MC Dispute Over Estate Agent's Business

[2017] 1 LNS 333 Legal Network Series
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR
IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA
[CIVIL SUIT NO: 23NCVC-100-12/2013]
BETWEEN
MOK SHOOK MOOI (aka Sherene Mok)

(NRIC No.: 640730-05-5042)
(suing as the sole proprietress of
Prismas Primas Interior and
Prismas Primas Management & Services) ... PLAINTIFF
AND
1. Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana

(through its Secretary, WONG KUI MAN)
2. WONG KUI MAN
3. CHOW THEAN CHOY
(NRIC No.: 570918-05-5203, 5234840)
4. VIJIARATNAM a/l v. RATNASINGAM
(NRIC No.: 480518-10-5575)
5. CHEONG CHEE WENG
(NRIC No.: 671005-10-5969)
6. CHONG KOK MING
(NRIC No.: 680124-01-6357)
7. YEOW HON HOONG WAI
(NRIC No.: 571217-10-5655)
8. CHEW KOOI HEONG
(NRIC No.: 561006-10-5752) ... DEFENDANTS
1
AGENCY: Authority of agent - Estate agent - Acting in excess -

Carrying out estate agency practice without being registered under
Valuers, Appraisers & Estate Agents Act 1981 and without being
issued with an authority to practice - Whether there was violation of
law in carrying out estate agency practice - Whether business of
unregistered estate agent tainted with illegality
TORT: Defamation - Libel - Action against management corporation

and its committee members concerning publication of two letters -
Absence of specific reference to plaintiff's name in letters - Letters
only mentioned words 'third party' - Innuendo - Whether letters in
their natural and ordinary meaning and/or by way of innuendo was
defamatory of plaintiff - Whether defendant was actuated by malice
when publishing letters - Whether words 'third party' complained of in
letter referred to plaintiff by way of innuendo
TORT: Defamation - Defences - Justification - Imputation that

plaintiff was a dishonest and untruthful person and trouble maker -
Whether defendant was required to prove truth of each and every
imputation - Whether defendant's allegations were true in substance -
Whether defendant was entitled to invoke justification as a complete
defence to claim for damages for libel - Defamation Act 1957, s. 8
TORT: Defamation - Defences - Qualified privilege - Letters issued

by management corporation in response to request by Commissioner
of Building ('COB') to answer to complaint by plaintiff which was
lodged with COB - Whether COB has a duty or interest to find out
whether plaintiff's complaint was valid or otherwise - Whether MC
and its members were obliged and have a moral, social and legal duty
to explain to COB - Whether malice or ill intention proven - Whether
defence of qualified privilege was applicable and accorded protection
to defendants
2
TORT: Defamation - Damages - Public policy - Claim for damages

arising from business activities which were tainted with illegality -
Whether damages ought to be allowed
TORT: Defamation - Defences - Fair comment - Public interest -

Whether words complained of in letters were fair comment on a
matter of public interest - Whether letters issued with legitimate
public interest
[Plaintiff’s claim dismissed with costs.]
Case(s) referred to:

Chew Peng Cheng v. Anthony Teo Tiao Gin [2008] 8 CLJ 418 HC
(refd)
Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461 CA (refd)
Dato’ Annas Khatib Jaafar v. Sharifuddin Mohamed & Ors [2014] 1

LNS 1849 HC (refd)
Dato’ Mohamad Bustaman Abdullah v. Malay Mail Sdn Bhd & Anor
[2014] 2 CLJ 682 HC (refd)
Datuk Husam Musa v. Utusan Melayu (M) Berhad & Ors [2015] 6
CLJ 760 HC (refd)
Dr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad Nawawi & Ors v. Dato’ Seri Haji Ahmad
Said [2015] 7 CLJ 180 CA (refd)
Keluarga Communication Sdn Bhd v. Normala Samsudin & Another

Appeal [2006] 2 CLJ 46 CA (refd)
Lee Chee Aik & Anor v. Siow Moon Yeow [2013] 1 LNS 258 HC (refd)
Merong Mahawangsa Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato’ Shazryl Eskay

Abdullah [2015] 8 CLJ 212 FC (refd)
Ong Thean Chye & Ors v. Tiew Choy Chai & Anor [2011] 1 CLJ 674
CA (refd)
3
P&A Systech Sdn Bhd v. YAB Dato’ Seri Mahdzir Khalid, Menteri
Besar Kedah Darul Aman & Anor [2011] 2 CLJ 318 HC (refd)
Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd v. Lim Guan Eng [2015] 9 CLJ 51 CA (refd)
Legislation referred to:

Building & Common Property (Maintenance & Management) Act
2007, s. 3
Contracts Act 1950, s. 24
Defamation Act 1957, ss. 8, 9
Strata Management Act 2013, ss. 4, 56, 59(1)(i), 153
Strata Titles Act 1985, ss. 2, 4, 15(1), 17, 29, 37(2), 38, 39(1), (4),
(5), 41, 42(1), (2), 43(2)(f), 44(1), (2), (3), (4)(a)(b)(c), (6), (7),
50(1), (2), (3), 55, 64, 64A, Second Schedule, Third Schedule
Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2007

Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2013
Valuers, Appraisers and Estate Agents Act 1981, ss. 2, 16(1),

22(1)(aa), 22A(1), 22B(1a), (2), 22C, 30(1)
Rules of Court 2012, O. 59, r. 7 (4)
Other source(s) referred to:

Gatley on Libel and Slander, Sweet & Maxwell, eleventh edition
Carter-Ruck On Libel and Privacy
Law of Torts in Australia, 2nd Edition 1993, by Francis Trindade

Peter Cane
Management Corporations in Malaysia by Michael J Willis, Sweet &

Maxwell Asia
4
GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT
Plaintiff’s suit
[1] On 13.12.2013, the plaintiff filed this suit through her solicitors,
namely, Messrs. Chan Tse Yuen & Co, vide a writ of summons
dated 13.12.2013 (“the writ”), enclosure (2), and a statement of
claim dated 13.12.2013, enclosure (1), for damages for the tort
of defamation, allegedly, committed by the defendants based on
their, allegedly, defamatory statements contained in 2 (two)
letters.
[2] The 2 (two) letters are as follows:
(1) A letter dated 5.6.2013, to the Pengarah, Jabatan

Bendahari, Pusat Perubatan UKM/Hospital Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia (“HUKM”) (“the 1 st letter”); and
(2) A letter dated 18.9.2013, to the Pesuruhjaya Bangunan

Kuala Lumpur (in Malay or in English the Commissioner
of Buildings) (“COB”), Jabatan Penilaian dan Pengurusan,
Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (“the 2 nd letter”).
Parties in the suit
[3] Mdm. Mok Shook Mooi, the plaintiff, is a business woman. She
has an address for service at unit A-3-I4, Prisma Perdana, Jalan
Midah 8A, Taman Midah, 56000 Kuala Lumpur, which is in
Block A of 3 (three) blocks of condominiums known as the
Prisma Perdana Condominiums (“the PPC”).
[4] Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana, the 1 st defendant, is the

Management Corporation of the PPC (“the MC”), which
5
manages the PPC with the assistance of the 2 nd to the 8 th

defendants.
[5] Wong Kui Man, the 2 nd defendant, is the Secretary of the MC.
[6] Chow Thean Choy, the 3 rd defendant, is the Chairman of the

MC.
[7] Vijiaratnam a/l v. Ratnasingam, the 4 th defendant, is the

Treasurer of the MC cum Building Manager of the PPC.
[8] Cheong Chee Weng, the 5 th defendant; Chong Kok Ming, the 6 th
defendant; Yeow Hoong Wai, the 7 th defendant; and Chew Kooi
Heong, the 8 th defendant; were the committee members of the
MC, at the material time.
Background
[9] The background which led to the plaintiff filing her suit against
the defendants arising from the alleged defamatory statements in
the 2 (two) letters is as follows:
(1) The PPC has 620 units of condominiums (“the units”);
(2) The plaintiff is the sole proprietress of Primas

Management & Services and Primas Interior (“the 2 (two)
firms”). The 2 (two) firms are registered with the Registrar
of Businesses (“RB”) with their office addresses at unit A-
3-14. At all material times, the plaintiff was carrying on
the businesses of the 2 (two) firms by herself;
(3) The plaintiff provided, through Primas Management &

Services, services to property owners to procure tenants
for them and to members of the public to procure
apartments or houses to them for rent. Primas Management
6
& Services had obtained leases of several of the units in

the PPC from their owners and it had sub-leased or rented
out the units concerned to tenants for profit;
(4) At all material times, the main customer of Primas

Management & Services was HUKM. HUKM is
administered by Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
(“UKM”);
(5) Since the year 2004, UKM had entrusted Primas

Management & Services with the task of renting units in
the PPC for the purpose of sub-letting them to the trainee
doctors, medical students, student nurses and personnel of
HUKM;
(6) The plaintiff carried out, through Primas Interior, the

business of interior design and renovation. The plaintiff
had carried out renovation of some of the units, which
were owned by her clients. The renovation involved the
carrying out of wet works, painting, piping and technical
works and also the installation of cabinets, tiles, grill
doors, plaster ceilings, etc;
(7) According to the defendants, the plaintiff was operating

the 2 (two) firms from unit A-3-14, which was a
residential unit, without a licence from Dewan Bandaraya
Kuala Lumpur (“DBKL”);
(8) With regard to the 1 st letter, according to the defendants,

the plaintiff had written a letter, the contents of which
were untrue, to HUKM to inform the latter of numerous
break-ins in or thefts at the PPC but the plaintiff did not
identify herself as the writer of the letter;
7
(9) Subsequently, the MC received a Voucher No. BCR 51719

dated 30.5.2013 (“the Voucher”) together with a CIMB
Islamic cheque No. 014613 dated 30.5.2013 for a sum of
RM 882.94 as payment for 10 water bills totalling a sum
RM 882.94 for 10 units in the PPC;
(10) Upon the advice of its solicitors, the MC returned the

cheque to HUKM together with the 1 st letter. The MC did
this to set the record straight because the MC had not
issued any invoice or statement of account to HUKM for
payment, by HUKM to the MC, of the 10 water bills
totalling a sum RM 882.94 for the 10 units in the PPC;
(11) In the 1 st letter, the MC advised HUKM to exercise care

and caution so as not to be deceived by the fraudulent or
dishonest acts of a 3 rd party, which could confuse HUKM
and cause HUKM to make payment to the MC for water
bills even though the MC did not issue any invoice or
statement of account to HUKM to ask for payment of the
sum of RM 882.94 for water bills to the MC;
(12) According to the plaintiff, she came to know of the 1 st

letter after she was informed of it by the staff of HUKM,
who were the sub-tenants for a number of units in the PPC,
which were sub-let to them by the plaintiff as the chief-
tenant of the units;
(13) According to the plaintiff, even though her name was not
mentioned in the 1 st letter, the defendants are liable to her
for defamation for publishing the 1 st letter to HUKM
because they had made the following defamatory remarks
of and concerning the plaintiff in the 1 st letter by way of
inneundo:
8
“As a note of caution, we wish to bring to your

attention that a third party who purportedly claims to
be management services has been sending
correspondences to your organization of which we
ourselves have no knowledge or dealings with such
actions and we further reiterate that we are not a
party to these transactions.”
“We would sincerely urge you to probe into this

matter seriously and thoroughly to determine the
truth of the subject matter to prevent any fraud and
wrongdoings by any party.”
(14) Hence, the plaintiff sent a letter of demand dated

14.8.2013 (“the 1 st letter of demand”) to the defendants,
through her solicitors, Messrs. Chan Tse Yuen & Co., in
respect of the 1 st letter, to demand, inter alia, for an
unreserved and unqualified apology and an assurance
thenceforth to desist from repeating the publication of
similar words in the 1 st letter;
(15) However, the defendants failed and refused to tender their

apologies to the plaintiff despite the plaintiff’s 1 st letter of
demand in respect of the 1 st letter;
(16) This is because according to the 4 th defendant, he had

issued the 1 st letter for the purpose of returning the
Voucher and the cheque to HUKM, on behalf of the MC,
after he discovered that HUKM had made payment to the
MC although the MC did not issue any invoice or
statement to HUKM for the payment of the sum of RM
882.94;
9
(17) According to the 4 th defendant, the MC and him are not

liable in damages to the plaintiff for writing and sending
the 1 st letter to HUKM even though in the 1 st letter, he had
warned HUKM to be careful of a third party, who may
falsely claim that it was representing the MC in order to
request for payment;
(18) According to the 4 th defendant, this is because the 1 st letter

was not defamatory of the plaintiff as he did not mention
the name of the plaintiff or refer to the plaintiff in the 1 st
letter;
(19) According to the 4 th defendant, he had issued the 1 st letter

to HUKM following the discovery by the MC that a 3 rd
party or an unknown party had, previously, without the
knowledge of the MC, issued a false letter to HUKM to
inform HUKM to be wary of numerous break-ins at the
PPC;
(20) With respect to the 2 nd letter, according to the plaintiff,

Primas Interior had renovated a unit, which was owned by
one Puan Nurul Amilin binti Mohammad @ Awang (“Puan
Nurul”);
(21) According to the plaintiff, she had paid to the MC a sum of

RM 1,000.00 as the deposit for the renovation of Puan
Nurul’s unit (“the renovation deposit”). However, upon the
completion of the renovation of Puan Nurul’s unit, the MC
had refused to refund the deposit to Primas Interior;
(22) Hence, by a letter dated 22.8.2013 (“the plaintiff’s letter of

complaint”) (see pgs. 343-344, CBD (2), Bundle C), the
plaintiff wrote to COB to complain about the unreasonable
action and behavior of the Committee Members of the MC
10
and the 4 th defendant, with regard to the refusal on their

part to refund the deposit to Primas Interior;
(23) By a letter dated 9.9.2013 (see pgs. 380-381, Bundle CBD

(2), Bundle C), COB extended the plaintiff’s letter of
complaint to the MC and requested the MC to respond,
directly, to the plaintiff with a copy to COB for its
information only;
(24) However, the MC responded to COB’s request by writing

and sending, directly, to COB, through the 2 nd defendant in
his capacity as the Secretary of the MC, the 2 nd letter
instead of responding directly to the plaintiff as requested
by COB;
(25) In the 2 nd letter, the 2 nd defendant explained its side of the

dispute by making, inter alia, the 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th and 5 th
alleged defamatory remarks. These are as follows:
a) “… complainant’s letter has been grossly distorted to

mislead the good office of COB.”
b) “… Sherene Mok has been a “trouble maker” …”
c) “… the said Contractor (Prismas Interior) had hidden

… and they are making use of the Proprietor …
deliberately creating a situation whereby deduction
will happen.”
d) “They will instigate the Proprietor to file a complaint

against the Management Corporation.”
e) “… the works carried out by … Prismas Interior have

not conformed with rules and regulations imposed by
the authorities …”
11
(26) At the bottom of the 2 nd letter, it is stated that the letter is

copied to 3 (three) other named parties. They are firstly,
the Datuk Bandar of DBKL; secondly, the Honourable Mr.
Tan Kok Wai, the Member of Parliament for Cheras (“the
MP for Cheras”); and thirdly, Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee Tan
& Associates, Advocates & Solicitors, who were the MC’s
solicitors and legal advisor, at the material time;
(27) According to the plaintiff, the 2 nd letter, which expressly

referred to the plaintiff by her nickname “Sherene Mok”
and which used, the words “trouble maker” to describe the
plaintiff and which also contained the other words and
phrases complained of in the 4 other alleged defamatory
remarks as reproduced above was defamatory of the
plaintiff because of 3 reasons;
(28) Firstly, it was published maliciously by the defendants.

Secondly, the letter referred to her by her nickname
“Sherene Mok”. Thirdly, the letter used the words “trouble
maker” and the other words and phrases as reproduced
above, which were defamatory of her in their natural and
ordinary meanings;
(29) Hence, the plaintiff sent a letter of demand dated

21.10.2013 (“the 2 nd letter of demand”) in respect of the
2 nd letter, to the MC and the 2 nd defendant, who had
written and sent the 2 nd letter to COB, in his capacity as
the Secretary of the MC, through her solicitors, Messrs.
Chan Tse Yuen and Co., to demand, inter alia, for an
unreserved and unqualified apology and an assurance,
thenceforth, to desist from repeating publication of similar
words in the 2 nd letter, and that if the defendants were to
12
take immediate steps to comply with her demands, she

would waive her claims for damages;
(30) However, the MC and the 2 nd defendant failed and refused

to tender their apologies to the plaintiff despite the
plaintiff’s 2 nd letter of demand;
(31) However, according to the MC and the 2 nd defendant, they

are not liable in damages to the plaintiff for the tort of
libel because they were justified in making the statements,
which were not defamatory of and concerning the plaintiff,
as the alleged defamatory statements are true in substance
and fact of and concerning the plaintiff;
(32) According to the MC and the 2 nd defendant, they are also

not liable in damages to the plaintiff for the tort of libel
because the alleged defamatory statements were made on
an occasion which entitles them to be protected by
qualified privilege as they had a duty to make them to
COB and COB had a corresponding interest to receive
them;

because the alleged defamatory statements were fair
comment on a matter of public interest;

because the plaintiff was operating her estate agency
practice illegally as she was not a registered estate agent at
all material times and she was also operating her 2 (two)
firms illegally from a residential unit in the PPC as she
13
was operating them at the residential unit without proper

approval from DBKL and the MC;
(35) Hence, on 13.12.2013, the plaintiff filed the instant suit

against the defendants to claim for the reliefs as endorsed
on the writ and as set out in para. 18 of her statement of
claim in respect of the alleged defamatory remarks in the 2
(two) letters; and
(36) Subsequently, the plaintiff amended and re-amended the

writ (“the re-amended writ”) and the statement of claim
(re-amended statement of claim.
Endorsement on the re-amended writ
[10] It is clear from her endorsement on the re-amended writ that the
plaintiff is suing all the 8 (eight) defendants for the tort of libel
for the publication of the 1 st letter to HUKM but only 2 (two) of
the 8 (eight) defendants, viz the MC and the 2 nd defendant, for
the tort of libel for the publication of the 2 nd letter to COB.
Plaintiff’s claim
[11] In para. 2 of her re-amended statement of claim, the plaintiff

pleaded as follows:
“2) The first defendant (hereinafter referred to as D1) is

a management corporation registered with
Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Kuala Lumpur (hereinafter
referred to as COB) which manages the Prismas
Perdana Condominium. At all material time the 2 nd ,
3 rd , 4 th , 5 th , 6 th , 7 th and the 8 th defendants were the
committee members of D1; while the 2 nd defendant
14
was also the secretary and the 3 rd defendant the

chairman of D1.”
[12] In relation to the 1 st letter, in para.13 of the re-amended

statement of claim, the plaintiff claimed that the contents of the
1 st letter are defamatory of the plaintiff, in particular, the words
and phrases in the two paras. which are reproduced therein. In
para. 13 of her re-amended statement of claim, the plaintiff
pleaded as follows:
“13) And earlier, D2 to D8 had jointly and/or severally

participated, secured, authorized, ratified and/or
caused to be written and published the letter of the
first defendant dated 5.6.2013 to the Pengarah
HUKM (referred to as the letter to HUKM) of and
concerning the plaintiff, the contents of which were
defamatory of the plaintiff, to wit:
“As a note of caution, we wish to bring to

your attention that a third party who
purportedly claims to be management
services has been sending correspondences to
your organization of which we ourselves have
no knowledge or dealings with such actions
and we further reiterate that we are not a
party to these transactions.”
“We would sincerely urge you to probe into

this matter seriously and thoroughly to
determine the truth of the subject matter to
prevent any fraud and wrongdoings by any
party.”
15
(collectively referred to as “the 6 th defamatory

remarks”)”
(Emphasis added).
[13] The plaintiff ascribed the defamatory meaning to those words in

paras. 14, 14 a) to 14 d). In para. 14 of her re-amended
statement of claim, the plaintiff pleaded as follows:
“14) By the words & phrases contained in the 6 th

defamatory remarks which were contained in the
letter to HUKM, in their natural and ordinary
meanings and/or by way of innuendo, imputed and
were understood to impute, amongst other things,
that:
a) The plaintiff was an impostor.
b) The plaintiff was a fraud and a cheat.
c) The plaintiff had committed fraud or

wrongdoings or was inclined to committing
fraud or wrongdoings.
d) The plaintiff was an undesirable element of

the society.”
(Emphasis added).

pleaded that the plaintiff was the chief tenant to several sub-
tenants for a number of units in the PPC, who were the staff of
HUKM. As a result of this, the HUKM staff, who read the letter
to HUKM, knew or were aware that the words complained of in
the two paras. in the 1 st letter referred to the plaintiff, and they
had informed the plaintiff about it. Para. 15 states as follows:
16
“15) Incidentally, the plaintiff was the chief tenant to

several sub-tenants for a number of units in the
Prisma Perdana Condominium, who were the staff of
HUKM. Hence HUKM staff who read the letter to
HUKM knew/aware that the words complained of in
the 6 th defamatory remarks referred to the plaintiff,
and informed the plaintiff about it.”

pleaded as follows:
“16) on 14.8.2013, the plaintiff through her solicitors,

Messrs. Chan Tse Yuen & Co., issued letters of
demand to D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7 and D8, and
demanded, inter alia, for an unreserved and
unqualified apology and an assurance thenceforth to
desist from repeating publication of similar words.”

pleaded as follows:
“17) The plaintiff further indicated that if the defendants

took immediate steps to comply with the demands, she
would consider to waive her claims for damages. But
the first to eight defendants had failed and refused to
tender any apology to the plaintiff. Hence, prompted
the plaintiff to proceed with proceedings in Court.”
[17] In relation to the 2 nd letter, in paras. 3, 3 a) to d) of the re-

amended statement of claim, the plaintiff claimed that the
contents of the 2 nd letter which was issued by the 1 st and 2 nd
defendants to COB, were defamatory of the plaintiff. In para. 3
of her re-amended statement of claim, the plaintiff pleaded as
follows:
17
“3) D1 and D2 had participated, secured, authorized,

ratified and/or caused to be written and published the
letter of the first defendant dated 18.9.2013 to the
Jabatan Penilaian dan Pengurusan (COB) of the
Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (hereinafter
referred to as the letter to COB) of and concerning
the plaintiff, the contents of which were defamatory
of the plaintiff, to wit:
a) “… complainant’s letter has been grossly

distorted to mislead the good office of COB.”
(referred to as the 1 st defamatory remarks)
b) “… Sherene Mok has been a “trouble maker”

…” (referred to as the 2 nd defamatory
remarks).
c) “… the said Contractor (Prismas Interior)

had hidden … and they are making use of the
Proprietor … deliberately creating a
situation whereby deduction will happen.”
(referred to as the 3 rd defamatory remarks).
d) “They will instigate the Proprietor to file a

complaint against the Management
Corporation.” (referred to as the 4 th
defamatory remarks).
e) “… the works carried out by … Prismas

Interior have not conformed with rules and
regulations imposed by the authorities …”
(referred to as the 5 th defamatory remarks).”
(Emphasis added).
18

pleaded as follows:
“4) D1 and D2 also published copies of the letter to the

COB to the Datuk Bandar, Dewan Bandaraya Kuala
Lumpur, the member of parliament of Cheras Tan
Kok Wai, and Chim Yiam Lee Tan & Associates.”
[19] The plaintiff proceeded to ascribe the meanings which the

plaintiff claimed to be defamatory of the plaintiff in paras. 5, 6,
7, 8 and 9 or 10 thereof. In para. 5 of her re-amended statement
of claim, the plaintiff pleaded as follows:
“5) By the words and phrases contained in the 1 st

defamatory remarks, in their natural and ordinary
that:
(a) The plaintiff was a dishonest person.
(b) The plaintiff was untruthful and

untrustworthy.
(c) The plaintiff had intentionally deceived and

misled the COB.”
(Emphasis added).

pleaded as follows:
“6) By the words and phrases contained in the 2 nd

19

that:
(a) The plaintiff was an unruly and quarrelsome

woman.
(b) The plaintiff was a shrew and/or behaved

like a shrew.
(c) The plaintiff was rude and unreasonable.”
(Emphasis added).

pleaded as follows:
“7) By the words and phrases contained in the 3 rd

that:
(a) The plaintiff was dishonest and untruthful.
(b) The plaintiff was unethical.
(c) The plaintiff was a hypocrite.
(d) The plaintiff was a discredited person.”
(Emphasis added).

pleaded as follows:
“8) By the words and phrases contained in the 4 th

20

that:
(a) The plaintiff was indeed a trouble maker.
(b) The plaintiff is an instigator created

misunderstanding/ displeasures of the
proprietor concerned towards D1 defendant
so as to file a complaint with the COB.
(c) The plaintiff had indulged in sharp

practices.”
(Emphasis added).

pleaded as follows:
“9) By the words and phrases contained in the 5 th

that:
(a) The plaintiff was an irresponsible person.
(b) The plaintiff was dishonest.
(c) The plaintiff was not a law abiding citizen.”
(Emphasis added).

pleaded as follows:
21
“10) By the words and phrases contained in the 1 st , 2 nd ,

3 rd , 4 th and the 5 th defamatory remarks, reading as a
whole, in their natural and ordinary meanings and/or
by way of innuendo, imputed and were understood to
impute, amongst other things, that:
(a) The plaintiff was dishonest and untruthful.
(b) The plaintiff was a trouble maker.
(c) The plaintiff was a quarrelsome woman.
(d) The plaintiff was a shrew and/or behaved

like a shrew.
(e) The plaintiff was not a law abiding citizen.
(f) The plaintiff was simply an undesirable

element; hence she was not fit to be received
by the society generally, in particular, the
residents in and within the vicinity of the
Prisma Perdana Condominium.”
(Emphasis added).

pleaded as follows:
“11) On 21.10.2013, the plaintiff through her solicitors,

Messrs. Chan Tse Yuen & Co., issued letters of
demand to the 1 st defendant and 2 nd defendant, who
had signed and published the letter to the COB in his
capacity as the secretary of the 1 st defendant,
demanded, inter alia, for unreserved and unqualified
apology an assurance thenceforth to desist from
repeating publication of similar words.”
22

pleaded as follows:
“12) The plaintiff further indicated that if D1 and D2 took

immediate steps to comply with the demands, she
would waive her claims for damages. But D1 and D2
had failed and refused to tender apology to the
plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff has no alternative but
to proceed with proceedings in Court.”
[27] I noted that in the writ, the plaintiff claimed against the MC and
all the Committee Members, viz the 2 nd to the 7 th defendants, for
damages for the tort of defamation arising from the 1 st letter but
only against the MC and the 2 nd defendant for damages for the
tort of defamation arising from the 2 nd letter.
[28] However, in para. 18 of her re-amended statement of claim, the

plaintiff claims for the following reliefs from the Court against
all and each of the 8 (eight) defendants for the tort of
defamation arising from the alleged defamatory statements in
the 2 (two) letters:
“18. WHEREFORE the plaintiff prays for judgment

against each and every one of the defendants for:
a) general damages;
b) aggravated damages;
c) interest on the judgment sums from the date of filing

of this action to the date of judgment;’
d) interest on the judgment sums from the date of

judgment to the date of realization;
e) costs; and
23
f) such further and/or other relief which the Honourable

Court may deem fit and proper.”
[29] Since there is a clear contradiction between the plaintiff’s claim

as contained in the endorsement of the plaintiff’s claim in the
plaintiff’s writ and in para. 18 of the re-amended statement of
claim and since it is trite law that parties are bound by their
pleadings, the endorsement of the plaintiff’s claim in the
plaintiff’s writ must prevail.
Defendants’ appearance
[30] On 19.12.2013, the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd defendants entered their

appearance vide their undated memorandum of appearance,
enclosure (3), through their current solicitors, namely, Messrs.
K C Yap & Partners.
Defendants’ defence
[31] On 20.1.2014, the 1 st to the 8 th defendants filed their statement

of defence dated 20.1.2014, enclosure (11).
[32] Subsequently, the defendants amended and re-amended their

statement of defence dated 20.1.2014.
[33] In para. 1(a) of their re-re-amended statement of defence re-re-

dated 9.7.2015, the defendants pleaded that the plaintiff, was not
a legal owner of any unit in the PPC, at the material time.
[34] In para. 1(b), the defendants pleaded that the plaintiff had
violated the law by operating an estate agency practice from a
residential unit in the PPC, without proper approval of the
DBKL and the MC, and hence, the defendants pleaded the issue
of illegality against the plaintiff.
24
[35] In para. 1(b), the defendants also pleaded that the plaintiff’s
businesses, viz Primas Management & Services and Primas
Interior, have similar names to the MC, viz Prisma Perdana
Management Corporation or “Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma
Perdana” in Malay (“PPPP”), or names which resemble the name
of the MC, which have a tendency to give a wrong impression
(to others) that the plaintiff’s businesses are authorized or
approved by the MC.
[36] In para. 2(b), the defendants also pleaded that the MC and its
members are under a statutory duty or obligation to manage and
run the PPC properly in the interest of the owners of the units in
the PPC to ensure that the PPC is properly maintained and the
safety and security of its residents and their properties inside the
PPC are well protected;
[37] In their re-re-amended statement of claim, the defendants

admitted writing and sending the 2 (two) letters but they denied
that they have committed the tort of libel against the plaintiff
because the contents of the 2 (two) letters were not defamatory
of the plaintiff.
[38] In the event, that the Court finds that the 2 (two) letters were
defamatory of the plaintiff, the defendants pleaded that they
should not be held liable to the plaintiff for the tort of libel
because they have valid defences against the plaintiff’s suit and
claim, viz the defence of justification under s. 8 of the
Defamation Act 1957, the defence of qualified privilege (under
the common law) and the defence of fair comment under s. 9 of
the Defamation Act 1957.
[39] In relation to the 1 st letter, the defendants’ defences as pleaded

in para. 14(a) onwards in their re-re amended defence are as
follows:
25
(1) In para. 14(a), that the plaintiff did not make full and frank
disclosure as to why the 1 st letter was issued by the
defendants to HUKM. It was only after the plaintiff had
issued the writ against the defendants that the defendants
discovered from one of the documents of the plaintiff (“the
document”) that the plaintiff had defamed the MC by
informing HUKM that there were numerous break-ins at
the PPC, which information was totally untrue;
(2) In paras. 14(b) and 14(c), that based on the plaintiff’s

admission in the document, she had earlier, without the
knowledge and consent of the MC, written to HUKM to
warn HUKM by spreading false information that there
were numerous break-ins in the PPC, even though there
was only one police report of a break-in, which was not
reported to the MC;
(3) In para. 14(b), the 3 rd defendant and the 5 th to the 8 th

defendants also claimed that the plaintiff has no cause of
action against them as the letter was written by the 4 th
defendant alone for the MC and on top of that the 1 st letter
was not defamatory at all;
(4) In para. 14(c), the defendants averred that the 1 st letter did
not mention the name of any party, that the plaintiff was
never mentioned at all in the 1 st letter and that without a
reference to the plaintiff in the 1 st letter, there can be no
defamation (committed by the defendants against the
plaintiff);
(5) In para. 17, the defendants relied on (the defences of) fair
comment and justification;
26
(6) In para. 18, the defendants averred that the 2 (two) letters
are protected by qualified privilege;
(7) In para. 18(b), the 4 th defendant averred that after he

discovered that HUKM was paying or trying to pay for
water and maintenance charges even though no billing was
issued to HUKM by the MC, he was compelled to return
the payment to HUKM after he received no response from
the Accounts Department of HUKM with regard to the
invoice or statement of account allegedly issued by the MC
for payment of the water and maintenance charges to the
MC by HUKM;
(8) In para. 18(d), the MC and the 4 th defendant pleaded that

there was nothing objectionable or defamatory in respect
of the 1 st letter, which had returned the cheque to HUKM
and advised HUKM to be careful or cautious, so as to
prevent losses due to possible fraud by an unknown third
party and this is especially so as the letter did not identify
the third party or name any person at all as the third party;
and
(9) In para. 19(a), the defendants alleged that it was the

plaintiff, who had grudges against the MC and who had
refused to cooperate with the MC and that it was her
refusal to notify the MC of her business activities in
renting several units in the PPC and in sub-letting them out
(to her clients) thereby disregarding the function and role
of the MC and this had compromised the safety and
security of the PPC.
[40] In relation to the 2 nd letter, the defendants pleaded as follows in

their defence to the plaintiff’s suit:
27
(1) In para. 3, that the 2 nd letter was in fact a reply to the

plaintiff’s complaint (letter) to COB that the MC had
apparently delayed or refused to refund the renovation
deposit to the plaintiff, and that the defence of (qualified
privilege) is applicable because the MC, which comes
under the jurisdiction of COB, had a duty to reply to
COB’s letter, and COB had a social, moral and legal duty
or interest to receive a reply from the MC regarding the
complaint made by the plaintiff to COB;
(2) In para. 3(c), the MC and the 2 nd defendant insisted that

the reply to COB was written in good faith, it was not
defamatory and that COB has an interest or duty to know
why the deposit was not refunded;
(3) In para. 3(d), the MC denied that the 2 nd letter was capable
of imputing the defamatory meaning as ascribed by the
plaintiff in paras. 3(a) to 3(b) of the amended statement of
claim. Alternatively, the MC averred that the 2 nd letter was
a reply to COB’s letter and it was issued on an occasion of
qualified privilege and that the 2 nd letter was the result of
the request by COB to respond to the plaintiff’s letter of
complaint and there was no malice or improper motive in
the MC’s reply to COB;
(4) In relation to the 2 nd letter, the defendants also

particularized the plaintiff’s breaches of the in-house rules
in para. (11) as follows:
“11. Particulars of breach or non-compliance of in-house

rules and misconduct or interference of management
of Prisma Perdana Condominium by the plaintiff as
non-owner of condominium, as referred or stated in
28
10(b) above are particularized as follows or include

