1. ABELLO V.

CIR
G.R. NO. 120721; FEBRUARY 23, 2005

FACTS:
During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are partners in the Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) law firm, contributed P882,661.31 each to the
campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, then running for the Senate. On April 21,
1988, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed each of the petitioners P263,032.66
for their contributions. Petitioners questioned the assessment through a letter to the BIR.
They claimed that political or electoral contributions are not considered gifts under the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), and that, therefore, they are not liable for donor's
tax. The claim for exemption was denied by the Commissioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not campaign fund from private respondents to Sen. Angara is considered a
donation.

RULING:
Yes. Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
(b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi.

The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. Petitioners, the late
Manuel G. Abello8, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala and Avelino V. Cruz, each
gave P882,661.31 to the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, without any material
consideration. All three elements of a donation are present. The patrimony of the four
petitioners were reduced by P882,661.31 each. Senator Edgardo Angara's patrimony
correspondingly increased by P3,530,645.249 . There was intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi was present since each of the petitioners gave their contributions without
any consideration.
2. LENTFER V. HANS JURGEN WOLFF
G.R. No. 152317; November 10, 2004

FACTS:
The petitioners are Gunter Lentfer, a German citizen; his Filipina wife, Victoria Moreño-
Lentfer; and John Craigie Young Cross, an Australian citizen, all residing Oriental Mindoro.
Respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff is a German citizen, residing in Makati City. They alleged
that with respondent, on engaged the notarial services of Atty. Rodrigo C. Dimayacyac for:
(1) the sale of a beach house owned by petitioner Cross in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro, and (2) the assignment of Cross' contract of lease on the land where the house
stood. The sale of the beach house and the assignment of the lease right would be in the
name of petitioner Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, but the total consideration of 220,000
Deutschmarks (DM) would be paid by respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff. A promissory note
was executed by said respondent in favor of petitioner Cross.

According to respondent, however, the Lentfer spouses were his confidants who held in
trust for him, a time deposit account in the amount of DM 200,0004 at Solid Bank
Corporation. The Lentfer couple urged him to buy petitioner Cross' beach house and lease
rights in Puerto Galera and through a bank-to-bank transaction, he paid Cross the amount
of DM 221,7005 as total consideration for the sale and assignment of the lease rights.
However, Cross, Moreño-Lentfer and Atty. Dimayacyac surreptitiously executed a deed of
sale whereby the beach house was made to appear as sold to Moreño-Lentfer for only
P100,000. The assignment of the lease right was likewise made in favor of Moreño-Lentfer.
Upon learning of this, respondent filed a Complaint with the lower court for annulment of
sale and reconveyance of property with damages and prayer for a writ of attachment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not payment by respondent is considered a donation.

RULING:
No. Petitioner Moreño-Lentfer's claim of either cash or property donation rings hollow. A
donation is a simple act of liberality where a person gives freely of a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it. But when a large amount of money is involved, equivalent to
P3,297,800, based on the exchange rate in the year 1992, we are constrained to take the
petitioners' claim of liberality of the donor with more than a grain of salt.

Petitioners could not brush aside the fact that a donation must comply with the mandatory
formal requirements set forth by law for its validity. Since the subject of donation is the
purchase money, Art. 748 of the New Civil Code is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of
money equivalent to P3,297,800 as well as its acceptance should have been in writing. It
was not. Hence, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal requisites
prescribed by law.
3. OCAMPO V. OCAMPO
G.R. No. 150707; April 14, 2004

FACTS:
Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo have ten children, including the 2 respondents to
this case. In the celebration of their marriage, they acquired several properties, all of which
are owned in common by their children. However, the residential/commercial lot in Nabua,
Camarines Sur is ostensibly owned by respondent Fidela Ocampo who acknowledged that
the same is co-owned by her and her siblings.

Petitioners also filed a supplemental complaint where they allege that Fidela Ocampo
cancelled the first TCT of the lot in Nabua and issued a new one in the form of Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito and her spouse Vicente Barrito. Both
the donor of the donee are notoriously aware that the lot is still under dispute in the
petitioners' first complaint, nevertheless, the two still pursued the donation. They also allege
that the transfer of ownership from Fidela to Belen, daughter of another defendant Felicidad,
is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share
therein, knowing as they do that the same are a co-ownership of the original parties
plaintiffs and defendants herein.

