Table of Contents

IAEA
Study Guide
Table of contents

Introduction
Structure of the IAEA
Relationship with the United Nations
Why do developing nations need nuclear energy?
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Non-Compliance and the Loophole in the NPT
Case Study 1: Iran
Case Study 2: India
Case Study 3: Pakistan
Case Study 4: Japan
The Pangaea Proposal
Energiewende in Germany
The Middle Eastern Crisis: A Summary
Deterrence: A Concept
Non State Actors
The Power that Developed Nations Possess
The MAD Theory
Can Artificial Intelligence Upend Nuclear Capability?
Nuclear Waste Disposal
The Environment Factor
Looking Ahead
Questions A Resolution Must Answer
Bibliography
Topic Area: Proliferation of Nuclear Energy in Developing
Nations

Introduction
The International Atomic Energy Agency, also known as the IAEA, is an
international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. Delegates
in this committee must examine previous IAEA frameworks and policies and aim to
ensure a nuclear free world.
The IAEA was formed in 1957 in an attempt to prevent the diversion of peaceful
nuclear materials and technology for military purposes through early detection. By
the mid-1960’s, the IAEA had established a program of on-site inspections, audits,
and inventory controls to execute its mission. The IAEA has considered reassessing
the safeguards that are currently in place due to weaknesses in the process and the
implementation of these safeguards. Some of the recognized issues include timely
and efficient detection of military weapons programs, the illicit trafficking of nuclear
materials, and non-compliance with the NPT. Many of these problems have
presented themselves in recent years with the nuclear programs of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Structure of the IAEA

Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency consists of 154 member states,
all of which are represented in the General Conference (GC), where each of them
has a single vote. The GC is the highest decision making entity in the IAEA, which
meets annually in December to determine the required budget for the agency.
Approve of the annual report that is submitted by the board of governors and to give
recommendations to the board about future actions. This Board of Governors
comprises of 35 elected members of the IAEA, and is the main executive organ of
the agency. Each member is selected for a yearlong tem by the fifteen outgoing board
members, or a two year long term by the GC based on a system ensuring the
equitable distribution of regions. The m embers are all experts on the subject, and
meet five times annually, with 2 meetings held before and after the General
Conference meets each year in September.

Relationship with the United Nations

From the start, the IAEA has focused its mission to be under the United Nations, and
has worked in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
However, the IAEA is still unique in the UN system as there are no other agencies
focusing solely on nuclear technology and the issues related to it. Annual reports are
submitted by the General Conference to the United Nations General Assembly
Plenary, or to the Security Council if the issue is directly linked to international
security. The Security Council can then request the agency to take actions regarding
issues concerning peace and international security. Security Council resolutions
regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguards, such as sc resolutions
1373 and 1540, which highlight this cooperation and have become the crux of the
agency’s legal framework. Both of these resolutions call for greater cooperation
between the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in an
attempt to tackle the problems of nuclear terrorism and non-state actors being in
possession of nuclear material. In order to do this, the IAEA has made a number of
programs to support member states taking action to deal with these concerns.

Why do developing nations need nuclear energy?

This committee will be discussing the development of nuclear energy in developing
nations. As nation states try to develop to best themselves, the need for a reliable and
uninterrupted supply of energy is deemed to be necessary. With a growing a
populace and the increasing depletion of finite resources for energy the world needs
to come up with better solutions to best solve the growing problem. The need to
improve global emergency preparations for nuclear crisis situations has reached its
peak in modern times, especially when developing states argue that this very nuclear
energy is not only a means to ensure security from bigger nations, but is the only
way forward for energy development and progress within their own state. For a
committee that pushes for disarmament of nuclear weapons as a whole, this issue
needs to be discussed and countries must come together to decide a viable solution
for the energy problems developing nations are plagued by.

Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Non-Proliferation was signed by United Nations member states in 1968. This
treaty stated that only a state “which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967” shall be treated
as a legal nuclear weapon state. It forbids all other states from acquiring nuclear
weapons and requests all states all ready in possession of nuclear weapons to use
them peacefully through the help of assistance, material and knowledge. It entered
into force in 1970, and since then, has often been referred to as a system comprising
of three pillars; disarmament, non proliferation and the right to use nuclear
technology peacefully. While this was not negotiated within the IAEA, the IAEA
was assigned to overlook its treaty provisions. It also, for the first time, declared the
successful establishment of safeguards as a responsibility of the agency.

Non-Compliance and the Loophole in the NPT

Article X of the Non-Proliferation Treaty affirms that all states party to the treaty
have the right to withdraw from it after giving a three month notice. This occurred
when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced that it was
withdrawing from the treaty in 2003. The question that then arose with DPRK’s
withdrawal is how to ensure effective safeguards when the NPT allows for
withdrawal and does not specify if the nuclear material acquired should be returned.
This issue was debated at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Similarly, the situation
in Iran gives rise to the question of what to do when a country is in non-compliance
with its safeguards agreements, as the meaning of non-compliance can be interpreted
in different ways. As well as this, it is not specified whether refusal to cooperate with
the IAEA when there is a suspicion of non-compliance is considered non-
compliance as well.