the following:
i) The plaintiff had carried out renting and sub-

renting of several units of Condominium units,
and she had also carried out renovation works of
apartments, without seeking prior approval or
notifying the 1 st defendant in advance, thereby her
conducts had breached house rules and were
affecting the security or safety of the entire
Condominium, without being informed or notified
by the plaintiff in advance, the 1 st defendant or its
MC had no knowledge of outsiders coming into
and leaving the Condominium when renovation
works were carried out by the plaintiff in respect
of units managed by the plaintiff;
ii) The plaintiff had put up advertisement of her

services on or outside her rented
apartment/condominium unit which was not a
commercial premise, this expose the management
council to breaking or breaching DBKL bye-law
regarding placing of advertisement signboard
without permission or approval of DBKL;
iii) The plaintiff had sub-let certain units to outsiders

especially to nurses of nearby hospital and
retained car parks separately; she then rented out
the car parks of the apartments/condominium
separately. This created problem for the 1 st
defendant’s management council whereby the 1 st
defendant had no knowledge of owners of
vehicles or owners/residents of condominium
29
coming in and out of the Condominium, the

plaintiff even requested the MC to withhold
issuing resident cards to certain car owners and
this interfered with the management of the
condominium and compromised the safety and
security of the Condominium.
iv) The plaintiff had claimed to act for certain

owners of Condominium units without arranging
for the owners themselves to personally call at
the management office to verify or confirm that
the owners had actually appointed the plaintiff to
rent out their units; therefore the MC cannot deal
directly with the plaintiff without actual
confirmation or written instruction by the owners,
tenancy agreements or letters are not sufficient
proof that the plaintiff had actual authority to
manage the units, the house rules of the 1 st
defendant clearly stated that only unit owners can
deal with the MC and not agent or outsider, this
is for security reason.
v) The plaintiff had allowed outside workers to

carry out renovation of certain units under her
care or control, without registering the name of
those workers with the MC and the plaintiff had
also failed to inform the MC of the nature or
extend of renovation works carried out by the
plaintiff, as such, the MC was unable to calculate
the charges or the amount of security bond to be
imposed and also to register and monitor
movement of workers brought into the
condominium by the plaintiff.
30
vi) The plaintiff had written letter to outsiders to

warn them of alleged rampant break ins at Prisma
Perdana Condominium, such letter or notice was
written and sent out by the plaintiff without the
knowledge and approval of the 1 st defendant or its
MC, this in turn had created bad publicity for the
Condominium and affected the value of the
apartments as well.
vii) The plaintiff had on many occasions failed or

refused to meet up with the MC despite letters to
her in order to solve several issues or problems
created by her in the course of her businesses
carried out at Prisma Perdana Condominium in
renting and sub leasing condominiums units
without knowledge or information of the 1 st
defendant which in turn caused difficulties and
problems for the MC in managing and
administering the 3 blocks of condominium.
viii) The plaintiff had also sent out flyers to residents

to attend emergency meeting of owners of Prisma
Perdana Condominium to be held on 27.10.2011
without consent or approval of the MC. Such
conduct by the plaintiff was unreasonable and
creating trouble for the MC. This resulted in the
MC issuing notice to inform the residents or all
owners that there was no such meeting to be held
on 27.10.2011.
The defendants shall refer to the relevant in-house

rules, correspondences, notices, letters to the
plaintiff and other documents to show that the
31
plaintiff had breached in-house rules and had

wrongfully interfered with the management of Prisma
Perdana Condominium, which is the sole function or
monopoly to manage and administer the 1 st defendant
exclusively, and that the plaintiff had also broken
several in house rules as stated above, had no right to
interfere or to run the condominium units under her
control according to her whims and fancies and
without the approval of the MC.”
(5) In para. 12(a), the MC and the 2 nd defendant denied

defaming the plaintiff as the MC’s reply to COB was
issued in the course of administering the PPC, and there
was no malice or improper motive on their part in writing
and sending the 2 nd letter;
(6) In para. 12(d), they averred that it was the plaintiff who
had acted in a hostile and an aggressive manner towards
the MC and in refusing to cooperate with the MC;
(7) In para. 4, the MC and the 2 nd defendant made no

admission that a copy of the 2 nd letter was sent or
delivered to the Honourable Mr. Tan Kok Wai, the MP of
Cheras, and to Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates,
the defendants’ previous solicitors, and in fact denied
extending the 1 st letter to either or both of the third parties.
The MC and the 2 nd defendant averred that the letter was
signed and issued out by the 2 nd defendant as the Secretary
of the MC;
(8) In paras. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the re-re-amended defence, the

defendants categorically denied that the said words
complained of are capable of giving rise to meanings or
implication or innuendo as stated in paras. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9
32
of the plaintiff’s re-amended statement of claim. The

defendants also averred that MC and the 2 nd defendant
regarded the proper meaning of the words complained of in
each of the alleged defamatory statements to be as follows:
(a) “… plaintiff’s letter of complaint lacked full and

frank disclosure” instead of “The plaintiff was a
dishonest person.”, “The plaintiff was untruthful and
untrustworthy.” and “The plaintiff had intentionally
deceived and misled the COB.” for the words
complained of, viz “… complainant’s letter has been
grossly distorted to mislead the good office of COB.”
(the 1 st defamatory remark);
(b) “Sherene Mok is a person giving the MC trouble and

she is not interested in resolving problems with the
MC” instead of “The plaintiff was an unruly and
quarrelsome woman.”; “The plaintiff was a shrew
and/or behaved like a shrew.” and “The plaintiff was
rude and unreasonable.” for the words complained of,
viz “… Sherene Mok has been a “trouble maker” …”
(the 2 nd defamatory remark);
(c) “… the plaintiff was making use of the proprietor of

the units managed by her to cover up her non-
compliance of in-house rules” instead of “The
plaintiff was dishonest and untruthful.”; “The
plaintiff was unethical.”; “The plaintiff was a
hypocrite.” and “The plaintiff was a discredited
person.” for the words complained of, viz “… the
said Contractor (Prismas Interior) had hidden … and
they are making use of the Proprietor … deliberately
33
creating a situation whereby deduction will happen.”

(the 3 rd defamatory remark);
(d) “… if or when the plaintiff could not get her way for
non-compliance of house rules, she would rely or
urge her client to make complaint to the MC for
delay in refund of deposit or deduction of deposit
instead of “The plaintiff was indeed a trouble
maker.”; “The plaintiff is an instigator created
misunderstanding/ displeasures of the proprietor
concerned towards D1 defendant so as to file a
complaint with the COB.” and “The plaintiff had
indulged in sharp practices.” for the words
complained of, viz “They will instigate the Proprietor
to file a complaint against the Management
Corporation.” (the 4 th defamatory remark); and
(e) “… the plaintiff had failed to observe or comply with

in- house rules when carrying out the renovations of
units managed by her especially her failure to notify
the MC in writing of the nature and duration of
renovations resulting in dispute especially deduction
of deposit … instead of “The plaintiff was an
irresponsible person.”; “The plaintiff was
dishonest.”; “The plaintiff was not a law abiding
citizen.” for the words complained of “… the works
carried out by … Prismas Interior have not
conformed with rules and regulations imposed by the
authorities …” (the 5 th defamatory remark).”
(9) In paras. 11(iv), (vii) and (viii), the defendants averred

that the plaintiff had refused to cooperate with the MC
regarding her business activities in leasing several units in
34
the PPC from their owners and subleasing them out to her
clients and her refusal to provide to the MC, proper
information and particulars of the units occupied by her
sub-tenants or clients and her breaches of the in-house
rules, which had resulted in problems faced by the MC
(with the plaintiff) in the management of the PPC,
especially, in the issuance of access cards and car stickers
to the plaintiff’s sub-tenants;
(10) In para. 13(a), the MC and the 2 nd defendant relied on

justification (based on true events as stated in para. 11) as
a defence to any defamation in the 2 nd letter; and
(11) In para. 13(c), the defendants also relied on fair comment

as a defence especially in relation to the plaintiff’s
conduct and they averred that the comment (expressed in
the 2 nd letter) is based on facts, which can be proven, and
that the comment was made without malice and concerning
a matter of public interest.
[41] Hence, the defendants prayed for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s
re-amended writ and re-amended statement of claim with cost by
the Court.
Plaintiff’s reply
[42] The plaintiff filed her reply dated 10.6.2014 to the defendants’
statement of defence.
[43] Subsequently, the plaintiff amended her reply and she filed her
amended reply, which was re-dated 7.11.2014, to the
defendants’ amended statement of defence.
35
[44] Subsequently, the plaintiff re-amended her reply and she filed
her re-amended reply, which was re-dated 20.7.2015, to the
defendants’ re-re-amended statement of defence.
[45] In her re-amended reply, the plaintiff pleads, inter alia, as

follows:
“1) The plaintiff is filing this RE-AMENDED REPLY

without prejudice to her averment that the defence
purportedly filed in Court on 20.1.2014 by Chim
Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates “CYLTA” was void ab
initio in that:
a) CYLTA had in fact been dissolved on

31.10.2013.
b) The plaintiff cannot response to the act of a

“ghost firm” nor the purported defence filed by
a ghost, but is doing so upon insistence of the
learned Judicial Commissioner.
2) The plaintiff joins issue with all the defendants on

their re-amended defence (09.07.20015) save in so
far as the same consists of admissions. All
paragraphs and sub-paragraphs herein were referring
to the re-amended statement of defence of the
defendants.
3) The plaintiff denies that the words complained of

were true. Further, the defendants failed to plead
any material facts with regard to justification.
4) The plaintiff denies that the words complained of

were matters of public interest. The defendants
knew and had reasons to know that the allegations
36
and the words complained of were not true, yet

they had deliberately concocted and published
them in the letter to the COB.
5) It is denied that the words complained of were fair

comments on a matter of public interest.
Conversely the plaintiff avers that the words
complained of were statements of fact and not
comments as alleged by the defendants.
6) Further, when publishing the defamatory remarks

set out in the statement of claim, the defendants
were actuated by malice, inter alia, that:
a) The defendants knew and/or had reasons to

believe that the words complained of were
untrue and/or lacked of honest belief in their
truth.
b) The defendants were reckless without

considering or caring whether the words
complained of were true or not.
c) The defendants had acted without thought of

harms to the plaintiff.
d) The defendants were overzealous in

publishing the words complained of.
e) The defendants were publishing the words

complained of with indirect or improper
motive.
f) The defendants through gross and/or

unreasonable prejudice had allowed their
37
minds to become so obsessed as to cast

reckless, baseless and farfetched aspersions
on the plaintiff.
7) The plaintiff categorically denies the defendants’

allegations in paragraph 3 of the amended defence
and avers that, conversely the defendants were not
being candid and had lied and distorted the truth; in
particular, the COB had directed the defendants to
clarify directly with the plaintiff but, instead, the
defendants had maliciously participated, secured,
authorized, ratified and/or caused to be written and
published the letter to COB and made defamatory
remarks or and concerning the plaintiff.
8) The plaintiff vehemently denies the defendants’

allegations in paragraph 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17
of the re-amended defence, and avers that the
defendants had blatantly lied and/or concocted lies.
8A) The plaintiffs categorically denies sub-paragraph

1(b) and states that the defendants’ farfetched and
baseless allegations further demonstrate the
malice of the defendants, who further made false
complaint with the DBKL alleging the plaintiff
carrying on business activities in the unit, which
the DBKL found out to be untrue after its officers
conducted unannounced prompt investigation. The
address was merely registered address and not
business operation as alleged.
i) Sub-paragraphs 1(c) and 3(b) were utterly

untrue and untenable which further
demonstrated the malice of the defendants.
38
ii) With regard to sub-paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c),

the plaintiff states that the defendants were not
lawfully elected members of the MC.
iii) As regards sub-paragraphs 3(a) and 3(c);

paragraphs 12 and 18(a), the plaintiff
categorically states that defendants were not
truthful; the fact that the defendants published
and/or caused the letter to be published to the
COB demonstrated that the defendants were
malicious in that, the COB had clearly advised
the defendants to answer the plaintiff directly,
instead the defendants wrote/published the letter
to the COB and made the defamatory remarks of
and concerning the plaintiff to the COB.
iv) Paragraph 6 further demonstrated the malice

of the defendants. There was no trouble at all
but it was the defendants who had created
lots of problems and troubles disturbing the
plaintiff.
v) The allegations in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and the

whole of paragraph 11 and sub-paragraph 12(d)
were utterly untrue, and were sheer lies
concocted by the defendants. The plaintiff has
repeatedly requested the defendants to produce
the relevant provisions of the alleged house
rule but the defendants had failed, refused and
could not do so, and even failed to do so up to
the stage of amended defence.
vi) The plaintiff categorically denies all the

contentions in the whole of paragraph 12; and
39
firmly states that she has enjoyed peaceful

life for over 10 years in that condominium
and her life has been spoilt, and reputation
has been damaged by malicious conduct of
the 2 nd , 3 rd and 4 th defendants particularly in
publishing defamatory remarks set out in the
statement of claim.
vii) The plaintiff denies the defendants’ allegations

in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 and states that they
had instead exposed the malice of the
defendants and their misconceived minds with
regards to the facts concerned.
viii) The plaintiff categorically denies the

defendants allegations in paras. 15, 16, 17, 18
and 19 and avers that she has no grudge
whatsoever with anyone, instead, it was the
defendants, in particular the 2 nd , 3 rd and 4 th
defendants who by their hostile conduct in
creating troubles on the plaintiff which
demonstrated their malice towards her.
Further, the plaintiff being the chief tenant
has the absolute rights in subletting any unit
without consent of the defendants. The
moment the plaintiff applies for car access
card/car sticker for the subtenants the
defendants would have knowledge/records of
the subtenants. The letter to HUKM was
clearly understood to be referring to
plaintiff. In this regard the plaintiff shall
adduced evidence during the trial of this action.
40
8B) The plaintiff also categorically denies allegations in

sub-paragraphs 18(b)b, 18(b)c, and 18(b)d and states
that the allegations besides farfetched, baseless, were
concocted by the defendants which demonstrated
malice of the defendants to wit:
i) Sub-paragraphs 18(b)b and 18(b)c were utterly

not true and blatant lies which further
demonstrated the malice of the defendants.
ii) As regards sub-paragraph 18(b)d, the

defendants vide D1’s letter to the Head of Kolej
Tun Dr. Ismail, PPUKM had specifically
identified and named the plaintiff as the third
party. In fact, the D2 and D3 had personally
informed HUKM when they appeared in
HUKM, without invitation, that the plaintiff
was the person the defendants referred to as
third party in the letter to HUKM.
8C) With reference to sub-paragraphs 18(b)b and 18(c),

the plaintiff states that HUKM and the defendants
were total strangers to each other. Hence, the letter
to HUKM clearly demonstrate the malice of the
defendants towards the plaintiff.
9) The plaintiff emphatically states that the words

complained of set out in the statement of claim
clearly referred to the plaintiff, in particular, when
the passage in the letter to the COB and the letter to
HUKM being read as a whole.
10) By reasons of publications of the words

complained of set out in the letter to the COB and
41
the letter to HUKM, the plaintiff has been injured

in her character, credit and reputation and has
been drastically lowered in the estimation of the
right thinking members of the society generally
and hurt in her feelings.
11) Save and except where it is expressly admitted, the

plaintiff denies each and every allegations contained
in the defence as if the same were set forth and
traversed seriatim.”
(Emphasis added).
[46] I noted that in her re-amended reply as reproduced above, the
plaintiff, purportedly, pleaded the particulars of the defendants’
express malice in para. 6, sub-paragraphs (a) to (f).
[47] However, I found that the particulars of express malice pleaded
were bare and too general. This was because no proper particulars
were pleaded by the plaintiff to support her claim of malice on the
part of the defendants in publishing the alleged defamatory
statements to HUKM and to COB. Hence, the plaintiff’s vague
allegations of malice cannot be regarded as actual malice to defeat
the defences of justification, qualified privilege and fair comment
on a matter of public interest, raised and relied upon by the
defendants (see Dr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad Nawawi & Ors v.
Dato’ Seri Haji Ahmad Said [2015] 7 CLJ 180, [2015] 5 MLRA
206 (“Dr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad Nawawi”)).
The agreed facts
[48] The agreed facts as set out in “F”, which was filed by the
plaintiff pursuant to Pre-Trial Case Management directions, are
as follows:
42
(1) The 4 th defendant, acting on behalf of the 1 st defendant,

published and/or caused to be published the 1 st letter to
HUKM (referred to in para. 13 of the re-amended
statement of claim) regarding the alleged wrong payment
of invoice to the 1 st defendant;
(2) The 2 nd defendant, acting on behalf of the 1 st defendant,

published and/or caused to be published the 2 nd letter to
COB (referred to in para. 3 of the re-amended statement of
claim);
(3) The 2 nd letter to COB was of and concerning the plaintiff,

and was the 1 st defendant’s letter of “reply” to COB;
(4) The plaintiff, was at all material times, a resident of the

PPC;
(5) The plaintiff’s husband, namely, Kok Yu Po, was at all

material times, the registered owner of unit A-15-12 in the
PPC; and
(6) The plaintiff was, at all material times, the sole

proprietress of the 2 (two) firms.
The 9 letters
[49] There are 9 letters, which are of particular importance to the

plaintiff’s claim for damages for libel and the defendants’
defences of justification, qualified privilege and fair comment
on a matter of public interest. They are as follows:
(1) The MC’s letter dated 5.6.2013 to the plaintiff regarding

the letter issued by Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee Tan &
Associates (“the MC’s previous solicitors”);
43
(2) The 1 st letter dated 5.6.2013 to HUKM;
(3) Messrs. Chan Tse Yuen & Co.’s letter dated 21.6.2016 to
Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates regarding the
latter’s client’s (MC’s) nonsensical blathers and blatant
lies;
(4) HUKM’s letter dated 19.7.2013 to the 4 th defendant in

reply to the 1 st letter;
(5) Plaintiff’s letter of complaint dated 22.8.2013 to COB

regarding the unreasonable action and behavior of the
Council Members of the MC and the 4 th defendant
concerning the refund of the RM 1,000.00 renovation
deposit;
(6) COB’s letter to the MC dated 9.9.2013 regarding the

unreasonable action and behavior of the Council Members
of the MC and the 4 th defendant concerning the refund of
the RM 1,000.00 renovation deposit;
(7) The 2 nd letter dated 18.9.2013 to COB;
(8) COB’s letter dated 4.6.2014 to Puan Nurul regarding the

dispute between the plaintiff and the MC concerning the
refund of the RM 1,000.00 renovation deposit; and
(9) Plaintiff’s letter dated 10.4.2014 to COB regarding the

unreasonable action and behavior of the Council Members
of the MC and the 4 th defendant concerning the refund of
the RM 1,000.00 renovation deposit.
MC’s letter dated 5.6.2013 to the plaintiff regarding the letter

issued by Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates
44
[50] The MC’s letter dated 5.6.2013 to the plaintiff is reproduced

below.
“Date: 5 th June 2013

Ms. Sherene Mok
A-3-14, Block A
Prisma Perdana Apartment
Jln Midah 8A
Taman Midah, Cheras
56000 Kuala Lumpur
Dear Madam,
Re: Letter issued by Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates
We refer to the above and also our letter dated 28 th May

2013 extending our Invitation to you to attend a meeting
with our council members on Tuesday, 4 th June 2013.
We regret to note that you have failed to attend the

meeting arranged by the council and furthermore you have
not taken the liberty to inform the Council Secretariat
regarding your absence at the meeting.
The Council has decided that in view of your non co-

operation granted to the Management Council, we have
referred this matter to our legal counsel for actions that
are deemed necessary.
Yours faithfully
…(signed)…
(WONG KUI MAN)
Secretary
Cc: Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates
45
No. 1-1-1, Jalan 4/101C

Cheras Business Centre
Batu 5, Jalan Cheras
56100 Kuala Lumpur”
(Emphasis added).
(See p. 232, Bundle C)
The 1 st letter dated 5.6.2013 to HUKM
[51] The 1 st letter is reproduced below.
“Date: 5 th June 2013
Pengarah
Jabatan Bendahari
Pusat Perubatan UKM
Jalan Yaacob Latiff
56000 Cheras, Kuala Lumpur
Dear Sir,
Re: Voucher No. BCR 51719 – for RM 882.94
We refer to the above payment cheque No. 014613 (CIMB

Islamic) dated 30 th May 2013 for RM 882.94 being
settlement of invoices which were not billed to your
organization. The management office takes a serious view
of this payment from the Government Agency and we have
no records whatsoever relating to the real purpose of such
payment.
If you are the legitimate tenant of those units

mentioned in your payment voucher, then you should
46
furnish full particulars of the Tenancy Agreement, with

copies extended to the Management office for record
purposes.
In view of the foregoing, we are returning the abovesaid.
Cheque to your office for your further action deemed

necessary.
Being a responsible Management Corporation

managing the affairs of the property known as Prisma
Perdana, we are duty bound to ensure that whatever
monies received from any sources, including
Government agencies, are properly accounted for and
that we are to ensure that these payments are used for
the right purpose.
We do not wish to be blamed for not exercising due

diligence in collecting such payments without proper
checking. Prudent management is being adopted by us to
protect the interests of the owners as well as the tenants
which in this case we have no knowledge as to the actual
tenants.
As a note of caution, we wish to bring to your attention

that a third party who purportedly claims to be the
management services has been sending correspondences
to your organization of which we ourselves have no
knowledge or dealings with such actions and we further
reiterate that we are not a party to these transactions.
We would sincerely urge you to probe into this matter

seriously and thoroughly to determine the truth of the
subject matter to prevent any fraud and wrongdoings
by any party.
47
Kindly revert to us with our request for additional

details mentioned above.
Thank you.
Yours faithfully
…(signed)…
(VIJAYRATNAM)
Building Manager.
c.c.
Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates
Advocates and Solicitors”
(Emphasis added).
(See pgs. 233-234, Bundle B)
Messrs. Chan Tse Yuen & Co.’s letter dated 21.6.2016 to Messrs.
Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates regarding the latter’s client’s
(MC’s) nonsensical blathers and blatant lies
[52] Messrs. Chan Tse Yuen & Co.’s letter dated 21.6.2016 to
Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates is reproduced below.
“Your ref : CYLT/PPPP-SM/LIT2013

Our ref : CTY-312613-35-SM-mcp
Messrs Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates

Advocates & Solicitors
chimyiam@yahoo.com
Dear Sir,
Re: your client’s nonsensical blathers and blatant lies
48
We act for Shereen Mok (hereinafter referred to as SM)

with regard to your letters to her previous solicitors,
M/s Wai Kuan & Co (WKC), namely:
(a) Your letter to WKC dated 30.5.2013 (your 2 nd letter)

(Note: your 1 st letter dated 3.5.2013 was addressed to
SM directly) and
(b) Your letter to WKC dated 11.6.2013 (your 3 rd letter).
We are instructed that:
(a) SM reiterates her stance in WKC’s letter to you dated

29.5.2013.
(b) To date your so-called registered letter still has NOT

reached SM.
(c) SM takes serious umbrage of your clients’

allegations in your 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd letters (your
clients’ allegations).
(d) It is clear beyond peradventure that your clients’

allegations besides highly mischievous and
irresponsible, were concocted from figment of
their imagination and are gravely misconceived
and indeed, are nonsensical blathers and blatant
lies not worth the salt to merit; yet your clients
have the gall and audacity keep harassing SM.
Such unscrupulous tactics are to be deplored.
(e) Bluntly put, your clients are sheer pugnacious

trouble makers.
We are further instructed that your clients’ are

unlawful occupiers of an unlawful committee and they
49
had committed unlawful misconducts which for reasons

best known to them, they may eventually be the subject
of criminal indictments.
Regards,
…(signed)…
c.c. Madam Shereen Mok”
(Emphasis added).
(See pgs. 254-255, Bundle C)
HUKM’s letter dated 19.7.2013 to the 4 th defendant in reply to the

1 st letter
[53] HUKM’s letter dated 19.7.2013 to the 4 th defendant is

reproduced below.
“En. Vijayratnam a/l v. Ratnasingam

Pengurus Bangunan
Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana
Taman Midah, 56000 Kuala Lumpur
Tuan,
RE: VOUCHER NO. BCR51727 (RM 1197.08) DAN

VOUCHER NO. BCR51719 (RM 882.94), BIL
AFFIDAVIT-IN-REPLY 26/2/2013-26/4/2013
Dengan hormatnya perkara di atas dirujuk dan surat

tuan bertarikh 5 dan 21 Jun 2013 mengenai perkara
yang sama adalah berkaitan.
50
Seperti yang tuan sedia maklum, Universiti Kebangsaan

Malaysia telah menyewa 20 unit rumah di Prisma Perdana
bagi tujuan penempatan pelajar perubatan sejak tahun
2004. Pihak Universiti juga telah membuat bayaran bil
terus kepada Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana sejak
tahun 2004.
Pihak Universiti sebelum ini tidak pernah menghadapi

masalah mengenai cek bayaran bil air yang tidak diketahui
sumbernya seperti yang dinyatakan dalam surat tuan
sehingga pihak Universiti mendapat surat tuan pada 13 dan
28 Jun 2013. Sehubungan itu, bersama-sama surat ini,
dikemukakan semula cek 51718 dan 51727 beserta
salinan dokumen bil air untuk tujuan makluman dan
semakan lanjut di pihak tuan.
Sukacita pihak Universiti mengingatkan tuan bahawa

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia dengan pihak
Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana adalah “pihak
ketiga” antara kedua-duanya. Sepanjang 9 tahun
kebelakangan ini, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
hanya “sub-tenant” kepada Primas Management &
Services (PMS). Oleh yang demikian, segala perkara
tenant “sub-tenancy” antara Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia dengan Prismas Management & Services, sila
berhubung terus dengan pihak Primas Management &
Services.
Sekian dimaklumkan, terima kasih.
“AKAUNTABILITI PEGANGAN KITA”
Yang benar,
…(tandatangan)…
51
RABAIAH BINTI HJ. ARHAM

Ketua Penolong Bendahari Kanan
Jabatan Bendahari
UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA”
(Emphasis added).
(See p. 288, Bundle C)
Plaintiff’s letter of complaint dated 22.8.2013 to COB regarding

the unreasonable action and behavior of the Council Members of
the MC and the 4 th defendant concerning the refund of the RM
1,000.00 renovation deposit
[54] The plaintiff’s letter of complaint dated 22.8.2013 to COB

regarding the unreasonable action and behavior of the Council
Members of the MC and the 4 th defendant concerning the refund
of the RM 1,000.00 renovation deposit is reproduced below.
“Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur

Jabatan Penilaian & Pengurusan Harta
Tingkat 5 Bangunan TH Perdana
1001 Jalan Sultan Ismail
50250 Kuala Lumpur
Peti Surat 11022
22 August 2013
Attn: CIK MARINI BINTI SUHAIMI
Dear Sir,
RE: UNREASONABLE ACTION AND BEHAVIOUR OF
52
1. COUNCIL MEMBER/S OF PERBADANAN

PENGURUSAN PRISMA PERDANA (PPPP)
2. BUILDING MANAGER, MR. VIJIARATNAM
A/L RATNASINGAM
IN REGARD TO REFUND OF RM 1,000.00
DEPOSIT FOR RENOVATIONS WORKS OF NO. C-
10-16, BLOCK C
As per the above subject matter, please find attached

supporting documents and letters which are self-
explanatory.
Please take note that as Management Corporation office
they are not willing to
1. Acknowledge receipt of letter/s which are hand
delivered to them,
2. Nor have the courtesy to reply to the letter/s address
to them,
3. Nor resolve the questions pose to them,
4. Nor refund deposit according to the terms as stated in
the form/s they provide.
Until-to-date, PPPP have NOT clearly indicated the

reason for not refunding the deposited amount.
If there is a justified reason for them to deduct or

forfeit the Deposit, then WHY are they dragging their
feet in clearly stating the reason for withholding the
REFUND!!!
Due to the above, we have no choice but to seek COB’s

assistance in resolving this matter for us, the
Renovation Contractor, as well as for the owner of Unit
C-10-16, Puan Nurul Amilin bt Mohamad.
53
Yours faithfully
…(signed)…
Sherene Mok
Proprietor of Primas Interior”
(Emphasis added).
COB’s letter to the MC dated 9.9.2013 regarding the unreasonable

action and behavior of the Council Members of the MC and the 4 th
defendant concerning the refund of the RM 1,000.00 renovation
deposit
[55] COB’s letter to the MC dated 9.9.2013 is reproduced below.
“Ruj. Kami: ( ) dlm.DBKL/JPPH/2013/COB/COB1307

Tarikh: 9 September 2013
Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana
18 Prisma Perdana Condominium
Jalan Midah 8A
Off Jalan Midah 8
Taman Midah
56000 Kuala Lumpur
Tuan/Puan,
UNREASONABLE ACTION AND BEHAVIOUR OF

1. COUNCIL MEMBER’S OF PERBADANAN
PENGURUSAN PRISMA PERDANA (PPP)
2. BUILDING MANAGER, MR. VIJIARATNAM A/L
RATNASINGAM IN REGARD TO REFUND OF RM
1,000.00 DEPOSIT FOR RENOVATIONS WORKS
OF NO. C-10-16, BLCOK C
54
Dengan segala hormatnya saya diarah merujuk kepada

perkara tersebut di atas.
2. Dimaklumkan bahawa Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Kuala

Lumpur (COB) telah menerima surat aduan daripada
pemilik petak C-10-16, Blcok C, Prisma Perdana
Condominium mengenai ketidakpuasanhati terhadap
pengurusan yang dijalankan di bangunan berkenaan.
Bersama-sama ini dilampirkan surat aduan tersebut
untuk makluman tuan selanjutnya.
3. Sehubungan itu, pihak tuan diminta untuk

memberikan maklumbalas terus kepada pihak pengadu
dan sesalinan ke jabatan ini untuk makluman.
Kerjasama tuan dalam hal ini adalah diharapkan.
Sekian, terima kasih.
“BERKHIDMAT UNTUK NEGARA
“BERSEDIA MENYUMBANG BANDARAYA

CEMERLANG”
Saya yang menurut perintah,

…(signed)…
(MARINI BINTI SUHAIMI)
b.p. Pesuruhjaya Bangunankl
s.k. Puan Sherene Mok

Block A-6-5, Prisma Perdana
Jalan Midan 8A, Taman Midah
Cheras
56000 Kuala Lumpur”
55
(Emphasis added).
The 2 nd letter dated 18.9.2013 to COB
[56] The 2 nd letter is reproduced below.
“Date: 18 th September 2013
DEWAN BANDARAYA KUALA LUMPUR

Jabatan Penilaian dan Pengurusan Harta
Tingkat 5, Bangunan TH Perdana
50250 Kuala Lumpur
(Att: Puan. Marini binti Suhaimi)
Dear Madam,
RE: UNREASONABLE ACTION AND BEHAVIOR OF

(1) COUNCIL MEMBERS OF PERBADANAN
PENGURUSAN PRISMA PERDANA
(2) BUILDING MANAGER, MR. VIJIARATNAM
A/L RATNASINGAM IN REGARD TO
REFUND OF RM 1,000 DEPOSIT FOR
RENOVATION WORKS OF NO C-10-16
BLOCK C
We refer to your letter dated 9 th September 2013 (Ref:

(16) dlm DBKL/JPPH/2013/COB/COB1307) on the
above subject.
We wish to inform COB as follows:-
56
(1) The Management Office has written to the Owner

of C-10-16 highlighting the breach of the
Contractor and the reasons for the deduction of
the deposit. The owner is fully aware of the
reasons and we believe she has communicated the
same to the Contractor concerned.
(2) The Management Office is agreeable to refund

only RM 400 to the owner due to the breach and
violation of house rules on Renovations within the
compound.
(3) However we have yet to obtain the consent from

the owner agreeing to the said refund.
(4) The complainant, Prismas Interior being a

contractor has no locus standi in this matter.
(5) More so, the Strata Titles Act 318 clearly spells
out that we (the Management Corporation) are
answerable to the Properties.
Further, we wish to reiterate that the complainant has

directed her complaint to the Building Manager who is
carrying his duty based on the directives and decisions
arrived at during our Council Meetings. In fact this subject
matter was discussed in council meetings and minutes of
which are recorded. Kindly note that the facts as
presented in the complainant’s letter have been grossly
distorted to mislead the good office of COB.
We also wish to emphasize that this so called

complainant, by the name of Sherene Mok has been a
“trouble maker” and she is not even a Proprietor.
57
Even if she is a Proprietor, she has no grounds to lodge

any complaint as she was fully aware of the breach and
violation of house rules except that she chose not to accept
the reasons given by the Management Office. (Note: This
so called complainant was present at the Meeting called
by COB on 31 st July 2013 wherein she was requested to
leave the Meeting Room as she was not a Proprietor and
as such her presence and her motives were very
doubtful. This was the opinion expressed by your Legal
Officer that her presence was not in order).
Please note that all contractors doing renovation works in

Prisma Perdana Apartment are to comply with house rules
and they should not dictate terms to the Management
Corporation.
We wish to inform you that we have refunded the

deposits to all our contractors who complied with house
rules. This is the case where we have reasons to believe
that the said Contractor (Prismas Interior) has hidden
agenda and/or vested interest and they are making use
of the Proprietor and in the process, deliberately
creating a situation whereby deduction will happen.
They will then instigate the Proprietor to file a

complaint against the Management Corporation.
We also wish to highlight to the COB that the works

carried by this so called contractor, Prismas Interior
have not conformed with rules and regulations imposed
by the authorities. Should the COB feel otherwise, then
we wish to suggest that you give the necessary approval
for any renovation works to be carried out at our place.
COB or DBKL may impose a fine if the Contractor fails
58
to abide by the Building Bye Laws and other local

authority’s requirements.
We hope that our explanations mentioned above are

sufficient to clear all doubts over the complaint.
Thank you.
Yours faithfully
…(signed)…
(WONG KUI MAN)
Secretary
C.C
(1) Datuk Bandar, Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur
(2) YB Tan Kok Wai, Member of Parliament for Cheras
(3) Chim Yiam Lee Tan & Associates, Advocates and
Solicitors”
(Emphasis added).
COB’s letter dated 4.6.2014 to Puan Nurul regarding the dispute

between the plaintiff and the MC concerning the refund of the RM
[57] COB’s letter dated 4.6.2014 to Puan Nurul regarding the refund
of the RM 1,000.00 renovation deposit is reproduced below.
“Ruj. Kami: ( )DBKL/JPPH/COB/1307

Puan Nurul Amilin bt. Mohamad
C-10-16, Prisma Perdana Apartment
Jalan Midah 8A, Off Jalan Midah 8
59
Taman Midah, Cheras

56000 Kuala Lumpur
Puan,
REFUND OF RM 1,000 DEPOSIT FOR RENOVATION

OF C-10-16, PRISMA PERDANA
Dengan hormatnya saya merujuk mengenai perkara di atas.

