhower by his naval
strictly administrative headquarters- aide, Capt. Harry C. Butcher, and cited
ETOUSA, SOS, and their subordinate in this volume as Diary Office CinC. Ex-
commands such as the Ground Force Re- cerpts from this diary were published by
inforcement Command, the Advance Sec- Captain Butcher in the volume M y
tion, and certain of the technical services T h r e e Years with Eisenhower (New
—were consulted at the Records Admin- York, 1946). T h e author had complete
istrative Center in St. Louis, Mo., but access to all official records relevant to
have since been transferred to Kansas this history regardless of classification.
City, Mo. Certain planning files of First
and Third Armies were also consulted in Secondary Sources
St. Louis. T h e COSSAC papers are in the An extensive body of unpublished sec-
SHAEF SGS files. ondary material exists covering the ac-
Two “unofficial” collections which tivities of the U.S. Army in Europe, the
proved valuable in reconstructing the his- most important of which are the follow-
tory of the War in Europe were the files ing:
referred to in footnotes as ETO Adm and (1) Histories of the technical services,
ETO Preinvasion. These consist of mis- the staff sections of Headquarters,
cellaneous planning papers, cable files, ETOUSA-COMZ, the base sections, and
and correspondence, which for the most the Ground Force Reinforcement Com-
part were rescued from destruction by mand, all required by E T O regulation.
personnel of the Historical Section, These vary in quality, the most useful
ETO, and were transferred intact to the being those of the Office, Chief of Trans-
Departmental Records Branch, AGO, in portation, Office of the Chief Engineer,
the War Department in 1946. Office of the Chief Surgeon, the COMZ
Two bodies of primary source material G–4, the Ground Force Reinforcement
originating in the War Department and Command, the Advance Section, and
proving highly useful were the corre- Normandy Base Section. They are filed
spondence files of the Army Service in the E T O Administrative File, Opera-
Forces, which threw particular light on tions Reports Section, Departmental
the role of Generals Somervell and Lutes Records Branch, AGO, in Alexandria,
in the support of the U.S. forces in Eu- Va.
rope, and files in the War Department (2) T h e Administrative and Logistical
Operations Divisions, including logs of History of the European Theater of
incoming and outgoing cables and Operations, eleven studies on logistics
decimal files on the subject of the troop and administration, prepared in the His-
basis and troop flow. T h e author had torical Section, ETO, under the author’s
access also to the papers collected by Lt. supervision, and based for the most part
Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, consisting on primary source materials available in
mainly of “Eyes Only” cables, which the theater in 1945–46. T h e most useful
have been deposited with the Depart- of these preliminary histories consulted
ment of the Army Library in the Penta- in the preparation of the present volume
520 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Civilian labor–Continued Collins, Brig. Gen. Leroy P., 34, 35. See also Base
Belgian, 105, 115, 168, 440, 479-81 Sections, Loire.
British, 485-86 Colmar, 25, 26, 157, 445
Dutch, 481 Cologne, 423
French, 89, 102, 103, 124, 137, 475, 476, 482 Combined Air Transport Operations Room
German, 481 (CATOR), 425, 426
Luxembourg, 481 Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10, 14, 124, 126, 283, 374
mobile units, 481-82 Combined Military Procurement Control Section,
number employed in COMZ, 477, 486 471
policy on procurement, 472-73,476,482 Command and organization, 350, 504-06. See also
Slav service units, 484 under major commands.
strikes, 115, 440,480-81 COMZ relations with field commands, 349, 505
wage scales, 473-74, 477-79, 481, 482 COMZ-ETOUSA staff, 350, 504-05
Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W., 29n, 314 Lee's position in theater command, 350, 504-06
Clarkson, Col. R. Hunter, 123 SHAEF’s position in theater command, 350-51.
