University of Chicago Press Southern Political Science Association

University of Chicago Press
Southern Political Science Association
Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies

Author(s): Russell J. Dalton
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Feb., 1984), pp. 264-284
Published by: University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
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Cognitive Mobilization
and
Partisan Dealignment
in
Advanced Industrial
Democracies
Russell J. Dalton
Florida State University
Theories of mass politics have stressed the value of partisanship in providing citizens with
cues for political decision making. The expanding political skills and resources of contem-
porary electorates are, however, increasing the abilities of the public and lessening the need
for partisan cues. A process of cognitive mobilization in advanced industrial societies is
creating a substantial number of apartisans, sophisticated individuals who lack party ties.
Data from an eight-nation survey document the correlates of changing mobilization patterns,
and link these findings to a new style of dealigned politics.
T he concept of party identification has been of major value in

understanding and explaining the political behavior of Western mass
publics. An enduring sense of partisan attachment often serves as a
valuable guidepost in helping the average citizen manage the complexities
of politics. For example, elections in most democracies almost always are
partisan contests; thus partisanship provides clear and low-cost voting
cues for the unsophisticated voter (Converse, 1975, pp. 111-34). The
cue-giving function of party ties also extends beyond the act of voting
(Miller, 1976; Borre and Katz, 1973, pp. 79-85). Issues and events fre-
quently are presented to the public in partisan terms, as the parties take
positions on the political questions of the day or react to the statements of
other political actors. Thus, partisanship can serve a reference-group
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1982 ECPR Workshop on Problems
of Party Government, Aarhus, Denmark. I would like to thank the members of the
workshop, Scott Flanagan, Paul Beck, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful com-
ments on this article.
COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 265
function as a source of cues for evaluating issues and political figures

(Baker et al., 1981, pp. 212-21; Barnes and Pierce, 1971). Finally, par-
tisanship can perform a mobilizing function; attachment to a political
party apparently draws an individual into the political process (King,
1969, pp. 123-28; Converse and Dupeux, 1962; Verba et al., 1978, ch. 6).
Consequently, party identification has been linked to voting behavior,
issue positions, interest in politics, participation in campaign activities,
and other forms of political participation.
Despite this evidence of the functional value of partisanship for the
average citizen, there are growing indications of a decline in the impor-
tance of party for mass political behavior. Although many voters con-
tinue to rely on the decisional cues emanating from partisan ties, the need
for such cues declines as the political skills of the voters increase and infor-
mation costs decrease (Shively, 1979). The dramatic spread of education
in advanced industrial democracies is producing a qualitative change in
the political sophistication of Western mass publics (Allardt, 1968; In-
glehart, 1977, chs. 11-12). At the same time, these societies have ex-
perienced an information explosion through the mass media, and the cost
of political information has decreased substantially. Because of this
cognitive mobilization, more voters now are able to deal with the com-
plexities of politics and make their own political decisions. Thus, the
functional need for partisan cues to guide voting behavior, evaluate
political issues, and mobilize political involvement is declining for a
growing sector of society.
This paper compares these two general methods for integrating and
mobilizing citizens into the political process: party mobilization and
cognitive mobilization.' Accordingly, we first establish that these are
two distinct mobilization processes, even though their effects partially
may overlap.2 Analysis yields a fourfold typology which summarizes the
mobilization patterns of contemporary mass publics.
While a good deal is known about the typical partisan supporter, much
I Our focus on party and cognitive mobilization does not imply that social reference
groups and other sources of political cues are unimportant. Rather, the two mobilization
factors we examine normally are considered to be more proximate to political behavior than
are social characteristics. In addition, social groups apparently are declining as a source of
political cues (Ladd with Hadley, 1975, esp. ch. 5; Baker et al., 1981, ch. 7; Lipset, 1981, ap-
pendix; Petersson, 1978, pp. 116-19).
2 The findings in this research are drawn from two data sources: the Political Action Study
conducted by Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase, and associates, and the Eurobarometer surveys
conducted by the European Communities. Both data sources were made available by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The combined results from
the Political Action Study are based on an equal weighting of the eight national samples; the
combined Eurobarometer results are weighted to obtain a representative sample of the Euro-
pean Community population.
266 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
less is known about the cognitively mobilized citizen. An examination of