2. Dimaklumkan pihak Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Kuala
Lumpur (COB) telah menerima aduan daripada pihak
kontraktor yang dilantik oleh pihak Puan iaitu Primas
Interior (Puan Sherene Mok) mengenai wang deposit RM
1,000 yang dibayar kepada pihak Perbadanan Pengurusan
(MC) Prisma Perdana bagi tujuan pengubahsuaian unit
rumah puan.
3. Untuk makluman puan, pihak MC memaklumkan

kontraktor yang dilantik telah melanggar syarat
perjanjian semasa kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut
dijalankan. Walau bagaimanapun, pihak MC ada
mengemukakan cadangan bagi memulangkan hanya
RM 400 sahaja daripada kepada pihak puan namun
sehingga kini tiada tindakan yang diambil oleh pihak
puan berhubung cadangan tersebut menyebabkan
deposit tersebut tidak dapat dipulangkan.
4. Sehubungan itu, pihak puan dinasihatkan untuk

berhubung terus dengan pihak MC tanpa melalui
kontraktor yang dilantik oleh pihak puan bagi mencari
jalan penyelesaian yang sewajarnya. Pihak COB tidak
mempunyai kuasa dalam menyelesaikan masalah ini
memandangkan masalah ini merupakan masalah
dalaman dan boleh diselesaikan secara rundingan.
60
5. Dikemukakan perkara di atas untuk maklum dan

tindakan pihak puan selanjutnya.
Sekian, terima kasih.
“BERKHIDMAT UNTUK NEGARA”

“BERSEDIA MENYUMBANG, BANDAR RAYA
CEMERLANG”
Saya yang menurut perintah,

…(tandatangan)…
(MOHD SAIFUL YAZID BIN BASRI)
Jabatan Penilaian dan Pengurusan Harta
b.p. Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Kuala Lumpur
s.k. Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana
18, Prisma Perdana Condominium
Taman Midah
56000 Kuala Lumpur
Sukacita pihak MC dapat berhubung terus dengan
pemilik bagi menyelesaikan masalah tersebut
secara rundingan.
Puan Sherene Mok
A-15-12, Prisma Perdana Apartment
Taman Midah
56000 Kuala Lumpur
Surat puan bertarikh 10 April 2014 adalah
dirujuk.”
(Emphasis added).
61
Plaintiff’s letter dated 10.4.2014 to COB regarding the

unreasonable action and behavior of the Council Members of the
MC and the 4 th defendant concerning the refund of the RM
[58] The plaintiff’s letter dated 10.4.2014 to COB on the

unreasonable action and behavior of the Council Members of the
MC and the 4 th defendant in regard to refund of the RM 1,000.00
renovation deposit is reproduced below.
“Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur

Tingkat 5, Bangunan TH Perdana
50250 Kuala Lumpur
Peti Surat 11022
10 April 2014
ATTN: EN. MOHD SAIFUL YAZID BIN BASRI
Dear Sirs
RE: UNREASONABLE ACTION AND BEHAVIOUR OF

1. COUNCIL MEMBER/S OF PERBADANAN
PENGURUSAN PRISMA PERDANA (PPP)
2. BUILDING MANAGER, MR. VIJIARATNAM A/L
RATNASINGAM
IN REGARD TO REFUND OF RM 1,000.00 DEPOSIT FOR
RENOVATIONS WORKS OF NO. C-10-16, BLOCK C
As per the above subject matter, my letter to PPPP on

15.08.2013, my letter to COB on 22.08.2013 and COB’s
letter to me on 17.10.2013 accompanied by PPPP’s
letter to COB on 18.09.2013 as well as these other
supporting documents (emails, receipts, PPPP’s forms
62
issued by PPPP & police report/s) and letters which are

self-explanatory.
I would like to direct your kind attention to PPPP’s

letter dated 18.09.2013 which was addressed to COB
and in turn, redirected to me by COB for my attention.
M 012-386 3070 (Sherene) M 012-406 3070 (Tommy)

primasinterior@hotmail.com
A Block A-6-5, Prisma Perdana, Jalan Midah 8A,

Taman Midah, Cheras, 56000 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
1 st and foremost, I would like to state that the

18.09.2013 letter by PPPP besides being defamatory on
me it is also FULL OF LIES and that is WHY they
purposely chose to reply to COB without cc me (never
realizing that COB would be forwarding me their
reply); and not according to COB’s directive in two of
COB’s letter to them (PPPP) to reply directly to me on
my complaint and cc COB.
I would like to point out that point (1) to point (4) in their
said letters are complete LIES as they have never bothered
to inform the owner of unit C-10-16 and to quote PPPP if
“Prismas Interior being a contractor has no locus standi in
this matter” then why do they insist that Primas Interior as
the contractor filled in PPPP’s issued form and pay the RM
1,000.00 deposit (however, PPPP refused to issue the
receipt under Primas Interior and instead issued the receipt
for the RM 1,000.00 deposit under the previous owner’s
name and not even under the new (current) owner’s, even
though, PPPP was at all times aware that the property had
change hands and the new owner was awaiting MOT). As
63
to point (5), if they really mean that they (PPPP) are

answerable to the Proprietors, then why are they ignoring
the owner of Unit C-10-16, Puan Nurul Amilin bt
Mohamad.
Looking at the whole situation now, there appears to be

an intention to cheat by PPPP’s current “council
members” together with Mr. Vijayaratnam the Building
Manager.
Throughout the whole letter PPPP’s “secretary”, Mr. Wong

Kui Man evaded in giving any specific breach and
violation of house rules on Renovation within the
compound. The only reason that can be derived or
concluded from such evasiveness from Wong Kui Man is
that there was never any breach or violation because if
there was any he would have clearly stated in instead of
generalizing the house rules.
As for the rest of contents of their letter, I again

stressed that they are full of defamatory remarks which
are included to draw or divert the attention away from
the actual complaint against them and that is “NOT
REFUNDING THE CONTRACTOR DEPOSIT” and not
being able to provide a valid reason for their deception.
Please take note again that as a Management Corporation

office, they were not willing to
1. acknowledge receipt of letter/s which were hand

delivered to them,
2. nor have the courtesy to reply to the letter/s address

to them,
64
3. nor provide photocopy of letter/s which they claimed

that they had sent out, but not received by the owner
of Unit C-10-16, Puan Nurul Amilin bt Mohamad,
4. nor resolve the questions pose to them,
5. nor refund deposit according to the terms as stated in
the form/s they provide.
M 012-386 3070 (Sherene) M 012-406 3070 (Tommy)

primasinterior@hotmail.com
A Block A-6-5, Prisma Perdana, Jalan Midah 8A,
Taman Midah, Cheras, 56000 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Until to-date, PPPP have NOT clearly indicated the
reason for not refunding the deposited amount.
If there is a justified reason for them to deduct or forfeit
the Deposit, then WHY are they dragging their feet in
clearly stating the specific reason for withholding the
REFUND!!!
Due to the above, we have no choice but to seek COB’s
assistance in resolving this matter for us, the Renovation
Contractor, as well as for the owner of Unit C-10-16, Puan
Nurul Amilin bt Mohamad.
Kindly let us know what is our next course of action.
Yours faithfully
…(signed)…
Sherene Mok
Proprietor of Primas Interior”
(Emphasis added).
65
The full trial
[59] The full trial commenced on 3.8.2015 but the Court ordered the
case to be heard de novo on the same day. This occurred after
the plaintiff’s first witness (PW1) had completed her
examination-in-chief and she was being cross-examined by Mr.
Low Peck Lim, the learned counsel for the defendants. This is
because the Court found that there were many documents in the
Bundles of Documents which were filed twice. Hence, the trial
was taking a long time as the witness was being asked to
identify both sets of documents. Therefore, the Court directed
the parties to refile the documents in the Bundles of Documents
to prevent duplication.
[60] The Court then set the case down for full trial on 18.8.2015.
However, on that date the full trial could not commence because
there were many errors in the witness statement of the plaintiff’s
sole witness, which needed to be corrected.
[61] The full trial finally commenced afresh on 20.8.2015.
[62] In the full trial, the parties called nine (9) witnesses altogether.
Plaintiff’s 6 (six) witnesses
[63] The plaintiff called 6 (six) witnesses. They are as follows:
(1) Mdm. Mok Shook Mooi, the plaintiff herself, as PW1;
(2) Puan Hamidah binti Abdul Hamid (“Puan Hamidah”), the

Assistant Hostel Manager of UKM, as PW2;
(3) Puan Asmahira binti Abdullah (“Puan Asmahira”), the

Finance Executive of Zon Kewangan Kampus Cheras,
Jabatan Bendahari HUKM, as PW3;
66
(4) Puan Nurul Amilin binti Mohammad @ Awang (“Puan

Nurul”), the owner of unit C-10-16 in the PPC, as PW4;
(5) Mr. Sii Lik Sii (“Mr. Sii”), a tiling contractor, as PW5;
and
(6) Mr. Ng Choon Hua (“Mr. Ng”), the father of Ng Boon

Ping, the owner of unit C-09-05 in the PPC, which was
rented by the plaintiff, as PW6.
[64] On 20.8.2015, the plaintiff’s first witness (PW1) testified vide a

revised witness statement, enclosure (167), (P1), for her
examination-in-chief. PW1 was then cross-examined by Mr.
Low Peck Lim, the learned counsel for the defendants.
[65] The trial was continued on 17.9.2015. On that day, PW1 was
cross-examined by Mr. D. M. Rao and Mr. Low Peck Lim, the
learned counsels for the defendants.
[66] The trial was continued on 23.9.2015. On that day, PW1 was
cross-examined by Mr. D. M. Rao, the learned counsel for the
defendants.
[67] The trial was adjourned to 25.9.2015 for continuation but on that
date Mr. Chan Tse Yuen, the learned counsel for the plaintiff,
was unwell. So the trial was postponed to 26 and 27.10.2015 for
continuation.
[68] On 26.10.2015, Mr. D. M. Rao, the learned counsel for the

defendants, continued his cross-examination of PW1. PW1 was
then re-examined by Mr. Chan Tse Yuan, the learned counsel for
the defendants. The plaintiff’s 2 nd witness (PW2) then gave
evidence for her examination-in-chief vide a witness statement,
enclosure (164) (P2). PW2 was cross-examined by Mr. Low
67
Peck Lim. PW2 was not re-examined by Mr. Chan Tse Yuen, the
learned counsel for the plaintiff.
[69] The plaintiff’s 3 rd witness (PW3) gave her evidence for her
examination-in-chief vide a witness statement, enclosure (163)
(P3). PW2 was cross-examined by Mr. Low Peck Lim. PW3 was
re-examined by Mr. Chan Tse Yuen, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff.
[70] The plaintiff’s 4 th witness (PW4) gave her evidence for her
(P4). PW2 was cross-examined by Mr. Low Peck Lim. PW3 was
re-examined by Mr. Chan Tse Yuen, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff.
[71] The plaintiff’s 5 th witness (PW5) gave his evidence for his
(P4). The plaintiff could not call his 6 th and last witness on that
day because his daughter was unwell.
[72] The trial was then adjourned to 13.1.2016 because I had a

medical appointment at the General Hospital, Ipoh on
27.10.2015. The trial was continued on 13.1.2016.
[73] On 13.1.2016, the plaintiff’s 6 th and last witness (PW6) testified

orally in answer to the questions, which were posed to him by
Mr. Chan Tse Yuen, the learned counsel for the plaintiff from
the List of Questions, which was filed pursuant to Case
Management Directions given by the Court. PW6 was cross-
examined by Mr. Low Peck Lim, the learned counsel for the
defendants. PW6 was not re-examined by Mr. Chan Tse Yuen,
the learned counsel for the plaintiff.
[74] The plaintiff then closed her case.
68
Defendants’ 3 (three) witnesses
[75] The defendant called 3 (three) witnesses. They are as follows:
(1) Mr. Wong Kui Man, the 2 nd defendant himself, who was
the Secretary of the MC, at the material time, as DW1;
(2) Mr. Chow Thean Choy, the 3 rd defendant himself, who was
the Chairman of the MC, at the material time, as DW2; and
(3) Mr. Vijaratnam a/l v. Ratnasingam, the 4 th defendant

himself, who was the Treasurer of the MC cum Building
Manager of the PPC at the material time, as DW3.
[76] On 13.1.2016, the defendants called their 1 st witness (DW1).

DW1 wished to give his evidence for his examination-in-chief
vide a revised witness statement. However, the Court had to
direct him to step out of the witness box after he was affirmed.
This was because he could not hear what was asked of him by
the Court or by Mr. Low Peck Lim, the learned counsel for the
defendants. This had occurred even though, prior to that date,
the Court had already advised him to get his hearing tested and
to get hearing aids if he has a hearing problem, but he did not do
so.
[77] The defendants then called their 2 nd witness (DW2). DW2 gave
his evidence for his examination-in-chief vide a revised witness
statement, enclosure (137) (the 5 th defendant). He was then
cross-examined by Mr. Chan Tse Yuen. The trial was then
adjourned to the next day, 14.1.2016 for continuation.
[78] On 14.1.2016, Mr. Chan Tse Yuen continued his cross-

examination of DW2. DW2 was then re-examined by Mr. Low
Peck Lim. DW1 was then recalled to give his evidence. This
time around DW1 had obtained his hearing aids and he was able
69
to hear questions which were posed to him by the Court and by

the defendants’ learned counsel.
[79] DW1 gave his evidence for his examination-in-chief vide a

revised witness statement, enclosure (210) (the 6 th defendant).
He was then cross-examined by Mr. Chan Tse Yuen. DW1 was
not re-examined by Mr. Low Peck Lim, the defendants’ learned
counsel.
[80] The defendants then called their 3 rd witness (DW3). DW3 gave
his evidence for his examination-in-chief vide a revised witness
statement, enclosure (131) (the 7 th defendant). He was then
cross-examined by Mr. Chan Tse Yuen. DW3 was then re-
examined by Mr. Low Peck Lim, the defendants’ learned
counsel.
[81] The defendants then closed their case.
Court’s directions
[82] The Court then gave directions to both parties to put in their
written submissions and bundles of authorities. The trial was
then adjourned to 3.3.2016 for clarification and/or decision.
[83] On 3.3.2016, the parties made further submissions in response to

queries posed to them by the Court. The Court then adjourned
the case to 29.3.2016 to deliver its decision. The date was,
subsequently, changed to 10.5.2016.
Plaintiff’s submissions
[84] The plaintiff submitted, inter alia, as follows:
70
(1) The plaintiff has succeeded in proving, on a balance of

probabilities, that the defendants had, falsely and
maliciously, published the 2 (two) letters, viz the 1 st letter
to HUKM and the 2 nd letter to COB;
(2) The 2 (two) letters contained the words complained of,

which are defamatory, and which are defamatory of and
concerning the plaintiff; and
(3) The defendants have failed to prove, on a balance of

probabilities, their defences of justification, fair comment
on a matter of public interest and qualified privilege.
[85] Hence, the plaintiff prayed that the Court allows the plaintiff’s
suit and claims with cost.
Defendants’ submissions
[86] The defendants submitted, inter alia, as follows:
(1) that the defendants have proven, on a balance of

probabilities, that the 2 (two) letters, which were published
to HUKM and COB, respectively, are not defamatory of
and concerning the plaintiff;
(2) In the event the Court finds otherwise, the defendants have
succeeded in proving, on a balance of probabilities, their
defences of justification, viz that the words complained of
were true in substance and fact; that the words complained
of were published to HUKM and COB, respectively, on
two occasions of qualified privilege; and that the words
complained of were fair comment on a matter of public
interest; and
71
(3) The plaintiff’s suit should also be dismissed based on

public policy on the ground of illegality as the plaintiff
was not a registered estate agent at all material times; the
plaintiff was operating the businesses of her 2 (two) firms
illegally from the residential unit in the PPC; and the
alleged defamatory remarks had arisen out of the
plaintiff’s illegal business activities.
[87] Hence, the defendants prayed that the Court dismisses the
plaintiff’s suit and claims for damages for libel with cost.
Decision of the Court
[88] On 10.5.2016, the Court decided in favour of the defendants.

The Court was satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to prove her
suit and claims for the tort of libel against the defendants on a
balance of probabilities. The Court ordered the plaintiff’s suit
and claims dismissed with cost.
[89] Mr. Low Peck Lim, the learned counsel for the defendants, then
proposed a sum of RM 100,000.00 as the cost of the action as
many witnesses were called during the trial.
[90] Ms. Lee Siew Lin, the learned counsel for the plaintiff counter-
proposed a sum of RM 10,000.00 as her client’s husband, viz,
the plaintiff’s husband, is a cancer patient. Furthermore, due to
the problems related to this case, the plaintiff is unable to sub-
let out the units in the PPC, which she has rented from the unit
owners.
[91] Mr. Low Peck Lim, the learned counsel for the defendants, then
proposed a sum of RM 70,000.00 as the cost of the action.
Nevertheless, he left it to the discretion of the Court.
72
[92] After hearing and considering the proposals of both the learned
counsels on the amount of cost to be ordered by the Court
against the plaintiff, and the reasons given by them, in particular
the submissions of the plaintiff’s learned counsel concerning the
hardship that the plaintiff is experiencing due to her husband’s
cancer illness, the Court ordered the plaintiff to pay to the
defendants a sum of RM 40,000.00 as the cost of the action.
[93] The Court further ordered that the allocator certificate shall be
issued by the Senior Assistant Registrar in accordance with O
59, r 7 (4) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“RC 2012”). The Court
finally ordered that the allocator fee must be paid before the fair
copy of the Order made that day could be filed in Court.
Reasons for the decision of the Court
[94] Below are the reasons why the Court decided in that manner.
Law on defamation
[95] The law of defamation mainly concerns two torts, viz the tort of
libel and the tort of slander. In the instant case, as the words
complained of are contained in the 2 (two) letters, which are in
writing, the tort, allegedly, committed by the defendants is the
tort of libel.
[96] Unlike the tort of slander, the tort of libel is a tort of strict
liability. It is actionable per se without the necessity of proving
damage.
[97] The tort of defamation protects a person’s reputation. A person’s

reputation is not his own good opinion about himself but what
others think of him.
73
[98] The essence of the tort of defamation is the publication of

matter, usually words, which are untrue and which convey a
defamatory imputation. The core damage compensable in
defamation is that of reputation although this includes injury to
feelings and consequential loss of a financial nature.
[99] Before the Court can determine whether the words complained
of are defamatory of the plaintiff, the Court has first to decide
on what is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words.
Having done that, the Court has to decide whether that meaning
is defamatory and also whether that meaning is defamatory of
and concerning the plaintiff.
[100] In order to do that, the Court has to apply 3 (three) formulae,

which have been particularly influential, and decide whether the
imputation in the words complained of have the tendency to
lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members
of society generally or whether the imputation in the words
complained have resulted in the plaintiff being shunned or
avoided by right-thinking members of society generally or the
words complained of have exposed him to hatred, contempt or
ridicule by right-thinking members of society generally. What is
important is that the words must have the tendency to injure the
plaintiff’s reputation (see Gatley on Libel and Slander, Sweet
& Maxwell, eleventh edition).
[101] Hence, it is trite law that in order for the plaintiff to succeed in
her claim for damages for the tort of defamation against the MC
and the 4 th defendant with regard to the 1 st letter and against all
the 8 (eight) defendants with regard to the 2 nd letter, the plaintiff
must prove the following three essential ingredients of the tort:
(1) The words complained of are defamatory;
74
(2) The words complained of were published to a third party;

and
(3) The words complained of were defamatory of and

concerning the plaintiff.
[102] In Datuk Husam Musa v. Utusan Melayu (M) Berhad & Ors
[2015] 4 MLRH 634, the High Court stated as follows on the
issue whether the words complained of, in their natural and
ordinary meaning, are capable of bearing the imputations
ascribed to them by the plaintiff and whether they are in fact
defamatory of the plaintiff at pgs. 643-647:
“Whether The Words Complained Of, In Their Natural

And Ordinary Meaning, Are Capable Of Bearing The
Imputations Ascribed To Them By The Plaintiff And
Whether They Are In Fact Defamatory Of Him?
[51] What is the law?
[52] In Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press Bhd [1998] 2

MLRA 287, at pp 288-289, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later
FCJ) speaking for the Court of Appeal postulated the
following two-staged approach in evaluating the
words complained of:
“The appellant took umbrage over the article.

In his statement of claim, he alleged that the
natural and ordinary meaning of the words in
the offending article meant or were understood
to mean inter alia, that he the appellant was a
cheat and that he was guilty of issuing false
statements to the press with the intention of
gaining popularity. Or, as his counsel put it in
argument before us, the article conveyed the
75
meaning that the appellant was untrustworthy

...
It cannot, I think, be doubted that the first task

of a court in an action for defamation is to
determine whether the words complained of are
capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. And it
is beyond argument that this is in essence a
question of law that turns upon the construction
of the words published. As Lord Morris put it in
Jones v. Skelton [1963] 3 ALL ER 952 at p 958:
The ordinary and natural meaning of the

words may be either the literal meaning or
it may be implied or inferred or an
indirect meaning; any meaning that does
not require the support of extrinsic facts
passing beyond general knowledge but is
a meaning which is capable of being
detected in the language used can be part
of the ordinary and natural meaning of the
words (see Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd
[1963] 2 All ER 151) The ordinary and
natural meaning may therefore include
any implication or inference which a
reasonable reader guided not by any
special but only general knowledge and
not fettered by any strict legal rules of
construction, would draw from the words.
The test of reasonableness guides and
directs the court in its function of
deciding whether it is open to a jury in
any particular case to hold that reasonable
76
persons would understand the words

complained of in a defamatory sense.
In my judgment, the test which is to be applied

lies in the question: do the words published in
their natural and ordinary meaning impute to
the plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable
conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his
part? If the question invites an affirmative
response, then the words complained of are
defamatory …
The article in the present instance when read as

a whole clearly suggests that the appellant is a
person who, under the guise of doing service,
was in fact making false statements in order to
deceive the people of Lukut. The implication is
that the appellant is a man given to deception
and is untrustworthy. I think that there can be
no doubt that to say of a man that he is a cheat
and a liar is a serious defamation of him. It has
the effect of lowering the appellant in the
estimation of right-thinking members of society
generally. It follows that the learned judge in
the present case clearly fell into error when he
held that the words complained of were not
defamatory of the appellant.
Having decided whether the words complained

of are capable of bearing a defamatory
meaning, the next step in the inquiry is for the
court to ascertain whether the words
complained of are in fact defamatory. This is a
77
question of fact dependent upon the

circumstances of a particular case.”
[53] In Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya’kub v.

Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 4 MLRH 877, Richard
Malanjum J (later JCA, FCJ and CJSS) having
referred to the full text of the impugned article
therein as, inter alia, “the words complained of”
expressed in clearer terms the two-staged approach to
the construction of the impugned article as follows at
p 880:
“Thus, in determining on the question of

liability, there are four issues which I must
address to in my mind. And the first issue to be
considered is:
(a) whether the words complained of, in their

natural and ordinary meaning, bear the
meaning ascribed to by the plaintiff and
are defamatory of him.
A(i) Issue (a) …
On issue (a), it is one of construction of the

words complained of and at the same time to
determine if they were capable of and in fact
defamatory of the plaintiff.”
[54] The above legal principle was succinctly stated by

the Privy Council in Jones v. Skelton [1963] 3 All ER
952, at p 958, wherein Lord Morris of Borthy-Gest,
in giving the judgment of the Board, and in holding
78
that the words complained of therein were incapable

of being defamatory stated as follows:
“It is well settled that the question whether

words which are complained of are capable of
conveying a defamatory meaning is a question
of law and is therefore one calling for decision
by the court. If the words are so capable then it
is a question for the jury to decide whether the
words do in fact convey a defamatory meaning.
In deciding whether the words are capable of
conveying a defamatory meaning the court will
reject those meanings which can only emerge as
the product of some strained or forced or
utterly unreasonable interpretation.”
[55] In Datuk Husam Musa v. The New Straits Times

Press (M) Bhd & Ors [2013] MLRHU 728, which
concerned an article in the New Straits Times
entitled “Husam: They go or I’ll quit, Nik Aziz won’t
allow blue eyed to resign if he wishes” which
concerned the same subject matter as in the
impugned report in the instant case, Lee Heng
Cheong JC (now J), in holding that the words
complained of therein were incapable of giving rise
to the defamatory imputations relied on by the
plaintiff (which incidentally are identical to the
imputations relied on in the statement of claim in the
instant case) stated as follows:
“(v) The issue of whether the words

complained of, in their natural and
ordinary meaning, are defamatory of the
79
plaintiff, is an issue of construction, not

evidence. Since the plaintiff relies only
on the natural and ordinary meaning as no
innuendo is pleaded, the relevant words
must be construed in their ordinary and
natural meaning.
(xv) Thus this court finds that the words

complained of in the New Straits Times
edition of 23 November 2009 do not bear
and are not capable of bearing the
meanings or imputations as contended by
the plaintiff.
Simply put, the words are not defamatory of the

plaintiff, when construed objectively in their
natural and ordinary meaning.”
[Emphasis Added]
[56] Based on the cases referred to above, it is clear that

two principles of law emerge from them which are as
follows:
(1) The court has to, in the first instance,

determine (in accordance with the principles of
construction) whether on a proper construction
of the impugned news report the words
complained of give rise to the imputations
pleaded by the plaintiff in his statement of
claim.
80
(2) That in undertaking that exercise, the court is

conducting a pure construction of the impugned
news report and not the evaluation of the
evidence adduced by the parties before the
court. In other words the question to be
answered is whether the impugned news report
is capable of giving rise to the imputations
relied upon by the plaintiff and not just what
are the meanings at large that they are capable
of giving rise to.
(3) It is trite law that in order to disclose a cause of

action for defamation in law the statement of
claim must particularise the cause of action for
defamation.
(4) The question at the preliminary stage is not

whether the words complained of (construed in
its proper context) are false but whether they
are defamatory in nature in the sense contended
by the plaintiff in his statement of claim.
(5) Falsity is presumed if the words are found to be

defamatory in the sense contended by the
plaintiff.
(6) Put in another way, are the words complained

of (construed in the context of the entire
impugned news report) capable of giving rise to
the imputations relied on by the plaintiff in his
statement of claim? If they are not, then that is
the end of the matter. If they are capable of
giving rise to the imputations relied on by the
plaintiff, then the court has to determine
81
whether they are in fact defamatory of and

concerning the plaintiff.
[57] The relevant principles involved in that intended

determination can be stated briefly as follows:
(1) In ruling on meaning, the court is not

determining the actual meaning but delimiting
the outside boundaries of the possible range of
meanings from those contended by the plaintiff
to bear in his statement of claim.
(2) The general principles involved in that respect

have been neatly summarised in the judgment
of Ramly Ali J (later JCA and now FCJ) in Soh
Chun Seng v. CTOS-EMR Sdn Bhd [2003] 4
MLRH 203 “Soh Chun Seng”, at pp 206-207 as
follows:
“... In construing the meanings of the

words complained of as pleaded by the
plaintiff, the court must do so in the
context of the entirety of the contents of
exh P2.
In Gatley on Libel and Slander (9 th edn)

at p 96 the learned author states:
It is necessary to take into

consideration, not only the actual
words used, but the context of the
words.
At p 97, the learned author continues:
82
It follows from the fact that the context

and circumstances of the publication
must be taken into account and that the
plaintiff cannot pick and choose parts
of the publication which, standing
alone, would be defamatory. This or
that sentence may be considered
defamatory, but there may be other
passages which take away the sting.
Our courts have also pronounced the same

principle to be the law applicable in
Malaysia. In Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v.
Shaikh Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3
MLRH 534, Kamalanathan Ratnam J
stated that:
I agree that the test to be applied when

considering whether a statement is
defamatory of a plaintiff is an
objective one in that it must be given a
meaning in which a reasonable man
would understand it (See: Gatley on
Libel & Slander (9 th edn) para 3.12)
and that for this purpose, that is, in
considering whether the words
complained of contained any
defamatory imputation, it is necessary
to consider the whole article.
In another case, Noor Asiah Mahmood &

Anor v. Randhir Singh & Ors [1999] 4
83
MLRH 580, the High Court has also

stated:
I must hasten to add that the same

authority reflected the view that a
claim for libel whilst not to be founded
on a headline or photograph in
isolation from the related text, the
question whether the article was
defamatory had to be answered by
reference to the response of the
ordinary reasonable reader to the entire
publication.” [Emphasis Added]
(a) At p 207, the learned judge

summarised further the applicable
principles in construing whether the
words complained of are capable of
bearing defamatory meanings or not
as follows:
“In construing the words complained of

to determine if they are capable of
bearing defamatory meanings or not,
the court must also endeavour to read
those words through the eyes of the
‘hypothetical reasonable person’. In
Gatley on Libel & Slander (9 th edn) at
p 80, the learned author opines as
follows:
If words conveyed a defamatory

imputation to those to whom they
were published, but would not have
84
done so to the hypothetical

reasonable person in that position,
they are not defamatory. The
essence of libel is the publication of
written words to a person or persons
by whom they would be reasonably
understood to be defamatory of the
plaintiff’ so that the mere fact that
the hearers understood the language
in a defamatory sense does not make
it defamatory unless they were
reasonably justified in so
understanding it. In the case of
words defamatory in their ordinary
sense it is not permissible to call
evidence to prove that anyone did
understand the words in a
defamatory sense, but the question
is simply whether reasonable people
would have so understood them.
At p 81, the learned author of Gatley

postulates the following question as an
appropriate one to asked in trying to get
the natural and ordinary meaning of the
words complained of. The question is:
What would the words convey to the

mind of the ordinary, reasonable, fair-
minded reader?”
(b) At p 208, the learned judge further

noted as follows:
85
“The court is also of the view that in

construing what the words
complained of might reasonably
mean, such meanings that can only
be arrived at by a strained or utterly
unreasonable interpretation are to be
rejected.”
[58] Those are the general statements of the principles

involved.”
[103] In Dato’ Annas Khatib Jaafar v. Sharifuddin Mohamed & Ors

[2014] MLRHU 1346, the High Court stated as follows on the
issue of malice at pgs. 52-57:
“Whether The Defendants Were Actuated By Malice?
[231] The publication of a defamatory statement gives rise

to a prima facie cause of action. This is because the
law presumes in the plaintiff’s favour that the words
are false, unless and until the defendant proves to the
contrary. Here the defendants have not proved to the
contrary. On the other hand, the plaintiff has proved
through the 3 rd defendant himself, that every
allegation and imputation in the words complained of
were false.
[232] The following matters have been proved false:
(1) The heading itself is false as admitted by the

3 rd defendant that the report to the ACA was
not lodged by the “ Lembaga Pengarah” in
Malay or “the Board of Directors” in English;
86
(2) There was no “keraguan berhubung dengan

pemberian kontrak ... bernilai kira-kira RM 55
juta” in Malay or “doubt concerning the
awarding of the contract ... valued at about
approximately RM 55 million” as the
“Rundingan terus 1/2002” in Malay or the
“Direct Negotiation 1/2002” in English was
executed by the 3 rd defendant himself;
(3) The insinuation that the “Lembaga Pengarah

tidak berpuas hati dengan tindakan pengurusan”
in Malay or “the Board of Directors was not
satisfied with the action of the Management” in
English is false as the 3 rd defendant himself
denied any involvement of LKIM’s Board of
Directors;
(4) The imputation that “pengurusan ... bukan saja

dilihat tidak mengikut prosedur tetapi juga
menyebabkan pembaziran” in Malay or
“Management ... not only was seen to have not
complied with procedures but has also resulted
in wastage” in English is false as the procedure
was determined by the Treasury and the LKIM
Management was only tasked to implement the
procedure and also the contracts;
(5) The imputations that “peruntukan kewangan

LKIM dibelanjakan secara tidak berhemah dan
tidak mengikut peraturan” in Malay or “the
financial allocations of LKIM were utilised
carelessly and not in accordance with
procedurs” in English are false as the contract
87
prices were negotiated on the Treasury’s

instructions and the final figures were also
approved by the Treasury. The awarding of the
contracts by direct negotiation was determined
by the Treasury at the outset;
(6) The allegation and imputation that the “

pengurusan tidak memaklumkan keputusan
memberikan kontrak pembinaan kompleks dan
kerja-kerja berkaitan kepada sebuah syarikat
secara rundingan terus” in Malay and the
“Management did not inform (the Board of
Directors of its decision to award the contract
for the construction of the complex and the
related works to a company vide direct
negotiation” in English are false as the 3 rd
defendant himself was deeply involved both in
the “Rundingan Terus 1/2002” in Malay or
“Direct Negotiation 1/2002” in English and
“Rundingan Terus 1/2006” in Malay or “Direct
Negotiation 1/2006” in English.
(7) The insinuations that “bangunan kompleks ...