Clay, Maj. Gen. Lucius B., 38, 88, 88n, 221, 266, 504
268, 385,388 Commodity loaders, 129, 132, 217
Clearance of U.K. depots. See Reverse BOLERO: Commodity loading, 110
RHUMBA. Communications Zone (COMZ), European Theater
Clothing, 218-28, 507 of Operations (ETOUSA)
committee on winter clothing, 234 and air transport, 162, 163,425
development of the 1943 uniform, 219 ammunition shortage, 247-75, 442-52
the “Eisenhower” vs. the M1943 jacket, 220-22, ammunition stocks, 447, 448
226-27 and Ardennes counteroffensive, 113, 155, 182-86
emergency requisitions for, 225 boundary changes, 389
field tests of, 234 civilian labor, 478, 479, 481. 484, 485
footwear. See Footwear. command and organization, 26, 31-45, 347, 382-
investigation of inadequacy of, 232-33 89, 415, 504-06
maintenance and replacement factors, 224-25, 226 delivery capability, 18, 169. 174, 175, 176, 177, 178.
tactical forecasts and clothing plans, 223-24 179, 180
Coal depot plans, 398
continental receipts, 210, 212, 213-14, 440-41 and diversions through Marseille, 297-98
discharge at Granville, 90, 92, 210 division slice, 299, 302
discharge at St. Brieuc, 93-94, 210 and divisional build-up, 277-89, 290
effect of shortage on local procurement plans, effect of pursuit on, 8, 86
475, 500 effect of withdrawals on, 463, 467
local procurement establishment on Continent, 26-27, 31
German, 441 general staff. See European Theater of Opera-
labor unrest, 213 tions, G–1, G–3, G–4.
in liberated countries, 210-12, 213, 440-41 incorporation of southern France, 40-45
pitwood shortage, 212, 441 local procurement, 471-75, 489
and reciprocal aid agreements, 471 Lutes-Somervell mission, 348-63
mine supplies provided, 499 move to Paris, 31
requirements and allocation of, 209-10 movement control, 390-93, 413-14
and U.K. coaster shortage, 125 pipelines, 198
Coal mining. See Coal, local procurement of. planes for Rhine crossings, 373, 375
Coastal Base Section (COSBASE). See Base Sec- POL stocks, 194, 206, 208, 208n
tions, Coastal. and port plans, 7, 47, 49-50, 85-86, 98, 101, 102,
Coasters, 100, 102-03 106, 114
OVERLORD requirements, 124 posthostilities planning, 385
return of to British, 152-53 ration levels, 188-93
and Reverse BOLERO, 402 relations with field forces, 27, 179, 349-51, 362,
shortages, 125, 212, 217 386-88, 505
U.K. requirements for, 125 replacements, 305-47, 459-69
and use of small ports, 61, 9 1 , 94, 96-97 requisitioning procedures, 358-59
Cobb, Col. Charles, 363 responsibility for 6th Army Group support, 42-
Cole, Col. Walter C., 317 43, 263n
Colglazier, Col. R. W., 363 and Reverse BOLERO, 402-04
528 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Communications Zone—Continued Coubert, 195, 205
role as theater headquarters, 328, 347, 350, 386- Couville, 82-83
88, 504-06 Crain, Maj. Gen. James K., 241
separation of COMZ from ETOUSA, 388 Crawford, Maj. Gen. Robert W., 60, 98, 174, 177,
and service troop basis, 291, 295, 296-97, 299, 300, 221, 254, 260, 294. 297, 306, 348, 388, 425
302, 303 Crerar, Lt. Gen. H. D. G., 24. See also First Ca-
and shipping problem, 127 nadian Army.
standing operating procedures. See Standing Cress, Col. James B., 72
Operating Procedures, COMZ-ETOUSA; SOP’S Crothers, Col. James A., 85
7, 10, 29.
and supply expedients, 359-63 “Danger pay,” 480
and supply shortages, 3, 4, 244. See also Supply Davis, Brig. Gen. Benjamin O., 384, 385, 389
shortages. De Gaulle, Gen. Charles. See Gaulle, Gen. Charles
territorial organization, 32-40, 578-80 de.
tonnage allocations, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177 De Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean. See Lattre de
withdrawals for retraining, 467, 468-69 Tassigny, Gen. Jean de.
Communications Zone, Mediterranean Theater of Decanting. See POL, decanting of.
Operations (COMZ-MTOUSA), 42 Dehydrated rations. See Rations, dehydrated.
COMZ-ETOUSA. See Communications Zone Delta Base Section. See Base Sections, Delta.