the correlates of the mobilization typology illuminates the contribution of
factors such as value priorities, social structure, and generational change
to current patterns of political mobilization. The mobilization typology
also has heuristic value in that it partially may explain the changes in mass
behavior now occurring in Western democracies. For instance, the past
decade has witnessed the apparent breakdown in stable partisan
alignments in the majority of Western party systems (Daalder and Mair,
1983, chs. 2-3). Voting behavior now is characterized by higher levels of
partisan volatility at the aggregate and individual levels. Discussions of a
crisis of confidence facing parties and party government have become
commonplace (Crotty and Jacobson, 1980; Raschke, 1982; Rose, 1980).
In several instances the proportion of party identifiers actually has de-
clined (Dalton et al., forthcoming, chs. 8-11; Crewe, 1980, pp. 381-88).
Another change involves an expansion of citizen participation beyond the
established partisan frameworks of campaigns and elections. Higher
levels of cognitive mobilization may be leading more citizens to direct ac-
tion methods - citizen action movements, neighborhood associations,
single issue groups, and protest behavior (Barnes, Kaase, et al., 1979, chs.
10, 12).
Many analysts treat these signs of partisan dealignment as a temporary
phase in the life cycle of party systems - a period of partisan decay before
a new realignment reestablishes strong party bonds (Beck, 1979; Camp-
bell, 1979, pp. 92-97; Clubb et al., 1980, chs. 4, 9; Crewe, 1980, pp.
379-81). However, others have argued that the present dealignment in
advanced industrial democracies at least partially reflects long-term and
on-going processes of partisan decline that are consistent with the
cognitive mobilization thesis (Burnham, 1970, ch. 5; 1978; Dalton et al.,
forthcoming, ch. 14; Shively, 1979, pp. 1050-51).
The primary goal of this research thus will be to explore the potential
consequences of mobilization patterns for mass attitudes and behavior.
We will consider the relationship between mobilization patterns and
several political attitudes: support for an influential political role for par-
ties, ideological sophistication, and political participation. Partisan and
cognitive mobilization sources have important and often contrasting im-
plications for political behavior. By separating their effects we can gain
a better understanding of contemporary mass politics. In addition, the
projection of these cross-sectional findings may provide new insights into
recent electoral trends in Western Europe, and may suggest future
changes in mass political behavior.
PARTY MOBILIZATION AND COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION
In order to examine the contrasts between party mobilization and
cognitive mobilization, we first must develop measures of both concepts.

The partisanship dimension is best represented by the strength of an in-
dividual's partisan attachments.3 Strong partisan identifiers, regardless
of their party preference, are generally more involved in the political
process than nonidentifiers.
The cognitive dimension is somewhat more abstract. Cognitive
mobilization implies that citizens possess the skills and resources necessary
to become politically engaged with little dependence on external cues. In
addition, cognitive mobilization implies a psychological involvement in
politics. A cognitive mobilization index was constructed by combining
education (to represent the skills component) with interest in politics (to
represent the political involvement component).4 The highly mobilized
are those who possess both the skills and motivation to grapple with the
complexities of politics on their own. As constructed, cognitive mobiliza-
tion should be a relatively enduring characteristic, rivaling the stability of
party attachments.
Although conceptually distinct, partisan mobilization and cognitive
mobilization are related in the real world. Indeed, the logic of party
mobilization is that strong party ties also stimulate political sophistication
and involvement, and some causal flow works in the opposite direction
(Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 142-45, 250-56). Table 1 presents the rela-
tionship between these two measures. Because we are concerned with a
process generally affecting advanced industrial societies, the data from
the eight separate national surveys in the Political Action Study have been
combined to produce a broad-based group of citizens that matches the
level of our theorizing. The Tau-b correlation (.15) between the partisan
and cognitive mobilization measures indicates a weak relationship.5 For
instance, 43.5 percent of the independents are low on cognitive mobiliza-
tion while only 24.1 percent of the strong partisans are. This is the type
3 The partisanship question was worded as follows: "Which political party do you feel
closest to? (If close to a party) would you say you feel very close, fairly close, or not very close
to that party?" In West Germany and Austria the options were: very close, fairly close,
moderate, fairly distant, and distant. For details on these variables see Barnes, Kaase, et al.
(1979, pp. 579-80).
4 The cognitive mobilization index is based on a simple additive combination of education
and general interest in politics (see Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976, pp. 261-64). The
respondent's age and educational level was coded: (1) college; (2) completed secondary; (3)
some secondary; (4) primary or less. Political interest was coded: (1) very interested; (2)
somewhat interested; (3) not much interested; (4) not at all interested. These two questions
were added together to yield a seven point index (2-8). Values of 5 or less were treated as
high cognitive mobilization in figure 1.
5 The general correlation between partisanship and cognitive mobilization is also
replicated within each national sample: U.K. = .20; U.S. = .18; Finland = .26;
Austria = .18; Netherlands = .30; Switzerland = .34; Germany = .18; Italy = .22.
268 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46,1984
TABLE 1
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTISANSHIP AND COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION (%)

COGNITIVE NON- NOT VERY FAIRLY VERY
MOBILIZATION PARTISAN CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE
Low 43.5 32.4 25.7 24.1

