THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

LIBRARY

95U9
Call Number
U5750
y2J25i
;2"~
FL Form 887 (Rev) 22 Oct 52
USACGSC—P2-4277—15 June 62—5M
OPERATIONS

IN

KOREA

DEPARTMENT O F MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

W E S T POINT, NEW YORK

 on

OPERATIONS

IN

KOREA

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

WEST POINT, NEW YORK

1953

NOV 5 1951;
RESTRICTED
U. S. M. A. A. G. PRINTING OFFICE

WEST POINT • NEW YORK

February, 1953 600

 CONTENTS

PAGE
INTRODUCTION 1
Strategic Importance of Korea . 1
Political Background of the War 2
Theater of Operations 3
Plans and Opposing Forces 3
North Korea 3
South Korea 4

OPERATIONS 5
The United Nations Defensive, 27 June-15 September 1950 . . . 5
Reaction of the United Nations 6
The Delaying Action . 7
Defense of the Pusan Perimeter 12
The United Nations Offensive, 16 September-2 November 1950 . . 16
The Amphibious Landing at Inchon . 16
Breakout From the Pusan Beachhead 18
The Advance to the Manchurian Border 20
The Chinese Communist Intervention,
3 November 1950-24 January 1951 21
Operations on the X Corps Front 24
Operations on the Eighth Army Front 26
The Second Invasion' of South Korea 29
The First United Nations Counter offensive, 25 January-21 April 1951 31
Operation Thunderbolt 3i
The Communist Counterattack 32
Operation Ripper .33
The Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel 34
The Chinese Communist Forces Spring Offensive,
22 April-8 July 1951 35
The First Impulse of the Offensive 36
The Lull Between Impulses . . .37
The Second Impulse of the Offensive 38
 CONTENTS
—•—
PAGE
The Counterattack .40
The Advance to the "Iron Triangle" 41
The Period of Armistice Talks 43

COMMENTS .47
Tactics 47
Enemy . 47
American 47
Air( Power 48
Naval Support 49
Reason for American Participation 50
 Security Information

OPERATIONS IN KOREA

INTRODUCTION
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF KOREA (Map 1).
After World War II the western strategic frontier of the Americas
was established along the great arc extending from Alaska through
the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, and the
Marianas.
During the postwar period Russian influence was extended east­
ward to include domination of China, Manchuria, and the northern
half of Korea. As a result of agreements reached at the Yalta Con­
ference early in 1945, Russia acquired the southern half of Sakhalin
Island, making that island Soviet territory in its entirety. The Ku­
rile Islands, just northeast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido, were
occupied by Russian forces between 8 August and 1 September 1945.
With the Japanese link in our chain of defense already threatened
from the north, the strategic importance of Korea increased mate­
rially. With the Communists already in the Kuriles, Sakhalin, Si­
beria, and Manchuria, their possession of South Korea would leave
Japan open only to the east. Thus the integrity of our defensive
arc would be threatened, and Russia's strategic position in north­
eastern Asia would be further strengthened. "The Korean peninsula
would provide a buffer for richly endowed Manchuria and the port
city of Vladivostok, eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Rail­
road and important Soviet air and naval base. Possession of the
entire peninsula would seal off the Sea of Japan and would provide
air bases and ice-free naval bases that would facilitate military op­
erations against Japan.1
Conversely, the Korean peninsula in neutral or friendly hands
would constitute a shield between Manchuria and our island frontier
and would secure Tsushima Strait and the southern portion of the
1
The distance across the Tsushima Strait between Pusan and Kyushu or south­
ern Honshu is about the same as that from southern England to the
beaches of Normandy.

1
RESTRICTED
Sea of Japan. In case of necessity it could furnish convenient bases
for air and naval operations against Vladivostok and against Man­
churia and the other northern provinces of China.
*
POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WAR
In the Cairo Declaration, December 1943, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and China pledged that "mindful of the enslave­
ment of the people of Korea . . . in due course they shall become
free and independent." The pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam
Declaration of July 1945 and was subscribed to by the Soviet Union
when she entered the war against Japan.
At the end of World War II the 38th parallel was designated as a
temporary line of demarcation to facilitate the surrender of Japa­
nese troops in Korea. Japanese forces north of the parallel surren­
dered to the Soviet troops, and those south capitulated to .United
States forces. At no time did the United States contemplate that
the 38th parallel would permanently divide the country. 0W*>;!r< ;
On the other handr the Russian occupation authorities soon estab­
lished frontier outposts and patrols and halted passage across the
parallel. Repeated efforts by our representatives failed to eliminate
' this artificial obstacle to the political and economic unity of the na­
tion.
The next development was the Moscow Agreement2 of December
1945, which aimed at establishing a provisional Korean democratic
government; however, every attempt to implement this agreement
was thwarted by the Soviet Union./ Thereupon the United States
laid the problem of Korean unity and independence before the United
Nations. A temporary commission was established by this world
body to supervise the election of Korean representatives who would
draft a democratic constitution and establish a national government.
But Russia, busily engaged in sovietizing the Korean people north
of the 38th parallel, refused entry to the United Nations Commis­
sion. Nevertheless, free elections were held in South Korea on 10
May 1948; and the Republic of Korea was founded on 15 August
1948.
Communist rule above the parallel was formalized on 9 September
1948 by the inauguration of the People's Democratic Republic of
Korea. Thus the 38th parallel, "a fortuitous line resulting from the
exigencies of the war", had become a politicalfrontier.
2
The United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom participated; China sub­
sequently subscribed.
 From this time until the invasion of June 1950 the Communist-
sponsored North Korean Government tried every means short of
full-scale war to foster disunity and disorder in the new republic
south of the parallel. Border raids, guerrilla action, sabotage, propa­
ganda, and economic strangulation all failed to achieve these ends.

THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Maps 2a and 2b)

The Korean Peninsula, about 575 miles long and averaging about^
150 miles wide, is similar in shape but larger than the state of
Florida.
Korea, for the most part, is mountainous. A great chain of moun­
tains extends south along the east coast almost to Pusan, with the
highest peaks in the north. South of the 38th parallel this range
throws off a spur which runs diagonally southwest across South
Korea to the Yellow Sea in the vicinity of the port of Mokpo. The
west coast is characterized by numerous estuaries and indentations.
Farther inland are rice paddies, lowland flats, terraced slopes, hills,
and broad valleys. Though far from ideal for large-scale ground op­
erations, western Korea is, nevertheless, more suitable than the
mountainous area to the east.
The main rivers, most of which run south and west, are very broad
and sufficiently deep to impede military operations. Their effect is
multiplied during the rainy season.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the standard-gauge rail net­
work, single-tracked for the most part, provided reasonably good
^transportation facilities between the principal ports and cities. In
the north it connected with the Manchurian railway system. The
highway system, however, was very inadequate for motor vehicles.
Most of the roads were narrow and tortuous. A few were hard-
surfaced, and some were surfaced with gravel or crushed rock; but
most of them were ordinary earth roads. Air transportation was
hampered by a dearth of satisfactory airfields and emergency land­
ing facilities.
The climate of Korea is similar to that of the region between Geor­
gia and Maine in the United States. Weather conditions interfere
with military operations during the cold winter of the northern re­
gions, during the spring thaw in February and early March, and dur­
ing the pronounced rainy season of July and August.

PLANS AND OPPOSING FORCES

North Korea.—In the early days of Soviet occupation Communist
propaganda had indicated that the objective of North Korea was to
drive out the "American imperialists" by force; that is, to seize and
hold South Korea. In December 1948 Russia announced that she
had withdrawn her occupation troops from North Korea, but the
United Nations Commission was not permitted to verify this.
<$ The planning for the invasion of the South Korean Republic was
closely supervised, if not directed, by Soviet. advisors. The •plan
called for a surprise assault along a broad front, with the main effort
directed toward Seoul. It was anticipated that the fall of the capital
city would result in the immediate capitulation of the Republic of
Korea; Occupation of the entire peninsula would quickly follow.
This strategy was based on the belief that the United Nations would
not or could not intervene in time to be of any help to the South
Koreans. J
Although North Korean mobilization plans contemplated fifteen
divisions,3 only six were ready for combat at the time of the invasion.
These were considered sufficient for the task. They were well-
trained, carefully rehearsed in the invasion plan, and equipped for
the most part with excellent Soviet materiel. Moreover, they con­
tained a hard core of perhaps 25,000 seasoned Korean veterans who
had fought with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria. The total
strength of the North Korean Army at this time was about 100,000.
This force could be supported by approximately 100 Soviet T34 tanks
and about the same number of obsolescent Russian combat planes.
The North Korean Navy was of negligible size and strength, but it
was capable of providing considerable coastwise transport for the
ground forces if permitted to operate at will.
South Korea.—At the conclusion of the occupation period, June
1949, a Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) remained in South
Korea at the request of the new Government. This group, consist­
ing of 500 American officers and enlisted men, was to assist in train­
ing the South Korean constabulary. It was under the direction and
control of the United States Ambassador to Korea, Mr. John J. Muc­
cio, rather than General MacArthur, for after the end of the occupa­
tion period MacArthur was no longer responsible for the defense of
Korea.
Additional assistance was given South Korea when, at the end
of the occupation, equipment with a replacement value of about
$110,000,000 was turned over to her security forces. This equip­
ment, sufficient for a force of 50,000 men, consisted of more than
3
The North Korean divisions were triangular in Organization and had a strength
of approximately 10,000.
100,000 small arms (including rifles, pistols, and machine guns) and
approximately 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition; more than 2,000
2.36-inch rocket launchers (bazookas) and over 40,000 rounds of
ammunition; more than 4,900 vehicles of all types; and a large num­
ber of 37-mm. and 57-mm. antitank guns, 105-mm. howitzers, 60-mm.
and 81-mm. mortars, together with over 700,000 rounds of ammuni­
tion for these weapons. In addition, seventy-nine light naval craft
and twenty liaison aircraft of the L4 and L5 type were turned over
to the South Koreans.
Prior to the end of the occupation Republic of Korea (ROK) forces
had been further provided with 40,000 Japanese rifles and stocks of
suitable ammunition. Subsequent to the American withdrawal in­
dividual organizational equipment for 15,000 troops was transferred
from stocks in Japan.
Further assistance was planned under tjie terms of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, but the implementation of this plan
had scarcely begun when the conflict broke out.
The plans of the Republic of Korea Army, besides providing for
internal security, were designed solely to defend the country against
invasion from the north. The Army was to fight a delaying actipn
from the 38th parallel south to Pusan, hoping meanwhile for frieiidly
intervention.'
At the time of the invasion the Republic of Korea Army, which
numbered 100,000, consisted of eight divisions,4 only four of which
were deployed along the frontier. A sizable proportion of the Army
strength was engaged in suppressing guerrillas. The South Koreans
possessed no tanks, no medium or heavy artillery, and none of the
supporting services normal to American divisions. Six of the eight
divisions had only one battalion each of 105-mm. howitzers; the
other two divisions had no field artillery. Equipped largely with
what the United States had transferred, the Navy consisted of a
handful of patrol craft, while the Air Force did not possess a single
warplane.

