See

discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/251424635

Role of a central administrator in managing

water resources: The case of the Israeli water
commissioner

Article in Water Resources Research · November 2007

DOI: 10.1029/2007WR005922

CITATIONS READS

20 73

3 authors, including:

Eran Feitelson Itay Fischhendler

Hebrew University of Jerusalem Hebrew University of Jerusalem
110 PUBLICATIONS 1,567 CITATIONS 48 PUBLICATIONS 778 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Transboundary Water Conflicts in North East India View project

: The Political Economy of Negotiating Renewable targets: The Israeli Case View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Itay Fischhendler on 30 September 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH, VOL. 43, XXXXXX, doi:10.1029/2007WR005922, 2007
Click
Here
for
Full
Article
2 Role of a central administrator in managing water resources:
3 The case of the Israeli water commissioner
4 Eran Feitelson,1 Itay Fischhendler,1 and Paul Kay2
5 Received 30 January 2007; revised 27 June 2007; accepted 24 July 2007; published XX Month 2007.
6 [1] Water managers are usually implicitly assumed to be public servants whose sole
7 purpose is to manage water in the best possible way for the public good. Yet water
8 managers, as all bureaucrats, have interests, ideas, beliefs, and constituencies. This paper
9 investigates whether and how differences between water managers affect the
10 management of water resources and especially their action in face of scientific uncertainty.
11 Israel has an exceptionally centralized national water system. The water commissioner
12 entrusted with operating and regulating this system has wide-ranging power to allocate
13 water among users and to determine the rate of abstraction from the various water
14 resources. The water allocations and abstraction policies of different water commissioners
15 in Israel are analyzed. It is shown that the tenure of a water commissioner is a significant
16 explanatory variable of water resource management, controlling for variations in
17 precipitation and state of the water resources. A more detailed analysis of their abstraction
18 decisions shows that different water commissioners followed distinctly different policies
19 under similar conditions. It is suggested that a stricter checks and balances system may
20 attenuate these intertenure variations in policies.
22 Citation: Feitelson, E., I. Fischhendler, and P. Kay (2007), Role of a central administrator in managing water resources: The case of
23 the Israeli water commissioner, Water Resour. Res., 43, XXXXXX, doi:10.1029/2007WR005922.

25 1. Introduction in particular their operation budgets [Niskanen, 1971]. 50

26 [2] Many regions face the pressure of growing demands Hence this literature largely focuses on the relations be- 51
27 on existing water resources, and the situation is expected to tween bureaucrats and politicians, often in a modeling 52
28 worsen in coming decades due to population growth, framework [Bendor and Moe, 1985]. In such studies 53
29 economic development, and climatic change [Raskin et bureaucrats, or managers, are usually viewed as faceless 54
30 al., 1997]. Consequently, most water resources and systems individuals whose motives stem from their positions. 55
31 are regulated, at least to some extent, and the prospect is a [4] Descriptive studies of decision-making, particularly 56
32 need for more management, especially as demand manage- regarding large-scale projects, have shown that in certain 57
33 ment paradigms are emerging alongside of or in place of cases personalities of bureaucrats have had central effects 58
34 supply-side solutions [Gleick, 2000, 2003]. Management on policies. Examples include Robert Caro’s description of 59
35 implies that some institutions have been established, and Robert Moses in New York City [Caro, 1974] and Marc 60
36 that some persons have been vested with authority to Reisner’s account of rivalries between Los Angeles, the 61
37 manage or regulate at least part of the water system within Bureau of Reclamation, and the U.S. Army Corps of 62
38 this institutional structure. Much of the water management Engineers in development of water in the western United 63
39 literature focuses on the institutional and physical facets of States [Reisner, 1986]. Yet these analyses are limited to 64
40 water management, and strives to provide such water highly visible and controversial circumstances typified by 65
41 managers with sets of tools that will allow them to manage large public investments. Other studies highlight the impact 66
42 the water system in an optimal manner, given the institu- of founding fathers on the policies pursued by the organ- 67
43 tional and physical parameters. The implicit assumption is izations they founded, implicitly suggesting that the per- 68
44 therefore that the sole purpose of water managers is to sonalities of subsequent heads of the organizations are of 69
45 maximize the public good. lesser importance [Avni, 2003]. 70
46 [3] Political science and particularly public choice liter- [5] This paper asks whether and under what conditions 71
47 atures have long recognized, however, that bureaucrats the personalities of water managers do have an effect on 72
48 (such as water managers) also have interests. In most cases ‘‘normal’’ water management. Unlike the descriptive narra- 73
49 these are assumed to further the goals of their organizations, tives cited above, this paper applies quantitative analyses to 74
the question. To this end the study focuses on the effects of 75
specific water commissioners on the management of Israel’s 76
1
Department of Geography, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, water resources. 77
Israel. [6] Israel, a highly water stressed country, has one of the 78
2
Department of Environment and Resource Studies, Faculty of
Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
world’s most centralized water systems. Essentially, all the 79
country’s water resources have been integrated into a 80
Copyright 2007 by the American Geophysical Union. national system and are operated according to a temporally 81
0043-1397/07/2007WR005922$09.00 sensitive optimization model. This was enabled by the high 82

XXXXXX 1 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the water system. Double-lined arrows represent physical
relationships among the components, and solid lines represent political or managerial relationships
among the components. Dashed lines suggest relationships from the physical to the political realms.