Case Study 1: Iran

Despite the IAEAs best efforts, if countries do not carry out Additional Protocol and
comply with IAEA guidelines, irregularities can occur. In 2003, it was discovered
that Iran was not sending reports under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
8 and Additional Protocol. Iran had not reported several quantities of fissionable
material to the IAEA, including nuclear material and waste. Furthermore, they did
not report changes to their existing nuclear programs. The IAEA did follow up work,
requesting for Iran to grant access to its facilities and asking Iran to rectify its
inventory. Following this, the Board of Governors requested a suspension of nuclear
activities in Iran until all of the country’s accounts and facilities could be verified.
After continuous unresponsiveness from the Iranian government, sanctions were
imposed against them under resolution 1737. The most recent SC resolution,
Resolution 2049, called for an extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts
created under SC Resolution 1929 to oversee the implementation of the Council’s
demands. In its Safeguards Statement of 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors stated
that, “the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and, therefore, was unable to
conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities. Today, the
situation is still under consideration of the IAEA and the SC.
Case Study 2: India
The Indian Nuclear Program was begun in mid-1940s as India picked up freedom
from hundreds of years of British govern, and after the utilization of nuclear weapons
against Japan by U.S. both these legacies have affected Indian pioneers. In 1948 the
Atomic Energy Act was set up. Under it the Department of Atomic Energy was made
in 1954. Obduracy of Nuclear forces of the world constrained India to go atomic.
Legitimization of atomic weapons by universal network likewise contributed
towards India going atomic. Rising patterns of mediation by the industrialized
countries in the residential undertakings of creating countries, among which India is
additionally one, likewise constrained India to coordinate its atomic assets towards
atomic weapons. It was vital for India to secure the self-governance of basic
leadership in the formative procedure in vital issue which are natural fair privileges
of one 6th of the worldwide populace living in India. From the earliest starting point,
the Indian atomic program was aggressive, India created offices for mining
Uranium, creating fuel, producing overwhelming water, and reprocessing spent fuel
and so on the program never dismissed the military employments of nuclear
vitality.To start with, India's unique atomic status mirrors that of a Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) perceived atomic weapon state. India has a waiver from the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), allowing exchange without expecting it to have NPT
enrollment. India has decided to specifically connect with global non-multiplication
agreements, for example, the NSG, while shunning others, for example, the Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Proceeded with
uncommon treatment undermines to disintegrate the interlinked non-expansion
administration by exhibiting the feasibility of accomplishing atomic weapon state
status outside the NPT and the likelihood of Indian reintegration without huge
concessions.
India's proceeded with endeavors to join the NSG are fundamentally in view of a
longing to anchor atomic exchange for its eager three-organize fuel cycle (which
enables them to tackle thorium as fuel). Admission to the NSG will require a
sensitive exercise in careful control between India's national intrigue and business
estimation of on one hand, and the worries of India's neighbors about expansion and
the second-phase of the fuel cycle. The second phase of Fast Breeder Reactors could
be used to create plutonium, and merchandise gave under a NSG enrollment waiver
could empower India to seek after atomic expansion.
Second, India's vital weapons complex can possibly push India's atomic capacities
to a full range of weapon frameworks. India has so far concentrated on the
foundation and upgrade of its ground and ocean based conveyance frameworks: the
development of four atomic controlled ballistic submarines for constant adrift
obstacle and ground-based intercontinental range competent rockets. Past this, this
report features that India's key weapons complex has investigated and built up extra
weapons frameworks that could be made atomic competent ought to there be
political will. Generally, times of capacity breakout happened around India's turning
point atomic tests (1974 and 1998). In such examples, the activity of the key
weapons complex in creating 'innovation demonstrators' (science attainability
extends that scale-up to a potential framework), has pre-empted political basic
leadership to receive such advances as military abilities. The improvement pathway
of the Agni is one such illustration wherein the choice to embrace ground-based
long-run rockets as an atomic conveyance framework was taken after researchers
had exhibited the plausibility of an indigenous nuclear capable ballistic rocket,
instead of the science and innovation division being coordinated by basic leadership
expert.
The procedure of Indian science advancements leading the pack over approach
course is the reason India's mechanical idleness should raise concerns. Past the
foundation and further improvement of India's current set of three capacities, new
innovations formed into abilities in accordance with the capacities of major atomic
weapons forces would enable India to float towards a 'maximalist' atomic arms
stockpile using both strategic and key atomic weapons in a graduated heightening
stance. For instance, air-propelled supersonic/hypersonic journey rockets, tipped
with low-yield atomic warheads, and combined with new fifth era warrior flying
machine could be considered by Indian arrangement producers soon as a way to
decisively end customary clash. India's duty to 'No First Use' and to a most extreme
striking back just stance would be disintegrated by these new conceivable abilities.
This report additionally features the conceivable disintegration of political control
of the atomic stockpile. For the most part, the Indian elucidation of an atomic
weapon incorporates the mating of the fissile material pit with the warhead and
conveyance framework itself .Traditionally, India's atomic weapons have been held
de-mated and under the control of various bodies, requiring a between organization
framework told immovably by a political body (the Nuclear Command Authority
led by the Prime Minister) to amass and send the atomic arms stockpile. The Agni
V intercontinental range fit ballistic rocket is pre-mated in an indistinguishable way
from the pre-mated ballistic rockets utilized on-board Arihant-class SSBNs. This
will significantly affect atomic approach and summon and control
Third, India's logical edifices (atomic, rocket, and space) are inadequately isolated.
The atomic program in India has been halfway submitted to universal shields, yet
this remaining parts restricted and enables India to practice true atomic weapons
state benefits with respect to the creation of extraordinary fissile material. India has
put resources into new extraordinary fissile material generation offices. This huge
unsafeguarded atomic fuel cycle incorporates various elements performing double
thoughtful and military capacities.
India's space program is committed to common and serene purposes, and generally
this remaining parts the case. Examples of verifiable innovation exchange from
common rocketry to military rocket programs is maybe no longer a functioning
worry as rocket programs are self-supporting and have accomplished key turning
points. A reverse innovation stream, from military to regular citizen area, remains a
plausibility. Military and common researchers and specialists keep on meeting
cautiously in discussions and gatherings, which should raise worries about cross-
field obscuring. Household understudies and worldwide visitors are visit participants
and these science and innovation spaces are a multiplication hazard.
Fourth, poor partition in these key areas ought to hone the requirement for tight fare
controls on impalpable exchanges and substantial exchange to India. While end-
client observing agreements are in actuality for a few elements, this report drives
forward the basic for delicate enterprises to receive 'Know Your Customer' best
practices. This report features the unpredictable connections of India's local
innovative construct, and of complicity to the atomic weapons program. Fifth, Indian
substances are at forward multiplication hazard. The potential risk lies with the
re/fare of touchy things and information out of India to remote forces. The residential
business providing India's vital weapons complex and the nation's atomic program
have achieved adequate specialized development to send out skill and unmistakable
atomic and rocket related products. The Indian government's help for its household
industry even with worldwide authorizations and innovation foreswearing has
proceeded since the standardization of exchange relations in 2008. A science and
innovation culture of independence and import substitution has framed, and despite
the fact that India's vital parts stay dependent on imports, the adjust of local provided
merchandise and imported products will tend towards residential arrangements in
the coming years. This is one convincing motivation behind why drawing India into
firm non-multiplication duties would improve worldwide security for the more
extended term. India has made solid strides towards actualizing a control list
(SCOMET), synchronizing it with key control administrations, and receiving best
practices for organizations; this exertion must be managed.
In conclusion, more prominent care and consideration should be paid to the present
issues with India's atomic power while likewise envisioning a future move in India's
capacities. Looking forward, there remains space for India to be drawn into firm
non-multiplication consistence.
furnishes data with respect to the level