Defendants, on the other hand, allege that Fidela has been the absolute owner of the
property since 1949, and that its title is free from all encumbrances and adverse claims. In
1984, Fidela conveyed the property to Belen via a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos and since
September 13, 1987, Belen has been the absolute owner of the same property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a deed of donation intervivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs of their
hereditary shares, is said deed valid

RULING:
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the
property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement
of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is
the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its
authenticity and due execution were proven -- the property had already been donated to
Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the
document relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTC’s ratiocination:

"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a written
acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in this
case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidela’s interest since the
alleged acknowledgement was written and executed on 24 December 1985 when she was
no longer the owner of the property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had
already donated all her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she
had no more properties with which she can have an interest to declare against."

As correctly found by the trial court, however, the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could
not be a fact against the interest of the declarant, since her right over the property had
already been extinguished by the prior act of donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration,
Fidela could not have acknowledged co-ownership, as she had no more property against
which she had an interest to declare.
4. TAN QUETO V. CA
G.R. NO. L-35648; FEBRUARY 27, 1987

FACTS:
Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot either as a
purported donation or by way of purchase on 11 February 1927 for P50.00 as the alleged
consideration thereof. The donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already
married to her husband Juan Pombuena. In 1935, Juan filed an application of Torrens title
over the land for himself and his supposed co-owner Restituta.

In 1938, a decision was promulgated pronouncing Juan as the owner of the land. On 22
September 1949 a contract of lease over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan
Queto and Restituta for a period of 10 years. Meanwhile, On 27 December 1960 Restituta
sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer (the lease contract having expired) before the
Municipal Court of Ozamis City. As a consequence of the cadastral case, an OCT was
issued in Juans name. In 1962, Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter agreement
whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses in turn became
the owners of a parcel of land with the house constructed thereon previously owned (that is,
before the barter) by Tan Queto. Thereafter, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a
concrete building, without any objection on the part of Restituta.

The Municipal court ruled in favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case; but on
appeal in the CFI, the entire case was dismissed because of an understanding (barter)
entered into by Juan and Tan Queto. Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for
reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter,
and for recovery of the land with damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not lot in question is paraphernal.

RULING:
The land is conjugal, not paraphernal. How was ownership transferred, if at all, from her
mother to RESTITUTA? The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation interviews
because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid
donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The allegation that
the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her
mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future
inheritance is generally prohibited.

The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as
a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a
considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore
conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money used being
presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her
own). The contention that the sale was fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) is
bankrupt. Firstly, there was a valid consideration therefor. Secondly, assuming that there
had indeed been a simulation, the parties thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a
stranger to said stratagem (like petitioner herein).
5. LAGAZO V. CA
G.R. NO. 112796; MARCH 5, 1998

FACTS: Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee Tito
Lagazo, was awarded a 60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate, a
public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under
its land-for-the-landless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a house on the lot.

Before she left for Canada where she executed a special power of attorney in favor of her
son-in-law Eduardo B. Español authorizing him to execute all documents necessary for the
final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot. However, the latter failed to accomplish
the purpose of the power of attorney granted to him, Catalina Reyes revoked said authority
in an instrument executed in Canada.

Catalina Reyes executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of
plaintiff-appellee Lagazo. Lagazo then checked with the Register of Deeds and found out
that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and
the remaining balance on the lot and declared the said property in the name of Catalina.

Lagazo thereafter sent a demand letter to defendant Alfredo Cabanlit asking him to vacate
the premises but the latter refused to vacate the premises claiming ownership thereo by
virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him by Espanol. Hence, Lagazo instituted the
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against defendant-appellant Cabanlit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation in favor of petitioner was valid.

RULING:
NO. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed
by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not
applicable.

Even conceding that petitioner’s full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have
been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition
for the donation. We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous.

It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the
donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with
Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts.
This much can be gathered from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that
a burden or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.

The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed
by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts
necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts
were meant to be a burden in the donation.

Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes
the donation null and void.