(2) 24.0 25.6 22.8 22.5
(3) 18.5 22.2 24.7 25.2
High 14.0 19.8 26.8 28.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Weighted N (2171) (2007) (2828) (989)
Source: Combined results from the Political Action Study.
of evidence which led previous research to stress the mobilizing function

of party attachments.
Despite this statistical relationship between partisanship and cognitive
mobilization, it is important to treat them as conceptually distinct dimen-
sions. First, the relationship is substantially less than perfect, and one
cannot separate the reciprocal effects between these variables. Second,
we believe both dimensions are derived from distinct causal processes,
and thus they have quite different implications for the nature of mass
political behavior. One example might highlight the distinction between
each mobilization source. The impact of age on both dimensions pro-
vides a partial test of our theorizing. The strength of partisan at-
tachments generally should increase with age. Age serves as an (im-
perfect) indicator of accumulated electoral experience and repeated
voting support for one's own party. These experiences normally promote
a strengthening of party bonds by reinforcing early-learned partisanship
(Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 161-65; Converse, 1976, chs. 2-3).
The cognitive mobilization thesis assumes a much different causal proc-
ess. If cognitive mobilization reflects the political skills and resources of
the individual, then there may be a large generational component to this
dimension. Younger citizens have much higher levels of education than
their elders, and they are more attuned to the political information pro-
vided by the mass media, especially television (e.g., see Baker et al., 1981,
pp. 64-65). Thus, cognitive mobilization should be higher among con-
temporary youth, even though they have only limited experience with
politics and the electoral process.
Table 2 indicates that our expectations are fulfilled. First, the strength
of partisan attachments generally increases with age in each nation. The
entries in the table appear small because they are unstandardized regres-
sion coefficients (b) with age measured in discrete years. The average
TABLE 2
THE RELATIONSHIP OF AGE WITH PARTISANSHIP AND COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION
(BY NATION)
PARTISAN COGNITIVE
STRENGTH MOBILIZATION
Great Britain .0120 -.0155

United States .0104 -.0108
Finland .0095 -.0128
Austria .0095 -.0088
Netherlands .0092 -.0095
Switzerland .0077 -.0131
West Germany .0055 -.0197
Italy .0007 -.0366
Average .0081 -.0159
Source: Political Action Study.

Note: Table entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients (b) with age.
European relationship (b = .0081) is almost identical to Philip

Converse's findings for the United States during the steady-state period of
1952-1964 (Converse, 1976, p. 51). This age relationship presumably
reflects a progressive increase in the strength of partisan attachments.6
Thus, over a normal adult life span (fifty years) the strength of partisan-
ship for an age cohort could be expected to increase by almost half a point
on our four-point scale (50 x .008 = .40).
Cognitive mobilization, in contrast, decreases with age; this pattern
probably reflects a generational effect consistent with the expansion of
education and media usage among the young. However, even if the
education component is removed from the cognitive mobilization index
and we construct a separate measure of psychological involvement in
politics, cognitive mobilization is still highest among the young.
Several significant and interpretable national variations in these pat-
terns also emerge in table 2. For example, the discontinuities of the
democratic experience substantially weaken age differences in partisan
attachments in Germany (b = .0055) and Italy (b = .0007). In con-
trast, age differences in partisanship are greatest in the stable democracies
of Great Britain (b = .0120) and the United States (b = .0104). On the
whole, the general age pattern holds across the eight nations surveyed.
This is a causal process which generally affects advanced industrial
democracies.
6 The interpretation of this relationship is much debated in the research literature (Con-
verse, 1976, ch. 1). While we generally agree with Converse's life cycle interpretation, the
generational changes implied by the cognitive mobilization model also might produce a
generational decline in partisan attachments. We will return to this point below.
A MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY
Assuming that party and cognitive mobilization represent distinct

phenomena, we need to separate the effects of both dimensions when ex-
amining the attitudes and behaviors of contemporary mass publics.
Figure 1 presents a mobilization typology based on the cross-classification
of both measures. This typology yields four groups which represent
distinct mobilization patterns.
"Apoliticals" is the label that we will apply to citizens who are neither
attached to a political party nor psychologically involved in politics. This
group should conform most closely to the independent voter originally
described by Campbell and his colleagues (1960, pp. 143-45). That is,
apoliticals should be less involved in politics, politically unsophisticated,
and less concerned about political issues.
Olof Petersson (1978, p. 115) has used the term "ritual partisans" to
describe citizens mobilized into political action primarily by their strong
party attachments. Party cues play a large functional role in guiding
political behavior in the absence of cognitive mobilization. Ritual par-
tisans should be supportive of party politics and involved in party-related
activities such as voting or campaigns. However, their party support
should be almost a habitual activity, and political involvement is not
likely to extend to areas where party cues are lacking.
FIGURE 1
THE MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY
STRENGTH OF PARTISANSHIP
NOT VERYCLOSE/ CLOSE/VERYCLOSE