OPERATIONS
THE UNITED NATIONS DEFENSIVE,
27 JUNE-15 SEPTEMBER 1950 (Map 3)
At 0400 on' Sunday, 25 June 1950, the North Korean People's
Army, commanded by Marshal Choi Yung Kun, invaded the Repub­
* The ROK division was patterned in general after the American division, even
though its strength was only about 9,500,
 6
•
lie of South Korea. The main effort, conducted with precision, pro­
ceeded down the Pochon-Uijongbu and Yonchon-Uijongbu corri­
dors toward Seoul. This drive was covered on the right by an at­
tack through Kaesong on Munsan and on the left by a strong move­
ment against Chunchon. On the western extremity of the invasion
front the Ongjin peninsula was quickly captured, and on the east
coast' a column advancing on Kangnung linked up with small sea-
borne detachments. (By 30 June landings had been made at points
on the east coast as far south as Yongdok.) Supported by ample
artillery and some 100 Russian-built combat planes, and spearheaded
by T34 tanks, the North Korean attacking force of six divisions plus
several brigades was too strong for the four South Korean divisions
that opposed it. With a small amount of light artillery, a few ar­
mored cars, and no air support, the ROK troops were not yet ready
to cope with anything more than guerrilla bands or raids across the
border. In addition, surprise was on the side of the invaders.
By 28 June the North Koreans had taken the capital city of Seoul,
had closed up along the Han River from its mouth to a point about
twenty miles east of Seoul, and had advanced as far as Samchok on
the east coast. ROK troops suffered serious losses in withdrawing
south of the Han River; and their attempts to regroup and retain
some degree of cohesion availed little as the enemy forces continued
their movement, which put them along the line Suwon-Wonju-Sam­
chok on 4 July.
Reaction of the United Nations.—-Faced with its most significant
test to date, the United Nations acted both quickly and firmly. On
25 June the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the ces­
sation of hostilities and requesting member nations to refrain from
giving aid to the aggressors. When this failed to stop the fighting,
President Truman announced, on 27 June, that he had ordered Amer­
ican air and sea forces to give the South Korean Army cover and
support.5
Later that day the Security Council passed another resolution,
which recommended that the members of the United Nations furn­
ish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary
to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and se­
curity in that area. Responses to this request for help included
pledges of raw materials, food and medicinal supplies, and direct
5
Prior to this date General MacArthur's Far East Command had no responsibil­
ity toward Korea other than the evacuation in an emergency of United
States nationals. Some 2,000 of these were evacuated by 28 June, about
870 of them being flown to Japan.
military support. Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Aus­
tralia, and the United Kingdom placed naval forces at the disposal
of the United Nations.6
On 30 June the President announced that General MacArthur had
been authorized to use American ground troops in Korea. At this
time the Eighth Army, stationed in Japan since the end of World
War II, consisted of four woefully under-strength occupation diviz_
sions. These divisions had less than 70 per cent of their full com­
plement of personnel and were organized with only two battalions
per infantry regiment. jSerjpus shortages existed in mortars and re­
coilless rifles; and, because of the poor roads and weak bridges in
Japan, divisional tank units were equipped with M24 light tanks
rather than thp heavier tanks normally prescl'llmd. Musi Of Ihe
equipment in the hands of troops had been used in World War
was worn to a degree, and in some instances was unserviceable be­
cause of a lack of maintenance parts and trained technical personnel.
The troops in Japan had been undergoing intensive training for
some months; but, hampered by the duties of occupation and by a
scarcity of maneuver areas in Japan for units larger than a battalion,
their combat readiness was far from complete. However, a series of
command-post exercises had been conducted for division and higher
headquarters. These headquarters were able to act quickly and ef­
fectively when orders were received for the commitment of ground
forces in Korea.
In order to make the most effective use of the various United Na­
tions forces, the Security Council adopted a resolution on 7 July
which provided for unified command in Korea. The United States
was requested to designate a commander in chief. The following
day the President appointed General MacArthur.7
The Delaying Action.—The problem which confronted General
MacArthur at the end of June was to employ the ground, sea, and
air forces available to him in a delaying action so as to provide the
time required to build up in South Korea a force capable of ejecting
the aggressors.
One of the initial steps was the dispatch to Korea of a group known
as the GHQ Advanced Command Group (ADCOM), headed by Briga­
6
In addition, the Australian Government made available a RAAF fighter squad­
ron; and Canada provided some air transports for use between the west
coast of the United States and Japan.
7
Throughout this period the Soviet delegate to the Security Council was absent,
the Soviet Union having boycotted meetings of the council since 10 Janu­
ary 1950.
 8

dier General John H. Church. This group functioned from 27 June

until it was absorbed by Headquarters, United States Armed-Forces
in Korea (USAFIK) on 3 July. It performed valuable service in be­
ginning the reorganization of shattered ROK forces, in keeping
Tokyo advised of the front-line situation, and in expediting the de­
livery of vital supplies to ROK forces.8
The Far East Air Forces,9 flying from bases in Japan, began op­
erations against the North Koreans^bn 27 June. On 28 June a re­
striction which limited air operations to South Korea was lifted.
Enemy air opposition was soon virtually eliminated, and close-sup­
port and interdiction missions contributed materially to retarding
the advance of the North Korean ground forces.
After neutralizing the small North Korean Navy, the United
States Naval Forces in the Far East 10 and other United Nations
naval elements established an effective blockade of the entire Korean
peninsula. In addition, they provided water transport and escort of
troops and equipment to Korea and commenced interdiction opera­
tions by surface ships and carrier aircraft against coastal lines of
communication.
The prompt application of sufficient ground strength to slow the
invasion posed difficulties with which the air and sea forces did not
have to contend because of their greater relative strength and their
strategic mobility. Stated briefly, the problem was to move Army
troops and supplies across the 125 miles of water separating Japan
from the port of Pusan; thence 175 miles by difficult, winding road
to Taejon; and, finally, 100 more miles toward Seoul. Expansion and
improvement of the port and the establishment of adequate base fa­
cilities had to be accomplished at the same time.
Advance elements of the American 24th Infantry Division; com­
manded by Major General William F. Dean,11 arrived in Korea on 2
July; and a small task force (Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith)
8
By 29 June approximately 5,600 tons of supplies for Korea had been loaded on
ships in Japan, and 119 tons of emergency supplies had been sent by air
to Pusan.
9
Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer commanding. Before the invasion
of South Korea the Far East Air Forces, consisting of eight and a half
combat groups, was charged with the air defense of Japan, Okinawa,
Guam, and Philippines.
10
Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy Commanding. The principal element of these
forces was the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur D.
Struble.
11
On 3 July General Dean was designated commander of the United States* Forces
in Korea. The advance force was air transported from Kuyushi to Taejon.
composed of two companies of infantry, a battery of artillery, two
4.2-inch mortar platoons, a platoon of 75-mm. recoilless rifles, and
six 2.36-inch rocket-launcher teams was sent forward to make con­
tact with the enemy. Soon afterwards the remainder of the division
landed and moved forward. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker
became ground commander in Korea on 12 July, and on the follow­
ing day his Eighth Army headquarters was established there. On
16 July the Eighth Army assumed command of all ROK ground
forces..
Task Force Smith established light-patrol contact with the enemy
on 4 July. Early the next day it received the full impact of an enemy
division that was supported by more than thirty T34 tanks. Al­
though heavily outnumbered and outgunned, the small delaying
force held off the attackers for four or five hours, after which it was
forced to abandon all but the men's individual weapons and fight its
way back. The pattern for subsequent North Korean attacks was
established here: a strong frontal attack followed by an envelop­
ment of both flanks and the establishment by infiltrating groups of
road blocks on the supply roads. —
It soon became apparent that the main enemy thrust was being
made down the Seoul-Taejon axis with about three reinforced divi­
sions. The 24th Division, after executing several costly but suc­
cessful delaying actions between Osan and Taejon, was compelled to
yield that communications center on 20 July.12 In spite of the over­
whelming superiority of the North Koreans, they did not succeed in
preventing the orderly withdrawal of the American troops.. Al­
though the initial employment of the 24th Division was necessarily
piecemeal, it caused the enemy to slow his advance by frequent and
sometimes unnecessary deployment of large numbers of troops.
In the mountainous central sector and along the east coast, re­
sistance was being offered solely by the regrouped and reorganized
remnants of approximately five South Korean divisions. However,
the American 25th Infantry Division (Major General William B.
Kean), having completed its movement to Korea by 14 July, ad­
vanced into this broad sector. By 22 July the division was concen­
trated in the Sangju area, and on the next day it relieved two EOK
divisions along a twenty-five-mile front extending southwest from
Hamchang. North Korean advances in this central sector, particu­
12
It was after this operation that General Dean was reported as missing' in ac­
tion. On 23 July, General Church succeeded him as commanding general
of the 24th Division. It was also in this operation that the new 3.5-inch
rocket launcher, firing an eight-pound shaped charge, was first used.
 10

