Bureaucracy’s Role in In Pakistan

There is general agreement among sociologists and political scientists that the
'elites' are present in all the societies. The Elites are the people of social significance
in the society. These elites are the top strata of the society who have capacity to
control or influence over the decision making process, in all spheres of life. The
control over the decision-making is with or with out the consent of the other sections
of the society1. This term applies to the functional / occupational groups, which have
higher status in the society for explicit or implicit reasons2. Theorists like Vilfred
Praeto (1963) and Gateno Mosca (1939) explained the doctrine of Elitism, they
described elite as a minority, which makes majority of the decisions. These major
decision are usually the political decisions. Most of the societies are made of two
classes, one that rules and the other that is ruled. The first class is always a minority,
small in number, whereas the later is always a majority, but lacks power3. The
structure of elite in every society is different and the reasons for elitism are also
different. Traditionally economic forces were described as the basis of this class
distinction. However, Burnham attributed the possession of means of production as
the core reason for this rule of minority. This monopoly over decision making process
is described as the fruit of the possession over means of production4

C. Wright Mills (1959) partly agreed with the assertion of Burnham that the
existence of elite in a society can be understood in the light of economic and social
structure of the society. He presented his power elite or institutional approach to
understand the power structure of USA. He tried to know who makes the decision in
American Society. He discovered that a minority comprising of individuals from
economic, political and military domain, constitute the power elite of USA. He
identified that a group of corporate rich, politicians holding important political offices
and bunch of army generals are the power elite in USA. These individuals work in

1 Fatima Qamar, ‘Who Governs Pakistan?’, Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 4, Fall
2014
2 Bottomore Elites and Society, Second Edition, pp. 8
3 Ibid, pp. 40
4 Parry, Political Elites, pp. 8
close collaboration. The decisions taken by all of them (power elite) tend to become
total in their consequence, therefore producing greater social value5. This inquiry
about the elites in American society highlighted the fact that the elites in American
society are the individuals who occupy top positions in financial, political and
military institutions. These individuals by virtue of their positions enjoy great power
over most institutions of the country (both public as well as private). Using this power
this small minority takes decisions for ordinary people. The close collaboration
between these members of the elite is the secret of their monopoly. This phenomenon
is prevalent in most of the societies of the world. As we see today that Government
are dependent on businessmen for generating tax revenues. Whereas businessmen are
always looking for government’s support in the form of loans and subsidies to
promote their businesses. And both government and businesses can't work unless and
until there is peace and stability, which bring the army general into the equation.
That’s how bureaucrats, generals and businessmen align themselves for their
collective benefits6.

The power elite / ruling elite is always equipped with political power. This
political power gives legitimacy to their decision and makes them binding for the
other sections of the society. Therefore, it becomes very important to understand that
who actually possess the power in the system to produce decision of binding nature7.
A distinction within the elite can be drawn i.e. general and functional elite. The later
consists of those who dominate their own individual sphere of public life: elites of
politics, government, business, religion etc. whereas the general elite are those who
dominate the society as a whole8. Elites are also define as “which are at the summits
of key social structure i.e. the higher positions in the economy, government, military,
politics, religion, mass organization education and the professions”9. Another view is
that “an elite is a body which controls a particular sphere of life though it may be
influenced by other elites at other levels or in different departments”10. Some theorists

5 Mills, The Power Elite, pp. 8,9

6 Fatima, Qamar, Who Governs Pakistan?, Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 4, Fall
2014
7 Orum, Introduction to Political Sociology: The Social Anatomy of the Body Politic, pp. 127
8 Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, pp. 4,5
9 Lipset, et al., Elites in Latin America , pp. 411
10 Spear, Perceival, The Mughal Mansabdari System. In Edumand Leach & Mukerjee, S.N.(edt).
Elites in South Asia. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1

2
has created an impression that elites are the decision makers of the society whose
power is not subject to a third force’s control. While others believe that they are the
sole source of the values in the society, they are the binding force, if they some how
vanish from the society the things would fall apart11. It is evident from the above
explanation of the concept of the elite that different theorists have explained it
differently, however, the phenomenon of Power is central to the notion of political
elite or power elite. The terms of political elite or power elite are synonymous with
influential, powerful, governors or decision makers12.

The above discussion brings to the conclusion that it is neither possible for an
individual nor for the masses to rule unless and until the support of the groups of
administrators, advisors, and propagandists is not accumulated. Similarly the masses
can't act on their own as long as they are not guided or controlled by a small group
(elite). The guidance from these small groups comes in the form of decisions. By
virtue of their small size, the elites have the inherent ability of exhibiting coherence,
producing quick decisions, showing solidarity in their public appearances13. This class
can be divided into two sub-classes i.e. governing elite and non-governing elite.
Governing elite has role in government, which means that they make decisions.
Whereas, the non-governing elite does not take major part in the decision making14.
Another way to categorize elites, is to classify them as specialized elite, social elite
and governing elite. The first two categories of the elite are based on their very
position in the society. The ability of the social elite to influence the lives of the
common man is limited because they don't posses any coercive power or monopoly
over decision-making process. They command respect of the masses, by virtue of this
significance, they influence people. People imitate them, this imitation may range
from dressing styles, table manners, accents, cultural and sporting interests etc.
Whereas, the political elite is composed of society's political leaders, who occupy the
positions in legislature. They hold coercive authority, which give them pre-eminence
in the decision making process15.

11 Parry Political Elites, pp. 64

12 Beck, A Survey of Elite Studies, Special Operations Research Office, pp. 5,6
13 Fatima, Qamar, Who Governs Pakistan?, Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 4, Fall
2014
14 Bottomore, Elites and Society, pp. 68
15 Parry, Political Elites, pp. 72

3
 Elite’s role, pattern and types in developing political systems are different
from those of western liberal democracies. Factors like poverty, high birth rate,
economic dependence on developed world, agriculture based economies, colonial
legacies, which ultimately lead to formation of weak political system. These
peculiarities differentiate them from well-established constitutional democracies of
the west. Non-western systems are differentiated into following types (a) political
democracies (b) Tutelary democracies (c) modernizing oligarchies (d) totalitarian
oligarchies (e) traditional oligarchies. One common thread which run across these
types is the absence of clear demarcation of boundaries between various institutions
of the state. Gross deviations from the routine functions of the democratic government
become a routine –matter. The legislative bodies become less effective in regulating
and controlling the rule making function of the bureaucracy16. In such transitional
democratic system, the task of identification of ruling elite becomes all the more
difficult. In well placed democratic system, all the government institution work with
in their specific domains and the ruling elite usually comes from the legislature. On
the contrary, in transitional democracies, the centers of power are usually found
outside the political / legislative system.

The ideas of ruling elite of the western democracy can not be transposed on
developing countries. Peculiarities of their political and social system and historical
realities make this transposition difficult. A detailed study of the constitutional and
political landscape of Pakistan in its historical perspective is necessary on two
accounts. First, it would explain the nature of the composition of ruling elite of
Pakistan. Second, it will also entail the role of bureaucracy in public policy making in
Pakistan.

British decided to leave India and partition plan divided the sub-continent into
two dominions i.e. Pakistan and India. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father
and the president of Muslim League and the first Governor General of the country
opted for British system of parliamentary democracy and hoped that rulers of the
country after him would be guided by the norms of this democratic system. However,
the incident after his death evolved into a structure, which was totally opposite to his

16 Wirda et al., Comparative Politics: Critical Concepts in Political Science (Vol.1), pp. 201

4
ideals. There are many factors for this unfortunate turn around, as Lawrence Ziring
(2004) described that the transfer of power established Pakistan as a parliamentary
democracy but the politicians were not ready for accepting the true values and norms
of the system17. Tussle between different ethnic and religious groups like Muslims,
Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Bengali, Punjabi, Pushtoons and Urdu Speaking, also
deformed the political structure and culture of the new state. These minorities / groups
began to strive for more and more share in the political and administrative set up. This
ruthless struggle resulted into chaos and political instability18. In 1947, civil political
leader like Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan were the leaders of the ruling
elite in Pakistan, they had complete control over policy-making process. This elite had
the final say in the matters of internal as well as foreign policy affairs. This continued
till the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan in 195119. After 1951, bureaucracy and
military began to increase their influence on the policy making process. And by 1958,
after the imposition of first military rule, laws like EBDO neutralized and eliminated
the majority of the political leadership from political / policy making process20. The
steel frame of British rule on India were two institutions i.e. army and bureaucracy.
After independence, political instability didn’t allow the political institutions to
develop. This lack of development of political institutions and political cultural
created a vacuum of authority and power. The civil service and military took
advantage of the situation and established their claims on public policy making. First
martial law proved to be the corner stone of evolution of ruling elite in the form of
civil and military bureaucracy in Pakistan. So two non-political elites i.e. civil and
military bureaucratic elite dominated the politics in Pakistan. However, this
dominance had brief interceptions during tenures of elected governments. Army and
civil bureaucracies have been self-appointed guardians of the state since
independence. The political parties have come and gone but these two institutions
have remained the pillars of state 21 . Successive dismissals of governments,
disintegration of political parties, dissolution of assemblies and clash between Muslim
nationalism and regional identities strengthened the grip of ruling elite i.e. civil and

17 Zirring, Pakistan: At the Cross Current of History, pp. 68

18 Gankovsky and Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan 1947-1958, pp. 113
19 Callard, Pakistan A Political Study, pp. 25,26
20 Goodnow, The Civil Services of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in A New Nation, pp. 75,87
21 Talbot, Does Army Shape Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. In Jaffrelot. Christophe (Edt). Pakistan:
Nation, Nationalism and the State, pp. 215

5
military bureaucracies. Regional and international factors also helped these non-
political ruling elite of Pakistan to consolidate their rule22.

Asaf Hussein (1976) explained the formation and existence of ruling elite of
Pakistan in its social and spatial context. It also explained the layers of power
structure in Pakistan. The elites come from the socio ethnic context of the society.
While in spatial context, feudal and capitalist class have been the breeding ground for
these elites. Majority of the high ranking officers, who occupied the important
position, had feudal or capitalist background. He identified six categories of elites in
Pakistani power structure, such as military elite, bureaucratic elite, religious elite, land
owning elite, industrial elite and professional elite23.

Nature of the regime and the political situation of that particular time shaped
up the composition of ruling elite in Pakistan. Asaf Hussain has talked about the
circulation of political elite and their role in the political system ”It was structure
primarily concerned with the circulation of power within its boundaries. The most
central area of the field was the power junction occupied by the governing elite; the
remainder area engaged by the non-governing elite. Political activity was almost
completely the reserve of the elite and if the middle sector and masses became
involved, it was as one or another group politically mobilized them in an attempt to
wrest control from the elite already occupying the position. The Civil- Military
elite tended to submerge the other four groups of elites as their share had always been
major in occupying the leading positions because of frequency of breakdown of
Political system. The corollary had been that two groups either exclusively or as a
joint venture exerted power and influence over the decision making structure”24

Dr. Saeed Shafqat (2002) affirms contours of Pakistan’s elite structure but in
a different perspective. While studying the Civil Military relations in Pakistan, he
coined two models: Military-Hegemonic Political System (1958-1969). Party
Dominant Political System (1977-1985). He has also found the primacy of
Military – Bureaucratic Elite in the political structure of Pakistan. He writes

22 Ayesha, The State of Martial Rule” the Origin of Pakistan’s Political Economy, pp. 295
23 Hussain, A, Elites and Political Development in Pakistan. The Developing Economies,
(Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1976), pp. 224,238
24 Ibid, pp, 239.

