Naïve Realism, Privileged Access and Epistemic Safety

What does the author know about the problem i.e. what have other people done previously?
This article talks about the naïve-realist theory pertaining to the veridical experience associated with

people nowadays. The author starts off the article by explaining concepts pertaining to this theory

and then explores different perspectives to this theory that have been previously researched upon by

other authors.

Matthew starts off the discussion on the work previously done on naive-realism in the veridical space

with Alan Millar, who provides the foundation of this theory. The premise of Millar’s theory is that

if person A knows an object B, then person A can also recognize object B when they see object B in

person. This reflects a recognitional ability in individuals.

Matthew then goes on to talk about how theorists of different fields have different explanations for

perceptual recognition, according to the field they belong to. For example, someone who studies

inner sense, will explain the phenomenon of perceptual recognition in terms of the inner sense

mechanism – the mechanisms theorists like Armstrong and Lycan used. However, there are theorists

who explain the phenomenon of perceptual recognition without relating it to the field they belong to,

like Sydney Shoemaker, for instance. Shoemaker says that self-knowledge is dependent on the

individual’s rational, intelligence, and conceptual competence capabilities, instead of the individual’s

perceptual capacities or sensitivities.

Matthew also discusses the works of Fred Dretske, on displaced perception. According to Drestke,

the phenomenon of displaced perception takes place when an individual believes that “a is F by

seeing b, where a is not equal to b”. The theory of displaced perception is based on the foundation of

“connecting belief”, through which, according to Drestke, individuals gain knowledge of their

surroundings.

Other works on the naïve-realism dimension include another of Millar’s theories of recognitional

beliefs. He believes that recognitional beliefs are “psychologically immediate”. Furthermore, the
theorist Byrne is also mentioned for his works on “mental states and knowledge”, whereby he states

that first-person beliefs are more likely to transform into knowledge as compared to other types of

beliefs, such as environmental beliefs.

What did the author do or propose to address the problem and how did the author do it i.e.
methodology, methods, etc.?
Matthew Kennedy’s article highlighted the foundation of naïve-realism by supporting the first-

person argument instead of the third-person arguments. He started off by discussing various theorists

and their works on the naïve-realism theory, in the veridical space, and showed some support for the

theory presented by Byrne but had his reservations about all theories as well.

Matthew then went on to further validate his argument of supporting the first-person paradigm by

first giving an example clarifying the first-person and the third-person, and then outlining three

scenarios, on the basis of which, he identified some profiles that people can assume when they are in

the naïve-realism paradigm.

The first-person example states that “I believe I see a brown object Z” and the third-person example

states that “Mr. X believes that Matthew sees a brown object Z”.

The scenarios are as follows (assumption is that object Z is brown):

1. Type A: I don’t see anything.

2. Type B: I see something, but it’s not object Z.

3. Type C: I see object Z, but it’s not brown.

The profiles identified are as follows:

1. Type A – First Person, False Belief: when an individual maybe hallucinating.

2. Type A – Third Person, False Belief: when the individual hasn’t seen anything, but the third

person believes that the individual has seen something.

3. Type B – First Person, False Belief: when an individual sees something but identifies it

incorrectly.

4. Type B – Third Person, False Belief: when an individual sees something and identifies it

incorrectly, but a third person believes that the individual has identified the seen object correctly.

5. Type C – realistic scenarios.

6. Type D – First Person, False Belief: a much more complex idea to implement for first-person

(similar to 3).

7. Type D – Third Person, False Belief: when an individual sees an object correctly, but a third

person believes the individual has seen something else.

These profiles explore the errors that individuals can make when they assume the respective profile,

due to circumstances that are not in their control.

What did the author find?

After comparing previous works on the subject with his own opinions and research, Matthew

Kennedy found some interesting conclusions to the naïve-realism theory, in the veridical dimension.

These conclusions are discussed below.

First-person beliefs will have an epistemic advantage over third-person beliefs, because the first-

person is always able to observe the finer print in more detail and grasp the particulars of his/her

environment in a much more holistic and reliable manner, as opposed to the third-person belief. The

connection to knowledge of an environment is much stronger with the first-person, as compared to

the third-person.

This conclusion further builds on the fact that the perceptual recognition ability of the first-person

will be much more safer as compared to that of the third-person because the third-person has a longer

checklist of things to observe in order to have a perceptual recognition result, such as the first person

and the object the first person is observing, as compared to the first-person, who is directly and only

observing his/her surrounding.

This, however, can have exceptions in cases where the third-person is very much involved into the

first-person’s experiences and may actually know a lot about the first-person’s behaviors, through

multiple in-depth observations.

Therefore, it is important to make sure that the first-person and the third-person are of like rationality

and conceptual competence, and have equal resources at disposal, in order for the first-person to

have the epistemic advantage over the third-person.

