Chapter 3

Defining and describing autonomy

Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

Autonomy is often defined as the capacity to take charge of, or responsi-

bility for, one’s own learning. If we wish to describe autonomy in language
learning in more detail, therefore, we will need to say more about what
‘taking charge’ or ‘taking responsibility’ means in the context of language
learning. In this book, I define autonomy as the capacity to take control
of one’s own learning, largely because the construct of ‘control’ appears
to be more open to empirical investigation than the constructs of ‘charge’
or ‘responsibility’. It is also assumed that it is neither necessary nor desir-
able to define autonomy more precisely than this, because control over
learning may take a variety of forms in relation to different dimensions
of the learning process. In other words, it is accepted that autonomy is
a multidimensional capacity that will take different forms for different
individuals, and even for the same individual in different contexts or at
different times.
Little (1990: 7) argues that autonomy is not ‘a single, easily describable
behaviour’ (Quote 3.1). Nevertheless, it is important that we attempt to
describe it for two reasons. First, construct validity is an important pre-
condition for effective research. In order for a construct such as autonomy
to be researchable, it must be describable in terms of observable phenomena.
In language learning research these are typically either behaviours or men-
tal states. While behaviours are often directly observable, mental states
need to be inferred from observable behaviours, elicited introspections or
learning outcomes. Second, programmes or innovations designed to foster
autonomy are likely to be more effective if they are based on a clear under-
standing of the changes they aim to foster. Put simply, whether we are con-
cerned with research or with practice, it is important that we know, and are
able to state, what we mean when we talk about autonomy. This is not to
say that we all should necessarily mean exactly the same thing. Autonomy

58
 DEFINING AND DESCRIBING AUTONOMY 59

may be recognised in a variety of forms, but it is important that we are able

to identify the form in which we choose to recognise it in the contexts of
our own research and practice.

Little on what autonomy is not

• Autonomy is not a synonym for self-instruction; in other words, autonomy

Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

is not limited to learning without a teacher.

• In the classroom context, autonomy does not entail an abdication of
responsibility on the part of the teacher; it is not a matter of letting the
learners get on with things as best they can.
• On the other hand, autonomy is not something that teachers do to
learners; that is, it is not another teaching method.
• Autonomy is not a single, easily described behaviour.
• Autonomy is not a steady state achieved by learners.
Little (1990: 7)

3.1 Dimensions of autonomy

One of the earliest and most frequently cited definitions of autonomy is
found in Holec’s (1981: 3) report to the Council of Europe, where auton-
omy is described as ‘the ability to take charge of one’s own learning’. Holec
elaborated on this basic definition as follows:
To take charge of one’s own learning is to have, and to hold, the responsibility
for all the decisions concerning all aspects of this learning, i.e.:
– determining the objectives;
– defining the contents and progressions;
– selecting methods and techniques to be used;
– monitoring the procedure of acquisition properly speaking (rhythm,
time, place, etc.)
– evaluating what has been acquired.
The autonomous learner is himself capable of making all these decisions con-
cerning the learning with which he is or wishes to be involved.
In this definition, taking charge of one’s own learning is described in terms
of the capacity to make decisions at successive stages of the learning
process. Autonomous learners are able to direct the course of their own
learning by making all the significant decisions concerning its management
and organisation.
 60 TE AC HI NG AND RESEARC H I N G AUT O NO MY

Holec’s definition covered the main areas of the learning process

in which one might expect the autonomous learner to exercise control.
The definition was problematic, however, in that it described the decision-
making abilities involved in autonomous learning in technical terms,
leaving open the nature of the cognitive capacities underlying effective
self-management of learning. Although Holec was clearly aware of the
cognitive dimension to autonomy (e.g. Holec, 1985a), his definition did
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

not make its importance explicit. In contrast, Little (1991: 3) argued that
‘autonomy is not exclusively or even primarily a matter of how learning is
organized’:
Essentially, autonomy is a capacity – for detachment, critical reflection,
decision-making, and independent action. It presupposes, but also entails,
that the learner will develop a particular kind of psychological relation to the
process and content of his learning. The capacity for autonomy will be dis-
played both in the way the learner learns and in the way he or she transfers
what has been learned to wider contexts.
(Little, 1991: 4)