83 technical/engineering capacity of the Israeli water sector, assumed control over most of the Jordan River sources and 127
84 coupled by what is often called a ‘‘strong state’’ [Migdal, the mountain aquifers), which was largely dominated by a 128
85 1988]. Indeed, many elements of this system have been dual Likud-Labor power structure (compared with the labor- 129
86 lauded as an example that other nations should follow dominated regime that preceded this era). The results of 130
87 [Postel, 1997], especially in light of impeding climatic these analyses are discussed in the last part of the paper, and 131
88 changes. the lessons regarding the importance of personalities, as 132
89 [7] Under the 1959 Water Law, all of the country’s water well as the possible policy implications, are advanced. 133
90 resources were nationalized and the exploitation and man-
91 agement of these resources was entrusted to a water 2. Precipitation, Water, and Decision-Making: 134
92 commissioner (WC). Since 1959, seven men have held this The Israeli System 135
93 position (one held it twice), for periods ranging from several
94 months to nearly 19 years. The WC has the authority to [10] The water system of Israel has for a very long time 136
95 determine the abstractions from all water resources, as well been centrally planned and managed to make use of all 137
96 as to allocate the water to the different users, all of which available resources to promote the national agenda of 138
97 are now nominally metered. settlement, sufficiency, and security [Menahem, 2001]. 139
98 [8] The national state of water resources is a function of Agriculture remains a major user of water, albeit its share 140
99 the variation of rainfall that replenishes storage, demand has dropped from 65% of total freshwater consumption in 141
100 attributes, and management decisions regarding allocations the late 1980s to less than 50% in 2005. 142
101 to users and reservoir status. Hence it can be hypothesized [11] To a large extent the system has been developed and 143
102 that the state of water resources in Israel can be attributed to managed for agricultural purposes. Rain-fed agriculture was 144
103 the decisions made by the WCs, the shifts in demand seen by the Zionist movement as insufficient for supplying 145
104 patterns, and the rates of replenishment. This paper seeks the local food demand already before the state’s indepen- 146
105 to explore the role of decision-making water managers in dence in 1948, due to the large-scale immigration, overall 147
106 water resources by discerning the effects of the tenure of levels of precipitation, and features of its distribution: 148
107 Israeli WCs on the state of water resources, while control- pronounced seasonality (long arid warm season), steep 149
108 ling for other factors, most notably rate of replenishment. latitudinal gradient, and marked interannual variability and 150
109 [9] The paper begins with a brief overview of the Israeli thus uncertainty. Consequently, large-scale plans were pre- 151
110 water management system, followed by brief descriptions of pared for connecting the country’s natural reservoirs (Lake 152
111 the WCs and their eras. Then quantitative analyses are Kinneret and the coastal and western mountain (Yarkon- 153
112 undertaken of the relationships between precipitation, res- Taninim) aquifers via a national water carrier. The construc- 154
113 ervoir levels, agricultural water use, and the tenure of the tion of the national water carrier allowed Israel to exploit all 155
114 WCs. In these aggregate analyses the question is asked of its natural resources to support the agricultural develop- 156
115 whether the tenure of water commissioners has statistically ment, and to supply the country’s expanding domestic and 157
116 significant effects on water resources and water use. This industrial water needs. 158
117 analysis is constrained by data availability to the period [12] A simplified schematic of the water system, consist- 159
118 beginning in 1969 – 1970. Hence the first 10 years after the ing of a physical realm (precipitation, and lake and aquifer 160
119 enactment of the Water Law are not analyzed, but all levels) and a managerial realm (withdrawals, abstractions, 161
120 commissioners are included. Then, in section 4, the actual and allocations) is presented in Figure 1. To these two 162
121 policies pursued by the different commissioners in the past realms a political decision-making realm, in which the water 163
122 20 years, for which the relevant data are available, are commissioner is a central player, is added. It is hypothesized 164
123 examined. By limiting the period of analysis to the past that water levels are a function of precipitation and abstrac- 165
124 25 years we control for the possibility that the policies tions, which are affected by the abstraction and allocation 166
125 changed as a result of a structural political or geopolitical decisions made by the various water commissioners. These 167
126 shift, as we analyze only the post-1967 period (when Israel decisions, in turn, may be affected by precipitation patterns 168

2 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

Figure 2. Time series of Har Kenaan annual precipitation, Lake Kinneret November (minimum) levels,
Yarkon-Taninim aquifer October (minimum) levels, and annual agricultural water use. All series have
been transformed into z scores, using means and standard deviations for the 33-year period of analysis, to
facilitate comparison.

169 and quantities and the state of the aquifers and lake. Hence, variables that are analyzed are the state of the main 200
170 in order to identify the effects of specific commissioners on resources (Lake Kinerret, the western mountain aquifer 201
171 the water system, it is necessary to control for all the and the coastal aquifer) and precipitation. 202
172 variables depicted in Figure 1. In the following discussion, [15] Figure 2 presents time series of Har Kenaan annual 203
173 the focus is on a simplified set of variables that represent precipitation, Lake Kinneret November (minimum) levels, 204
174 this system. Data have been obtained from sequential Yarkon-Taninim aquifer October (minimum) levels, and 205
175 volumes of the Statistical Abstract (Central Bureau of annual agricultural water use. All series have been trans- 206
176 Statistics), from the Water Commission, and from the Israel formed into z-scores, using means and standard deviations 207
177 Hydrological Service (lake and aquifer levels). for the 33-year period of analysis, to facilitate comparison. 208
178 [13] The demand of the domestic and industrial sectors is [16] The analysis proceeds by first describing the behav- 209
179 viewed as largely inelastic compared with that of agricul- ior of each of the continuous variables in the common 210
180 ture. Hence, in years when the replenishment of the water period of observation 1969– 1970 to 2001 –2002. Bivariate 211
181 reservoirs is below average, cuts in water use allocations are relationships, as suggested in Figure 1, are then described. 212
182 primarily in the agricultural sector. Thus freshwater alloca- The relationships shown in the system model suggest that 213
183 tions for agriculture in such circumstances have been the the variables may be collinear and the system is multilinear. 214
184 focal point of Israeli water politics [Kartin, 2000; Menahem, Discriminate analysis is therefore employed to see the 215
185 2001; Feitelson, 2005]. As a result, freshwater allocations extent to which the water commissioners may be differen- 216
186 for agriculture can serve as a dependent variable in the tiated by the joint behavior of the physical variables during 217
187 analyses of WCs’ policies. Annual water use by agriculture their time in office. As well, the discriminant analysis may 218
188 is used in the absence of a complete record of allocations, allow us to point to the relative sensitivity to the rainfall 219
189 which would have been the more direct measure of political variable of the different commissioners. Finally, the rela- 220
190 decisions; however, for the years with records of both tionship is examined with a regression of agricultural water 221
191 variables, it seems that use is very close to allocation [Kislev use on the physical state variables together with the dummy 222
192 and Vaksin, 1997]. variable representing the WCs. 223
193 [14] If different water commissioners indeed represent 2.1. Precipitation 225
194 different political regimes and decision-making priorities,
195 this should be reflected in water allocation decisions for [17] Annual precipitation (on a water year basis, September 226
196 agriculture, relative to the situation of the water resources of year t through May of year t + 1) at Har Kenaan in the 227
197 (i.e., availability as indicated by status of the surface and eastern Galilee is used as an indicator of the natural input of 228
198 aquifer reservoirs). In the analysis reported below, a dummy water to the system. Precipitation at Har Kenaan is signif- 229
199 variable is used to identify the WCs. The other explanatory icantly correlated with that at other stations in northern 230
Israel (r > 0.58) and with stations in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem 231