6
 “Bureaucratic elite constituted the epitome of power structure in Pakistan; they
enjoy power, privilege, prestige and status. These elites also monopolize control
over governmental resources i.e. coercion and patronage. The military and
bureaucracy are the principal institutions. These elites are relatively small,
cohesive, share similar political attitudes and enjoy the institutional base of
power”25.

The above discussion has established that Bureaucracy has always been the
part of the ruling elite of Pakistan since the independence. The degree of its influence
on the process of policy making has been varying depending upon the political system
of the country. However, there is no denying that bureaucracy has always been among
the ruling elite of Pakistan. Now lets discuss the details of Civil Bureaucracy as an
elite.

The Bureaucracy As An Elite

Bureaucracy’s importance for the smooth functioning of the state is

undeniable. It is the professional crops of officials, bound by a hierarchy, rules and
procedures. The importance of bureaucracy has increased with the passage of time;
bureaucrats have achieved degree of specialization in various dimensions of the
management and administration of the state. Bureaucracies, all the over the world,
have common characteristics. Functional organization requires that every office is
assigned a special task and selection of officer is based upon qualification.
Institutionalized procedures in the form of well-defined rules and procedures
streamline the working of bureaucracy. It has hierarchal organization with
arrangement of Government officials in pyramidal form, in which line of authority
runs from top to bottom and each lower officer is answerable to and supervised by
the next higher officer. Professional qualification is prerequisite for the officials to
perform the assigned task26.

Max Weber’s visualization of bureaucracy has lost its relevance in today’s

modern world. The requirement and the patterns of administration and management

25 Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations: From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto, pp. 4,10
26 Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 166,175

7
have greatly changed, especially in transitional democracies. Weak economies,
political instability, non-viable political structure, inherent vulnerability to political
pressures and non-standardize procedures have posed new challenges to
bureaucracies 27 . Bureaucracies have grown as more pervasive, more powerful,
dominant actor in policy-making process in transitional democracies, which
predominantly cover the third world countries28.
Being an ex-colonial state, Pakistan was no exception with regards to
bureaucracy’s influence on policy making process. Pakistani bureaucrats were the
lineal descendent of ICS (Indian Civil Service), which was setup by British to rule a
colony, they trained the officers of ICS to rule not to serve the local population. This
tendency to subjugate and overpower the common man did not die after the
independence. In Pakistan ICS was renamed as Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP).. In
Pakistan ICS was renamed as Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). The CSPs besides
structural patterns, also inherited the traditions, norms, political ethos of ICS. The
ICS officers had always been recruited from the elite class by qualifying an entrance
exam, a very superior and difficult one, which could only be passed through a very
superior quality education. The lower strata people could not even have dreamt of
it29.

The officer of the Civil Service of Pakistan had the edge of the superior
educational background, entry into superior service and inculcated western outlook
,which continued as it is after independence, combined with other factors of high
salaries, decisive role in policy formation and planning divisions and execution
apparatuses. The deputy commissioner, the lowest in ranking attained the role of
“Government in the field”30.

Authoritarian in tone and zero tolerance for outside interference in the

absolute use of their authority was the hallmark of officer of ICS. The same attitudes
prevailed after independence in Pakistan. For a very long time after independence,

27 Smith, Political Realities: Modern Bureaucracy: The Home of Civil, pp. 89 ,104.
28 Guy, The Politics of Bureaucracy , pp. 235

29 Goodnow, Henry Frank, The Civil Services of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in A New Nation, New
(Haven and London, Yale University, 1964). pp. 148,180
30 Hussain, Elites and Political Development in Pakistan. The Developing Economies, pp.
224,238

8
government did nothing to train bureaucrats to accept politicians’ superiority as the
elected representative of masses. The inculcation of behavior of ICS officers was so
strong that upcoming CSPs emerged with even more powerful role than that of
their imperial predecessors31. At the time of partition, Pakistan’s share in the
official corps was very minimal, because the Muslim ratio was only 9 percent, who
had hardly any experience at higher posts of Bureaucratic hierarchy as only one
Muslim officer had served as the joint secretary, while 5 or 7 came with the
experience of Deputy Secretaries.32

At the time of partition , the ICS officers were permitted to choose one of the
three courses for their future. First, an ICS officer can opt for service either India or
Pakistan without any reduction in salary or rank and without any loss in pension
privileges. The second option was to leave the service with allowances equal to
officer’s salary from 1947 to normal retirement date. The third option required re-
entry into service by personal contract with the government concerned. Out of 101,
ICS-IPS Muslim officers, 95 opted for Pakistan33.

In total 157 opted for Pakistan. 15 out of 157 officers, held judicial and 6
diplomatic assignments. Accordingly, only 136 officers were available to form
Pakistan’s administrative structure. Majority of the Muslim officers were from
provinces, which did not form with Pakistan. There was an uneven representation
of the incorporated provinces of Pakistan, as Punjab 27% NWFP 3% and Sindh had
only 5 % share. Asam and Bengal had 20% Portion. This created a chasm between
the provinces and center-provinces as well34.

Securing reserve positions in the bureaucracy for an ethno-sub-national group

was a way of ensuring guarantee for the right of his/her group. This alternative course
of action was due to the absence of significant institution of Political representation.
Initially Central Superior Services were the constellation of 13 services. The Civil
Services of Pakistan was at the apex, an elitist group, occupied the key post in
policymaking institutions. The power elite in the bureaucratic system from 1947 to

31 Ziring, Pakistan The Enigma of Political Development, pp. 161,175.

32 Kenneday, Bureaucracy In Pakistan, pp. 101,102
33 Ziring et al., Pakistan: The Long View, pp. 370
34 Ibid, pp. 360-370.

9
1962 were 82 ICS officers, with annual increase of about 25 CSP officers.
These were entitled to and held practically all the top posts at the federal level and
2/3 of the posts of provincial level. However, there was some sharing of power
especially in the provinces between the all Pakistan CSP and the only other all-
Pakistan viz the PSP. Until 1973, the structure of bureaucratic system continued with
the cold patterns, as the ranks were divided into four classes. The organizational
layout included the three categories. Firs, was the general administrative category
for which the CSPs were recruited. Second, there was the functional recruitment for
services such as the Pakistan Foreign Service (FSP) the Police Service of Pakistan
(PSP), Income Tax Service, Customs, Central Excise, Audit and Accounts Services.
The third category included the engineering and health services. But the real power
had always rested in the hands of CSPs, But FSP and PSP also enjoyed a prestigious
position as compared to other services35.

From 1948 till 1969, the ruling elite of Pakistan drew majority of its
intellectual and moral strength from CSP, higher ranks of military36. They had the
sympathies of judiciary 37 . The appearance of this elite and its monopoly over
decision-making can best be understood in the light of political instability, which
Pakistan experienced right from the very first day. Kashmir war, refugees’ influx and
many other governance issues coupled with ever deteriorating health of Jinnah made
things worse at the start and eventual death of Jinnah in 1948 gave a leadership set
back to new born nation38. Liaqat Ali Khan tried to fill leadership gap. But he was not
Jinnah. Increasing political differences between religious parties, communist, secular
elements etc. made the constitution making process a very demanding task. Internal
rifts of Muslim Leagues, governance crisis in Punjab and Baluchistan exposed the
abilities of politician to effectively govern this country. The sudden assassination of
Liaqat Ali khan in 1951, further made things worse. In 1949, Govt. in Punjab was
dismissed over the charges of corruption and misconduct. Military operation was
launched in Baluchistan and against Khan of Kalat. East Bengal was upset over
national language issue. Then war with India over Kashmir issue and its after math
added to the problems. On the western borders, Afghanistan laid claim over Pakistani

35 Kenneday, Bureaucracy In Pakistan, pp. 108,115.

36 Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan, Bureaucracy In A New Nation, pp. 49
37 Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan, pp. 201
38 Callard, Pakistan A Political Study, pp. 73

10
territories and became the only country to vote against the membership of Pakistan in
United Nations. Religious parties such as Jamaat-i-Islami, began to agitate to convert
Pakistan into a priestly state. Communist began to extend their agenda for a
revolution, which finally broke into Rawalpindi conspiracy. All these issues added to
the worries of Muslim League leadership39.

Politicians showed lack of character and instead of facing all these issues; they
preferred to hide behind Mr. Jinnah. On 30th December 1947, federal cabinet decided
that no matter of policy would be decided except at a meeting presided by Mr. Jinnah.
In case of difference of opinion between Cabinet and Mr. Jinnah. Governor General’s
decision would prevail. However, Jinnah observed that it’s entirely cabinet’s decision
what issues should be brought to him for guidance. Mr. Jinnah was also declared
entitled to call Secretary General or secretary of any ministry for the provision of any
information he might need and they shall be bound to do it. This decision signified
many things, first, Muslim League preferred to draw strength from an individual
instead of its ideology or institution. Second, it was the first legitimization of extra-
constitutional authority. Third, it set the precedence of direct interaction between final
authority and bureaucracy, eliminating the cabinet. Fourth, it made established that
government is a personal affair not institutional. On 11th August, 1947, Mr. Jinnah
declared that legislature is sovereign, but on 30th December leading members of
legislature declared Mr. Jinnah sovereign40.

Appointment of Ghulam Muhammad, as Governor General, epitomized the

rule of bureaucracy in the country. Governor General dismissed Nazimuddin’s
government under section 10 of provisional constitution of 1947. This move of
Ghulam Muhammad started a series of incidents which lead to final demise of
parliamentary democracy in Pakistan when Ayub Khan came to the throne as the de
facto ruler of the country and for the time being it looked that Pakistan is destined to
be a country ruled by Army generals fully supported by bureaucracy41. Ayub Khan
had high regard for the higher bureaucracy, specially the CSP, he took advice and
assistance from them on matter of pubic policy and national importance. He used in

39 Niaz, The Culture of Power And Governance Of Pakistan 1947 – 2008 , pp. 62
40 Ibid, pp. 72.
41 Ibid., pp. 83.

11
political roles as well in Basic Democracies system and bureaucrats equally
responded to the trust reposed in them42.