larly down the Chungju-Hamchang corridor, now threatened the

vital Taejon-Taegu supply link and the right flank of the American
position immediately east and north of Yongdong.
The strongest enemy attacks continued to be made along the axis
Taejon-Yongdong, against the battered 24th Division. This divi­
sion was relieved on 22 July by the American 1st Cavalry Division13
(Major General Hobart R. Gay), which had landed at Pohang on 18
July. Both the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th Infantry Division,
on its right, fought stubbornly in one delaying position after another
against greatly superior strength. By the end of the month the two
divisions were facing the North Koreans along an interrupted line
from south of Kumchon to north of Hamchang.
Meanwhile a North Korean force of two divisions drove rapidly
south along the west coast toward Chonju. Opposed only by weak
elements of the South Korean militarized police, these columns
reached Kwangju and the southwestern port of Mokpo by 25 July.
Turning east, the enemy pushed toward Chinju and Umyong. Gen­
eral Walker, having recognized this maneuver as a strategic envel­
opment of major proportions, took immediate steps to counter it.
Two newly arrived battalions of the American 29th Infantry Regi­
ment were committed in the Chinju area; and the 24th Division
moved rapidly south from Kumchon, deployed leading elements, and
made contact with the enemy on 27 July in the vicinity of Anui and
Hadong. After five days of heavy fighting at various points along a
forty-mile front the division had withdrawn by 1 August to the
broken line shown on the map. But there was no respite; the threat
to the vital port of Pusan grew as the enemy committed more and
more strength in that direction.
On 31 July the 25th Division crossed the Naktong at Waegwan
and, in a move of unprecedented speed, shifted from the northern
to the southern sector of the front in two days' time to protect the
approaches from Chinju to Pusan. On 1 August the 1st Cavalry
Division crossed the river at Waegwan, and by the next day all the
Naktong River bridges had been blown. The Naktong phase of the
operations had begun.
By 5 August the 25th Division had taken over the sector running
south from the junction of the Naktong and Nam Rivers. The 24th
Division and the 1st Cavalry Division had already completed their
withdrawal to organized defensive positions east of the Naktong,
and ROK divisions assumed responsibility for the northeastern sec­
13
One battalion of the 7th Regiment remained in the Yongdok area to strengthen
ROK resistance against the push down the east coast.
 11

tor of the defensive perimeter. Unremitting enemy pressure had.

squeezed the defending American and ROK units into a rectangular-
shaped beachhead ninety miles long by sixty miles wide. Until
now the line of battle had been in no sense continuous, and even at
this time there was a wide mountainous gap between Andong and
Yongdok.
Identifications indicated that at least thirteen North Korean in­
fantry divisions and one armored division were now attacking. These
divisions were supported by artillery fire that was both intense and
accurate.
From the beginning of the conflict most of the North Korean arms
were provided by Russia. In spite of Russian claims that no arms
had been furnished North Korea since the end of the occupation, De­
cember 1948, many captured articles were identified as having been
manufactured as late as 1950. Among these were items of signal
equipment, ammunition, and automatic weapons. Other equipment
of Russian manufacture included artillery, mortars, small arms, and
tanks.
To oppose the many enemy divisions, General Walker had three
American divisions, all considerably under strength, and five ROK
divisions. The latter had recently been reorganized and re-equipped.
As previously mentioned, the new 3.5-inch rocket launchers had
been in use in limited numbers since 20 July; but the first medium
tanks did not arrive until 30 July.
Although in the first week of August the situation of the defend­
ers was still grim, there was reason to be somewhat more hopeful.
The enemy had suffered an estimated 37,000 casualties; we still held
a beachhead that afforded ample room for maneuver; and Pusan pro­
vided a port with adequate facilities.14 The Pusan Logistical Com­
mand (Brigadier General Crump Garvin) had been organized on 4
July and during that month had discharged over 300,000 tons of mili­
tary supplies. And, most important of all, badly needed reinforce­
ments continued to arrive.15
During these first six weeks of the operations in Korea the Far
East Air Forces played an important part in delaying the enemy.
Lacking medium tanks and artillery, the ground forces were particu­
larly dependent upon the support of the air forces. In the initial
14
The beachheads at Salerno and Anzio were both much smaller, and the troops
there had to be supplied over the beaches.
15
The American 2d Infantry Division (Major General Laurence B. Kaiser) ar­
rived between 31 July and 15 August. The American 1st Marine Brigade
(Provisional) and the 5th Regimental Combat Team landed on 3 August.
 12