Case Study 3: Pakistan

Current Situation
Pakistan keeps up a lead in the quantity of nuclear warheads when contrasted with
most outstanding adversary India, as indicated by an evaluation by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute on Monday, revealed The Times of India. The
Indian distribution noticed that the nation was currently dependent on building up a
prevention capacity which concentrated on survival in dread of strikes by Pakistan.
As indicated by the daily paper, Islamabad has 140-150 atomic warheads, when
contrasted with 130 atomic warheads possessed by New Delhi. China, contrasted
with the two nations, has 280 atomic weapons. Nine days into 2017, Pakistan did the
first-since forever flight trial of the Babur-3, its new atomic able submarine-
propelled voyage rocket (SLCM). A variation of the Babur-3 ground-propelled
voyage rocket (GLCM), this SLCM will see Pakistan's atomic obstacle go to
ocean—most likely at first on board its Agosta 90B and Agosta 70 submarines,
however in the end, maybe even on board new Type 041 Yuan-class submarines
Pakistan is relied upon to secure from China. Sea-based weapons can aggravate
crisis stability concerns in the India-Pakistan dyad and present unique command-
and-control challenges for Pakistan, which may be required to place these weapons
at a higher level of readiness during peacetime. Finally, Pakistan’s internal security
environment will remain a concern with a submarine-based deterrent.
Overview
• Nuclear Infrastructure
Pakistan's atomic program is construct fundamentally in light of exceptionally
improved uranium (HEU), which is created at the A. Q. Khan inquire about lab
at Kahuta, a gas rotator uranium advancement office. The Kahuta office has been
in task since the mid 1980s. By the mid 1990s, Kahuta had an expected 3,000
axes in task, and Pakistan proceeded with its quest for extended uranium
improvement abilities.
In the 1990s Pakistan started to seek after plutonium generation abilities. With
Chinese help, Pakistan assembled the 40 MWt (megawatt warm) Khusab inquire
about reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan declared that the reactor was
operational. As per open proclamations made by US authorities, this unsafeguarded
substantial water reactor creates an expected 8-10 kilotons of weapons review
plutonium every year, which is sufficient for one to two atomic weapons. The reactor
could likewise create tritium on the off chance that it were stacked with lithium-6.
As per J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium creation limit could enable
Pakistan to create lighter atomic warheads that would be less demanding to convey
with a ballistic rocket.
Plutonium partition apparently happens at the New Labs reprocessing plant
alongside Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in
Rawalpindi and at the bigger Chasma atomic power plant, neither of which are liable
to IAEA assessment.
• Nuclear Arsenal
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) gauges that Pakistan has
constructed 24-48 HEU-based atomic warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have
delivered 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's atomic
warheads depend on an implosion plan that uses a strong center of exceedingly
improved uranium and requires an expected 15-20 kg of material for every warhead.
As per Carnegie, Pakistan has additionally created a little yet obscure amount of
weapons review plutonium, which is adequate for an expected 3-5 atomic weapons.
Pakistani experts guarantee that their atomic weapons are not gathered. They keep
up that the fissile centers are put away independently from the non-atomic explosives
bundles, and that the warheads are put away independently from the conveyance
frameworks. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department battles that "Islamabad's
atomic weapons are likely put away in part shape" and that "Pakistan presumably
could collect the weapons decently fast." However, nobody has possessed the
capacity to find out the legitimacy of Pakistan's affirmations about their atomic
weapons security.

Pakistan's dependence essentially on HEU makes its fissile materials especially

helpless against redirection. HEU can be utilized as a part of a moderately basic
firearm barrel-type outline, which could be inside the methods for non-state on-
screen characters that plan to gather an unrefined atomic weapon.
The fear monger assaults on September eleventh raised worries about the security of
Pakistan's atomic stockpile. As indicated by squeeze reports, inside two long periods
of the assaults, Pakistan's military started migrating atomic weapons segments to six
new mystery areas. Presently, Gen. Pervez Musharraf shot his knowledge boss and
different officers and confined a few presumed resigned atomic weapons
researchers, trying to find fanatic components that represented a potential risk to
Pakistan's atomic stockpile.
Concerns have likewise been raised about Pakistan as a proliferate of atomic
materials and ability. In November, 2002, soon after North Korea confessed to
seeking after an atomic weapons program, the press revealed charges that Pakistan
had given help with the advancement of its uranium enhancement program in return
for North Korean rocket advances.
• Foreign Assistance
Before, China assumed a noteworthy part in the advancement of Pakistan's atomic
framework, particularly when progressively stringent fare controls in western
nations made it troublesome for Pakistan to secure materials and innovation
somewhere else. As indicated by a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has
provided Pakistan with atomic materials and mastery and has given basic help with
the development of Pakistan's atomic offices.
In the 1990s, China composed and provided the overwhelming water Khusab
reactor, which assumes a key part in Pakistan's creation of plutonium. A backup of
the China National Nuclear Corporation additionally added to Pakistan's endeavors
to extend its uranium enhancement capacities by giving 5,000 uniquely designed
ring magnets, which are a key segment of the orientation that encourage the rapid
turn of rotators.
As per Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is additionally answered to have given
Pakistan the outline of one of its warheads, which is moderately advanced in plan
and lighter than U.S. furthermore, Soviet planned original warheads.
China additionally gave specialized and material help in the fulfillment of the
Chasma atomic power reactor and plutonium reprocessing office, which was worked
in the mid 1990s. The undertaking had been started as an agreeable program with
France, yet Pakistan's inability to sign the NPT and unwillingness to acknowledge
IAEA shields on its whole atomic program made France end help.

As indicated by the Defense Department report referred to above, Pakistan has

likewise gained atomic related and double utilize and hardware and materials from
the Former Soviet Union and Western Europe.
• Irregular US Sanctions
On a few events, under the expert of changes to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S.
has forced endorses on Pakistan, cutting off financial and military guide because of
its quest for atomic weapons. Nonetheless, the U.S. suspended endorses each time
advancements in Afghanistan made Pakistan a deliberately critical "bleeding edge
state, for example, the 1981 Soviet occupation and in the war on fear based
oppression.
• Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine
A few sources, for example, Jane's Intelligence Review and Defense Department
reports keep up that Pakistan's rationale in seeking after an atomic weapons program
is to counter the danger postured by its important opponent, India, which has
prevalent regular powers and atomic weapons.
Pakistan has not marked the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). As per the Defense Department report refered to above,
"Pakistan stays ardent in its refusal to sign the NPT, expressing that it would do as
such simply after India joined the Treaty. Therefore, not the greater part of Pakistan's
atomic offices are under IAEA shields. Pakistani authorities have expressed that
mark of the CTBT is to Pakistan's greatest advantage, however that Pakistan will do
as such simply in the wake of building up a residential agreement on the issue, and
have denied any association with India's choice."
Pakistan does not comply with a no-first-utilize teaching, as prove by President
Pervez Musharraf's announcements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did
not need a contention with India but rather that in the event that it came to war
between the atomic furnished adversaries, he would "react with full may." These
announcements were deciphered to imply that if squeezed by a mind-boggling
ordinary assault from India, which has unrivaled customary powers, Pakistan may
utilize its atomic weapons.

