G.R. No.
85502 February 24, 1992 Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of
Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO
GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO
BUGTAI, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues
raised in this petition — the correct application of the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement
(TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within
the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in
Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on
September 31, 1992.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a
petition with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of
serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of
forestry laws and regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein
private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with
damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to
wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the
plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and
3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1
of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on
December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion for reconsideration on
February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to
the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial
court in a decision dated July 4, 1988, 3 and in its resolution of
September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration. 4
The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not without exception and
pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where
it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in
the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent
need for judicial intervention, which it explained thus:
The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the
City Council of Pagadian in its Resolution No. 111 requested
the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in
Lison Valley. This request remained unacted upon. Instead in
1982, a TLA covering 29,500 hectares, including the area
requested, was given to petitioner.
resolution became reality.
"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the
logging operations of the defendant has caused heavy siltation
not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City
Council of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the Tukuran
River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and Sibuguey River. In
other words, the adverse effects of the logging operations of
the defendant have already covered a wider area than that
feared to be adversely affected by the City Council of
Pagadian City.
Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas
years back, particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When the
grant of logging concessions started, so was the denudation of
forests. . . . It is common knowledge that heavy floods have
occurred in areas/places adjoining logging concessions.
(Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5).
Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped.
Irreparable damage would ensue unless the court intervenes.
Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its
inaction on the council's request seven years back.
The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the
case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5 where "irreparable damage and
injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow
Transportation Corporation v. Board of
Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived because of
"the strong public interest in having the matter settled" as soon
as possible.
The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which
provides:
Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or
growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval,
revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the
proper administrative official or body on concessions,
licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in
connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization,
exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the
Philippines.
This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power
vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts by Article
VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court
cited Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 7 where
several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for
divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just
compensation in expropriation cases.
The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the
1
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
Page
correctly applied and that the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for
resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the
resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for
review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a
cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the
Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The
deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as
a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss
and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine
had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a
becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the
other departments. The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to resolve questions
addressed to their particular expertise and that errors
committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified
by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less
important consideration is that administrative decisions are
usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available
to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the
rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of
avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily
loaded dockets. 9
As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there
are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed
with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately.
Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question
raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is patently
illegal; 12 4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6) when
irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8) when strong
public interest is involved; 17 9) when the subject of the
controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo
19
warranto proceedings.  PAGADIAN CITY
The private respondents now submit that their complaint
comes under the exceptions because forestry laws do not
require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to
judicial action; the question they are raising is purely legal;
application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable
damage; and public interest is involved.
We rule for the petitioner.
Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly
require prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for
the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still
require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded,
there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws
vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the
development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of
the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction"
in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain," 20 and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly
the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the
enforcement of the forestry laws aid regulations 21 here
claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive
conferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR
should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any
controversy coming under its express powers before the courts
of justice may intervene.
The argument that the questions raised in the petition are
purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents
have charged, both in the administrative case before the
DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and
conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and
regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the
presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best
evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing
their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules
allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise
their powers of review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the
claimed adverse impact of the case on the national interest, the
record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily
established these extraordinary circumstances to justify
deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative
remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact,
this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner's
uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its
operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the
DENR.
In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court,
the petitioner alleged that its logging operations had been
suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23,
1988, by the District Forester from the Regional Executive
Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as follows:
DISTRICT FORESTER
QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED
FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM SECRETARY FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY
CMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF
SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION
UNQUOTE SUBMIT REPORT ASAP.
RED BATCAGAN
The petition now before us contains the allegations that the
"petition for cancellation of petitioner's TLA is still pending
up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were)
2
ordered suspended by the Secretary of the DENR pending
Page
further investigation." 23
In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is
informed that "the Secretary of the DENR suspended
petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The
suspension is still in force up to this date after the lapse of
almost 3 years." 24

These statements have not been disputed by the private

respondents in their pleadings before the respondent court and
this Court and are therefore deemed admitted.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within

the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the
wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as
a result of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it
will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA
and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated.
To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the
primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of
the DENR. The application of the expertise of the
administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a
condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still
necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.

In view of the above observations, we find that there was no

need for the respondent court to declare the unconstitutionality
of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of
constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be
decided on some other available ground, 25 as we have done in
the case before us. The resolution of this same question must
await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a
judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily
established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to
make the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice
Laurel, if such action is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

the respondent court dated July 4, 1988, and its resolution
dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the
trial court dated December 11, 1987 and February 15, 1988,
are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2732 in
the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