With the fall of Ayub Khan in 1969. Bureaucracy also saw a sharp decline in
its acceptance and popularity in the corridors of power. Yahya Khan thought of
running the country like army. There was also a perception in Army at that time that
civil bureaucracy actually deceived and manipulated Ayub Khan. Therefore,
immediately after the arrival of Yahya Khan, operation clean up against bureaucracy
started and many officer were dismissed or removed from the service. In the first
phase 303 senior civil servants were removed from the service. Moreover, senior
officers of civil bureaucracy found themselves reporting to junior level military
officers, these tactics were used to demoralize the bureaucracy. As result of these
steps bureaucracy found itself alienated and cornered. During these years of Yahya
Khan’s regime, bureaucracy was more of a silent critic of the govt. policies43.

CSP had full grip on the matters of the government. By 1964 nine out of ten
secretaries at the center, seven out of ten in provinces and three out of four divisional
commissioners were from CSP. What it substantiated that policy planning at the
center, co-ordination with provinces and implementation at the local level were all in
the hands of CSP. From planning commission to Industrial Development corporation
to other public sector corporation , CSP were holding the key positions. They were
playing important role in policy making and policy implementation. Deputy
commissioners under Ayub Khan’s Basic Democracies System became all powerful;
they were the link between state and the people. They were not only responsible for
the administration function. They were the mediator, explorer, exponent and executor
of the sovereign will. During Ayub Khan’s military rule, civil bureaucracy played a
very important role, which is little understood. It stood as a buffer between Army and
general public, bureaucracy was the medium through which both military rulers and
people interacted44.

42 Ibid., pp. 103.

43 Gardezi and Jamal, Pakistan The Roots of Dictatorship, pp. 145
44 Ziring, et al. ,Pakistan: The Long View pp. 169

12
 Civil Services reforms of 1973, introduced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto completely
altered the structure of the civil service of Pakistan. Bhutto viewed bureaucracy as
mother of all ills. He vowed to break the back of the CSP in particular and
bureaucracy in general. And he effectively did it. He did it by introducing civil
services reform in 1973. These reforms totally deprived the civil servants of the
tenure security, which was available to them in earlier constitutions of 1956 & 1963.
Removal of this security exposed the senior level officer to political pressures. In
order to institutionalize the administrative reform to ensure that CSP in particular and
bureaucrats in general may not gain the lost ground. Mr. Bhutto introduced the idea
of lateral entry. In paper it was meant to induct technocrats into the service but
practically, it was used to induct the personal loyal individuals in order to
institutionalize the loyalty in the civil service. The reforms included the basic
changes into infrastructure, organizational layout. As all service cadres were
abolished and system of occupational groups were introduced. The ranks system
was restructured into 22 national pay grades. Grade 1-4 were for working class with
unskilled tasks grade 5 to 15 for clerical personnel, grade 16 for superintendent and
grade 17 to 22 for officers. The new scheme services renamed these as cadres,
assigned official an occupational group and his job type, promotional prospects
remains within the purview of initial affiliation. Before 1973 reforms, the
promotional prospects, training facilities and housing were more lucrative for
CSPs as compared to others. A combined pre-entry training system was introduced
for all occupational groups, which were previously essential only for CSPs and
Foreign Service of Pakistan through Civil Services Academy. The decision was also
taken to make lateral entry into bureaucracy not through Public Service
Commission45.

Mr. Bhutto tried to control the politicians and bureaucrats through a system of
corruption, which was made possible through nationalization drive. In which large
industrial units, banks, educational institutions were left to the mercy of bureaucracy
which played havoc with them and when only after few years later Zia ul Haq decided
to roll back the nationalization process, there was actually nothing left in those units.

45 Ibid. pp. 145,190.

13
Mr. Bhutto tried to create a bureaucracy, which is loyal to him. But his attempt failed
miserably46.

Mr. Bhutto’s regime came to an end with imposition of martial law by his
hand picked Chief of Army Staff. Zia Ul Haq regime did not undo the civil service
reforms of 1973. However, bureaucracy was given due respect and the witch-hunt
started by previous regime stopped. Zia was ready to listen to bureaucracy to learn
from their experience. Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan (civil servant) became important
figure in the regime. Zia was comfortable with centralization of the decision-making;
rather it suited his dictatorial regime. Higher bureaucracy recovered some of the
autonomy and the importance of federal secretariat restored. Policy making function
very much came back to the folds of bureaucracy. Between 1977-88, political
representation in the system was absent, although a political government was set up in
1985, but there were many ‘no go’ areas for political govt. as far as policy-making
was concerned.

Assassination of Zia opened the doors of democracy in Pakistan. The period of

1988-1999 was the first real interaction of Pakistan with continued stints of
democratic government. During these years, one thing was blatantly missing,
leadership, and little attention was paid to it. Corruption was rampant in these
decades. Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan Muslin League (N) came to power
twice but could not complete their tenure. However, in these tenures bureaucracy was
again given the core job of policy formulation. These years were marked with policy
interventions of International Monetary Fund. Pakistan had to avail monetary
assistance from IMF due to financial indiscipline, corruption. Pakistan under went
structural adjustment plan, under this IMF directed plan, various structural changes
were initiated in the economy. Financial policy was more or less in the hands of IMF
and World Bank. The derive to politicize the bureaucracy gained full momentum and
over a few years bureaucrats began to be recognized for their political affiliation by
virtue of their prized postings in the government of one particular party. Politicians’
all efforts were directed at perpetuating themselves in offices of benefits. All the
members of National and provincial assemblies were allocated quotas for jobs which

46 Niaz, The Culture of Power And Governance Of Pakistan 1947 – 2008, pp. 225

14
lead to cronyism at the middle and lower level of administration and education
department. These misadventures of nepotism aggravated the existing problems of
delinquency, incompetence, and corruption to new heights. Legislatures persistently
interfered in the transfers and promotions of officials of all levels, which allowed
incompetent and dishonest bureaucrats to rise and further promote the culture of
corruption.

A culture of political victimization was promoted by both PPP & PML(N)

during 1988-99. Officers were senselessly removed from the posting and made
Officer on Special Duty (OSD). There are many examples of arbitrary promotions by
Mr. Nawaz Sharif, one such is the promotion of an additional secretary in Foreign
Office to full secretary and then appointment in Washington as Ambassador. This was
done shortly before Army threw him out of the govt. Ms. Bhutto’s placement bureau
was intended to circumvent the establish norm and procedures of appointment,
nepotism saw new heights. These innovative methods to discourage merit and
efficiency and reward loyalty further demoralized the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy’s
involvement was more or less limited to the policy implementation. More over, even
the political governments did not have much policy space to work with. It was
international financial institutions, which took over as policy masters in these ten
years. Furthermore, the political leadership (cabinet especially) was neither capable
enough to understand the policy dynamics nor interested in understanding these
dynamics. Their whole focus was on minting money. On one of the occasions, when a
policy draft of oversees employment presented before the cabinet, none of the
ministers were interested in applying his / her mind to the contours of the policy,
rather quotas were given to the ministers for placements of their favorites. There was
a tendency of accommodating party workers for their sacrifices during the army days.
But in this drive of adjusting the loyal party workers, gross irregularities were
committed and the bureaucracy was left helpless. The propensity to rule by verbal
orders increased in these ten years. Persons at the high positions tend to run the govt.
matters merely on verbal orders, they showed utter disregard for the paper work. Mr.
Moeen Qureshi, in 1993, took over as an interim Prime Minister, expressed his
disbelief and frankly admitted that government was used as an instrument of political
patronage and is being run like a feudal state rather than a representative govt.
Uneven and over paid promotions, arbitrary changes in the tenure of officers reduced

15
the level of efficiency and experience in higher Bureaucracy. The civil administration
was at total collapse. Army was called to do normal/ ordinary jobs like electricity
meters readings, census, judicial courts, ghost school hunting drive etc.

Higher bureaucracy CSP/DMG served as a restrain on army, extra

constitutional rulers ruled the country through bureaucracy, they were the interface
between army and the people. During army rule, the access of common man to the
corridors of the power was through bureaucracy. Assistant Commissioners and deputy
Commissioners and other officers working in the field offices of various departments
helped to developing a formal and informal mechanism of providing feedback to the
army rulers for thinking and rethinking of public policies. On October 12th, 1999,
Army once again took over the govt. from politicians. General Musharaf came to the
power as the chief executive of the country. In 2001 , govt. took a major decision and
introduced a local governments system, it was an attempt to delegate power at the
grass root level. Indirectly elected administrative were given powers to formulate
policy at the local level in number of areas e.g. development schemes etc. This system
lead to massive participation at the local level. A lot of governmental functions
previously held at provincial level, were handed over to local government level.
Under this system structure of Pakistan was divided into six hierarchical levels i.e.
federal, province, district, town(also called Tehsil & taluka) and union council. The
head of all the levels were elected representatives aided by civil service professionals.
This was a major deviation from the history of governance of Pakistan. This change
also brought a check on the bureaucracy. However, it looked very rosy on paper, this
system remained in practice for ten years. However, in 2008, a major change was
made and the elected leadership positions at district downwards level were removed
and replaced with bureaucrats. However, this system could not bear the full results
and it was rolled back the political govt. in 2008.

During Masharf’s time between 1999 till 2008, bureaucracy, once again
regained its lost confidence, although much of the policy formulation remained in the
hand of retired army men. National Re-construction Bureau (NRB) headed by a
technocrat, was instrumental in bringing policy changes in the administration set up of
the country. Financial policy was taken care by technocrats; bureaucrats can only
implement the orders. Most of the federal Govt. institutions e.g. federal public service

16
commission, planning commission etc. were headed by army general. Bureaucrats
were asked to take the back seats.

Between 1988 & 2008, the higher bureaucracy had become self centered,
lethargic and ineffective that it failed to show the vigor and enthusiasm in formulation
and implementation of complex policies. In 1998, politicians had a quasi medieval,
semi effective administration and policy making system at their disposal. However, in
2008, a highly politicized, dangerously divided and substantially ineffective
bureaucracy which spent last twenty years catering to wholly primitive whims of
politicians.

Laporte commenting on the administrative reforms concluded that the

perpetuity of the old pattern at the district level and a lack of workable system of
elected government let the old system continued while short interregna of Basic
Democracies during Ayub Regime and strong party workers cadre had some effect
on the power and role of bureaucratic system at district level. However, it could not
bring any change at institutional level47.

Decentralization was essential for the establishment of true democracy.

The Devolution Plan announced on 14th August 2000, contained reforms for
district to village levels under a new set up of local government. The popular
participation at grass-root level increased by reserving seats for some marginalized
groups. Women were given one third of the seats to the Zila Tehsil union and
village councils level. The 5% of total seats were allocated for workers/peasants and
minorities. The supremacy of elected representatives was established over the
Bureaucracy. At the district level administration and police was put under the
control of Zila Nazim (District Administrator) and Niab Nazim (Deputy
Administrator) of local governments. This corresponded to Mushraf emphasis, on
17th Oct 1999 speech, for governments to serve not to rule the people. Whatsoever
was the motive behind it, the bureaucracy was first time made to serve the people48.