In this definition, the capacity to take responsibility for one’s own learning
is described more in terms of control over the cognitive processes
underlying effective self-management of learning. Little’s definition was
complementary to Holec’s, but added a vital psychological dimension.
Holec’s and Little’s definitions covered two key dimensions of autonomy,
but underplayed a third dimension concerned with control over the con-
tent of learning. Control over learning content has a situational aspect.
Autonomous learners should, in principle, have the freedom to determine
and follow their own learning goals and purposes, if learning is to be
genuinely self-directed. But full self-direction is only feasible if the learner
studies in isolation from others and, because language learning is generally
enhanced by interaction with others, full self-direction tends to be a less
than desirable option. There is also, therefore, a social aspect to control
over learning content, which involves the learner’s ability to negotiate over
goals, purposes, content and resources with others. In an earlier paper
(Benson, 1996: 33), I argued that control over learning necessarily involves
actions that have social consequences:
Greater learner control over the learning process, resources and language
cannot be achieved by each individual acting alone according to his or her
own preferences. Control is a question of collective decision-making rather
than individual choice.

In approaching learner control in this way, I was concerned to emphasise

the political and potentially transformative character of autonomy
(evident, for example, in the writings of Dewey, Freire and Illich), which is
 DEFINING AND DESCRIBING AUTONOMY 61

often absent from definitions of autonomy in language learning focused

on the capacities of the individual learner. A commitment to the principle
of learner control of content will generally pose much more of a challenge
to established classroom and institutional power relationships than a
commitment to developing autonomy in regard to self-management and
cognitive processing.
It should be emphasised that any definition of autonomy that attempts to
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

cover every potential aspect of control over learning risks becoming too long
for practical use. A simple definition of autonomy as the capacity to take
control of one’s learning also establishes a space in which differences of
emphasis can coexist. However, it can be argued that an adequate description
of autonomy in language learning should at least recognise the importance
of three dimensions at which learner control may be exercised: learning
management, cognitive processes and learning content (Figure 3.1).
These three dimensions of control, which will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 5, are clearly interdependent. Effective learning manage-
ment depends upon control of the cognitive processes involved in learning,
while control of cognitive processes necessarily has consequences for the
self-management of learning. Autonomy also implies that self-management
and control over cognitive processes should involve decisions concerning
the content of learning. As we will see throughout this book, however,
researchers and practitioners often attach more importance to one dimen-
sion of control than they do to others, and for this reason it can be helpful
to consider each dimension separately.

Figure 3.1 Defining autonomy: the capacity to take control over learning
 62 TE AC HI NG AND RESEARC H I N G AUT O NO MY

3.2 Versions of autonomy

Although a variety of definitions of learner autonomy have appeared in the
literature, there has been little debate over the exact meaning of the term.
Instead, researchers seem to have found the elasticity of existing definitions
to be more of a help than a hindrance. There have, however, been a
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