3
Page
 
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-
Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region
2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional
Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a
movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A
of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code
of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives
empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for
our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989
when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman
while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan,
was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan,
issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck
and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to
submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited.
Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989,1 Regional Executive Director
Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents
filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June
22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was,
however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12,
1989.2 Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners
to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents'
statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their
letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter
should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending
resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed
as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents
against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of
Cagayan,5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck
to private respondents.6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial
court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no
cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an
order dated December 28, 1989.7 Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition
for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent
Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling
that the question involved is purely a legal question. 8 Hence,
this present petition,9 with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the
petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution
dated September 27, 1993,10 the prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this
Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A
of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on
the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this
principle asserting that the instant case falls within the
exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due
process was violated because they were not given the chance
to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on
the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products,
and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used
in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and
relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that
the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
court's judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation
of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action.11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel
the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
4
one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
Page
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice
for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This
doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by
the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1)
when there is a violation of due process, 13 (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question,14 (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction,15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part
of the administrative agency concerned,16 (5) when there is
irreparable injury,17 (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter, 18 (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of
a claim,20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings,21 (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was
pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded
to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the order of
July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28,
1989,23 private respondents clearly recognize the presence of
an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they
did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your
favorable action, then this letter should be considered as an
appeal to the
Secretary.24
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents
looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of
their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the
existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and
open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they
cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an
action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of
forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed
by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well
within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court,
therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which
is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.25 In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary,26 which was reiterated in the recent case
of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,27 this Court
held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of
these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of
cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere
in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect
bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the
ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However,
considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can
not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be
without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of
due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989
order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention
has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean
or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard.28 One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation
but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. 29 In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense.30 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration, 31 as in the instant
case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the
opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however,
denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco,32 we ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of
seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative
5
officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform
Page
these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is
authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the
second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
Sec. 68. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic]
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along
with private respondents' thinking not only because the
aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include
"conveyances" that can be the subject of confiscation by the
courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly
restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces
the other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein
below:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His
Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all
cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or
air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the
same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and
policies on the matter. (Emphasis ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary
and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority
to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating
the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The
phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the
act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The
only limitation is that it should be made "in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In the
construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to
give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. 33 Statutes
should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved
and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be
given such construction as will advance the object, suppress
the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 34 In this wise,
the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more
responsive to present situations and realities" and in view of
the "urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the
country," that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This
amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally
separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than
anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that
characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal
actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section
68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining
forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of
the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved
and protected through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers
from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the
penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to
penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and
realities;"
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision
authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only "conveyances,"
but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of
forest products by the "court" in a criminal action has long
been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents
insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except
only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A
would have no Purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would
not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO
277, supra.35
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was
illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the
Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan
that the truck of private respondents was not used in the
commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was
given to and received by the counsel of private respondents,
reads in part, viz.:
. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by
her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that
the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could
a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .36
We observed that private respondents misread the content of
the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the
intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the
petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the
commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the
commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a
criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation
of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners
did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used
in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of
6
Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same
Page
order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:
. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and
further amended by Executive Order No. 277 specifically
provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the
transport of forest products not covered by the required legal
documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and
gathering of the product in question but the fact that she
accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor
liable. . .37
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime
defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified
theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989
order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as
provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have
committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We
disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705
before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of
Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned
Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
products without license. — Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public
lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of
qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section
68, P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277)
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
forest products without license. — Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . .
(Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section 68,
P.D. 705 as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending
Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without
authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from
the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is
clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it
eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and
explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law.38
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for
replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative
forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D.
705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of
cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper
course of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in
the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to
one's recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an
element of private respondents' right of action, is too
significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is
founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully
withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to
recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully
detained.39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep
in custody,"40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking
whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or
an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense
of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the
property is sufficient.41 Under the Rules of Court, it is
indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must
show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession
of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the
defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has
not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution,
or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such
seizure, and the actual value of the property. 42 Private
respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a
wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant
case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the
petitioners because it was transporting forest products without
the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of
Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A
of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the
confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of
DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the
conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws.
Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck
by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is
legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the
case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a
procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority
given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is
explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the
provisions of the said law are subject to review by the
7
Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the
Page
decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:
Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director
are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any
person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose
decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said
decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with
Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the
Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except
through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of

the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and
its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE
AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on
September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the
Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with
utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