3 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

232 (r = 0.63), but hardly correlated with the south [Kislev and Maximum lake level is thus a truncated response to precip- 295
233 Vaksin, 1997, Table 2]. Har Kenaan can thus be considered itation extremes on the wet side. Second, minimum levels 296
234 as representative of northern Israel, where precipitation are managerially limited by the ‘‘red line,’’ below which the 297
235 largely exceeds 600 mm a 1 , compared with below lake level is not supposed to fall. Definition of the red line 298
236 200 mm a 1 south of Beer-Sheba. Attention here is not was based on concerns of sustainable water supply and 299
237 on the absolute quantity of water provided by precipitation, quality, and by the level of the intake for the pumping 300
238 but on the intra-annual and interannual variations that system that draws Kinneret water into the National Water 301
239 occurred. Carrier system. The red line was initially set in 1969 at 302
240 [18] Mean annual precipitation for the period 1969 –1970 212.0 m and was lowered to 213.0 m in 1981. Still, 303
241 to 2001– 2002 at Har Kenaan was 681 mm (Figure 2). With water levels did not drop below 212.0 m until 1986 and 304
242 a standard deviation of 177 mm, the coefficient of variation did not reach the 213.0 red line until 1990. After the water 305
243 was 26%. Annual precipitation was as low as 385 mm in levels rose following the record rain year of 1991– 1992, the 306
244 1972 – 1973, and as high as 1083 mm in 1991 –1992. While lake’s water level again fell several times from 1993 307
245 there have been trends in 25-year averages of precipitation onward. As a result, in the 1999 – 2001 drought the WC 308
246 at some stations in Israel [Kislev, 2006, Figure 10.3], no was forced to lower the red line five times, ultimately to a 309
247 trends were found within the time period analyzed herein. level of 215.5, which is the physical limit for pumping to 310
248 The first-order autocorrelation of 0.23 indicates both a the National Water Carrier [Feitelson et al., 2005]. 311
249 weak correspondence between one year’s rainfall and that of 2.3. Western Mountain Aquifer Levels 313
250 the preceding year, and a marked interannual variability in
251 departure from the long-term mean. It is noted that multi- [22] October levels in the Menashe T1 well are estimates 314
252 year periods of below-average rainfall often terminated by a of the minimum level of water in the Yarkon-Taninim 315
253 year of well above average rainfall (compare 1986– 1987, (western mountain) aquifer. Although the aquifer underlies 316
254 z = +2.17, and 1991– 1992, z = +2.94). Thus the natural both Israel and the West Bank, it is controlled since 1967 317
255 input to Lake Kinneret is considered to have been random solely by the Israeli WC. As the Israeli WC operates the 318
256 throughout the time period of analysis, about a constant three main basins (Lake Kinneret, coastal aquifer, and 319
257 mean. western mountain aquifer) within a single system, 320
258 [19] Intra-annual precipitation was even more variable interconnected by the National Water Carrier, the operation 321
259 than interannual amounts. Mean monthly amounts describe and hence water levels in the three basins are related. 322
260 a symmetrical curve on the season from September to May, However, they are not necessarily well correlated, as the 323
261 with almost two thirds of the rainfall in December to WC can decide to lower the levels in one basin while 324
262 February (and 88% in November to March). The annual maintaining them in another. This is actually what occurred 325
263 cycle of monthly means is centered on a peak of 157.6 mm in the 1999 – 2001 drought, when the WC decided to lower 326
264 in January, but individual actual peaks occurred almost the red line in Lake Kinneret but maintain it in the western 327
265 equally in December or January, three times in November, mountain aquifer [Feitelson et al., 2005]. 328
266 and even once in April. [23] The water table in the western mountain aquifer fell 329
from the mid-1980s until 1991, when it was replenished 330
268 2.2. Lake Kinneret following the exceptionally rainy winter of 199 – 1992. 331
269 [20] Lake Kinneret levels lag the seasonal cycle of Then water levels dropped gradually, threatening to breach 332
270 precipitation by several months, reaching minimum level the (unofficial) red line of +9.0 at Menashe T1 borehole 333
271 2 – 3 months after the commencement, and maximum level during the drought of 1999 – 2001. 334
272 2 – 3 months after the end, of the rainfall season. The lake [24] The coastal aquifer, which is the most readily ex- 335
273 cycle is not symmetrical, though, with on average 147 days ploitable in Israel, was overpumped in the 1950s, and 336
274 between minimum and maximum, but 220 days between partially replenished after the National Water Carrier was 337
275 maximum and the next minimum; this pattern is driven by completed in 1964. This sandstone aquifer is susceptible to 338
276 the rainfall season being shorter than the dry season. Levels pollution and salinization. As a stratified aquifer it has a 339
277 of Lake Kinneret in November and May represent thus the very high variability in its state [Gvirtzman, 2002]. This 340
278 minimum and maximum, respectively, annual levels of the aquifer, as well as several smaller aquifers, is not included 341
279 lake, which serves as Israel’s major surface water reservoir. in our quantitative analysis. 342
280 In the time period of analysis, mean maximum level was 2.4. Agricultural Water Use 344
281 209.83 m (relative to mean sea level), with a standard
282 deviation of ±1.21 m, and mean minimum level was [25] As noted above, agricultural water use is the focal 345
283 211.21 m, with a standard deviation of ±1.33 m. Unlike point of discussions in the water sector, particularly in dry 346
284 the record of precipitation, both the time series of maximum years [Kislev, 2006]. The allocation of water to the agricul- 347
285 and minimum lake levels displayed strong interannual tural sector takes place in a two-stage process. At the 348
286 persistence, with first-order autocorrelation of +0.70 and beginning of winter (around October) the WC allocates 349
287 +0.71 (Figure 2). approximately 75% of the agricultural water quota. The 350
288 [21] Lake levels are artificially controlled in two ways. remainder is allocated in March – April, as a function of the 351
289 First, maximum levels have been structurally capped at actual rainfall during the winter months. Once this alloca- 352
290 208.90 m by the Degania dam at the lake’s outlet, tion is made the WC cannot alter it without an agreement. A 353
291 following shore zone flooding in the very high water year time series of allocations, disaggregated according to the 354
292 1969. That level was reached, and excess water spilled over two decision points in the year, would be the ideal data for 355
293 into the Jordan River or was recharged into the aquifers, in analysis here, but such was not available. Therefore the 356
294 1970, 1971, 1972, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1988, 1992, and 1993. discussion uses consumption as a surrogate. 357