number of attempts to identify different approaches to the application of

the concept in practice as discussion of autonomy has widened. Benson
(1997) was among the first to open this discussion in a paper that identified
technical, psychological and political ‘versions’ of autonomy. Relating
these versions of autonomy to the dimensions of autonomy identified in
this chapter, technical versions would focus mainly on learning manage-
ment, psychological versions on cognitive processes, and political versions
on learning content. In more recent work, I have found the idea of versions
of autonomy less useful, because it often refers only to differences of
emphasis within approaches that are typically oriented to learning man-
agement, cognitive processes and learning content at one and the same
time. As Oxford (2003) pointed out, there is also a tendency to assume
that political versions of autonomy are in some sense more ideologically
sound than psychological or technical versions, whereas approaches to the
development of autonomy are, in practice, best evaluated by reference
to the goals and desires of the learners and contextual conditions.
There have also been several other potentially useful ways of dividing
up the cake of autonomy in the recent literature. Some have looked at
autonomy in terms of stages of development. Littlewood (1996: 81), for
example, developed a three-stage model for the development of autonomy
based on dimensions of language acquisition, learning approach and per-
sonal development. Autonomy in language acquisition involved ‘an ability
to operate independently with the language and use it to communicate
personal meanings in real, unpredictable situations’ (‘autonomy as a com-
municator’). Autonomy in learning approach involved learners’ ‘ability to
take responsibility for their own learning and to apply active, personally
relevant strategies’ (‘autonomy as a learner’). ‘Autonomy as a person’ was
seen as a higher-level goal that potentially emerged from autonomy in
communication and learning approach. At around the same time, Macaro
(1997: 170–172) proposed a similar three-stage model involving ‘autonomy
of language competence’, ‘autonomy of language learning competence’
and ‘autonomy of choice and action’.
Littlewood (1999) also introduced a distinction between ‘proactive’ and
‘reactive’ autonomy, which has been widely cited in the literature. Proactive
autonomy ‘affirms [learners’] individuality and sets up directions which
they themselves have partially created’, while reactive autonomy, ‘does not
create its own directions but, once a direction has been initiated, enables
 DEFINING AND DESCRIBING AUTONOMY 63

learners to organise their resources autonomously in order to reach their

goal’ (Littlewood 1999: 75). Littlewood describes reactive autonomy as the
kind that causes learners to learn vocabulary without being pushed, to take
the initiative to do past examination papers or to organise study groups to
complete an assignment. In terms of the model that I have proposed, it
might be understood as involving control over learning management and
cognitive processing, without control over learning content.
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

Subsequent writers have cut the cake in different ways, focusing less on
stages within the development of autonomy and more on the ways in which
autonomy is conceptualised in pedagogical practice. Distinctions introduced
in the recent literature include Ribé’s (2003) ‘convergence’, ‘divergence–
convergence’ and ‘convergence–divergence’ positions, O’Rourke and
Schwienhorst’s (2003) ‘individual–cognitive’, ‘social–interactive’ and
‘exploratory–participatory’ perspectives, Oxford’s (2003) expanded version
of Benson’s (1997) model, which recognised ‘technical’, ‘psychological’,
‘sociocultural’, and ‘political–critical’ perspectives, and Holliday’s (2003)
‘native–speakerist’, ‘cultural–relativist’ and ‘social’ approaches. Smith (2003),
meanwhile, made a more general distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’
pedagogies for autonomy (Quote 3.2), while Kumaravadivelu (2003) made
a similar distinction between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ views of autonomy. Most
recently, Allford and Pachler (2007: 14) have contrasted ‘radical’ and ‘gradu-
alist’ versions of autonomy. In radical versions, the emphasis is on the
learners’ right to autonomy, while in gradualist versions autonomy is a long-
term goal and a product of the acquisition of autonomous learning skills.

Smith on weak and strong pedagogies for autonomy

‘Weak’ versions of pedagogy for autonomy, in this characterization, tend to view

autonomy as a capacity which students currently lack (and so need ‘training’
towards), and/or identify it with a mode of learning (for example, self-access)
which students need to be prepared for. The underlying assumptions tend to
be that students are deficient in autonomy (and/or currently unable to make
effective use of self-access resources), but that autonomy – as conceived in
the mind of the teacher, syllabus designer and/or institution – is nevertheless
a goal worth pursuing with them. . . . A ‘strong version’ of pedagogy for learner
autonomy, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that students are,
to greater or lesser degrees, already autonomous, and already capable of
exercising this capacity.
Smith (2003: 130–1)