8
Page

G.R. No. L-15430             September 30, 1963
IPEKDJIAN MERCHANDISING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
Latorre, Blanco, Gadioma, and Josue for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, Special Attorneys P. R.
Gonzales and J.C. Llamas for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Petition to review the resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals
dismissing the petition for review in C.T.A. Case No. 374.
On January 11, 1951 respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (then Collector of Internal Revenue) assessed and
demanded from Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc., the
amount of P97,502.25, as compensating tax and surcharge on
gold chains imported by it, which were later melted and
converted into gold bullion and sold as such, plus the amount
of P200.00 as compromise penalty, for violation of Sec. 190 of
the Tax Code. In accordance with the provisions of Executive
Order No. 401-A, series of 1951, Petitioner appealed from the
Commissioner's decision to the Board of Tax Appeals, which
after hearing on the merits, rendered judgment affirming the
Commissioner judgment (B.T.A. case No. 10). Petitioner
appealed, but this Court "following the decision in the case
of University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, G.R.
No. L-570 June 23, 1953 "dismissed the appeal, without
prejudice (L-5772, March 30, 1954). The dismissal having
become final and executory petitioner sought to reinstate its
appeal in this Court but its petition for reinstatement of appeal
was denied on March 21, 1955.
On March 30, 1955 petitioner sought to reopen the case in the
Court of Tax Appeals by filing a "petition for review"
docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 107. On July 26, 195 the Court
of Tax Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
petitioner having failed to maintain the necessary action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila in accordance with Section
306, Tax Code, or with the Court of Tax Appeals within 30
days from its creation (on June 16, 1954) pursuant to Section
11, R.A. 1125. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal was denied. .
On November 3, 1955 petitioner made a partial payment of
P5,000.00 on its tax liability, but four days later filed with
respondent Commissioner a written claim for refund of the
same, requesting at the same time cancellation of the balance
of the assessment. This was denied by the Commissioner on
the ground that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was
already final and executory.
On May 10, 1957 petitioner filed a Petition for review in the
Court of Tax Appeals (C.T.A. Case No. 374) of the decision
of respondent Commissioner denying its request for refund
and cancellation of the balance of the assessment. On June 14,
1957 respondent Commissioner filed his answer to the
petition, raising therein as affirmative defense the fact that the
decision in B.T.A. Case NO. 10 operates as res judicata to
petitioner's appeal.
On February 26, 1958 respondent Commissioner filed a
motion for execution of judgment in B.T.A. Case No. 10,
which was granted by respondent court in its resolution of July
16, 1958. Reconsideration of that resolution being unavailing
petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, L-
14791, praying for annulment of the order of execution of the
judgment in B.T.A. case No. 10.
On December 29, 1958 respondent Court dismissed C.T.A.
Case No. 374 on the ground of res judicata. Respondent court
having refunded to reconsider the dismissal, petitioner now
seeks review thereof.
The petition for certiorari in Ipekdjian Merchandising Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-14791, was disclosed by this
Court on May 30, 1963.
The question presented by appellant is whether or not the
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in B.T.A. Case No. 10
operates to bar C.T.A. Case No. 374. Appellant argues that the
doctrine of res judicata, being a doctrine of expediency, is
applicable only to judgments rendered by a court or judge and
does not extend to decisions of administrative agencies, like
the Board of Tax Appeals, which are devoid of judicial
functions.
The essential requisites for the existence of res judicata are:
(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions (a)
identity of parties (b) identity of subject matter and (e) identity
of cause of action (Navarro v. Director of Lands, L-18814,
July 31, 1962; Aring v. Original, L-18464, Dec. 29, 1962).
To say that the doctrine applies exclusively to decisions
9
rendered by what are usually understood as courts would be to
Page
unreasonably circumscribe the scope thereof. The more
equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to
decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred.1
Since the Board of Tax Appeals was certainly not a court, the
pertinent question is whether the same had been granted
judicial powers. In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court
of Tax Appeals, supra, wherein we refused to annul
respondent court's resolution granting execution of judgment
in B.T.A. Case No. 10, we ruled:.
"It is true that in the case of U.S.T. v. BTA, (supra) an
administrative body and it was held that the BTA was an
administrative body and its proceedings and decisions were
administrative in Character. But the petitioner did not take into
consideration the fact that subsequently on June 16, 1954, all
cases heretofore decided by the said Board of Tax Appeals and
thence appealed to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Executive
Order Number Four Hundred One-A, shall be decided by the
Supreme Court on the merits to all intents and purposes as if
said Executive Order had been duly enacted by Congress' and
'that all cases now pending in said Board of Tax Appeals, shall
be transferred to the Court of Appeals and shall be heard and
decided by the latter to all intents and purposes as they had
been originally filed therein' (section 21, supra). We can thus
see, that Rep. Act No. 1125 had conferred judicial character
on the proceedings and decisions of the BTA. It, therefore,
results that the decisions of the BTA, in cases not subsequently
brought before the Court of First Instance, in accordance with
the decision in the case of U.S.T. v. BTA (supra), or before the
CTA, under the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1125, within the
30-day period prescribed in section 11 thereof, counted from
the creation or organization of the CTA (Lim Tio, et al. v.
CTA, et al., G.R. No. L-10681, March 29, 1958; Sta. Clara
Lumber Co v. CTA, G.R. No. L-9833, Dee. 21,
1957), received judicial confirmation under said R.A. No.
1125 and the same should be considered final and executory
and enforceable by execution, just like any other decision of a
court of justice. (Emphasis supplied).1awphîl.nèt
prayed that it be held not subject to the aforementioned
compensating tax that the Collector be made to refund the
P5,000.00 it had paid; and that the respondent Collector's
demand or assessment for the balance of the compensating tax
be cancelled. It is clear that the alleged cause of action in both
cases is the same: appellant's claim to non-liability for
compensating taxes. The only appreciable difference is that
while in the B.T.A. case is assailed the Collector's decision
assessing the sum of P97,502.25 as compensating tax, etc., and
holding him responsible therefore, in the C.T.A. case, he
ostensibly tried a different tack, by assailing the Collector's
denial of the claim for refund and request for cancellation of
the balance of the assessment. Nonetheless, in both cases, the
issue is the same: whether or not appellant is liable for the
compensating tax prescribed in Section 190 of the Tax Code.
Appellant cannot, by merely superficially changing the form
of his action, plead the non-application of the rule of bar by
prior judgment.2
All the requisites for the defense of res judicata being present,
respondent court properly dismissed the petition in C.T.A.
Case No. 374.
The resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing the
petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against herein
petitioner.

Thus, under the above pronouncement, while the decisions of

the B.T.A. were administrative in character, those that were
not brought before the Court of First Instance.
following U.S.T. v. B.T.A. supra, or before the Court of Tax
Appeals, pursuant to Section 11, R.A. No. 1125, were
considered as having been judicially confirmed by virtue of
R.A. No. 1125. The decisions covered by the pronouncement
assumed the character of decisions of regular courts.
Consequently, appellant's principal argument falls.