yang ... dibina ...dengan kos RM 29 juta tidak
dapat digunakan kerana jeti pendataran terletak
kira-kira 10 meter dari laut” in Malay or “the
building of the Complex ... that ... was built at
a cost of RM 29 million could not be used
because the landing jetty was situated about 10
meters from the sea” in English are false.
Firstly, at the time of publication, the main
complex had not been commissioned yet as the
access road was still under construction and,
88
secondly, according to the testimony of Dato’

Mustafa Ahmad (DW5) the jetty was not only
fully operational for the purpose for which it
was constructed, it was being used to berth
much bigger and deeper draught deep-sea
fishing vessels;
(8) There was no “syarikat sama diberikan kontrak

mengorek pasir bagi membolehkan air laut
memasuki kawasan jeti” in Malay or “same
company that was given the contract to dredge
the sand (from the river bed) in order to enable
the sea water to enter the jetty area” in English.
It was a mere concoction; and
(9) The imputation of bribery and abuse of power

in the statement involving the Direct
Negotiation 1/2006 which reads as follows:
“Syarikat sama juga dikatakan mendapat

kontrak bernilai RM 17.8 juta bagi membina
jalan masuk sepanjang 1.8 kilometer ke
kompleks itu dan nilai kontrak itu juga
dikatakan jauh lebih tinggi” in Malay or “The
same company was also said to have obtained a
contract valued at RM 17.8 million to construct
an access road 1.8 kilometers long to the
complex and the value of the contract was said
to be very much higher (than normal)” in
English is false as it was done with the blessing
of the then Prime Minister and, more
importantly, the contract was executed by the
89
3 rd defendant himself for and on behalf of the

Government.
[233] Therefore, the Court agreed with and accepted the

submissions of the plaintiff that by virtue of the
matters set out above, the 3 rd defendant was actuated
by malice in the publication of the defamatory
statements against the plaintiff.
[234] Be that as it may, it is trite law that the plaintiff need

not have to prove malice on the part of the
defendants unless and until the Court rules that the
words were published on a privilege occasion.
[235] This is because in the tort of defamation the law

implies malice from the mere act of the defendant in
publishing a defamatory matter.
[236] In Adam v. Ward [1917] AC 309 Lord Finley, LC

said at p 318 as follows:
“From the mere publication of defamatory matter

malice is implied, unless the publication was on what
is termed a privilege occasion.”
[237] Malice is not only provable by extrinsic evidence; it

may be “inferred from the terms of the alleged libel
itself” (see Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co,
Limited, and Another [1906] 2 KB 627).
[238] Reverting back to the instant case, in my judgment,

in the present case, after the 1 st and 2 nd defendants
failed to obtain the comments of the plaintiff, they
published the words complained of in the impugned
article without considering or caring whether they
90
were true or not. They were indifferent to the truth of

the words complained of. They did not bother to even
check the veracity or the truth of the words
complained of before they published them in the
impugned article. They did not practise responsible
journalism in reporting the words complained of in
the impugned article in their newspaper, the Harian
Metro.
[239] In that sense, they have acted recklessly in

publishing the words complained of in the impugned
article.
[240] In Clark v. Molyneux [1877] 3 QBD 237 at p 247,

Brett L J said as follows:
“If a man is proved to have stated that which he

knew to be false, no one need inquire further.
Everybody assumes henceforth that he was
malicious, that he did do a wrong thing for some
wrong motives. So, if it be proved that out of anger,
or for some other wrong motive, the defendant has
stated as true that he does not know to be true, and
he has stated it whether it is true, or not recklessly,
by reason of his anger or other motive, the jury may
infer that he used the occasions, not for reason which
justified it, but for gratification of his anger or other
indirect motive.
[245] However, in my judgment all the cases cited by them

are distinguishable on the following grounds:
91
(1) Para 16.02 of Duncan and Neill on Defamation,

third edition, states the law that qualified
privilege will be lost if it is shown that the
defendant was actuated by malice in publishing
the words complained of and the para cites
Egger v. Viscount Chelmsford and Others
[1965] 1 QB 248 as the authority for the
proposition of law. Since the 3 rd defendant in
the present case was actuated by malice, that
case does not apply to the 3 rd defendant;
(2) In Halim Arsyat v. Sistem Televisyen Malaysia

Bhd & Ors [2001] 3 MLRH 64; [2001] 6 MLJ
353; [2001] 7 CLJ 268; [2001] 4 AMR 4930,
the Malacca High Court held that the defence
of qualified privilege was available only if the
statement was made honestly and without any
indirect or improper motive and it depended on
the honesty of purpose with which the
defamatory statement was made. From the 3 rd
defendant’s testimony, it has been shown that
the statements in the article were false and he
knew it. Thus, in the circumstances, those
statements not only were not made honestly and
were in fact made with indirect or improper
motive, this improper motive renders the
purpose of the publication as dishonest. Hence,
the 3 rd defendant cannot rely on that case;
(3) In Tony Pua Kiam Wee v. Syarikat Bekalan Air

Selangor Sdn. Bhd. (unreported), the Court of
Appeal observed as follows:
92
“The important consideration is not the

truth of the statements, but whether the
appellant honestly believed in the truth of
impugned words. In this respect, whether
he genuinely believed in the truth of the
impugned words, would, in turn, depend
on the source for the statements issued by
the appellant.”
Issues for the determination of the Court
[104] The parties have framed the following 3 issues for the
determination of the Court:
(1) (a) Whether the 1 st letter was referring to the plaintiff?

(b) Whether the words and phrases complained of in the
1 st letter, in their natural and ordinary meanings
and/or by way of innuendo, are capable of bearing
the imputations ascribed to them by the plaintiff and
whether they are in fact defamatory of the plaintiff?
(c) Whether the defendants were actuated by malice

when publishing and/or causing to be published to
HUKM the 1 st letter?
(2) (a) Whether the words and phrases complained of in the

2 nd letter, in their natural and ordinary meanings
and/or by way of innuendo, are capable of bearing
the imputations ascribed to them by the plaintiff and
whether they are in fact defamatory of the plaintiff?
(b) Whether the defendants were actuated by malice
when publishing and/or causing to be published to
COB the 2 nd letter?
93
(3) Whether the defendants can rely on their pleaded defences

of justification, qualified privilege and/or fair comment on
a matter of public interest for the publication of the words
and phrases complained of in the 2 (two) letters?
Additional issues for the determination of the Court
[105] Based on the undisputed evidence adduced by the parties in the

full trial that the plaintiff was an unregistered real estate agent
at the material time, that the plaintiff did not have the approval
of DBKL and/or the MC to conduct her business activities at the
PPC and that the 2 (two) letters were written and published to
HUKM and COB, respectively, arising from the business
activities of the plaintiff, the Court has framed the following
additional 4 (four) issues for the determination of the Court:
(1) Whether the plaintiff was operating her businesses

illegally in her residential unit without approval from the
City Hall and/or the MC?
(2) If so, whether the plaintiff’s claim in defamation ought to

be dismissed with cost on the ground that the Court ought
not to assist the plaintiff to claim for damages for the tort
of defamation that had arisen in the course of her carrying
out her businesses illegally in the PPC?
(3) Whether the plaintiff, who was not a registered estate

agent at the material time, was operating illegally as an
estate agent in renting the units from the unit owners and
sub-letting the units concerned to her clients?
(4) If so, whether the plaintiff’s claim in defamation ought to

be dismissed with cost on the ground that the Court ought
not to assist the plaintiff to claim for damages for the tort
94
of defamation that has arisen in the course of her carrying

on her businesses illegally as she was not a registered
estate agent at the material time?
Findings of this Court
[106] Below are the findings of this Court and the reasons for the
findings.
Credibility of plaintiff’s witnesses
[107] I did not find the plaintiff (PW1) to be a truthful witness on the
issues with regard to the 2 (two) letters, their contents, the
plaintiff’s letter of complaint, its contents, her ignorance or lack
of knowledge of the by-laws of the PPC and the in-house rules
of the MC, her ignorance or lack of knowledge of the duties,
responsibilities and function of the MC, the existence or
otherwise of malice and improper motive on the part of the MC
in sending the 1 st letter to HUKM and the 2 nd letter to COB and
whether she had behaved in a hostile and aggressive manner
towards the MC and the members of the Management Committee
of the MC, when the MC refused to entertain her many requests
for access cards, which she wished to give to the persons, who
were occupying the units, which she had sub-leased or sub-let to
HUKM, and also for car stickers, which she wished to give to
the persons, who wished to park their cars in the car park bays,
which are accessory parcels to some of the units rented or leased
by her and also when the MC refused to give to her a refund in
full of the renovation deposit.
[108] I also found the plaintiff’s evidence I found Puan Hamidah

(PW2) and Puan Asmahira (PW3) to be truthful witnesses. Based
95
on their evidence, it was manifestly clear to the Court that the

plaintiff had acted as an unregistered estate agent when she
rented units in the PPC and she sub-leased or sub-let the units to
UKM and she was paid by UKM for her services.
[109] I did not find Puan Nurul (PW4) to be a truthful witness on the
identity of the person, who had paid the renovation deposit to the
MC; whether the alleged two breaches of the in-house rules by
the contractor, viz, the plaintiff (PW1), did in fact, occur; and the
reason why she did not meet up with the MC to resolve the refund
of the balance renovation deposit even after she had received the
letter dated 4.6.2014 from COB advising her to do so.
[110] I did not find Mr. Sii (PW5) to be a credible witness. He

claimed that he could not speak any Malay and he asked for the
use of a Chinese interpreter. When his request was rejected by
the Court, he gave his evidence in Malay but he pretended that
he did not know even basic Malay. After he was assisted to give
his evidence in Malay by the plaintiff’s learned counsel, I found
his evidence to be quite irrelevant and, hence, it was not helpful
to the plaintiff’s case, as it did not shed any light on the
plaintiff’s alleged 2 nd breach of the in-house rules with regard to
the dumpster being parked in the compound of the PPC outside
the times as stipulated in the form.
[111] As for Mr. Ng Choon Hua’s (PW6’s) evidence, I found that it

supports the defendants’ case instead of the plaintiff’s case. This
is due to the presence of a clause in the Tenancy Agreement,
which was entered into between PW6’s son by the name of Ng
Boon Ping, as the owner of unit C-09-05, and the plaintiff as his
tenant. The presence of the clause in the Tenancy Agreement
showed that the plaintiff knew of the in-house rules of the MC.
This is because by virtue of that clause, the plaintiff was
96
contractually obliged to adhere to and comply with the in-house

rules of the MC. Hence, the plaintiff’s efforts in attempting to
feign ignorance of the in-house rules of the MC proved futile.
Evidence of plaintiff (PW1), who wrote letter of complaint dated

22.8.2013 to COB
[112] During the trial, the plaintiff (PW1) gave evidence in her
examination-in-chief in the form of a Revised Witness Statement
(P1). In her examination-in-chief, she stated, inter alia, as
follows:
(1) She is a businesswoman and the sole proprietress of the 2

(two) firms;
(2) Both of the 2 (two) firms were using unit A-3-14 as their
registered addresses;
(3) She started the business of Primas Management & Services

in the year 2003;
(4) The business of Primas Management & Services is the

provision of management and services which include
helping property owners to look for tenants and helping
people to rent apartments or houses. She made some hard
earned money from the services provided by her;
(5) From the year 2004 onwards, she had been renting many
units in the PPC and sub-letting them to the trainee
doctors, medical and student nurses and staff of HUKM;
(6) She had done this because HUKM, which is situated

nearby the PPC, needed her help to obtain housing for its
trainee doctors, medical and student nurses and staff;
97
(7) So in the year 2004, the management of HUKM

approached her and entrusted her with the task of looking
for apartments for them to stay from the year 2004
onwards;
(8) She started the business of Primas Interior in the year

2012;
(9) The business of Primas Interior is the provision of interior

design and renovation. Renovation includes wet works, the
installation of cabinets, grill doors and plaster ceilings and
painting, tiling, piping and electrical works;
(10) The defendants had on two occasions published

defamatory words against her;
(11) The 1 st occasion is when the defendants published to

HUKM the 1 st letter dated 5.6.2013, which was signed by
the 4 th defendant;
(12) The 1 st letter contained remarks referred to her or

understood by the staff of HUKM as referring to her, as set
out in paragraph 13 of the re-amended statement of claim,
which seriously defamed her, particularly, in the eyes of
the officers/staff of HUKM and Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee
Tan & Associates, who had read it;
(13) The remarks in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 1 st letter, which

are referred to as the 6 th defamatory remark and
reproduced in the re-amended statement of claim, are
highly defamatory of her as they referred to her;
(14) This is because since the year 2004 onwards, she was the
only person providing management services by renting and
sub-letting units in the PPC to HUKM. Therefore, over the
98
9 years viz from the year 2004 to the year 2013, she was
always in communication with the HUKM staff including
through face-to-face conversations in meetings or over the
telephone and through letters. In short, HUKM staff knew
that Primas Management & Services was her business and
the moment the words “management services” are
mentioned, the HUKM staff concerned would know that it
was referring to me;
(15) She had dealt with the HUKM staff including Puan
Hamidah (PW2) and Puan Asmahira (PW3);
(16) She has proof that the HUKM staff knew that the words
complained of in the 1 st letter to HUKM referred to her
because of two reasons. Firstly, upon receipt of the letter
by HUKM, the HUKM staff promptly informed her and
gave her a copy of the letter. That was how she came to
know about the defendants’ 1 st letter to HUKM. Secondly,
from HUKM’s letter dated 19.7.2013 to the MC of the PPC
for the attention of D4, she was able to confirm that the
HUKM staff knew that the 1 st letter to HUKM referred to
her. Paragraph 4 of HUKM’s letter dated 19.7.2013 stated,
amongst other things, as follows:
“… Sepanjang 9 tahun kebelakangan ini, Universiti

Kebangskaan Malaysia hanya “sub-tenant” kepada
Prismas Primas Management & Services (PMS). Oleh
yang demikian, segala perkara tentang “sub-tenancy”
antara Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia dengan
Prismas Primas Management & Services, sila
berhubung terus dengan pihak Prismas Primas
Management & Services”
(See Bundle C, p 288).
99
(17) The second occasion is when the defendants published the

2 nd letter dated 18.9.2013 to COB, which contained the
words and phrases complained of, which are referred to as
the 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th and 5 th defamatory remarks and set out
in the re-amended statement of claim, which have defamed
her;
(18) She strongly denied the 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th and 5 th remarks;
(19) With regard to the 1 st remark, she did not distort any fact
and she did not mislead COB. Instead it was the
defendants, who had distorted the facts and misled COB.
The defendants have even misled the Court by alleging
that the letter was written to COB to answer queries posed
by COB, when the truth was that in paragraph 3 of COB’s
letter, COB had requested the 1 st defendant to explain
directly to her and to extend to COB a copy of their
explanation to her;
(20) With regard to the 2 nd remark, she was never a trouble

maker. Instead, the defendants themselves were the trouble
makers;
(21) The 3 rd remark is a baseless and defamatory remark against

her, which is also not true and malicious;
(22) The 4 th remark is, again, totally untrue, baseless and

malicious;
(23) The 5 th remark is also totally false, baseless and malicious;
(24) Her evidence will show the malice of the defendants

towards her in several instances, which relate to issues
concerning charges for resident cards; the car park bays
for the units in the PPC, which were rented and sub-let by
100
her and payments for water bills and maintenance charges

for the units in the PPC, which were rented and sub-let by
her;
(25) The defendants have published the 2 (two) letters

maliciously because they had grudges against her as the
defendants were also in the business of selling, buying and
renting units in the PPC. Hence, the defendants became
hostile towards her; and
(26) Her lawyers have issued letters of demand to the

defendants to apologise to her and promise not to repeat
the all defamatory remarks but the defendants did not
comply with the letters of demand.
[113] She admitted during cross-examination, inter alia, as follows:
(1) The plaintiff has been operating her estate agency business
since the year 2004, peacefully, until the MC came along
in the year 2009 and acted to disrupt or sabotage her
business, especially, her business with HUKM;
(2) She was in the Management Committee of the MC in the

year 2006 or thereabout. She had raised the issue that the
MC ought to regulate and supervise agents, who are
renting and selling properties at the PPC (see Bundle B, p.
20-B);
(3) In the year 2011, she had maybe around 20 or 30 or 36

units in the PPC under her management through Primas
Management & Services but she only submitted a copy of
one of the tenancy agreements for the units to the MC for
the latter’s information and records;
101
(4) She also admitted that she was asked by the MC to give to
the MC her credentials and authority to represent the unit
owners in the PPC, which were under her management,
through Primas Management & Services but, up until the
date of the full trial, she has not done so;
(5) Up until the day she testified in Court during the full trial
of her suit against the defendants she still did not have a
copy of the in-house rules and regulations of the MC;
(6) Hence, she did not know that the rules and regulations of
the MC require observation not only by the unit owners
and residents but also the unit owners’ and residents’
guests, agents and licensees;
(7) She claimed that only the unit owners in the PPC are
required to notify the MC when their units are leased or
rented out;
(8) She has entered into a tenancy agreement dated April 2012
with one Ng Boon Ping, whereby as tenant she has to
follow and adhere to the rules and regulations of the MC
(see Bundle B, pgs. 77 to 84);
(9) She was aware of the MC’s lawyer’s letter to her asking
her to liaise with and inform Puan Nurul, the owner of the
unit, to contact the MC to sign the acceptance of the
penalties imposed by the MC and to authorize the MC to
release the balance renovation deposit to the plaintiff (see
Bundle C, p. 333);
(10) She admitted making a police report against the MC for

refusing to release the renovation deposit to her. In her
police report, she admitted that the MC had asked her to
contact Puan Nurul to inform her (Puan Nurul) to get in
102
touch with the office of the MC to sign the necessary

papers for the release of the balance renovation deposit to
the plaintiff by the MC (see Bundle C, p. 371);
(11) She was aware of the letter from COB and several
reminders from the MC in August, September and
November 2014 to her asking her to contact the MC so that
the matter concerning the refund of the balance renovation
deposit could be resolved. However, she failed or
neglected to contact the MC to resolve the matter (see
Bundle D, pgs. 566, 673, 687, 688, 691 and 696); and
(12) Despite being aware of the MC’s procedure and the

reminders, which were sent to her by the MC, the plaintiff
did not comply with the procedure and she also did not
contact the MC on 2 or 3 occasions for the release of the
balance renovation deposit, even though she was asked to
do so by the MC.
Evidence of Puan Hamidah (PW2) of UKM, who dealt with the

plaintiff (PW1)
[114] Puan Hamidah (PW2) gave evidence in her examination-in-chief

vide a Revised Witness Statement (P2) that as the Assistant
Hostel Manager of UKM, at the material time, it was her
responsibility to provide accommodation for the student nurses
and medical students of the Medical Faculty of UKM, who were
pursuing their studies at HUKM, which is under the
administration of UKM.
[115] The plaintiff (PW1) is known to PW2 because PW1’s firm was
appointed by UKM to look for houses, which could be rented
and converted into a student’s hostel. This had occurred in the
103
year 2003 when UKM needed an additional student’s hostel near

the vicinity of HUKM. PW2 had contacted the maintenance
office of the PPC and someone there suggested to her to contact
Madam Sherene Mok (PW1). She had contacted PW1 to provide
the houses, which were needed for the additional student’s
hostel.
[116] Thereafter, at the beginning of each academic year, upon being

informed by UKM as to the number of students, who would be
enrolling at Kolej Tun Dr. Ismail, the Medical Faculty at UKM,
PW2 would contact Primas Management & Services, through
Madam Sherene Mok (PW1), to find the houses, which were
needed as accommodation for the students.
[117] After PW1 had found the houses, UKM would follow up with an
official letter together with the tenancy agreements for the
houses concerned. As a result of this, UKM became the sub-
tenant of Primas Management & Services, through Madam
Sherene Mok (PW1).
[118] Since HUKM is situated beside the PPC, the houses that were
rented by UKM from Primas Management & Services were
usually the units in the PPC.
[119] In the year 2004, UKM paid the rentals to PW1 and UKM paid
the charges for the water bills to the Joint Management Body
(JMB) of the PPC. However, in the year 2009, UKM paid the
charges for the water bills to the Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma
Perdana (PPPP), viz the MC of the PPC.
[120] In addition to providing units in the PPC for rental by UKM,

PW1 also provided the services of terminating the sub-tenancies
for the units concerned, whenever UKM no longer needed the
units concerned. This was usually done via a phone call by PW3
104
to PW1, which would be followed up by an official letter by

PW3 to PW1. PW1 would then attend to the termination of the
sub-tenancies.
[121] UKM has paid PW1 for the services rendered by her to HUKM
as stated above.
Evidence of Puan Asmihira (PW3) of UKM, who also dealt with

the plaintiff (PW1)
[122] Puan Asmihira (PW3) gave evidence in her examination-in-chief

vide a Revised Witness Statement (P3). In her examination-in-
chief, she stated that sometime around the beginning of the year
2004 she came to know PW1 as the proprietress of Primas
Management & Services. This had occurred because Primas
Management & Services provided, through Madam Sherene Mok
(PW1), services to UKM to assist UKM to find accommodation
for the medical and nursing students of HUKM within the
vicinity of HUKM. The plaintiff provided the accommodation in
the PPC, which is located within the vicinity of HUKM.
[123] PW3 explained that the relationship between the plaintiff (PW1)
and UKM is that of tenant and sub-tenant.
Evidence of Puan Nurul (PW4), who engaged the plaintiff (PW1)

to renovate her unit in the PPC
[124] Puan Nurul (PW4) gave evidence in her examination-in-chief

vide a Witness Statement (P4). In her examination-in-chief, she
stated that she is a nurse attached to the Emergency Department
of HUKM. In her examination-in-chief, she also stated that she
came to know PW1 when she was a student nurse in HUKM. At
that time, she had stayed in student accommodation, which was
105
provided by UKM, through the services of PW1. Since then PW1

has become a good friend of hers.
[125] She is now the owner of unit C-10-16 in the PPC. The previous
owner was one Haw Chew Pou. However, I noted that she did
not produce a copy of the sale and purchase agreement between
her and Haw Chew Pou to support her evidence that she had
purchased the unit from Haw Chew Pou. I also noted that this
person was not called as a witness by the plaintiff.
[126] She had engaged PW1’s firm, Primas Interior, through PW1, as
her (PW4’s) contractor to renovate her unit. She knew that PW1
was the one, who had signed the Application For Renovation
form (“the form”) at the management office of the MC even
though she did not accompany PW1 to the management office of
the MC to sign the form. She was informed by PW1 that it was
all arranged by PW1 and that PW1 had also paid the deposit to
the MC for the renovation. A receipt was issued by the MC to
PW1 for the payment.
[127] However, subsequently, after the renovation was completed, the

MC refused to refund the deposit in full to PW1 on the ground
that PW1 had committed two breaches of the in-house rules.
[128] The 4 th defendant, had alleged that when her unit was being
renovated by PW1, he found someone sleeping in her unit after
working hours. The 4 th defendant had also alleged that he also
found that the dumpster for the waste products from the
renovation of her unit was parked in the compound of the PPC
outside the times specified in the form.
[129] Hence, the MC refused to refund the deposit in full to PW1. The
MC was only agreeable to refund a sum of RM 400.00 out of the
RM 1,000.00 deposit. But PW1 did not agree to the deduction by
106
the MC of a sum of RM 600.00 for the two alleged breaches of

the in-house rules.
[130] PW4 had carried out her own investigation and she found that
the 4 th defendant’s two allegations were untrue. She had
informed her own findings to the MC and she had also asked
PW1 to liaise with the MC on the matter.
[131] Hence, there was a dispute between PW1 and the MC. But she
was not involved in the dispute because the renovation deposit
was not paid by her and it was PW1, who had paid for it using
her own (PW1’s) money.
[132] With regard to her investigation, PW4 had asked her cousin as to
whether it was true that someone was sleeping in her unit after
working hours, when her unit was being renovated. But her
cousin informed her that no one was in her unit as alleged by the
4 th defendant. PW4 believed her cousin, who was not called as a
witness for the plaintiff. PW4 had also asked PW1 about the 4 th
defendant’s second allegation concerning the dumpster.
However, PW1 told her (PW4) that the allegation was untrue.
PW1 told her that the renovation waste in the dumpster was
from another unit and was not from her unit.
[133] In cross-examination, Puan Nurul said that although she was

advised by COB in its letter to her dated 4.6.2014 to meet up
with the MC to resolve the despute she did not do so because of
the following two reasons:
(1) When the MC deducted the RM 600.00 from the renovation

deposit due to the two alleged breaches of the in-house
rules by PW1, PW1 told her (PW4) that the MC could do
so but she (PW1) wanted proof of the two breaches from
the MC; and
107
(2) Her (PW4’s) husband did not allow her to meet up with the
MC to resolve the dispute because she (PW4) was caught
in between the MC and the plaintiff.
[134] In re-examination, when PW4 was asked to explain further why

she did not meet up with the MC, she gave the following three
reasons:
(1) She felt that she could not discuss the dispute with a man
because the person in the MC, who was handling the
dispute, viz the 4 th defendant, was a man;
(2) She was afraid that she would be bullied by the 4 th

defendant and the MC; and
(3) She felt that she was not able to resolve the dissatisfaction
between the two parties, viz the MC and the plaintiff.
Evidence of Mr. Sii (PW5), who shared a dumpster with the

plaintiff, at the material time
[135] Mr. Sii (PW5), who is a tiling contractor gave his evidence in
his examination-in-chief by way of oral answers to the questions
in the Revised List of Questions filed by the plaintiff, pursuant
to Pre-Trial Case Management directions, which were given by
the Court and marked “O” by the Court.
[136] PW5 said that he shared a dumpster with the plaintiff, at the
material time. He also said that he was carrying out the
renovation of his own unit, viz unit C-9-15, whilst the plaintiff
was carrying out the renovation of unit C-10-16, viz Puan
Nurul’s unit. He also paid that he had used the dumpster, which
he should with the plaintiff to keep the renovation waste from
his own unit.
108
[137] PW5 was not cross-examined by the defendants.
Evidence of Mr. Ng (PW6), father of Ng Boon Ping, owner of unit

C-09-05 rented by plaintiff (PW1)
[138] Mr. Ng (PW6) is an optician by occupation. In his examination-

in-chief, he gave oral evidence by way of answers to the Revised
List of Questions, filed by the plaintiff, pursuant to Pre-Trial
Case Management directions, which were given by the Court and
marked “P” by the Court.
[139] He said that he knew the plaintiff (PW1). When he was shown a
letter dated 3.4.2013 from the 4 th defendant (see p. 197 in
Bundle B), he said that Ng Boon Ping, whose name appears in
the letter is his son. He also said that Ng Boon Ping is the owner
of unit C-09-05. He also said that he had received two water
bills from the MC and that he had passed them to the plaintiff
(PW1) to make payment. He gave to PW1 two cheques together
with his handwritten note to make the payment but the cheques
were, subsequently, returned to him by the bank on the ground
that the two cheques had expired.
[140] In cross-examination, he said that his son’s unit was rented out
to the plaintiff (PW1). However, he could not remember whether
he had informed the MC that he had rented out his son’s unit to
the plaintiff (PW1).
[141] He also said that the two cheques were not his cheques. He also
said that he did not personally make the payment for the two
water bills to the MC because it was the tenant’s responsibility
to pay for them.
[142] PW6 was not re-examined by the plaintiff’s learned counsel.
109
[143] Based on the evidence of the plaintiff (PW1) and her 5 other
witnesses (PW2, PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW6), I found that there
was no evidence at all adduced by the plaintiff that the MC or
any of its members had acted in a high handed manner or
unfairly towards Puan Nurul or the plaintiff to deny the plaintiff
the full refund of the renovation deposit.
Credibility of defendants’ witnesses
[144] The defendants relied on the evidence of the following witnesses

to prove their case against the plaintiff:
(a) The evidence of the plaintiff herself (PW1) elicited during

cross-examination by the defendants’ learned counsel;
(b) The evidence of Puan Asmihira, a staff of the Accounts

Department of HUKM, who testified for the plaintiff as the
plaintiff’s third witness (PW3);
(c) The evidence of Wong Kui Man, the 2 nd defendant, who is

the Secretary of the MC, the 1 st defendant, and who
testified as the defendants’ first witness (DW1);
(d) The evidence of Chow Thean Choy, the 3 rd defendant, who

is the Chairman of the MC, the 1 st defendant, and who
testified as the defendants’ 2 nd witness (DW2); and
(e) The evidence of Vijiaratnam A/L V.Ratnasingam, the 4 th

defendant, who is the Treasurer of the MC (the 1 st
defendant), and also the Building Manager of the PPC, and
who testified as the defendants’ 3 rd witness (DW3).
[145] The Court found the defendants’ witnesses (DW1, DW2 and
DW3) to be honest and truthful witnesses. They had no reason to
110
lie. They were merely discharging their duties as the office

bearers in the Management Committee of the MC. The Court
found their evidence to be inherently credible, consistent, cogent
and reliable as it was supported by contemporaneous
documentary evidence. Hence, the Court believed and accepted
their evidence.
Evidence of 3 rd defendant (DW2), Chairman of MC, who met with

HUKM together with 2 nd defendant (DW1)
[146] The Chairman of the MC, Chow Thean Choy (DW2), the 3 rd
defendant gave, inter alia, the following evidence in his
examination-in-chief vide a Revised Witness Statement (D5):
(1) The MC was established in the year 2009 under the Strata
Titles Act 1985 (Act 318) when it came into force;
(2) The Management Committee of the MC was elected by the

unit owners and it is solely responsible for the
management and administration of the PPC and answerable
to all the unit owners and COB;
(3) Prior to the establishment of the MC in the year 2009, the

PPC was managed by a management services company
known as Prisma Perdana Management Services Sdn. Bhd.;
(4) When the purchasers took vacant possession of the units

from the developer, each of the purchasers was given a
copy of the in-house rules;
(5) At the 2 nd AGM of the MC, the MC adopted the in-house

rules which were already in use at that time joint
Management Body as the in-house rules of the MC;
111
(6) The 1 st letter was sent to HUKM because the 4 th defendant

(DW3) and his department were rather concerned that
someone maybe falsely or wrongfully representing the MC
to ask for payment of water and maintenance charges from
HUKM;
(7) Even though HUKM had rented many units in the PPC
from the plaintiff under sub-tenancies, the MC did not
receive any cooperation from HUKM to assist the MC in
the management and administration of the PPC by
informing the MC as to the actual number of units in the
PPC, which were rented by HUKM and the names of the
persons, who were staying in the units;
(8) The MC also faced difficulty in obtaining clarification

from HUKM with regard to the payment of water and
maintenance charges by HUKM for the units rented from
the plaintiff;
(9) Due to the several long outstanding issues with HUKM,

the MC also wanted to impress upon HUKM that in order
to avoid any misunderstanding between HUKM and the
MC it is important for HUKM to deal directly with the MC
and not through a third party;
(10) Hence, on 4.6.2014, both he and Wong Kui Man, the 2 nd

defendant (DW1), visited HUKM and met up with its
management in order to clarify and resolve the issues
faced by the MC with HUKM;
(11) Following that meeting, HUKM admitted to the MC that it

had, wrongly, made the payment to the MC for the water
and maintenance charges;
112
(12) Nevertheless, HUKM still refused to disclose the details

and particulars of the tenancy agreements between itself
and the plaintiff and also its arrangements with the
plaintiff for the management of the units in the PPC, which
were rented by HUKM from the plaintiff;
(13) Therefore, despite his (DW2’s) and the 2 nd defendant’s

efforts to resolve the difficulties faced by the MC, HUKM
did not assist them in making the administration of the
PPC by the MC any easier; and
(14) In Q&A 11 of his Revised Witness Statement (D5), DW2

states as follows:
“Q11A Why did you as chairman and D2 as Secretary

made appointment to meet up with HUKM?
A. Sometime on 4/6/2014 both myself and Wong the

Secretary had visited and meet up with HUKM
management, (see page 49 of enclosure 94).
Because our MC have face several long
outstanding issues with HUKM, we decided to
meet up with them to clarify and sort out issues
with them. (See also page 230, 233 and 226 of
enclosure 118 or Core Bundle 2).
The plaintiff, managing several units at PPC had

refused to cooperate with us by closing actual
units rented out to HUKM staff, or disclose
names of tenants staying at units under care of
plaintiff, we also faced difficulty in receiving and
clarifying payment for maintenance and water
charges from UKM, therefore, we were
compelled to meet up with UKM management to
113
resolve such issues and to improve our services

as MC.
Both our letters to UKM and UKM letter to us

(see page 230 and 233 of Core Bundle 2) were
extended to COB, DBKL for their information.
Our aim was to ensure proper payment were
received from HUKM and to inform them that our
MC is managing the Condominium, and HUKM
ought to deal with our MC directly, and not
through party, to avoid misunderstanding.
As such, we have no intention or motive to

threaten or jeopardize the interest or business of
the plaintiff, as falsely alleged by her. We have
never taken away any business from the plaintiff
or any other estate agents. We only expect them
to follow in-house rules and adhere our
management policies.
Following our meeting with HUKM management,

they admitted making wrong payment to us but
still they refused to disclose tenancy agreements
or management with plaintiff, therefore HUKM
did not really assist us in making our
administration of PPC easier (please see page 51
and 52 of enclosure 94).”
Evidence of 4 th defendant (DW3), Building Manager of PPC, who

issued the 1 st letter to HUKM
[147] In his examination-in-chief, Vijiaratnam a/l v. Ratnasingam