NONPARTISAN
HIGH APARTISAN COGNITIVE

PARTISAN
COGNITIVE
MOBILIZATION
Low APOLITICAL RITUAL

PARTISAN
Those whom we have labeled "cognitive partisans" are highly rated on

both mobilization dimensions. Their strong party attachments should
stimulate involvement in party-related activities. At the same time, this
group is psychologically involved in politics even when party cues are
lacking. Since the partisan and cognitive dimensions overlap, these are
reinforcing influences for cognitive partisans.
The "apartisan" group is the focal point of this study. The apartisans
are not attached to political parties. Nevertheless, they are involved in
politics. If the cognitive mobilization thesis is correct, this group should
possess the political skills necessary to orient themselves to politics without
depending on party labels. Apartisans also may be involved in party-
related activities, although they may be less supportive of partisan
politics, and their political involvement may extend beyond the partisan
sphere. They are political independents-but often they are in-
dependents of a much different sort than the apoliticals.
This typology distinguishes between different types of citizens who nor-
mally are combined when either mobilization dimension is considered
separately. For example, studies of party mobilization normally com-
bine the apolitical and apartisan groups -even though one group is unin-
volved in politics and the other is comprised of politically interested
citizens. John Petrocik's research (1974) provided an early suggestion of
the mix between both types for American independents, and of the
anomalies that result from this mixture. Similarly, ritual partisans and
cognitive partisans often are combined, although we will see that each
group frequently approaches politics in a substantially different manner.
Therefore, distinguishing between these four distinct groups should
clarify our understanding of contemporary political behavior.
Table 3 displays the distribution of these four mobilization groups in
each nation. The breakdown of the mobilization typology by nation pro-
vides some insight into the variations among party systems. For example,
the American electorate is characterized by a large percentage of apar-
tisans and cognitive partisans, reflecting the high levels of political in-
volvement and education in the United States. Conversely, cognitive
mobilization is limited in Finland, Britain, and Italy. When citizens in
these countries become mobilized into politics, it is largely through par-
tisan channels. Thus, the largest percentages of ritual partisans are
found in these three nations, while the numbers of apartisans are the
lowest among the nations surveyed. In the remaining nations the
number of apartisans and ritual partisans are roughly equivalent.
THE CORRELATES OF MOBILIZATION PATTERNS
The significance of the apartisan category rests partially on the size of
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this group and partially on its source. Democratic electorates always

have contained at least a small number of cognitively mobilized citizens.
However, the presently large numbers of apartisans have been linked to
the development of advanced industrialism-the expansion of educa-
tional opportunities, increased access to information, a changing social
structure, and concomitant value change. These presumptions can be
tested by examining the distribution of mobilization patterns across
several variables that are identified with advanced industrial politics.
These analyses will help us identify the social characteristics of the four
mobilization groups. More important, these analyses serve as another
test of the partisan and cognitive mobilization theories.
Both mobilization theories provide clear expectations for age dif-
ferences in mobilization types. Party identification research argues that
party ties should strengthen with age -especially for ritual partisans who
heavily rely on these cues to guide their behavior (Shively, 1979, pp.
1040-42). Conversely, the cognitive mobilization thesis maintains that
the apartisans should be more frequent among younger citizens, because
they are more educated and have been socialized in an environment
where parties are less central to politics.
Table 4 provides clear support for both expectations. The combined
number of partisans (ritual and cognitive) is larger among older cohorts
than among the young, as we have seen. However, the increase is based
almost solely on those voters with limited political sophistication who rely
on party cues to guide their political behavior, the ritual partisans. The
number of apartisans displays a counter-trend of decreases with age; this
pattern holds even if we use a cognitive measure excluding education
(data not shown). In this instance age differences probably signify a
generational shift in the proportion of sophisticated nonpartisans
resulting from the development of advanced industrialism. If this is the
case, then the number of apartisans should continue to increase gradually
because of the ongoing process of generational turnover.
The changing social structure of advanced industrial societies is another
factor that should affect mobilization patterns. Advanced industrialism
has been linked to the emergence of a new middle class of salaried white
collar employees and government workers, which differs from the old
middle class of business owners and self-employed (Inglehart, 1977, ch. 7;
Baker et al., 1981, ch. 7). On balance, the new middle class is highly
educated; they include the technological elite whose skills and
background make them well suited to the complexities of modern politics.
The ambiguous class position of the new middle class also means that this
group is not well integrated into contemporary party systems, which
weakens their partisan mobilization (Lipset, 1964; Kerr, forthcoming).
TABLE 4
MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY BY AGE, SOCIAL CLASS, AND VALUE PRIORITIES
AGE
MOBILIZATION
TYPOLOGY 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 +
Apartisan 28.1% 22.7% 16.7% 16.1% 11.8%
Cognitive Partisan 26.5 28.2 23.7 24.1 22.2
Ritual Partisan 14.2 19.3 25.6 26.2 31.8
Apolitical 31.2 29.7 34.0 33.6 34.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Weighted N (1839) (1506) (1366) (1309) (1729)
OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