It next maintains that the cause of action in B.T.A. Case No.

10 is different from that in C.T.A. Case No. 374.

From appellant's petition in B.T.A. Case No. 10 and the

decision of the Board it may be gathered that what appellant
sought therein was the review of the decision of the Collector
of Internal Revenue holding it liable for P97,502.25 as
10

compensating tax, etc., with the purpose in mind of having the

same reversed. In its petition for review in C.T.A. Case No.
Page

374, after alleging the same facts embodied in the B.T.A.

decision, with the addition of the circumstance of payment, it

G.R. No. L-80160 June 26, 1989
GOVERNOR FELICISIMO T. SAN LUIS, THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN, PROVINCIAL
ENGINEER JUANITO C. RODIL AND PROVINCIAL
TREASURER AMADEO C. ROMEY, ALL OF
LAGUNA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIANO L. BERROYA,
JR., respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari and mandamus and/or appeal
by certiorari assails the appellate court's ruling that mandamus
lies to compel the reinstatement of a quarry superintendent in
the provincial government of Laguna who was initially
detailed or transferred to another office, then suspended, and
finally dismissed following his expose of certain anomalies
and irregularities committed by government employees in the
province.
The background facts, as narrated by the respondent Court of
Appeals are:
Records show that at all pertinent times, petitioner-appellant
(private respondent herein) had been the quarry superintendent
in the Province of Laguna since his appointment as such on
May 31, 1959. In April and May of 1973, petitioner-appellant
denounced graft and corrupt practices by employees of the
provincial government of Laguna. Thereafter, the development
of events may be briefly encapsulated as follows:
a. On July 20, l973, herein respondent-appellee provincial
governor (one of the petitioners herein) issued Office Order
No. 72 transferring Berroya to the office of the Provincial
Engineer. An amended office order invoked LOI 14-B for said
transfer.
b. Berroya challenged said transfer, and on October 25, 1973,
the Civil Service Commission ruled the same violative of
Section 32, RA 2260, and ordered that Berroya be reverted to
his regular position of quarry superintendent.
c. On December 12, 1973, instead of complying with the CSC
directive that Berroya be reverted to his regular position,
herein respondent-appellee provincial governor suspended
Berroya for alleged gross discourtesy, inefficiency and
insubordination. On that basis, reconsideration of the CSC
directive that Berroya be reverted to the position of quarry
superintendent was sought as academic (sic).
d. On February 26, 1974 the Civil Service Commission
reiterated its October 25, 1973 directive for the immediate
reversion of Berroya to his former position, and ruled the one-
year suspension illegal.
e. Respondent-appellee provincial governor appealed to the
Office of the President from the CSC rulings alluded to.
f. On May 29, 1974, there issued OP Decision 954, Series of
1974 reversing the CSC rulings without prejudice to the
decision of the Local Review Board [which had in fact already
sustained the one-year suspension under date of May 6, 1974].
g. On petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration, the
Office of the President rendered OP Decision 1834, Series of
1976, dated May 19, 1976, setting aside OP Decision 954,
declaring the one-year suspension improper, and ordering
payment of back salaries to Berroya.
h. Respondent-appellant moved for reconsideration of OP
Decision 1834 on June 14, 1976. The said motion for
reconsideration was denied on November 6, 1978.
i. In the interim, respondent-appellant provincial governor
issued an Order of April 27, 1977 dismissing Berroya for
alleged neglect of duty, frequent unauthorized absences,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty and
abandonment of office, which order of dismissal was appealed
by Berroya to the Civil Service Commission on May 12, 1977.
j. On January 23, 1979, the Civil Service Commission
resolved said appeal by declaring the dismissal unjustified,
exonerating Berroya of charges, and directing his
reinstatement as quarry superintendent.
k. On February l4, 1979, respondent-appellee provincial
governor sought relief from the CSC decision of January 23,
1979 declaring Berroya's dismissal unjustified.
1. On October 15, 1979, the CSC Merit System Board denied
said motion for reconsideration in its Resolution No. 567.
m. Thereafter, respondent-appellee provincial governor moved
anew to set aside O.P. Decision 1834, Series of 1976-the first
motion for reconsideration of which had been denied on
November 6, 1978. (ref. #h, supra). The Office of the
President dismissed said motion on March 27, 1981.
Petitioner-appellant's formal demand for reinstatement to the
11
position of quarry superintendent having been disdained
despite the factual antecedents aforestated, he filed, [on May
Page
27, 1980] the antecedent Civil Case No. SC-1834 for
mandamus to compel his reversion to the position of quarry
superintendent at the Oogong Quarry, with back salaries for
the entire period of his suspension and dismissal (exclusive of
leaves of absence with pay), and prayed for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of suit.
Respondents-appellees moved to dismiss said petition for
mandamus, as amended, and opposed the therein application
for preliminary injunctive relief for immediate reinstatement.
In an Order of December 1, 1980, the trial court denied the
application for preliminary injunctive relief "until after the
parties shall have adduced evidence, pro and con the grant of
injunctive relief", and similarly deferred its resolution on the
motion to dismiss "for lack of merit for the present ... until
after the trial."
On December 15, 1980, respondents-appellees answered the
petition for mandamus and prayed that judgment be rendered-
1. Dismissing the Complaint and denying the prayer for
Preliminary Injunction;
2. Declaring petitioner to have been legally separated or
dismissed from the government service;
3. Order petitioner to pay each of them the sum of P
200,000.00 by way of moral damages; P 100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P 10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P
300.00 each per court appearance; other litigation expenses
which may be incurred as may be proved in due course; and to
pay the costs of suit [Rollo, pp. 35-37].
During the pendency of the civil case for mandamus, on April