For the most part, these models do not intend to dichotomise, but often
aim to highlight choices that might be made within an overall orientation
to autonomy. Smith (2003: 131), for example, associates ‘weak’ pedagogies
 64 TE AC HI NG AND RESEARC H I N G AUT O NO MY

with the assumption that students currently lack autonomy and ‘strong’
pedagogies with the assumption that they are already autonomous to some
degree. Ribé (2003: 15) associates ‘convergence’ models of autonomy with
a movement towards shared, other-directed curriculum goals, while ‘diver-
gence’ models are associated with more open approaches to language cur-
ricula in which autonomy ‘lies in the wide range of choices around the
process affecting almost all levels of control, management and strategic
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

decisions’. In both cases, the distinctions again seem to be related to the

presence or absence of control over learning content (Chapter 5.3).
Most of these models recognise the legitimacy of all of the approaches they
describe. Ribé (2003) argues, for example, that ‘an optimal learning envir-
onment probably requires a mixture of the three perspectives’, while Oxford
(2003: 90) argues that research should employ multiple perspectives and
‘no single perspective should be considered antithetical to any other’. This
reflects both a tendency towards inclusiveness and a tendency to defer to the
need to base pedagogies for autonomy on cultural and contextual conditions.
There is, however, usually an implication that ‘stronger’ versions of autonomy
are more legitimate than ‘weaker’ ones and the modelling process is, indeed,
often a device for critiquing versions of autonomy that are perceived as being
‘mainstream’ because they focus on ‘lower’ levels of autonomy. Central to this
critique is the argument that learners are invariably more capable of making
reasoned decisions about the content of their learning than their teachers
suppose. From this point of view, gradualist, step-by-step approaches, in
which the ‘higher’ levels of autonomy may never be reached, may ultimately
inhibit, rather than foster, the development of autonomy.
The discussion of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ versions of autonomy echoes earlier
discussion of a similar shift from more radical to mainstream approaches
to communicative language teaching in the early 1980s (Howatt, 1984:
287), which suggests a more general tendency in the development of
learner-centred innovations over time. Allwright and Hanks (2009) relate
this tendency both to the interests of commercial language teaching pub-
lishers in packaging and promoting competing methods and the fact that
so many institutions prescribe the use of textbooks that already embody
methods (Quote 3.3).

Allwright and Hanks on packaging methods

Packaging methods, whether ‘mainstream’ or ‘fringe’, is not just a way of

marketing textbooks. It offers control over how teachers teach, even if the
underlying pedagogical ideas do not themselves suggest strong teacher control
in the classroom. In practice, few methodological options involve any serious
relinquishing of teacher control, and they are naturally the ‘unpackagable’ ones.
Allwright and Hanks (2009: 49)
 DEFINING AND DESCRIBING AUTONOMY 65

3.3 Measuring autonomy

If we are able to define autonomy and describe it in terms of various
aspects of control over learning, we should also, in principle, be able to
measure the extent to which learners are autonomous. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that we will ever be able to measure autonomy in the same way as we
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