(COMZ), European Theater of Operations DELTABeach, 120, 122
(ETOUSA). Depots, 6, 84, 128, 181, 187, 355, 375
COMZ-MTOUSA. See Communications Zone, Med- advance, 6, 154, 155
iterranean Theater of Operations. and Ardennes battle, 181-86, 398
CONAD. See Continental Advance Section. base. 8, 356, 397-98
Connery, George, 218n control of, 382
Construction effect of pursuit on, 8, 356
bridge, 149, 157, 216, 407, 408-10, 422-24, 453 inadequacy of system, 397-98,509
pipeline, 196, 199, 200 intermediate, 6, 137, 187, 355, 357
port, 71-77, 90, 99-100, 102, 122 and movement plans, 390-93
railway 81-83, 149, 155-57, 406-10, 412 Normandy, 84, 86, 97
road, 422-24 OVERLORD plans for, 356
staging areas, 497 plans for echeloned structure, 398
Consumption factors. See Maintenance rates. plans for final offensive, 375, 428
Continental Advance Section (CONAD), 40, 44, 46, replacement. See Replacement depots.
159, 301, 378 Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L., 16, 17, 29, 272, 280, 302,
and Burgundy District, 378, 379-80 306, 314. 333, 345, 372, 384, 445. See also
civilian labor, use of, 477 Army Group, 6th.
coal mining, 441 Dieppe, 98, 106
control of transport, 159 Differdange, 149,498
depots, 428 Dijon, 40, 42
operations east of the Rhine, 375, 379, 380 Displaced persons, 460,482
rail congestion, 186 Divette, 61
and regulating stations, 414n Division slice, 289, 296, 486, 510
supply reserves, 180,428 6th and 12th Army Groups compared, 301-02
Continental Base Section (CONBASE). See Base effect of accelerated build-up on, 278
Sections, Continental. northern and southern LofC compared, 299, 299n,
Conversion training. See Replacements, conversion 301-02
training of general assignment men. plans-for, 289, 299, 299n
Corps, V, 30, 367 size in July and August, 290
Corps, VI, 257, 427 supply requirements of, 18, 169, 173, 373, 374,
Corps, VII, 264 430, 431. See also Maintenance rates.
Corps, VIII, 28, 34, 92, 170n, 183, 184 Divisions, See also Airborne divisions: Armored
Corps, XII, 216, 264, 370 divisions; Infantry divisions.
Corps, XV, 17, 186, 251,298 arrival dates, 282-83
Corps, XVIII Airborne, 28, 234 build-up of. See Build-up, U.S. forces.
Corps, XX, 256, 264 build-up east of the Rhine, 373, 374, 375, 376,
Corps XXX ((British), 264 377
Corps of Engineers, 191, 290 days of combat, 282-83
INDEX 529
Namur, 111, 149, 155, 181, 192, 405 Office of The Quartermaster General, 219, 221, 222,
Nancy 19,22,49 223, 225, 228, 232, 234, 235. See also Quarter-
Nantes, 16, 47 master General, The; Gregory, Maj. Gen. Ed-
Napier, Maj. Gen. Charles S., 98 mund B.
NATOUSA. See North African Theater of Opera- Officer Candidate School. See Officer replacements.
tions, U.S. Army. Officer replacements, 325, 329, 330-31, 466, 467-68
Naval Harbor Master (Cherbourg), 79 O’Hair, Pvt. William G., 73
Naval Officer in Charge (NOIC), 109 O’Hare, Brig. Gen. Joseph J.. 323
Negro troops and units, 147, 322-23, 384-85 Oise River, 166
New York Port of Embarkation (NYPOE), 44, 131, OMAHABeach, 51, 53-60. See also MULBERRY A.
190,353. 399, 400,401 OMAHA Beach Command, 58
Nieuwpoort, 106 “Operation OVERBOARD,” 46
Ninth Air Force. See Air Force commands and Oppenheim, 370, 423
units, Air Force, Ninth. OQMG. See Gregory, Maj. Gen. Edmund B.; Of-
Ninth Army, 107, 134, 367-68, 370. 372, 378, 410. fice of The Quartermaster General.