9, 1981 petitioner provincial governor filed a petition for relief
from O.P. Decision 1834 with the Office of the President. This
was denied on November 27, 1984 on the ground that only one
motion for reconsideration of O.P. Decision 1834 was
allowed, the petition for relief being the third such motion
filed by petitioner.
On May 17, 1985, after trial, the court a quo rendered its
decision finding the transfer of petitioner- appellant from his
position of quarry superintendent to the office of the
Provincial Engineer sufficiently warranted. Furthermore, his
one-year suspension was found to be proper under LOI 14-B
and unassailable upon affirmation by the Local Review Board.
His summary dismissal was likewise found to be a justified
exercise of the authority granted under LOI 14-B. The trial
Court further decided "that none of the respondents should be
held personally liable in their private capacity to the petitioner
because their actuations are not at all tainted with malice and
bad faith" [Rollo, p. 38].
However, although the trial court upheld the validity of
Berroya's dismissal, it nevertheless ordered his reinstatement
to an equivalent position as a matter of equity. Hence, the
dispositive portion of its decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents to reinstate petitioner to any position
equivalent to that of a quarry superintendent which has been
abolished in the present plantilla of the provincial government
of Laguna as reorganized pursuant to PD 1136 without
diminution in rank and salary;
2. Ordering respondents to pay the back salary of petitioner
from April 26, 1977 to September 1, 1977 only and
appropriating funds therefor, as soon as this decision becomes
final;
3. Dismissing all claims and counterclaims of both parties for
other damages including attorney's fees [Rollo, p. 35].
On June 6, 1985, herein private respondent Berroya appealed
from the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated May 17,
1985. The appeal was resolved by the respondent Court of
Appeals in his favor in a decision which was promulgated on
April 30, 1987, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is accordingly resolved as
follows:
(a) Petitioner-appellant is ordered to be reinstated to the
position of quarry superintendent of the Oogong Quarry in
Laguna or to the position which said office may now be called
pursuant to the reorganization of the plantilla of the Provincial
Government of Laguna under PD 1136, without diminution in
rank and salary;
(b) Respondents-appellees are ordered to pay the back salary
of petitioner-appellant corresponding to the period of
suspension and of illegal dismissal from the service, exclusive
of that corresponding to leaves of absences with pay;
(c) Respondents-appellants (sic) are ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay petitioner-appellant the sum of P 50,000.00
as and for moral damages;
(d) Respondents-appellants (sic) are ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay petitioner-appellant the further sum of P
20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus costs and expenses of
suit.
The decision of May 17, 1985, in Civil Case No. SC-1748 is
accordingly set aside forthwith.
With costs against respondents-appellees.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 43.]
Petitioners moved to reconsider the decision of the appellate
12
court but their motion was denied. Hence, the instant petition
docketed as G.R. No. 80160, which is "both or alternatively an
Page
original action for certiorari and mandamus and an appeal by
certiorari" [See Rollo, p. 1, et seq.] Another petition for review
of the Court of Appeals' decision was filed with this Court on
October 8, 1987 docketed as G.R. No. 79985 by the same
petitioners. However, in a resolution dated November 16,
1987, the Court noted the manifestation/motion filed by
petitioners stating, among other things, that the petition
docketed as G.R. No. 79985 be considered withdrawn and the
petition dated October 16, 1987 which was filed on October
19, 1987 and docketed as G.R. No. 80160 be considered as the
main and real petition [Rollo, p. 50].
Accordingly, the parties were required to submit their
respective pleadings in G.R. No. 80160. The petition in G.R.
No. 80160 contains the following assignment of errors:
First
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED ITS
JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION BY MEANS OF A MERE
MINUTE RESOLUTION, STATING NO LEGAL BASIS
THEREFOR, IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION'S EXPRESS MANDATE AND WHEN IT
STATED AND HELD IN SAID RESOLUTION "THAT NO
NEW REASON HAS BEEN ADDUCED [IN SAID
MOTION] TO JUSTIFY A REVERSAL OR
MODIFICATION OF [ITS] FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS".
Second
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED
ITS JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT MARIANO L. BERROYA, JR. DOES NOT
FALL UNDER THE CATEGORY OF "NOTORIOUSLY
UNDESIRABLE" AND THAT THE "APPLICABILITY OF
LOI 14-B TO RESPONDENT BERROYA IS OPEN TO
QUESTION AS HE WAS NEVER ASKED TO RESIGN AS
BEING NOTORIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE".
Third
THE RESPONDENT COURT BLATANTLY ERRED AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE
"RECALL" OF THE DISMISSAL ORDER IS ITSELF
ATTENDED BY A TOUCH OF MYSTERY, MENTIONED
ONLY IN THE TESTIMONY OF PETITIONER
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, UNFORTIFIED BY ANY
WRITING THEREOF, AND NOT ADVERTED TO IN THE
DECEMBER 15, 1980 ANSWER FILED IN THE
ANTECEDENT mandamus ACTION, AND IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT BERROYA COMMITTED
ABANDONMENT OF OFFICE.
Fourth
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED
ITS JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION
OF THE LOCAL BOARD OF REVIEW UNDER LOI 14-B
MAY BE REVIEWED UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PREROGATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT TO SUPERVISE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS, WHICH INCLUDES THE
AUTHORITY TO REVIEW, MODIFY OR REVERSE
DECISION INVOLVING SUSPENSION OF LOCAL
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES.
Fifth
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED
ITS JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING IN RATHER
STRONG LANGUAGE THAT THE "ABOLITION OF THE
POSITION OF QUARRY SUPERINTENDENT FROM THE
PLANTILLA OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
LAGUNA MUST BE VIEWED WITH (sic) ABERRATION