(DW3), the 4 th defendant, who was the Treasurer of the MC cum
114
Building Manager of the PPC, at the material time, gave

evidence vide a Revised Witness Statement (D6) that the 1 st
letter was signed and issued by him as the Building Manager of
the PPC, and his duty included the collection of water and
maintenance charges and the issuing of bills to residents and
owners of all the units in the PPC.
[148] In his Revised Witness Statement (D6), the 4 th defendant (DW3)

gave further evidence as follows:
(1) He and the MC were surprised if not taken aback to

receive several cheque payments from HUKM (see Bundle
C, pgs. 252 and 253) although the MC had never issued
any billing or statement of account, directly, to HUKM;
(2) Therefore, the MC did not expect any payment to be sent

by HUKM to the MC (see also Bundle B, p. 224 a(ii) and
224 a(iii)). Such payments made by HUKM were
suspicious as no billings were issued by the MC;
(3) Both the payment vouchers mentioned that the payment is

to be made to Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana
(“PPPP”), viz the MC;
(4) When the 4 th defendant (DW3) or his office received

several cheque payments from HUKM being purported
payment for water and maintenance charges for some units
at the PPC, the 4 th defendant investigated and found that
the MC was certain that it had never issued any billings to
HUKM;
(5) The 4 th defendant (DW3) was certain and clear that his
office or staff had discovered that there was no billing
issued by MC, yet HUKM issued voucher payment with
PPPP or the MC as payee; and
115
(6) Hence, the 4 th defendant (DW3) and/or the MC was

compelled to issue a notice to HUKM to return the cheque
payment to HUKM.
[149] The 4 th defendant (DW3) also said that he immediately

contacted Puan Asmihira (PW4) of the Accounts Department of
HUKM to seek clarification (see Bundle B, p. 224 a(i)).
However, the 4 th defendant’s email dated 31.5.2013 to Puan
Asmihira was not answered promptly.
[150] After a lapse of 1 week and due to the failure of the HUKM
Accounts Department of HUKM to respond to the query, the 4 th
defendant and the MC then issued a letter to HUKM to return
the cheque payment issued by HUKM in which the 4 th defendant
mentioned another cheque which was also received by the office
of the MC from HUKM (see Bundle B, p. 233). I noted that
there appeared to be some error or misunderstanding on the part
of the 4 th defendant in his evidence. Although Bundle B, p.
224a(i) and 224a(ii) referred to another payment or Voucher
number, viz Voucher No. BCR47153, dated 17.5.2013, however,
the 1 st letter to HUKM dated 5.6.2013 at p. 233 of Bundle B
actually referred to another cheque and voucher number, which
were also sent by HUKM to the MC when no billing was issued
by the MC).
[151] During cross-examination and re-examination, the 4 th defendant

(DW3) gave, inter alia, the following clear and un-contradicted
evidence:
(1) The plaintiff refused to cooperate with the MC by coming

forward to register herself as an agent with the MC despite
being sent notices and reminders;
116
(2) The plaintiff also refused to disclose to the MC the actual

number of units at the PPC, which were managed by her
for HUKM;
(3) The MC or the 4 th defendant’s accounting staff had never

issued any billing directly to HUKM regarding the units
sub-let by the plaintiff to HUKM and occupied by the staff
of HUKM or its students;
(4) Without a copy each of the tenancy agreements or other

evidence of the sub-leasing of the units concerned, the MC
had great difficulty in issuing access cards and car stickers
to the sub-tenants, who were occupying the units, which
were sub-let by the plaintiff to HUKM; and
(5) He and the MC did not know that the plaintiff had issued a
notice to warn HUKM by alleging that there were many
break-ins at the PPC. Prior to the commencement of this
suit by the plaintiff, the MC was not informed of a police
report that was lodged by a student of HUKM one incident
of break-in at the PPC.
[152] In Q&A 21 of his Revised Witness Statement (D6), DW3 stated,

inter alia, as follows:
“Q21. Did the plaintiff comply with in-house rules

when she carried out renovation works for Puan
Nurul’s unit at Block C, C-10-16?
A. …
Despite such rule, the plaintiff as contractor had

breached our rules by inter alia, allowing
materials to be delivered to Puan Nurul’s unit
outside scheduled hours i.e. after 6pm. She had
117
also allowed her workers to stay at the

Condominium beyond 6pm (Please see page 13
enclosure 44).
As such the MC was compelled to deduct deposit

or imposed penalty for the breaches in carrying
out renovation works for Puan Nurul’s unit. (See
page 5, 6, and 7 of common bundle 2 and page 18
and 26 of common bundle 1).
(See page 13,1 5, 18, 27 (police report) of

enclosure 44, page 19, and 21 enclosure 94, and
page 1 and 2 Additional Common Bundle of
Documents).”
[153] In Q&A 27 of his Revised Witness Statement (D6), DW3 stated

as follows:
“Q27. Are you aware that the plaintiff had in the past
objected to other estate agents putting up notices
to sell or rent out properties at Prisma Perdana?
A. Yes. I refer to page 2 of CBD updated Bahagian

II or enclosure 94 at item 5(g) of General
Meeting held on 28/9/2006, the plaintiff herself
had objected or highlighted the danger of other
property putting up notices to sell or rent out
units at Prisma Perdana without proper
credential.
Please refer to page 12 of Additional CBD in

which the plaintiff herself was not following
what she had preached.
118
The plaintiff’s refusal to cooperate with our MC

especially to furnish the MC her personal or
company profile and her list of tenants in respect
of units manages by her, and the tenancy
agreements thereof and other documents
contradicted with her position or stand at the
General Meeting held on September 2006. She
knew her refusal to cooperate with our MC such
us furnishing us pertuclar units manages by her
and list or updated list of her tenants ets would
make us face difficulties in our administration of
Prisma Perdana Condominium and also make us
argue or quarrel unnecessarily with her.”
[154] In Q&A 27A of his Revised Witness Statement (D6), DW3

stated as follows:
“Q27A. Do you as building manager deal with other

estate agents managing some units at Prisma
Perdana?
A. Yes. Our MC and I myself as building manager

have or had dealing with other estate agents or
estate negotiations such us K L Tan, Christine
Ooi, Madam Lai and Thomas Teo, etc.”
[155] In Q&A 27B of his Revised Witness Statement (D6), DW3

stated as follows:
“Q27B. Do you or your MC or your staff encounter any

problems with these agents managing certain
units for owners?
A. No, based on my experience, our MC and myself

have no problem or difficulty dealing with other
119
estate agents or negotiations as they are generally

very co-operative with us. They would follow our
in-house rules and management regulations.
They would submit copy of their tenancy

agreements to us, furnished us proper record or
particulars of tenants and update payment of
maintenance and water charges so that car park
stickers and resident cards could be issued by us
on time for their tenants or without delay and
without any problem.
Furthermore, none of the other estate agents or

negotiations had objected to our ruling not to
accept bulk payment when making payment for
maintenance and water charges of the units.”
[156] In Q&A 27C of his Revised Witness Statement (D6), DW3

stated as follows:
“Q27C. Did your MC or your management indulge in the

business of introducing buying and selling of
properties or Condominium units managed by
your MC?
A. No. We have never been involved in the business

of such activity. Our MC had never been
involved in the business of introducing buying
and selling of Prisma Perdana units. We are also
not involved in the business of renting out
premise or units at Prisma Perdana to anyone. I
believe our regulation or the Act does not allow
us to do so.
120
Our primary duties are to manage and run our

Condominium properly according to the Act.
However, our MC do provide a Notice Board for
owners wishing to buy and sell or to rent out
their premises, to put up their notices. We were
not involved in their transactions.”
[157] In Q&A 28A of his Revised Witness Statement (D6), DW3

stated as follows:
“Q28A. Can you tell the Court when does the

Condominium’s new in-house rules regulation
adopted and became operational?
A. We continue to us the old in-house rules as stated

in page 284 to 297 of enclosure 44 when we took
over from PPMSS in 2009. The new in-house
rules were adopted at our EGM held on 2014.
Therefore, it operates from November 2014.”
[158] In Q&A 28B of his Revised Witness Statement (D6), DW3

stated as follows:
“Q28B. As far as you are aware besides the plaintiff not

cooperating with your MC in terms of furnishing
the list of units under her management and list of
tenants occupying Prisma Perdana, do you also
face problems with the plaintiff’s major tenant,
UKM?
A. Yes, it is true the plaintiff had refused to co-

operate with us although I believe she was aware
that Condominiums unlike landed properties such
as house or bungalow, are subject to strict
management by MC, in which our MC come into
121
operation in 2009. Her refusal to furnish us list of

her tenancy agreements, names of her tenants
despite our notices and reminders had made it
difficult for us to issue resident cards and car
stickers to her tenants and thereby causing
problems for our security personnel, making
control of people and vehicles coming in and out
of Prisma Perdana difficult.
We face similar problems with UKM as well. In

our efforts to improve security and provide better
service to HUKM or their staff staying at Prisma
Perdana, our MC tried to contact management of
HUKM to have dialogue with them and to find
out how many of HUKM staff were staying at
units in Prisma Perdana.”
[159] In Q&A 28C of his Revised Witness Statement (D6), DW3

stated as follows:
“Q28C. Did HUKM furnish your MC with tenancy

agreements or details and particulars of their
staff staying at Prisma Perdana?
A. Please see page 230 Core Bundle 2 and this letter

was extended to COB, DBKL.
Frankly our MC were disappointed with HUKM’s

response. They refused to provide us with
tenancy agreements between HUKM and the
plaintiff, despite Mr. Wong and Mr. Chow telling
them we were trying improve security and service
to their staff staying at Prisma Perdana and since
122
the Plaintiff did not provide us particulars of

HUKM staff saying at our Condominium.
HUKM informed us that we are third party and

they have nothing to do with us … please refer to
page 21 Core Bundle 1, page 51 enclosure 94,
page 233 Core Bundle 2.
However, at page 233 Core Bundle 2 UKM did

admit mistake in their cheque payment to the MC
(pages 16 and 17 enclosure 94).”
[160] In Q&A 28D of his Revised Witness Statement (D6), DW3

stated as follows:
“Q28D. Why did your MC approach HUKM management

directly?
A. There was no hidden motive or agenda in our

meeting with HUKM management. We have to
approach HUKM directly as we received no co-
operation from the plaintiff regarding HUKM
staff staying at Prisma Perdana. It was simply to
inform them that our MC is now operating since
2009 under the Strata Title Act.
And it would be better for HUKM to deal with

our MC or management directly to avoid any
problem or misunderstanding such as payment to
MC by HUKM when MC did not issue letter
dated 15/4/2013 for such payment (see page 16
and 17 od enclosure 94).
Encik Saiful of COB, DBKL was informed of our

meeting or engagement with HUKM management
123
as we intended to improve our service and keep

HUKM management posted of our role as MC.
(See page 230 of our letter 5/6/2014 enclosure
118 of Core Bundle 2).”
[161] I noted that when Puan Asmihira (PW3) of the Accounts

Department of HUKM was cross-examined by the defendants’
learned counsel, she admitted that she did receive the email from
the 4 th defendant and/or the MC (see Bundle B, p. 224a (i)).
[162] Puan Asmihira (PW3) also gave evidence that upon receiving
the email from the 4 th defendant, she immediately referred the
matter to the plaintiff, for her to resolve the matter with the MC.
[163] I noted that Puan Asmihira (PW3) did not give evidence that
after reading the 1 st letter, she could identify the third party
mentioned in the 2 nd letter as the plaintiff. She merely said that
she immediately forwarded the 4 th defendant’s 1 st letter to the
plaintiff, for her to resolve the matter. In other words, no
evidence was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the third
party stated in the 1 st letter was identified by PW3 as the
plaintiff.
[164] In any event, the 1 st letter was issued strictly for the private
consumption of HUKM and nobody else.
[165] Therefore, the evidence given by the 4 th defendant (DW3), viz to

return the payment to HUKM as no billing was issued to HUKM
by the MC has been confirmed and corroborated by Puan
Asmihira of HUKM.
[166] Hence, I agreed with the defendants that the 4 th defendant had a
proper and valid reason to write to the Accounts Department of
HUKM. It was an occasion of privilege on which the 4 th
defendant and/or the MC was compelled to issue the 1 st letter to
124
return the cheque and to warn HUKM to be cautious when

making payments to the MC in future because the MC had not
billed HUKM.
[167] The MC and/or the 4 th defendant was extremely concerned and

suspicious that the MC’s name had been used by someone to
induce HUKM to make payments to the MC, when in reality the
MC did not issue any billing or such a statement of account to
HUKM. Hence, there existed reciprocity between the MC and
HUKM, whereby HUKM had a duty or interest to accept the
cheque, which was returned by the MC, and to be reminded to be
careful, when issuing payments to the MC in future.
Evidence of 2 nd defendant (DW1), Secretary of MC, who issued the

2 nd letter to COB
[168] The defendants have relied on Wong Kui Man’s (DW1’s), the
2 nd defendant’s, evidence in his Revised Witness Statement
(D6). DW1 denied that he was actuated by malice or improper
motive when he issued the 2 nd letter to COB. I noted that the 2 nd
defendant’s (DW2’s) evidence in his Revised Witness Statement
(D6) was not challenged by the plaintiff. This is because the 2 nd
defendant (DW1) was not cross-examined by the plaintiff.
[169] Therefore, the Court is entitled to accept the unchallenged and

undisputed evidence of the 2 nd defendant (DW1) as per his
Revised Witness Statement (D6) in support of the defendants’
defence on the issues raised by the plaintiff in her suit against
the defendants with regard to the 2 nd letter.
[170] The evidence of the 2 nd defendant (DW1), may be summarized

as follows:
125
(1) The 2 nd letter was the MC’s reply to COB. It was signed by
him (DW1) as the Secretary of the MC;
(2) The 2 nd letter was written and published to COB in

response to COB’s request for an explanation to be given
directly to the plaintiff following the written complaint
lodged by the plaintiff with COB. In her complaint to
COB, the plaintiff alleged that the MC was guilty of
unreasonable conduct for not refunding the renovation
deposit to her. The plaintiff did this even though she
already knew the procedure to be followed before the
balance renovation deposit can be released to her;
(3) The MC had made a deduction from the renovation deposit

by way of penalty for the breaches of the in-house rules by
the contractor, viz Primas Interior.
(4) The plaintiff was informed by the MC in writing to liaise

with her client, Puan Nurul. The MC had also informed the
plaintiff that Puan Nurul must contact the office of the MC
to accept the deduction as stated in the MC’s letter and
sign the consent for the release of the balance renovation
deposit to the plaintiff;
(5) In her police report against the MC, for not refunding to
her the renovation deposit, the plaintiff has also admitted
being aware of the MC’s procedure as stated above;
(6) The particulars of the deduction by way of penalty had

also been given to Puan Nurul. The MC had also requested
her (Puan Nurul) to go to the MC’s office, if she needed
any further clarification, and to sign the relevant papers
before the refund could be released to the plaintiff (see
Bundle C, pgs. 333, 370 and Bundle D, p. 652);
126
(7) On the advice of COB, the MC had given notices and

reminders to the plaintiff to attend the meeting with the
MC to resolve the dispute concerning the refund of the
renovation deposit (see Bundle D, pgs. 670, 687, 688 and
736). Despite all that was done by the MC to resolve the
dispute concerning the refund of the balance renovation
deposit to the plaintiff, she still refused and/or neglected
to meet up with the MC. Hence, the dispute remained
unresolved up till the day DW1 testified in Court in the
full trial;
(8) After the writ was issued by the plaintiff, the plaintiff and
her lawyer tried to harass him (DW1) by issuing frivolous
notices of demand, in which she alleged that he (DW1) had
slandered her lawyer by uttering the words “… the bugger
Chan Tse Yuen” (see Q&A 25 to Q&A 27 of the Revised
Witness Statement (D6) of Wong Kui Man (DW1));
(9) The plaintiff further defamed the defendants’ lawyer, Mr.

Low Peck Lim, by making a false complaint to the
Advocates and Solicitors’ Disciplinary Board. She also
lodged a police report, in which she alleged that Mr. Low
Peck Lim had no right to take over the conduct of the case
for the defendants from their previous lawyer, namely, Mr.
Ronny Wong of Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee Tan &
Associates, when such an allegation was totally baseless
(see Q&A 28 of the Revised Witness Statement (D6) of
Wong Kui Man (DW1));
(10) There was no improper motive on the MC’s part and on his
part in replying directly to COB. This is because the MC
does not deal directly with the contractors as the
contractors come and go. In the MC’s dealings with the
127
unit owners, the unit owners are held accountable for the
misconduct of their contractors; and
(11) The reply was issued in good faith solely to explain to

COB in more detail why the MC could not release the
balance renovation deposit directly to the plaintiff. This is
because the procedure for the refund had already been
made known to Puan Nurul and the plaintiff but not
complied with by them. Despite that, the plaintiff still
chose to make a written complaint to COB in which the
plaintiff blamed the MC for the non-refund of the
renovation deposit.
Malicious notices by plaintiff before filing action against

defendants
[171] I have also examined the conduct of the plaintiff before she
issued the writ against the defendants on 13.12.2013. This is
because the defendants have contended that she had conducted
herself in a hostile, malicious and provocative manner towards
them before she issued the writ against them on 13.12.2013.
[172] The defendants have relied on the plaintiff’s evidence during

cross-examination, in which the plaintiff admitted issuing 2
(two) lawyer’s letters to the defendants or their lawyers before
filing the defamation suit against the defendants.
[173] The 2 (two) lawyer’s letters are as follows:
(a) A lawyer’s letter dated 21.6.2013 (“the 1 st lawyer’s letter”)

(see Bundle C, p. 254); and
(b) A lawyer’s letter dated 30.8.2013 (“the 2 nd lawyer’s

letter”) (see Bundle C, p. 368).
128
[174] In the 1 st lawyer’s letter, the plaintiff accused the defendants of

being troublemakers, that they were occupying their positions in
the MC, illegally or unlawfully, and that they would soon face
criminal charges.
[175] In the 2 nd lawyer’s letter, the plaintiff claimed that the MC or its
members had cheated the plaintiff and had embezzled the
renovation deposit of RM 1,000.00 and that, upon the plaintiff
filing a police report, they would soon face criminal charges.
[176] The defendants contended that the 2 (two) lawyer’s letters are
false and that they were maliciously issued to them.
[177] By a letter dated 27.7.2013 from the MC’s solicitors, the

defendants responded to the 1 st lawyer’s letter dated 21.6.2013
and demanded the withdrawal by the plaintiff of her false and
baseless allegations that the defendants are pugnacious
troublemakers, who are sitting illegally or unlawfully in the MC.
However, according to the defendants, the plaintiff has the
failed and/or refused to withdraw her malicious allegations
against the defendants (see Bundle C, pgs. 291-292).
[178] I also found that the plaintiff had, subsequently, sent a third
lawyer’s letter, the contents of which were also not proven by
the plaintiff, through her learned counsel, to the 2 nd defendant
(DW1), threatening him with slander (see the last part of the
Revised Witness Statement (D6) of Wong Kui Man (DW1)).
[179] Due to the failure of the plaintiff to prove her accusations

against the defendants as stated in the 3 (three) lawyer’s letters
and her refusal to withdraw them and to tender an unreserved
apology to the defendants, I agreed with the defendants that, in
issuing the three malicious and offensive lawyer’s letters to the
MC, when the truth was far from it, the plaintiff had conducted
129
herself in a hostile, highly provocative and malicious manner

towards the defendants, which reflects her bad character.
[180] Hence, I found that the plaintiff has come to Court with unclean
hands.
[181] It is trite law that in the event the claimant is successful in

proving his defamation case, the Court can and ought to take
into account the claimant’s provocation and bad character when
assessing damages (see pgs. 523-524 of Carter-Ruck On Libel
and Privacy).
Power of MC to manage or regulate contractors
[182] During cross-examination of the 3 rd defendant (DW2), the

learned counsel for the plaintiff had challenged the MC’s power
to impose penalties on contractors for breaching in-house rules.
The 3 rd defendant was vigorously and repeatedly asked by the
learned counsel for the plaintiff as to the source of the MC’s
power to regulate contractors carrying out renovations of units
in the PPC and to impose penalties on contractors for breaches
of the in-house rules, when carrying out renovations of units in
the PPC.
[183] I agreed with the defendants that such a line of questioning by

the plaintiff’s learned counsel was not only improper and not
bona fide but that it was also irrelevant. This is because neither
the plaintiff nor Puan Nurul had ever questioned the power of
the MC to impose penalties on contractors for breaches of the
in-house rules. Hence, I found that there was no basis,
whatsoever, for the belated challenge.
[184] Be that as it may, I found that the plaintiff’s contention that the
MC has no power to control and supervise contractors by
130
imposing penalties on contractors to be misconceived. This is

because during the trial, the plaintiff has never produced any
contemporaneous document, which states that the MC has no
power to impose penalties on defaulting contractors. On the
other hand, the defendants have relied on Clause 10 captioned
“Renovation” and Clause 19 captioned “Amendment to Rules” in
the In-House Rules (see Bundle B, pgs. 11 and 13) and s.
59(1)(i) of the Strata Management Act 2013 (Act 757) (“SM Act
2013”) as the sources of its supervisory power over contractors.
The defendants have also referred to s. 56 of the SM Act 2013
(Act 757) which provides for the election of the office bearers
of a Management Committee to perform the MC’s duties and
conduct the MC’s business on the MC’s behalf, which includes
the management of the PPC. The section states as follows:
“56. Management committee
(1) Subject to subsection 63(4), the management

corporation shall elect a management committee which,
subject to any restriction imposed or direction given by the
management corporation at a general meeting, shall
perform the management corporation’s duties and conduct
the management corporation’s business on its behalf, and
may for that purpose exercise any of the management
corporation’s powers.
(2) The provisions of the Second Schedule shall apply to

the management corporation and the management
committee.
[185] S. 59 of the SM Act 2013 (Act 757) provides that the MC has
the power and duty to manage and administer the PPC in the
interest of the owners of the units in the PPC. The section states
as follows:
131
“59. Duties and powers of management corporation
(1) The duties of a management corporation shall be as

follows:
(a) to properly maintain and manage the

subdivided building or land and the common
property and keep it in a state of good and
serviceable repair;
(b) to determine and impose the Charges to be

deposited into the maintenance account for
the purposes of proper maintenance and
management of the subdivided buildings or
lands and the common property;
(c) to determine and impose the contribution to the

sinking fund to be deposited into the sinking
fund account for the purposes of meeting the
actual or expected expenditure specified under
subsection 51(2);
(d) to effect insurance according to this Act or to

insure against such other risks as the
proprietors may by special resolution direct;
(e) to comply with any notice or order given or

made by the local authority or any competent
public authority requiring the abatement of any
nuisance on the common property, or ordering
repairs or other work to be done in respect of
the common property or other improvements to
the common property;
132
(f) to prepare and maintain a strata roll for the

subdivided buildings or lands;
(g) to ensure that the accounts required to be

maintained by the management corporation
under this Act are audited and to provide
audited financial statements for the information
to its members;
(h) to enforce the by-laws; and
(i) to do such other things as may be expedient

or necessary for the proper maintenance and
management of the subdivided buildings or
lands and the common property.
(2) The powers of the management corporation shall be

as follows:
(a) to collect the Charges from the proprietors in

proportion to the share units or provisional
share units of their respective parcels or
provisional blocks;
(b) to collect the contribution to the sinking fund

from the proprietors of an amount equivalent to
ten percent of the Charges;
(c) to authorize expenditure for the carrying out of

the maintenance and management of the
subdivided buildings or lands and the common
property;
(d) to recover from any proprietor any sum

expended by the management corporation in
133
respect of that proprietor’s parcel in complying

with any such notice or order as referred to in
paragraph (1)(e);
(e) to purchase, hire or otherwise acquire movable

property for use by the proprietors in
connection with their use and enjoyment of the
common property;
(f) to employ or arrange and secure the services of

any person or agent to undertake the
maintenance and management of the common
property of the subdivided building or land;
(g) subject to subsection 70(2), to make

additional by-laws for the proper
maintenance and management of the
subdivided buildings or lands and the
common property;
(h) to borrow moneys required by the management

corporation in the exercise of its powers or the
performance of its duties;
(i) to secure the repayment of moneys borrowed by

it and the payment of interest thereon by
negotiable instrument or by a charge of unpaid
Charges to the maintenance account (whether
already imposed or not), or by a charge of any
property vested in it or by a combination of any
of those means; and
(j) to do all things reasonably necessary for the

performance of its duties under this Act and
for the enforcement of the by-laws.
134
(3) Where the management corporation performs any

repairs, work or act that are or is required or
authorized by or under this Part or by or under any
other written law to perform, whether or not the
repairs, work or act were or was performed
consequent upon the service on it by any Government
or statutory authority of any notice or order, but the
repairs, work or act were or was wholly or
substantially the liability or the responsibility of the
proprietor of a parcel only, or wholly or substantially
for the benefit of some of the parcels only, any
money expended by the management corporation in
performing the repairs, work or act shall—
(a) in the case where the repairs, work or act were

or was wholly or substantially the liability or
the responsibility of the proprietor of a parcel
only, be recoverable by the management
corporation in an action in a court of competent
jurisdiction or before the Tribunal as a debt due
to it jointly and severally from—
(i) the relevant proprietor of the parcel at the

time when the repairs, work or act were or
was performed; and
(ii) the relevant proprietor of the parcel at the

time when the action was commenced; or
(b) in the case where the repairs, work or act were

or was wholly or substantially for the benefit of
some of the parcels only, or wholly or
substantially the liability or the responsibility
of the proprietors of some of the parcels only,
135
be recoverable by the management corporation

in an action in a court of competent jurisdiction
or before the Tribunal as a debt due to it jointly
and severally from—
(i) the relevant proprietor of each of such

parcels at the time when the repairs, work
or act were or was performed; and
(ii) the relevant proprietor of each of such

parcels at the time when the action was
commenced.
(4) The amount payable by any proprietor and former

proprietor under subsection (3) in respect of any
parcel shall not be more than the proportion of the
debt which the share unit of the parcel then bears to
the total share units of all those parcels.
(5) A proprietor of a parcel who is not the proprietor of

the parcel at the time when the repairs, work or act
referred to in subsection (3) were or was performed
shall not be liable to pay the management corporation
any amount due under that subsection if he has, at
any time on or within twenty-one days before the
date he acquired the title or interest in the parcel,
made a requisition in writing to the management
corporation to inquire about the amount, if any,
recoverable by the management corporation under
that subsection in respect of the parcel, and the
management corporation has—
136
(a) certified that no amount is recoverable by the

management corporation in respect of the
parcel; or
(b) not given a reply to the requisition at any time

within fourteen days of the date of the service
of the requisition.
(6) Where—
(a) the management corporation incurs any

expenditure or performs any repairs, work or
act that it is required or authorized by or under
this Part or by or under any other written law to
perform, irrespective of whether or not the
expenditure was incurred or the repairs, work
or act were or was performed consequent upon
the service on it of any notice or order by any
Government or statutory authority; and
(b) the expenditure or the repairs, work or act

referred to in paragraph (a) were or was
rendered necessary by reason of any willful or
negligent act or omission on the part of, or
breach of any provision of its by-laws by, any
person or his tenant, lessee, licensee or invitee,
the amount of the expenditure of any money

performing the repairs, work or act shall be
recoverable by it from that person as a debt in an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction or
before the Tribunal.
137
(7) The generality of this section shall not be

prejudiced by any other provision in this Part
conferring a power or imposing a duty on the
management corporation.”
(Emphasis added).
[186] I found that the defendants have proven on a balance of

probabilities that Clause 10 and Clause 19 of the in-house rules
clearly provide that the MC has the power to control and manage
contractors, when they carry out renovations of the units in the
PPC (see Bundle B, pgs. 11 and 13).
[187] However, I am of the respectful view that the reliance by the

defendants on s. 59(1)(i) of the SM Act 2013 (Act 757), which
confers wide powers on the MC to do anything expedient or
necessary for the proper maintenance and management of the
units in the PPC and that these wide powers include the power to
manage or regulate contractors, is misplaced. This is because the
SM Act 2013 (Act 757) only came into force on 1.6.2015
whereas the 2 (two) letters to HUKM and COB were published
before that date, viz on 5.6.2013 and 18.9.2013, respectively.
[188] Nevertheless, I am of the view that the MC can rely on the wide
powers, which are conferred on the MC by the provisions of the
Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318), in particular, s. 43(2)(f), s. 44
and the by-laws of the PPC as set out in the Third Schedule of
the Act, to manage or regulate contractors. S. 43(2)(f) empowers
the MC to do all things reasonably necessary for the
performance of its duties under Part VII of the Act and for the
enforcement of the by-laws as set out in the Third Schedule of
the Act.
138
[189] I also noted that the 3 rd defendant (DW2) has said categorically
that it was the usual or customary practice for the MC to
supervise contractors, who are carrying out renovations to units
in the PPC. DW2 has said this when replying to the plaintiff’s
learned counsel’s query as to the MC’s source of power to
supervise contractors, when carrying out renovations. To my
mind, pursuant to the in-house rules and the Strata Titles Act
1985 (Act 318), it is clear that it is part and parcel of the
administrative function and responsibility of the MC to
supervise the contractors. I noted that the fact that COB has
never objected to the MC’s rights to impose the penalties on the
plaintiff for her breaches of the in-house rules, when she carried
out the renovation of Puan Nurul’s unit, through Primas Interior,
fortifies my conclusion. This fact is evident from the 2 (two)
letters, dated 9.9.2013 and 4.6.2014, respectively, which were
issued by COB to the MC and to Puan Nurul, respectively,
which were copied to the plaintiff for her information and which
were received by her.
Non-publication of 2 nd letter to the Honourable Mr. Tan Kok Wai,

the MP for Cheras
[190] The plaintiff pleaded that the 2 nd letter was published to the
Honourable Mr. Tan Kok Wai, the MP of Cheras. She relied on
the statement at the bottom of the 2 nd letter, which stated that it
was copied to 3 named parties, one of who was the Honourable
Mr. Tan Kok Wai, the MP for Cheras as proof, without more, of
the publication of the 2 nd letter to the latter. The defence has
specifically pleaded that the 2 nd letter was not sent to the
Honourable Mr. Tan Kok Wai, the MP for Cheras. The 3 rd
defendant (DW2) as the Chairman of the MC, who was cross-
examined by the plaintiff’s learned counsel, did not admit
139
sending the letter to the Honourable Mr. Tan Kok Wai, the MP
for Cheras.
[191] The person, who signed the 2 nd letter, and published it to COB,
by sending it to COB, was the 2 nd defendant (DW1) who was
acting in his capacity as the Secretary of the MC. The plaintiff
has relied on the evidence of the 3 rd defendant (DW2) on this
point but DW2 did not know whether the 2 nd letter was sent to
the Honourable Mr. Tan Kok Wai. In my view, who as
Chairman, was not sure, whether it was sent to the Honourable
Mr. Tan Kok Wai, the MP for Cheras cannot be faulted for his
uncertainty on this point.
[192] Therefore, I found that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the
2 nd letter was, in fact, published to the Honourable Mr. Tan Kok
Wai, the MP of Cheras as alleged by her.
Issue 1: (a) Whether the 1 st letter was referring to the

plaintiff?
(b) Whether the words and phrases complained of in

the 1 st letter, in their natural and ordinary
meanings and/or by way of innuendo, are capable
of bearing the imputations ascribed to them by the
plaintiff and whether they are in fact defamatory
of the plaintiff?
(c) Whether the defendants were actuated by malice

when publishing and/or causing to be published
the 1 st letter to HUKM?
[193] The 1 st letter is one of the 2 (two) subject matters of the

plaintiff’s suit, which the plaintiff claimed contained the words
and phrases complained of, which in their natural and ordinary
meanings and/or by way of innuendo, are capable of bearing the
140
imputations ascribed to them by the plaintiff and are in fact

defamatory of the plaintiff.
[194] However, the defendants’ pleaded case is that it was actually a

letter to HUKM to return cheque payments received by the MC
from HUKM for water and maintenance charges in the absence
of any billing or statement of account issued by the MC to
HUKM and to warn HUKM of the possibility of being cheated
by a “third party”, purportedly, claiming to be the MC and
requiring the payments to be made.
[195] On issue 1 (a), the defendants submitted as follows:
(1) A proper perusal of the 1 st letter to HUKM shows that the

plaintiff’s name was never mentioned;
(2) Hence, since there is no reference to the plaintiff at all in

the 1 st letter, there cannot be defamation of the plaintiff by
the MC and/or the 4 th defendant;
(3) The third party mentioned in the last paragraph of the 1 st

letter can never be deemed to refer to the plaintiff (see p.
233, Bundle B). It simply means somebody else or some
other unknown and unidentified party;
(4) In the above premise, the plaintiff has no basis to complain

or claim that the MC or the 4 th defendant had defamed her
as the letter did not mention any name at all;
(5) The 1 st letter was issued to one and only one party i.e.
HUKM, who has an interest and/or social moral and legal
duty to receive the 1 st letter as there was no basis for
HUKM to make payment to the MC, when the MC did not
bill HUKM at all;
141
(6) At the material time, the MC and the 4 th defendant had no

knowledge or information as to who had requested or
arranged for HUKM to make payment to MC;
(7) At the material time, when the 1 st letter was issued and
sent to HUKM along with the cheque payment to be
returned to HUKM, the MC and the 4 th defendant had no
improper motive or ill intention against any party or any
person at all. Accordingly, there was no malice,
whatsoever, in returning the cheque payment to HUKM
together with the covering letter reminding HUKM to be
careful or cautious when making payment to the MC in
future;
(8) From the MC’s point of view and for accounting purposes,
there was simply no justification and reason to receive
payment from HUKM when the MC has no record that they
have billed HUKM for such payment;
(9) It is, therefore, highly illogical, if not perverse, for the

plaintiff’s learned counsel to suggest to the 4 th defendant
(DW3) that it would be good for the wellbeing of the MC
or the PPC to simply receive money from HUKM when the
MC was not legally entitled to do so;
(10) Further or alternatively, the 4 th defendant and the MC

relied on justification as a defence due to the true and
actual event happening, whereby the MC received cheque
payments from HUKM, when in actual fact, the MC had
never sent any billing to HUKM. This is because HUKM
had never informed or notified the MC that they have
leased several units at the PPC from the owners.
Therefore, the MC had no record of any tenancy agreement
of any unit at the PPC that was entered into between the
142
unit owner or the tenants of the unit owners with HUKM.

