370 N.E.
2d 1198
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171
(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third
Division.
William E. RANQUIST, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ronald E. STACKLER, as Director of the
Department of Registration and Education of the
State of Illinois, and the Department of Registration
and Education of the State of Illinois, Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 76-1175.
Dec. 7, 1977.
Department of Registration and Education and
its director appealed from an order of the Circuit
Court, Cook County, Arthur L. Dunne, J., reversing
an order suspending a real estate salesman's license.
The Appellate Court, Jiganti, J., held that: (1) the
provisions of the Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen
License Act authorizing suspension or revocation of
salesman's license for demonstrating “unworthiness
or incompetency to act as a real estate broker or
salesman in such manner as to safeguard the interest
of the public,” or for “dishonest dealing,” warranted
discipline for a salesman's deliberate discouragement
of real estate customers from certain areas because of
race, and (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the decision to suspend the salesman's license for 60
days.
Reversed.
West Headnotes
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
669.1
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 1
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
     15AV Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions
           15AV(A) In General
               15Ak669 Preservation of Questions Before
Administrative Agency
                     15Ak669.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
     (Formerly 15Ak669)
As general rule, when party presents his case or
defense to administrative body upon certain theory,
he will not be permitted to prevail upon another
theory before reviewing court; reason for this rule is
to avoid unfair surprise to opponent thereby denying
him chance to contest issue and to allow
administrative body opportunity to initially construe
law.
[2] Brokers 65 3
65 Brokers
     65I Regulation and Conduct of Business in
General
           65k3 k. Licenses and Taxes. Most Cited Cases
In action to review order of director of
Department of Registration and Education
suspending real estate salesman's license for 60 days,
record established that salesman challenged
Department's construction of statute in relation to
charges placed against him in administrative
proceedings and was thus not precluded from
challenging construction of statute in circuit court.
[3] Appeal and Error 30 842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
     30XVI Review
370 N.E.2d 1198
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171
(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)
           30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
               30k838 Questions Considered
                     30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
                         30k842(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Generally, in construing statute, reviewing court
need not defer to conclusion of finder of fact.
[4] Statutes 361 219(1)
361 Statutes
     361VI Construction and Operation
           361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
               361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
                     361k219 Executive Construction
                         361k219(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
While court is not formally bound by
administrative decision as to legal effect of statutory
words, it should give that conclusion great weight,
using it as substantial factor in its own construction
of statute.
[5] Statutes 361 219(1)
361 Statutes
     361VI Construction and Operation
           361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
               361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
                     361k219 Executive Construction
                         361k219(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
In ascertaining legislative intent to construe
broad statutory standard delegated to agency's
discretion, court must consider particular agency's
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 2
interpretation of that law and should rely on agency's
interpretation as controlling whenever there is
question that is open to reasonable debate.
[6] Statutes 361 184
361 Statutes
     361VI Construction and Operation
           361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
               361k180 Intention of Legislature
                     361k184 k. Policy and Purpose of Act.
Most Cited Cases
In defining term of statute, court must assess
term in light of statute's purpose, the mischief it
attempts to prevent and the goals it seeks to attain.
[7] Licenses 238 1
238 Licenses
     238I For Occupations and Privileges
           238k1 k. Nature of License for or Tax on
Occupation or Privilege. Most Cited Cases
Predominant purpose of state in licensing trade
or profession is prevention of injury to public by
assuring that occupation will be practiced with
honesty and integrity, excluding from profession
those who are incompetent or unworthy.
[8] Statutes 361 235
361 Statutes
     361VI Construction and Operation
           361VI(B) Particular Classes of Statutes
               361k235 k. Liberal or Strict Construction
as Affected by Nature of Act in General. Most Cited
Cases
370 N.E.2d 1198 Page 3

55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171

(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)

Statute which is intended to promote public estate customers from certain areas because of race
welfare will be liberally construed. under provisions of Real Estate Brokers and
Salesmen License Act authorizing suspension or
[9] Brokers 65 3 revocation of license for demonstrating
“unworthiness or incompetency to act as a real estate
broker or salesman in such manner as to safeguard
65 Brokers
the interest of the public,” or for “dishonest dealing”;
     65I Regulation and Conduct of Business in
and fact that statute was subsequently amended to
General
specifically bar racial steering did not preclude
           65k3 k. Licenses and Taxes. Most Cited Cases
suspension of license under the more general
provisions of the Act. S.H.A. ch. 114 1/2 , § 115(e),
Although suspension of real estate salesman's
pars. 11, 15, 21, 26, 28, 31.
license may be hardship, resulting in loss of
livelihood, action is not criminal prosecution and
suspension is neither judgment of illegality of prior [12] Statutes 361 212.5
acts nor infliction of punishment for them.
361 Statutes
     361VI Construction and Operation
[10] Brokers 65 3
           361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
               361k212 Presumptions to Aid Construction
65 Brokers
                     361k212.5 k. Intention to Change Law.
     65I Regulation and Conduct of Business in
Most Cited Cases
General
           65k3 k. Licenses and Taxes. Most Cited Cases
It is presumption of statutory construction that
amendment to law changes that law; however, this
Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen License Act is
inference is not conclusive and may be overcome by
not penal measure, to be strictly construed against
persuasive considerations.
state, but broad statutory system, interpretation of
which must regard state's interest in protecting public
from effects of improper conduct by real estate [13] Brokers 65 3
salesmen. S.H.A. ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
65 Brokers
     65I Regulation and Conduct of Business in
[11] Brokers 65 3
General
           65k3 k. Licenses and Taxes. Most Cited Cases
65 Brokers
     65I Regulation and Conduct of Business in
Substantial evidence supported decision of
General
Department of Registration and Education to suspend
           65k3 k. Licenses and Taxes. Most Cited Cases
real estate salesman's license for 60 days because of
his deliberate discouragement of real estate
Real estate salesman's license could be
customers from certain areas because of race. S.H.A.
suspended for his deliberate discouragement of real
ch. 114 1/2 , § 115(e), pars. 11, 15, 21, 26, 28, 31.

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370 N.E.2d 1198 Page 4

55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171

(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)

and Education (the Department) and its Director,

[14] Trial 388 382 Ronald E. Stackler, the defendants below, seek to
reinstate the Director's order which suspended the
real estate salesman license of the plaintiff, William
388 Trial
E. Ranquist. The order, issued after a full
     388X Trial by Court
administrative hearing, concludes that Ranquist
           388X(A) Hearing and Determination of Cause
violated the conduct required of him by the Real
               388k381 Rulings on Weight and
Estate Brokers and Salesmen License Act,
Sufficiency of Evidence
Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 114 1/2 , par. 115(e), on
                     388k382 k. In General. Most Cited
September 4, 1974, by inducing persons to purchase
Cases
property through statements which misrepresented
and distorted the racial composition and the quality
In cases where testimony is conflicting, it is duty
of certain neighborhoods in Chicago. In this action by
of fact finder to evaluate credibility of witnesses.
Ranquist, pursuant to the Illinois Administrative
Review Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110, par. 264 et
[15] Appeal and Error 30 1011.1(1) seq.), the circuit court reversed the suspension order.
The court found that this conduct was not prohibited
30 Appeal and Error by the Act in effect at the time the statements and
     30XVI Review misrepresentations were made.
           30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings The Department filed a complaint with the Real
               30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court Estate Examining *547 Committee (the Examining
                     30k1011 On Conflicting Evidence Committee) requesting the revocation or suspension
                         30k1011.1 In General of Ranquist's real estate salesman's license. Ranquist
                               30k1011.1(1) k. In General. Most is an employee of the real estate brokerage of McKey
Cited Cases and Poague.[FN1] The complaint, after describing
certain of Ranquist's actions on September 4, 1974,
Mere fact that evidence is conflicting is not set forth six subsections of section 115(e) of the Real
sufficient reason to warrant reversal by review court. Estate Brokers and Salesmen License Act as causes
to suspend or revoke his license:
*546 **1200 ***173 William J. Scott, Atty. Gen. of
the State of Illinois, fordefendants-appellants; FN1. The brokerage of McKey and Poague
Gregory G. Lawton, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel. was served with a similar complaint. After a
hearing, the Examining Committee found
Coffield, Ungaretti, Harris & Slavin, Chicago, for that the Department failed to prove its case
plaintiff-appellee; Philip C. Stahl, Chicago, of against the brokerage.
counsel.
“11. Having demonstrated unworthiness or
JIGANTI, Justice. incompetency to act as a real estate broker or
By this appeal, the Department of Registration salesman in such manner as to safeguard the interest