AND AN ANOMALY, IN THE LIGHT OF
UNCONTROVERTED SHOWING THAT QUARRY
OPERATIONS AT THE SAME SITE CONTINUE TO
DATE, AS WOULD MILITATE AGAINST ATTENDANCE
OF GOOD FAITH IN THE ABOLITION OF SAID
OFFICE."
Sixth
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED
ITS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BACK SALARIES FOR THE
PERIOD OF HIS SUSPENSION AS WELL AS DISMISSAL
UNTIL REINSTATEMENT AS QUARRY
SUPERINTENDENT, AND IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF P50,000.00 AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF P20,000.00 IN
FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BERROYA,
AND IN HOLDING ALL THE PETITIONERS HEREIN
SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF
AFORESAID BACK SALARIES AND DAMAGES [Rollo,
pp. 13-14].
The first error assigned in the instant petition is not well taken.
A thorough perusal of the assailed resolution of the respondent
CA denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration reveals
clearly its legal basis. Thus, its resolution stating that
Considering that the motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 30, 1987 filed by respondent-appellee
merely reiterates the grounds and arguments already
discussed, thoroughly analyzed and passed upon by this Court;
and that no new reason has been adduced to justify a reversal
or modification of the findings and conclusion of this Court.
13
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit [Rollo, p. 45; Emphasis supplied].
Page
constitutes sufficient compliance with the constitutional
mandate that no motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be denied without stating the legal basis therefor
(1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2).
The resolution of the remaining assigned errors hinges on a
determination of the effect of the decisions rendered in favor
of Berroya by two administrative agencies.
A. It is worth noting that the issue of legality of the order of
suspension by petitioner Governor dated December 12, 1973
had already been passed upon in a decision of the Office of the
President (O.P. Decision No. 1834) dated May 19, 1976
reversing its earlier ruling in O.P. Decision No. 954 dated May
29, 1974. The Office of the President categorically ruled as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not disputed that the Governor, in issuing his Order of
Suspension, was exercising an authority legally endowed upon
(sic) him by LOI 14-B, but it must not be an unbridled
exercise of such authority....
A review of the records discloses that the only act of the
governor which was sustained by the Local Review Board was
his imposing the suspension on Berroya for alleged
discourtesy. This Office is prone to adopt a contrary stand on
the matter taking into consideration the circumstances leading
to the writing of the so-called "dishonest' statements of the
petitioner. It is unfortunate that the Local Review Board took
it as an infraction of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
It must be observed that the said statements were made in the
course of a pending case before the Civil Service Commission,
and in defense of the position of the petitioner. Although the
said statements, by themselves, may be considered as lacking
in refinement, still this fact alone does not justify the drastic
action taken against the petitioner in this case. . . .
In view of the foregoing, this Office rules that the suspension
order was unjustified. Considering that respondent Berroya
has already served the suspension order and that his
suspension was not proper, it is hereby ordered that he be
entitled to the payment of his back salaries corresponding to
the period of his suspension [Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1, pp.
102-103].
From this decision of the Office of the President, petitioner
Governor filed a petition for reconsideration dated June 14,
1976 which was denied for lack of merit in a resolution of the
Office of the President dated November 6, 1978 [Folder of
Exhibits, Vol. 1, p. 170]. On July 3, 1979, petitioner governor
filed a second petition to reconsider O.P. Decision No. 1834
on the main ground that the disputed decision is null and void
ab initio allegedly because Berroya filed his motion for
reconsideration of O.P. Decision No. 954 only on July 15,
1975 or after a lapse of one year and forty seven (47) days
from the date when the said decision was rendered. The Office
of the President denied such petition in a resolution dated
March 27, 1981 [Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1, p. 210] on the
strength of Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966 which
empowers said office to act upon petitions for reconsideration,
even if filed late, in exceptionally meritorious cases. Said
Office further pointed out that upon review of the records of
the case, it was shown that Berroya's motion for
reconsideration was filed on July 15, 1974 and not on July 15,
1975 as erroneously indicated in O.P. Decision No. 1834
[Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1, p. 213].
From the foregoing, it can be seen that OP Decision No. 1834
had already attained finality upon denial of the first motion for
reconsideration in view of the clear provisions of the
applicable law at the time. Executive Order No. 19, Series of
1966, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Petitions for reconsideration filed after the lapse of the
aforesaid period (fifteen days from receipt of the decision)
shall not be entertained unless the Office of the President, for
exceptionally meritorious causes, decides to act thereon,
provided that only one petition for reconsideration by any
party shall be allowed [Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, the filing of the second petition for
reconsideration could not have stayed the finality of the
aforesaid decision.
In a last ditch attempt to assail the validity of O.P. Decision
No. 1834, a petition for relief was filed by herein petitioners
on April 9, 1981, during the pendency of the mandamus case.
This petition was finally denied in a resolution of the office
dated November 27, 1984.
B. On the other hand, the validity of Berroya's dismissal was
already passed upon by the Merit Systems Board of the Civil
Service Commission in MSB Case No. 40. In a decision
promulgated on January 23, 1979, the Merit Systems Board
held as follows:
After carefully perusing the records of this case, this board is
convinced that there is no strong evidence of guilt against
Berroya. In fact, there is not even sufficient evidence to