4 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

358 [26] In the period of analysis, agricultural water use was drawn from the natural reservoirs for agriculture, lake and 421
359 typically between 1100 and 1300  106 m3 a 1. The time aquifer levels should fall. If reservoir levels are low, there is 422
360 series shows only a very weak downward trend (r = 0.16; less water available to be drawn and allocated to agricultural 423
361 Figure 2). Particularly marked reductions in agricultural use. Minimum reservoir levels, by this reasoning, should be 424
362 water use occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, following the more critical of the two seasonal extremes to consider 425
363 the 1989 – 1991 drought; but water use quickly returned to with respect to decisions about water removal. The relation- 426
364 nearly the same level it had been through the 1980s, not to be ships are, in fact, nonexistent: r = +0.11 for minimum lake 427
365 reduced again until the early years of the new millennium. levels, and r = 0.03 for minimum aquifer levels. These 428
367 2.5. Bivariate Relationships results may suggest that agricultural water use decisions are 429
made without consistent regard to the hydrological state of 430
368 [27] On the physical side of the system (Figure 1), lake the reservoirs. It seems therefore that agricultural water use is 431
369 and aquifer levels should exhibit some direct response to indeed largely a function of the political economy of the 432
370 precipitation. The correlations between levels in the western Israeli water sector, as argued by Kartin [2000] and Feitelson 433
371 mountain aquifer and at Lake Kinneret are moderately [2005]. 434
372 strong, r = +0.54 for minimum levels and r = +0.76 for
373 maximum levels, suggesting that the two reservoirs are
374 responding to some degree to a common external signal 3. Distinguishing the Effects of Water 436
375 (such as climate). Commissioners 437
376 [28] Yet the relationships of each reservoir to precipi- [32] Studies of Israeli water politics and policies have 438
377 tation are less strong. Maximum levels of Lake Kinneret focused on the changes in paradigms [Galnoor, 1978; 439
378 have only a modest correlation with annual precipitation Menahem, 2001] and on the role of the agricultural sector, 440
379 (r = +0.36), suggesting that only 13% of the interannual mainly as an obstructionist sector for policy reform [Kartin, 441
380 variability is accounted for by the variation in precipita- 2000; Menahem, 2001; Feitelson, 2005]. Essentially, these 442
381 tion. The lack of a strong relationship may be due to two studies suggest that water professionals identified the flaws 443
382 factors: Har Kenaan is an imperfect surrogate for the sum of overdraft policies that resulted in the depletion of water 444
383 of hydrological input to the lake; and lake maxima are reservoirs. Yet attempts to change these policies were 445
384 artificially truncated, as noted above. Minimum lake levels thwarted by the agricultural lobby. Most of these studies 446
385 have a slightly weaker correlation with annual precipitation suggested that the water commissioners were part of this 447
386 (r = 0.31), meaning just under 10% of the variations are agricultural lobby and thus preferred to take a probabilistic 448
387 related to precipitation. The sign of the relationship is in the risk of water resource degradation rather than a certain loss 449
388 anticipated direction: higher minimum levels in wet years. to farmers of an early reduction in water allocations [Dery 450
389 The weakness of the relationship is probably due to the fact and Salomon, 1997]. Feitelson [2005] recently took a 451
390 that summer evaporation loss, rather than winter precipita- different view, focusing on the latest (1999 – 2001) drought, 452
391 tion input, is the more critical climatic variable. Maximum whereby the WC’s options were structurally constrained by 453
392 and minimum levels of the western mountain aquifer show a policy impasse between the Ministry of Finance (the 454
393 correlations with precipitation of r = +0.42 and r = +0.15, treasury) and the agricultural lobby. While the treasury 455
394 respectively. Again, the Har Kenaan record is probably an prevented an increase in water supply through desaliniza- 456
395 imperfect surrogate for the totality of hydrological input and tion on economic grounds, the agricultural lobby prevented 457
396 loss in the region of the aquifer. an increase in water rates, which would have allowed for 458
397 [29] If a regionally aggregated value of precipitation were stronger demand management. Thus the Water Commis- 459
398 available, it is possible that the relationships of lake and sioner, viewed as a professional concerned with the state of 460
399 aquifer levels (certainly of maxima) might be stronger than the resource, was structurally forced to trade off water 461
400 reported above. Nevertheless, the modest levels of these resources in the reservoirs with allocations to farmers. 462
401 relationships, and particularly the much weaker values for Moreover, as Feitelson et al. [2005] have shown, the ability 463
402 minimum levels, suggest that much of the variability in of the agricultural lobby to postpone allocation cuts forced 464
403 these two natural reservoirs is due to extraction decisions, the WC to lower water levels in Lake Kinneret. Though 465
404 rather than natural signals. several of these studies noted the changes in commissioners 466
405 [30] On the managerial side of the system, agricultural and anecdotally mentioned their impacts, all focused on the 467
406 water use might be expected to show an inverse relationship institutional and structural aspects. None analyzed the role 468
407 to precipitation, more irrigation being needed in drier years. of the commissioners themselves. 469
408 However, agricultural water used shows essentially no [33] In this paper we hypothesize that the differences in 470
409 correlation with annual precipitation at Har Kenaan (r = the perspectives of the role of the water commissioner, as 471
410 0.14). The sign of the relationship is in the expected well as the paradigm changes, may be partially explained by 472
411 direction, but there is altogether too much unaccounted for the background and personalities of the different WCs. In 473
412 variability for the relationship to be significant. The primary order to test this hypothesis it is first necessary to establish 474
413 factor here is very likely the fact that most irrigated that WCs do indeed make a difference in water resource 475
414 agriculture is in the center and south of Israel, far removed management, when we control for the natural variations in 476
415 from the headwaters of Lake Kinneret and even of the precipitation and the state of the reservoirs. That is, have 477
416 western mountain aquifer. As suggested above, the correla- different WCs responded differently to similar variations in 478
417 tion of Har Kenaan precipitation not very strong with that at precipitation and in reservoir levels? 479
418 stations in the southern part of the country. [34] In addressing this point two questions arise: Can the 480
419 [31] The relationships between agricultural water use and various water commissioners be differentiated by the com- 481
420 lake and aquifer levels may be reflexive. If more water is bined behavior of the precipitation, water, and agricultural 482

5 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

t1.1 Table 1. The Israeli Water Commissioners and Their Back- Both men are water professionals, unlike others in the office 503
grounds of WC, and as shall be shown in the next section, both have 504
t1.2 Commissioner Tenure Background attempted similar policies. 505
[36] As can be seen in Table 1, the water commissioners 506
t1.3 Menahem Kantor 1959 – 1977 engineer came from diverse backgrounds. Three (Kantor, Zaslavsky, 507
Meir Ben-Meir 1977 – 1981 farmer, DG of the Ministry of
t1.4 1996 – 2000 Agriculture (1980 – 1988) and Tal) were engineers. Two (Ben Meir and Yishai) were 508
Tzemach Yishai 1981 – 1991 farmer, representative of the part of the agricultural establishment but lacked professional 509
t1.5 Agricultural Union credentials. One (Tsur) was an administrator who went up 510
Dan Zaslavsky 1991 – 1992 professor of engineering at the through the ranks from the Hydrological Service to being 511
t1.6 Technion
Gideon Tsur 1992 – 1996 administrator, previously deputy for
the deputy commissioner for administration. Thus, while he 512
t1.7 administration of the WC office was very familiar with the water administration, he was not 513
Yaacov Efrati 2000 (Feb – Jul) public servant, DG of Ministry of considered a professional authority. This variation in back- 514
t1.8 Infrastructure grounds allows us to hypothesize that the policies pursued 515
Shimon Tal 2000 – 2006 engineer, previously chief engineer of by the different water commissioners were affected by the 516
t1.9 Mekorot
previous affiliations and backgrounds of the commissioners, 517
and thus to analyze the implications of the manning of an 518
administrator’s position on the policies pursued. 519
[37] The method of discriminant analysis is appropriate 520
483 use variables during their terms of office? What is the for the two questions posed above. The technique allows the 521
484 relative strength of the precipitation variability signal in use of intercorrelated variables to ‘‘predict’’ (discriminate) a 522
485 that differentiation? As a background for analyzing these categorical variable that signifies groups or clusters thought 523
486 questions, the WCs, their terms in office, and their back- to be distinct. A brief introduction of this approach is given 524
487 grounds are presented in Table 1. The commissioners’ by Murphy and Katz [1985]. Each WC is assigned an 525
488 backgrounds are based on their testimony in meetings of identifying integer, from 1 = Kantor to 5 = Tzur; Ben-Meir = 526
489 the Parliamentarian Committee to Investigate the Water 2 for both his terms in office, and Zaslavski and Tal are 527
490 Crisis (see http://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/heb/docs/ combined and identified by 4. This dummy variable then is 528
491 vaadat_chakira_mayim.htm). the dependent variable in the analysis. The predictor vari- 529
492 [35] In the 33 years of record analyzed here, 1969 –1970 ables are the continuous, interrelated variables of the phys- 530
493 to 2000 – 2001, seven different men have served as water ical system (annual precipitation, November lake level, 531
494 commissioner; one (Ben Meir) served two separate terms in October aquifer level) plus annual agricultural water use. 532
495 office. As one of the commissioners (Efrati) filled the A discriminant score is produced as an aggregate of the 533
496 position in a caretaker role for less than half a year, from predictor variables (i.e., the sum of the coefficients times the 534
497 February to July 2000, he was not differentiated in this values of the predictor variables, plus an intercept) for each 535
498 analysis, his term being considered to be the last part of the case (year). The distribution of the scores (Figure 3) allows 536
499 water year (1999– 2000) of his predecessor, Ben Meir. Dan an assessment of the similarities or differences between the 537
500 Zaslavski served from October 1991 to August 1992; this WCs; it is the relative, rather than the absolute, values of the 538
501 one year is insufficient for statistical analysis. For the sake scores that are useful here. The coefficients of the discrim- 539
502 of this analysis he has been coded together with Shimon Tal. inant equation are weights that allow identification of the 540