stages of the hostilities attempts had been made to provide close

support for the ROK units. But since the latter's lack of air-ground
communications rendered these efforts largely ineffective, attacks
had to be confined almost entirely to targets of opportunity. Nor
was air-ground coordination everything to be desired when Amer­
ican ground forces entered the fighting. Prior to the war in Korea
the mission of the air units in Japan had been defensive in nature;
and, therefore, neither equipment nor organization was on hand for
air-ground coordination in mobile warfare. As a result, there had
been a lack of joint training in this field. As the war progressed,
however, a workable system was improvised with the personnel and
equipment available; and by 1 August approximately 4,300 close-
support missions had been flown. In addition, some 2,500 interdic­
tion sorties had been flown and 60 strategic bombardment missions.
The interdiction missions had been particularly effective, compelling
virtually all enemy traffic to move during the hours of darkness.
Night sweeps along lines of communication had then been instituted.
During this period the blockade established by the Navy denied
the coastal waters to the enemy as a line of supply. Naval vessels
also provided effective interdiction and ground-support fire, particu­
larly on the east coast, where the slowing of the enemy advance to­
ward Yongdok was due in large measure to naval gunfire support.
Strikes by carrier-based planes supplemented the support by land-
based aircraft and proved of great value to the men on the ground.
In addition, the Navy was efficiently performing its traditional mis­
sion of providing logistical support for the ground and air forces.
Defense of the Pusan Perimeter (Map 4a).—The period of fighting
from 6 August until 15 September might well be considered a con­
tinuation of the delaying action, because it provided the necessary
time for General MacArthur to muster sufficient strength to launch
his offensive.
While throughout this period the principal objective of the enemy
was the destruction of the United Nations forces, the strategy em­
ployed followed two distinct patterns. These, for purposes of. dis­
cussion, divide the operations into two more or less distinct phases.
The first phase, lasting from about 6 August to 26 August, was
marked by successive blows at individual points in determined at­
tempts to break through the defense line; the second, between 27
August and 15 September,16 was a period of heavy and almost simul­
taneous attacks around the entire perimeter.
16
The dates given are approximate.
 13

The first phase commenced with a United Nations spoiling attack.

In order to throw off balance the expected enemy attack from Chinju
toward Pusan, General Walker organized Task Force Kean, which
consisted of the 25th Infantry Division (less the 27th RCT), the 1st
Marine Provisional Brigade, and the 5th RCT. This force attacked
on the morning of 7 August toward Chinju. The enemy attacked on
the same morning toward Masan, and the two forces met head-on
early in the day. Several days of heavy fighting followed; but by the
night of 11 August, Task Force Kean had occupied the high ground
just east of Chinju. At this time heavy enemy pressure on other
parts of the perimeter necessitated the transfer of some of the units
of the task force; and, the immediate threat from Chinju being re­
duced, the remaining units withdrew step by step to their previous
position.
Along the Naktong River front, north of that river's junction with
the Nam, the North Koreans struck a series of severe blows, hoping
to sever our main line of communication, which ran northwest from
Pusan through Taegu. During the period 6-15 August the enemy
established and reinforced several bridgeheads, the most threaten­
ing of which was just north of the Nam. The second half of August
witnessed desperate fighting along the river line, but all bridgeheads
south of Waegwan that were of any consequence were finally re­
duced. The 24th Division was relieved by the 2d Division on 24
August.
On the eastern flank the North Korean efforts to break through
the perimeter came nearer success. Identified initially as guerrillas,
a force of approximately division strength infiltrated this lightly
held mountain area and by 12 August had fought its way into Po-
hang. The ROK 3d Division, cut off south of Yongdok by this move,
was evacuated by sea and landed below Pohang, where it re-estab­
lished the right flank. Part of the Eighth Army reserve moved to
Yonil airfield, just south of Pohang, and succeeded in holding that
important fighter field. The remainder of the Eighth Army reserve
moved north to Kyongju in order to be readily available in case of a
major breakthrough in this area. Fortunately, the enemy was not
prepared to follow up his success. Pohang was retaken on 18 Au­
gust, and ROK troopshad pushed well north of that city by the 26th.
The last determined effort during this period was made about mid-
August when North Korean forces applied heavy but sporadic pres­
sure down the Waegwan-Taegu road against the 1st Cavalry Divi­
sion Little progress was made here; but an enemy attack from
 14

Kunwi toward Taegu forced the ROK 1st Division to withdraw, ex­
posing the valley road from Tabu to Taegu. Seeing this as the most
serious threat to Taegu, General Walker on 18 August committed
the 27th and 23d RCT's from army reserve to reinforce the ROK 1st
Division in this area. Much bitter back-and-forth fighting took place
along the north-south valley road from Soi to Tabu. This stretch of
road, known to our troops as the "Bowling Alley", was the scene of
some much publicized and excellent work by the famed 27th Infan­
try Regiment. Finally the enemy was halted.
An analysis of the North Korean attacks during this period shows
that none was made in overwhelming strength and that the enemy
was incapable of exploiting his successes. No single assault lasted
more than three days, as communications and supply could not fur­
ther support it. The peak of every attack was reached on the sec­
ond day; the power was gone on the third. As this phase ended, air
and ground reconnaissance clearly indicated that the enemy was
making every effort to gather sufficient strength for further major
operations.
During the second phase (27 August-15 September) of this period
heavy enemy assaults took place around almost the entire perimeter
(Map 4b). Apparently Marshal Choi's strategy aimed at prevent­
ing General Walker from rushing his reserves from one threatened
point to another, as the latter had done during the earlier phase.
The North Korean offensive began on 26 August with a strong
secondary attack in the Pohang area. Extensive enemy gains neces­
sitated some reinforcement of the ROK I Corps. Then at 2400 on 31
August, along the western perimeter of the beachhead, six enemy
divisions plus several tank regiments launched a major effort against
the forty-five-mile front held by the 2d and 25th Divisions. In the
25th Division sector the enemy was halted after much heavy fight­
ing in which he gained considerable ground. By 5 September, how­
ever, the original front had been restored. On its wide front the 2d
Division had to cope with strong enemy forces that succeeded in
crossing the Naktong at seventeen different places and in advancing
four to six miles. But within a week the bridgeheads had been con­
tained by the employment of local reserves and the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade. From 3 to 10 September, in some of the bitterest
fighting to date, the North Koreans registered gains of six to eight
thousand yards against the 1st Cavalry Division and ROK tropps
 15