Case Study 4: Japan

The regime in 2000 adopted a policy of radioactive waste disposal by means of
burying it underground, by soliciting municipalities across the land available to serve
as a site for the process. The final choice was made when a town in the Kochi
Prefecture applied in 2007, however only to be retracted when local opposition arose
complaining of the financial predicament of the municipality. No progress was made
once the mayor of the locality in question was ousted in the next election.
Recently in 2015 howeverthe Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry presented a
revised draft that encapsulated the new policy, making voluntary waste management
by individual towns simpler, calling for a “direct disposal” of spent fuel as waste
without reprocessing it.This could potentially replace the policy atthe time of
reprocessing spent fuel and reusing extracted plutonium and uranium as reactor fuel
by encouraging operators of nuclear plants to increase their capacity for temporary
storage of spent fuel— given that the final disposal storage site is not expected to be
ready in the near future.
Three general principles are employed in the management of radioactive wastes:
• Concentrate-and-contain (non radioactive)
• Dilute-and-disperse (non radioactive)
• Delay-and-decay (unique to radioactive)
The following methods are currently being contemplated as long-term solutions for
storage of nuclear waste.
a) Space
While this means appears to be the most appropriate for permanently shirking this
responsibility, by posing no more risk of accidently stumbling upon the waste than
when using radioactive shielding for space travel, the technicalities of its release
beyond the Earth’s atmosphere is the major drawback. Not only would the rocket
used need to provide enough power to escape the earth’s gravity in order to not
leave the waste in orbit and by extension increase chances of this waste to reenter
the earth’s environment due to collision with satellites, and other orbiting waste or
spacecraft; but the large delivery rocket would also be expensive and an accident
during launch could have catastrophic results.
Under the sea bed
As the rock formations below the seabed are comparatively more stable than those
on landmass, the risk of exposure to seismic activity is reduced. Moreover, there is
no major fear of radioactive waste contaminating ground water for potential human
consumption. The greatest charm of under sea burial is simultaneously its greatest
drawback. The taxing nature of waste extraction would prevent accidental or
malicious disturbing of the waste. This cost is also the major deterrent from
underwater burial.
b) Large geological formations on land
Once tectonically stable rock formations are located, the radioactive waste may be
vitrified and buried in caverns and sealed again with stone once the process is
complete. Despite the expense and peril that this entails this is the most viable
option available.

The Pangaea Proposal

The major research in the 1990s identified Australia, southern Africa and western
China as having the potential geological credentials for a deep waste repository. As
a commercial venture, the area would be equipped with a port and rail layout for
this sole purpose. The objectives of the Pangea proposal are still relevant to present
legislation of the matter;
To provide an economic and environmentally responsible disposal option.
To provide a safe and secure transportation service to the repository location.
To provide the host country with the opportunity to gain substantial economic
benefits and to play an important role in enhancing security and non-proliferation
efforts for the benefit of all nations.

Energiewende in Germany
The Energiewende is the planned transition by Germany to a low carbon,
environmentally sound, reliable, and affordable energy supply, relying heavily on
renewable. Most if not all coal-fired generation will need to be retired. Legislative
support for the Energiewende was passed in late 2010 and includes greenhouse
gas reductions of 80–95% by 2050 and a renewable energy target of 60% by 2050,
coupled with transparency in energy policy. The Berlin-based policy institute Agora
Energiewende noted, "While the German approach is not unique worldwide, the
speed and scope of the Energiewende are exceptional". Significant progress has
been made on its GHG emissions reduction target, achieving a 27% decrease
between 1990 and 2014. However the country will need to maintain an average GHG
emissions abatement rate of 3.5% per year to reach its goals, equal to the maximum
historical value thus far.
Another tangent for debate is the natural role climate change plays in deterring
nuclear development for the third world. Plagued with the affects of pollution in air,
water and land, developing megacities are considered incapable of grappling with
the burden of the nuclear industry and waste management.
The Middle Eastern Crisis: A Summary
When asked in a 1984 Newsweek poll where they believed was the greatest threat
of a conflict situation that might escalate to nuclear war the majority of top tanking
American military officers responded clearly: the Middle East. This was at a time
when Congress was debating a Pentagon budget that would increase spending for
Third World intervention by 34 percent. Some of the “power projection” weapons
systems were “dual capable” in other words, able to fire nuclear as well as
conventional warheads. Today the US military accumulation in Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf, largely accomplished under the cover of the Iran-Iraq war, has made
Southwest Asia a key strategic theater equipped with numbers and quality of nuclear
blast-hardened command posts more advanced than those of NATO.
• Nuclear proliferation, whether in fact or myth, continues. According to Israeli
reports, a Syria nuclear project was “reduced to dust by Israeli jets”, thus
raising skeptical concerns over the legitimacy of Syrian reconciliation with
regards to their chemical weapons stockpiles. Not a fan of mutual assured
destruction itself, Israel is believed to have significantly vast undeclared
arsenal.
• Iraq pursued nuclear capabilities under Saddam for decades; the centerpiece
of his nuclear efforts was the Tuwaitha nuclear complex,south of Baghdad.
• The site was bombed by Iran in 1980, by Israeli warplanes in 1981 attack and
the USA in 1990 soon afterwards, targeting main reactors. Israel in response
inaugurated a pre-emptive strike policy that was subsequently named after
then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin.
• Iran was stopped from approaching weapons capability, which it denied
seeking, through a deal with world powers. The 2015 agreement limiting the
atomic program brought — as North Korean leader Kim Jung Un undoubtedly
has noted significant economic benefits in its wake.
• The KSA first began exploring a nuclear power program in August 2009 and
it set up the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy in 2010
to develop plans for the future. However these ambitions have been dismissed
many a time as a smoke and mirrors game, as the kingdom is falling behind
on education, is yet to develop its own model of a car suffers from countless
other deficiencies which make the prospects of a nuclear Saudi Arabia appear
very distant.
In 2011, Riyadh announced plans to build 16 nuclear reactors over 20 years.
According to an article by the World Nuclear Association, construction was
set to begin in 2016.
Deterrence: A Concept
Introduction
Establishing effective deterrence against attacks in space and against the use of
hybrid warfare tactics are the two most urgent priorities. The use of hybrid and
terrorist tactics of warfare has gained newfound salience in the land domain of
warfare, the likelihood that future military clash will envelop strife in space and the
internet has risen fundamentally. Not just has the United States' capacity to
discourage hostility in the conventional air, land, and ocean areas of fighting been
thrown in question, yet new prerequisites to stop future animosity in the spaces of
room and the internet have likewise emerged. At the point when an adversary has no
motivating force to start or heighten strife at any given intercession or acceleration
edge in any given space of fighting—both vertically and on a level plane inside that
area and along the side into at least one extra areas of fighting—fruitful cross-space
discouragement can be said to be as a result. Thisstudy guide focuses on the new
challenges of deterring aggression in three of those five domains:
Types of Deterrence
Deterrence by punishment plans to make a contention excessively difficult or
hazardous also, in this manner pressure the adversary into maintaining a strategic
distance from or ending it. Full scale punishment/discipline can be incongruent with
endeavors to pressure a foe to settle on a coveted choice: It is hard to impact an
assailant when it has nothing left to lose. Deterrence by denial/foreswearing is
coercive to a limited extent yet basically inclines toward dangers to control the
circumstance adequately to deny the enemy key alternatives or gains. As a general
suggestion, at whatever point plausible, prevention by foreswearing is to be wanted
to prevention by discipline on the grounds that the last requires persistent pressure,
though the previous includes control. Including prevention by foreswearing and
discouragement by discipline, no less than four extra unique sorts of prevention can
be recognized; they are neither totally unrelated nor commonly thorough:

1. General deterrence is said to be in actuality when the adjust of intensity is steady

and no on-screen character is thinking about mounting an assault on another. General
prevention can be in actuality at the worldwide level or at a provincial level.
2. Immediate deterrence is required when a performer begins to examine or plan for
military activity, along these lines releasing an emergency or crisis and making
general discouragement break down.
3. Direct Deterrence, otherwise called focal prevention, includes a deterrent
debilitating a potential attacker with striking back to keep the attacker from utilizing
military power against the deterrer's most imperative interests, for example, its
country. Since coordinate prevention includes the protection of essential interests, it
is for the most part accepted to include a dependable threat.
4. Extended Deterrence includes a deterrer debilitating striking back against a
potential assailant trying to anticipate
Successful deterrence identified in the classic texts appear to be persistently used by
developed countries. China demonstrated an ability to attack U.S. satellites in low
Earth orbit (LEO) and in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) in 2007 and 2013,
respectively. Beijing demonstrated its ability to conduct rendezvous and proximity
operations with U.S. satellites, in 2016. Russia demonstrated similar capabilities in
2015 and 2016. Both China and Russia have thus made it clear that they have the
capability to carry out and may be contemplating crippling blows on U.S. space-
based assets at the outset of a conflict.
This is a prime example of developed nations exerting their power and using it
against the international community as a means to protect themselves or to inflict
harm upon other states in order to gain what they wish to be so in terms of politics
or to help identify themselves to be the largest superpower in the global arena.

With regards to psychological warfare, general discouragement can be said to be in

constrain when such strategies are most certainly not being utilized to challenge the
adjust of intensity or mount assaults on others. Immediate discouragement implies
the fruitful business of measures to keep the further work of fear monger strategies
after their first utilize. In perspective of the persistent and continuous universal
military crusades against the Islamic State in Iraq what's more, Syria, al Qaeda, al
Mourabitoun, Boko Haram, al Shabaab, Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, and the Taliban, among others, in the Levant; in Syria and Iraq; in North,
East, and West Africa; and in South and East Asia, the adequacy of U.S. What's
more, united general and prompt discouragement against non state performers
utilizing psychological militant strategies can be said to be low. Coordinate
discouragement of psychological warfare involves counteracting assaults on the U.S.
country. No significant, mass-setback assaults on the United States have repeated
since 9/11. Be that as it may, a critical number of occasions, for example, those at
Fort Hood in November 2009, Boston in April 2013, San Bernardino in December
2015, and New York City in November 2017, by and large including more than 370
losses, have occurred. While a far more noteworthy number of assaults may have
occurred had the United States not fortified country security after the 9/11 assaults,
coordinate discouragement of assaults on the U.S. country still can't be said to be
high. Broadened discouragement of psychological oppression involves anticipating
psychological militant assaults on partners through the danger of striking back.
Demonstrations of hostility by non state on-screen characters utilizing fear monger
strategies against a noteworthy number of U.S. partners have repeated with some
normality since the 9/11 assaults. Such assaults additionally proceed to be mounted
in spite of the way that the United States is as of now connected with against their
instigators militarily in various auditoriums of military activities. Since U.S.
mediation for the benefit of companions also, partners against fear monger
associations in different performance centers of activities has not lessened the
utilization of fear monger strategies of fighting, the U.S. limit with regards to
expanded prevention of hostility by nonstate on-screen characters utilizing
psychological militant strategies can be said to be low.
Surprise: with regards to fear mongering, strategic shock includes getting cautioning
of an assault yet neglecting to have sufficient energy to take measures to move
potential casualties out of mischief's way or thwart the assault. Open, Western social
orders are loaded with potential delicate targets helpless to fear based oppressor
assault. Shy of draconian severe measures or the restrictively costly "hardening" of
potential focuses all through whole social orders, promote strategic astonishment at
the hands of non state performing artists utilizing fear monger strategies seems, by
all accounts, to be inescapable.
Technology: The impetus for non state performers to strike first utilizing
psychological oppressor strategies is high. Rehashed assaults have demonstrated that
the assailant to-target proportion is low: It just takes one aircraft to execute handfuls;
three psychological oppressors slaughtered 90 regular people amid a November
2015 assault at the Bataclantheater in Paris. Besides, the parts expected to develop
ad libbed hazardous gadgets and people willing to collect, convey, and explode them
keep on being accessible in wealth. Vital slack in this manner supports the aggressor.
Doctrine: A very much explained and extensively spread U.S. national
convention/doctrine by which to discourage assaults by non state performing artists
does not seem to exist. The striking nature and believability of U.S. convention are,
along these lines, low, just like the United States' notoriety for discouragement in
the nonstate performing artist subarea of the land space of warfare.68 In-area
prevention: In-space techniques of discouragement can be utilized to deny nonstate
performing artists the preferences that they look for in utilizing awry fear monger
strategies. Developed insight participation, arbitrary quests out in the open spots,
and occasional irregular surges in the level of security at clear targets increment the
likelihood that assailants will be impeded, accordingly diminishing the danger of
strategic amazement. Blocking the likelihood of positive attention and guaranteeing
negative media scope rather could lessen the normal incentive to the assailant of
mounting an assault. A coordinated, global vital interchanges crusade could raise the
normal expenses and lower the normal advantages of assaults by nonstate on-screen
characters by accentuating the accompanying:
1. the Islamic wrongness of such strategies, when Islam is manhandled to
legitimize them
2. the low achievement rate of such assaults
3. the disappointment of such battles to accomplish their political destinations
4. their counterproductive nature, defaming Muslims and causing sanctions
5. Observational proof that such assaults usher hard-line government officials,
less slanted to bargain, into office.