Figure 3. Time series of the discriminant scores, calculated from the coefficients of the discriminant
function. The symbols identify the years in office of the various water commissioners; note that Zaslavski
and Tal have been grouped in this analysis.
6 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

t2.1 Table 2. Coefficients of the Discriminant Function, Differentiating (November) levels. A dummy variable representing the 592
Water Commissioners According to Precipitation, Lake, and WCs is a separate predictor variable. The overall strength 593
Aquifer Levels, and Agricultural Water Use of the multiple regression equation is poor, R2 = 0.21, and 594
t2.2 Predictor Variable Coefficient t Value only marginally significant (F = 2.52). The coefficients of 595
the equation show that the strongest predictor is the WC 596
t2.3 Water-year precipitation 0.0003 0.26 dummy variable, and that the physical variables are barely 597
t2.4 Annual agricultural water use 0.0046 2.48
t2.5 Lake Kinneret level, minimum 0.0435 3.29 significant (Table 3). 598
t2.6 Yarkon-Taninim level, minimum 0.0607 0.72 [42] These results suggest that agricultural water use has 599
not been closely linked with the state of the reservoirs, yet 600
the WCs do have a perceptible influence on both agricul- 601
tural water use and on the state of the resources. In order to 602
541 relative importance of each predictor variable in achieving understand how this influence comes about, it is necessary 603
542 that discrimination (Table 2). to take a closer look at their actions. 604
543 [38] The discriminant function showed moderately strong
544 power in distinguishing the water commissioners. The 4. Differences in Water Commissioners’ 605
545 coefficient of determination (R2) was 0.85, and the F value Allocation Policies 606
546 was 41.44, significant at 0.05 probability level. The plot of [43] As noted above, the allocation of freshwater to 607
547 the scores shows that the WCs are differentiated by the agriculture is a two-stage process. In the fall an initial 608
548 combined state of the predictor variables during their tenure allocation is suggested, which consists of approximately 609
549 (Figure 3). Except for his last year in office, Ben Meir had 75% of the quota. Yet this amount is not used up during the 610
550 scores consistently below those of his predecessor Kantor or wet winter months. The final allocation is made in spring, 611
551 successor after his first term, Yishai. That ‘‘aberrant’’ year once the amount of winter rainfall is known and hence a 612
552 for Ben Meir was 1999 –2000, which was a drier than good assessment of the state of the reservoirs can be made. 613
553 average year (actually, midway through a multiyear In making this allocation the WC consults with a profes- 614
554 drought) marked by very low lake and aquifer levels, yet sional operation committee, which is appointed by him and 615
555 with agricultural water use still high. Tzur’s term between includes people from the Hydrological Service, the Water 616
556 Yishai and Ben Meir’s second time in office showed scores Commissioner’s office, Mekorot (the national water com- 617
557 indistinguishable from those for Ben Meir. Yishai’s range of pany), the Kinneret administration, and regional bodies. In 618
558 scores was similar to those of Kantor. Zaslavski and Tal, addition, he consults with the Water Council, which is 619
559 however, had scores distinctly different from any of the dominated largely by agricultural users. Almost invariably 620
560 other WCs. the final allocation is less than the full historic quota, as the 621
561 [39] The relative contribution to the discrimination of the full quota was determined in an era when the state of water 622
562 water commissioners by the four predictor variables is resources was not fully known, and hence if all the quotas 623
563 indicated by their coefficients (Table 2). The strongest will be allocated and used, they will exceed the replenish- 624
564 variables are minimum level of Lake Kinneret and agricul- ment rate in most years. 625
565 tural water use. Precipitation, the physical driver of the [44] Figure 4 shows the cutbacks that were requested by 626
566 entire water system, is the weakest predictor. That is, their the various water commissioners since 1986, as well as the 627
567 behavior with respect to the management of the reservoirs cuts that were finally adopted and the deviation of the 628
568 (drawdowns, manipulation of red lines) and their allocations replenishment rate from the multiyear average. The baseline 629
569 of water to the agricultural sector serve to differentiate some that is used in Figure 4 for depicting the suggested and 630
570 WCs from others. adopted cutbacks is the 1989 water allocation, when 1236  631
571 [40] As noted above, agriculture is the most sensitive of 106 m3 were allotted to the agricultural sector [Water 632
572 the water use sectors to management decisions, particularly Commission, 2003]. Data on the proposed cutbacks were 633
573 in times of drought, as agriculture has served throughout as culled from newspapers and from the reports of the Oper- 634
574 the ‘‘buffer sector’’ of the Israeli water system. Thus ations Committee. Data on adopted cutbacks were provided 635
575 ostensibly the role of water commissioners can be detected by the Water Commission. It can be expected that if the 636
576 by focusing on agricultural water use and controlling for replenishment rate is below average, the WC would propose 637
577 variations in precipitation and the state of the reservoirs. a greater cutback, though this may be mediated by the state 638
578 That is, another statistical approach is to focus on agricul- of the resources (shown in Figure 2). It can also be expected 639
579 tural water use as the dependent variable, representing the that large cutbacks will generate a greater opposition, 640
580 primary output of the political decision-making about this
581 water system.
582 [41] It would have been interesting to create a multiple Table 3. Coefficients of the Multiple Regression of Agricultural t3.1
583 regression for each water commissioner and then to com- Water Use on Physical (Precipitation and Lake Level) and Political
584 pare the coefficients of the physical predictor variables that (Water Commissioner) Variables
585 emerge. However, the tenure of many of the WCs was too
586 short to allow a sufficient number of years to construct Predictor Variable Coefficient t Value t3.2
587 reliable equations. Therefore a multiple regression method Constant 3836.6 0.916 t3.3
588 that allows the use of dummy variables as predictors was WC 48.9 2.482 t3.4
589 chosen [Draper and Smith, 1981]. The dependent variable Lake Kinneret level, minimum 25.0 1.246 t3.5
590 is annual agricultural use. The physical explanatory varia- Water-year precipitaiton 0.1 1.123 t3.6
591 bles are annual precipitation and minimum Kinneret

7 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

Figure 4. Cutbacks requested by the various water commissioners, cuts that were finally adopted, and
the deviation of the replenishment rate from the multiyear average.