in the Taegu area.17 The city of Taegu, however, remained in our

hands.
Encouraged by the unexpected success of the 26 August attack
in the Pohang area, Choi decided to renew it on 2 September. A
three-division attack pierced the front of the ROK I Corps, captured
Pohang on 6 September, and drove a deep salient to the Taegu­
Kyongju-Pusan supply road. At this point General Walker com­
mitted his reserve, the 24th Division, north of Kyongju. The divi­
sion's counterattack, combined with a push by ROK troops against
the western face of the salient, served to halt this southwesterly ad­
vance which had severed the supply road near Yongchon and which
soon would have rendered the defenders' position in the Taegu area
untenable. However, up until the eve of the Eighth Army's own of­
fensive, units of the 24th Division were involved in bitter fighting
to reduce the enemy's deep salient in the Kyongju area.
Although the Eighth Army had survived its last'major crisis in
the beachhead area, hard fighting continued through mid-September
along the entire line of contact. For six weeks the defending force
had used its interior lines and greater mobility to fend off a superior
force that at no time was able to assemble sufficient logistical sup­
port to exploit a breakthrough.
Of the 28,000 combat sorties flown by United Nations aircraft
since the beginning of-the fighting in Korea, the greater part had
been in direct support of the ground forces. Yet the interdiction
missions flown had been so successful that the North Koreans had
been unable to undertake a major ground effort until the last day of
August. In addition, the few strategic targets available had been
heavily damaged.
The extent to which the North Korean Army was able to supply
its forces in the face of this heavy air effort is remarkable. Our air
interdiction could not halt rail movement entirely, as the trains
moved only at night.18 Htfwever, by mid-August there was an acute
shortage of motor transportation for the final haul from railroad to
battle line. In the attempt to overcome this difficulty, animal-drawn
vehicles and conscripted civilians (South Koreans) were pressed
into service. But the enemy supply situation grew steadily worse,
17
The headquarters of the American I Corps (Major General Frank W. Milburn)
arrived in Taegu on 13 September. The next day the I Corps assumed
control of the 1st Cavalry Division, the ROK 1st Division, and the United
Kingdom 27th Infantry Brigade. The last-named had arrived on 29 Au­
gust and had been committed on the south flank of the 1st Cavalry Divi­
sion on 5 September.
8
The North Koreans made use of tunnels to conceal trains during the day.
 16

resulting eventually in shortages of rations and clothing. Petro­

leum was also in short supply, although sufficient stocks were pro­
vided for armored vehicles. Ammunition stocks were maintained
at fairly adequate levels.
In contrast, the logistic requirements of the United Nations forces
were met in spite of the growing demand created by the increase in
personnel as well as the desperate nature of the fighting. In August,
alone, 595,000 measurement tons of supplies and equipment were un­
loaded at Pusan. In spite of the destruction or capture of nearly
150 miles of rail lines by the enemy, the railroads carried 108,000
tons of supplies to the combat areas. Units near the coast were sup­
plied by LST's.

THE UNITED NATIONS OFFENSIVE,

16 SEPTEMBER-2 NOVEMBER 1950

The Amphibious Landing at Inchon (Map 5).—The initiative in

;the Korean campaign changed hands abruptly on 15 September.$On_
that date United Nations troops made a successful landing more
than 150 miles behind enemy lines in an operation similar to-General
MacArthur's many successful amphibious envelopments in World
/War II.
As early as 4 July, MacArthur had considered an amphibious land­
ing at Inchon by the 1st Cavalry Division. Some amphibious train­
ing was conducted; but when the critical situation around Pusan re­
quired immediate commitment of the division, the Inchon plans were
postponed. However, a joint planning staff, headed by Major Gen­
eral Edward M. Almond, Chief of Staff, Far East Command, contin­
ued detailed consideration of the problem of a strategic sea-borne
envelopment. This staff, working under pressure, produced its plan
in only a fraction of the time normally allotted. The basic problem,
of course, was to determine where the landing should take place.
Landings at Kunsan, Wonsan, Inchon, and elsewhere were consid­
ered. A landing at Inchon would involve practically every disadvan­
tage known to amphibious specialists. There was an unusual tidal
range of over twenty-nine feet which would permit use of the beaches
for only about three hours in twelve; at low tide there was a wide
expanse of mud flats in front of the difficult beaches; the channel
was narrow and the port facilities inadequate. But a landing at
Inchon had the prime strategic advantage of proximity to Seoul,
whieh lay astride the major north-south supply arteries. Other fa­
vorable considerations were' Seoul's psychological importance as Kor
rea's capital city and its value to the enemy as a supply base. Intel­
 17

' ligence estimates indicated that the area was comparatively lightly
defended.
Despite the grave risk, General MacArthur, with the approval of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decided that the amphibious assault would
be made at Inchon. He also insisted that the operation should take
place on 15 September, the earliest date on which the tides would be
suitable. The necessary directive was issued on 12 August, leaving
only a month for detailed plans and preparations that usually take
five or six months.
The X Corps, designated to conduct the operation, was activated
on 16 August, with General Almond as its commander. The corps
consisted of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division, and
supporting troops. The 7th Division (Major General David G. Barr),
tye last of the four divisions on occupation duty in Japan when the
conflict began, was drawn from GHQ reserve. It contained 8,000
ROK troops that had trained very briefly with the division in Japan.
The 1st Marine Division (Major General Oliver P. Smith)'was as­
sembled in Japan by moving the 1st Marine Brigade from Korea and
uniting it with six Marine battalions drawn from the United States
and the Mediterranean.
The air preparation for this operation can be considered as having
begun on 3 August with the initiation of the B-29 interdiction cam­
paign in North Korea and the shifting in mid-August of a portion of
the short-range air effort to similar attacks in South Korea. This
air offensive served a double purpose: restriction of the enemy's ef­
forts against the Pusan perimeter and preparation for the coming
offensive by disrupting his transportation facilities. The results
Later became evident when the North Koreans were unable either to
shift large units to the defense of Seoul or to regroup effectively
the Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan perimeter,
purposes of deception ROK marines made a minor landing at
Mokpo on the southwest coast and ex,ecuted feints at Kunsan on the
west coast and near Pohang and Yongdok on the east coast. Naval
forces conducted a demonstration off Samchok.
APrior to the landings naval aircraft from four carriers and fire
from four cruisers (two American and two British), six destroyers,
and three rocket-firing landing craft pounded enemy defenses and
Ideal transportation facilities for two days while the offshore area
va.s being swept clear of mines. These naval forces, increased by
the arrival of another aircraft carrier, remained offshore and pro­
vide-1 air and gunfire support on call from the ground troops after
the initial landings.
 18