Accordingly, no billing, whatsoever, was sent to HUKM
for payment. The MC only bills the unit owners of the PPC
for water and maintenance charges;
(11) As the MC had no records of billings sent to HUKM, the

MC had no right or basis to receive payments from
HUKM. Such facts are true. Therefore, the MC had no
alternative but to return the cheque, especially, when Puan
Asmihira was not able to confirm that HUKM had received
direct billing from the MC. After waiting for one week for
a reply from Puan Asmihira and since none was
forthcoming, the 4 th defendant and the MC then returned
the cheque to HUKM together with the 1 st letter. However,
the 1 st letter did not and never did mention the name of any
person responsible for causing the payment to be made to
the MC without proper billing of HUKM by the MC; and
(12) Clearly, there was no malice or improper motive by the

MC or its officer in publishing to HUKM the 1 st letter.
[196] Hence, the MC and the 4 th defendant urged the Court to find that
the 1 st letter was issued in good faith to HUKM based on true
events, which had taken place and which necessitated the return
of the payments by cheque to HUKM together with the covering
letter containing the 6 th remark advocating caution on the part of
HUKM.
[197] In the above premise, the MC and the 4 th defendant and all the
other defendants prayed that the claim against them in respect of
the 1 st letter be dismissed with cost as there was no defamation
based on the undisputed fact that the plaintiff was never named
in the 1 st letter.
143
[198] Alternatively, the defendants submitted that they are entitled to

rely on the defences of justification and/or qualified privilege
and/or fair comment on a matter of public interest.
[199] On issue 1(a), I found that the defendants’ submissions have no

merit. Hence, I rejected them. I was satisfied that the 1 st letter
was referring to the plaintiff.
[200] On issue 1(b), I found that the words and phrases complained of
in the 1 st letter, in their natural and ordinary meanings and/or by
way of innuendo, are capable of bearing the imputations
ascribed to them by the plaintiff and they are in fact defamatory
of the plaintiff. The words complained of are pleaded in para. 13
of the plaintiff’s re-amended statement of claim and reproduced
earlier in this Judgment. They are as follows:
“As a note of caution, we wish to bring to your attention

that a third party who purportedly claims to be
management services has been sending correspondences
to your organization of which we ourselves have no
knowledge or dealings with such actions and we further
reiterate that we are not a party to these transactions.”
“We would sincerely urge you to probe into this matter

seriously and thoroughly to determine the truth of the
subject matter to prevent any fraud and wrongdoings
by any party.”
(Emphasis added).
[201] On issue 1(c), I found that the defendants were not actuated by
malice when publishing and/or causing to be published the 1 st
letter.
[202] Below are my reasons for the above findings.
144
[203] In my judgment, in the instant case, even though there was no

specific reference to the plaintiff by name, there was no doubt in
my mind upon an objective evaluation of the evidence adduced
by the parties that the words “third party” complained of in the
1 st letter referred to the plaintiff by way of innuendo.
[204] This is because based on the evidence adduced, it was easily

understood by HUKM that the words referred to the plaintiff in
her capacity as the sole proprietress of Primas Interior. It was
because of this reason that upon receipt of the 1 st letter, Puan
Asmahira (PW3) from the Accounts Department of HUKM
referred the 1 st letter to the plaintiff for her attention and action
even though in her evidence in Court, PW3 did not identify the
plaintiff as the “third party” in the 1 st letter.
[205] In my judgment, when understood, objectively, in that manner

by ordinary sensible or reasonable persons, the words had the
tendency to expose the plaintiff to contempt, odium and ridicule
by right thinking members of HUKM. This is because the words
had the tendency to convey the defamatory imputations to the
readers as ascribed by the plaintiff in para. 14 a) and partially in
para. 14 c) of her re-amended statement of claim, viz the
plaintiff was an imposter and the plaintiff was inclined to
committing fraud or wrongdoings.
[206] However, I rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the plaintiff

has succeeded in proving that the words had the tendency to
convey the defamatory imputations to the readers as ascribed by
the plaintiff in para. 14 b), partially in para 14 c) and in para 14
d), viz that the plaintiff was a fraud and a cheat, that the
plaintiff had committed fraud or wrongdoings and that the
plaintiff was an undesirable element of the society.
145
Issue 2: (a) Whether the words and phrases complained of in

the 2 nd letter, in their natural and ordinary
meanings and/or by way of innuendo, are capable
of bearing the imputations ascribed to them by the
plaintiff and whether they are in fact defamatory
of the plaintiff?
(b) Whether the defendants were actuated by malice

when publishing and/or causing to be published
the 2 nd letter to COB?
[207] The 2 nd letter is one of the 2 (two) subject matters of the

plaintiff’s suit, which the plaintiff claimed contained the words
and phrases complained of, which in their natural and ordinary
meanings and/or by way of innuendo, are capable of bearing the
imputations ascribed to them by the plaintiff and are in fact
defamatory of the plaintiff. However, the defendants’ pleaded
case is that it was actually a reply by the MC, directly, to COB
concerning the plaintiff’s complaint to COB.
[208] On issue 2(a), I found that the words and phrases complained of
in the 1 st , 2 nd and 5 th remarks in the 2 nd letter, in their natural
and ordinary meanings and/or by way of innuendo, are capable
of bearing the imputations ascribed to them by the plaintiff and
are in fact defamatory of and concerning the plaintiff. The 1 st ,
2 nd and 5 th remarks have been pleaded in para. 3 a), b) and c) of
the plaintiff’s re-amended statement of claim and reproduced
earlier in this Judgment. These are as follows:
“3) D1 and D2 had participated, secured, authorized,

ratified and/or caused to be written and published the
letter of the first defendant dated 18.9.2013 to the
Jabatan Penilaian dan Pengurusan (COB) of the
Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (hereinafter
146
referred to as the letter to COB) of and concerning

the plaintiff, the contents of which were defamatory
of the plaintiff, to wit:
a) “… complainant’s letter has been grossly

distorted to mislead the good office of COB.”
(referred to as the 1 st defamatory remarks)
b) “… Sherene Mok has been a “trouble maker”

…” (referred to as the 2 nd defamatory
remarks).
c) ...
d) ...
e) “… the works carried out by … Prismas

Interior have not conformed with rules and
regulations imposed by the authorities …”
(referred to as the 5 th defamatory remarks).”
(Emphasis added).
[209] The imputations have been pleaded in para. 5(a), (b) and (c),
para. 6 (a), (b) and (c) and in para 9 (a), (b) and (c) of the
plaintiff’s re-amended statement of claim and reproduced earlier
in this Judgment. These are as follows:
“5) By the words and phrases contained in the 1 st

that:
(a) The plaintiff was a dishonest person.
147
(b) The plaintiff was untruthful and untrustworthy.
(c) The plaintiff had intentionally deceived and

misled the COB.
6) By the words and phrases contained in the 2 nd

that:
(a) The plaintiff was an unruly and quarrelsome

woman.
(b) The plaintiff was a shrew and/or behaved like a

shrew.
(c) The plaintiff was rude and unreasonable.
9) By the words and phrases contained in the 5 th

that:
(a) The plaintiff was an irresponsible person.
(b) The plaintiff was dishonest.
(c) The plaintiff was not a law abiding citizen.”
[210] I also found that the words and phrases in the 3 rd and 4 th remarks
in the 2 nd letter, in their natural and ordinary meanings and/or by
way of innuendo, are capable of bearing the imputations
ascribed to them by the plaintiff and are in fact defamatory of
148
and concerning the plaintiff. The 3 rd and 4 th remarks have been

pleaded in para. 3 c) and 3 d) of the plaintiff’s re-amended
statement of claim and are as follows:
“c) “… the said Contractor (Prismas Interior) had hidden

… and they are making use of the Proprietor …
deliberately creating a situation whereby deduction
will happen.” (referred to as the 3 rd defamatory
remarks).
d) “They will instigate the Proprietor to file a complaint

against the Management Corporation.” (referred to as
the 4 th defamatory remarks).”
[211] The imputations have been pleaded in para. 7(a), (b) and (c) and
para. 8(a), (b) and (c) of the plaintiff’s re-amended statement of
claim and are as follows:
“7) By the words and phrases contained in the 3 rd

that:
(e) The plaintiff was dishonest and untruthful.
(f) The plaintiff was unethical.
(g) The plaintiff was a hypocrite.
(h) The plaintiff was a discredited person.
8) By the words and phrases contained in the 4 th

149

that:
(d) The plaintiff was indeed a trouble maker.
(e) The plaintiff is an instigator created

misunderstanding/ displeasures of the
proprietor concerned towards D1 defendant so
as to file a complaint with the COB.
(f) The plaintiff had indulged in sharp practices.”
[212] On issue 2(b), I found that the defendants were not actuated by
malice when publishing and/or causing to be published the
words and phrases complained of in the 2 nd letter.
[213] Below are my reasons for the above findings.
[214] Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, I found that the
defendants, in particular, the MC and the 2 nd defendant, did not
issue the 2 nd letter out of the blue or for no apparent reason at
all. COB had responded to the plaintiff’s letter of complaint
dated 22.8.2013 by requesting, in writing, the MC to reply to the
plaintiff’s complaint over the non-refund to her of the
renovation deposit. The 2 nd letter, which is the MC’s letter of
reply, directly, to COB was dated 18.9.2013 and signed by the
2 nd defendant, as the Secretary of the MC.
[215] In my judgment, the words “Sherene Mok has been a trouble

maker” in the 2 nd letter were not published maliciously by the
defendants because they have given sufficient evidence to prove
that the main imputation in the natural and ordinary meanings of
the words complained of, viz Sherene Mok is a trouble maker,
were true in substance and fact. The defendants have adduced
sufficient evidence to prove on a balance of probabilities that
150
the plaintiff had been creating trouble for them ever since the
MC was established under the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318)
to manage the PPC.
[216] There was evidence that the defendants knew that the plaintiff
wanted back a full refund of the renovation deposit, which she
had paid to the MC on behalf of Puan Nurul, the owner of the
unit, but the MC could not give her a full refund of the
renovation deposit as the plaintiff had breached the in-house
rules.
[217] Hence, although the plaintiff has succeeded in proving on a

balance of probabilities that the defendants had written and
published the defamatory words in the 2 nd letter, the plaintiff
had failed to prove that in doing so, the defendant had
maliciously and falsely published the defamatory statements,
which were calculated to disparage the plaintiff by casting
aspersions on the plaintiff’s good character, thereby injuring the
plaintiff’s reputation.
[218] I also found that COB had erroneously thought that the
plaintiff’s letter of complaint was written by Puan Nurul, the
owner of the unit C-10-16, Block C, PPC. The error appears in
para. 2 of COB’s letter dated 9.9.2013 to the MC. In that
paragraph, COB informs the MC that it (COB) had received a
letter of complaint from the “pemilik petak C-10-16, Block C,
Prisma Perdana Condominium” in Malay, which mean “the
owner of unit C-10-16, Block C, Prisma Perdana Condominium”
in English.
[219] I also found that after the MC had written the 2 nd letter to COB
to give its side of the story, COB had written, directly, to Puan
Nurul vide its letter dated 4.6.2014 to advise Puan Nurul to deal,
directly, with the MC, instead of through the plaintiff, who was
151
only a contractor engaged by her (Puan Nurul) to get back the

refund of the renovation deposit. In doing this COB had clearly
stated in its letter (reproduced earlier in this Judgment) that
COB has no authority to deal with the plaintiff’s complaint as
the dispute concerning the refund of the renovation deposit was
an internal problem between the MC and the unit owner. Hence,
COB advised the MC to resolve the dispute through discussion
or negotiation.
[220] I found that the 2 nd letter was based on true events, which had
occurred between the plaintiff and the MC, regarding the refund
of the balance renovation deposit. It is very pertinent that the
plaintiff had taken upon herself to lodge the written complaint to
COB, even though she was not the owner of the unit concerned.
The owner of the unit was Puan Nurul. The plaintiff knew that
she was only a contractor, who had carried out the renovation of
the unit owned by Puan Nurul. Hence, the plaintiff had no locus
standi to deal directly with COB or the MC or the 4 th defendant
with regard to the refund of the renovation deposit or to write
and send the letter of complaint to COB unless she was
authorized in writing by Puan Nurul to do so. No. such letter of
authorization was produced by the plaintiff in the full trial.
[221] Be that as it may, the evidence, which included the documents

relied upon by the parties showed that the plaintiff’s complaint
to COB regarding the refusal of the MC to refund to her the
renovation deposit in full, was totally unjustified and was made
mala fide by the plaintiff. In reality, the plaintiff had refused to
comply with the procedure set by the MC to obtain only a
partial, and not a full, refund of the renovation deposit and the
procedure to be followed for the refund of the balance
renovation deposit had already been made known to her (see
152
Bundle C, p. 333) and to Puan Nurul (see Bundle B, pgs. 217(a),

231 and 263(a)).
[222] Further notices were also sent to both Puan Nurul and the
plaintiff to resolve the matter amicably (see Bundle D, pgs. 652,
670, 691 and 696). But both did not respond. Therefore, the MC
cannot be blamed for the non-refund of the balance renovation
deposit to the plaintiff, through Puan Nurul.
[223] In any event, the main or substantial imputation in the alleged

defamatory 2 nd letter as stated in para. 3 of the plaintiff’s re-
amended statement of claim, against the plaintiff in the 2 nd letter
was based on true events, which had taken place and based on
facts which were true in substance, which were proven by the
defendants on a balance of probabilities. In other words, the
plaintiff knew of the reason for the non-refund directly to her of
the renovation deposit in full, yet she proceeded to lodge a
written complaint with COB without disclosing the full facts,
and she had done that to make the MC look bad and
irresponsible in the eyes of COB.
[224] Both the defendants’ witnesses, viz the 2 nd defendant (DW1) and
the 3 rd defendant (DW2), have given evidence as to why the MC
and the 2 nd defendant did not reply directly to the plaintiff. The
defendants had chosen to reply to COB directly and not to the
plaintiff despite been asked to do so by COB. The MC explained
that in discharging its duties under the Strata Titles Act 1985
(Act 318), it preferred to deal directly with the unit owners and
not with the contractors engaged by them, including the
plaintiff, because the contractors would usually come and go and
would not be contactable or to be found once the jobs have been
completed.
153
[225] I found the MC’s explanation to be a reasonable one as it is in

line with the duties and responsibilities which have been
imposed on the MC by the law. Hence, the MC, certainly, could
not be faulted for relying on Clause 2 and Clause 10 of the in-
house rules in insisting on dealing directly with the unit owners
and not with the contractors engaged by them (see Bundle B,
pgs. 7 and 11).
[226] The plaintiff had admitted, and the 2 nd defendant and the 3 rd
defendant have given evidence, that the MC had requested the
plaintiff to liaise with Puan Nurul, the owner of the unit (see
Bundle C, p. 333), and Puan Nurul was required to contact the
MC and to accept the penalty, which was imposed on the
contractor (see pgs. 217(a) and 263(a)).
[227] Furthermore, Puan Nurul was required to sign the consent letter
for the MC to release the balance deposit to the plaintiff (see
Bundle C, p. 370). However, this procedure was not complied
with by Puan Nurul and the plaintiff. Had Puan Nurul turned up
for the meeting with the MC, she would have been given a fair
hearing on the issue concerning the deduction or the penalty
imposed on her contractor, viz the plaintiff, by the MC. Hence, I
found that the issue of the arbitrary and high handed conduct of
the MC in imposing the penalty as suggested by the plaintiff’s
learned counsel was unproven by the plaintiff.
[228] Accordingly, there is no basis for the plaintiff to accuse the MC

for creating trouble for her. The rule or procedure, which is
contained in Clause 2 and Clause 10 of the in-house rules of the
PPC, was applied to all the unit owners and not, directed, solely,
at the plaintiff. In any event, COB has advised Puan Nurul to
resolve the matter, directly, with the MC instead of going
through the plaintiff. It had done this because it was of the view,
154
and I found that this is a correct view, that the dispute between
Puan Nurul and the MC is an internal matter and that the MC
was entitled to impose conditions, which were not unreasonable
regarding the refund of the renovation deposit to the plaintiff,
through Puan Nurul (see Bundle D, pgs. 652-653).
[229] In addition, the plaintiff’s own police report dated 2.9.2013 (see
Bundle C, p. 371) showed that the plaintiff was aware of the
procedure imposed by the MC before the balance renovation
deposit could be released by the MC to her (see Bundle C, p.
371). The procedure required Puan Nurul’s written approval and
consent for the refund of the balance renovation deposit to the
plaintiff.
[230] I noted that despite emails and notices to both the plaintiff and
Puan Nurul to attend a meeting with the MC to resolve the
matter of the refund of the renovation deposit, both chose not to
attend the meeting (see Bundle D, pgs. 514, 566, 652 and 692).
Had both attended the meeting the balance renovation deposit
could and would have been released by the MC to the plaintiff,
through Puan Nurul. Therefore, the plaintiff should blame
herself for not assisting the MC to release the balance
renovation balance renovation deposit to her through Puan Nurul
instead of picking a fight or quarrelling with the members of the
Management Committee of the MC and making her baseless
complaint to COB and also lodging a baseless police report (see
Bundle D, pgs. 673, 674, 691 and 696).
[231] Based on the above reasons, the 2 nd letter to COB definitely

cannot be the subject matter of a defamation suit against the
defendants, when it is read in its proper context and under the
circumstances, in which it was published to COB, which was in
the form of a reply from the MC and the 2 nd defendant as to why
155
the refund was delayed or not made to the plaintiff. COB would
be concerned to find out the reason why the renovation deposit
was not refunded by the MC to the plaintiff as per the complaint
of the plaintiff.
[232] I noted the fact that prior to the issue of the plaintiff’s writ, the
plaintiff had issued two highly provocative and defamatory
lawyer’s letters to the defendants and their lawyer alleging
serious criminal offences of cheating the plaintiff of the
renovation deposit and embezzlement of the plaintiff’s
renovation deposit. I found that these allegations were unproven
by the plaintiff and were totally frivolous and completely
without basis.
[233] I found that the plaintiff’s credibility was highly questionable

when she claimed that she was not aware of the in-house rules
and that she need not have to report or register with the MC
when the MC took over the management of the PPC in the year
2009 onwards. As an estate agent, although practicing without
license, the plaintiff must have known or ought to know that she
has to comply with the rules and regulations of the PPC and the
MC. Her refusal to cooperate with the MC or follow the rules
and regulations of the MC has put her at unnecessary odds with
the MC.
[234] The plaintiff could have avoided having to send her complaint
letter to COB over the delay or non-refund of the balance
renovation deposit had she co-operated with the MC. The 3 rd
defendant (DW2) gave evidence in the full trial that there were
other agents who did not experience the same problem as the
plaintiff because they had co-operated with the MC. The
plaintiff ought to have attended the meeting with the MC to
resolve the matter as requested by the MC in their notices to her
156
(see Bundle D, pgs. 670, 674, 688, 690 and 696). However,
despite being informed by the MC vide two or three notices to
attend the meeting with the MC, she had blatantly failed or
refused to do so.
[235] The plaintiff had admitted she knew of the procedure for the
balance renovation deposit to be refunded to her. Hence, I found
that she had deliberately refused to comply with the procedure,
which if complied with would have enabled the MC to release
the balance renovation deposit to her. Yet she, unreasonably,
proceeded to lodge a police report and to make a complaint to
COB against the alleged unreasonable action and behavior of the
MC, the members of the Management Committee and the 4 th
defendant.
[236] If the plaintiff is serious about the refund of the renovation

deposit or about the alleged breach by the MC, she ought to
have filed a civil claim against the defendants rather than filing
this defamation suit against the defendants.
[237] The reply to COB was published merely to answer or provide

the MC’s explanation to COB as to why the balance renovation
deposit could not be released by the MC to the plaintiff. There
was no evidence of malice or improper motive on the part of the
MC and the 2 nd defendant in sending the 2 nd letter to COB.
[238] In her re-amended reply to the re-re-amended defence of the

defendants, the plaintiff failed to furnish proper and credible
particulars of malice. Paragraph 6 a) to 6 f) in the plaintiff’s re-
re amended Reply cannot constitute actual malice to defeat the
defendants’ defence of qualified privilege (see Dr Syed Azman
Syed Ahmad Nawawi).
157
[239] More importantly, the plaintiff has taken upon herself to

exercise her right to reply to the defendant’s 2 nd letter to COB
(see Bundle D, pgs. 566-568). Having said her piece in her letter
to COB, the plaintiff would have had the opportunity to clear
whatever imputation that were ascribed by her to the alleged
defamatory remarks against her in the eyes of COB. Therefore,
the issue of defamation would no longer arise.
[240] At the conclusion of the trial, I found that the plaintiff was
aware of the MC’s notice to her and the other residents in the
PPC to the effect that the MC no longer accepted payment in
bulk for water and maintenance charges, with the exception of
one owner of several units. Yet, the plaintiff refused to observe
or obey the MC’s ruling on the non-acceptance of payment in
bulk (see Bundle B, pgs. 206 and 207).
[241] Even after the suit was filed by the plaintiff on 13.12.2013 and
before the full trial commenced afresh on 20.8.2015, the
plaintiff was also given a lawyer’s letter dated 11.6.2015 by the
MC, which notified her regarding the procedure to be complied
with by her for the issuance of a car sticker for unit A-10-8,
after she had made a complaint in her letter dated 6.5.2015 that
the MC had unreasonably refused to issue a car sticker to her
sub-tenant to enable her sub-tenant to park his car within the
PPC’s car park area (see Bundle E, p. 922).
[242] The defendants’ witness (DW3) gave evidence that a penalty of RM

300.00 was imposed on the plaintiff because the plaintiff was
carrying on the renovation after office hours. This had occurred
after the security personnel found a person in Puan Nurul’s unit
after office hours whereby the identity of the person could not be
ascertained, as he was not registered at the guard house.
158
[243] The defendants’ witness (DW3) also gave evidence that another
penalty of RM 300.00 was imposed because the dumpster which
was used to keep the renovation waste from Puan Nurul’s unit
was left in the PPC outside the times stipulated in the form.
[244] There was documentary evidence that the receipt for payment of the
renovation deposit was issued in the name of one Han Choo Pau
because the payment of the renovation deposit of a sum of RM
1,000.00 in cash was made by him. But he was never called to give
evidence to support the evidence of PW1 and Puan Nurul that there
were no breaches of the in-house rules of the PPC by the plaintiff
(PW1) as contended by the defendants’ 3 rd witness (DW3).
Issue 3: Whether the defendants can rely on their pleaded

defences of justification, qualified privilege and/or fair comment
on a matter of public interest for the 2 (two) letters?
[245] On issue (3), I found that the defendants have proven their
defence of justification on a balance of probabilities in respect
of the main defamatory imputations in the 2 (two) letters, which
I found to be true in substance and in fact.
[246] As for the defence of qualified privilege, I found that the defendants
have also proven this defence on a balance of probabilities due to the
existence of the reciprocity of duty and interest on the part of the
MC and HUKM with regard to the 1 st letter and on the part of the
MC and COB with regard to the 2 nd letter.
[247] However, on the defendants’ third defence of fair comment on a

matter of public interest, I found that the defendants have failed
to prove this defence on a balance of probabilities with regard to
the 2 (two) letters.
Law on justification
159
[248] It is trite law that the test for justification is whether the words
complained of were true in substance and in fact.
[249] In Chapter 11, on justification, the learned author in Gatley on

Libel and Slander, Sweet & Maxwell, eleventh edition, states as
follows:
“CHAPTER 11
JUSTIFICATION (TRUTH)
Terminology and policy. It is a defence for the defendant

to establish that the imputation in respect of which he is
sued is substantially true, and the defence is called a plea
of justification. The name is unfortunate because while its
meaning may be clear to lawyers it may convey to lay people
the idea that there must be some good reason for the
publication, whereas in fact, with one minor exception, it is
not actionable as defamation maliciously to publish the
truth. Nevertheless, the usage is so inveterate in England
that it is adhered to in this chapter. Whether truth should in
all circumstances be a defence is controversial and for long
in a number of Australian states the law was that the defence
was confined to cases where the publication was “for the
public benefit” or “in the public interest”; however, the
current uniform legislation restores the common law
position. If one has a public benefit requirement one in
effect introduces in an indirect way a limited form of
liability for invasion of privacy by the revelation of
embarrassing private facts. However, at the moment the
English law of defamation is committed to the
proposition that a claimant is not entitled to recover
damages for injury to a reputation which he ought not to
160
possess and for this purpose the reputation he ought to

posses is determined as a matter of objective fact.”
(Emphasis added).
(See pgs. 309-310 of Gatley on Libel and Slander, Sweet &

Maxwell, eleventh edition).
[250] With regard to the burden of proof, the learned author states as
follows at pgs. 311-312:
“The burden of proof. Although the practice is that the

claimant alleges that the defendant published the
matter “falsely”, it is a clear in England and in other
jurisdictions which follow the common law on this point
that a defamatory imputation is presumed to be false
and that the burden is upon the defendant to show that
it is substantially true. From a theoretical point of view
there are arguments both ways. On the one hand, the
placing on the defendant of the burden of proof on what is
(or should be) the central issue in proceedings having as
their purpose the vindication of reputation is out of line
with the general approach in tort law; on the other hand, it
is the defendant who has made a charge against the
claimant and the claimant may say that he is entitled to be
regarded as “innocent” until proven “guilty”. From the
more general perspective of freedom of speech there is no
doubt that the present rule inhibits the ability of the media
to expose what they believe to be matters of public
concern; but again, on the other side, a claimant who faced
general charges of wrongdoing might find it difficult to
prove a negative”.
(Emphasis added).
161

[251] With regard to proof of justification in cases where the

imputation is of suspicion, the learned author states as follows:
“Proof of justification: cases where the imputation is of

suspicion. The approach to proof of justification in
“reasonable grounds to suspect” cases was summarized by
Eady J., adopting the submissions of counsel, in a passage
approved by the Court of Appeal in Musa King v.
Telegraph Group Ltd as follows:
“(2) [W]here the nature of the plea is one of

‘reasonable grounds to suspect’, it is necessary
to plead (and ultimately prove) the primary
facts and matters giving rise to reasonable
grounds of suspicion objectively judged:
(3) It is impermissible to plead as a primary fact

the proposition that some person or persons (eg
law enforcement authorities) announced,
suspected or believed the claimant to be guilty;
(4) A defendant may (for example, in reliance upon

the Civil Evidence Act 1995) adduce hearsay
evidence to establish a primary fact – but this
in no way undermines the rule that the
statements (still less beliefs) of any individual
cannot themselves serve as primary facts;
(5) Generally, it is necessary to plead allegations

of fact tending to show that it was some
conduct on the claimant’s part that gave rise to
162
the grounds of suspicion (the so-called

‘conduct rule’).
(6) It was held by [the CA] in [Chase v. Newsgroup

Newspapers Ltd], that this is not an absolute
rule, and that for example ‘strong
circumstantial evidence’ can itself contribute to
reasonable grounds for suspicion.
(7) It is not permitted to rely upon post-publication

events in order to establish the existence of
reasonable grounds, since (by way of analogy
with fair comment) the issue has to be judges as
at the time of publication.
(8) A defendant may not confine the issue of

reasonable grounds to particular facts of his
own choosing, since the issue has to be
determined against the overall factual position
as it stood at the material time (including any
true explanation the claimant may have given
for the apparently suspicious circumstances
pleaded by the defendant).
(9) Unlike the rule applying in fair comment cases,

the defendant may rely upon facts subsisting at
the time of publication even if he was unaware
of them at that time.
(10) A defendant may not plead particulars in such a

way as to have the effect of transferring the
burden to the claimant of having to disprove
them.”
163

[252] With regard to the requirement to prove the imputation

contained in the words, which has to be justified, not the literal
truth of the words, nor some other similar charge not contained
in the words, the learned author states as follows:
“Justification required of and limited to the imputation.

It is the imputation contained in the words which has to be
justified, not the literal truth of the words, nor some other
similar charge not contained in the words, this has two
consequences. First, the defendant may succeed in a plea
of justification even though what he has said may be
inaccurate in a number of respects. Secondly, he may not,
under a plea of justification, prove the truth of other facts
damaging to the claimant’s reputation, even if they are in
the same sector of the claimant’s life, and would be no less
damaging to the claimant’s reputation. The issue of what
may be advanced under a plea of justification is therefore
closely linked to the meaning or meanings which the
defamatory words are reasonably capable of bearing. If,
therefore, the defendant states that the claimant’s affairs
are under investigation by the fraud squad that is incapable
of carrying the imputation that the claimant is guilty of
fraud that is incapable of carrying the imputation that the
claimant is guilty of fraud and the defendant may therefore
justify without showing that he is guilty. However, one
should guard against the assumption that a direct
imputation of guilt also conveys a lesser imputation of
suspicion. If I say that you are a thief I cannot attempt to
advance a plea of justification directed at showing that
there were reasonable grounds to suspect you of theft.
164
The general rule is that the imputation must be justified by

reference to the facts as they were at time when it was
published. A defendant may not rely on matters which
occurred after the date of publication complained of in
order to support a plea that there were, objectively
speaking, reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
claimant performed the actions attributed to him in that
publication. Contrariwise, whatever the position may be
under the law of negligence or the data protection
legislation, the defendant who published accurate
information is not obliged, for the purposes of defamation
law, to correct it when it becomes inaccurate. However,
the nature of the imputation must be considered, so that a
general charge against character may be justified by
subsequent events:
“if a libel accuses a man of being a ‘scoundrel’, the

particulars of justification can include facts which
show him to be a scoundrel, whether they occurred
before or after the publication.”

[253] With regard to the sufficiency of proof of substantial

justification, the learned author states as follows:
“Substantial justification sufficient. Some leeway for

exaggeration and error is given by the defences of fair
comment and qualified privilege. However, for the
purposes of justification, if the defendant proves that “the
main charge, or gist, of the libel” is true, he need not
justify statements or comments which do not add to the
165
sting of the charge or introduce any matter by itself

actionable.
“it is sufficient if the substance of the libelous

statement be justified; it is unnecessary to repeat
every word which might have been the subject of the
original comment. As much must be justified as
meets the sting of the charge, and if anything be
contained in a charge which does not add to the sting
of it, that need not be justified.”
When considering substantial truth it is important to

“isolate the essential core of the libel and not to be
distracted by inaccuracies around the edge – however
substantial”. Journalists “need to be permitted a degree of
exaggeration even in the context of factual assertions” and
“one needs to consider whether the sting of a libel

has been established having regard to its overall
gravity and the relative significance of any elements
of inaccuracy or exaggeration. Provided these criteria
are applied, and the defence would otherwise
succeed, it is no part of the court’s function to
penalize a defendant for sloppy journalism – still less
for tastelessness of style”
So, in Clarke v. Taylor the defendants charged the plaintiff

with having been connected with a “grand swindling
concern”. The whole of the alleged libel related to
transactions said to have taken place at Manchester with
the exception of the following passage:
“As we have already stated, Clarke had been at Leeds

for one or two days before his arrival in this town,
166
and is supposed to have made considerable purchases

there. It is hoped, however, that the detection of his
plans in Manchester will be learnt in time to prevent
any very serious losses from taking place.”
The defendants in their plea justified the whole libel with

the exception of this passage. The declaration contained no
allegation that the defendants intended to impute to the
plaintiff the commission of any fraud at Leeds. A jury
having found for the defendants on the part of the libel
which was justified the court refused to enter a verdict for
the plaintiff on the passage not justified, adding that it was
not libelous in itself. “The question”, said Vaughan J.:
“is whether the libel is not substantially justified. All

that part of it which directly imputes fraud to the
plaintiff relates solely to what took place at
Manchester, and that is covered by the justification.
With respect to Leeds there is no averment or
innuendo in the declaration to point the libel … I
cannot discover in the alleged libel any distinct and
clear substantive act of criminality charged, which
the defendant’s plea does not cover.”
However a charge of “organizing bands of hecklers to go

about wrecking performances of modern, atonal music”
was not justified by evidence of booing after one
performance.”
(See pgs. 320-321of Gatley on Libel and Slander, Sweet &

167
[254] With regard to the unimportance of a slight inaccuracy in one or

more details when proving the defence of justification, the
learned author states as follows:
“Inaccuracy of detail. Again, if the defendant can prove

that the main charge or gist of the libel is true, a slight
inaccuracy in one or more of its details will not prevent
him from succeeding in a defence of justification. Thus in
Alexander v. N. E. Ry the defendants published at their
stations a notice stating that the plaintiff had been
convicted of riding in a train for which his ticket was not
available; and sentenced to a fine of £1 with the alternative
of 14-days’ imprisonment. On demurrer it was held that
the inaccuracy as to the length of the alternative
imprisonment did not necessarily make the notice libelous,
and that it was a question for the jury whether the notice
was substantially true – that is, whether what was stated
inaccurately was of the gist of the libel. In contrast, in
Gwyinn v. S. E. Rly a similar notice stated that the plaintiff
had been convicted of travelling without a ticket and
sentenced to a fine of 1 s .., or in default of payment, to
three-days’ imprisonment with hard labour, whereas no
hard labour had in fact been imposed in default, and the
plaintiff recovered £250 damages. The words
“imprisonment with hard labour” were not only untrue, but
must, in the opinion of the jury, have produced a wholly
false impression of the gravity of the offence committed.”