NEW OLD
MIDDLE- MIDDLE- WORKING
CLASS CLASS CLASS FARMER
Apartisan 29.1 21.4 13.5 9.7

Cognitive Partisan 33.2 31.3 19.2 15.7
Ritual Partisan 12.9 18.1 28.6 36.8
Apolitical 24.7 29.2 38.7 37.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Weighted N (2618) (884) (2940) (690)
VALUES
MIXED MIXED POST-
MATERIAL MATERIAL POSTMAT MATERIALIST
Apartisan 16.6 18.1 21.1 31.7

Cognitive Partisan 21.3 23.6 28.3 39.9
Ritual Partisan 25.1 24.5 22.1 10.6
Apolitical 36.9 33.7 28.5 17.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Weighted N (2773) (2555) (1624) (772)

Thus, the members of the new middle class are more likely than those of
other social strata to belong to the apartisan category.
The second panel of table 4 describes the distribution of mobilization
groups by social class. In order to tap the general social environment of
an individual, social class is measured by the occupation of the head of the
household. Individuals from new middle class families are more likely
than other class groups to belong to the apartisan category. Further-
more, even when members of the new middle class hold partisan ties, they
are substantially more likely to be cognitive partisans than ritual par-
tisans. At the other extreme, roughly two-fifths of the working class and
farmers remain removed from politics as apoliticals. Because of their
limited political skills, members of these two strata are mobilized into
politics primarily through partisan ties as ritual partisans.
A final element in the cognitive mobilization thesis is the relationship
between changing values and political sophistication (Inglehart, 1977,
pp. 1-18, 339-40). The socioeconomic trends of advanced industrialism
have led to the development of postmaterial values which stress political
participation and independence from elite-controlled hierarchical
organizations (such as political parties). In addition, postmaterialists are
only weakly integrated into most democratic party systems, because most
of the established parties have not been responsive to their new issue con-
cerns (Lijphart, 1981, pp. 40-41; Flanagan and Dalton, 1984). Thus,
postmaterialists should disproportionately belong to the apartisan
category.
The third panel of table 4 presents the relationship between value
priorities and the mobilization typology. Value priorities are strongly
related to cognitive mobilization. Consequently, the proportions of both
apartisans and cognitive partisans are largest among citizens with
postmaterial values. And conversely, the number of ritual partisans and
apoliticals are proportionately greatest among materialists.
In sum, education and political skills are mobilizing citizens into the
political process. However, this involvement often is occurring outside of
the party system. Some individuals orient themselves to politics through
a partisan framework out of necessity (ritual partisans) or choice
(cognitive partisans). However, a sizable number of young, new middle-
class, postmaterialist citizens are avoiding party attachments and are
more directly involved in the political process as apartisans.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MOBILIZATION PATTERNS
The value of the mobilization typology largely must be based on its

ability to explain political attitudes and behaviors. Our discussion of the
party and cognitive mobilization theories has alluded to several conse-
quences of mobilization patterns. For example, public images of
political parties and party government should be linked to differences in
mobilization patterns. Party identifiers obviously should be more sup-
portive of party politics than are apartisans and apoliticals. Similarly,
we would expect differences in ideological sophistication and participa-
tion patterns among the four mobilization groups. Because of their social
background, the apartisans should be sophisticated and involved citizens,
especially for nonpartisan modes of participation. Conversely, the ritual
partisan may display a substantial level of political involvement, although
focusing primarily on partisan activities. This section tests several of
these expectations. We examine the impact of mobilization patterns on
opinions about the role of political parties, political sophistication, and
several forms of political participation.
Table 5 provides evidence from the Eurobarometer studies on group
differences in attitudes toward the role of parties in the political process.7
TABLE 5
MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY AND SUPPORT FOR PARTY INFLUENCE, 1979 (%)

COGNITIVE RITUAL
APARTISANS PARTISANS PARTISANS APOLITICALS
Influence in National
Government
Favor 51.6 72.6 67.3 43.9
Neutral/No opinion 28.8 16.1 22.8 41.3
Against 19.6 11.3 9.9 14.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Influence in Local
Community
Favor 39.8 59.6 58.1 35.7
Against 31.6 22.3 19.3 26.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Influence in European
Community
Favor 43.8 62.7 58.8 36.4
Against 26.6 16.5 13.2 19.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Weighted N (1710) (1014) (2014) (4157)