measure language proficiency and to make this comparison is to raise the

question of why we would want to measure autonomy independently of its
contribution to language proficiency in the first place. There are at least
two good reasons. First, Nunan’s (1997: 192) observation that autonomy is
not an ‘all-or-nothing concept’, but a matter of ‘degree’ is widely cited in
the literature. We also read of students being ‘more’ or ‘less’ autonomous
and of becoming ‘more autonomous’ over time. These ways of talking
about autonomy imply that we have, at least, an intuitive scale of measure-
ment in our minds and, if this is the case, we should surely articulate the
scale that we have in mind. The second reason is more narrowly related to
research. One kind of research that is frequently carried out tries to assess
whether a particular learning programme or activity type contributes to
student autonomy. Another explores relationships between autonomy and
constructs such as motivation or the use of learning strategies. In both
cases, the research is very difficult to carry out without some scale of mea-
surement for autonomy. A third, more problematic, reason is that we may
want to measure autonomy for purposes of student assessment in courses
that specify greater autonomy as a learning outcome. There has been at
least one report of a credit-bearing independent language learning course
in which student autonomy forms part of the assessment (Ravindram,
2000). Again, if we wish to assess autonomy, we will need a scale of mea-
surement, although we will also need to think carefully about whether such
assessments are legitimate in language learning programmes.
Later in this section, I will look at some approaches to measuring auton-
omy that have been described in recent publications, but before doing so,
I want to look at some problems of principle involved in the enterprise.
The first of these concerns the complexity of the construct of autonomy,
which is generally understood as a composite of many other constructs,
none of which are quite the same thing as autonomy itself. When we judge
that learners are ‘more’ or ‘less’ autonomous, therefore, we appear to be
observing certain behaviours or abilities and treating them as indexical of
autonomy. One behaviour of this kind might be the ability to draw up a
study plan. If we observe that students are able to do this well (leaving aside
the difficult question of what a ‘good’ study plan would look like), we could
infer that they are to some degree autonomous. But the ability to make
study plans is, at best, a component of autonomous learning, and possibly
not even a necessary one (Chapter 5.1.1). An initial problem, therefore, is
to determine what the necessary components of autonomy are. There may
 66 TE AC HI NG AND RESEARC H I N G AUT O NO MY

also be non-observable components and a second problem is to determine

whether the non-observable components are so central to autonomy that
we may never really be able to measure it all.

Little on the variability of autonomy

Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

It is true, of course, that we recognize autonomous learners by their behaviour:

but that can take numerous different forms, depending on their age, how far
they have progressed with their learning, what they perceive their immediate
learning needs to be, and so on. Autonomy, in other words, can manifest itself
in very different ways.
Little (1991: 4)

A related problem concerns the diversity of behaviours and abilities that

are potentially involved in learner autonomy. Little (1991) suggests that
learners can be autonomous in entirely different ways (Quote 3.4). At the
risk of over-simplification, one learner may be good at drawing up and
following study plans using self-access materials, while another may be
good at creating opportunities for interaction with target language speakers.
Learners may also call upon different aspects of autonomy as different
situations demand them. We might want to say that these learners are
‘equally’ autonomous, although they are, in fact, autonomous in different,
and possibly non-comparable, ways.
Second, it seems that autonomy tends to overlap with a number of con-
structs that have their own integrity in the research literature. Autonomy
appears to be closely related, for example, to language awareness, motivation,
strategy use, learner beliefs and metacognition. The relationship between
autonomy and these constructs often seems to be based either on the presence
of shared components or on the inclusion of one construct within the other.
This is possible because none of these constructs, autonomy included,
denotes a discrete observable attribute. Instead, they designate ways of
thinking about and foregrounding certain aspects of the language learning
processes. If we want to relate autonomy to other constructs in such a way
that we might say that an ‘increase’ in one corresponds to an ‘increase’ in
the other, therefore, we need to find ways of measuring autonomy that
clearly differentiate it from the other constructs that we are interested in.
If there turns out to be a correlation between, for example, autonomy and
motivation on a scale for autonomy that includes motivational components,
we will not have discovered very much at all.
At the end of this section, I will suggest a provisional solution to these
problems of measurement. The following problems seem to be less easily
solved, however. First, as Holec (1981: 3) puts it, autonomy refers to
 DEFINING AND DESCRIBING AUTONOMY 67

‘a potential capacity to act in a given situation – in our case – learning, and

not the actual behaviour of an individual in that situation’. Sinclair (1999:
95–6) illustrates this idea with an anecdote about a student working in
a self-access centre, who comes across the unfamiliar phrase power distance.
He gets up from his seat and asks the tutor on duty what it means. Sinclair
asks, ‘How do we know whether this student is demonstrating autonomy or
not?’ An irritated tutor, she suggests, ‘might feel that he is taking the lazy
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