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370 N.E.2d 1198
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171
(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)
of the public;
15. Any other conduct, whether of the same or a
different character from that specified in this Section
which constitutes dishonest dealing;
21. Disregarding or violating any provision of
this Act, or the published rules or regulations
promulgated by the Department to enforce this Act;
26. Making any misrepresentations concerning
the race, color, religion or national origin of persons
in a locality or any part thereof for the purpose of
inducing or discouraging a listing for sale or rental or
the sale or rental of any real estate.
28. Refusing to show listings or real estate
because of the race, color, religion or national origin
of any prospective purchaser, lessee or tenant, or
because of the race, color, religion or national origin
of the residents in the area in which the property is
located.
31. Volunteering of information on the race,
color, religion or national origin of the residents of a
community or part thereof.“
Subsequently, subsections 26, 28 and 31 were
stricken upon Ranquist's motion. Those subsections
were amendments to section 115(e) of the Act which
became effective September 5, 1974, the day after the
conduct alleged in the complaint occurred. The
Department's complaint remained based on
subsections 11, 15 and 21.
At the hearing before the Examining Committee,
the Department presented Ronald Pudel as its sole
witness. Pudel, a **1201 ***174 caucasian resident
of the Morgan Park community of Chicago, testified
it was his observation that McKey and Poague
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 5
showed homes for sale in his neighborhood
exclusively to one race. He thought that their
salesmen might be unfairly *548 influencing
prospective purchasers by discouraging buyers from
considering homes in certain areas on a racial basis.
This practice is commonly called racial steering. (See
Zuch v. Hussey (E.D.Mich.1973), 366 F.Supp. 553.)
He felt that such sales tactics damaged his
neighborhood. In an effort to confirm his suspicions
Pudel and his wife went to the offices of McKey and
Poague on September 4, 1974. Representing
themselves as a couple from Cleveland, Ohio,
interested in purchasing property, they asked
Ranquist to help them locate a suitable residence in
Morgan Park or Beverly, an adjoining community.
During this meeting the Pudels and Ranquist
examined a listing of homes for sale. From this
listing a number of homes were selected and their
addresses written down. Ranquist reviewed these
addresses and scratched out several, remarking to
Pudel that homes in that particular neighborhood
were “low priced,” and “going FHA to blacks.” He
advised the Pudels, “to stay north of 115th Street and
west of Longwood Drive.” Pudel requested to see a
specific home; Ranquist replied that the home was
one block from Morgan Park High School, which “is
90 percent black;” Ranquist said, “if you want to live
that way it's all right with me.”
Ranquist, testifying in his own behalf, denied
making any of these statements. He claimed that he
did not attempt to limit the area of the Pudels'
consideration, comment on the population of Morgan
Park High School or express any opinion about the
quality of the community surrounding it. He admitted
he crossed out the addresses, but he said he did not
eliminate any of them for reasons related to race and
location. Some of the homes were unlike the style of
house in which the Pudels had represented interest;
another was the subject of a signed sales contract and
it violated office policy to show such a home to
370 N.E.2d 1198
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171
(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)
another buyer. Ranquist declared he was without
authority to show the Pudels yet another listed home
because the sales agreement between the brokerage
and the owner of that home had expired.
The Examining Committee, after the hearing,
made the following factual findings:
“13) THAT on or about September 4, 1974, Mr.
& Mrs. Roland Pudil (the correct spelling is ”Pudel“)
went to Respondent Broker's office located at 10540
South Western Avenue, Chicago, Illinois and
represented to Mr. Ranquist that they were
prospective purchasers and were interested in
purchasing a home in the Beverly or Morgan Park
area of Chicago.
14) THAT Mr. Ranquist advised Mr. & Mrs.
Pudil (sic) while they were reviewing various real
estate listings in these areas, “not to look East of
Longwood Drive . . . because these are low priced
homes going FHA to Blacks.”
15) THAT upon finding a home on Prospect
Avenue, Mr. Ranquist *549 stated to the Pudils (sic)
that “that house is one block from Morgan Park High
School, which is 90% Black.”
By this conduct, they concluded, Ranquist
violated subsections 11, 15 and 21 of section 115(e),
for which they recommended the Director of the
Department suspend Ranquist's real estate license for
sixty days.
Ranquist requested a rehearing from the
Director. At oral argument on this motion, Ranquist
claimed that the recommendation of the Examining
Committee was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. He argued that the Department failed to
show any evidence which would support a finding of
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Page 6
unworthy or incompetent conduct (subsection 11),
dishonest dealing (subsection 15) or conduct in
violation or disregard of the licensing Act or rules
and regulations promulgated by the Director
(subsection 21). The Director denied the motion and
adopted the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law of the Examining Committee; he ordered**1202
***175 Ranquist's license suspended for 60 days.
Ranquist initiated this action to review the Director's
determination in the circuit court. In his complaint he
alleged:
“(a) The conduct complained of is not cause for
suspension under the applicable statute, and the
Department therefore exceed its authority;
(b) The decision was against the manifest weight
of the evidence;
(c) The decision is contrary to law and based
upon incorrect legal standards.“
The circuit court reviewed the record and
reversed the order of suspension, holding as a matter
of law that the conduct in the Department's complaint
was outside the scope of the License Act, section
115(e), subsections 11, 15 and 21.
The defendants argue that the question of
whether subsections 11, 15 and 21 of section 115(e)
of the Act can be construed to include racially
discriminatory conduct was not properly before the
circuit court. They contend that the circuit court, as a
reviewing body, erred in considering that issue
because the plaintiff failed to first present the theory
of statutory construction as a specific claim at the
administrative level. To first advance such an
argument on review, the defendants contend, deprives
the body charged with administering the License Act
opportunity to initially construe the law it has the
370 N.E.2d 1198
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171
(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)
duty to enforce; therefore, Ranquist waived this
argument.
[1] As a general rule, when a party presents his
case or defense to an administrative body upon a
certain theory, he will not be permitted to prevail
upon another theory before the reviewing court. (
Abbott Publishing Co. v. Annunzio (1953), 414 Ill.
559, 112 N.E.2d 101.) The reason for this rule, in
addition to the purpose suggested by the defendant, is
to avoid unfair surprise to an opponent thereby
denying him *550 the chance to contest the issue.
Abbott Publishing Co.; Gordon v. Department of
Registration and Education (1970), 130 Ill.App.2d
435, 264 N.E.2d 792.
[2] The rule is not applicable here. Examination
of Ranquist's position during the administrative
proceedings demonstrates that he did in fact
challenge the Department's construction of the Act in
relation to the charges placed against him. In his
motion for rehearing, for example, his proposal that
the Examining Committee's decision was against the
manifest weight of the evidence is a twofold
argument. First, Ranquist characterizes Pudel's
testimony, the Department's evidence, as weak and
incredible when compared to his own credible
explanations of the occurrence. Second, he argues
that no evidence produced at the hearing, in any
event, shows conduct which could be cause for
suspension of his license under the applicable
provisions of section 115(e). While this latter
proposition lacks the specificity of the issue framed
before the circuit court, its thrust presented for the
consideration of the Director the question of whether
Ranquist's conduct violated subsections 11, 15 and 21
of section 115(e) of the Act. In accepting the facts
and conclusions of law of the Examining Committee,
the Director necessarily considered the question. His
order of suspension subsumes that such conduct
demonstrates unworthy or incompetent acts on the
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 7
part of a licensed salesman (subsection 11), dishonest
dealing (subsection 15) and a disregard of the
provisions of the Act (subsection 21). The Director
did consider the question of construction of the
statute, he decided the question adverse to Ranquist.
We find the issue was presented to the agency,
preserved for review and not waived by Ranquist.
[3][4] Whether Ranquist's conduct can be a
violation of section 115(e), subsections 11, 15 and 21
is a question of law. Generally, in construing a
statute, a review court need not defer to the
conclusion of the finder of fact. ( People v. Baldi
(1972), 3 Ill.App.3d 496, 279 N.E.2d 21; Schoenbein
v. Board of Trustees (1965), 65 Ill.App.2d 379, 212
N.E.2d 380.) However, when an agency is the finder
of fact as well as the interpreter of the law below, a
review court is in a less than plenary position. While
a court is not formally bound by the
administrative**1203 ***176 decision as to legal
effect of statutory words, it should give that
conclusion great weight, using it as a substantial
factor in its own construction of the statute. ( First
National Bank & Trust v. City of Rockford (1977), 47
Ill.App.3d 131, 5 Ill.Dec. 312, 361 N.E.2d 832;
Youakim v. Miller (1976), 425 U.S. 231, 96 S.Ct.
1399, 47 L.Ed.2d 701.) The importance of the
agency's interpretation derives from the legislative
decision to remedy harms through an administrative
body. In using this method the legislature
acknowledges the existence of complex problems
requiring a variety of solutions and the need for an
efficiency and expertise unavailable from specific,
static laws.
*551 [5] The agency's expert appraisal of a
situation is a necessary component of the law itself.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Stofer v. Motor
Vehicle Casualty Co., (1977), 68 Ill.2d 361, 12
Ill.Dec. 168, 369 N.E.2d 875, noted:
370 N.E.2d 1198
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171
(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)
“ * * *, the administrator's task is not merely to
interpolate among broadly stated legislative
prohibitions, but, rather, to extrapolate from the broad
language of his enabling statute, and, using the
regulatory tools given him by the legislature, to deal
with the problems which the legislature sought to
address.”
In ascertaining legislative intent to construe a
broad statutory standard delegated to an agency's
discretion, a court must consider the particular
agency's interpretation of that law ( Adams v. Jewel
Co. (1976), 63 Ill.2d 336, 348 N.E.2d 161) and
should rely on the agency's interpretation as
controlling whenever there is a question about it that
is open to reasonable debate. Legg v. Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Commission (1975), 28
Ill.App.3d 932, 329 N.E.2d 486.
[6][7][8][9][10] In defining a term of a statute, a
court must assess the term in light of the statute's
purpose: the mischief it attempts to prevent, the goals
it seeks to attain. ( People v. Bratcher (1976), 63
Ill.2d 534, 349 N.E.2d 31.) The predominant purpose
of the State in licensing a trade or profession is the
prevention of injury to the public by assuring that the
occupation will be practiced with honesty and
integrity, excluding from the profession those who
are incompetent or unworthy. (People ex rel. State
Board of Health v. Apfelbaum (1911), 251 Ill. 18, 95
N.E. 995; Kaplan v. Department of Registration and
Education (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 968, 5 Ill.Dec. 303,
361 N.E.2d 626.) In licensing real estate salesmen,
that concern is evidenced in section 101 of the Act,
which declares:
“The intent of the legislature in enacting this
statute is to evaluate the competency of persons
engaged in the real estate business for the protection
of the public.” (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 114 1/2 , par.
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 8
101). (Emphasis added.)
The essence of the Act is remedial and it is
settled law that a statute which is intended to promote
the public welfare will be liberally construed. ( May
v. Pollution Control Board (1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 930,
342 N.E.2d 784). The focus of the Act is upon
evaluation of a licensee's conduct with regard to
fitness to practice the profession as it affects the
public. Although a license suspension may be a
hardship, resulting in the loss of livelihood, the action
is not a criminal prosecution. A suspension is neither
a judgment of the illegality of prior acts nor the
infliction of a punishment for them. ( In re Damisch
(1976), 38 Ill.2d 195, 230 N.E.2d 254; Klafter v.
State Board of Examiners of Architects (1913), 259
Ill. 15, 102 N.E. 193; Saleson v. Department of
Registration and Education (1968), 95 Ill.App.2d
104, 237 N.E.2d 822.) The Real Estate Brokers and
Salesmen License Act is not a penal measure, to be
strictly construed against the State, but a *552 broad
statutory system, interpretation of which must regard
the State's interest in protecting the public from the
effects of improper conduct by real estate salesmen.
[11] With these tenets of construction in mind we
look at the wording of section 115(e) to determine if
Ranquist's conduct falls within its prohibitions.
No Illinois court has explicitly examined the
import of the words “unworthy”, “incompetent”, and
“dishonest dealing” in the License Act. Several other
jurisdictions **1204 ***177 have considered
whether similar terms in other licensing statutes
encompass racially discriminating conduct.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ford v.
Wisconsin Real Estate Examining Board (1970), 48
Wis.2d 91, 179 N.W.2d 786, held that the State Board
was without authority to discipline a licensee for
370 N.E.2d 1198
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171
(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)
racial discrimination. The Wisconsin Act permitted
the suspension or revocation of a license when a
salesman or broker had:
“(i) Demonstrated untrustworthiness or
incompetence to act as a broker, salesman or
cemetery salesman in such manner as to safeguard
the interests of the public;
“***
“(k) Been guilty of any other conduct whether of
the same or a different character from that specified
herein, which constitutes improper, fraudulent or
dishonest dealing.” 179 N.W.2d at 794.
The Ford decision relied on Wisconsin
precedents which construed those sections to an
exiguous scope in an effort to rescue the statute from
constitutional challenges that its standards were too
vague. The terms “trustworthiness” and
“competency” were defined in past cases as
trustworthy in a financial sense and competency in
the sense of being educationally qualified. “Improper,
fraudulent or dishonest dealing” was restricted to the
taking of unfair financial advantage. The Ford court
refused to expand these definitions to include racial
discrimination.
A narrow reading of the similar standards in the
Illinois License Act does not follow. No past Illinois
cases circumscribe the broad terms of subsections 11
and 15. On the contrary, Illinois courts have tended to
be expansive in their interpretations of criteria in
laws which promote the public welfare. ( May v.
Pollution Control Board (1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 930,
342 N.E.2d 784.) In the absence of explicit
definitions, broad guidelines in professional licensing
statutes have been held to reflect the standards of the
profession concerned.   Gordon v. Department of
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 9
Registration and Education (1970), 130 Ill.App.2d
435, 264 N.E.2d 792.
In McKibbin v. Michigan Corporation and
Securities Commission (1963), 369 Mich. 69, 119
N.W.2d 557, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to
construe the words “dishonest or unfair dealing” to
encompass racially discriminatory *553 conduct.
Such a construction, the court held, without a precise
statement of legislative policy within the statute,
would violate Michigan's constitution as a delegation
of legislative power.
The rationale of McKibbin is not appropriate in
Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a
standard is sufficient for an agency to guide the
exercise of its discretion and for a court to evaluate
that discretion on review if it describes:
“(1) The persons and activities potentially
subject to regulations;
(2) the harm sought to be prevented; and
(3) the general means intended to be available to
the administrator to prevent the identified harm.“
Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. (1977), 68 Ill.2d
at 372, 12 Ill.Dec. at 172, 369 N.E.2d at 879.
The court has upheld as constitutional legislation
which prohibits conditions in insurance policies
which “unreasonably or deceptively” affect risks (
Stofer, 68 Ill.2d 373, 12 Ill.Dec. at 173, 369 N.E.2d at
880); it has found “the welfare of such person and the
community,” an adequate standard for the discharge
of mental patients ( Hill v. Relyea (1966), 34 Ill.2d
552, 556, 216 N.E.2d 795, 797); it has been able to
gauge the discretion of an administrator under terms
which required evaluation of “the health and safety of
pupils,” Board of Education v. Page (1965), 33 Ill.2d
370 N.E.2d 1198
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171
(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)
372, 376, 211 N.E.2d 361, 363.
It also should be noted that the Michigan
Supreme Court, although not citing McKibbin,
discounted the need for specific legislative policy
statements within a statute in Beech Grove
Investment Co. v. Civil Rights Commission (1968),
380 Mich. 405, 157 N.W.2d 213. The court found, in
that case, authority for an agency to hear a complaint
against a real estate broker for discriminatory housing
sales in the State's common law policy of promoting
racial tolerance.
**1205 ***178 This latter approach was also
employed by New York courts in reading that State's
real estate licensing Act. The New York Act lists
“demonstrated untrustworthiness” as a cause for
suspension or revocation of a license. The New York
courts construe this term to forbid racially
discriminatory practices by real estate salesmen. (
Diona v. Lomenzo (1966), 26 A.D.2d 473, 275
N.Y.S.2d 663; Birch v. Lomenzo (1969), 31 A.D.2d
825, 298 N.Y.S.2d 281; Kamper v. Department of
State of the State of New York (1966), 26 A.D.2d
697, 272 N.Y.S.2d 808.) Further, the prohibited
conduct which demonstrates untrustworthiness
comprehends racially directive sales practices which
promote segregation and disharmony. Butterly &
Green, Inc. v. Lomenzo (1975), 36 N.Y.2d 250, 367
N.Y.S.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 799.
The Diona court stated that other New York
statutes declaring discrimination repugnant to its
citizens and to the health, safety and welfare of the
State's inhabitants;
“ * * * are of legitimate concern to government.
The state has *554 power to enact laws of
safeguarding its peace and security, including laws
prohibiting discrimination (citation). Knowledgeable
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 10
violation of state law and policy is a factor which
properly may be considered by the licensing
authority, an agency of government, in determining
untrustworthiness. The State also has power to
require licensing of brokers (citation) and to establish
reasonable conditions for the maintenance of such
license. The purpose of Article 12-A in the licensing
of brokers and salesmen ‘is to assure by means of
licensing competency and the observance of
professional conduct on the part of real estate brokers
and salesmen.’ (Citation). ‘The real estate broker is
brought by his calling into a relation of trust and
confidence’ (citation), and demonstrated misconduct
in disregard of law and public policy may be
considered in determining untrustworthiness.” 275
N.Y.S.2d at 667, 668.
The Diona court found the term
“untrustworthiness” to be flexible, not vague,
evincing a legislative intent to have an agency
evaluate its meaning through the application of State
policies. Such a system rather than promoting
unfettered administrative discretion satisfied due
process through the safeguards of judicial review and
a requirement of a hearing with a specific factual
presentation by the charging agency
“ * * * concerning acts or conduct by the
licensee or his agent as would warrant a conclusion
of unreliability, and which establishes that any
confidence or reasonable expectation of fair and
unbiased dealing with the general public is
misplaced.” 275 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
Illinois courts have also rejected challenges to
laws on the basis of vagueness and unconstitutional
delegations of power through the recognition of
procedural protections against arbitrary agency
action. In City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control
Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146, for
example, the test for evaluating delegations of power
was articulated as the presence, in the law, of
370 N.E.2d 1198 Page 11