641 especially in drought years when irrigation is more crucial, enlisted specialists whose views contradicted the widely 672
642 and thus in such years the proposed cuts may not be held position of the professional community (as enumerated 673
643 implemented due to effective opposition by the agricultural in multiple reports). 674
644 interests. The means by which the agricultural interests can [47] In his third year a severe drought began. That year 675
645 thwart the WC’s suggestions are detailed by Feitelson et al. (1999) was one of the driest on record. This led to 676
646 [2005]. precipitous falls in water levels in all reservoirs. In the last 677
647 [45] In Figure 4 it can be seen that both Zaslavsky and Tal 2 years of his tenure, Ben-Meir suggested 40% cuts, but 678
648 invariably requested cutbacks that exceeded 30%, regard- these were not implemented. Yet even the suggestions made 679
649 less of the rate of replenishment. Actually, they both asked by Ben-Meir were less than those proposed by the Opera- 680
650 for such cutbacks even in years of exceptionally high tion Committee. In 2000 the Operation Committee proposed 681
651 replenishment rates. This was done by both men in order that he enact a 50% cut, while he advanced only a 40% cut. 682
652 to increase the amount of water stored in the aquifers, which Faced with a similar recommendation by the Operation 683
653 is the multiyear storage, thereby increasing the reliability of Committee in 2001 and 2002 (a 50% cut), Tal opted for a 684
654 the water supply system. However, their suggestions were much larger cutback (75% and 73%, respectively), due to 685
655 often not adopted. Hence the actual cutback was somewhat the dire state of the reservoirs. While these extreme cut- 686
656 lower than the amount they requested. backs were not approved, the cutbacks implemented in 687
657 [46] In contrast, Yishai requested very low cutbacks those years still exceeded 45%. 688
658 (below 20%), even in years where replenishment rates were [48] This description of the propositions made by the 689
659 below average. Actually, only in his last year in office, at various WCs shows that the actions they took and the 690
660 the end of a 3-year drought and with the state comptroller propositions they made differed greatly. Yet these differ- 691
661 about to issue a very critical report of him (which eventually ences were not random. Rather, commissioners coming 692
662 led to his dismissal), did he request a substantial cutback. from the agricultural sector (most notably Yishai and Ben 693
663 Tsur requested throughout his tenure cutbacks between 20% Meir) proposed very modest cutbacks as a policy. Commis- 694
664 and 30%. While there is some inverse relationship of sioners with a strong water engineering background tended 695
665 cutbacks to replenishment rates during his tenure, it is not to propose large cutbacks, in order to raise water levels in 696
666 a clear correlation. All of the suggestions made by Yishai the aquifers and thereby improve the robustness of the water 697
667 and Tsur were adopted. Ben-Meir’s second tenure may be supply system. Actually, only one commissioner (Tsur), 698
668 the most illuminative. At the outset he did not request any who was an administrator with only modest professional 699
669 cutbacks at all. Instead he has adopted a brinkmanship credentials and was appointed by a minister of agriculture 700
670 policy, thereby taking greater risks due to the uncertainty who was a central figure in the agricultural lobby, seems to 701
671 inherent in lowering red lines. To justify this policy, he