47 La. Porte, Power and Privilege: influence and Decision Making in Pakistan, pp. 160,170
48 Mohsin Public Administration in South Asia, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, pp. 315-325

17
 The post of Deputy Commissioner (DC) abolished, who was the actual
repository of power at district level and manifestation of iron hand of British
colonial power. The magisterial power held by the DC was transferred to District
and Session judges and police functions were handed over to the district Nazims.
The DCOs (District Coordinating Officer’s) were to function as the chief advisers
to the district Nazims and as in charge of eleven District Offices (DOs) and
coordinate the work of the executive district officers, (EDO). The DCO and DPO,
grade 20 or 19 public servant remained the federal or provincial employed.
After 1999, the military once again took over the steering wheel of the
administrative system, became the senior partner with a large-scale entry into civil-
Bureaucracy. The retired and serving military officers held almost 600 senior
level posts in the federal and provincial governments49.

Bureaucracy’s Influence on Policy Making

Ayub Khan’s ascendancy to power marked the beginning of a new alignment

of power structure in Pakistan. Military and Civil Bureaucracy displaced the political
parties from their position of power. If we evaluate this ascendancy, it was nothing
but mere revival or continuity in legal and organizational pattern of authority from
colonial period to post independence era. For the analysis of this structural
continuity of bureaucratic supremacy over power requires in depth evaluation of
verifiable behavior of governmental authority rather than the conventional rhetoric of
legitimacy and political conflict of competing section of political elite. The rosy
dreams of economic developments were propagated as a tool for claiming (false)
legitimacy. Bureaucrats, in the capacity of the managers of the state, consolidated
their power by outgrowing the particularistic hold of groups based on class, ethnicity
and tribe on one hand. And on the other hand pursued the economic development50.

Bureaucrats are inherently self interest maximizers, their primary job is to

ensure compliance. However, this forced compliance is exercised within a particular
class context. While operating in the capitalist world, these bureaucrats / state
managers try to strengthen this compliance process in order to buy off the political

49 Kenneday, Bureaucracy In Pakistan, pp. 1,11

50 Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan, pp. 138

18
challenges for state power51. Bureaucratic Machinery takes a life of its own and it
strives for as much independence from its masters as possible52. Bureaucrats manifest
the state power through their manipulative efforts to secure their operational
autonomy in comparison to other social groups and classes. The autonomy of the
bureaucracy is manifested as its social functionality. Which means that the function
of meeting the reproduction demand of the society on the one hand and on the other
hand individual officer’s status interests53. Bureaucrats as a bearer of state authority,
reduces the political parties to role of mere brokers, who manipulate public opinion
in their favor and thus serve as legitimacy factor54. The capacity of the bureaucracy to
appropriate a large portion of national income and then use it as lever of power,
provides a clue to its potential autonomy in comparison to other groups and classes in
Pakistan and elsewhere55.

The Framework for the inquiry into the dominant role of bureaucracy in the
process of policy making is provided by the general commitment to economic
development, promotion of nationalism and concerns for national security. This
commitment is based on the state’s altruistic motives of modernizing the traditional
societies. This commitment of modernization best serves the classes or groups in the
state, which are already organized and integrated into the economic system. Push
factor of claims of various classes or groups in the political system play more
important role than the pull factor of policy objectives of various government and
non-government institutions, in determining the policy directions of a state56.

Development was bureaucracy’s religion under the colonial governments and

it got new impetus in the post second world war era in west. Even in case of India,
British rulers always presented themselves as modernizing force, always looking to
deliver India from backwardness. Which basically meant commercialization of
agriculture, industrialization and new relationship between government and social
classes. In Political terms, it meant a paternalistic rule, immersed in a constitutional
vision of a responsible government. This modernization was manifested through

51 Block, Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects, pp. 228-30
52 Marx, Theory of Revolution: State and Bureaucracy, Vol. I, pp. 312, 319.
53 Lanzendorfer, The State in Peripheral Societies, pp. 165.
54 Kenneday, Bureaucracy In Pakistan, pp. 43
55 Ibid. p. 295.
56 Ibid. p. 305.

19
moral and material progress ranging from religious reforms, provision of technical
education and sanitation etc. And all this modernization process was conceived and
implemented by the bureaucracy. After independence, Pakistan received its share of
bureaucratic heritage of development orientation. Partition created immense pressure
on the governments to create jobs and develop productive forces in general to settle
the millions of refuges in their new homeland. This meant that the bureaucracy would
take up a full-thrusted developmental orientation, which would help bureaucracy to
safeguard its organizational security and leadership role. During the first ten years of
independence, political turmoil was at its height, which allowed the bureaucrats to
hold the initiative in their hands. 1958 coup and subsequent politico-constitutional
framework further consolidated their position. Which manifested the impression that
actual transition took place between British bureaucracy and the emerging Pakistani
bureaucracy57. Failure of the politics of the nationalism also played its role in
surrendering the initiative to bureaucracy. Pakistan was created as a result of politics
of nationalism. However, after independence, this failed to provide a sense of unity
and soon the regionalism engulfed the political stage, which lead to the weakening of
the political institutions and strengthening of bureaucratic hold over policy-making
process58. The challenges posed by the partition were so huge that no one notices the
residual patterns of authority. In reality the continuity of the state structure was
almost forgotten in the wake of overwhelming effect of the change in terms of end of
subjection to white rule and escape from possible Hindu rule. Perhaps even the
Muslim officers who served at the strategic posts in new state would not have
imagined the extent of legal authority which they would be entitled to exercise after
independence59.
The first of such policy decisions, which gave bureaucracy an overwhelming
control over policy-making, was the creation of the new post of Secretary-General of
the Government of Pakistan. This post was the overlord of the bureaucracy and it was
to hold sway over the whole gamut independently of the actual cabinet of ministers in
the interest of administrative efficiency60. Ch. Muhammad Ali was appointed at this
post, he formally represented the Prime Minister at the secretariat level. He could

57 Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan, pp. 139-142

58 Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, pp. 250-280
59 Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan, pp. 132-143
60 Hamza Alavi, ‘Class and State’, in Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds), Pakistan: the Roots
of Dictatorship, pp. 75,80.

20
supersede ministers in policy decisions, he enjoyed confidence of Jinnah and Liaqat
Ali Khan. Ch. Muhammad Ali had the powers to scrutinized each and every
department. While on the other hand, perceived threat of Indian aggression laid the
foundation of turning Pakistan into a security state. Which brought army to the
forefront. Bureaucracy assumed the role of middle man between Army and
politicians. Iskandar Mirza, with a military background, serving as secretary defense
was ideal to serve as a bridge between military and political leadership. Ghulam
Muhammad was the first finance minister of Pakistan, he was a bureaucrat, who was
invited to by Mr. Jinnah himself to serve as Finance Minister. After the assassination
of Liaqat Ali Khan, Ghulam Muhammad became the governor general of Pakistan.
Ayub Khan, chief of army staff slowly gradually became more and more involved in
politics and policy making till the time he took over the government completely. This
gang of four became all the more powerful during the early year after independence61.

Ghulam Muhammad, ex-bureaucrats became the governor general, which gave

bureaucracy a more assertive role. Ghulam Muhammad was the third governor
general of Pakistan. Leaving Mr. Jinnah out of this discussion, it was the first time
that the governor general has support of the army and civil bureaucracy. When he
dismissed the Constituent Assembly in 1954, he sustained his decision by mustering
support of civil and military bureaucracy and the bureaucratic supremacy over
political institutions was publically demonstrated. From 1951 till 1954, Ch.
Muhammad Ali, Ghulam Muhammad, Iskandar Mirza and Ayub Khan operated freely
on the chess board of Pakistani politics. All these gentlemen had their roots in
bureaucracy. After Ghulam Muhammad’s retirement and Ayub Khan’s formal
withdrawal from politics, the remaining bureaucrats i.e. Ch. Muhammad Ali and
Iskandar Mirza assumed the two top most positions in the political system i.e. prime
minister and president. Ch. Muhammad Ali, the Prime Minister and the president of
the ruling party i.e. Muslim League could not hold together the political forces and the
system eventually collapsed and all the political initiative fell into the hand of
Preseident Iskandar Mirza and his coterie of politicians. The stage was set for a
military take over which saved the bureaucracy from a need to seek legitimacy for
their rule through a mass mandate. The process of assumption of power by the non-

61 Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan, pp. 150

21
parliamentary groups was complete with General Ayub Khan’s deceleration of martial
law in 1958.

This gang of four played an important role in representing group alignments.

Ch. Muhammad Ali, as secretary general, enjoyed legitimacy and power. Ghulam
Muhammad waged a war with parliament, which he won with the help of judiciary.
Iskandar Mirza discredited the parliamentary system and paved way for bureaucratic
rule under the suzerainty of military. And finally Ayub Khan imposed martial and
fully establish the civil and military bureaucracy rule, which didn’t require any guise
of legitimacy.

One-Unit frustrated the smaller provinces, specially the politicians from Sindh
demanded to roll back this decision62. Government’s response to this demand was
purely bureaucratic, which speak volumes about the influence of bureaucracy on
decision-making. It was proposed that the administration may be decentralized and
more powers may be given to divisional commissioners or four administrative zones
may be created, with Committee of local ministers, under the leadership of Lt.
Governor63. A culture was prompted, in which rule of law meant strengthening the
law enforcing agencies and penalizing the politicians. In other words, official thinking
weighed the group identity of the lawful authority of the state in favor of bureaucracy
as against the politicians64.

Pakistan movement successfully conveyed the impression that the

independence would bring an era of prosperity for the Muslims. Muslim League was
given the mandate to turn this promise into reality. However, Muslim league could
not keep up this promise and disintegrated as an institution after independence.
Bureaucracy as an institution showed the potential of keeping up with the challenges
faced by the new country. Which won it an exclusive right to plan for the country’s
future almost by dictation. However, the question arises that what made the
bureaucracy’s claim more authentic than the other competing groups for the ruling
elite of Pakistan. Was it only the strength of bureaucracy as an institution and its

62 The Pakistan Times, 7th September 1958.

63 The Pakistan Times,(editorial), 2nd July 1958.
64 Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, pp. 285

22
historical legacy, which allowed it to discriminate against other groups like politicians
or there were other factors. Discussion in the coming pages would explore
bureaucracy’s role and influence on the public policy making in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s colonial heritage in the form of legal and hierarchical structure of

bureaucracy, constitutionally-sanctioned official roles and tenurial security for
individual officers gave the confidence to the bureaucracy as an institution to assume
the role of implicit and explicit decision maker or policy giver right from 1947. As it
has already been discussed how the bureaucrats managed to capture political offices
after a few years of back stage maneuvering. Similar situation prevailed in Thailand in
1932, Military rulers placed mid level bureaucrats in high decision making positions,
these individuals were more receptive to their implicit bosses rather than competing
groups of the power elite 65 . As for the parliamentary rule, cabinet was more
influential than the parliament. Ministers had constituency in bureaucrats and they
could stay in the office as long as the bureaucrats accept them as their bosses.
Ineffectiveness of parliamentary process made the parliament redundant66. Limited
control of parliament over finance, the incessant proliferation of the administration
staff and over centralization of the decision making power in the hands of executive
were the salient characteristics of government structure in Thailand in 193267.