55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171

(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)

intelligible standards guiding the discretion of an
agency, judicial review of agency action and
procedural safeguards.
In addition, the Illinois definition of public
interest, as in New York, can be said to contain a
strong public policy against discrimination in the sale
or rental of property. Article 1, section 17 of the 1970
Illinois constituted provides:
“All persons shall have the right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed,
national ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion
practice of any employer or in the sale or rental of
property. These rights are enforceable without action
by the General *555 Assembly, but the General
Assembly by law may establish reasonable
exemptions relating to these rights and provide
additional remedies for their violation.”
the legislature has assigned that task to the
Department and its Director, who are charged with
the Act's enforcement. Determination of
unworthiness to act as a salesman “in such a manner
as to safeguard the interests of the public”
(subsection 11) and conduct constituting dishonest
dealing “whether of the same or different character”
as described in other sections (subsection 15) requires
an expertise, a familiarity with the various types of
sales techniques and approaches and the needs of the
areas in which those techniques are practiced. The
experience of the Department in these matters must
be brought to bear on the question of what is
unworthy behavior or dishonest dealing under the
Act. Resolving that question, like determining who
should receive a license in the first place, belongs to
the usual administrative routine. A reviewing court's
function is to see if the agency had a reasonable basis
in law to interpret the statutory terms to prohibit the
conduct.