See also Simpson, Lt. Gen. William S. Order and shipping time, 238, 239, 261, 261n, 262,
and ammunition allocations, 264 351, 353, 354, 507
ammunition expenditures, 448 Ordnance Service, COMZ, 488,492,493
534 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES
ORELOB.See Reverse BOLERO. POL—Continued
Organization and command. See Command and distribution system, 204-05. 207, 373, 374, 376,
organization. 438
Osborn, Maj. Gen. Frederick H., 386 intake facilities, 77, 97, 98, 106, 122, 123, 198, 205,
Ostend, 51, 106, 114, 184, 199 207,435
“OVERBOARD.” See “Operation OVERBOARD.” levels of supply, 194, 194, 435, 438
OVERLORD, 4, 7. See also Post-OVERLORD
plans. pipelines for Rhine crossing, 373, 374, 375, 376,
command and organization, 27, 34 436-37
and DRAGOON, 117, 118 planning factors, 194
logistic plans, 4 rationing, 194
port plans, 46, 53, 61 and September decisions, 12
predicted development, 4, 5 shortage in pursuit, 8
Overshoes. See Footwear. storage, 104, 198, 199, 207,438
Port clearance, 7, 12, 79, 81, 96, 101, 123, 132, 148,
Page, Col. Carter, 363 424n. See also indtuidual port names.
Parachute supply, 163. See also Air transport. Port Construction and Repair Groups. See Engi-
Paris, 5. 7, 31-32, 210, 356,496-97 neer Port Construction and Repair (PC&R)
Parsons jacket, 219, 221, 222, 227 Groups.
Pas de Calais beaches, 17 Port discharge. See also individual port names.
Pas de Calais mines, 441, 499 capacity, 4, 7, 13, 18, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 124, 128,
Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M., 28, 370. See also 130, 132, 248
Seventh Army. effect of accelerated build-up on, 278-79
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., 12, 183, 349, 370. See performance, 12, 46, 50, 96, 103, 116, 124, 132,
also Third Army. 133, 254, 393
Persian Gulf Command, 417 requirements, 4, 13, 14, 47, 48, 96-97
Peterson, Maj. Gen. Virgil L., 312, 313 September decisions on port development, 513-51
Petit Couronne, 199 shift to Antwerp, 49-50, 52-58
Petroleum. See POL. Port du Bouc, 119, 122, 123,438
PHOENIXES, 59, 60 Port-en-Bessin, 51, 97, 197
Pilferage,415 Port Executive Committee, Antwerp, 109, 114
Pilotless aircraft. See V-weapons. Port Jerome, 199
Pipeline Systems Porter, Maj. Gen. Ray E., 30, 324
air attacks on, 208 Ports, 4, 5, 10, 15, 46-95, 96-97, 108, 117-18, 132.
cross-Channel. See PLUTO. See also individual port names; Brittany ports;
delivery capability, 438 Channel ports; Port clearance: Port discharge.
Major System, 77, 195-96, 197, 208, 435. 438 4th, 33. 78, 476
Minor System, 196, 197, 198 5 t h 93, 94, 110
Northern System, 199-201, 435,437 6th, 124, 123
PLUTO. See PLUTO. 11th,90, 102
and Rhine crossings, 436-37 12th, 78
Seine River System, 199 13th, 110
16th 92, 93, 94, 100, 102
Southern System, 435,438
1 7 t h 395
Western System, 197n 52d,102
Pitprops. See Pitwood. backlogs, 396
Pitwood, 211, 212,441 Brussels Conference on, 106
Plank, Maj. Gen. Ewart G., 33, 113, 349, 462. See changes in planned use, 49-53
also Advance Section, Communications Zone role in DRAGOON plan, 117-18
(ADSEC). Posthostilities planning, 385-86
PLUTO, 198n Post-OVERLORD plans, 6
POL, 8, 12, 174, 180, 183, 193-209. See also Gaso- Portugal, local procurement, 500
line; Pipeline Systems. Potter, Col. Harold E., 331
air attacks on distribution facilities, 208, 209 Potter, Col. W. E., 86, 111
air transport of, 161-62, 163, 426-27 Pounder, Capt. William F., 219, 422
in Ardennes battle, 148, 183, 208-09 Priorities for supply. See Tonnage allocations.
bulk shipments of, 201,438 Prisoner of war labor, 89, 102, 103, 124, 169, 212,
consumption rates, 194, 194n, 438, 439-40 213, 297, 301, 423, 424, 476, 484-85. 486. See
decanting of, 201,205, 207, 208,437 also Italian service units.