The Power that Developed Nations Possess

Cyber Warfare
Enablers/Empowering agents: The suppositions and necessities for fruitful
prevention for the most part give off an impression of being met in the digital space.
A few rivals do, in any case, seem to have a moderately high craving for going out
on a limb in the digital space. This suggests it will, at any rate at first, be more
difficult to deflect such on-screen characters from future demonstrations of digital
hostility. It is hard to decide if adversaries' conduct in the digital space can be
clarified as heedlessness conceived out of deficient involvement with the constraints
and symptoms of such fighting or whether it is the consequence of chilly, careful
computation by rivals that they would be advantaged by heightening in this domain.
Types of Deterrents: Because endeavors to change the adjust of intensity in the
digital area have been in progress for quite a while, general discouragement can be
thought to be very low. Due to the certainty that we have seen rehashed and
proceeding with occurrences of both rival PC organize abuse (spying and taking of
data) and adversary PC arrange attack, immediate deterrence of cyber warfare can
likewise be regarded to be low.
Surprise: With the conceivable special case of zero-day abuses (the misuse of
beforehand obscure PC working framework or on the other hand programming
shortcomings), the likelihood of vital astonishment in the digital space looks low;
the danger is well-known. Barring a incapacitating first strike on both the business
and administrative digital barrier assets of the United States or its partners, the
capacity to prepare assets in light of a cyber attack gives off an impression of being
high, and the likelihood of strategic astonishment in this way gives off an impression
of being low. Be that as it may, the impetuses and assets required for the private part
to ensure basic framework against cyber attack are considerable also, likely not in
place.
Technology: The United States' capacity to dissuade rivals specifically inside the
digital area is a capacity both of the predominance of arranged PCs in the objective
nation and of that nation's level of interconnectedness with the outside world. For a
few nations (e.g., Russia, China), consequently, open doors for coordinate
discouragement might be high; for others (e.g., North Korea), they might be lower.

The MAD Theory

Today the idea of hard and fast nuclear war is seldom discussed. There are worries
about Iran and North Korea's atomic projects and fears that psychological militants
may get hold of an atomic bomb. Be that as it may, the dread of a war in which the
point is to wipe out the whole populace of a foe has startlingly reduced. In 1962, the
idea of commonly guaranteed decimation began to have a noteworthy influence in
the guard arrangement of the US. President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert
McNamara, set out in a discourse to the American Bar Foundation a hypothesis of
adaptable atomic reaction. Generally it implied accumulating an immense atomic
armory. In case of a Soviet assault the US would have enough atomic capability to
survive a first rush of atomic strikes and strike back. The reaction would be massive
to the point that the adversary would endure "guaranteed pulverization".
Consequently the genuine reasoning of atomic discouragement was set up. On the
off chance that the opposite side realized that starting an atomic strike would
likewise unavoidably prompt their own particular pulverization, they would be
nonsensical to press the catch.
Arms Race between Soviet Union/Russia and the US since 1962:
Before, wars had been battled by vanquishing your adversary on the war zone by
prevalent utilization of power. However, MAD was a radical flight that bested the
regular perspective of war. The period of MAD proclaimed another dread, with
natives realizing that they could be destroyed inside a matter of minutes at the dash
of a catch a few a huge number of miles away. "The focal thing was the general
population had no control," says Dr Christopher Laucht, a teacher in British history
at Leeds University. "You were helpless before political leaders. Aside from the
dread that one side would accomplish something moronic, there was additionally the
dread of innovation and the subject of 'imagine a scenario in which a mischance
happened.
Eight months after McNamara's discourse the idea of MAD was nearly put under a
magnifying glass by the Cuban Missile Crisis. At last the two superpowers gave
ground and the issue was turned away however humankind had never come so near
doomsday.
Following a time of Cold War armistice in the 1970s, pressure climbed again in the
1980s. By this point the Soviet Union had numerous more warheads, and it was
ordinarily said that there were sufficient atomic arms on Earth to wipe the planet out
a few times.
The dread of approaching assault turned into a piece of regular discussion. Kids
hypothesized in the play area about the primary indications of an atomic assault -
hair and fingernails dropping out - and whether one could survive an atomic winter.
In 1983 there were various Russian false cautions. The Soviet Union's initial
cautioning framework erroneously got a US rocket coming into USSR airspace.
Around the same time, NATO's military arranging activity Able Archer drove some
Russian administrators to infer that a NATO atomic dispatch was up and coming.
A series of movies and TV arrangement in the 1980s - from War Games, Threads,
and When the Wind Blows - mirrored these feelings of dread.
Now and again the dark cleverness radiated from impossible spots. In 1984 President
Ronald Reagan broadly said in a radio sound check: "My kindred Americans, I'm
satisfied to reveal to you today that I've marked enactment that will prohibit Russia
for eternity. We start shelling in five minutes."
The experts attempted to offer consolation. In the UK a well known open data battle
Protect and Survive gave individuals guidance on the most proficient method to
construct an atomic safe house. It was later ridiculed by When the Wind Blows,
which depicted an elderly couple constructing their sanctuary and dying in the
atomic consequence.
Two decades after the Cold War finished, there are still in excess of 17,000 atomic
warheads around the globe, the lion's share as yet pointing forward and backward
between the US and Russia. Be that as it may, MAD as an open dread has vanished.
"Vulnerable War there was a little danger of absolute atomic disaster," says Paul
Rogers, teacher of peace learns at Bradford University.
Today the hazard isn't so much Armageddon yet an "elusive incline" of expansion,
he says. North Korea is thought to have around 10 warheads, Rogers notes, while
Iran is believed to be near an atomic bomb.
Some have guessed Saudi Arabia could take after if Iran succeeds and it's been
recommended that Israel as of now has in excess of 100 warheads.
The most genuine remain off today isn't the US and Russia yet the possibility of an
atomic trade amongst India and Pakistan in which "several millions would pass on",
Rogers recommends. What's more, the risk in any of these territorial question is that
the US and Russia get sucked in and what started as a war between two neighbors
goes worldwide.
"The dread of atomic war has lessened somewhat in light of the fact that the hazard
has retreated essentially with the finish of the Cold War," says Nick Bostrom,
executive of Oxford University's Future of Humanity Institute. "Be that as it may,
another factor may be basic changes in hazard mold - it ending up more famous as
of late to stress over a dangerous atmospheric devotion, for instance."
More quick stresses are psychological militant assault, pandemic malady, and
financial emergency.
Robert Harris in his ongoing novel The Fear Index analyzed the advanced tension
that breakers the danger of ground-breaking innovation with unbridled monetary
markets.
The fundamental character, who runs a flexible investments, comments: "Dread is
driving the world as at no other time... The ascent in advertise instability, as we
would like to think, is an element of digitalization, which is overstating human
emotional episodes by the phenomenal spread of data through the web."
These are current feelings of trepidation that John F Kennedy and Nikita
Khrushchev, driving the superpowers at the tallness of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
would battle to grasp.