teacher-dependent way out’, but does she know whether or not the student
has considered alternative strategies before approaching her. It could be,
Sinclair argues, that the student has been using his capacity for autonomy
but the tutor ‘cannot see the process, only the outcome’.
The next problem concerns the nature of autonomy as a developmental
process. We know, for example, that autonomy tends to be ‘domain-specific’
and that it can be ‘lost’ as well as ‘gained’. As Little (1991: 5) argues,
The fact is that autonomy is likely to be hard-won and its permanence can-
not be guaranteed; and the learner who displays a high degree of autonomy
in one area may be non-autonomous in another.
Little (1991: 21) also argues that the development of autonomy in institu-
tional contexts can involve conflicts of expectations that leave learners
disoriented:
Indeed, it is a common experience that attempts to make learners conscious
of the demands of a learning task and the techniques with which they might
approach it, lead in the first instance to disorientation and a sense that learn-
ing has become less rather than more purposeful and efficient.
For Holec (1985a), the development of autonomy involves ‘psychological
deconditioning’, while for Breen and Mann (1997: 143), it may initially be
manifested in ‘individualistic and non-cooperative or competitive ways of
being’ in situations where learners have been socialised into relations of
dependency.

Breen and Mann on the ‘mask of autonomous behaviour’

Learners will generally seek to please me as the teacher. If I ask them to mani-
fest behaviours that they think I perceive as the exercise of autonomy, they
will gradually discover what these behaviours are and will subsequently reveal
them back to me. Put simply, learners will give up their autonomy to put on
the mask of autonomous behaviour.
Breen and Mann (1997: 141)

Lastly, Breen and Mann (1997) use the metaphor of the ‘mask of
autonomous behaviour’ to signal the possibility that students will learn
 68 TE AC HI NG AND RESEARC H I N G AUT O NO MY

how to display autonomy, without necessarily becoming more autonomous

in a deeper sense (Quote 3.5). Like the problem of the uneven develop-
ment of learner autonomy, this problem relates to the distinction between
autonomous behaviour and autonomy as a capacity. In general, we infer
capacities from corresponding behaviours, knowing that our inferences
may be unreliable. In the case of autonomy, the capacity can be hidden
behind misleading behaviour or simulated as a desired response. If we are
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

to measure learner autonomy reliably, we will somehow have to capture

both the meaning of behaviours and their authenticity in relation to an
underlying capacity for autonomy.
It would be fair to say that there has been no great progress in solving
problems associated with the measurement of autonomy, partly because
the insertion of autonomy into the goals of education systems has not yet
been translated into a requirement to assess it, and partly due to a sense
that ‘testing itself is anti-autonomy’ (Champagne et al., 2001: 49). In a
recent paper, however, I have discussed several studies that describe ways
of measuring, or at least identifying the presence of, autonomy in the con-
text of research (Benson, 2010). Rowsell and Libben’s (1994) study used
discourse analysis of student journals to identify and count instances of
autonomous behaviour in use of self-instructional materials (Chapter 16.6,
Case Study). Simmons and Wheeler (1995) also used discourse analysis to
analyse student roles and decision-making procedures during action meet-
ings in a course organised on process syllabus principles. Sinclair (1999)
reported ongoing research on an assessment procedure and scale, based on
metacognitive awareness, to be used during assessment sessions in self-
access learning. The assessment of autonomy was to be based mainly on
students’ rationales and awareness of alternative strategies. Lai (2001: 35)
designed two rating scales for use in self-access learning programmes, one
to measure ‘process control at the task or micro level’ and the other to
measure ‘self-direction at the overall process or macro level’. These scales
were principally used to assess the quality of planning and reflectivity
found in study plans and weekly logs. Rivers (2001) studied the self-
directed learning behaviours of adult students studying Georgian and
Kazakh at a U.S. university by analysing ethnographic data for style
conflicts, requests for modifications to the course, and learning behaviours
(Chapter 16.4, Case Study).
Although none of these studies claims to report a reliable instrument for
measuring degrees of autonomy, they do point to the possibility of design-
ing workable procedures for research projects. One shared characteristic of
these instruments and procedures is that they are context-sensitive and
apparently designed for single use. This seems important, because a more
generalised instrument would almost certainly fail to capture the multiple
ways in which it is possible to be an autonomous language learner. There
is also a risk in moving too far beyond descriptive assessments of autonomy
 DEFINING AND DESCRIBING AUTONOMY 69