INDEX 535
Schelde estuary, 24, 107, 110 Siegfried Line, 11, 15, 25, 369. See also West Wall.
Schroeder, Col. August H., 78 Simpson, Lt. Gen. William S., 25, 349. See also
Seine ports, 4, 5, 13, 16, 49, 51, 97, 98. See also Ninth Army.
Havre, Le.; Rouen. Siple, Maj. Paul A., 235, 235n
Seine River Sisteron, 156
and tactical developments, 5 Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter B., 31, 32, 221, 315, 348, 374
and tactical plans, 4, 6, 48 Soissons, 134, 149, 184, 252, 356
as waterway, 166,424 Solbert, Brig. Gen. Oscar N., 386
Seine River System. See Pipeline Systems, Seine Solglint, 67, 70-71
River System. Solid Fuels Section (SHAEF), 440
Seine Section. See Base Sections, Seine. Sombernon, 29
Selective discharge, 125, 128, 131, 402 Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.
Service troops, 289-303 and ammunition shortage, 265,268, 271
and accelerated build-up of divisions, 278, 290 criticism of depot structure, 355-57, 397
allocation between north and south, 297-303 on ETOUSA command practices, 390
demand for additional, 7, 290, 292, 294, 296 and release of servicemen to foundries, 246
for French forces, 301-03 and shipping tie-up, 129, 130
planned troop basis, 7, 294, 296 and tank shortage, 241
on southern line of communications, 186, 297-303 and vehicle shipments, 243
Services à la Main d’Oeuvre, 478 visit to theater, 348-63, 390, 397, 403
Services of Supply (SOS), 334 Sommesous, 134, 149, 190
Services of Supply (SOS), NATOUSA, 38, 43 SOP7, 358
Seventh Army, 5, 6, 26, 119, 156, 157. 158, 219, 370, SOP 10,474
371. See also Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.; SOP 29,472
Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC). SOS, NATOUSA. See Services of Supply,
and air transport, 427 NATOUSA.
ammunition shortages, 250-51, 264,447 Sottevast, 82, 83
and DRAGOON, 28 Southern Base Section. See Base Sections, Southern.
and local procurement, 493 Southern France. See DRAGOON; Army Group, 6th;
and November offensive, 25 Seventh Army; First French Army; Southern
POL stocks, 439 Line of Communications.
preparations for final offensive, 429 Southern France beaches, 118, 119. See also ALPHA
replacements, 314, 323, 333 Beach; CAMELBeach; DELTA Beach; St. Ra-
supply consumption rate, 431,432 phael; St. Tropez.
supply reserves, 180 Southern France ports. See ALPHABeach; CAMEL
truck transport support, 418 Beach; DELTABeach; Marseille; Port du Bouc;
winter clothing, 231, 235 Toulon.
Seventh Army (Ger.), 5 Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), 42,
SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied Ex- 301, 383
peditionary Force. control of transportation, 159
SHAEF Maintenance Rate (ammunition), 272 dissolution, 46, 378, 383
SHAEF Mission to France, 211 division slice, 301, 302
Shannon, Col. Lyle T., 323, 327, 384, 459, 464 forward reserves, 178, 180, 186
Sheppard, Lawrence B., 234n incorporation with COMZ, 40-45
Shipping, 108, 124-33, 277-78, 351-52, 398-402. relations with field commands, 349
See also Coasters; Commodity loaders; LCT’s; relationship with other commands, 42-45, 263,
LST’s; Liberty ships; MT ships.
cancellations of, 399-401 303
role in support of 12th Army Group, 17, 40, 123,
effect of shortage on local procurement, 501-02
186, 263n, 297-98, 299
express procedure (REX), 352
service troop basis, 297-98, 299, 302
selective discharge, 125, 128, 131,402
theater requirements, 126, 128, 133, 399, 400 tonnage allocations, 173, 186
tie-up of ocean shipping, 124-33, 398-401 Spa, 182
turnaround of, 125, 127, 130, 402-03 Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Carl, 461,469
Shipping Control Board, ETOUSA, 131 Spain, local procurement, 500
Shoepac. See Footwear. Spare parts supply, 8, 236,430,453, 454
Shrivenham,11,463 local procurement, 489
Sibley, Col. Cleland C., 33,78, 84, 85, 85n Special Services, 386
538 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES
Standing Operating Procedures, COMZ-ETOUSA, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
139, 163. See also SOP’s, 7, 10, 29. Force—Continued
Stars and Stripes, 230, 245. 342n, 386 Chief of Staff. See Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter B.