The plan for the first phase of the operation required the seizure
of Wolmi, a tiny island which dominates Inchon harbor and which
is connected to the port of Inchon by a causeway (Map 6a). At dawn
on 15 September, about one hour before high tide, a reinforced batr
talion of the 1st Marine Division landed and captured Wolmi against
light resistance in less than thirty minutes.
The plan for the second phase contemplated the seizure of the
Inchon peninsula. During the next high tide, at 1730 hours, other
elements of the 1st Marine Division assaulted the nine-foot sea wall
in the port area. North Korean garrison and security forces offered
little opposition; and by the afternoon of the next day, 16 Septem­
ber, the marines were several miles east and northeast of Inchon.
Kimpo airfield fell on the 17th, and on the following day it was serv­
ing as the terminus of an airlift operation that landed\400 tons of
cargo daily.
The 7th Infantry Division came ashore on 18 September and as­
sumed responsibility on the south flank. It fanned out quickly to
the south and east.
The plan for the third phase contemplated the liberation of Seoul
and the denial to the enemy of the railroads and highways in the
vicinity, vital link's in his lines of communication to the south. Ma­
rine troops crossed the Han River below Seoul on 19 September and
advanced rapidly on the city. Meanwhile, having secured Suwon,
7th Division troops late on 26 September linked up with advance ele­
jments of the 1st Cavalry Division, which was leading the breakout
from the Pusan beachhead. Other elements of the 7th Division
crossed the Han south of Seoul and entered the outskirts of the capi­
tal city. The columns advancing from north, south, and west en­
countered strong resistance; but Seoul fell on 26 September.
Breakout from the Pusan Beachhead (Map 5).—On the eve of the
Eighth Army's own offensive the enemy began another attack east
from Waegwan, and on the night of 15 September he was threaten­
ing the northern approach to Taegu. But despite this enemy threat,
and the rainy weather that almost eliminated air support, the Eighth
Army began its general offensive on 16 September. :
The landing at Inchon, deep in the enemy rear, had no immediate
effect on Marshal Choi's army in South Korea; and the Eighth Army
scored no appreciable gains Until 20 September. At this time it was
confirmed that there was little depth to the enemy defenses. When
the "hard shell" was broken, there was nothing behind it to impede
the advance of the Eighth Army.
 19

The drive of the 25th Division down the Masan-Chinju road, sup­
ported by gunfire from naval vessels off the south coast, experienced
heavy going for the first few days; but it soon gained momentum,
and on 26 September the division was several miles west of Chinju.
The 2d Division,19 after several days of stubborn fighting, found a
soft spot and pushed forward rapidly toward Kochang.
On the north face of the perimeter, where ROK divisions attacked,
the pattern of resistance was much the same. After resisting
strongly for four days, the enemy defense collapsed; and he with­
drew in haste. The ROK troops followed as rapidly as their trans­
port could carry them.
The I Corps, made up of the 1st Cavalry Division, 24th Division,
ROK 1st Division, and the United Kingdom 27th Brigade, made the
most sweeping advance. The 24th Division, initially in corps re­
serve, was committed on the left of the 1st Cavalry Division. After
breaking the enemy defenses, both divisions established bridgeheads
across the Naktong and drove rapidly northwest. In one day, 26
September, leading elements of the 1st Cavalry Division sped more
than 100 miles behind enemy lines to form a juncture with troops of
the 7th Division in the vicinity of Osan.
Although all or part of eight North Korean divisions were isolated
in southwestern Korea, there was ample opportunity for individuals
or small groups to escape to the north. Large numbers threw away
their arms and donned civilian clothing, which made it extremely
difficult to identify them. But despite this, during the period 15-30
September United Nations forces took 23,600 prisoners.
In southwestern Korea the 2d and 25th Divisions (IX Corps) con­
tinued to advance rapidly against the scattered but often formidable
counteraction of disorganized groups. Before the end of the month
the west-coast port of Kunsan was seized by the 25th Division. De­
struction of by-passed enemy concentrations constituted a major
problem. A difficult task assigned to the I Corps was to clear and
make secure the Taegu-Taejon main supply route.
In the vast mountainous area east of the line Taegu-Seoul the
ROK divisions advanced rapidly against practically no opposition.
On the east coast ROK troops reached the 38th parallel by 1 Octo­
ber.20
19
The IX Corps (Major General John B. Coulter) became operational on 23 Sep­
tember. Its major units were the 2d and 25th Divisions.
20
As of this date approximately 21,000 ROK troops were attached to or inte­
grated with American ground units. The ROK corps, frequently referred
to in this narrative, were made up entirely of ROK units.
 20