Source: Combined results from Eurobarometer 11 (excluding N. Ireland).
7Since the Eurobarometers lack a question on general political interest, a question tapping
active political discussion was substituted in measuring cognitive mobilization. The con-
struction of this cognitive mobilization index follows the guidelines in Inglehart and
Klingemann (1976, pp. 261-64). Extensive analyses verified that the Eurobarometer index
performs similarly to the index from the Political Action Study.
Respondents were asked whether they favored an important role for par-
ties in national government, their local communities, and the European
Community. Phrased in these terms, most Europeans favor party in-
fluence. Still, there are clear group differences in these opinions. In all
three areas the apartisans and apoliticals express limited support for party
influence, although the apoliticals often are undecided or neutral. The
cognitive and ritual partisans are strong supporters of party government.
This pattern is not a surprising finding; it is more a validation of our
mobilization typology.
Although Europeans support an influential role for political parties, the
extent of that support emerges more clearly when party influence is
weighed against other factors. For example, when Eurobarometer
respondents were asked whether members of the European parliament
should be guided by party or their own ideas about European integration,
only a minority of each group agreed with the primacy of party cues
(table 6). Furthermore, apartisans are most likely to propose that
EuroMPs vote based on their own ideas about Europe (68.3 percent); only
a slight majority of the three other groups favor this option.
A similar question focused on the role of members of the respective na-
TABLE 6
THE MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY AND LEGISLATIVE ROLES (%)
COGNITIVE RITUAL
APARTISAN PARTISAN PARTISAN APOLITICAL
EuroMP should vote based on:

Party 19.2 40.0 37.2 18.4
Ideas about Europe 68.3 55.8 54.0 57.0
No opinion 12.5 4.2 8.8 24.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Weighted N (1710) (1014) (2014) (4157)
Role of National MP:

Help citizens with problems 42.9 37.3 44.1 43.9
Support party 13.9 23.4 23.9 16.2
Debate policy, government
program 40.0 36.1 27.9 31.6
No opinion 3.2 3.2 4.1 8.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Weighted N (1610) (886) (1815) (4695)

Source: The EuroMP table is from Eurobarometer 11 (excluding N. Ireland); the national
MP table is from Eurobarometer 7 (excluding N. Ireland).
tional parliaments (table 6). Again, the party-support role received little
endorsement from any group, and least of all from the apartisans (13.9
percent). Constituency and policy orientations are preferred roles for
members of the national parliament. Ritual partisans and apoliticals are
oriented toward constituency service; cognitive partisans and apartisans
place relatively more stress on the policy aspects of the legislative role.
Another area of expected group differences is ideological sophistication.
Cognitive partisans should contain a large number of political ideologues
because they benefit from both mobilization sources; the political
sophistication of the apartisans and ritual partisans is tied to a single
mobilization dimension. The apartisans should be sophisticated about
politics because of their mobilization on the cognitive dimension. For the
ritual partisans, involvement in party politics and familiarity with the
parties and party leaders can substitute partially for their limited educa-
tion and cognitive skills (King, 1969, pp. 123-28). Despite wide dif-
ferences in social background, sophistication levels should be roughly
similar between apartisans and ritual partisans; only the apoliticals
should be noticeably less sophisticated.
Table 7 presents group differences on two measures of ideological
sophistication from the Political Action Study. The first measure taps the
active use of ideological thinking based on evaluations of political parties
(Barnes, Kaase, et al., 1979, pp. 559-60). This measure is based on
Philip Converse's well-known levels of conceptualization variable (Con-
verse, 1964, pp. 214-19). A significant percentage of all three mobilized
groups are classified as ideologues or near ideologues. The second
measure reflects a passive recognition and understanding of ideological
concepts in describing the terms "left" and "right" (Barnes, Kaase, et al.,
TABLE 7
THE MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION (%)
COGNITIVE RITUAL
Active use of ideological

thinking in evaluating parties 32.6 39.8 27.2 15.2
Ideological recognition and

understanding of left and
righta 32.6 32.5 13.0 11.9
Weighted N (1472) (1795) (1433) (2292)

Note: Entries are the percentage scored as ideologues or near ideologues.
a Entries are the percentage defining both left and right in ideological terms.
1979, pp. 561-62). A large number of cognitive partisans and apartisans