Stavelot, 209 and civilian labor, 478, 479,481, 482, 485
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., 343 and coaster problem, 126
Stock control, 358 command relationships, 28, 386-89, 504-06
Storage, 111-13, 182. See also Depots. and diversions through Marseille, 297-98
Strasbourg, 26 establishment on Continent, 27
Stratton, Brig. Gen. James H., 18, 87, 162, 217, 278, estimate of Berlin thrust plan, 10, 11
352, 383 estimate of logistic capabilities, 13-14. 20
Strikes,213 estimate of supply requirements, 19
Sullivan, Commodore William A., 69 G–1. See Barker, Maj. Gen. Ray W.
Supply, 3-4, 8, 12, 22, 188, 215, 351, 433, 458. See G–3. See Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R.
also Rationing; Requisitioning procedures; G–4. See Crawford, Maj. Gen. Robert W.
Supply deliveries; Supply reserves: Supply Logistic Plans Branch, 98
shortages; Tonnage allocations. OVERLORD logistic estimates, 4
Class I. See Rations. port plans, 50, 51, 59, 85-87, 98, 104, 105, 106,
Class II and IV, 108, 177, 215-46, 452-58 108
Class III, 178, 180, 434-41. See also Coal: Gaso- and reciprocal aid, 471, 474,489
line; POL. relations with COMZ, 350, 386-88
Class V. See Ammunition. and replacements, 322, 326, 327. 333, 334, 459
expedients, 359-63 and Rhine crossing plans, 8-9, 10-11, 372-73
priorities for operations, 11, 173, 175, 176 and service troop basis, 292-97
requisitioning procedures, 353, 358-59, 360 Solid Fuels Section, 210, 211, 212
Supply “bricks,” 165 and southern France forces, 29, 41-45
Supply deliveries to armies, 169-80, 182, 186, 428, supply allocations system, 20-21
430 tactical plans, 8, 9, 367, 372-73
by air, 424-25,426,427 tonnage allocations, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 205
allocations system, 20-21 as a U.S. theater headquarters, 505
estimated for October, 18, 19 Surge pool, 141, 142
by motor transport, 416, 419, 421 Switzerland, local procurement, 500
by rail, 154, 158,410-12
requirements for October, 20 T26 tank (Pershing), 456-57
in September, 12 Tactical Air Command, IX. See Air Force com-
Supply requirements. See Maintenance rates. mands and units, Tactical Air Command, IX.
Supply reserves Tactical Air Command, XII. See Air Force com-
in COMZ, 427,428 mands and units, Tactical Air Comamnd, XII.
in forward areas, 8, 108, 172, 177, 178, 179, 180, Tactical plans
206, 390-93. See also Advance Section, supply for advance into Germany, 10, 14, 17, 173, 175,
reserves; Continental Advance Section, supply 176, 367, 372-73, 374-75
reserves. as affected by ammunition shortage, 255-57, 443,
Supply shortages, 3-4, 169, 257, 351. See also 444, 445
Spart parts; Tanks; Tires; Trucks: Winter as affected by pursuit, 508
clothing. logistic implications, 9, 17
engineer, 216, 452-53 for Rhine crossing, 8, 9, 367
ordnance, 235-46, 453-58 Talley, Col. Benjamin B., 85n
quartermaster, 216-35 Tancarville Canal, 166, 175
signal, 215, 453 Tanks, 22, 236
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. M24, 457
See also Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D. T26 (Pershing), 242,456-57
and accelerated division build-up, 280, 287 conversion of 75-mm. gun, 457-58
and air transport, 162, 163, 425, 426 engine rebuild, 488
and ammunition shortage, 254, 259, 272, 273, German. See Tanks, Tiger (Ger.) vs. T26.
442-47 loan of by Mediterranean theater, 240
and Antwerp, 114, 181 local procurement of parts, 488,491
and Ardennes battle, 182 losses, First Army, 239-40
and attrition rates, 235-36 order and shipping time, 507
on capabilities of SOLOC, 17 reduced T/O&E’s, 236
INDEX 539