8 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

702 have proposed the cutbacks as a somewhat inverse function circumstances of his tenure. An administrator with a weak 763
703 of the precipitation in each year. professional standing, he was appointed to replace Dan 764
Zaslavsky, a vocal academic, who was sacked after only a 765
704 5. Discussion year in office by a strong minister of agriculture who was 766
part of the agricultural lobby, and who opposed Zaslavsky’s 767
705 [49] The Israeli case shows that water commissioners do proposals for substantial cuts in allocations. Hence it was 768
706 make a difference in ‘‘ordinary’’ water management deci- clear that large cutbacks would not be ratified, especially as 769
707 sions. It is erroneous to regard all the commissioners as a the state of the resources was seen as favorable, following 770
708 single player with a consistent agenda. The statistical the record rainfall of 2001 – 2002. Under these circum- 771
709 analyses indicate that the identity of the WC affected the stances, Tsur could propose only modest cutbacks, which 772
710 water use in agriculture, controlling for precipitation and he did, in a somewhat inverse function of the replenishment 773
711 state of the resources, and hence the state of the resources. rate in each specific year. 774
712 [50] The more detailed analysis of water commissioners’ [54] It is important to note that despite the differences 775
713 actions shows two distinct patterns. The first pattern, best between the two modes of operation in ‘‘regular’’ water 776
714 seen in Yishai’s tenure, is that of brinkmanship, whose goal management decisions, both types of WCs supported desa- 777
715 is to provide the maximal amount of water for agriculture, lination, as desalination widens the scope of action open to 778
716 even at the expense of the reliability and quality of the WCs. Thus, when desalinization became affordable, both 779
717 resource. This is the type of behavior analyzed and de- Ben-Mier and Tal advanced large-scale desalinization along 780
718 scribed by Dery and Salomon [1997]. This policy is typical the Mediterranean coast in order to mitigate the effects of 781
719 of the WCs who came from the agricultural sector. Ben- the water crises [Fischhendler, 2007]. 782
720 Meir followed a similar approach in both of his tenures. His [55] The power of water commissioners to affect policies 783
721 decision to lower the red line in Lake Kinneret in 1981 was not lost on decision-makers. As a result, the appoint- 784
722 (thereby increasing the quantity available for annual use), ment of water commissioners is deemed to be a political 785
723 despite the fact that there was no particular contingency at decision. Two commissioners did not complete their term. 786
724 the time [Feitelson et al., 2005] and the implications of this Tzamach Yishai’s term was terminated following a critical 787
725 act on the lake’s water quality was uncertain, is a further state comptroller’s report, which was written by a water 788
726 indication of this approach. professional. Dan Zaslavsky was replaced following a 789
727 [51] The second pattern is manifest in the actions of water change of government which brought a new agriculture 790
728 commissioners who came from a professional background. minister into office, as noted above. Also, other WCs faced 791
729 These WCs (most notably Zaslavsky and Tal) gave prece- threats of replacement. Thus when Tal’s first term ended he 792
730 dence to the state of the resource over immediate agricultural was kept on a temporary contract for some time. This 793
731 needs. Both Zaslavsky and Tal suggested deep cuts in provided the minister (the minister of national infrastructure 794
732 allocations of freshwater for agriculture in order to raise in this case) with exceptional leverage vis-à-vis the WC, as 795
733 water levels in the reservoirs and reduce the risk of saliniza- he could terminate the WC’s tenure on a short notice. 796
734 tion associated with an overdraft policy. This was true even in [56] One factor that is not included in the analysis is the 797
735 the rainiest year on record, 1992, when Zaslavsky suggested a personality of the WC. Indeed some of the WCs during this 798
736 cutback exceeding 30%. Yet these suggestions were not era were more prone to confrontations (particularly Ben 799
737 accepted, and the reduction that was adopted was signifi- Meir and Zaslavsky), while others were more conciliatory 800
738 cantly lower than that proposed, due to the effective opposi- (such as Tsur and Tal). However, it seems that these 801
739 tion of the agricultural lobby. personality attributes merely serve to accentuate or mitigate 802
740 [52] On the basis of the analyses it can be concluded that the differences between the two modes of operation noted 803
741 there have been two main modes of action among the water above. Thus the WCs who tended toward confrontations 804
742 commissioners in the past 20 years. The first was as part of may have taken the mode of operation to which they 805
743 the agriculturally dominated policy network described by adhered to a greater extreme than those who were more 806
744 Menahem [2001]. This mode gave precedence to agricul- conciliatory. So while certain personality attributes may 807
745 tural needs over water quality concerns or nature, and accentuate the importance of tenures or attenuate it, they 808
746 adopted a brinkmanship approach, whereby water abstrac- do not seem to affect the observations regarding the modes 809
747 tions may exceed replenishment rates over several years, as of operation. 810
748 at some point a rainy year will fill the gap. WCs operating [57] An additional factor that was not explicitly analyzed 811
749 within this mode usually suggested modest cutbacks when is the effect of scientific progress. It can be safely assumed 812
750 replenishment rates fell below average, but as they were part that over the period the understanding of the water system 813
751 of the agricultural sector’s network their recommendations (particularly the aquifers) has improved, as have the oper- 814
752 were largely accepted. A second mode of action advanced ational models. If such progress would have significant 815
753 large cutbacks, regardless of rainfall, in order to maintain impact on WCs, we would expect to see a reduction in 816
754 high water levels in the reservoirs, thereby reducing the the variance of propositions made by commissioners re- 817
755 likelihood of a crisis in the case of a multiyear drought. Yet garding allocation cuts (controlling for precipitation and 818
756 the cutbacks advanced by these WCs operating within this state of resources), as the uncertainty is reduced. However, 819
757 mode invariably led to opposition from the agricultural from the evidence we found, this is not the case. Hence we 820
758 sector, which succeeded in reducing them. do not find evidence that improvement in knowledge 821
759 [53] Gideon Tsur presents somewhat of a middle road. He reduces the gap between operating modes. Moreover, we 822
760 proposed relatively modest cutbacks, though related to the did see that when a WC wants to undertake steps that 823
761 state of the resources, which were largely accepted. His increase the risk of salinization, as Ben Meir did, he may 824
762 mode of action can perhaps be explained by the specific
9 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

825 use the legitimate scientific disagreements to justify his agriculture, commissioners from a professional background 886
826 steps on the basis of one of the parties to the disagreement, chose to reduce allocations to agriculture so as to reduce the 887
827 even if the scientists he bases his decisions upon are in a risk of salinization and hence loss of storage capacity. 888
828 minority within the scientific community. Similarly, a WC [62] Since the implications of a cutback policy on the 889
829 may purposefully ignore or stifle evidence or analyses that agricultural sector are certain while the implications of an 890
830 contradict his position. This was the case during the tenure overdraft policy are often uncertain, central administrators 891
831 of Zemach Yishai, when he shelved the 1988 National may be inclined to adopt an unsustainable policy [Feitelson, 892
832 Water Plan, prepared by Tahal (the national water planning 2005]. In the Israeli case, when new scientific knowledge 893
833 company), which called for reducing the risk to the reser- questioned the implications of an overdraft policy in Lake 894
834 voirs, on the basis of an elaborate analysis, thereby contra- Kinneret, central administrators that were aligned with the 895
835 vening Yishai’s brinkmanship policy. agricultural lobby were able to use this new understanding 896
836 [58] In some cases new scientific evidence reduces the to further promote an overdraft policy [Feitelson et al., 897
837 uncertainty, as was the case regarding the salinization 2005]. These findings stress the negative implications of a 898
838 mechanisms in Lake Kinnerret, thereby increasing the centralized system, where central administrators or other 899
839 latitude of the WC to take risks, if they are so inclined (as ‘‘policy manipulators’’ can pick and choose the scientific 900
840 indeed was the case with Ben-Meir). The only case in which evidence that supports their position, and to dismiss the 901
841 an improvement in knowledge did decrease the discrepancy evidence that contradicts it [Jordan and O’Riordan, 1997]. 902
842 between the two modes of operation was the improvement [63] To counter the ability of commissioners to undertake 903
843 in desalination technologies, which reduced its cost, and an undue risky policy, it is necessary to introduce a checks- 904
844 thereby led WCs who otherwise adhered to different oper- and-balances system. Essentially, if additional players are 905
845 ation modes to advance desalinization. It seems that if an introduced into the decision-making process, the adminis- 906
846 improvement in knowledge increases the scope of action trator will be required to reach some sort of consensus, or at 907
847 open to a WC to advance his goals, he will make use of it. least a majority, and thus he will need to take heed of 908
848 Otherwise he may well ignore it (as was the case with additional voices, among them those that are concerned 909
849 Yishai). Whether the use of new knowledge will increase or over quality and the longer range. Such a change will reduce 910
850 decrease the differences between WCs depends on the type the ability of a single technocrat to change policies abruptly 911
851 of action this improvement allows. Thus while the improved or to disregard the professional and scientific community on 912
852 understanding of the salinization processes in Lake Kinneret the basis of a contested theory, as he will need to convince a 913
853 allowed to rationalize a brinkmanship policy, and thereby wider set of actors, with different interests and knowledge. 914
854 increased the discrepancy between modes, desalinization Hence such a change in decision-making procedures is 915
855 allowed both more allocations to agriculture and higher likely to widen the political basis of sustainability. More 916
856 water level in the reservoirs, and hence could advance the important for the purpose if this paper, it is likely to reduce 917
857 goals of both types of commissioners, thereby reducing the the variability of policies between tenures, as a new admin- 918
858 variance between WCs. istrator would mean that only one player changes in a 919
balanced decision-making process, while the other remains, 920
859 6. Conclusions thereby assuring greater continuity. This holds true at both 921
the national and local level, as the insights gained in this 922
860 [59] The water policy field is characterized by two types study may well be pertinent also at the local level, where 923
861 of regimes. The first is the supply-oriented hydraulic supply systems are often highly centralized. In other words, 924
862 mission regime. This regime is typified by large capital we do not propose that management will be decentralized to 925
863 expenditures for large-scale engineering feats. Such projects the local level necessarily, but rather that additional stake- 926
864 require decisions at the highest level and often have holders will be included in the decision-making process, 927
865 widespread environmental and political ramifications. It is regardless of scale. 928
866 not surprising therefore that behind such projects one can [64] Decision-making is often incremental, whereby most 929
867 often find influential policy entrepreneurs. Indeed, the of the decisions are ‘‘routine’’ and made within technocratic 930
868 importance of personalities in influential positions in the echelons. These seemingly mundane actions are often seen 931
869 promotion and advancement of such projects has been noted to be conducted by faceless managers, whose behavior is 932
870 [Reisner, 1986]. This is the type of regime that dominated driven largely by their positions. This proposition is chal- 933
871 the Israeli water policies until the mid-1960s [Galnoor, lenged by the findings of this study that suggests that even 934
872 1978]. in the case of seemingly routine decisions, it is worthwhile 935
873 [60] The second type of regime is the ‘‘good manage- to examine the perceptions and background of the bureau- 936
874 ment’’ regime, which strives to manage the water resources, crats that make these decisions, as these variables may have 937
875 subject to natural and politically determined constraints. a distinct effect on the management outcome. This implies 938
876 This regime is characterized by emphases on management that while institutional and political factors may frame 939
877 techniques, demand management, and precaution in decisions, the personal backgrounds of the actors within 940
878 addressing uncertainties. these structures may have an effect on the actual decisions 941
879 [61] The analysis of the topmost water bureaucrats in the made. Thus it is insufficient to analyze only institutions and 942
880 Israeli system shows that decisions on the type of manage- power. However, this does not mean that institutions and 943
881 ment regimes are influenced by the background and career power may be ignored, as the institutional structure may 944
882 paths of such managers. While commissioners aligned with affect the impact of the personal variables. 945
883 the agricultural lobby were willing to take routine, annual, [65] At this point it is necessary, however, to somewhat 946
884 allocation decisions that involve high levels of risk, by qualify the findings of this study, as it is based on a single 947
885 adopting a brinkmanship policy to provide more water for
10 of 11
 XXXXXX FEITELSON ET AL.: MANAGING WATER RESOURCES XXXXXX