A similar kind of political structure emerged in Pakistan immediately after

independence, which was dominated by the bureaucracy even while working under
the political bosses i.e. Ministers. The Cornelius Report highlighted the reality by
accepting that although the elected representatives are in-charge of the government
but the secretaries are the brains of the ministers, which eventually dictates every
action. This fact undermines a fundamental purpose of the Constitution i.e. the power
and the chosen representatives of the people shall exercise the authority of the State68.
There was an anomaly underlying the post independence arrangement of state
authority in Pakistan. On one hand, there was bureaucracy which ruled for a hundred
years. While on the other side, there were politicians who were new to the power.
They enjoyed political offices practically in the pleasure of the higher bureaucracy. La

65 Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity, pp. 323

66 Ibid. pp. 328,29.
67 Ibid. pp. 358
68 Report of the Pay and Services Commission, (Karachi, 1969), pp. 80.

23
Porte recognized this fact and described them as qualitative power holders, who are
only selectively influenced by politicians in decision-making, whereas, the politicians
were the quantitative power holders having voting strength69. Absence of elections for
many years, made the politicians and political parties redundant. While on the other
hand administrative system of the state was not redundant even for a single day.
Which enabled the bureaucracy to expand its qualitative power70.

Bureaucrats have usually viewed politics as another name of instability,

systematic disruption and disunity. Ethos of elitism infused bureaucratic thinking.
Bureaucratic authoritarianism reached idyllic heights when the role of a development
officer was termed as custodian of morals of communities as well71. CSP officers
stood at the apex of the bureaucratic structure and found themselves enjoying
monopoly over correct thinking 72 . Bureaucracy under Ayub Khan presented an
intricate form of bureaucratic authoritarian rule. New sources were applied to
establish legitimacy in order to achieve public order. Nationalism was one of such
tools used extensively during Ayub Khan’s regime. During Zia-ul-Haq ‘s time Islam
and Jihad rhetoric was used to seek legitimacy. General Musharaf used the ‘Pakistan
first’ and ‘Enlightened Moderation’ symbols to control and direct the public
sentiment. These slogans and symbols were used to slow down the process of public
participation in policy-making and divert public attention from real issues. The policy
making process remained limited to the ruling elite of Pakistan, which included Army,
Bureaucrats, Politicians and Religious Leaders. And the development orientation of
this ruling elite was limited to the improvement of socio-economic conditions of
urban life. However the role of non-bureaucratic institutions is always detested and
every attempt is made to keep the localize politics under firm control. Ayub Khan
experimented with the Basic Democracies System, objective was to transfer the
authority to the grass root level. However the system remained under the directive
control of the bureaucracy.

From 1951 till 1969, Pakistani bureaucracy completely dominated the political
process from top to bottom, role played by leading bureaucrats has already been

69 La. Porte, Power and Privilege: influence and Decision Making in Pakistan, pp. 12
70 Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan, pp. 163
71 Ibid, pp. 164
72 Ibid, pp. 165

24
discussed. This domination by bureaucracy directly related to parallel process of
under development of political institutions, political parties and legislature.
Institutional imbalance between bureaucracy, politicians and social groups can be
traced at the heart of this issue Bureaucracy legitimized its out grown role as decision
making, largely as the agent of modernization and economic development.
Bureaucracy felt it binding on itself to lead society’s quest to move out of the clutches
of the tradition. Bureaucracy also found it a way to ensure its supremacy among the
ruling elite of the country. Therefore, special emphasis was given on keeping
bureaucracy abreast with the development in economic and administration field.
Special attention was paid to improvement in its own organization. However, any
attempt made from outside to revamp the bureaucratic structure was strongly resisted.
Pakistan inherited complex bureaucratic structure from the British. Internally the
bureaucracy was divided into vast number of services and cadres. These were: (i) the
CSP, generalists in nature, mainly trained for administration, (ii) Specialized services
like Health & Engineering, with in each of specialized service, a hierarchy of four
classes existed, with different appointing and dismissing authorities, with different
levels of responsibility and power, as well as different conditions for service. There
was a functional division between the central and provincial services.

An attempt was made to re-organize the structure of the civil service

immediately after independence. Previously the officers were permanently posted in
the provinces and were deputed to the center on its request. After the re-organization,
center used to loan officer on deputation for specific tenure73. Provinces didn’t have
effective control over officer coming from center on deputation. These officer from
center used to look after the functions transferred from center to province. This
manifested the distrust of the center over the provinces. This factor was more
prevalent in Punjab and NWFP province where anti-Muslim League political
sentiment was strong. Central govt. used these officers as a tool to safeguard its
interests74. The dominant position of CSP remained the hallmark of bureaucratic
structure in Pakistan. Seats were reserved for CSP at the highest level i.e. Secretary,
Joint Secretary etc. This reservation of seat for CSP was a British tactic to handle the
pressure of Indianization of civil service in Pakistan. British surrendered some of the

73 Braibanti, Research on Bureaucracy of Pakistan, pp. 298

74 Ibid., pp. 301

25
superficial power and authority to the new emerging technical cadres, while real
policy making authority remained confined to CSP cadre. Same power structure
remained intact after independence75. As per the CSP cadre rules of 1954, 66% of the
higher posts were reserved for them, which included posts of secretaries, joint
secretaries and deputy secretaries at the center and provinces as well as commissioner
and deputy commissioners in the field. By 1964, 89% of the secretaries at center and
65 % at the provinces were from CSP cadre. Similarly 75% of Divisional
commissioners and 51% of deputy commissioners were from CSP cadre76 . As
discussed earlier that the centralization of the power in the hands of civil service was
initiated by creation of the post of the secretary general in the center. This post not
only supervised the work of eight ministries present at that time but also incorporated
the secretary-ship of cabinet and establishment division. The entire govt. was thus
centralized in the hands of the secretary general , Ch. Muhammad Ali, he firmly
established the rule of generalist bureaucracy in the country. In British India, under
India Act of 1935 Secretaries had the direct access to the supreme head, which was
viceroy. this provided a good precedence for CSP after independence, this elite
service assumed the role of brokerage between the chief executive on the one hand
and the ministerial and parliamentary interest on the other hand. After a while,
ministers became so hapless that it was beyond their power to even transfer the CSP
officer from one place to another, as they had constitutional guarantee for tenure77.

Just like any other bureaucracy, Pakistani Bureaucracy tried to portray itself as
non-political organization. Working to achieve national goals. These apolitical and
neutral bureaucrats never accepted liability for any failure even when they were
involve in high political functions like allocation of resources. It is important to
remember that public policy is all about allocation of resources, which is not possible
with out the participation of those who actually manage and utilize resources by
techniques of simulation, satisficing, simplification and defining jurisdictional areas78.
This is only possible if the bureaucracy de-politicize itself in the name of rational
innocence. This innocence was manifested in the apparently non-political identity of

75 Ibid. pp. .204

76 Ibid. pp. 302
77 Burki, ‘Twenty years of the Civil Service in Pakistan: A reevaluation’, Asian Survey, 1969,
pp.243-247.
78 Bernard Schaffer, ‘Insiders and Outsiders: The Ins and outs of Bureaucratic Politics’, Seminar
paper, University of London, 1982, P.$.

26
the Pakistan bureaucracy, which sought to maintain the façade of functional neutrality
in professional terms.

Failure of the most political and martial law regimes to re-structure the civil
services of Pakistan to break their monopoly over decision-making institutions of
Pakistan. CSP cadre had been the target of most of these attempts. However, CSP
cadre successfully handled these moves until and unless Mr. Bhutto came up with
1973 civil services reforms. CSP cadre was dismantled and renamed as District
Management Group (DMG). In post 1973 civil services reforms era, DMG cadre
proved to be the true successor of CSP. However, it is pertinent to mention that
Bureaucracy, specially the CSP and now DMG / PAAS cadre has always resisted any
policy initiative to reform the civil service. Any such move is always consider as an
initiative to put restrictions on the power and authority of the civil servants. For
example, Cornelius Report recommended the revival of old system of provincial
encadrement of officer and their subsequent allocation to the center79. The CSP
members of the Cornelius Commission wrote a dissenting note, stating that these
recommendations of the commission were the most drastic changes to be introduced
anywhere in the world, when implemented would create a psychological upheaval and
scramble for promotion and selection. The present system had stood the test of the
time and the administrative leadership and co-ordination itself is a specialized
function for which the CSP were most qualified80.

Bureaucracy has always used its role in preservation of social order as main
defense against any criticism. Most of the reforms packages for civil service re-
structuring have been resisted by CSP/DMG cadre in particular and bureaucracy in
general. The bureaucratic polity has never allowed public representatives from
meddling into the affairs of bureaucracy; instead the successive governments have
been told to keep civil services reforms agenda ‘out of politics’, this is something that
the bureaucracy would decide itself. The case of civil services reform of 1973 is some
what different in a sense that these reforms may have changed the services structure
of various cadres, however, the hegemony of CSP remained intact, only the name was
changed from CSP to DMG. Most interestingly, politicians have accepted the bid of

79 Cornelius Report, para 57.

80 Note of Dissent by G. Mueenuddin and Ali Asghar, in Ibid., paras 5 to 6, p. 447.

27
bureaucracy to leave the civil service reforms agenda to bureaucracy, this has given
legitimacy to the routinized supremacy of bureaucracy with the help of legal
institutional traditions.

Most interestingly, the most potent resistance to the monopoly of the top
hierarchy of the civil bureaucracy came from with in its ranks. Provincial Civil
Services, police, judiciary, non-CSP/DMG cadres always resisted the overwhelming
role of top hierarchy. It was the intra-bureaucracy rivalries, which dominated the
power game in Pakistan. Often these marginalized cadres, which developed
particularistic demands such as departmental interests, which focused on the state as
an arena for settlement of conflicting pressures. The boundaries are jealously guarded
through merit based recruitment methods, exclusivist communication channels and
super-confidentiality of the office files81.

Government of Pakistan, right from the day one, took a policy decision to
establish a centrally controlled economy model in which government has the central
role. Private sector is given protection and incentive to follow the lead given by the
Government for their investment decision. This approach towards economic planning
and development gave a long lasting leverage to bureaucracy to exercise endless
influence on economic policy making in Pakistan. This commitment to economic
development surfaced as early as 1948, a development board was coordinating the
nation-building schemes. In 1950, various schemes of social and economic
development were initiated, these schemes provide an orientation to the generalist
oligarchy i.e. CSP cadre, which lead to the formation of Administrative Enquiry
Committee in 1951, which was followed up by Economy Committee in 1953. The
Colombo Conference of 1955 further ignited the spirit of economic development.
Successive measure were taken to enlarge the administrative capacity of the
government. By the time Ayub Khan govt. launched the second five year plan, a
moderately sophisticated planning machinery for development was already in place.