Certainly a law establishing standards of conduct

The Department and the Director, based on the
for real estate salesmen must be read to incorporate
testimony of Pudel, found that Ranquist, while
relevant constitutional provisions. See City of
working as a real estate salesman, through his
Waukegan, 57 Ill.2d at 183, 311 N.E.2d at 153.
volunteered comments about the racial composition
Practices which **1206 ***179 contravene the
of neighborhoods, consciously directed the Pudels
constitutional policy of nondiscriminatory sale and
away from Morgan Park. The steering of one race
rental of property, as in New York a violation of State
away from integrated neighborhoods can be
law, could be a factor considered in a suspension
detrimental to the stability and safety of a
order by the licensing authority charged with
community. Such overt manipulation of the
maintaining professional standards. Indeed, to
population of an area may be against the public
exclude knowledge of this constitutional provision
interest. Deliberate discouragement of real estate
from the professional standards of licensed real estate
customers from certain areas because of race may
salesmen may defeat the right it establishes.
unfairly influence the housing market. Conduct of
that sort may be intolerable when practiced by a State
It is a reasonable reading of the statutory
sanctioned salesman, to the extent that the salesman
standards “unworthy” and “dishonest dealing” to find
may be said to be unworthy of his license. This is
that they prohibit discriminatory conduct. A precise
cause under section 115(e) subsection 11 for a license
definition of those terms by a review court is not
*556 suspension. Unsubstantiated comments of the
necessary in this instance. In light of the broad public
type the Examining Committee found Ranquist made
interest purpose of the Act set forth in section 101,
about the quality of a neighborhood because they are

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

370 N.E.2d 1198
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171
(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)
made by a licensed professional salesman, can
constitute misrepresentation bordering on inequitable
and fraudulent bargaining. That type of conduct is not
beyond the understood meaning of dishonest dealing,
controlled by section 115(e), subsection 15.
This court is urged to adopt the holding in
Quinlan and Tyson, Inc. v. City of Evanston (1975),
25 Ill.App.3d 879, 324 N.E.2d 65, characterized as a
ruling that racial steering is “punishable” only under
a statutory provision specifically making it an
“offense.” Quinlan and Tyson did not so hold. In that
case a court interpreted a narrow, unambiguous city
ordinance, which forbid a real estate broker to refuse
to show property to prospective customers on account
of race, religion, origin or color, to only prohibit
conduct which actually included an outright refusal
and failure to show property for those reasons. The
conduct at question in the case did not include such a
refusal; the court, therefore, would not apply the
statute to the situation. The Quinlan and Tyson court
clearly distinguished such a specifically worded
ordinance from statutes which controlled practices of
real estate brokers and salesmen with broad statutory
standards. The latter type of law, the court noted,
could be read to prohibit a salesman from influencing
the choice of a prospective home buyer on a racial
basis. Quinlan and Tyson, 25 Ill.App.3d at 892, 324
N.E.2d at 75.
[12] It is Ranquist's position that, if one accepts
Pudel's testimony, his conduct only amounted to
racial steering and that real **1207 ***180 estate
salesmen were free to engage in racial steering prior
to September 5, 1974, the day the amendments
explicitly forbidding such practice became operative,
the day after the Pudels visited McKey and Poague.
The Examining Committee and the Director found
Ranquist's conduct within the ambit of the
proscriptions of the unamended law. It is a
presumption of statutory construction that an
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 12
amendment to a law changes that law. ( Kaplan v.
Department of Registration and Education (1977), 46
Ill.App.3d 968, 5 Ill.Dec. 303, 361 N.E.2d 626.)
However, this inference is not conclusive; it may be
overcome by persuasive considerations. ( Bruni v.
Department of Registration and Education (1974), 59
Ill.2d 6, 319 N.E.2d 37, cert. denied 421 U.S. 91, 95
S.Ct. 1573, 43 L.Ed.2d 780.) We find article 1,
section 17 of the Illinois Constitution, effective since
1970, such a consideration. The fact that the
legislature subsequently codified the licensing Act to
clarify and reflect the policy of nondiscriminatory
property sales cannot operate to lessen the vigor of
the constitutional mandate.
[13][14][15] Since we find that conduct such as
Ranquist is alleged to have committed is a violation
of the applicable licensing Act, the remaining *557
issues are whether the Department and Director's
decision to suspend his license for 60 days was
against the manifest weight of the evidence and
unsupported by substantial evidence. Pudel testified
on direct examination that the plaintiff made false
statements about the racial makeup of his
neighborhood designed to discourage a prospective
white customer from looking for a home in that area.
Ranquist denied making those statements. In cases
where testimony is conflicting it is the duty of the
fact finder to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
( LoPiccolo v. Department of Registration and
Education (1972), 5 Ill.App.3d 1077, 284 N.E.2d
420.) The mere fact that evidence is conflicting is not
sufficient reason to warrant reversal by a review
court. ( Hruby v. Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners (1974), 22 Ill.App.3d 445, 318
N.E.2d 132; Davenport v. Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners (1972), 2 Ill.App.3d 864, 278 N.E.2d
212.) The Real Estate Examining Committee
believed the testimony of Pudel over that of Ranquist.
We find the evidence of sufficient quality and
quantity to sustain the decision to suspend Ranquist's
370 N.E.2d 1198 Page 13

55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171

(Cite as: 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171)

license.

The decision of the circuit court is reversed and

the order by the Director of the Department of
Registration and Education, suspending the real
estate salesman's license of William E. Ranquist for
sixty days, is reinstated.

Reversed.

SIMON, P. J., and McGILLICUDDY, J., concur.

Ill.App. 1 Dist., 1977.

Ranquist v. Stackler
55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171

END OF DOCUMENT

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

 Date of Printing: Dec 23, 2011

KEYCITE

Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.,Dec 07, 1977) (NO.
76-1175)
History

Direct History

=> 1 Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 07,
1977) (NO. 76-1175)
Certiorari Denied by
2 Ranquist v. Director of Dept. of Registration and Educ. of Illinois, 439 U.S. 926, 99 S.Ct. 309, 58
L.Ed.2d 318 (U.S.Ill. Oct 30, 1978) (NO. 77 1846)

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

 Date of Printing: Dec 23, 2011

KEYCITE

Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., Dec 07, 1977)
(NO. 76-1175)

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

 Date of Printing: Dec 23, 2011

KEYCITE

Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 Ill.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 13 Ill.Dec. 171 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 07, 1977) (NO.
76-1175)
Citing References

Positive Cases (U.S.A.)

   Discussed
1 McKey & Poague, Inc. v. Stackler, 379 N.E.2d 1198, 1203+, 63 Ill.App.3d 142, 149+, 20 Ill.Dec.
130, 135+ (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Apr 14, 1978) (NO. 76-1158) " HN: 10,11 (Ill.Dec.)

   Cited
2 Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 854+, 59 Ill.Dec. 905, 910+, 89 Ill.2d
379, 389+, 28 A.L.R.4th 189, 189+ (Ill. Feb 02, 1982) (NO. 54516) HN: 10,11 (Ill.Dec.)
3 Gruwell v. Illinois Dept. of Financial and Professional Regulation, 943 N.E.2d 658, 666, 406
Ill.App.3d 283, 291, 348 Ill.Dec. 50, 58 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. Nov 30, 2010) (NO. 4-09-0495) " HN: 7
(Ill.Dec.)
4 Franklin County Bd. of Review v. Department of Revenue, 806 N.E.2d 256, 261, 346 Ill.App.3d
833, 839, 282 Ill.Dec. 281, 286 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. Mar 09, 2004) (NO. 5-02-0541) HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
5 Carmody v. Retirement Bd. of Fireman's Annuity and Ben. Fund of Chicago, 712 N.E.2d 870, 873,
305 Ill.App.3d 600, 604, 238 Ill.Dec. 766, 769 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 27, 1999) (NO. 1-98-3592) HN:
1 (Ill.Dec.)
6 Lakehead Pipeline Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com'n, 696 N.E.2d 345, 353, 296 Ill.App.3d 942, 954,
231 Ill.Dec. 353, 361 (Ill.App. 3 Dist. Apr 07, 1998) (NO. 3-97-0524)
7 Cruz v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, 648 N.E.2d 932, 934, 271 Ill.App.3d 383, 385, 208 Ill.Dec.
10, 12 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Mar 21, 1995) (NO. 1-94-0617)
8 Naylor v. Kindred, 620 N.E.2d 520, 524, 250 Ill.App.3d 997, 1003, 189 Ill.Dec. 552, 556 (Ill.App. 4
Dist. Sep 09, 1993) (NO. 4-92-0411)
9 Mulack v. Hickory Hills Police Pension Bd., 625 N.E.2d 259, 263, 252 Ill.App.3d 1063, 1068, 192
Ill.Dec. 299, 303 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Sep 03, 1993) (NO. 1-92-0988) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
10 People ex rel. O'Malley v. Illinois Commerce Com'n, 606 N.E.2d 1283, 1294, 239 Ill.App.3d 368,
384, 180 Ill.Dec. 206, 217 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. Jan 06, 1993) (NO. 2-91-1421, 2-91-1459, 2-92-0007, 2-
92-0014, 2-92-0032, 2-92-0059, 2-92-0060, 2-92-0061) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
11 Lake County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 548 N.E.2d 1129, 1134+, 192 Ill.App.3d
605, 613+, 139 Ill.Dec. 573, 578+ (Ill.App. 2 Dist. Dec 28, 1989) (NO. 2-89-0334) HN: 4,5