948 case study, Israel, which has an extraordinarily centralized Cent. for Soc. and Econ. Res. on the Global Environ., Norwich, U. K. 983
(Available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/env/cserge/pub/wp/) 984
949 system. Hence a single person, the water commissioner, has Kartin, A. (2000), Factors inhibiting structural changes in Israel’s water 985
950 an inordinate effect on policy. The possibility that a more policy, Polit. Geogr., 19, 97 – 115. 986
951 balanced institutional structure at the technocratic level will Kislev, Y. (2006), The water economy of Israel, in Water in the Middle 987
952 reduce the impact of interpersonal differences among water East: Cooperation and Technological Solutions in the Jordan Valley, edi- 988
953 managers needs to be studied in a system in which better ted by K. D. Hambright et al., pp. 127 – 150, Okla. Univ. Press, Norman. 989
Kislev, Y., and E. Vaksin (1997), The water economy of Israel: An illu- 990
954 checks and balances exist. strated review, Work. Pap. 9705, Cent. for Agric. Econ. Res., Rehovoth, 991
Israel. 992
955 References Menahem, G. (2001), Water policy in Israel 1948 – 2000: Policy paradigms, 993
956 Avni, Z. (2003), The formation and protection of open spaces in Israel as a policy networks and public policy, Isr. Aff., 7, 21 – 44. 994
957 representation of institutional belonging, Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew Migdal, J. S. (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Rela- 995
958 Univ., Jerusalem. tions and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton University 996
959 Bendor, J., and T. M. Moe (1985), An adaptive model of bureaucratic Press, Princeton, N. J. 997
960 politics, Am. Polit. Sci. Rev., 79, 755 – 774. Murphy, A. H., and R. W. Katz (1985), Probability, Statistics and Decision 998
961 Caro, R. (1974), The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New Making in the Atmospheric Sciences, Westview, Boulder, Colo. 999
962 York, Vintage, New York. Niskanen, W. A. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, 1000
963 Dery, D., and I. Salomon (1997), After me, the deluge: Uncertainty and Aldin Atherton, Chicago, Ill. 1001
964 water policy in Israel, Int. J. Water Resour. Dev., 13, 93 – 110. Postel, S. (1997), Last Oasis: Facing Water Scarcity, 2nd ed, W. W. Norton, 1002
965 Draper, N. R., and H. Smith (1981), Applied Regression Analysis, 2nd ed., New York. 1003
966 John Wiley, Hoboken, N. J. Raskin, P., P. H. Gleick, P. Kirshen, G. Pontius, and K. Strzepek (1997), 1004
967 Feitelson, E. (2005), Political economy of groundwater exploitation: The Water Futures: Assessment of Long-Range Patterns and Problems, 1005
968 Israeli case, Int. J. Water Resour. Dev., 21, 413 – 423. Stockholm Environ. Inst., Stockholm. 1006
969 Feitelson, E., T. Gazit, and I. Fischhendler (2005), The Redlines in the Kin- Reisner, M. (1986), Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappear- 1007
970 neret: Their Role as Checks and Balances in the Operation of the National ing Water, Viking, New York. 1008
971 Water System (in Hebrew), Jerusalem Inst. for Isr. Stud., Jerusalem. Water Commission (2003), The water in Israel: Consumption and produc- 1009
972 Fischhendler, I. (2007), The politics of water allocation in Israel, Ground- tion, internal report, Isr. Water Comm., Tel Aviv. 1010
973 water, in press.
974 Galnoor, I. (1978), Water policymaking in Israel, Policy Anal., 4, 339 – 367.
975 Gleick, P. H. (2000), The changing water paradigm: A look at twenty-first
976 century water resources development, Water Int., 25, 127 – 138. E. Feitelson and I. Fischhendler, Department of Geography, Hebrew 1012
977 Gleick, P. H. (2003), Global freshwater resources: Soft-path solutions for University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. 1013
978 the 21st century, Science, 302, 1524 – 1528. (msfeitel@mscc.huji.ac.il) 1014
979 Gvirtzman, H. (2002), Water Resources of Israel (in Hebrew), Yad Ben Zvi, P. Kay, Department of Environment and Resource Studies, Faculty of 1015
980 Jerusalem. Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue 1016
981 Jordan, A., and T. O’Riordan (1997), Social institutions and climate West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L3G1. (pkay@fes.uwaterloo.ca) 1017
982 change: Applying cultural theory to practice, Work. Pap. GEC 97-15,

11 of 11