In 1950s, development in general and economic development in particular

emerged as a thriving academic discipline. Bureaucrats from various third world

81 Nazim, ‘For Official Use Only’, The Muslim, Islamabad, 5 November 1979

28
countries went to western universities to study public administration, economic
development courses. Change, progress, growth and development were the buzz
words. Bureaucracy in Pakistan had its share of exposure to the emerging conceptual
framework of development administration, which in common usage of the term meant
a rapidly development country, which was headed for modernity with special focus on
nation building and socioeconomic development82. Weidner proposed a model in this
regard, which consisted of four possibilities; growth with system change; growth
without system change; no growth with system change and no growth with no system
change83. Pakistan fell in second possibility, the so-called short run pay off strategy,
where the continuing constrains of the system keep the return relatively limited84.

Under Ayub Khan, the planning machinery for development made quite a lot
of progress. At the top was National Economic Council, which consisted of the
President, provincial governors and relevant ministers, vice chairman of Planning
Commission and heads of PIDC and WAPDA. It reviewed the overall economic
position of the country in the light of approved five year plan and sanctioned
development Schemes. One step lower, the Economic Committee of Cabinet (ECC)
supervised implementation of economic policies and sanctioned development
schemes. Most important was Planning Commission, which was directly responsible
for preparing the five-year plan, periodically assessing the action resources, devising
schemes for their most efficient use, setting priorities for their allocation. It also
conducted economic research. Project division of Planning Commission prepared and
distributed reports on the progress including periodic digests to measure the
performance against predefined output standards. It carried out evaluation of the
completed project / development schemes85. Provincial government also had their
planning departments. The constitutionally, the question of division of power between
center and the provinces remained unresolved, the general assumption prevailed that
the provinces are mere executors of the schemes86. Planning Commission’s role
epitomized the role of bureaucracy in economic planning.

82 Edward W. Weidner, ‘The Elements of Development Administration’, Development

Administration in Asia, (Durham, 1970), p.7.
83 Ibid., pp. 5,6.
84 Ibid., pp. 13.
85 Pakistan, Planning Commission, Second five Year Plan 1960-1965, (Karachi, 1960), p.103.
86 Ibid., pp. 109.

29
 Pakistan inherited some public sector organization concerned with
improvement of towns, railways and ports. By 1958, the number of these
organizations reached to 13 which also included State Bank of Pakistan and Pakistan
Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC). Ayub Khan gave his regime the
character of a government by public corporations. New bureaucratic set ups were
formed to avoid the gruesome routine of regular administrative departments run by
the same bureaucrats. The regular department were considered full of repetitions, non-
growing experience, dotted with unnecessary checks and balances 87 . The
establishment of these huge corporations was solely a bureaucratic initiative;
legislative played no role in this 88 . These public sector organizations were not
answerable to the legislature. The only specially set up commissions can probe the
matters.

Having discussed the economic and developmental planning institutional set

up in Pakistan, which laid the foundations of bureaucratic influence on economic
policy-making. Lets have a look at the development strategies formulated and
implemented by the bureaucracy. However, there are opposite views as regards the
question that who actually dominated the national economy of Pakistan. The Soviet
writers like Gankovsky and Polanskaya and socialist circles of the society follows the
orthodox line for class analysis and thus concludes that the bureaucracy worked as an
agent of the bourgeoisie and safe guarded their interests. In this view, class is an
independent variable and bureaucracy is a dependent variable89. Whereas, Alavi and
others depicted civil and military bureaucracy oligarchy90. Fundamentality Pakistan’s
power structure always brought out the centrality of the state which had its support
bases with in the society. Bureaucracy started with opening up the economy for much
needed capital from foreign sources to provide impetus to the economic activities.
This choice for the development route seemed easy and required labor from
bureaucracy. Furthermore, it had the support of the bourgeoisie, however, it seriously
lacked the social context. Over all development orientation can be understood from
the bureaucracy’s understanding of the social crisis from input rather than the output

87 G.S. Birkland, ‘Government by Corporations’, Development Administration in Asia,

(Durham, 1970), p.123.
88 Mahmood, Public Policy and The Rural Economy of Pakistan, pp. 93.
89 Gankovsky and Polonskaya , A History of Pakistan 1947-1958, pp. 84
90 Fatma Qamar, ‘Who Governs Pakistan’, Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4, Fall 2014

30
level. Production rather than the distribution was the main focus on the economic
planning. In this bid, state acquired conservable control over the process of capital
investment. State provided security for the investment and guarantee for the minimum
returns. State had monopolistic control over the regulations for access to foreign aid
for selected groups, classes, through measure like foreign exchange control,
protectionist policies and licensing systems. Bureaucracy enjoyed very high level of
control over industrial and commercial policy-making. It is pertinent to note that no
major legislation related to economic and industrial development originated in the
legislature. Major initiative in this regard were either in the form of presidential or
martial law orders or the policy documents formulated by the relevant ministries,
which had ceremonial approval of the Cabinet or Prime Ministers. For examples
major legislation about labor took place between 1942 to 1958. Industrial dispute
ordnance of 1959, Foreign Exchange Act of 1947 and Import & Export Act of 1950
were purely bureaucratic initiatives91.

The development process, which included formulation of plans, scheduling of

industrial investment, allocation of foreign exchange, size. Location and ownership of
the industrial enterprise, was completely dominated by the bureaucracy. In practical
term the decision-making in this field was reserved with Planning Commission,
Department of investment, Department of Production & Supplies, , the Licensing
Board, Chief Controller of Imports and exports and many other government bureaus.
Any development in Ayub Khan’s planned economy has a stamp of bureaucratic
thinking. Appeal against the decision of any of these organizations was not allowed to
any authority outside. Business community hardly had any involvement in the
determining the process for adjudication. The absence of public participation in
formulation of policy indirectly legitimized the law-making authority of the state as a
fait accompli92. The justifiability of administrative actions in the courts was limited to
non-policy matters. However, during 1990s structural reforms program under IMF’s
supervision done away all these structural arrangements and set the trade and
commerce activities free from all sorts of licensing requirement. These initiatives
reduced the grip of bureaucracy on trade and commerce activities in the country.

91 Brecher and Abbas , Foreign Aid and industrial Development in Pakistan, (Cambridge
University Press, New York, 1972), pp. 110,115.
92 Ibid, pp. 140,145.

31
However, bureaucracy’s role changed from regulator to facilitators. Till date, trade
policy, import and export policies and industrial policies, monetary and fiscal policies
are still largely in the hand of the bureaucrats, through which they still determine the
export/import/industrialization orientation of the country.

Right from the start factors like private proprietorship of means of production,
enhanced control of state. Import substitution, consumption based industrialization
and reliance on foreign aid, can be counted as the determinants of the growth policy
of the country. The salient features of bureaucratic thinking about economic
development were (i) functional inequality,(ii) development of large scale
manufacturing industry, (ii) commitment to foreign aid and (iv) direct or indirect
involvement of state. Following these principles govt. subsidized the industrial
development and helped the emergence of independent bourgeoisie. State provided
most of the input below the opportunity cost, cheap labor (through cheap wage goods
and curbs on unionization), cheap capital (by providing low-interest loans from public
financial institutions), cheap machinery (by giving import license to import
machinery) and cheap raw materials – mainly jute and cotton (by making them cheap
through export taxes and over valued exchange rates)93.

Measures like profit controls, price controls, labor regulations, rationing of

scarce commodities shaped the economic and industrial development process during
the early years. Generalist civil servants determined the technological needs of the
industrial units and their foreign exchange demands94. After the first decade, direct
controls gave way to indirect control systems. Planning Board later Planning
Commission’s role became more prominent. Market allocation i.e. monetary
incentives were provided through indirect allocation using tools like Export Voucher
Scheme and export duties and subsidies. State Bank’s role became more central with
regards to foreign exchange. Quotas and licensing regime was liberalized. Govt.
issued Open General License for various commodities while others were dealt under a
‘cash cum bonus’ system which was required a proportion of the import bill to be
paid out in the form of Bonus Voucher. That’s how the role of government as a
regulator and controller emerged as a major determinant of the shape of the national

93 Naseem, Underdevelopment, Poverty and Inequality in Pakistan, pp. 292.

94 Ibid, pp. 305-310

32
economy. Role of PIDC was important, it helped the private sector to establish into
risky business of manufacturing in hard areas like east Bengal etc. leading
industrialist were at the board of directors of the PIDC. It claimed that PIDC acted as
a front organization of the private sector95.
As regards the industrial policy Mr. Jinnah always wanted a strong industrial
base for the country, which could provide the foundations to realize the dream of
economic prosperity. The landlords who dominated the ruling party had little idea of
working on a commercial / industrial policy. On the other hand the businessmen
community comprises of refuges came from various part of India to settle in Pakistan,
they had no representation in legislature. Therefore, it was natural that real power in
this sphere would eventually fall into the hand of relatively established and organized
institution of state namely bureaucracy. This dominance of bureaucracy on industrial
policy making became a permanent feature until 1990 when Pakistan relatively
liberalized its industrial sector and govt. assumed the role of a facilitator rather than
the regulator.

Agriculture is one of the most important sector of the economy, it provides

input to the most of the industries in the economy, its contribution at present is 25.6%
in GDP96. This share has come down from 57% in 1950s. Although the majority of
the ruling class in the earlier years had agricultural background. However,
bureaucracy’s role in policy formulation for the development of this sector is
overwhelming, this role can be understood at two levels. (i) Institutional Level (ii)
Technological Level. Institutional level role includes role in land reforms and other
forms of rural engineering. Bureaucracy has direct role at this level, however, it was
not effective due to the severe opposition of the powerful interests of landlords. At
Technological level, the role of bureaucracy was indirect e.g. providing subsidies to
the farmers to help them increase their output. However, this strategy failed to yield
any change in the prevalent class structure of the society, it ended up helping the rich
farmer more97.

In agriculture policy related issues Bureaucracy’s role was more of an

95 Rashid, Industrial Concentration and Economic power in Pakistan, pp. 34,35.

96 Economic Survey of Pakistan 2013-14
97 F. Kahnet ‘et al. ‘Land Reforms and Development in Pakistan’, in W. Froehlick (ed), Land
Tenure, industrialization and Social Stability, (Wisconsin, 1971), p. 268.