carried out for the purpose of specific research projects. The growing
expectation that language education will produce autonomous learners has
not yet filtered down into accountability mechanisms. Self-access centres,
for example, are often held accountable for their contribution to language
proficiency, but seldom for their contribution to learner autonomy (Morrison,
2005). But it is possible that, in educational climates in which there is a
close relationship between the value of educational achievements and their
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

measurability, we will increasingly be encouraged to think of autonomy as

being both measurable and testable. We might then find ourselves trapped
in a logic that leads from the idea that autonomy is measurable to the con-
struction of tests, and from the construction of tests to their implementation
in student assessment. This is a direction that teachers would no doubt
want to resist, not simply because a requirement for autonomy is funda-
mentally opposed to the principle of autonomy itself, but also because
such a requirement would encourage students to wear Breen and Mann’s
‘mask of autonomy’ and divert teachers’ attention from fostering genuine
autonomy to separating the genuine from its inauthentic display.

3.4 Autonomy and culture

Riley’s questions on autonomy and culture

• Are the principles and practice on which ‘autonomous’ and ‘self-directed’

learning schemes are based ethnocentric?
• Are there any ethnic or social groups whose cultural background predis-
poses them for or against such approaches?
Riley (1988: 13)

If autonomy takes different forms for different individuals, and even for
the same individual in different contexts of learning, its manifestations are
also liable to vary according to cultural context. However, debates on
autonomy and culture have also asked whether a concept that is largely
grounded in Western discourses on philosophy, psychology and education
can be relevant to non-Western contexts at all. Concerns about the cultural
appropriateness of the idea of autonomy in non-Western contexts were
first raised by Riley (1988) at a time when discussion of the concept was
largely confined to Europe (Quote 3.6). Riley’s concerns were directed at
the fate of non-European students in European educational institutions
that adopted autonomy as one of their goals. In the 1990s, these concerns
 70 TE AC HI NG AND RESEARC H I N G AUT O NO MY

gained a renewed importance as the idea of autonomy spread around the

world with much of the discussion focusing on its relevance to Asian
students (Palfreyman 2003a; Smith 2001).
One of the more substantial contributions to this debate came from
Pennycook (1997), who critiqued learner autonomy as an idea that was
embedded in European Enlightenment conceptions of the individual and
spread around the world through the global spread of English language
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

teaching (ELT). Focusing his critique mainly on ‘mainstream’ conceptions

of autonomy that foreground individual psyschology and learning strate-
gies, he drew on feminist and post-colonial theory to develop the view that
autonomy should, in the context of ELT, be more a matter of helping
students to ‘find a voice in English’ and ‘confront a range of cultural
constructions as they learn English’ (Pennycook 1997: 48). Holliday (2003,
2005) also sees autonomy as a central construct in dominant ELT discourses,
which oppose the active Western student to the passive non-Western
‘Other’. Holliday’s (2003: 117) notion of ‘social autonomy’, based on the
assumption that ‘autonomy resides in the social worlds of the students,
which they bring with them from their lives outside the classroom’ also
departs radically from conventional conceptions of autonomy in language
learning. Most recently, Schmenk (2005: 112) has argued that the pro-
motion of autonomy as a universal good depends upon a ‘glossing over’ of
questions concerning ‘what autonomy might entail in specific social, cul-
tural, or institutional learning contexts’, which ‘leaves the concept devoid
of specific characteristics and thus facilitates its homogenization’. Schmenk
argues that the concept of autonomy has value, nevertheless, provided that
language educators ‘admit that autonomy is not a universal and neutral
concept and that it encompasses a critical awareness of one’s own possibili-
ties and limitations within particular contexts’ (p.115).
Although cultural appropriateness is often seen as the Achilles’ heel of
autonomy, it is worth noting that even critics such as Pennycook, Holliday
and Schmenk do not reject the idea of autonomy altogether. The most
vigorous defence of the universal relevance of the principles of learner
autonomy has come from Little (1999), who takes the view that they are
grounded in assumptions about the psychology of learning that are not
culturally-specific. Like others, however, Little also suggests that the ways
in which teachers will go about fostering autonomy should be contextually
appropriate. The problem raised here is whether a legitimate distinction
can be made between the principle of autonomy in language learning and
the pedagogical practices associated with it. In one recent critique of the
appropriateness of autonomy in African contexts, for example, Sonaiya’s
(2002) argument is directed mainly at the replacement of teaching by
computer-assisted language learning, which is viewed, perhaps unjustifiably,
as a pedagogical expression of autonomy.
 DEFINING AND DESCRIBING AUTONOMY 71