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

 (Ill.Dec.)
12 Village of Wheeling v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., 524 N.E.2d 958, 962+, 170 Ill.App.3d 934,
941+, 120 Ill.Dec. 776, 780+ (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 12, 1988) (NO. 87-1561) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
13 Ballin Drugs, Inc. v. Illinois Dept. of Registration and Educ., 519 N.E.2d 1151, 1157+, 166
Ill.App.3d 520, 527+, 116 Ill.Dec. 936, 942+ (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Feb 16, 1988) (NO. 87-0128) HN: 14
(Ill.Dec.)
14 Dugan v. Cook County Officers Electoral Bd., 519 N.E.2d 1064, 1068, 166 Ill.App.3d 459, 465, 116
Ill.Dec. 849, 853 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Feb 09, 1988) (NO. 88-0306) (in dissent) HN: 2 (Ill.Dec.)
15 Skale v. Illinois Dept. of Public Aid, 520 N.E.2d 749, 752, 165 Ill.App.3d 776, 780, 117 Ill.Dec. 398,
401 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 30, 1987) (NO. 87-0088) HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
16 Trigg v. Sanders, 515 N.E.2d 1367, 1373, 162 Ill.App.3d 719, 727, 114 Ill.Dec. 96, 102, 43 Ed. Law
Rep. 311, 311 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. Nov 30, 1987) (NO. 4-87-0113) HN: 7 (Ill.Dec.)
17 Devore v. State Employees' Retirement System of Illinois, 510 N.E.2d 80, 84, 156 Ill.App.3d 790,
795, 109 Ill.Dec. 459, 463 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 12, 1987) (NO. 86-0084) HN: 14 (Ill.Dec.)
18 I.F. v. Department of Children and Family Services, 496 N.E.2d 1162, 1164, 146 Ill.App.3d 68, 71,
100 Ill.Dec. 97, 99 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jul 28, 1986) (NO. 85-2956) HN: 4 (Ill.Dec.)
19 Golden Bear Family Restaurants, Inc. v. Murray, 494 N.E.2d 581, 588+, 144 Ill.App.3d 616, 626+,
98 Ill.Dec. 459, 466+, 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1097, 1097+, 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA)
1275, 1275+, 106 Lab.Cas. P 55,751, 55751+, 7 Employee Benefits Cas. 2203, 2203+ (Ill.App. 1
Dist. May 15, 1986) (NO. 85-1088) HN: 3,5 (Ill.Dec.)
20 Lindsey v. Edgar, 473 N.E.2d 92, 94, 129 Ill.App.3d 718, 721, 84 Ill.Dec. 876, 878 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.
Dec 28, 1984) (NO. 4-84-0341) HN: 7 (Ill.Dec.)
21 Whitley v. Board of Review, 451 N.E.2d 942, 944, 116 Ill.App.3d 476, 478, 71 Ill.Dec. 788, 790, 12
Ed. Law Rep. 866, 866 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. Jul 06, 1983) (NO. 82-299) HN: 4 (Ill.Dec.)
22 Batley v. Kendall County Sheriff's Dept. Merit Commission, Kendall County Ill., 425 N.E.2d 1201,
1206, 99 Ill.App.3d 622, 628, 55 Ill.Dec. 28, 33 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. Aug 24, 1981) (NO. 81-42)
23 White v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 425 N.E.2d 1017, 1018, 99 Ill.App.3d 323, 324, 54 Ill.Dec.
800, 801 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Aug 10, 1981) (NO. 80-364) " HN: 7,10 (Ill.Dec.)
24 Knop v. Department of Registration and Ed. of State of Ill., 421 N.E.2d 1091, 1097, 96 Ill.App.3d
1067, 1075, 52 Ill.Dec. 228, 234 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. Jun 09, 1981) (NO. 80-431) HN: 14 (Ill.Dec.)
25 Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 415 N.E.2d 565, 567, 91 Ill.App.3d 1134, 1136, 47
Ill.Dec. 560, 562 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 18, 1980) (NO. 79-2085)
26 Bisluk v. Town Realty, Inc., 414 N.E.2d 151, 152, 90 Ill.App.3d 1039, 1041, 46 Ill.Dec. 429, 430
(Ill.App. 1 Dist. Nov 26, 1980) (NO. 80-95) HN: 8,10 (Ill.Dec.)
27 Citrano v. Department of Registration and Ed. of State of Ill., 414 N.E.2d 74, 77, 90 Ill.App.3d 937,
940, 46 Ill.Dec. 352, 355 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Nov 21, 1980) (NO. 79-1830) HN: 7 (Ill.Dec.)
28 Edens View Realty & Inv., Inc. v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1069, 1073, 87 Ill.App.3d
480, 484, 42 Ill.Dec. 360, 364 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Aug 01, 1980) (NO. 79-1436) HN: 10 (Ill.Dec.)
29 Walther v. Linderman, 408 N.E.2d 490, 492, 86 Ill.App.3d 1030, 1033, 42 Ill.Dec. 112, 114 (Ill.App.
5 Dist. Aug 01, 1980) (NO. 79-541) HN: 7 (Ill.Dec.)
30 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Department of Local Government Affairs, 408 N.E.2d 263, 265, 86

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

 Ill.App.3d 768, 771, 41 Ill.Dec. 841, 843 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jul 08, 1980) (NO. 79-1520) HN: 4
(Ill.Dec.)
31 Rasky v. Department of Registration and Ed., 410 N.E.2d 69, 75, 87 Ill.App.3d 580, 585, 43 Ill.Dec.
69, 75 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 27, 1980) (NO. 79-334) HN: 9 (Ill.Dec.)
32 Moy v. State Dept. of Registration and Ed., 406 N.E.2d 191, 195+, 85 Ill.App.3d 27, 31+, 40 Ill.Dec.
490, 494+ (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 04, 1980) (NO. 78-1928) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
33 Heerey v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Chicago., 403 N.E.2d 617, 621, 82 Ill.App.3d 1088,
1094, 38 Ill.Dec. 386, 390 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Mar 31, 1980) (NO. 79-117) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
34 Keen v. Police Bd. of City of Chicago, 391 N.E.2d 190, 195, 73 Ill.App.3d 65, 71, 29 Ill.Dec. 31, 36
(Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 12, 1979) (NO. 77-1945) HN: 14 (Ill.Dec.)
35 Stojanoff v. Department of Registration and Ed., 391 N.E.2d 10, 16, 72 Ill.App.3d 584, 590, 28
Ill.Dec. 811, 817 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 08, 1979) (NO. 77-1837) HN: 6,7 (Ill.Dec.)
36 Schoenbeck v. Board of Fire and Police Com'rs of Village of River Forest, 387 N.E.2d 738, 743, 69
Ill.App.3d 366, 373, 25 Ill.Dec. 862, 867 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jan 17, 1979) (NO. 77-1494)
37 Hofmeister v. Department of Registration and Ed. ex rel. Galvin, 379 N.E.2d 383, 386, 62 Ill.App.3d
777, 781, 19 Ill.Dec. 719, 722 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. Aug 04, 1978) (NO. 14764) HN: 15 (Ill.Dec.)
38 Buonincontro v. Kloppenborg, 378 N.E.2d 635, 637, 61 Ill.App.3d 1041, 1043, 19 Ill.Dec. 134, 136
(Ill.App. 2 Dist. Jul 14, 1978) (NO. 77-383) HN: 10 (Ill.Dec.)
39 Paset v. Old Orchard Bank & Trust Co., 378 N.E.2d 1264, 1269, 62 Ill.App.3d 534, 538, 19 Ill.Dec.
389, 394 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jul 05, 1978) (NO. 76-1029) HN: 6 (Ill.Dec.)
40 Tinner v. Police Bd. of City of Chicago, 378 N.E.2d 1166, 1169, 62 Ill.App.3d 204, 208, 19 Ill.Dec.
291, 294 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 28, 1978) (NO. 76-1586)
41 Taylor v. Police Bd. of City of Chicago, 378 N.E.2d 1160, 1165, 62 Ill.App.3d 486, 491, 19 Ill.Dec.
285, 290 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 28, 1978) (NO. 76-1290) HN: 14 (Ill.Dec.)
42 Bruns v. Department of Registration and Ed., 376 N.E.2d 82, 85, 59 Ill.App.3d 872, 876, 17 Ill.Dec.
189, 192 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. May 12, 1978) (NO. 14642) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
43 Coles v. Department of Registration and Ed., 376 N.E.2d 269, 271+, 59 Ill.App.3d 1046, 1048+, 17
Ill.Dec. 270, 272+ (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 02, 1978) (NO. 771797) HN: 9,10 (Ill.Dec.)
44 Strickland v. Department of Registration and Ed., 376 N.E.2d 255, 258, 60 Ill.App.3d 1, 6, 17
Ill.Dec. 256, 259 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 01, 1978) (NO. 77 728) HN: 10 (Ill.Dec.)
45 Citizens Party of Illinois v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 546 F.Supp. 1050, 1056 (N.D.Ill. Aug 06,
1982) (NO. 82 C 4574)