33
implementer rather than the formulator. Strong politician land lords families knew the
dynamics of agriculture more than the bureaucracy therefore, they always instructed
bureaucracy to formulate policy to their liking. If ever any policy made to challenge
the status quo of the agriculture sector. It faced severe opposition from Landlords.
Bureaucracy failed to implement that particular policy decision. Land Reforms
initiative is one of such example. Land reforms have been undertaken twice in the
history of Pakistan in 1959 and in 1972. The objective of land reform was to eliminate
the feudal system that existed in rural areas, by imposing ceiling on the amount of
land an individual can hold, government wanted to reduce the power of landlords and
distribute the excess land to the landless peasants, which would lead to the reduction
in economical as well as political inequalities. Also, the empirical evidence shows that
an inverse relationship exists between the productivity and size of the land. Therefore,
another goal of land reforms was to increase the agricultural productivity. However, at
both occasions government was unable to achieve its objectives and land reforms
failed to improve the land distribution. The following article would look into various
aspects that lead to the failure of the land reforms in Pakistan. Firstly, the land
reforms at both events had put a ceiling on the individual holdings of the land instead
of family holdings. This was a major loophole on government’s part due to which the
desired results remained unattainable. Landlords took full advantage of this
opportunity and avoided loosing any land by transferring land above ceiling to
members of family. Hence, the land distribution more or less remained the same as
before. Another factor that contributed towards the failure of land reforms was the
political power the land lords enjoyed. There was a majority of landlords in all the
ruling parties of the country who naturally were never in the favor of land reforms.
Even if the reforms were passed in assembly, they were never implemented on a
larger scale due to the political contacts of these landlords. No government was
willing to put its sovereignty at stake by earning opposition of this economically as
well as politically strong class. Furthermore, when Zia ul Haq came to power he
ended the land reforms that were initiated by Z.A Bhutto. He brought his Islamization
programme. Also, land reforms were labeled as un-islamic on the grounds that Islam
does not allow appropriation of one’s property without providing compensation to its
lawful owner. Hence, since then the question of land reforms has been buried away
and no other government took measures to undertake it.

34
 In order to sum up the discussion in this chapter, it can be said that
bureaucracy has always remained an integral member of the ruling elite of Pakistan.
In Pluralistic setting of power structure of Pakistan over the last six decades,
bureaucracy’s grip on the policy matters went through ups and down during. From
1951 till 1958, it enjoyed unprecedented power over policy-making. During martial
law regimes, bureaucracy has to share the power with army bureaucracy. However,
1973 civil service reform, things didn’t remain the same. During Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s
regime bureaucracy saw the lowest point of its power and authority. Bureaucrats were
effectively restricted to the role of policy implementers. Though Zia Ul Haq’s regime
restored bureaucracy’s confidence but didn’t do the changes made by the Mr. Bhutto.
During political governments of 1990s, bureaucracy became highly politicized, its
role in policy making was made limited by the interventions of international monetary
agencies i.e. IMF, World Bank etc. During General Musharaf regime from 1999 till
2008, bureaucracy again reclaimed its place as policy formulator but military
oversight was always guarded their decision making limits.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Pakistan’s governance and power culture closely resembles to that of a

bureaucratic state. Pakistan’s ruling elite over the past sixty-seven years has failed to
follow the footsteps of British nomocracy. Conscious and unconscious efforts were
made to subvert and destroy that state structure which was inherited from the British
at the time of independence. Different sections of the ruling elite i.e. politicians,
bureaucracy, army etc. failed to accept their prescribed role in decision making
arrangement. They failed to co-exist peacefully. There has always been a continuous
struggle for monopoly over right to exercise power. Unlike other successful
bureaucratic states i.e. Singapore, Malaysia, France, Japan etc. our policy formulators
and implementers failed to realize that it was the intellectual and moral quality of their
bureaucracy, which set the pace for their sustained progress. The most salient feature
of tortured history of Pakistan is the failure of the leadership to perform its statutory
function. Competing groups of ruling elite always tried to overreach into the spheres
of the others and tries to grab more and more power to consolidate its position, which

35
originally belonged to others. The politicians set the precedence of these breaches
during the early years. The usage of position for corruption and accumulation of
wealth by politician dragged the bureaucracy and army into the politics. Repressive
legislations, ordinances and imposition of governor’s rule were used to suppress /
punish political opposition. Political and administrative institutions were frequently
used for personal gains.

Over the last 67 years of governance and policy making has signified the
personal nature of policy making. Who so ever came to the power, casted his personal
impression on the policy making process. This tendency never allowed an institutional
approach to develop. A culture of circumvention of rules and procedures prevailed for
this entire period of time. This culture of arbitration, confusion and political instability
impacted the policy making process. Institutions responsible for policy making also
suffered from the tendency of personalization of policy-making process. Which lead
to policies, which were not efficient and welfare enhancing. This culture of arbitration
prompted the behavior pattern of doing totally opposed to whatever the law, policies
& rules demanded. The impact of these attitudes in bureaucracy led to ineffective,
slow and often misdirected policy response from the state. This also cultivated a
culture of corruption and incompetence in bureaucracy. The practice of rewarding the
corrupt and discouraging the efficient and skillful continued for too long, which
eventually made the skillful and efficient bureaucrats a very rare commodity. On the
one hand are bureaucrats who are honest but are in very small number, while on the
other hand is a vast majority of bureaucrats, who is inspired by its self-interest,
remained busy in pleasing political bosses rather than performing the statutory
functions. This brought the relationship between state apparatus, bureaucrats, citizens
and politicians to a virtual collapse. The attitude of treating state as personal state
accelerated the collapse. This dimension of power culture of the country had a
gravitational hold on the entire governance process. Unfortunately, this factor cuts
across institutional, class and intellectual divisions of our society. The inability of
successive regimes in Pakistan to reform the state apparatus show the delusional facet
of power culture. The higher bureaucracy was reduced to a smaller stature and
competence levels. Policy makers operated under the illusion that quality of the state
institutions does not really matter. The implementation of policies was left to
mediocre.

36
It can conclusively be said that Pakistan has been a bureaucratic state. Bureaucracy
has always had a share in the power structure of Pakistan. Influence of bureaucracy on
policy making varied from time to time depending on the dominant player in the
power structure. Politicians preferred to use bureaucracy as a tool for loot and plunder
by making policies, which have enough space for corruption. Whereas army relied on
the bureaucracy for latter’s technical strength in the art and craft of policy-making.
Apart from brief period, starting from 1969 to 1977. Bureaucracy has been the
dominant / influential player in the process of policy making in Pakistan. Some of the
reasons concluded in this regard are as under;

• Politician failed to respond to the challenges faced by Pakistan in its early

days. They lost ground to bureaucrats. Main challenges that Pakistan faced in
its early days were (a) reconciliation of demands for formation of Islamic and
secular polity (b) integration of regional actors for rights / authority / influence
in decision making (c) imbalance between political and institutional
development. Civilian Bureaucracy played a very significant role in
formulation of Government policies to address these issues. As regards to the
first challenge. Demand for Pakistan was predominantly based on religious
ideology – separate state for the Muslims of India. After the independence, it
took nine years to develop a consensus between competing lobbies of religious
and secular thoughts to reach and consensus in the form of 1956 constitution.
Though there was no opposition in the Constituent Assembly but there were
groups that were critical of the Muslim League. On the left was Iftikharuddin
a former congressmen and a communist. On right were the religious critics
like Maulana Shabir Ahmad Ossmani. Naturally the bureaucracy was the ally
of secular lobbies, bureaucrats by virtue of their education, training and status
belonged to elite class and therefore their preference for western values was
obvious. Second challenge was to deal with regional disparities, Pakistan was
a combination of various regional and ethnic groups and it was required that
these all groups be merged by adopting principles of equality and equity,
however, Punjabis enjoyed dominance in politics as well as bureaucracy (civil
and military both). This dominance expressed itself through subsequent

37
 policies choices made by the ruling class. Third challenge was the imbalance
of development between political and bureaucratic institutes. Pakistan
inherited political and bureaucratic institutions from British. Unfortunately
politicians failed to adapt to the traditions of British political system whereas
bureaucrats consolidated themselves by following the legacy of their colonial
past. Failure of the political system is evident from the fact that in all the
elections held till 1971, losers have always accused others of rigging. Then
country has remained under martial laws, which erosion of supremacy of
political institutions. Consequently all the government, political as well as
martial law, they had to depend heavily on civil bureaucracy. Bureaucracy had
supported the secular lobbies, owing to its deep-rooted origin in the elite of the
society, who had always identified themselves with western values.
Misrepresentation of various ethnic and regional groups in the bureaucracy has
been promoted through quota system that has been prevalent in Pakistan since
1947. One of the major reason for separation of east Pakistan was the
misrepresentation of Bengali population in army and civil bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy has always viewed development of political institutions as
challenge to their power and authority, whereas military rules had suited them
perfectly where bureaucrats along with military bureaucracy enjoyed
unprecedented say and authority in decision making and policy formulation.

• Political leader to Pakistan including Jinnah, Liaqat Ali, Ayub, Bhutto, Zia etc.
ruled through sufferance of civil and military bureaucracy. They preferred
bureaucrats over politician. It is a fact that Bureaucracy in Pakistan is not only
the primary executive branch of the government but it is the primary
legislative branch as well because there is no countervailing political
institution. This lead to the point where bureaucrats acquired such pivotal role
in the determination of public policy, whereas, ideally speaking there role is to
implement the public policy, formulation of public policy should solely rest
with the political preventatives who are selected by the people. Strong reliance
on bureaucrats for governance issues, a tradition set by Jinnah, Liaqat Ali
Khan has been followed very strongly till this day, Bureaucrats working in
Prime Minister’s office are more powerful than any politician. The main

38
 reason behind this reliance on bureaucrats for public policy issues was the fact
that the only system of governance that Pakistani Politicians were familiar was
British viceregal system in India, where bureaucrats exercised power with out
any interference from politicians. After inheriting British political system and
British civil servants, it is not surprising if Pakistani politicians thoughts that
they could not do with out following their traditions set by the British masters
• In post reform era (before 1973 reform) bureaucrats enjoyed supremacy over
their political bosses in the matters of public policy formulation. Between
1947 and 1958, political instability was on its height, average tenure of a
ministry in a ministry was not more than six month whereas average tenure of
a secretary was three years. This clear disparity between tenure gave an
obvious advantage to bureaucrats. Interestingly, from 1947 till the time Ayub
Khan imposed martial law, Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers, from
September 1956 until 1958, there were four Prime Ministers, Mr. I.I.
Chundrigar remained Prime Minister only for two months. This leads to a
very strong argument given by the people who justify the role of bureaucracy
in public policy making process, is that the Ministers have very little time to
think about delicate policy issue and more over their stay in a particular
minister is usually very short, they never get a chance to develop profound
understanding of the policy issues and available options. Whereas,
bureaucrats not only have knowledge, skills to deal with policy issues, rather
their stay in a particular minister / division is longer.
• Selection criteria for a Minister have always been political loyalty rather than
administrative or functional expertise. Whereas, secretaries were career
bureaucrats, with vast experience of policy matters as well as public
administration, enjoying loyalty of their sub-ordinates by virtue of hierarchy
of bureaucracy.
• Till 2008, Pakistan has remained under three martial law governments. These
military interventions were justified on the pretext that the political
governments have failed to realize their duties and country is head towards
collapse. Politicians had borne the burnt of martial law government.
Bureaucracy, as an institution enjoyed more and more power and importance

39
 during these times. Only irk was, they had to share it with military
bureaucracy.
• Pakistani Bureaucracy had usually held important, if not central position in
political processes of the state. Therefore the role aspirations of bureaucrats
have often been determinative of policy outcomes.
• Bureaucratic elite monopolized the policy-making institutions by virtue of
their orientation, training and access to vital information, which resulted in
their dominance over policymaking process.