qualify as full ideologues on the second measure. However, only 13.0
percent of the ritual partisans are ideologues, similar to the sophistication
of apoliticals (11.9 percent).
These findings illuminate the workings of both mobilization processes.
In the partisan domain, ritual partisans are significantly more
sophisticated than the apoliticals because they can draw upon their party
experiences in determining the good and bad points of the major parties.
In the more abstract domain of left/right concepts, the cognitive partisans
and apartisans are equally able to deal with these areas in ideological
terms. In evaluating left and right, however, ritual partisans lack the
clear party cues on which they depend and are significantly less
sophisticated. This pattern underlines the partisan aspect of party
mobilization.
A final area of expected group differences is political participation.
Cognitive partisans should be active in partisan and nonpartisan modes of
participation, since they are mobilized along both the partisan and
cognitive dimensions. Ritual partisans and the apartisans should display
a contrast. Ritual partisans are mobilized more heavily into party-
related activities -elections, campaigns, etc. -but participation is less
likely to extend to communal activities or unconventional political
behavior. The apartisans should follow a different pattern: relatively
high levels of political participation, especially for nonpartisan activities.
The first panel in table 8 presents group differences in party-related
forms of political participation. Participation levels are generally high
for all three mobilization groups relative to the apoliticals, especially for
the cognitive partisans who are motivated by both mobilization dimen-
sions. More important are the differences between the ritual partisans
and the apartisans, since they highlight the unique effects of each
mobilization dimension. For example, the ritual partisans turnout at
higher levels than the cognitively mobilized apartisans. In addition, the
participation rates of the ritual partisans match or exceed the participa-
tion levels of the apartisans for other forms of partisan activity.
The second panel in table 8 displays participation rates for several ex-
amples which do not necessarily involve partisan activities. The
cognitive partisans again emerge as the most active citizens. As expected,
however, in this domain the cognitive mobilization of the apartisans
generally stimulates greater activity than does the partisan mobilization
of the ritual partisans. When a clear party framework is lacking, the
ritual partisans are substantially less active than the apartisans.
The final panel of table 8 involves a form of participation that has been
described as elite challenging or antipartisan - protest potential. This
measure combined involvement and approval of several protest activities
TABLE 8
THE MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY AND PARTICIPATION (%)
COGNITIVE RITUAL
Partisan
Voted in last
election a 82.0 90.0 88.5 73.0
Attend meeting
or rally 15.4 31.0 15.9 5.4
Convince other
how to vote 13.9 29.7 14.7 4.4
Work for party
or candidate 6.0 17.6 5.8 1.7
Non-Partisan
Discuss politics 63.9 78.7 36.6 23.5
Work with
people in
community 22.7 35.9 19.5 10.3
Contact officials 18.6 29.7 9.3 4.8
Anti-partisan
Protest potential 22.2 24.1 12.2 11.5

a Based on respondents aged 21 or older.
into a Guttman scale (Barnes, Kaase, et al., 1979, pp. 554-55). Cogni-
tive mobilization is relevant to participation in this domain, but party
mobilization is not. Thus, the apartisans now match the participation
orientations of the cognitive partisans. Ritual partisans and apoliticals
display a common pattern of lower support for protest.
In sum, the imbalance in participation patterns parallels our findings
for ideological sophistication. When partisan cues are relevant, the
political involvement of the ritual partisans rivals that of the better-
educated apartisans. However, as the value of partisan cues wanes, the
activity level of the ritual partisans falls toward the participation rates of
the apoliticals. Ritual partisans are mobilized into the political process,
but primarily in party-related terms.
CONCLUSION
Evidence is steadily accumulating that the party systems in advanced

industrial societies are in a state of flux (Daalder and Mair, 1983, chs. 2,
3, and 14; Epstein, 1980, pp. 359-83; Dalton et al., forthcoming, ch. 1).
Electoral volatility is generally on the rise. Numerous new parties have
emerged to challenge the established partisan order, and there are signs of
increasing intraparty tensions. The parties' control of citizen input has
been undercut by the rise in citizen action groups and protest movements.
In a few instances, these general trends have been accompanied by a
rapid decline in the proportion of party identifiers.
In part, these changes reflect the inability of the established parties to
deal with the new issues and problems of contemporary society. Con-
fronting the issues of environmental quality, resource shortages, and the
economic crises of the welfare state have placed severe strains on ad-
vanced industrial democracies. However, in addition to these immediate
issue tensions, we believe that a more fundamental and long-lasting proc-
ess of political change is altering the style and content of mass politics.
This research has focused on the differential effects of partisan and
cognitive mobilization as a partial explanation of the changes now occur-
ring in mass political behavior. The partisan mobilization thesis
presumes that many voters maintain affective partisan ties because par-
tisanship is a useful source of political cues. A core group of ritual par-
tisans serves as a stabilizing inertial force in democratic party systems.
Parties can mobilize these supporters at election time, but otherwise these
citizens are largely unconcerned about politics.
The characteristics of contemporary mass publics are, however,
undergoing substantial change. The expansion of education and the
growing sophistication of mass publics generally are decreasing the func-
tional value of partisan ties for some sectors of society. This cognitive
mobilization is focused on a group of citizens whose greater political skills
and resources enable them to be functionally independent of party cues:
the better educated and politically involved. Moreover, among social
groups that are identified with advanced industrial politics - younger
generations, the new middle-class, and postmaterialists - the apartisans
are represented disproportionately.
Both short-term partisan tensions and the long-term trend of partisan
decline are necessary to explain the present status of contemporary party
systems. If the short-term problems of party government are resolved,
the likely result would be at least a temporary revitalization of party
systems and a mobilization of apoliticals into the ranks of the ritual par-
tisans. Even if this occurs, we believe that a long-term process of par-
tisan dealignment will continue to function. Ongoing processes of
socioeconomic change gradually should increase the number of apartisan
citizens. 8 Thus, if our cross-sectional findings are projected as a
8 Ignoring short-term effects, such trends will require continued social change over a
relatively long time period. Data from the U.S. election studies can outline the past pattern
of change in at least one nation. The election studies use a different question on interest in
the election campaign, which also restricts the level of cognitive mobilization. Thus, these
developmental pattern, our evidence suggests a long-term trend toward