   Mentioned
46 Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 664 N.E.2d 61, 66+, 215 Ill.Dec. 664, 669+, 171 Ill.2d
230, 241+, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,987, 43987+ (Ill. Mar 21, 1996) (NO. 78343) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
47 Romero v. Selcke, 576 N.E.2d 276, 280, 216 Ill.App.3d 138, 144, 159 Ill.Dec. 607, 611 (Ill.App. 1
Dist. Jun 25, 1991) (NO. 1-90-1097) HN: 7 (Ill.Dec.)
48 Check Inn Lounge, Inc. v. Kozubowski, 518 N.E.2d 442, 447, 164 Ill.App.3d 1023, 1032, 115
Ill.Dec. 917, 922 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 22, 1987) (NO. 86-3217)

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

49 Alexander v. Director, Dept. of Agriculture, 444 N.E.2d 811, 814, 111 Ill.App.3d 927, 931, 67
Ill.Dec. 575, 578 (Ill.App. 3 Dist. Jan 04, 1983) (NO. 82-87) HN: 7 (Ill.Dec.)
50 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 438 N.E.2d 1263, 1266, 108 Ill.App.3d 156,
160, 63 Ill.Dec. 900, 903 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jul 21, 1982) (NO. 81-3113) HN: 4,5 (Ill.Dec.)
51 National Consol. Industries, Ltd. v. Department of Ins., 392 N.E.2d 295, 299, 73 Ill.App.3d 816, 822,
29 Ill.Dec. 738, 742 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 26, 1979) (NO. 78-703)
52 Distaola v. Department of Registration and Ed., 391 N.E.2d 489, 493, 72 Ill.App.3d 977, 982, 29
Ill.Dec. 226, 230 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 05, 1979) (NO. 78-913) HN: 9 (Ill.Dec.)
53 Weisenritter v. Board of Fire and Police Com'rs of City of Burbank, 385 N.E.2d 336, 338, 67
Ill.App.3d 799, 802, 24 Ill.Dec. 424, 426 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Aug 02, 1978) (NO. 77-1330)
54 State ex rel. Florence-Carlton School Dist. No. 15-6 v. Board of County Com'rs of Ravalli County,
590 P.2d 602, 605, 180 Mont. 285, 291 (Mont. Dec 05, 1978) (NO. 14365)

State Administrative Materials (U.S.A.)

55 IN THE MATTER OF: WILLIAM K. WILSON, 2003 WL 2008899 (Ill.Sec.Dept.), *4+ (2003)
56 1990 Ill. Atty. Gen. Op. 264, Shinae Chun (1990) HN: 7 (Ill.Dec.)
57 1980 Ill. Atty. Gen. Op. 85, Michael L. Mory, Secretary State Employees' Retirement System of
Illinois Springfield, Illinois. (1980) HN: 2 (Ill.Dec.)

Secondary Sources (U.S.A.)

58 Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction s 58:4, Nature of interests and kinds of persons
affected (2011) HN: 8 (Ill.Dec.)
59 CJS Brokers s 41, General considerations (2011) HN: 10 (Ill.Dec.)
60 CJS Brokers s 60, Grounds-Dishonesty, incompetence, fraud, and the like (2011) HN: 11 (Ill.Dec.)
61 CJS Brokers s 61, Grounds-Other grounds (2011) HN: 11 (Ill.Dec.)
62 CJS Brokers s 67, Proceedings-Evidence; proof; determination (2011) HN: 13 (Ill.Dec.)
63 CJS Brokers s 68, Judicial review (2011)
64 Illinois Law and Practice Brokers s 10, Disciplinary actions relative to real estate licenses (2011)
65 Illinois Law and Practice Statutes s 49, Presumptions to aid construction (2011)
66 Illinois Law and Practice Statutes s 69, Executive or administrative construction (2011) HN: 2
(Ill.Dec.)
67 Illinois Law and Practice Statutes s 86, Liberal or strict construction (2011) HN: 8 (Ill.Dec.)
68 CASE NOTES, 35 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 815, 844 (1997) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
69 CASE NOTES, 35 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 839, 844 (1997) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)

Court Documents

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 Appellate Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Appellate Petitions, Motions and Filings

70 ROSELLE POLICE PENSION BOARD, Defendant-Petitioner, v. VILLAGE OF ROSELLE,
Plaintiff-Respondent., 2008 WL 6589040, *6589040 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ill. Jun
23, 2008) Petition for Leave to Appeal (NO. 106741)

Appellate Briefs
71 VILLAGE OF ROSELLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSELLE POLICE PENSION BOARD AND
BONNIE GURKE, Defendant-Appellant., 2008 WL 6587552, *6587552+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Dec
10, 2008) Brief of Amicus Curiae Metropolitan Alliance of Police in Support of Appellant's,
Roselle Police Pension Board and Bonnie Gurke (NO. 106741) HN: 1,5 (Ill.Dec.)
72 CARPETLAND U.S.A., INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and Lynn Quigley Doherty, Director of the Illinois Department of
Employment Security, Defendants-Appellants., 2001 WL 34387862, *34387862+ (Appellate Brief)
(Ill. Nov 13, 2001) Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. (NO. 91564) HN: 1
(Ill.Dec.)
73 MIDSTATE SIDING AND WINDOW COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth ROGERS
and Ella Rogers, Defendants-Appellees., 2000 WL 34029425, *34029425 (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Jul
21, 2000) Brief and Argument of Plaintiff-Appellant (NO. 89059) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
74 THE PEOPLE ex rel. Illinois Historic Preservation Agency and Illinois Department of
Transportation, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. CIGNA PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.; The
Lady Elgin Foundation, Inc.; and Harry Zych, d/b/a American Diving & Salvage Co., Defendants-
appellants., 1998 WL 34114787, *34114787+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Jun 05, 1998) Brief of
Appellants (NO. 84514) HN: 3 (Ill.Dec.)
75 Carl E. LAFEVER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEMLITE COMPANY, a division of Dyrotech, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant. Kemlite Company, a division of Dyrotech, Inc., Third Party Plaintiff, v.
Banner Western Disposal, a division of Waste Management of North America, Inc., Third Party
Defendant-Appellant., 1998 WL 34182278, *34182278 (Appellate Brief) (Ill. May 06, 1998)
Supplemental Brief of Third Party Defendant-Appellant Banner Western Disposal, a division
of Waste Management of North America, Inc. (NO. 84761, 84762)
76 Rudolph SILVA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Electrical Systems, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Midwest Conveyor Company, Inc., Third-
Party Defendant-Appellant., 1998 WL 34114755, *34114755 (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Mar 31, 1998)
Supplemental Brief of Third-Party Defendant-Appellant (NO. 84356) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
77 Rudolph SILVA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Electrical Systems, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Midwest Conveyor Company, Inc., Third-
Party Defendant-Appellant., 1998 WL 34181993, *34181993 (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Mar 31, 1998)
Supplemental Brief of Third-Party Defendant-Appellant (NO. 84356) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)

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78 Dennis CLEMONS, Plaintiff, v. MECHANICAL DEVICES, CO., Defendant., 1997 WL 33623947,
*33623947 (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Oct 28, 1997) Answer to Petition for Leave to Appeal (NO.
84244) HN: 3 (Ill.Dec.)
79 Marcia M. ROUBIK, Appellee, v. Merrill LYNCH, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Larry H. Lovitsch
and Thomas R. Valaika, Appellants., 1997 WL 33561046, *33561046+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Jul 28,
1997) Brief of Appellee Marcia M. Roubik (NO. -82752) HN: 7,11 (Ill.Dec.)
80 Marcia M. ROUBIK, Appellee, v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INC., Larry
H. Lovitsch and Thomas R. Valaika, Appellants., 1997 WL 33623956, *33623956+ (Appellate Brief)
(Ill. Jul 28, 1997) Brief of Appellee Marcia M. Roubik (NO. -82752) HN: 7,11 (Ill.Dec.)
81 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elvio LAVARIEGA, Defendant-
Appellant., 1996 WL 33437136, *1+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Jul 10, 1996) Reply Brief of Appellant
(NO. 80560) HN: 7,10 (Ill.Dec.)
82 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elvio LAVARIEGA, Defendant-Appellant.,
1996 WL 33468351, *33468351+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Jul 10, 1996) Reply Brief of Appellant
(NO. 80560) HN: 7,10,11 (Ill.Dec.)
83 ENVIRITE CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation, Complainant-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, Respondent, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, an
agency of the State of Illinois, and Peoria Disposal Company, a Nevada corporation, Respondents-
Appellants., 1993 WL 13016339, *13016339+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Sep 30, 1993) Brief and
Argument for Appellant Peoria Disposal Company (NO. 75060) "
84 ENVIRITE CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation, Complainant-Respondent, v. ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, an agency of the State of Illinois and Peoria
Disposal Company, a Nevada corporation, Respondents-Petitioners., 1993 WL 13016336,
*13016336 (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Mar 02, 1993) Answer to Joint Petition for Leave to Appeal
(NO. 75060) "
85 Bruce M. ABRAHAMSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION and Stephen F. Selcke, Director, Defendants-Petitioners., 1992
WL 12019948, *12019948+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill. Feb 28, 1992) Defendants-Petitioners' Brief
(NO. 71786) HN: 7 (Ill.Dec.)
86 Bridget A. MITCHELL, Petitioner-Appellants, v. COOK COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL
ELECTORAL BOARD, constituting the Electoral Board, individually and as such Board, David D.
Orr, Anita M. Alvarez, and Dorothy Brown and Bonnie Carol McGrath, Respondent-Appellees.,
2010 WL 2811328, *2811328+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jan 11, 2010) Brief of the
Respondent-Appellee, Bonnie Carol McGrath, in Support of Affirming the Judgment of the
Circuit Court Which Affirmed the Decision of the Cook County Officers Electoral Board (NO.
1-10-0002)
87 BELL LEASING BROKERAGE, LLC, an Illinois limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellee, v. ROGER AUTO SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant/Counterplaintiff/Appellant, Waldermar Rodriguez, and Carmen Rodriguez, Defendants.,
2006 WL 6221420, *6221420+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 08, 2006) Brief and
Argument of Appellant (NO. 1-05-2313)