There has also been some criticism of the use of national or ethnic
cultural categories in this debate. Aoki and Smith (1999: 23) argue that,
‘arguments against the aspirations of people and/or for the political status
quo in a particular context can easily be masked by stereotyping or argu-
ments against cultural imperialism’. In both European and non-European
settings, the idea of autonomy represents a challenge to cultural and edu-
cational tradition. The notion that cultural traits are fixed is inimical to the
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

idea of autonomy, which implies that learning should be a process in which

individuals contribute to the transformation of culture. Aoki and Smith
(1999: 21) argue that,
It is important to recognize that autonomy is not an approach enforcing a
particular way of learning. It is, rather, an educational goal, as Holec (1981)
explicitly states. Objections to autonomy based on students’ current incapacity
to learn in a wholly self-directed manner therefore lack validity in any context.
To the extent that education contributes to the development of culture, the
promotion of autonomy can also be seen as a culturally legitimate goal in
the sense that autonomous learners are likely to be the most able to con-
tribute to cultural development and transformation.

Sung Dynasty advocates of autonomy

Pierson (1996) argues that learning attitudes in Hong Kong favouring teacher
authority and rote learning are as much a legacy of colonial education policies
as they are of Chinese cultural values. He cites two Sung Dynasty scholars in
support of the contention that the idea of autonomy in learning has roots in
Chinese thought:
The youth who is bright and memorizes a large amount of information is not to
be admired; but he who thinks carefully and searches for truth diligently is to be
admired.
Lu Tung-lai (1137–81)
If you are in doubt, think it out by yourself. Do not depend on others for expla-
nations. Suppose there was no one you could ask, should you stop learning? If
you could get rid of the habit of being dependent on others, you will make your
advancement in your study.
Chu Hsi (1130–1200)

Palfreyman and Smith’s (2003) collection of papers represents an import-

ant step forward by carrying the discussion of autonomy and culture
beyond appropriate pedagogies and national/ethnic categories. Palfreyman
(2003b), for example, discusses the different ways in which stakeholders
involved in an attempt to implement autonomy in a Turkish university
 72 TE AC HI NG AND RESEARC H I N G AUT O NO MY

understood and represented the concept, while Aoki and Hamakawa (2003)
explore issues of autonomy from a feminist cultural perspective. The
growing number of empirical studies of Asian students’ responses to
pedagogies associated with autonomy also represents a step forward.
Although the findings of these studies are mixed, they show that the
opportunity to direct their own learning is valued by many Asian students.
Huang’s (2010) ethnographic study of student language learning and life
Downloaded by [University of California, San Diego] at 03:51 17 March 2017

at a provincial university in China is especially valuable in the way that it

teases out students’ aspirations for autonomy within a framework of expec-
tations for community and care. An issue that deserves further attention
is the sense in which relationships between foreign language learning
and identity imply inter-cultural learning (Sercu 2002) and challenges to
culturally-conditioned conceptions of the self that both draw upon and
foster learner autonomy (Benson, Chik and Lim 2003; Riley 2003).