maintain the charges against him. Hence, the same does not
fall within the scope of Section 40, Presidential Decree No.
807.
The record does not show that Berroya is notoriously
undesirable. On the contrary, his performance ratings from the
period ending December 31, 1969 to the period ending June
30, 1973 are all very satisfactory.
Such being the case, he is not notoriously undesirable under
the standard laid down by the President, to wit: "the test of
14
being notoriously undesirable is two-fold: whether it is
common knowledge or generally known as universally
Page
believed to be true or manifest to the world that petitioner
committed the acts imputed against him, and whether he had
contracted the habit for any of the enumerated misdemeanors".
The same are not present in the case of Berroya. On the
contrary he should be given recognition for his efforts in
exposing the irregularities allegedly committed by some
authorities of the Laguna Provincial Government which led to
the filing of criminal as well as administrative cases against
such officials.
Foregoing premises considered, this Board finds the order of
dismissal dated April 27, 1977, without justifiable basis.
Wherefore, the Board hereby exonerates Engr. Mariano
Berroya, Jr. of the charges against him. Consequently, it is
hereby directed that he be reinstated to his position as Quarry
Superintendent of Laguna immediately, [Folder of Exhibits,
Vol. 1, pp. 175-176].
The motion for reconsideration from this decision was denied
in a resolution of the Board dated October 15, 1979. This
decision was therefore already final when Berroya instituted
suit in 1980 to compel petitioner to reinstate him to his former
position and to pay his back salaries.
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and
the Office of the President had long become final and
executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts.
It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions
and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to
their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of resjudicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99
Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdjian Merchadising Co., Inc. v. Court of
Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9
SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of public, executive or administrative officers and boards
acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at
503].
Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications
is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are
ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon
whom judicial powers had been conferred. Hence, whenever
any board, tribunal or person is by law vested with authority to
judicially determine a question, like the Merit Systems Board
of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
President, for instance, such determination, when it has
become final, is as conclusive between the same parties
litigating for the same cause as though the adjudication had
been made by a court of general jurisdiction [Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, supra at
76].
Furthermore, the trial court's act of reviewing and setting aside
the findings of the two administrative bodies was in gross
disregard of the basic legal precept that accords finality to
administrative findings of facts.
The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in
force in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative
officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the
former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative
officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such
findings are supported by substantial] evidence. . . . [Lianga
Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enage, G.R. No. L-30637,
July 16, 1987,152 SCRA 80].
Finally, the Court cannot ignore the undisputed fact that the
decisions rendered by the Office of the President and the Merit
Systems Board had attained finality without petitioners having
taken any timely legal recourse to have the said decisions
reviewed by the courts. On the other hand, Berroya, in order to
enforce his right to reinstatement and to back salaries pursuant
to these final and executory administrative rulings, instituted a
suit for mandamus to compel petitioners to comply with the
directives issued by the two administrative agencies.
Since private respondent Berroya had established his clear
legal right to reinstatement and back salaries under the
aforementioned final and executory administrative decisions,
it became a clear ministerial duty on the part of the authorities
concerned to comply with the orders contained in said
decisions [Tanala v. Legaspi, G.R. No. L-22537, March 31,
1965,13 SCRA 566 at 574-575].
The established rule is that a writ of mandamus lies to enforce
a ministerial duty or "the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or
station" [Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
Lianto v. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo, et al., G.R. No. L-21905,
March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 599]. In this case, the appropriate
administrative agencies having determined with finality that
Berroya's suspension and dismissal were without just cause,
his reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of the
petitioner Provincial Governor, a duty whose performance
may be controlled and enjoined by mandamus [Ynchausit and
Co. v. Wright, 47 Phil. 866 (1925); Tee and Co. v. Wright, 53
Phil. 194 (1929); Gementiza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-
41717-33, April 12, 1982,113 SCRA 477; Laganapan v.
Asedillo, G.R. No. L-28353, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA
377].
Thus, this Tribunal upholds the appellate court's judgment for
the reinstatement of respondent Berroya and payment of his
back salaries corresponding to the period of suspension and of
illegal dismissal from service, exclusive of that corresponding
to leaves of absences with pay. However, as respondent
Berroya can no longer be reinstated because he has already
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty five years on
December 7, 1986,** he should be paid his back salaries
[Salcedo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40846, January 31,
15
1978, 81 SCRA 408] and also all the retirement and leave
privileges that are due him as a retiring employee in
Page
accordance with law [Tanala v. Legaspi, supra at 576].