Defence of justification in respect of 2 nd letter
168
[255] I found that the imputations in respect of the 5 remarks in the

2 nd letter, which the plaintiff claimed to be defamatory of her,
are in fact true or substantially true based on the evidence
adduced by the parties. This is because I found that they have
been proven to be substantially true by the defendants.
[256] The imputation that the plaintiff was dishonest and untruthful
arising from the 1 st alleged defamatory remark concerning the
gross distortion of facts by the plaintiff, and the imputation that
the plaintiff is a troublemaker arising from the 2 nd alleged
defamatory remark are substantially true. The plaintiff had
refused to disclose to COB the procedure imposed by the MC for
the plaintiff to procure the refund of her deposit from the MC.
Despite been aware of the procedure, the plaintiff still
proceeded to lodge a police report and to send a complaint letter
to COB alleging unreasonable conduct on the part of the MC,
the members of the Management Committee and the 4 th
defendant for not refunding to her the renovation deposit.
[257] Based on the admission by the plaintiff, she had received the
letter from the MC’s lawyer requesting her to liaise with Puan
Nurul and for her to request Puan Nurul to deal directly with the
MC for the release of the balance renovation deposit to the
plaintiff (see Bundle C, p. 333).
[258] Based on her police report (see Bundle C, p. 371), the plaintiff
knew that she and her client, Puan Nurul, had to follow the
procedure before the MC could release the balance renovation
deposit to her. The plaintiff knew that Puan Nurul must contact
the MC to sign the letter of acceptance and release before the
MC could refund the balance deposit to her (see Bundle C, p.
263(a)). Yet, the plaintiff made a written complaint to COB
169
without disclosing such facts or procedure in order to paint a

bad picture of the MC.
[259] Under s. 8 of the Defamation Act 1957, there is no requirement for

the defendants to prove the truth of each and every imputation or
all of the imputations in the 5 (five) remarks listed by the plaintiff.
[260] It is trite law that so long as the main gist of the libel contained
in the defamatory imputation is true, it is sufficient for the
defence of justification to apply. Hence, I agreed with the
defendants that since the two main gists of the libel, viz the
plaintiff is a trouble maker and the plaintiff was dishonest and
untruthful when writing and sending her letter of complaint to
COB are true in substance, the defendants and/or the MC and the
2 nd defendant are entitled to invoke justification as a complete
defence to the plaintiff’s claim for damages for libel (see para.
55, p. 699 in Dato’ Mohamad Bustaman Abdullah; para. 10, p.
431 in Chew Peng Cheng; and also paras. 17, 18 and 19, p. 324
of P&A Systech Sdn. Bhd.).
[261] This is because as stated, inter alia, by the learned author in

Gatley on Libel and Slander, Sweet & Maxwell, eleventh
edition, and reproduced earlier in this Judgment, the law of
defamation is committed to the proposition that a claimant is not
entitled to recover damages for injury to a reputation which he
ought not to possess and for this purpose the reputation he ought
to possess is determined as a matter of objective fact.
Law on qualified privilege
[262] It is trite law that defamatory words are protected by qualified

privilege if all the conditions are satisfied, viz that the
publication was made bona fide and without malice towards the
170
claimant on a privileged occasion (see Gatley on Libel and

Slander, Sweet & Maxwell, eleventh edition).
Defence of qualified privilege in respect of 2 nd letter
[263] Based on the evidence, I found that the defendants’ defence of

qualified privilege succeeded because the 2 nd letter to COB was
written in response to the request by COB to answer to the
complaint by the plaintiff, which was lodged with COB. COB,
being the governing or statutory body having supervision and
control over the MC, has a duty or interest to find out whether
the plaintiff’s complaint was valid or otherwise.
[264] The MC and the 2 nd defendant are obliged and have a moral,
social and legal duty to explain to COB as to why the balance
renovation deposit could not be released to the plaintiff, which
was simply due to the non-compliance of procedure by Puan
Nurul and the plaintiff.
[265] Therefore, such an occasion arises whereby qualified privilege

applies in the event the words are deemed defamatory of the
plaintiff. Reciprocity exists because the MC and/or the 2 nd
defendant merely issued to COB the 2 nd letter in order to comply
with the request of COB.
[266] As explained earlier, the MC took the stand that as the letter of
inquiry came from COB arising from the plaintiff’s letter of
complaint to COB, the MC was duty bound to reply to COB, and
not to the plaintiff despite COB asking the MC to reply directly
to the plaintiff.
171
[267] I found that the reply to COB, viz the 2 nd letter was published to
one and only one party, i.e. COB. It was published without
malice and in good faith solely to explain to COB what had
actually transpired between the plaintiff and the MC and why
the balance renovation deposit could not be refunded to the
plaintiff, as yet.
[268] I also found that there was no evidence at all to prove the
plaintiff’s claim that there was malice or ill intention on the
MC’s part in replying, directly, to COB. I found that other than
the single publication of the 2 nd letter to COB, the 2 nd letter was
never published to outsiders or the general public. Hence, there
can be no improper motive or collateral purpose on the part of
the MC in publishing the reply to COB.
[269] I found that since COB was set up to supervise or oversee the
management and administration of subdivided buildings by the
management corporations, including the MC of the PPC in the
instant case, what the letter would have conveyed to COB with
regard to the alleged non-refund of the renovation deposit by the
MC would be as follows:
(1) In not making full and frank disclosure to COB and in

giving a misrepresentative account of what had actually
transpired between the plaintiff and the MC to COB, the
plaintiff was dishonest and untrustworthy. This is because
the plaintiff knew the reason why the MC did not or could
not refund to her in full the renovation deposit and the
reason is her and her client’s failure to comply with the
procedure as set down by the MC;
(2) By making the unnecessary and unjustified complaint to

COB, when she was not even an owner of a unit in the
PPC, coupled with her and Puan Nurul’s refusal to comply
172
with the procedure already made known to her for the

refund of the balance of the renovation deposit, the
plaintiff had given trouble to the MC by deliberately
distorting the true facts in order to mislead COB that the
MC’s action towards the plaintiff was indeed
unreasonable;
(3) The plaintiff is not a law abiding person because she has
refused to comply with the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act
318), the by-laws as set out in the Third Schedule of the
Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318), in particular, the by-laws
in paragraph 6(a) and (c), and the in-house rules of the
MC; and
(4) The plaintiff has a hidden motive in making such an

unfounded complaint to COB because there is a possibility
that the plaintiff may use the occasion to ask the unit owner,
viz Puan Nurul, to make a complaint to the MC and/or COB
for the non-refund of the renovation deposit in full.
[270] Quite apart from my findings as stated above, I also found that
para. 6 and paras. 6(a) to (f) of the plaintiff’s re-amended reply,
which purported to set out the particulars of the defendants’
express malice, have no merit. This is because it did not provide
any particulars to substantiate the plaintiff’s claim of malice on
the part of the defendants (see Dr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad
Nawawi). In that case the Court of Appeal ruled that the
allegations of malice were bare and were only bland statements
without more.
[271] I also found that Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee Tan & Associates,
being the solicitors and the legal advisor to the MC are legally
entitled to receive a copy of the 2 nd letter. Hence, the extension
of a copy of the 2 nd letter to Messrs. Chim Yiam, Lee Tan &
173
Associates is also protected by qualified privilege. This is

because the law firm had an interest and a duty to receive a copy
of the 2 nd letter when acting as the MC’s legal advisor.
[272] Based on the above reasons, even though I have found that the
imputations are defamatory of the plaintiff I ruled that the
defence of qualified privilege was applicable and that it
accorded protection to the defendants (see p. 433, at para. G of
Chew Peng Cheng; and p. 702, at paras. 66-68 of Dato’
Mohamad Bustaman Abdullah).
The office of COB, the Building & Common Property

(Maintenance & Management) Act 2007 (Act 663) (since repealed
on 1.6.2015), the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318) and the Strata
Management Act 2013 (Act 757)
[273] The office of COB was first set up under s. 3 of the now
repealed Building & Common Property (Maintenance &
Management) Act 2007 (“BCP (M&M) Act 2007”) (Act 663) for
the purposes of administering and carrying out the provisions of
the Act and to be in charge of Parts VI and VII of the Strata
Titles Act 1985 (Act 318). The same section also states that
COB shall perform such other duties as are imposed and may
exercise such powers as are conferred upon him by the Strata
Titles Act 1985 (Act 318).
[274] The BCP (M&M) Act 2007 (Act 663) was passed by Parliament
to provide for the proper maintenance and management of
buildings and common property. S. 4 of the Act provides for the
establishment of a Joint Management Body consisting of the
developer and the purchasers where a building or land intended
for subdivision into parcels has been completed before the
commencement of the Act and vacant possession of the parcels
174
has been delivered by the developer to the purchasers but the

management corporation has not come into existence.
[275] S. 15(1) of the Act provides that the Joint Management Body
shall be deemed to be dissolved three months from the date of
the first meeting of the management corporation for the
building.
[276] By virtue of the interpretation contained in s. 2 of the Act, the

term “management corporation” “means the management
corporation established under the Strata Titles Act 1985”.
[277] The Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318) was passed by Parliament
to facilitate the subdivision of building into parcels and the
disposition of titles and for purposes connected therewith. It
came into force in Peninsular Malaysia and the Federal Territory
of Kuala Lumpur on 1. 6. 1985. Subsequently, the preamble was
amended to insert the words “or land” after the word “building”
vide the Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2007 (Amendment Act
1290) which came into force on 12.4.2007.
[278] Part VI of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318) contains
provisions relating to the rights and obligations attaching to
individual parcels and provisional blocks.
[279] Part VII of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318) contains
provisions relating to the management of a subdivided building
by the management corporation of a subdivided building (see s.
29), the power of COB to appoint a managing agent to exercise
or perform certain powers including those of the managing
corporation (see s. 50), breaches of provisions of Part VII of the
Act by the management corporation or defaults in complying
with any requirements of or duties imposed on it by any of the
provisions of Part VII of the Act, etc.
175
[280] The BCP (M&M) Act 2007 (Act 663) was repealed by s. 153 of
the Strata Management Act 2013 (Act 757) on the date of the
coming into force of the SM Act 2013 (Act 757), viz on
1.6.2015 for the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, the Federal
Territory of Labuan and the Federal Territory of Putrajaya and
on 12.6.2015 for the state of Penang. However, Chapter 5 of
Part IV the Act, which deals with Strata Management Before
Existence of Management Corporation, contains transitional and
saving provisions due to the repeal of the BCP (M&M) Act 2007
(Act 663).
[281] S. 37(2) in that Chapter expressly provides that nothing in the

Act shall affect the past operation of, or anything done under the
repealed Act before the date of coming into operation of the Act.
S. 38 in that Chapter provides that a Joint Management Body
established or a Joint Management Committee elected under the
repealed Act, viz the BCP (M&M) Act 2007 (Act 663), shall be
deemed to have been established or elected under this Act
except that after the commencement of the Act the provisions of
the Act shall apply to such a Body or Committee.
[282] S. 41 in that Chapter deals with the incumbent COB and other
officers. It provides that a person who, immediately before the
commencement of the Act is COB or an officer appointed under
subsection 3 (1) of the repealed Act, viz the BCP (M&M) Act
2007 (Act 663), shall continue to hold such office as if he were
appointed under subsection 4 (1) of the Act.
[283] The SM Act 2013 (Act 757) was passed by Parliament to make
provision for the proper maintenance and management of
buildings and common property, and for related matters.
[284] S. 4 of the SM Act 2013 (Act 757), which provides for the
appointment of COB, vests responsibility for the administration
176
and carrying out of the SM Act 2013 (Act 757) with specified
duties and powers in the office of COB (see Management
Corporations in Malaysia by Michael J Willis, Sweet & Maxwell
Asia). The section states as follows:
“4. Appointment of Commissioner of Buildings,

deputies and other officers
(1) The State Authority may, in respect of a local

authority area or any other area, appoint an
officer to be known as the Commissioner of
Buildings and such number of Deputy
Commissioners of Buildings and other officers as
may be necessary for the purpose of administering
and carrying out the provisions of this Act.
(2) The appointment of the Commissioner of

Buildings, any Deputy Commissioner of Buildings
and other officer under subsection (1) shall be made
by notification in the Gazette.
(3) Subject to any general or special direction of the

State Authority which is not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, the Commissioner shall have
charge of the administration of this Act and may
perform such duties as are imposed and may
exercise such powers as are conferred upon him by
this Act or any other written law.
(4) Subject to any general or special direction of the

Commissioner which is not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, any powers conferred on and
duties to be performed by the Commissioner under
this Act or any other written law may be exercised or
177
performed by any Deputy Commissioner or other

officer appointed under subsection (1).
(5) The Commissioner may, in relation to any particular

matter, delegate in writing all or any of his powers or
functions under this Act, except his power of
delegation, to any public officer or officer of any
local authority.
(6) Any delegation under subsection (5) may be revoked

at any time by the Commissioner and shall not
prevent the Commissioner from exercising the
powers or performing the functions delegated.”
(Emphasis added).
[285] S. 50 in Part VII of Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318) empowers,
initially, the “Director” to appoint a managing agent to exercise
or perform certain powers, etc. The term “Director” is given the
following interpretation in s. 4 of that Act:
“Director” means the Director of Lands and Mines for the

State and includes a Deputy Director of Lands and Mines
and, in the case of the Federal Territory, the Land
Administrator.”
[286] Subsequently, s. 50 was amended to substitute COB for

“Director”. The amended s. 50(1) empowers COB to appoint a
managing agent to exercise the powers and discharge the duties
and functions of the management corporation, upon complaints
by a proprietor or any person or body having a registered
interest in a parcel that the management corporation has not
functioned satisfactorily, if COB is satisfied that it is in the
interests of the parcel proprietors in the subdivided building or
land concerned.
178
[287] Upon the appointment of the managing agent, the amended s.

50(2) empowers COB, to also specify that the managing agent
shall have and may exercise and discharge the following powers,
duties and functions:
“(a) all the powers, duties and functions of the

management corporation for the subdivided building
to which the appointment relates or of the council of
the management corporation;
(b) Any one or more of those powers, duties and

functions specified in the appointment; or
(c) All of those powers, duties and functions except

those specified in the appointment.”
[288] S. 50(3) provides that the expenses incurred by the managing

agent shall be charged on the management fund of the
management corporation.
[289] By virtue of the original s. 4, the term “management

corporation”, “in relation to any subdivided building shown in
an approved strata plan, means the management corporation
established under section 39, 64 or 64A;”
[290] S. 39(1) provides, inter alia, for the establishment of a

management corporation upon the opening of a book of the
strata register in respect of a subdivided building consisting of
all the parcel proprietors.
[291] S. 39(4) provides, inter alia, that the management corporation

shall elect a council which shall perform the management
corporation’s duties and conduct the management corporation’s
business on its behalf, and may for that purpose exercise any of
the management corporation’s powers.
179
[292] S. 39(5) provides that the provisions of the Second Schedule

shall have effect in relation to the management corporation and
its council. The Second Schedule was deleted by the Strata
Titles (Amendment) Act 2013 (Act A1450), which came into
force on 1.6.2015 in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur,
Federal Territory of Putrajaya (this Amendment Act is not
applicable to the instant case as the writ was filed on 13.12.2013
and the 2 (two) letters were dated 5.6.2013 and 18.9.2013,
respectively).
[293] The Second Schedule sets out the provisions which govern the
management corporation and its council. The provisions relate
to the constitution of the council, meetings, quorum for council
meetings, delegation of powers and duties by the council, power
of the council to employ agents and servants, proceedings of the
council, the annual general meeting of the management
corporation, the extraordinary general meetings of the
management corporation, notice of general meeting, quorum at
general meeting, the chairman of the general meeting, manner of
deciding questions at general meetings, proxy, voting rights of
the proprietor of the unit, voting rights of the co-proprietors and
the common seal of the management corporation.
[294] Subsequently, ss. 64 and 64A have been deleted by the Strata
Titles (Amendment) Act 2007 (Act A 1290) and s. 4 was
amended by the Strata Titles (Amendment) Act (Act A1290) and
the Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2013 (Act A1450) to change
the interpretation of the term “management corporation” to state
as follows:
“management corporation”, in relation to any subdivided

building shown in a certified strata plan, means the
management corporation established under s 17;”
180
[295] However, as stated earlier in this Judgment, the Strata Titles

(Amendment) Act 2013 (Act A1450) is inapplicable to the
instant case as it came into force on 1.6.2015 in the Federal
Territory of Kuala Lumpur where the PPC is situated whereas
the 2 (two) letters were dated prior to that date, viz on 5.6.2013
and on 18.9.2013, respectively.
[296] The original s. 17 provides that upon authenticating the

statement in Form 3 required to be contained in any book of the
strata register, the Registrar shall make on the register and issue
documents of title to the lot in question a memorial to the effect
that the book has been opened, and that the common property is
vested in the management corporation and he shall return the
issue document to that corporation.
[297] Subsequently, s. 17 was amended vide the Strata Titles

(Amendment) Act 2013 (Act A1450), which came into force on
1.6.2015 in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Federal
Territory of Putrajaya. However, this Amendment Act is not
applicable to the instant case as the writ was filed on 13.12.2013
and the 2 (two) letters were dated 5.6.2013 and 18.9.2013,
respectively. The amended s. 17 provides that upon
authenticating the statement in Form 3 required to be contained
in any book of the strata register, the Registrar shall make on
the register and issue documents of title to the lot in question a
memorial to the effect that the book has been opened, and that
the common property is vested in the management corporation
coming into existence by virtue of subsection (3) (which is new)
and he shall return the issue document to that corporation.
[298] The new subsection (3) provides that upon the opening of the
book of strata register in respect of a subdivided building or
land there shall, by the operation of that section, come into
181
existence a management corporation consisting of all the parcel

proprietors including in the case of a phased development, the
proprietor of the provisional block or block and the Registrar
shall issue a certificate certifying the establishment of the
management corporation as a body corporate constituted under
that Act on the day specified in the certificate.
[299] The amended s. 17 also has a new subsection (4) and a new
subsection (5). The new subsection (4) provides that the
management corporation existed by virtue of subsection (3) shall
be known by the name appearing in the book of the strata
register relating to a subdivided building or land, and shall be a
body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common seal
and which may sue and be sued.
[300] The new subsection (5) provides that in the case where a
certificate certifying the establishment of the management
corporation was not issued during the opening of a strata book,
the management corporation may apply to the Registrar for a
certificate certifying that the management corporation has been
established in Form 9. Subsequently, the word “Director” was
substituted for the word “Registrar.
[301] S. 42 deals with the ownership of the common property and the
custody of the issue document of title. S. 42(1) provides that the
management corporation shall, on coming into existence,
become the proprietor of the common property and be the
custodian of the issue document of title of the lot. S. 42(2)
provides that the management corporation shall have in relation
to the common property the powers conferred by the National
Land Code 1965 on a proprietor in relation to his land subject to
the 2 limitations which are set out in the proviso thereof.
182
[302] S. 43 sets out the duties and powers of the management

corporation. The duties of the management corporation are set
out in subsection (1). The main duties of the management
corporation are to manage and properly maintain the common
property and keep it in a state of good and serviceable repair
(see para. (a) of subsection (1)) and to prepare and maintain, in
such form as may be prescribed, a strata roll for the subdivided
building (see para (i) of subsection (1)). The powers of the
management corporation are set out in subsection (2). Paragraph
(f) of subsection (2) empowers the management corporation to
“do all things reasonably necessary for the performance of its
duties under this Part and for the enforcement of the by-laws set
out in the Third Schedule.
[303] S. 44 deals with the by-laws for the regulation of a subdivided

building which are set out in the Third Schedule. The Third
Schedule was deleted by the Strata Titles (Amendment) Act
2013 (Act A1450), which came into force on 1.6.2015 in the
Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Federal Territory of
Putrajaya. However, this Amendment Act is not applicable to
the instant case as the writ was filed on 13.12.2013 and the 2
(two) letters were dated 5.6.2013 and 18.9.2013, respectively.
[304] By virtue of the interpretation provision in paragraph 1(2) of the

Third Schedule, except for paragraph 2(1)(g), references in the
by-laws to a parcel proprietor howsoever expressed, where the
context so admits, in the case of a parcel occupied by a person
who is not the parcel proprietor, shall be construed as including
the occupier of that parcel.
[305] The duties of a parcel owner are set out in paragraph 2(1) and (2).
[306] Paragraph 2(1)(g) requires a parcel owner to notify the

management corporation forthwith of any intended change in the
183
proprietorship of his parcel or of any other dealing with his

parcel of which he is aware, for entry in the strata roll
maintained by the management corporation for this purpose.
[307] Paragraph 2(2) provides that a parcel owner shall use and enjoy
the common property in such a manner as not to interfere
unreasonably with the use and enjoyment thereof by other
proprietors or their families or visitors.
[308] Paragraph 3 deals with the common property and states that it is
for the common benefit of all the proprietors. It provides that
the management corporation shall control, manage and
administer the common property for the benefit of all the
proprietors subject to the following proviso:
“that the corporation may, by agreement with a particular

proprietor, grant him exclusive use and enjoyment of part
of the common property or special privileges in respect of
the common property or part of it.”
[309] Paragraph 4 concerns the provision of amenities or services by

the management corporation to or in respect of a parcel of a
particular proprietor. It provides that the management
corporation may make an agreement with a particular proprietor
for the provision of amenities or services by the management
corporation to or in respect of his parcel.
[310] Paragraph 5 sets out the functions of the management

corporation. Para. 5(e) requires the management corporation to,
without delay, enter in the strata roll any intended change or any
other dealing notified to it pursuant to sub-para. 2(1)(g), which
was mentioned earlier in this Judgment.
[311] Paragraph 6 sets out the prohibitions for a parcel proprietor. It

provides as follows:
184
“A parcel proprietor shall not—
(a) use his parcel for any purposes (illegal or

otherwise) which may be injurious to the
reputation of the building;
(b) use as fuel any substance or material which may

give rise to smoke or fumes or obnoxious smells;
(c) throw or allow to fall, any refuse or rubbish

of any description on the common property
or any part thereof except in refuse bins
maintained by him or in refuse chutes
provided in the building; or
(d) keep any animal in his parcel or on the common

property which may cause annoyance to any
other proprietor.”
(Emphasis added).
[312] S. 44(1) provides that the by-laws in the Third Schedule shall,
as and from the opening of a book of the strata register be in
force for all purposes in relation to every subdivided building or
land and shall not be amended by the management corporation.
[313] S. 44(2) empowers the management corporation to, by special

resolution, make additional by-laws, or make amendments to
such additional by-laws, not inconsistent with the by-laws in the
Third Schedule, for regulating the control, management,
administration, use and enjoyment of the subdivided building or
land.
[314] S. 44(3) provides that the by-laws for the time being in force in
respect of the subdivided building shall bind the management
185
corporation and the proprietors to the same extent as if they

constituted properly executed agreements on the part of the
management corporation with each proprietor and on the part of
each proprietor with every other proprietor and with the
management corporation to observe and perform all the
provisions of the by-laws.
[315] S. 44(4)(a) requires the management corporation to keep a

record of the by-laws in force from time to time.
[316] S. 44(4)(b) requires the management corporation, on receipt of

an application in writing made by a proprietor or by a person
duly authorized to apply on behalf of a proprietor for a copy of
the by-laws in force, to supply to such proprietor or duly
authorized person at a reasonable cost a copy of the by-laws.
[317] S. 44(c) requires the management corporation, on the application

of any person who satisfies the management corporation that he
has a proper interest in so applying, to make such by-laws
available for inspection.
[318] S. 44(6) requires the management corporation to lodge a copy of

any by-laws made by it under subsection (2) and any amendment
of any by-laws for the time being in force, certified as a true
copy under the seal of the management corporation, with,
initially, the Director, and subsequently, with COB, within 30
(thirty) days of the passing of the resolution by the management
corporation approving the by-laws.
[319] S. 44(7) entitles the management corporation or any proprietor

to apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for an order to
enforce the performance of, or restrain the breach of any by-
laws by or to recover damages for any loss or injury to any
persons or proprietors arising out of the breach of any by-laws
186
from any person bound to comply therewith, the management

corporation or the administrator. Upon such an application being
made, the court may make such order against any such persons,
the management corporation or the members of its council, or
the administrator, as the court thinks fit.
[320] In the instant case, since the PPC is located in Cheras and Cheras is
within the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, at the material time,
the law, which is applicable to its MC, which was established in the
year 2009, is the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318).
[321] Therefore, in view of the provisions of s. 43, s. 44, s. 50 and s.

55 of the Strata Titles Act 1981 (Act 318), at the material time,
the MC of the PPC was subject to the supervision of COB. In
other words, at the material time, the MC was answerable to
COB, when it was discharging its function, performing its duties
and exercising its powers as the Management Corporation of the
PPC under the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318) and not under
the SM Act 2013 (Act 757) as was submitted by the learned
counsels for the defendants at the conclusion of the full trial.
Differences/disputes between plaintiff and MC following takeover

of management of PPC by MC
[322] Due to the change in the law in respect of the management of

condominiums and apartments, upon the coming into force of
the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318), the management of the PPC
came under the administration of the MC from the year 2009
onwards. The members of the Council of the MC are elected
annually as provided in s. 39(4) read together with paragraph 2
of the Second Schedule.
187
[323] S. 39, as amended by the Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2007

(Act A1290), states as follows:
“Establishment of management corporation
39. (1) Upon the opening of a book of the strata register

in respect of a subdivided building or land there shall, by
the operation of this section, come into existence a
management corporation consisting of all the parcel
proprietors including in the case of phased development,
the proprietor of the provisional block or blocks.
(2) The management corporation established by

subsection (1) shall be known by the name appearing in the
book of the strata register relating to a subdivided building
or land, and shall be a body corporate having perpetual
succession and a common seal.
(3) The management corporation may sue and be sued.
(4) The management corporation shall elect a

council which, subject to any restriction imposed or
direction given by the management corporation at a
general meeting, shall perform the management
corporation’s duties and conduct the management
corporation’s business on its behalf, and may for that
purpose exercise any of the management corporation’s
powers.
(5) The provisions of the Second Schedule shall have

effect in relation to the management corporation and its
council.”
(Emphasis added).
188
[324] Paragraph 2 of the Second Schedule, as amended by the Strata

Titles (Amendment) Act 2007 (Act A1290), states as follows:
“Constitution of council
2. (1) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph and to

any rules made under the Act, the council shall consist of
not less than three and not more than fourteen proprietors,
who shall be elected at each annual general meeting and
shall cease to hold office at the next annual general
meeting.
(2) Where –
(a) the first annual general meeting has not yet

been held; or
(b) there are not more than three proprietors,
the council shall consist of all the proprietors.
(3) Except where the council consist of all the

proprietors, the corporation may, at any time, by resolution
at an extraordinary general meeting remove any member of
the council from office and appoint another proprietor in
his place to hold office until the next annual general
meeting.
(4) A member of the council may resign his office at

any time in writing under his hand addressed to the
corporation.
(5) Where a vacancy in the membership of the council

occurs otherwise than by operation of subparagraph (1) or
(3), the remaining member may appoint another proprietor
to be a member until the next annual general meeting.
189
(6) Members of the council shall be eligible for re-

election or reappointment.”
[325] As stated earlier in this Judgment, s. 43 sets out the duties and
powers of the management corporation. The section, as amended
by the Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2007 (Act A1290), states
as follows:
“Duties and powers of management corporation
43. (1) The duties of the management corporation

include the following:
(a) to manage and properly maintain the common

property and keep it in a state of good and
serviceable repair;
(b) to ensure and keep insured the subdivided

building or land to the replacement value
thereof against fire and such other risks as may
be prescribed under this Act;
(c) to effect such other insurance of the subdivided

building or land as may be required by law;
(d) to insure against such other risks as the

proprietors may by special resolution direct;
(e) to apply insurance moneys received by it in

respect of damage to the subdivided building or
land in rebuilding and reinstating it in so far as
it may be lawful to do so, subject to any order
made by the court under section 56;
(f) to pay premiums on any insurance effected by

it;
190
(g) to comply with any notices or orders given or

made by any competent public or statutory
authorities requiring the abatement of any
nuisance on the common property, or ordering
repairs or other work to be done in respect of
the common property or any building or land or
other improvements on the lot;
(h) to comply with any such notices or orders as

are referred to in paragraph (g) given or made
in respect of any of the parcels, if the
proprietor fails to do so within a reasonable
time;
(i) to prepare and maintain, in such form as

may be prescribed, a strata roll for the
subdivided building or land;
(2) The powers of the management corporation shall

include the following:
(a) to recover from any parcel proprietor any sum

respect of that proprietor’s parcel in complying
with any such notices or orders as are referred
to in paragraph (1) (h);
(b) to purchase, hire or otherwise acquire movable

property for use by the parcel proprietors in
connection with their enjoyment of the common
property;
(c) to borrow moneys required by it in the exercise

of its powers or the performance of its duties;
191
(d) to secure the repayment of moneys borrowed by

it and the payment of interest thereon by
negotiable instrument or by a charge of unpaid
contributions to the management fund, (whether
already levied or not) by a charge of any
property vested in it or by a combination of any
of those means;
(e) to collect during the initial period by way of

contributions from proprietors in proportion to
the share units or provisional share units of
their respective parcels or provisional blocks;
and
(f) to do all things reasonably necessary for the

performance of its duties under this Part and
for the enforcement of the by-laws set out in
the Third Schedule.
(3) The management corporation shall be deemed –
(a) for the purposes of effecting any insurance

under paragraph (1)(b) or (c), to have an
insurable interest in the subdivided building
equal to its replacement value; and
(b) for the purposes of effecting any insurance

under paragraph (1)(d), to have an insurable
interest in the subject matter of the insurance.
(4) A policy of insurance taken out by the management

corporation under this section in respect of the
subdivided building shall not be liable to be brought
into contribution with any other policy of insurance,
192
except another policy taken out under this section in

respect of the same subdivided building.
(5) Where the management corporation performs any

repairs, work or act that is required or authorized by
or under this Part or by or under any other written
law to perform (whether or not the repairs, work or
act were or was performed consequent upon the
service on it by any Government or statutory
authority of any notice or order), but the repairs,
work or act were or was wholly or substantially the
liability or the responsibility of the proprietor of a
parcel only, or wholly or substantially for the benefit
of some of the parcels only, any money expended by
the management corporation in performing the
repairs, work or act shall –
(a) in the case where the repairs, work or act were

or was wholly or substantially the liability or
the responsibility of the proprietor of a parcel
only, be recoverable by the management
corporation in an action in a court of competent
jurisdiction as a debt due to it jointly and
severally from –
(i) the relevant proprietor of the parcel at the

time when the repairs, work or act were or
was performed; and
(ii) the relevant proprietor of the parcel at the

time when the action was commenced; or
(b) in the case where the repairs, work or act were

or was wholly or substantially for the benefit of
193
some of the parcels only, or wholly or

substantial the liability or the responsibility of
the proprietors of some of the parcels only, be
recoverable by the management corporation in
an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as
a debt due to it jointly and severally from –
(i) the relevant proprietor of each of such

parcels at the time when the repairs, work
or act were or was performed; and
(ii) the relevant proprietor of each of such

parcels and the time when the action was
commenced,
the amount payable by any proprietor and

former proprietor in respect of any parcel being
not more than the proprietor of the debt which
the share unit of the parcel then bears to the
total share units of all those parcels.
(6) A proprietor of a parcel who is not the

proprietor of the parcel at the time when the
repairs, work or act referred to in subsection
(5) were or was performed shall not be liable to
pay the management corporation any amount
due under that subsection if he has, at any time
on or within twenty-one days before the date he
acquired the title or interest in the parcel, made
a requisition in writing to the management
corporation to inquire about the amount (if any)
recoverable by the management corporation
under that subsection in respect of the parcel
and the management corporation has –
194
(a) certified that no amount is recoverable by

the management corporation in respect of
the parcel; or
(b) not given a reply to the requisition at any

time within fourteen days of the date of
the service of the requisition.
(7) Where the management corporation incurs any

expenditure or performs any repairs, work or
act that it is required or authorized by or under
this Part or by or under any other written law to
perform (whether or not the expenditure was
incurred or the repairs, work or act were or was
performed consequent upon the service on it by
any Government or statutory authority of any
notice or order) and the expenditure or the
repairs, work or act were or was rendered
necessary by reason of any willful or negligent
act or omission on the part of, or breach of any
provision of its by-laws by, any person of his
tenant, lessee, licensee or invitee, the amount
of that expenditure of any money expended by
it in performing the repairs, work or act shall
be recoverable by it from that person as a debt
in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
(8) The generality of this section shall not be

prejudiced by any other provision in this Part
conferring a power of imposing a duty on the
management corporation.”
(Emphasis added).
195
[326] As stated earlier in this Judgment, s. 44, as amended by the

Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2007 (Act A1290), provides,
inter alia, that the by-laws in the Third Schedule shall apply to a
subdivided building. The section states as follows:
“By-laws for the regulation of a subdivided building or

land
44. (1) The by-laws set out in the Third Schedule

shall, as and from the opening of a book of the strata
register be in force for all purposes in relation to every
subdivided building or land and shall not be amended
by the management corporation.
(2) The management corporation may by special

resolution make additional by-laws, or make amendments
to such additional by-laws, not inconsistent with the by-
laws set out in the Third Schedule, for regulating the
control, management, administration, use and enjoyment of
the subdivided building or land.
(3) The by-laws for the time being in force in

respect of the subdivided building or land shall bind the
management corporation and the proprietors to the
same extent as if they constituted properly executed
agreements –
(a) on the part of the management corporation

with each proprietor; and
(b) on the part of each proprietor with every

other proprietor and with the management
corporation,
to observe and perfom all the provisions of the by-laws.
196
(4) The management corporation shall –
(a) keep a record of the by-laws in force from time

to time;
(b) on receipt of an application in writing made by

a proprietor or by a person duly authorized to
apply on behalf of a proprietor for a copy of the
by-laws in force, supply to such proprietor or
duly authorized person at a reasonable cost a
copy of the by-laws; and
(c) on the application of any person who satisfies

the management corporation that he has a
proper interest in so applying, make such by-
laws available for inspection.
(5) No by-law is capable of operating –
(a) to prohibit or restrict the transmission, transfer,

lease or charge of, or any other dealing with
any parcel of a subdivided building; and
(b) to destroy or modify any easement expressly or

impliedly created by or under this Act.
(5A) In subsection (5) “easement” includes a right or

obligation created by section 35.
(6) A copy of any by-laws made by the

management corporation under subsection (2) and any
amendment of any by laws for the time being in force,
certified as a true copy under the seal of the
management corporation, shall be lodged by the
management corporation with the commissioner within
197
thirty days of the passing of the resolution by the

management corporation approving the by-laws.
(7) The management corporation or any

proprietor shall be entitled to apply to a court of
competent jurisdiction –
(a) for an order to enforce the performance of,

or restrain the breach of, any by-laws by; or
(b) to recover damages for any loss or injury to

any persons or properties arising out of the
breach of any by-laws from,
any persons bound to comply therewith, the
management corporation or the administrator, and the
court may make such order against any such persons, the
management corporation or the members of its council, or
the administrator, as the court thinks fit.”
(Emphasis added).
[327] S. 55, as amended by the Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2007

(Act A1290), provides that the MC commits an offence it if,
inter alia, commits a breach of any provisions of Part VII of the
Act. The section states as follows:
“Breaches of provisions of this Part
55. (1) If the management corporation commits a

breach of any of the provisions of this Part or makes
default in complying with any requirements of or duties
imposed on it by any of the provisions of this Part, the
management corporation and ever member of its council,
and any other proprietor, who knowingly is a party to the
breach or default shall be guilty or an offence and shall be
198
liable, or conviction to a penalty expressly prescribed for

such breach or default, or if no penalty is so prescribed, to
a fine not exceeding ten thousand ringgit.
(2) Where a requirement or duty is imposed on the

management corporation by this Part, any person for
whose benefit, or the benefit of whose parcel that
requirement or duty is imposed on the management
corporation, may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction
for an order compelling the management corporation to
carry out that requirement or perform that duty, as the case
may be, and on such an application being made, the court
may make such order as it thinks proper.”
[328] The plaintiff has given evidence that she had been operating
happily and peacefully at the PPC since the year 2004 or
thereabout, without any interference from any party until the
MC came along in the year 2009 or thereabout, to give her
trouble. Hence, it is clear from her evidence that she took a
strong objection against what she perceived as the unjust and
unreasonable interference by the MC in respect of her “business
activities” at the PPC from the year 2009 onwards.
[329] I found that from evidence adduced from cross-examination of

the defendants’ witnesses, in particular, the 3 rd defendant (DW2)
and the 4 th defendant (DW3), the plaintiff had refused to register
herself with the management office of the MC or to provide to
the MC a company profile of her businesses despite being
notified to do so by the MC. Despite numerous requests or
reminders by the MC, she also refused to disclose her tenancy
agreements with the owners of the units concerned or her sub-
tenancies with HUKM, her main client. She had, persistently,
refused to notify the MC as to the actual units managed by her
199
in the PPC. She also refused to furnish the list of tenants staying
at the units managed by her in the PPC despite reminders to that
effect (see Bundle B, pgs. 49, 51, 73 and 196).
Requirement imposed on unit owners to notify MC of leases or

tenancies of their units
[330] I agreed with the plaintiff’s assertion in her examination-in-

chief and re-examination that she does not need to disclose to
the MC her tenancy agreements with the unit owners concerned
because the duty and responsibility to do so lay with the unit
owners who are the members of the MC. This is because Clause
2 of the in-house rules expressly requires the unit owners to
notify the MC and to furnish the MC with details of the leases or
lettings of their units from time to time (see Bundle B, p. 7).
However, I agreed with the defendants that if such notices are
not given by the owners, it is incumbent or only proper for the
tenants to do so, if the tenants wish to apply for access cards and
car stickers from the MC. As the plaintiff was in greater and
more frequent need of the services from the MC, it was only
proper and reasonable for the plaintiff to cooperate with the MC
for the benefit of all the parties concerned.
[331] There was evidence before the Court that the plaintiff had sub-
let units in the PPC without the car park bays. There was also
evidence before the Court that the plaintiff had sub-let the car
park bays car, separately, to her sub-tenants without the units
concerned. She had then applied to the MC for access cards and
car stickers from the MC for her sub-tenants without giving to
the MC the necessary information.
[332] The 3 rd defendant (DW2) has given unequivocal evidence in

support of the defendants’ defence in his capacity as the
200
Chairman of MC. The 4 th defendant (DW3) as the Building

Manager of the PPC has also given evidence in support of the
defendants’ defence. The material parts of DW2 and DW3’s
evidence were set out earlier in this Judgment. Based on their
evidence, which were credible, consistent, cogent and reliable, I
found that it was impossible for the MC to work harmoniously
with the plaintiff due to the plaintiff’s insistence on having
things done her own way. She refused, for reasons only known
to herself, to supply to the MC the information on the identities
of her sub-tenants. She also refused outright to furnish proof of
her credentials to the MC, which was a basic requirement. So
there was, clearly, a lack of cooperation on her part. This
problem was aggravated when her frequent requests for resident
or access cards and car stickers for her sub-tenants and for other
services, which were connected to her business activities, could
not be entertained by the MC.
[333] Hence, since she was the applicant for resident or access cards
and car stickers for her sub-tenants and for other services and in
view of the duties, responsibilities and function of the MC under
the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318), I rejected the plaintiff’s
assertion that she was under no duty to inform or disclose to the
MC the details and particulars of the sub-letting arrangements
between her and/or Primas Management & Services with HUKM
or with her other clients in respect of the units leased or rented
by her in the PPC.
Was the plaintiff aware of in-house rules and function of MC?
[334] On this point, I rejected the plaintiff’s (PW1’s) evidence that

she was not aware or had no knowledge of the in-house rules
and the function of the MC. Below are my reasons.
201
[335] I found the plaintiff’s lack of awareness or knowledge

inherently incredible. The defendants were able to furnish
documentary evidence to show that the plaintiff was a legal
owner of a unit in the PPC back in the year 2006 or the year
2007 (see the document in Bundle B, p. 20-B). Therefore, as a
legal owner of a unit in the PPC, she must have or ought to have
a copy of the in-house rules. Based on the same reason, she must
have been or ought to have been aware of the functions and
power of the MC in managing the PPC. Paragraph (g) of the
minutes of the MC’s meeting, which was held on 28.9.2006,
clearly indicated that she was in the Council of the MC before.
As a matter of fact, while she was in the Council of the MC she
had objected to other property agents putting up notices for
rental and sale of the units in the PPC without proper control
(see Bundle B, p. 20-B).
[336] The defendants were also able to furnish documentary evidence to

show that the plaintiff had entered into a Tenancy Agreement with
one Ng Boon Ping, the legal owner of a unit in the PPC (see
Bundle B, pgs. 77 to 84). Having perused the Tenancy Agreement,
I found that Clause 3(d) of the Tenancy Agreement clearly
requires the tenant, viz the plaintiff, to conform and adhere to the
in-house rules of the MC, irrespective of whether these rules are
the existing rules or the new rules (see Bundle B, p. 79).
[337] Therefore, the Court could not believe or accept the plaintiff’s
evidence that she was ignorant of the procedure to be complied
with by her for the refund of the renovation deposit as stipulated
in the in-house rules because she did not have a copy of the in-
house rules or that she was not aware of the in-house rules. On
the other hand, the plaintiff also cannot blow hot and cold by
claiming that she did not have to follow the rules and
regulations of the MC.
202
[338] Despite her attitude and/or mindset not to cooperate with the
MC, there was evidence that the plaintiff frequently attended at
the management office of the MC to demand for various services
for her sub-tenants/clients, such as car stickers and access cards.
Unfortunately, the MC, especially, the Building Manager (DW3)
had to turn down or delay the plaintiff’s requests for such
services. The Court accepted the explanation of DW3 that since
the plaintiff had omitted, neglected or refused to provide him
with her credentials for his verification that she was authorized
by the unit owners concerned in the PPC, from whom she had
leased or rented the units, to represent them to apply for the
access cards and also the car stickers for the car park bays, the
MC was not able to grant her requests and issue the access cards
and car stickers due to security reasons. I also accepted
explanation ofDW3 that the MC was also unable to entertain the
plaintiff’s request for maintenance and water bills for the units
in the PPC, which the plaintiff had claimed to be managed by
her, as the MC had sent out all the bills directly to the unit
owners. I found DW3’s explanations to be satisfactory. Hence, I
found that there was no unreasonable conduct or action on the
part of the MC or its Council members in not granting the
plaintiff’s requests and in not giving in to the plaintiff’s
unjustified, unreasonable and unlawful demands.
[339] As a result of the matters set out above, I found that after the
MC began to function and manage the PPC in the year 2009
onwards, serious differences or disputes arose between the
plaintiff and the MC because the plaintiff was insistent on
having her own way but she faced stiff resistance from the MC.
The problem was further compounded when HUKM, which had
sub-leased quite a number of units from the plaintiff also
refused to cooperate with the MC. There was evidence before
the Court that despite the request of the MC, HUKM had also,
203
most probably, out of sheer ignorance on its part with regard to

the duties, responsibilities and function of management
corporations established under the Strata titles Act 1985 (Act
318) refused to furnish the particulars of and a copy of each of
the sub-lease or sub-tenancy agreements, which were entered
into between the plaintiff and HUKM for the units concerned in
the PPC, in order to enable the MC to know the identities of the
persons, who were occupying the units concerned and who were
using the car park bays to park their vehicles.
Clash of old ways and new law or clash between plaintiff and MC
[340] From evidence adduced from both sides, I found that after the
MC took over the administration and management of the PPC in
the year 2009, the plaintiff insisted on continuing to operate her
businesses in the same manner as she had operated them before
the MC took over the administration and management of the
PPC in the year 2009.
[341] On the other hand, the MC being elected by the owners of the
units in the PPC, maintained that under the Strata titles Act 1985
(Act 318), it was merely discharging its function and duties
diligently. Since, it is accountable to COB and to the unit
owners, who had elected the MC and the members of its
Management Committee, the MC could not give in to the
plaintiff’s unreasonable demands as she was only a contractor.
[342] Not surprisingly, both parties had come to a serious impasse,

which resulted in the lawsuit herein before the Court. This
situation is neatly summed up in para. 6 of the MC’s lawyer’s
letter dated 11.6.2013 (see Bundle C, p. 248).
204
Plaintiff replied directly to COB regarding MC’s explanation in

2 nd letter to COB
[343] I noted that the plaintiff has, in fact, exercised her right to reply,
directly, to COB regarding the MC’s explanation in the 2 nd
letter, which is the defendants’ letter to COB, and which she
claimed to be defamatory of her.
[344] The plaintiff wrote to COB on 10.4.2014 to rebut the MC’s reply
to COB regarding the complaint made by her concerning the
MC’s alleged refusal or delay in refunding the renovation
deposit to her (see Bundle D, pgs. 566-568).
[345] The plaintiff has, during cross-examination, admitted sending

the above letter to COB to counter or rebut the 2 nd letter, viz the
defendant’s letter to COB. Hence, I agreed with the defendants
that the plaintiff’s suit against them is not bona fide, and
whatever defamation, if any, arising out of the 2 nd letter to COB,
which is not admitted by the defendants, would have been
diluted or evaporated.
Law on fair comment on a matter of public interest
[346] It is trite law that in order to succeed on a defence of fair

comment on a matter of public interest in a defamation case, the
defendant must prove that the publication was of matter which
was the subject of legitimate public interest and the defendant
complied with the standard of “responsible journalism” (so-
called Reynolds privilege) (see Gatley on Libel and Slander,
Sweet & Maxwell, eleventh edition).
[347] In my judgment, the words complained of in the 2 (two) letters

were not fair comment on a matter of public interest.
205
[348] With regard to the 1 st letter to HUKM, it is because the 6 th

remark was not published in respect of a matter, which was of
legitimate public interest, based on facts truly stated. The
publication was in respect of a matter, which was only of
legitimate interest to three parties, viz the MC, HUKM and the
plaintiff, and not to the members of the general public. This is
because the MC was concerned that HUKM had made cheque
payments to the MC for billings for water and maintenance
charges, which were never issued by the MC to HUKM.
[349] With regard to the 2 nd letter to COB, it is because the 1 st , 2 nd ,

3 rd , 4 th and 5 th remarks were also not published in respect of a
matter, which was of legitimate public interest, based on facts
truly stated. The publication was in respect a matter, which was
only of legitimate interest to a total of four parties, viz the MC,
COB, the plaintiff and Puan Nurul, and not to the members of
the general public. This is because the MC was concerned that
COB did not have the full story of what had actually transpired
between the plaintiff and the MC and between Puan Nurul and
the MC regarding the dispute between the plaintiff and the MC
concerning the refusal of the MC to refund the balance
renovation deposit, directly, to the plaintiff.
[350] Hence, I am of the respectful view that the authorities, which

were cited by the defendants to support their submission on the
third defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest, are
inapplicable to the instant case. In those cases, the alleged
defamatory statements, which were published to a third party
were fair comment on a matter of public interest, see paras. 58,
59, 60 and 61 of Dato’ Mohamad Bustaman Abdullah v. Malay
Mail Sdn Bhd & Anor [2014] 2 CLJ 682, [2014] 2 MLRH 91
(“Dato’ Mohamad Bustaman Abdullah”); para. 10b at p. 431
of Chew Peng Cheng v. Anthony Teo Tiao Gin [2008] 8 CLJ 418,
206
[2008] 2 MLRH 360 (“Chew Peng Cheng”); and para. f at p.

376 of Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v. The China Press
Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371, [1998] 2 MLRA 287.
Additional issue (1): Whether the plaintiff was operating her

businesses illegally in her residential unit without approval from
the City Hall and/or the MC?
Additional issue (2): If so, whether the plaintiff’s claim in

defamation ought to be dismissed with cost on the ground that the
Court ought not to assist the plaintiff to claim for damages for the
tort of defamation that had arisen in the course of her carrying
out her businesses illegally in the PPC?
Additional issue (3): Whether the plaintiff, who was not a

registered estate agent at the material time, was operating illegally
as an estate agent in renting the units from the unit owners and
sub-letting the units concerned to her clients?
Additional issue (4): If so, whether the plaintiff’s claim in

defamation ought to be dismissed with cost on the ground that the
Court ought not to assist the plaintiff to claim for damages for the
tort of defamation that has arisen in the course of her carrying on
her businesses illegally as she was not a registered estate agent at
the material time?
[351] Notwithstanding the findings of the Court as stated earlier in

this Judgment, I shall now deal with the 4 (four) additional
issues on illegality, which I have raised in the course of the trial
and directed the parties to submit on. This has occurred due to
evidence before the Court that the plaintiff did not have a
commercial office in the PPC to operate her two businesses but
nevertheless carried on her two businesses in the PPC.
207
[352] At the beginning of the trial, when the plaintiff was being cross-
examined by the defendants regarding her status as an estate
agent, operating through Primas Management & Services, the
issue of illegality attracted my attention.
[353] It was not disputed that the business activities of the plaintiff in
leasing and sub-leasing or sub-letting several units in the PPC
amounted to “estate agency practice” as defined in s. 2 of the
Valuers, Appraisers and Estate Agents Act 1981 (Act 242). That
section gives the following interpretation of “estate agency
practice” as follows:
““estate agency practice” means acting or holding

oneself out to the public or to any individual or firm as
ready to act, for a commission, fee, reward or other
consideration, as an agent in respect of the sale or other
disposal of land and buildings and of any interest therein
or the purchase or other acquisition of land and buildings
and of any interest therein or in respect of the leasing or
letting of land and buildings and of any interest therein
including the act of making known of the availability of
land, building or any interest therein for such sale or
other disposal, purchase or other acquisition, leasing or
letting;”
(Emphasis added).
[354] The plaintiff has admitted that she did not have a valid licence
to conduct estate agency practice as she was not registered with
the Board of Valuers, Appraisers and Estate Agents established
under s. 9 of that Act.
[355] S. 22A(1) provides for the registration of estate agents. It states

as follows:
208
“PART VA
ESTATE AGENTS
Registration of estate agents
22A. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act every

person shall be entitled to have his name entered under
Part III of the Register upon making application to the
Board and proving to its satisfaction that—
(a) he has attained the age of 21 years and is of sound

mind, good character and has not been convicted of
any offence involving fraud or dishonesty or moral
turpitude during the five years immediately
preceding the date of his application;
(aa) he has not made a statement or affirmed or attested a

document that is false or misleading in a material
particular;
(ab) he has not dishonestly concealed material facts;
(ac) he has not furnished false information;
(b) he is not an undischarged bankrupt;
(c) he satisfies the requirements of section 22d;
(d) he has made a declaration in the form and manner

prescribed by the Board;
(e) he has paid the fees prescribed by the Board; and
(f) he is not under suspension from valuation or estate

agency practice nor has his name been cancelled
from the Register.”
209
[356] S. 22(1)(aa) of that Act provides that no person shall carry on

business or take up employment as an estate agent unless he is a
registered estate agent and has been issued with an authority to
practice under s. 16.
[357] S. 16(1) states as follows:
“Authority to practise
16. (1) The Registrar shall, upon receipt of a fee

prescribed by the Board with the approval of the Minister,
issue to every applicant, whose application has been
approved, an authority to practise in the form prescribed
by the Board and subject to such conditions or restrictions
as it may deem fit to impose.”
[358] By virtue of the interpretation of the term “registered estate

agent” in s. 2 of that Act, a registered estate agent is “a person
whose name has been entered under Part III of the Register and
to whom an authority to practice has been issued by the Board
under section 16”.
[359] S. 30(1) of that Act makes it an offence for any person, who acts
in contravention of s. 22C. If convicted, the person is liable to a
fine not exceeding three hundred thousand ringgit or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both
and he shall be liable to a further penalty of one thousand
ringgit for each day during the continuance of such offence.
[360] S. 30(1) states as follows:
“PART VIII
GENERAL
210
Offences
30. (1) Any person who—
(a) …;
(b) …;
(c) …;
(d) …;
(e) impersonates a registered valuer,

appraiser or estate agent;
(f) …;
(g) …;
(h) …;
(i) acts in contravention of section 21 or

section 22c; or
(j) aids and abets in the commission of an

offence under this Act,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine

not exceeding three hundred thousand ringgit or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to
both and he shall be liable to a further penalty of one
thousand ringgit for each day during the continuance of
such offence.”
[361] Under s. 22B(1) of that Act, a registered estate agent who has
been issued with an authority to practice by the Board shall be
entitled to practice his profession and shall be authorized to
undertake estate agency practice.
211
[362] Under s. 22B(1A) of that Act, no registered estate agent shall

carry on property management. However, there is an exception
to that restriction. The exception is provided in s. 22B(2) of that
Act. Under that subsection, the Board may permit a registered
estate agent to carry on property management —
(a) if he was permitted to do so before the coming into force

of subsection (1A); and
(b) subject to the same conditions and restrictions that the

Board may have imposed upon him before the coming into
force of subsection (1A).
[363] S. 22B states as follows:
“Estate agency practice
22B. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a

registered estate agent who has been issued with an
authority to practise by the Board shall be entitled to
practise his profession and shall be authorised to undertake
estate agency practice.
(1a) Subject to subsection (2), no registered estate agent

shall carry on property management.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1a), the Board may

permit a registered estate agent to carry on property
management —
(a) if he was permitted to do so before the coming

into force of subsection (1a); and
(b) subject to the same conditions and restrictions

that the Board may have imposed upon him
212
before the coming into force of subsection

(1a).”
[364] By virtue of the interpretation of the term “property

management” in s. 2 of that Act, it means as follows:
“the management and control of any land, building and any

interest therein, excluding the management of property-
based businesses, on behalf of the owner for a fee and
includes but is not limited to the following
responsibilities:
(a) monitoring outgoings for the property and making

payments out of the income from the property;
(b) preparing budgets and maintaining the financial

records for the property;
(c) enforcing the terms of leases and other agreements
pertaining to the property;
(d) advising on sale, purchase and lettings decisions;
(e) advising on insurance matters;
(f) advising on the opportunities for the realization of
development or investment potential of the property;
and
(g) advising on the necessity for upgrading the property
or for the merging of interests.
and the term “property manager” means a person, a firm or
a company who, on behalf of the owner of any land,
building and any interest therein, manages and controls
such land, building and interest to maintain or increase the
investment in, or physical worth of, such property.”
213
[365] Hence, in view of the above matters, I have reframed the

additional 4 issues into 1 (one) main additional issue. It is as
follows:
(1) Whether the plaintiff’s suit and claims against the

defendants for damages for libel ought to be
dismissed with cost on the ground of public policy as
her claim originates from her business activities,
which are tainted with illegality?
Whether the plaintiff’s suit and claims against the defendants for
damages for libel ought to be dismissed with cost on the ground of
public policy as her claim originates from her business activities,
which are tainted with illegality?
[366] The material undisputed facts are that the plaintiff was an
unregistered estate agent. She had conducted her estate agency
practice, through Primas Management & Services, by renting
several units in the PPC and sub-leasing or sub-letting them to
her clients, in particular, HUKM. She had also conducted her
renovation business through Primas Interior. Based on her own
documents, both businesses are registered at a residential unit in
the PPC, viz unit A-3-14 (‘the residential unit”). The plaintiff
has also given evidence that she had conducted her business
activities for the two firms using a hand phone but she denied
that she had conducted her business activities for the two firms
from the residential unit.
[367] In addition to the above, the plaintiff has also admitted during
cross- examination that she had put up banners outside the
windows of the units in the PPC, which were rented and
managed by her in the PPC to look for prospective sub-tenants
214
to whom she could sub-let the units. This clearly constitutes

estate agency practice as set out in s. 2 of that Act.
[368] Based on the evidence adduced by the parties before the Court, I
found that the plaintiff has clearly violated the law in carrying
out her estate agency practice in the year 2009 onwards without
being registered under the Valuers, Appraisers & Estate Agents
Act 1981 (Act 242) and without being issued with an authority
to practice under the same Act and for holding herself out as a
registered estate agent to HUKM since the year 2004 onwards
(see Ong Thean Chye & Ors v. Tiew Choy Chai & Anor [2011] 1
CLJ 674 and [2010] 3 MLRA 181, at paras. 29, 32, 33 and 34).
[369] Furthermore, the plaintiff is also using a residential unit at the

PPC to run her two businesses, viz estate agency practice under
Primas Management & Services, and renovation of the units in
the PPC under Primas Interior.
[370] The issue that arises is that the business activities of the
plaintiff is tainted with illegality. This is because the plaintiff
has contravened the express provisions of the Valuers,
Appraisers & Estate Agents Act 1981 (Act 242), viz s.
22(1)(aa), s. 22B(1a) and s. 22C, and also the Strata Titles Act
1985 (Act 318). The plaintiff has also contravened the in-house
rules of the PPC and the by-laws of DBKL because she had
conducted the business activities of the 2 (two) firms from the
residential unit in the PPC.
[371] As far as contracts are concerned, it is well settled that the

Court will not assist parties, who are in breach of s. 24 of the
Contracts Act 1950, to enforce their contracts. Hence, any
contract tainted with illegality cannot be enforced (see Lee Chee
Aik & Anor v. Siow Moon Yeow [2013] 1 LNS 258, which was
upheld by the Court of Appeal).
215
[372] It is also trite law that there is no requirement to plead illegality

before the issue of illegality can be raised by a defendant. The
Court or Judge must also take cognizance of the illegality once
such an issue has surfaced during the trial (see Merong
Mahawangsa Sdn Bhd v. Dato’ Shazryl Eskay Abdullah [2015] 8
CLJ 212, [2015] 5 MLRA 377).
[373] However, it may be a different situation all together when it

comes to tort cases. Unlike contract cases, where there are
agreements entered into between the parties, tortious cases do
not involve an agreement or any mutual consent to perform
certain obligations under a bargain struck by the parties.
[374] In the Law of Torts in Australia, 2 nd Edition 1993, the author,

Francis Trindade Peter Cane, posed the following question
regarding illegality in tort cases:
“The basic question is about the extent to which a plaintiff

should be penalized because at the time when he was
injured he was acting illegally—either in breach of statute
or perhaps contrary to common law... Admittedly this is
not a simple question to answer. The Court has to strike a
delicate balance between the rights of the claimants and
the rights of the defendants.”
[375] Reverting back to the instant case before this Court, the
additional issue is whether the Court ought to assist or allow the
plaintiff to claim for damages for the tort of defamation when
the claim for damages arises from the business activities of the
plaintiff, which were tainted with illegality?
[376] In light of the recent decision by our apex Court in Merong

Mahawangsa Sdn Bhd v. Dato’ Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, (supra),
I agreed with the defendants that the Court, for uniformity of the
216
law and on the ground of public policy, ought not to assist the
plaintiff to seek damages from the defendants, especially, when
the plaintiff herself is blameworthy and had conducted herself
illegally and dishonorably. To decide otherwise would in my
respectful view result in a state of lawlessness, where there is no
respect for the law of the land.
Inconsistency of claim by plaintiff against defendants
[377] As mentioned earlier, there is a clear discrepancy in the

plaintiff’s claim as stated in the paras. (1) and (2) of the
endorsement of the plaintiff’s claim on the amended writ and in
the plaintiff’s prayer at para. 18 of the plaintiff’s re-amended
statement of claim. In para (2) of the endorsement, the plaintiff
claimed damages against all the 8 (eight) defendants for
damages for alleged defamation in respect of the 1 st letter,
whereas in para. 18 of the plaintiff’s re-amended statement of
claim the plaintiff prays for judgment for damages for
defamation against each and every one of the 8 (eight)
defendants. In para. (1) of the endorsement, the plaintiff merely
claimed against the MC and the 2 nd defendant for, inter alia,
damages for defamation in respect of the 2 nd letter, whereas in
para. 18 of the plaintiff’s re-amended statement of claim the
plaintiff prayed for judgment for damages against each and
every one of the 8 (eight) defendants for defamation in respect
of the 2 nd letter.
[378] Hence, I agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff is bound
by the endorsement on her writ by virtue of para (1) of the
endorsement of her claim on the amended writ.
[379] I also agreed with the defendants that since no evidence was
adduced by the plaintiff against the 3 rd defendant and the 5 th to
217
the 8 th defendants for defamation in respect of the 1 st letter, the

plaintiff’s claim against them must be dismissed with cost.
Conclusion
[380] The findings and reasons for the findings of the Court can be
summarized as follows:
(1) The plaintiff’s claim for damages in respect of the 1 st letter

ought to be confined only to the 4 th defendant and the MC
as there is no basis to extend it to the other defendants,
who were not directly involved in the publication of the 1 st
letter to HUKM;
(2) The plaintiff’s claim for damages in respect of the 2 nd

letter ought to be confined only to the MC and the 2 nd
defendant by virtue of the endorsement of her claim in the
amended writ;
(3) The plaintiff has not pleaded malice properly as required

by law as no particulars of malice were stated in her re-
amended reply, and the so called particulars, which were
stated therein, were merely general and bland statements;
(4) The defendants have shown that the plaintiff had issued
provocative and defamatory lawyer’s letters to the MC
before issuing the writ;
(5) The defendants have also shown that before the

commencement of the full trial of the instant case, the
plaintiff had displayed oppressive conduct towards the
defendants, in particular, the 2 nd defendant, through Mr.
Chan Tse Yuen, her lawyer, by issuing a lawyer’s letter to
the 2 nd defendant, to falsely claim that the plaintiff’s
218
lawyer, Mr. Chan Tse Yuen, had been slandered by the 2 nd

defendant, which claim was unproven by the plaintiff in
the full trial;
(6) Since the plaintiff has conducted herself dishonorably and

displayed bad conduct, her own reputation is highly
questionable, and, therefore, she is not entitled to claim for
damages for injury to her reputation against the
defendants;
(7) The two letters issued by the 2 nd defendant and the 4 th

defendant, respectively, have extremely limited circulation
because the 1 st letter was to return to HUKM the cheque
payment made by HUKM without billing by the MC and
the 2 nd letter was a reply to COB, which the MC felt was
necessary due to the plaintiff’s letter of complaint to COB
and the defendants were not actuated by improper motive
or malice in publishing the 1 st letter to HUKM and the 2 nd
letter to COB;
(8) The 2 (two) letters are defamatory of and concerning the

plaintiff but both the libels are not actionable by the
plaintiff because the defendants have proven their defence
of justification;
(9) Be that as it may, the defendants have also proven their

defence of qualified privilege and, hence, they are not
liable in damages to the plaintiff for the tort of
defamation;
(10) The defendants have failed to prove their defence of fair

comment on a matter of public interest for the 2 (two)
letters; and
219
(11) Be that as it may, the Court ought not to assist or allow the
plaintiff to claim for damages for the tort of defamation on
the ground of public policy because the claim for damages
arises from the business activities of the plaintiff, which
were tainted with illegality.
[381] In the premises, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit and
claims with cost of 40,000.00.
Dated: 30 NOVEMBER 2016
(SU GEOK YIAM)

Judge
High Court Civil NCvC 11
Kuala Lumpur
COUNSELS:
For the plaintiff - Chan Tse Yuen & Lee Siew Lin; M/s Chan Tse Yuen
43-2-A, Jalan Dwitasik 2
Dataran Dwitasik 2
Bandar Seri Permaisuri, Cheras
56000 Kuala Lumpur
For the defendants - Low Peck Lim & DM Rao; M/s KC Yap
2 nd Floor, Wisma Niaga Mas
No. 99, Jalan Kapar
41400 Klang
Selangor
220

MC Dispute Over Estate Agent's Business

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

MC Dispute Over Estate Agent's Business

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

[2017] 1 LNS 333 Legal Network Series

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR

IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA

[CIVIL SUIT NO: 23NCVC-100-12/2013]

MOK SHOOK MOOI (aka Sherene Mok)

1. Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana

AGENCY: Authority of agent - Estate agent - Acting in excess -

TORT: Defamation - Libel - Action against management corporation

TORT: Defamation - Defences - Justification - Imputation that

TORT: Defamation - Defences - Qualified privilege - Letters issued

TORT: Defamation - Damages - Public policy - Claim for damages

TORT: Defamation - Defences - Fair comment - Public interest -

[Plaintiff’s claim dismissed with costs.]

Case(s) referred to:

Dato’ Annas Khatib Jaafar v. Sharifuddin Mohamed & Ors [2014] 1

Keluarga Communication Sdn Bhd v. Normala Samsudin & Another

Merong Mahawangsa Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato’ Shazryl Eskay

Legislation referred to:

Contracts Act 1950, s. 24

Defamation Act 1957, ss. 8, 9

Strata Management Act 2013, ss. 4, 56, 59(1)(i), 153

Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2007

Valuers, Appraisers and Estate Agents Act 1981, ss. 2, 16(1),

Other source(s) referred to:

Carter-Ruck On Libel and Privacy

Law of Torts in Australia, 2nd Edition 1993, by Francis Trindade

Management Corporations in Malaysia by Michael J Willis, Sweet &

[2] The 2 (two) letters are as follows:

(1) A letter dated 5.6.2013, to the Pengarah, Jabatan

(2) A letter dated 18.9.2013, to the Pesuruhjaya Bangunan

Parties in the suit

[4] Perbadanan Pengurusan Prisma Perdana, the 1 st defendant, is the

manages the PPC with the assistance of the 2 nd to the 8 th

[6] Chow Thean Choy, the 3 rd defendant, is the Chairman of the

[7] Vijiaratnam a/l v. Ratnasingam, the 4 th defendant, is the

(1) The PPC has 620 units of condominiums (“the units”);

(2) The plaintiff is the sole proprietress of Primas

(3) The plaintiff provided, through Primas Management &

& Services had obtained leases of several of the units in

(4) At all material times, the main customer of Primas

(5) Since the year 2004, UKM had entrusted Primas

(6) The plaintiff carried out, through Primas Interior, the

(7) According to the defendants, the plaintiff was operating

(8) With regard to the 1 st letter, according to the defendants,

(9) Subsequently, the MC received a Voucher No. BCR 51719

(10) Upon the advice of its solicitors, the MC returned the

(11) In the 1 st letter, the MC advised HUKM to exercise care

(12) According to the plaintiff, she came to know of the 1 st

“As a note of caution, we wish to bring to your

“We would sincerely urge you to probe into this

(14) Hence, the plaintiff sent a letter of demand dated

(15) However, the defendants failed and refused to tender their

(16) This is because according to the 4 th defendant, he had

(17) According to the 4 th defendant, the MC and him are not

(18) According to the 4 th defendant, this is because the 1 st letter

(19) According to the 4 th defendant, he had issued the 1 st letter

(20) With respect to the 2 nd letter, according to the plaintiff,

(21) According to the plaintiff, she had paid to the MC a sum of

(22) Hence, by a letter dated 22.8.2013 (“the plaintiff’s letter of

and the 4 th defendant, with regard to the refusal on their

(23) By a letter dated 9.9.2013 (see pgs. 380-381, Bundle CBD

(24) However, the MC responded to COB’s request by writing

(25) In the 2 nd letter, the 2 nd defendant explained its side of the