40
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70. Knill, Christoph and Tosun, Jale, Public Policy A New Introduction (Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2012) pp .67 ,75
71. Hassan K. Mahmood, Public Policy And The Rural Economy of Pakistan
(Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd. Lahore, 1998) pp.. 22
72. Bashir, Mohsin, Public Administration in South Asia (Taylor & Francis
Group, LLC, USa, 2013) pp. 325
73. Wheeler S. Richard, The Politics of Pakistan A Constitutional Quest (Cornell
University Press, London, 1970) pp. 148
74. Zaidi S. Akbar, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy (Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 274
75. Fatima Qamar, ‘Who Governs Pakistan?’, Berkeley Journal of Social
Sciences, Vol. 4, Fall 2014
76. Bottomore, T.B, Elites and Society, Second Edition (1993).London:
Routledge, pp.8
77. Ibid, pp. 40
78. Parry, Geraint, Political Elites, (London: George Allen and Unwin. 1969), pp.
8
79. Mills, C Wright. The Power Elite. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1956), pp. 8-9

43
 80. Fatima, Qamar, ‘Who Governs Pakistan?’, Berkeley Journal of Social
Sciences, Vol. 4, Fall 2014
81. Orum, Anthony. M, Introduction to Political Sociology: The Social Anatomy
of the Body Politic. (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs. Prentice Hall, Inc. 1978),
pp. 127
82. Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 4,5
83. Lipset, Seymour, Martin, Elites in Latin America. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967), pp. 411
84. Spear, Perceival, The Mughal Mansabdari System. In Edumand Leach &
Mukerjee, S.N.(edt). Elites in South Asia. (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), pp. 1
85. Parry, Geraint, Political Elites, (London: George Allen and Unwin. 1969), pp.
64
86. Beck Karl, A Survey of Elite Studies .Special Operations Research Office,(The
American University. Washington D.C, 1965), pp. 5,6
87. Fatima, Qamar, ‘Who Governs Pakistan?’, Berkeley Journal of Social
Sciences, Vol. 4, Fall 2014
88. Bottomore, T.B. Elites and Society, (Routledge, London, 1966), pp. 68
89. Parry, Geraint, Political Elites, (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1969). pp.
72
90. Wirda and Howard and Tan, Comparative Politics: Critical Concepts in
Political Science (Vol.1) (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group,
2005), pp. 201
91. Zirring, Lawerence, Pakistan: At the Cross Current of History,
(Lahore:Vanguard Books.2004), pp. 68
92. Gankovsky and Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan 1947-1958, (USSR
Academy of Sciences, Institute of Asia, 1966), pp. 113
93. Callard, Keith, Pakistan A Political Study, (George Allen & Unwin Ltd.1957),
pp. 25,26
94. Goodnow, Henry Frank, The Civil Services of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in A
New Nation, (New Haven and London, Yale University, 1964), pp. 75,87
95. Talbot, Ian, Does Army Shape Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. In Jaffrelot.
Christophe (Edt). Pakistan: Nation, Nationalism and the State, (Lahore:
Vanguard, 45 The Mall. 2005), pp. 215
96. Jalal, Ayesha, The State of Martial Rule” the Origin of Pakistan’s Political
Economy, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication. 1999), pp. 295
97. Hussain, A, Elites and Political Development in Pakistan. The Developing
Economies, (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1976), pp. 224,238
98. bid, pp, 239.
99. Saeed, Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations: From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Benazir
Bhutto. (West View Press, USA, 1997), pp. 4,10
99. Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston,
USA. . 1969) pp. 166,175
100 . Smith, Enid Russel, Political Realities: Modern Bureaucracy: The Home of
Civil, ( Longman, London, 1974), pp. 89 ,104
101. Peter B. Guy, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Routledge, London and New York,
2001), pp. 235
102. Goodnow, Henry Frank, The Civil Services of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in A
New Nation, New (Haven and London, Yale University, 1964). pp. 148,180

44
103. Hussain, A, Elites and Political Development in Pakistan. The Developing
Economies, (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1976), pp. 224,238
104. Ziring, Lawrence, Pakistan The Enigma of Political Development (Westview
Press Inc, 1980). pp. 161,175.
105. Kenneday H. Charles, Bureaucracy In Pakistan (Oxford University Press,
1987). pp. 101,102
106. Ziring, Lawrence and Braibanti, Ralph and Wriggins W. Howard, Pakistan:
The Long View (Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. 1977). pp. 370
107. Ibid, pp. 360-370.
108. Kenneday H. Charles, Bureaucracy In Pakistan (Oxford University Press,
1987) pp. 108,115.
109. Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan, Bureaucracy In A New
Nation, (Yale University Press, 1964) pp. 49
110. Waseem, Mohammad, Politics And The State In Pakistan, (Progressive
Publishers, 1989) pp. 201
111. Callard, Keith, Pakistan A Political Study (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1957)
pp. 73
112. Niaz Ilhan, The Culture of Power And Governance Of Pakistan 1947 – 2008
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) pp. 62
113. Ibid, pp. 72.
114. Ibid., pp. 83.
115. Ibid., pp. 103.
116. Gardezi, Hassan and Rashid, Jamal, Pakistan The Roots of Dictatorship
(Oxford Printing Press, New Delhi, 1983) pp.145
117. Ziring, Lawrence and Braibanti, Ralph and Wriggins W. Howard, Pakistan:
The Long View (Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. 1977) pp.169
118. Ibid. pp. 145,190.
119. Niaz Ilhan, The Culture of Power And Governance Of Pakistan 1947 – 2008
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010). pp. 225
120. Robert, La. Porte, Power and Privilege: influence and Decision Making in
Pakistan, (New Delhi, 1976), pp. 160,170
121. Mohsin Bashir, Public Administration in South Asia, India, Bangladesh and
Pakistan (CRC Press, USA, 2013). pp. 315-325
122. Kenneday H. Charles, Bureaucracy In Pakistan (Oxford University Press,
1987). pp. 1,11
123. Waseem, Mohammad, Politics And The State In Pakistan, (Progressive
Publishers. Lahore, 1989), pp. 138
124. Fred Block, Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical
Subjects, (London 1980), pp. 228-30
125. Hall, Draper, Karl Marx, Theory of Revolution: State and Bureaucracy, Vol. I,
(New York, 1977), pp. 312, 319.
126. M. Lanzendorfer, The State in Peripheral Societies, (London, 1977), pp. 165.
127. Kenneday H. Charles, Bureaucracy In Pakistan (Oxford University Press,
1987). pp. 43
128. Ibid. p. 295.
129. Ibid. p. 305.
130. Waseem, Mohammad, Politics And The State In Pakistan,(Progressive
Publishers, Lahore, 1989) pp. 139-142
131. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London, 1957), p. 250-280

45
132. Waseem, Mohammad, Politics And The State In Pakistan,(Progressive
Publishers, Lahore, 1989), pp. 132-143
133. Hamza Alavi, ‘Class and State’, in Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds),
Pakistan: the Roots of Dictatorship, (London, 1983), pp 75,80.
134. Waseem, Mohammad, Politics And The State In Pakistan, (Progressive
Publishers, 1989), pp. 150
135. The Pakistan Times, 7th September 1958.
136. The Pakistan Times,(editorial), 2nd July 1958.
137. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London, 1957), p. 285
138. Fred Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity, (Honolulu,
1966), pp. 323
139. Ibid. pp. 328,29.
140. Ibid. pp. 358
141. Report of the Pay and Services Commission, (Karachi, 1969), pp. 80.
142. Robert, La. Porte, Power and Privilege: influence and Decision Making in
Pakistan, (New Delhi, 1976), pp. 12
143. Waseem, Mohammad, Politics And The State In Pakistan, (Progressive
Publishers, 1989). pp. 163
144. Ibid, pp. 164
145. Ibid, pp. 165
146. Braibanti, Ralph, Research on Bureaucracy of Pakistan, *Duke University
Press, London, 1966a), pp. .298
147. Ibid., pp.301
148. Ibid. pp. .204
149. Ibid. pp. 302
150. S.J. Burki, ‘Twenty years of the Civil Service in Pakistan: A reevaluation’,
Asian Survey, 1969, pp.243-247.
151. Bernard Schaffer, ‘Insiders and Outsiders: The Ins and outs of Bureaucratic
Politics’, Seminar paper, University of London, 1982, P.$.
152. Cornelius Report, para 57.
153. Note of Dissent by G. Mueenuddin and Ali Asghar, in Ibid., paras 5 to 6, p.
447.
154. Nazim, ‘For Official Use Only’, The Muslim, Islamabad, 5 November 1979
155. Edward W. Weidner, ‘The Elements of Development Administration’,
Development Administration in Asia, (Durham, 1970), p.7.
156. Ibid., pp. 5,6.
157. Ibid., pp. 13.
158. Pakistan, Planning Commission, Second five Year Plan 1960-1965, (Karachi,
1960), p.103.
159. Ibid., pp. 109.
160. G.S. Birkland, ‘Government by Corporations’, Development Administration in
Asia, (Durham, 1970), p.123.
161. Hasan K. Mahmood, Public Policy and The Rural Economy of Pakistan,
(Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1998), pp. 93.
162. Gankovsky and Polonskaya , A History of Pakistan 1947-1958, (USSR
Academy of Sciences, Institute of Asia, 1966), pp. 84
163. Fatima, Qamar, ‘Who Governs Pakistan’, Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences
Vol. 4, Fall 2014
164. Brecher and Abbas , Foreign Aid and industrial Development in Pakistan,
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 1972), pp. 110,115.

46
165. Ibid, pp. 140-145.
166. S.M. Naseem, Underdevelopment, Poverty and Inequality in
Pakistan,(Lahore, 1981), p.292.
167. Ibid, pp. 305-310
168. Rashid Amjad, Industrial Concentration and Economic power in Pakistan,
(Lahore, 1974), pp.34-35.
169. Economic Survey of Pakistan 2013-14
170. F. Kahnet ‘et al. ‘Land Reforms and Development in Pakistan’, in W.
Froehlick (ed), Land Tenure, industrialization and Social Stability,
(Wisconsin, 1971), p. 268.

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