Be that as it may, the finish of the Cold War hasn't evacuated the atomic warheads.
Relations amongst Russia and the West have decayed as of late. China, whose atomic
program is minimal comprehended in the West, is multiplying its military spending.
India and Pakistan remains a potential flashpoint. So for what reason don't
individuals fear atomic war as they used to?
For some examiners the world is presently a less steady place than it was amid the
Cold War. And all the major geopolitical showdowns still spin around atomic
weapons, says Dr Nick Ritchie, instructor in worldwide security at the University of
York.
"No less than a few hundred American and Russian atomic rockets stay on 'hard
caution' equipped for being propelled inside minutes. Regardless of whether that isn't
really the approach or goal, the frameworks and practices stay set up."

The phantom of MAD stays regardless of whether individuals would rather not
consider it.

Can Artificial Intelligence Upend Nuclear Capability?

Artificial Intelligence or "Man-made reasoning" and nuclear war have been fiction
clichés for quite a long time. The present AI is amazing no doubt, yet specific, and
remains a long ways from PCs that wind up mindful and betray their makers. In the
meantime, mainstream culture does not do equity to the dangers that cutting edge AI
undoubtedly shows, for example, its capability to make atomic war more probable
regardless of whether it never applies coordinate control over atomic weapons.
“There’s a “significant potential” for artificial intelligence to undermine the
foundations of nuclear security, according to a new report published today by the
RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization. This grim
conclusion was the product of a RAND workshop involving experts in AI, nuclear
security, government, and military. “
“At the very core of this discussion is the concept of nuclear deterrence, in which
the guarantee of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD), or “assured retaliation,”
prevents one side from launching its nuclear weapons at an equally armed
adversary. It’s a cold, calculating logic that has—at least to this stage in our
history—prevented an all-out nuclear war, with rational, self-preservational powers
opting to fight a Cold War instead. As long as no nuclear power maintains
significant first-strike capabilities, the MAD concept reigns supreme; if a weapons
system can survive a first strike and hit back with equal force, assured destruction
remains in effect. But this arrangement could weaken and become destabilized in
the event that one side loses its ability to strike back, or even if it starts to believe that
it runs of the risk of losing that capability.

This equation incentivizes state actors to avoid steps that could destabilize the
current geopolitical equilibrium, but, as we’ve seen repeatedly over the past several
decades, nuclear powers are still willing to push the first-strike envelope. See: the
development of stealth bombers, nuclear-capable submarines, and most recently
Russian president Vladimir Putin’s unveiling of an invincible ballistic missile.”

“ in the paranoid logic of nuclear deterrence, AI doesn’t have to actually provide

this breakthrough in order for it to be destabilizing — the enemy only has
to think that it provides a putative edge that puts its nuclear force at risk.

In the case of intelligent image processing, it’s not just paranoia. The U.S. Defense
Department’s Project Maven aims to take reams of drone video and pick out objects
automatically from full-motion video, enabling the analysis of massive quantities of
video surveillance.”

Do these developments make it easier for developed nations to have an upper hand
over developing nations? Where does this leave developing nations and does this
justify their use of nuclear energy to protect their states?
Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the military criticalness of AI when he
announced in September that the nation that leads in man-made brainpower will in
the long run govern the world. He might be the main pioneer to have put it so gruffly,
yet other world forces have all the earmarks of being thinking also. Both China and
the United States have declared eager endeavors to bridle AI for military
applications, feeding fears of a nascent weapons contest.
In a similar September discourse, Putin said that AI accompanies "epic openings"
and additionally "dangers that are hard to foresee." The gravest of those dangers may
include atomic steadiness—as we portray in another RAND distribution that layouts
a couple of the manners by which security could be stressed.
Key dependability exists when governments aren't enticed to utilize atomic dangers
or compulsion against their foes. It includes something other than keeping up a
tenable capacity to strike back after an adversary assault. Notwithstanding that
obstacle, atomic strength requires confirmation and consolation. At the point when
a country stretches out an atomic security certification to partners, the partners must
be guaranteed that nukes will be propelled with all due respect regardless of whether
the country expanding the assurance must put its own particular urban communities
in danger. Foes should be consoled that powers developed for prevention and to
ensure partners won't be utilized without incitement. Prevention, affirmation, and
consolation are regularly inconsistent with each other, making atomic steadiness
hard to keep up notwithstanding when governments have no enthusiasm for
assaulting each other.
In this present reality where expanding quantities of adversary states are atomic
equipped, the circumstance turns out to be relatively unmanageable. In the 1970s,
four of the five pronounced atomic powers basically focused on their weapons on
the fifth, the Soviet Union (Beijing, after its 1969 fringe conflicts with the Soviet
Union, dreaded Moscow significantly more than Washington). It was a moderately
basic two-sided remain off between the Bolsheviks and their numerous enemies.
Today, nine atomic forces are trapped in covering key contentions—including Israel,
which has not announced the atomic weapons store that it is broadly accepted to
have. While the United States, the United Kingdom, France still stress over Russia,
they additionally worry around an inexorably powerful China. Beijing's adversaries
incorporate not only the United States and Russia but rather India also. India fears
China as well, yet basically worries about Pakistan. What's more, everybody is
stressed over North Korea.
In such an intricate and dynamic condition, groups of strategists are required to
explore struggle circumstances—to distinguish alternatives and comprehend their
consequences. Could AI make this activity less demanding? With AI currently
beating human experts in the antiquated Chinese procedure diversion Go, and in
addition in recreations of feigning, for example, poker, nations might be enticed to
fabricate machines that could "sit" at the table in the midst of atomic clashes and go
about as strategists.
Falsely keen machines may end up being less blunder inclined than people in
numerous specific circumstances. However, for errands, for example, exploring
strife circumstances, that minute is still far away later on. Much exertion must be
used before machines can—or should—be depended on for predictable execution of
the unprecedented errand of helping the world stay away from atomic war. Late
research recommends that it is shockingly easy to trap an AI framework into
achieving off base conclusions when an enemy gets the opportunity to control a
portion of the sources of info, for example, how a vehicle is painted before it is
captured.
In any case, AI could undermine the establishments of atomic solidness through
means other than giving exhortation to strategists. Sensors and cameras are
expanding in number all through the world; AI's developing capacity to make
forecasts in view of data from these different sources may make countries stress that
the rockets and submarines they rely on for guaranteed countering will wind up
powerless. Amid the Cold War, the superpowers looked for devastating "first-strike"
abilities, yet this was a hazardous system—every superpower ended up persuaded
that the other may dispatch an incapacitating strike against it. With striking back
avoided, whoever struck first would pick up a tremendous preferred standpoint.
Along these lines the odds of inadvertent atomic war were significantly expanded.
Such difficulties are considerably more full in this day and age. More states are
atomic furnished—and AI innovation may loan additional believability to dangers
against atomic retaliatory powers.
In the coming years, AI-empowered advance in following and focusing on enemies'
atomic weapons could undermine the establishments of atomic steadiness; that is,
countries may address whether their rockets and submarines are helpless against a
first strike. Will AI some time or another have the capacity to control procedure
choices about acceleration or notwithstanding propelling atomic weapons? Such
capacities are off out yonder until further notice, yet the possibility that they will in
the end develop is genuine—just like the need to see, at this moment, how AI could
reshape the world's way to deal with atomic strength.