Truth
What does the author know about the problem i.e. what have other people done previously?
Jon Mills discusses the true idea behind the concept of “truth” in this article, and he starts off by

mentioning the origins of this concept in Greek Discourse and follows on to the theories provided by

different researchers in the field of psychoanalysis, and mentions Greek mythology in a couple of

places that relate to the concept of truth.

He first starts off by mentioning Plato’s dialogues on truth, whereby Plato assigns the concept of

truth an eternal stature and describes it as an entity that is pure, unchanged, beautiful, good and

unaltered. Plato placed truth at the “apex of metaphysical inquiry”. He awarded the highest of values

to truth and identified the process of getting at truth through a laborious and intensive rational

discourse, which was more often than not impossible. Moreover, Plato emphasized truth on being

“lasting”, “irrefutable”, “permanent” and “intelligible”.

Jon Mills then proceeds to talk about Heidegger’s works, which he has cited the most throughout the

article. The discourse that Jon Mills builds around the concept behind truth greatly digresses from

Heidegger’s stance on the matter. Heidegger’s works on the matter range vastly from truth being a

phenomenon of disclosedness to his contradiction with Aristotle and Plato’s views of truth being

something that is correct, as opposed to truth being form of disclosure or unconcealment.

Building on these theories, Mills also refers to Aristotle’s publications that correspond to the

coherence theory that has been talked about in much detail in this article.

Furthermore, Mills cites the pragmatic theories that were the works of perspectivalists and

constructivists such as Orange, Hoffman and Stern. He goes on to mention works of Freud in

multiple places as well, in accordance with Charles Hanly’s beliefs and arguments. Other notable

theorists mentioned include Rosenberg and Medini, who referred to truth as being a “process of

emergence”.
What did the author do or propose to address the problem and how did the author do it i.e.
methodology, methods, etc.?
Jon Mills has used the arguments of Charles Hanly and Heidegger to support his opinions on the

matter of what truth really is. He has used the method of discourse, that is common in Greek works,

and has constantly questioned the arguments posited by different theorists over time.

Mills first states that truth is usually used in clinical situations where patients are in question, and

then he uses their examples throughout the article to apply different theories to these situations in

order to test their practicality and logic.

He focuses on the phenomenon called “Alethia”, whereby truth is characterized as a process of

“disclosedness” or “unconcealedness”. Truth is also mentioned in this article as a result of

manifestations that reveal themselves in a state of unconsciousness.

Jon Mills counters the arguments posed by Plato when he states truth to be “correctness” as that

would entail the existence of a standard which would in turn be decided by the people who are most

benefited by it, hence contradicting the purity of the concept of “truth”, which is now overshadowed

by the satisfactory needs of the people making the standards. Therefore, he comes back to

Heidegger’s proposition that truth already exists and just has to be uncovered, instead of being

coherent with facts and reality, and being consistent throughout, as truth can be dynamic, given the

changing definitions. Similarly, if truth is said to be a relation between what is reality and what is

external, then it loses its property of being a pure and grand entity on its own and comes down to

being a relational property only. Hence, this argument is also flawed and brings Mills back to

Heidegger’s stance.

Mills also explores the arena where truth is not only a mere linguistic tool, but also a concept that

holds conditions or properties, in the field of psychoanalysis. He does this by looking at Freud’s and

Hanly’s works on constructivism and comes down to the conclusion that truth is a mental property

and doesn’t ascertain to being facts or what is “correct” and “justified”.

What did the author find?
The author found two major concepts behind the phenomenon of “truth”. While he was discovering

these two concepts, he realized that most allegations regarding what “truth” really is, from different

perspectives throughout the history of research, end up contradicting one another, which is why it is

important to bring context into whatever we do.

The first concept was that “truth” is a process and is not an entity or a relational aspect connecting

two parts of a situation. Truth is uncovered through a rational dialogue and discourse over a period of

time, as truth can never be unveiled fully all at once – it takes time for the complete truth to be

unveiled. Most often than not, we know what is true, but for the sake of a natural tendency for self-

censorship, we end up concealing the truth, which unconsciously reveals itself at a certain point in

time in the future, because truth speaks for itself and uses linguistics and appearances to be revealed

out in the open.

The second concept that was realized in this article was that “truth” is never useful on its own, and

that many units of truth make up a whole truth that better explain a situation. These small revelations

that turn into a grandiose totality of knowledge, better explain the real essence of truth. Therefore,

when revealed, truth will always be incomplete because it will always have another piece linking it

to a more holistic situation.

Truth tends to come out in the open through two main ways – prereflexive actions or logical

discourse. The use of either of these tools, depending on the context and intensity of the situation,

can help uncover “truth” through multiple small units. Truth is never a correctness or a satisfactory

result, but is something that already exists, and is not seen by the naked eye, unless it is sought after.