partisan dealignment in advanced industrial societies. This trend holds
several implications for the nature of mass politics.
The apartisans differ from our traditional notion of partisan in-
dependents. For example, Petersson indicates that apartisans have the
potential to act as the independent issue voters who are described in
democratic theory but seldom observed in practice (Petersson, 1978, pp.
115-16). Our findings show that apartisans possess the political resources
to follow the complexities of politics, and they are free of affective party
ties. Thus, this group should inject more issue voting into elections and
make candidates more responsive to public opinion.
We also believe that apartisans should press for an expansion of citizen
input beyond the narrow channel of elections. The political skills of the
apartisans enable them to organize effective citizen action groups, citizen
lobbies, protest demonstrations, and other means of unconventional
political participation. The nonpartisan and issue-oriented
characteristics of these activities make them ideal participation modes for
the apartisans. Similarly, apartisans may furnish support for direct
democracy techniques such as the initiative and referendum.
It is clearly premature to predict the withering away of parties, even if
many of their institutional functions are curtailed and party identification
becomes less important. Parties still have a role to play in representative
democracies. Yet, if our thinking is correct, partisan dealignment is
more than a temporary phase in the history of advanced industrial
democracies. The growing sophistication of mass publics should con-
tinue to lessen the role of partisanship as a framework for political
behavior. Although contemporary societies are now just realizing the
presence of a substantial number of apartisan citizens, we believe the pat-
tern of partisan dealignment has elements of an ongoing process.
data must be viewed very tentatively. The number of apartisans has doubled over the past
thirty years, while the proportion of cognitive partisans has increased by only a fifth, and
ritual partisans actually have decreased by nearly half:
1952 1980
Apartisans 10.9% 22.3%
Cognitive partisans 31.9 38.0
Ritual partisans 42.5 25.2
Apoliticals 15.5 14.5
100.0 100.0
N= (1769) (1614)
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Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies

T he concept of party identification has been of major value in

function as a source of cues for evaluating issues and political figures

less is known about the cognitively mobilized citizen. An examination of

In order to examine the contrasts between party mobilization and

cognitive mobilization, we first must develop measures of both concepts.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTISANSHIP AND COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION (%)

Low 43.5 32.4 25.7 24.1

of evidence which led previous research to stress the mobilizing function

THE RELATIONSHIP OF AGE WITH PARTISANSHIP AND COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION

Great Britain .0120 -.0155

Average .0081 -.0159

Source: Political Action Study.

European relationship (b = .0081) is almost identical to Philip

Assuming that party and cognitive mobilization represent distinct

THE MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY

NOT VERYCLOSE/ CLOSE/VERYCLOSE

HIGH APARTISAN COGNITIVE

Low APOLITICAL RITUAL

Those whom we have labeled "cognitive partisans" are highly rated on

THE CORRELATES OF MOBILIZATION PATTERNS

The significance of the apartisan category rests partially on the size of

X,z E-~~~~~~- cis

this group and partially on its source. Democratic electorates always

Weighted N (1839) (1506) (1366) (1309) (1729)

OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

Apartisan 29.1 21.4 13.5 9.7

Weighted N (2618) (884) (2940) (690)

Apartisan 16.6 18.1 21.1 31.7

Weighted N (2773) (2555) (1624) (772)

THE CONSEQUENCES OF MOBILIZATION PATTERNS

The value of the mobilization typology largely must be based on its

MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY AND SUPPORT FOR PARTY INFLUENCE, 1979 (%)

Weighted N (1710) (1014) (2014) (4157)

THE MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY AND LEGISLATIVE ROLES (%)

EuroMP should vote based on:

Weighted N (1710) (1014) (2014) (4157)

Role of National MP:

Weighted N (1610) (886) (1815) (4695)

THE MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION (%)

APARTISAN PARTISAN PARTISAN APOLITICAL

Active use of ideological

Ideological recognition and

Weighted N (1472) (1795) (1433) (2292)

Source: Combined results from the Political Action Study.

1979, pp. 561-62). A large number of cognitive partisans and apartisans

Source: Combined results from the Political Action Study.

Evidence is steadily accumulating that the party systems in advanced

developmental pattern, our evidence suggests a long-term trend toward

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