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88 ILLINOIS HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-
Appellee and Cross Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Deirdre K.
Manna, The Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Insurance, Glen R. Gasiorek, Defendants,
University of Chicago Hospitals, and University of Chicago Practice Plan, Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Appellees; University of Chicago Hospitals and University of Chicago Practice Plan,,
2006 WL 6057143, *6057143+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Apr 19, 2006) Response Brief
and Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants University of Chicago Hospitals and University of
Chicago Practice Plan (NO. 1-05-2422, 1-05-2548)
89 ILLINOIS HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-
Appellee and Cross Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Deirdre K.
Manna, The Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Insurance, Glen R. Gasiorek, Defendants,
University of Chicago Hospitals, and University of Chicago Practice Plan, Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Appellees; University of Chicago Hospitals and University of Chicago Practice Plan,,
2006 WL 6057141, *6057141+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jan 19, 2006) Brief and Separate
Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants University of Chicago Hospitals and University of Chicago
Practice Plan (NO. 1-05-2422)
90 COUNTY OF COOK on behalf of John H. Stroger, Jr. Hospital of Cook County, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Nathaniel S. SHAPO, the Director of Insurance for the State of Illinois, the Illinois Department of
Insurance, and Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Guaranty Association, Defendants-
Appellees., 2002 WL 34558971, *34558971+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 23, 2002) Brief
of Defendant-Appellees Loyola University Medical Center University of Chicago Hospitals
EHS Hospitals - Bethany Hospital EHS Hospitals - Christ Hospital EHS Hospitals - South
Chicago Community ... (NO. 1-02-0264)
91 Sue Ann GOTT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PALOS HILLS POLICE
PENSION BOARD, Defendant-Appellant., 2001 WL 34364848, *34364848+ (Appellate Brief)
(Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 03, 2001) Brief and Argument of Plaintiff-Appellee (NO. 1-01-1774)
HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
92 PALOS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Palos Heights, St. George Corporation, and St. George
Wellness Center, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS HEALTH FACILITIES PLANNING BOARD,
et al., Defendants-Appellees. People of The State of Illinois, ex rel. The Illinois Health Facilities
Planning Board, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Palos Community Hospital; The St. George Corporation; and
St. George Wellness Center, Defendants-Appellants., 2001 WL 34315992, *34315992+ (Appellate
Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Oct 19, 2001) Brief of the Appellees Illinois Health Facilities Planning
Board and Its Members (NO. 1-01-2199) " HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
93 Gary PANOZZO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARVEY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 152, Defendant-
Appellant., 2001 WL 34365442, *34365442+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Sep 27, 2001) Brief
of Plaintiff-Appellee, Gary Panozzo (NO. 1-01-1961) HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
94 Thomas PHELAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF LAGRANGE PARK POLICE
PENSION FUND, the Board of Trustees of the Village of Lagrange Park Police Pension Fund, Reg
Potter, President, Cynthia Lautner, Vice President, William Beaudway, Secretary, Felix Hernandez,
Trustee, and Donald Barkell, Trustee, Defendants-Appellees., 2001 WL 34316247, *34316247+
(Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jul 18, 2001) Brief of Defendants-Appellees (NO. 1-01-1226)

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 HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
95 COOK COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL
BOARD, an administrative agency by 35 ILCS 200/7-5, Corporate Lakes of Matteson LLC,
taxpayer, Rich Township High School District #227, taxing district, Rich Township Elementary
School District #159, taxing district, Respondents., 2001 WL 34158696, *34158696 (Appellate
Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jul 16, 2001) Brief of Respondent Corporate Lakes of Matteson, LLC
(NO. 1-00-1183)
96 COOK COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL
BOARD, an administrative agency created under 35 ILCS 200/7-5, Lake Holiday Properties,
taxpayer, Union Ridge School District 86, taxing district, and Board of Ed. of Ridgewood High
School District 234, taxing district, Respondents, (No. 1-00-2213) Cook County Board of Review,
Petitioner, v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, an administrative agency created under 35 ILCS
200/7-5,, 2001 WL 34158711, *34158711 (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 22, 2001) Brief of
Respondents Lake Holiday Properties and Krupp Realty Park Place, Chicaco Limited
Partnership (NO. 1-00-2213, 1-00-2239)
97 STANDARD BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, an Illinois Banking Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v. Darlene S. WIGBOLDY, Defendant/Appellant., 2001 WL 34365245, *34365245+ (Appellate
Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 11, 2001) Brief of Defendant/Appellant, Darlene S. Wigboldy (NO. 1-
01-0491) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
98 COOK COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL
BOARD, an administrative agency created by 35 ILCS 200/7-5, Robert Bosch Corporation,
taxpayer, and Komarek School District #94, taxing district, Respondents., 2000 WL 34202543,
*34202543+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 13, 2000) Brief of the Respondent Illinois
Property Tax Appeal Board (NO. 1-00-1183) " HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
99 Dianna L. DRURY-AKERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OFFICE OF BANKS AND REAL ESTATE OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and Jack Schaffer, Commissioner of the Office of Banks and Real
Estate, Defendants-Appellants., 2000 WL 34223087, *34223087+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist.
Sep 14, 2000) Brief of Defendants-Appellants Office of Banks and Real Estate and Jack
Schaffer, Commissioner (NO. 1-00-0856) HN: 7,11 (Ill.Dec.)
100 TRUNG TIN GIFT AND PHARMACY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC AID and Ann Patla, Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, Defendants-
Appellees., 2000 WL 34203981, *34203981+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Sep 08, 2000) Brief
and Argument for Defendants-Appellees (NO. 1-00-0824) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
101 GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. GALLANT
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Larry Young, Third-Party
Defendant., 2000 WL 34222005, *34222005+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Aug 18, 2000)
Brief and Argument of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant, Gallant Insurance
Company (NO. 1-00-608)
102 James BOSH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS,
Continental Casualty Company, a/k/a Cna Insurance, Respondents-Appellees., 2000 WL 34247395,
*34247395 (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Mar 31, 2000) Brief of Respondent-Appellee
Continental Casualty Company (NO. 1-99-2101) HN: 5,10 (Ill.Dec.)

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103 CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, Local 1, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Petitioner-
Appellant, v. ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and Chicago School
Reform Board of Trustees, Respondents-Appellees., 2000 WL 34201529, *34201529+ (Appellate
Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2000) Brief of Respondent-Appellee, City of Chicago Board of Education
(NO. 1-01-2510) " HN: 4,5 (Ill.Dec.)
104 Richard M. DALEY, Mayor and Local Liquor Control Commissioner, and Winston Mardis, Director,
Mayor's License Commission, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMERICAN DRUG STORES, d/b/a Osco
Drug, License Appeal Commission of the City of Chicago, Albert McCoy, Irving Koppel, Anthony
Calabrese, George Velcich, David L. Maher and Leonard Branson, Defendants-Appellees., 1999 WL
33895061, *33895061+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Oct 19, 1999) Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants (NO. 1-99-1125) HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
105 CARPETLAND U.S.A., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, an Administrative Agency in the State of Illinois, and Lynn Quigley
Doherty, Director of the Department of Employment Security, Defendants-Appellees., 1999 WL
33741478, *33741478+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Aug 30, 1999) Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant (NO. 1-99-1983) HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
106 Peter Noel HICKEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rene RIERA, Jr., et al., Defendant-Appellee., 1999 WL
33908278, *33908278 (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 22, 1999) Brief of the Appellant, P.
Noel Hickey (NO. 1-98-2880) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
107 Thomas R. CARMODY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S
ANNUITY and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Defendant-Appellant., 1999 WL 33908835, *33908835+
(Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Apr 05, 1999) Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief (NO. 1-98-3592)
HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
108 Richard M. DALEY, Mayor and Local Liquor Control Commissioner of the City of Chicago,
Mayor's License Commission of the City of Chicago, and Winston Mardis, Director of the Mayor's
License Commission, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMERICAN DRUG STORES, d/b/a Osco Drug,
License Appeal Commission of the City of Chicago, Albert McCoy, Commissioner, Irving Koppel,
Commissioner, and George Velcich, Chairman, Defendants-Appellees., 1999 WL 33740865,
*33740865+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1999) Brief of Defendant-Appellee, American
Drug Stores d/b/a Osco Drug (NO. 1-99-1125) " HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
109 Desmond R. O'NEILL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S
ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant., 1998 WL 34294526,
*34294526+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Oct 19, 1998) Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief (NO. 1-98-
0931) " HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
110 Leonardo CARTER and Luis J. Marchan, Plaintiffs, v. Tim J. HERCL and New Image Installations,
Inc., Defendants., 1997 WL 33767247, *33767247+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Oct 14, 1997)
Brief and Argument for Defendant-Appellee (NO. 1-97-1520) HN: 3 (Ill.Dec.)
111 CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lynn DOHERTY, Director, Illinois
Department of Employment Security; Board of Review and its members individually, Rolland W.
Lewis, John G. Cashman, Stanley V. Mucha, Gary J. Sullivan, Jon R. Walker; and William Griffin,
Jr., Defendants-Appellees. Chicago Transit Authority, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lynn Doherty, Director,
Illinois Department of Employment Security; Board of Review and its members, 1997 WL