According to settled jurisprudence, Berroya, as an illegally
terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries
limited only to a maximum period of five years Laganapan v.
Asedillo, supra; Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II, G.R.
No. L-40490, October 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 123; Salcedo v.
Court of Appeals, supra, Gementiza v. Court of Appeals,
supra].
That petitioners Provincial Governor, Provincial Treasurer and
Provincial Engineer of Laguna, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Laguna and the Province of Laguna, formally impleaded
herein,'** are liable for back salaries in case of illegal
termination of a civil service employee finds support in earlier
decisions of this Court [Balquidra v. Court of First Instance of
Capiz, Branch II, supra; Gementiza v. Court of Appeals,
supra; Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-44484,
1,44842, L-44894, L-44591, March 16, 1987,148 SCRA 496;
Laganapan v. Asedillo, supra].
However, the petitioners Juanito Rodil and Amado Romey
must be held liable only in their official capacities as
Provincial Engineer and Provincial Treasurer, respectively
since they had been expressly sued by Berroya as such
[Petition for mandamus with Preliminary Injunction, Record,
Vol. 1, p. 1, et seq.; Gray v. De Vera, G.R. No. L-23966, May
22, 1969, 28 SCRA 268].
The same does not hold true for petitioner provincial governor
who was found by the appellate court to have acted in bad
faith as manifested by his contumacious refusal to comply
with the decisions of the two administrative agencies, thus
prompting respondent Berroya to secure an indorsement from
the Minister of Local Government and Community
Development dated November 15, 1979 for his reinstatement
[Annex "Y-9", Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1, p. 207]. The
Minister's directive having been ignored, Berroya was
compelled to bring an action for mandamus.
Where, as in this case, the provincial governor obstinately
refused to reinstate the petitioner, in defiance of the orders of
the Office of the President and the Ministry of Local
Government and in palpable disregard of the opinion of the
Civil Service Commission, the appellate court's finding of bad
faith cannot be faulted and accordingly, will not be disturbed
by this Tribunal Enciso v. Remo, G.R. No. L-23670,
September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 580.] This is in line with our
previous ruling in Remo v. Palacio [107 Phil. 803 (1960)] that
xxx xxx xxx
(i)t having been clearly shown by evidence, that respondent,
Deogracias Remo, in his capacity as Mayor of Goa, refused to
reinstate the petitioner to his former position in the police
force of Goa, despite the orders of Malacanang to do so (Exhs.
G and I), and inspite of the opinion of the Secretary of Finance
(Exh. H), the respondent Mayor of Goa, willfully acted in bad
faith, and therefore, he, as Mayor of Goa, should pay for
damages caused to the petitioner, Angel Enciso. [At pp. 807-
808.]
It is well-settled that when a public officer goes beyond the
scope of his duty, particularly when acting tortiously, he is not
entitled to protection on account of his office, but is liable for
his acts like any private individual [Palma v. Graciano, 99
Phil. 72 (1956)].
Thus, in Mendoza v. De Leon [33 Phil. 508 (1916)], it was
held:
Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the
performance of governmental duties which are in their nature
legislative or quasi-judicial liable for the consequences of their
official acts, unless it be shown that they act wilfully and
maliciously and with the express purpose of inflicting injury
upon the plaintiff [at 513; Emphasis supplied].
Accordingly, applying the principle that a public officer, by
virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his
personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith
[Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16290, October 31,
1961, 3 SCRA 413; Correa v. Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, G. R. No. L-46096, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 312],
the Court holds that petitioner Felicisimo T. San Luis, the
Provincial Governor of Laguna who has been sued both in his
official and private capacities, must be held personally liable
to Berroya for the consequences of his illegal and wrongful
acts.
In this regard, the Court sustains the appellate court's finding
that petitioner San Luis must be held liable to Berroya for
moral damages since justice demands that the latter be
recompensed for the mental suffering and hardship he went
through in order to vindicate his right, apart from the back
salaries legally due him [Rama v. Court of Appeals, supra at
p. 5061]. The appellate court was clearly warranted in
awarding moral damages in favor of respondent Berroya
because of the obstinacy of petitioner Governor who
arbitrarily and without legal justification refused Berroya's
reinstatement in defiance of directives of the administrative
agencies with final authority on the matter. We agree with the
appellate court that the sum of P 50,000.00 for moral damages
is a reasonable award considering the mental anguish and
serious anxiety suffered by Berroya as a result of the wrongful
acts of petitioner Governor in refusing to reinstate him.
Finally, as correctly adjudged by respondent court, petitioner
San Luis must likewise answer to Berroya for attorney's fees
plus costs and expenses of suit, which have been fixed by said
court at P 20,000.00, in view of the wrongful refusal of
petitioner provincial governor to afford Berroya his plainly
valid and just claim for reinstatement and back salaries [Rollo,
p. 42].
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is
hereby MODIFIED as follows: (1) the petitioners, in their
official capacities, are ordered to pay private respondent
16
Berroya, his back salaries for a maximum period of five years;
(2) since the reinstatement of Berroya can no longer be
Page
ordered by reason of his having reached the retirement age, he
should instead be paid all the retirement benefits to which he
is entitled under the law; and (3) petitioner Felicisimo T. San
Luis, in his personal capacity, is further ordered to pay
Berroya the sum of P 50,000.00 as and for moral damages, the
sum of P 20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees plus costs and
other expenses of suit. This decision shall be IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

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