Nuclear Waste Disposal

The question of potential proliferation in the developing world merits thorough
debate regarding the management and disposal of radioactive waste. The process is
taxing for many, regardless of economic circumstance. Thus a variety of proposals
to handle this responsibility have been tabled worldwide, as the problems they are
faced with are also far reaching.
“Many nuclear power plants, particularly in the developed countries around the
world, are nearing the end of their operating lives, ” as these nations enjoyed a lead
in the nuclear race and their power plants have put more years behind them. This
nuclear race was at its peak during the Cold War, which left its mark on twenty first
century non-proliferation efforts in the form of left over radioactive waste from
decommissioned nuclear missiles.

The concern over proper disposal is more a question of efficient management than
technicalities. Typically represented by 5% of the total cost of the generated
electricity, the cost of managing disposal may comfortably be extracted from the
average national budget. Moreover, each country with nuclear capability has the
ethical and legal responsibility to dispose, thus by default radioactive waste in the
ideal scenario must be disposed in each of the approximately 40 countries involved
- an unfeasible option – as this entails that Sweden and other counties with few
plants of their own must invest in research for a local site for disposal out of
obligation. The more tangible alternative was then the establishment of ‘commercial
geologic repositories,’ which may last a predicted 100,000 years, pivoted around
competition and funded by fees from countries whose waste is being disposed for
them. The stable underground site in Yucca Mountain, Nevada serves as a paradigm.

The Environment Factor

The Demand for Clean Energy
In an increasingly environment-conscious age where the onus is on the energy sector
to sustainably handle the growing energy demands, as sustainability becomes the
ethical norm. A market determined carbon price incentivizes cleaner energy sources
as compared to fossil fuels to enter the playing field in which wind, solar and nuclear
are the main contenders.
The growing involvement in global efforts to combat climate change appeared more
tangible than ever when in 2015 over 140 nations expressed their approval of the
UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by agreeing to an 8%
per capita reduction in CO2 emissions by 2025 and 9% by 2030. The role of India
and China INDCs is noteworthy here with India pledging 246 GWe and China 352
GWe by 2030 on top of present world 178 GWe with regards to their solar capacity.
Regarding wind, China pledged 345 GWe and India 78 GWe capacity by 2030 on
top of 2015 world capacity. Also noteworthy among the policy responses to climate
change was the Kyoto Protocol.

Uranium Stewardship

“Stewardship involves the care and management of a commodity through its entire
life cycle. For a mineral, this cycle generally encompasses exploration, mining,
processing, refining, fabricating, use, recovery, recycling and disposal. Stewardship
must be an integrated programme of action aimed at ensuring that all materials,
processes, goods and services are managed throughout the life cycle in a socially
and environmentally responsible manner.”

The appeals of stewardship, if well implanted are many. Not only does this foster
lucrative economic relationships across the board, and enhance the social license of
an industry to operate, but also it also entails low energy and water consumption, as
well as less expenditure on other auxiliaries, and thus minimized harm to people and
the environment.

Looking Ahead
Despite the difficulties in store for the IAEA and its safeguards system in the near
future, this system is of immense importance for the conservation of global peace
and security. As explained in the IAEA booklet, Verifying Compliance with Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Undertakings, safeguards are a crucial aspect of the global nuclear
security framework. Furthermore, the booklet explains that safeguards are also
necessary for “regional and national security.” It must be understood that for all of
the IAEA’s work, states’ intentions related to the use of nuclear material cannot
always be predicted, and that “nuclear safeguards are only as good as the IAEA
membership allows them to be.”
Planning ahead, in its Long-Term Strategic Plan 2012-2013, the IAEA Department
of Safeguards has highlighted a number of objectives, in addition to its plan of action
for the improvement of Safeguards provisions. Moreover, It has decided to make
safeguards “more objectives-based and information-driven,” addressing its
shortcomings regarding verification. In addition, the IAEA acknowledges current
advances in nuclear technology, and is preparing to meet new challenges by adapting
its safeguards system accordingly. It also discusses the IAEA’s involvement in other
nonproliferation activities, such as providing technical advice in the negotiation of a
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Finally, the IAEA Department of
Safeguards has made a renewed commitment to working effectively with Member
States.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

1. How will the activities of the IAEA have to adapt to the new standards of the
future?
2. With new countries establishing nuclear facilities, what can the IAEA do to ensure
that all of its nuclear material is effectively safeguarded?
3. What should the IAEA do to address the concerns of Member States that
safeguards are being used to limit the growth and development of peaceful nuclear
facilities in nonnuclear weapons states?
4. How should the Agency deal with issues of non-compliance?
5. Is it justified for developing nations to continue to grow their nuclear arsenal?
6. What should be done of the environmental damages done by nuclear energy?
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