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 33764790, *33764790+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 23, 1997) Brief of State
Defendants-Appellees (NO. 1-96-3776) " HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
112 Steven A. RHOADS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CITY OF
CALUMET CITY POLICEMEN'S PENSION FUND, Defendant-Appellant., 1997 WL 33761670,
*33761670+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 05, 1997) Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee (NO. 1-
96-1920) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
113 Michael HEALY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a
municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee., 1997 WL 33762550, *33762550 (Appellate Brief)
(Ill.App. 1 Dist. Mar 17, 1997) Reply Brief and Argument of Plaintiffs-Appellants (NO. 1-96-
854)
114 ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE
COMMISSION; AT&T Communications of Illinois, Inc., MCI Telecommunications Corporation of
Illinois, Inc.; LCI International Telecom Corp.; and Sprint Communications Company, LP,
Respondents. People of the State of Illinois ex rel. James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Petitioner, v.
Illinois Commerce Commission et al., Respondents., 1997 WL 33761846, *33761846+ (Appellate
Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jan 16, 1997) Joint Brief of Respondents-Appellees, AT&T
Communications of Illinois, Inc., MCI Telecommunications Corporation, Sprint
Communications Company, L.P. and LCI International Telecom Corp. (NO. 1-96-2146, 1-96-
2166) " HN: 4 (Ill.Dec.)
115 Steven A. RHOADS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CITY OF
CALUMET CITY POLICEMEN'S PENSION FUND, Defendant-Appellant., 1996 WL 33651389,
*33651389+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 31, 1996) Brief and Argument of Defendant-
Appellant (NO. 1-96-1920) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
116 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Denise WEED,
Illinois State Board of Education, and Hearing Officer Darrell Dunham, Defendants-Appellees.,
1996 WL 33650898, *33650898+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jan 30, 1996) Brief of
Defendant-Appellee Denise Weed (NO. 1-95-2876) HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
117 William MASTRO, Plaintiff-Appelllant, v. THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Douglas L. Whitley, Director of the Department of Revenue, The Illinois Gaming Board, Morton E.
Friedman, Administrator of the Illinois Gaming Board, William J. Kunkel, Jr., William J. Chamblin,
J. Thomas Johnson, Robert F. Vickery, and Michael H. Zaransky, Illinois Gaming Board Members,
Raymond Niepert, former member of the Illinois Gaming Board, Defendants-Appellees., 1995 WL
17166267, *17166267+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Aug 24, 1995) Brief of Defendants-
Appellees (NO. 1-94-1813) " HN: 7,10,11 (Ill.Dec.)
118 Velma HIGHTOWER, Plaintiff-appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID and
Robert W. Wright, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, Defendants-appellees., 1995 WL
17167836, *17167836+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Apr 18, 1995) Reply Brief of Appellant
(NO. 1-94-3652) HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
119 Marcia M. ROUBIK, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. K. KINNAIRD, Judge Presiding
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Larry H. Lovitsch and Thomas R. Valaika, Respondents-
Appellees/Cross-Appellants., 1995 WL 17164251, *17164251+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist.
Mar 22, 1995) Reply Brief of Cross-Appellants Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,

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 Larry H. Lovttsch and Thomas R. Valaika (NO. 1-94-2774) HN: 4 (Ill.Dec.)
120 Velma HIGHTOWER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID; and
Robert W. Wright, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, Defendants-Appellees., 1995 WL
17167835, *17167835+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Mar 02, 1995) Brief and Argument for
Defendants-Appellees (NO. 1-94-3652) HN: 1 (Ill.Dec.)
121 CITIZENS UTILITY BOARD and People of Cook County ex rel. Jack O'Malley, States Attorney,
Petitioners-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION and, Commonwealth Edison
Company, Respondents-Appellees., 1995 WL 17164215, *17164215+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1
Dist. Feb 21, 1995) Response Brief of the Illinois Commerce Commission (NO. 1-94-2714, 1-94-
2828) " HN: 4 (Ill.Dec.)
122 CITIZENS UTILITY BOARD and People of Cook County ex rel. Jack O'Malley, States Attorney,
Petitioners-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION and, Commonwealth Edison
Company, Respondents-Appellees., 1995 WL 17164222, *17164222+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1
Dist. Feb 21, 1995) Response Brief of the Illinois Commerce Commission (NO. 1-94-2714, 1-94-
2828) " HN: 4 (Ill.Dec.)
123 Marcia M. ROUBIK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Merrill LYNCII, et al., Respondents-Appellees., 1995
WL 17164254, *17164254+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jan 04, 1995) Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant (NO. 1-94-2774) HN: 7,11 (Ill.Dec.)
124 Joseph PETRAUSKAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE VILLAGE OF ALSIP, Illinois, John L. Carlson, and Francis May, and
Kenneth Wood, Chief of Police for The Village of Alsip, Defendants-Appellees., 1995 WL
17167532, *17167532+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1995) Brief and Argument of
Defendants-Appellees (NO. 1-94-1881) HN: 14 (Ill.Dec.)
125 DOVER CORPORATION, Dover Elevator International, Inc., Dieterich Standard Corporation,
Universal Instruments Corporation, Tipper Tie, Inc., and Dover Elevator Company, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellee., 1994 WL
16169631, *16169631+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Aug 04, 1994) Brief of Defendant-
Appellee Illinois Department of Revenue (NO. 1-93-3340) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
126 OK TRUCKING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas L. ARMSTEAD, Office of the Illinois
State Fire Marshal, Defendants-Appellees., 1994 WL 16170059, *16170059+ (Appellate Brief)
(Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 01, 1994) Brief of Defendants-Appellees Thomas L. Armstead and Office of
the Illinois State Fire Marshal (NO. 1-93-3810) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)
127 Thomas D. SULLIVAN, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF FIREMEN'S
ANNUITY & BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellees., 1994 WL 16170020,
*16170020+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 26, 1994) Plaintiff-Appellant's Reply Brief
(NO. 1-93-3582) HN: 14 (Ill.Dec.)
128 John CLARK, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant/Appellee.,
1994 WL 16170687, *16170687 (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1994) Brief for the
Plaintiff/Appellant (NO. 1-94-0456)
129 Robert L. GREINER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. DOMINICK'S FINER FOODS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, Dominick Dimatteo, Jr., Lasalle National Bank as Trustee under Trust No. 54204,
S.D.M., Inc., an Illinois corporation a/k/a S.D.M. Realty, Inc., an Illinois corporation, Salvatore

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 DiMucci, Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank as Trustee under Trust No. 9234, Defendants/Appellees.,
1993 WL 13137936, *13137936+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Dec 13, 1993) Brief and
Argument of Plaintiff-Appellant (NO. 1-93-0127) HN: 10 (Ill.Dec.)
130 Richard A. KARTCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF FIREMEN'S ANNUITY
& BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee., 1993 WL 13152666, *13152666+
(Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Oct 07, 1993) Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief in Support of Appeal
(NO. 1-93-2383) HN: 3 (Ill.Dec.)
131 Merlyn FRUIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION and Illinois State Board of Pharmacy, Defendants-Appellees., 1993 WL 13137806,
*13137806+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Jun 11, 1993) Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant (NO. 1-
93-464) HN: 4,5,11 (Ill.Dec.)
132 CONGREGATION KOL AMI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RELATIONS, et al., Defendants, Jeanne Diamond, Intervenor-Appellant., 1993 WL 13152676,
*13152676+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. May 10, 1993) Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee
Congregation Kol Ami (NO. 1-92-2599) "
133 Michael O'KEEFE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF FIREMEN'S ANNUITY &
BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, CITY OF CHICAGO, and Donald Stensland, Defendants-
Appellees., 1993 WL 13136660, *13136660+ (Appellate Brief) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Feb 02, 1993)
Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief in Support of Appeal (NO. 1-92-3772) HN: 3 (Ill.Dec.)

Trial Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Trial Pleadings
134 William TUCKER, Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST, Illinois; Park Forest Police Pension
Board; Carl Kuester, President; Michael Gonzales, Vice-President; Fred Bailey, Secretary; Don
Myers; Trustee; and Willis A. Brunson, Trustee., Defendants., 1999 WL 34976716, *34976716 (Trial
Pleading) (Ill.Cir. May 13, 1999) Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiff's
COMPLAINT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW (NO. 98CH16314) HN: 5 (Ill.Dec.)

Trial Motions, Memoranda and Affidavits

135 CARPETLAND U.S.A., INC., Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY AND LYNN QUIGLEY DOHERTY, Director of the Department of Employment
Security, Defendant., 1997 WL 34678710, *1 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (Ill.Cir.
1997) Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support
of the Decision of the Director of Employment Security (NO. 97L50149) HN: 4,5 (Ill.Dec.)

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