It became apparent during this period of the campaign that Mar­

shal Choi, in his hope for a quick victory and. unmindful of other
considerations, had committed virtually all his strength against the
beachhead in the southeast. Therefore, when the grave need for it
developed, he had no general reserve. Moreover, the precipitous
flight of his troops, during which they abandoned vast quantities of
heavy equipment and large stocks of supplies, gave evidence that he
had had no plan for an orderly withdrawal. Enemy confusion was
aggravated by inadequate signal communications and lack of motor­
ized transport. "No longer did North Korean forces hold any well-
defined line in the south.
The Advance to the Manchurian Border (Map 6b).—Although
General MacArthur announced the fall of Seoul on 26 September and
restored the city to the Korean Government on the 29th, the 1st Ma­
rine Division and elements of the 7th Division were compelled to
engage in severe street fighting until the latter date before strong
pockets of resistance were eliminated. By 1 October 1st Marine Di­
vision columns had advanced more than ten miles north of Seoul,
against strong rear-guard resistance.
The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, elements of which
had landed at Kimpo airfield on 24 and 27 September, took over the
security of the X Corps' north flank. It advanced up Kumpo penin­
sula and succeeded in clearing it by the end of the month.
Meanwhile, in the area immediately south and southeast of Seoul,
the 7th Division was blocking the main escape routes from the south
against numerous small bands of North Koreans.
To permit its employment elsewhere, the X Corps, which was not
assigned to the Eighth Army but operated directly under Far East
Command headquarters, was relieved in the Seoul area by the I Corps
(Map 7). At the same time the IX Corps assumed the security re­
sponsibilities of the I Corps in South Korea. Moving north, the 1st
Cavalry Division of the I Corps overcame relatively heavy resistance
near Kaesong and crossed the 38th parallel on 9 October. It then en­
veloped the enemy position in the vicinity of Kumchon. Also par­
ticipating in this action was the 27th British Commonwealth Bri­
gade, whose name had been changed after the assignment of an Au­
stralian battalion. Unabated, the ROK pursuit on the east coast
rolled twenty miles north of the transportation center of Wonsan by
14 October. Enemy efforts to organize defensive positions failed.
The following week saw no pause in the deep thrusts of the United
Nations troops. The advance north from Sariwon of the 1st Cavalry
 21

Division, the relentless drive up the Yesong River of the ROK 1st
Division, and the northwesterly sweep of the ROK 7th Division fore­
told the fall of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, which was
completely occupied on 21 October. On the previous day two bat­
talions of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team had been
dropped by parachute at Sukchon and Sunchon. With so little re­
sistance actually being met at Pyongyang, the effect of this airborne
operation appears to have been slight. Of interest, however, was
the drop from C-119's of considerable heavy equipment, including
four %-ton weapons carriers, twenty-eight 14-ton vehicles, twelve
105-mm. howitzers, and four 90-mm. guns. While equipment had
been dropped in World War II, this was probably the first operational
drop of the heavier weapons and artillery pieces. With enemy re­
sistance in a state of disintegration, troops advancing overland con­
tacted the airborne forces on the 21st.
As the United Nations forces swept into the northern reaches of
Korea, the front broadened considerably. On 26 October the ROK
6th Division reached Chosan, on the Manchurian border. At the
same time, to the east, the ROK Capital Division approached the
area south of the Choshin and Fusen reservoirs.
Still operating as a separate command, the X Corps moved to the
east coast, where the 1st Marine Division disembarked at Wonsan on
26 October21 and commenced clearing pockets of resistance which
had been by-passed in the drive by ROK troops up the east coast.
After their annihilating defeats, in which they had lost 135,000
men as prisoners since mid-September, the North Korean forces
showed little aggressiveness. By the end of the month the 24th Di­
vision had advanced to within a few miles of the temporary North
Korean capital of Sinuiju (Map 8).

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION,

3 NOVEMBER 1950-24 JANUARY 1951
Meanwhile resistance in front of ROK forces in the vicinity of
Unsan stiffened, and the presence of Chinese soldiers was verified.
At first it was not clear whether they were members of North Ko­
21
The X Corps headquarters had arrived several days before and had assumed
control of the ROK I Corps. The original plan had contemplated an am­
phibious assault at Wonsan, but this was made unnecessary by the unex­
pectedly swift advance of the ROK I Corps up the east coast. It was for­
tunate that such was the case, for the mines in the channel off Wonsan
were so numerous that six days were required to clear a channel for the
transports carrying the marines.
 22

rean divisions or whether complete Chinese divisions had entered

the conflict, but it was soon learned that the latter was the case.
Strong attacks were launched against the ROK 6th and 8th Divi­
sions, driving them back toward the Chongchon River. This reverse
so threatened the troops near Sinuiju that General Walker decided
to pull them, together with the forces in the large salient in the cen­
ter, back to the general line of the Chongchon River.
Along the wide front of the X Corps the only enemy strength of
any significance was in the area of the Choshin and Fusen reservoirs.
The 7th Division of that corps commenced debarking at Iwon on 29
October. It moved rapidly toward Pungsan against.sporadic enemy
opposition and by 21 November entered the Manchurian border town
of Hyesanjin in sub-zero weather. Within a few days the 7th Divi­
sion had assumed responsibility for the broad sector extending
southwest from Hyesanjin to the east side of the Choshin reservoir.
In the meantime the 1st Marine Division, battling bitter weather
while reducing defended roadblocks, drove up both sides of the Cho­
shin reservoir.
The 3d Infantry Division (Major General Robert H. Soule) de­
barked at Wonsan during .the first three weeks of November. The
division was made responsible for the security of the Wonsan area
and was given the mission of patrolling in the vast area to the left
of the 1st Marine Division. One of its regiments was placed in X
Corps reserve.
The lull which existed on the Eighth Army front after 6 Novem­
ber was utilized by General Walker to improve his logistical situation
and to regroup his forces for further offensive operations. This re­
grouping included the movement of the IX Corps from South Korea.
Briefly stated, the plan for the coming offensive contemplated a gen­
eral assault northward by the Eighth Army combined with a X
Corps attack against the enemy left flank and rear. The main enemy
supply road, Kanggye-Huichon, would be the primary terrain ob­
jective of the X Corps. Originally the Eighth Army assault was
scheduled for 14 November. The date, however, was changed to 24
November to permit the arrival of the IX Corps, whose northward
movement was delayed by heavy guerrilla activity in the Pyonggang
area that threatened our main line of communication. ROK units
assumed the anti-guerrilla and security mission in South Korea after
the departure of the IX Corps.
Because of the growing scarcity of close-support targets during
the period 15 September to 24 November the emphasis of the air
effort gradually shifted to interdiction. In November alone these
 23

interdiction attacks destroyed or damaged 650 trucks, 78 locomo­

tives, over 1,800 railread cars, and more than 70 bridges. In evalu­
ating the success of the enemy in building up his forces in the face
of this interdiction effort, it should be noted that his lines of com­
munication from Manchuria were then quite short and that move­
ments could be completed in a single night. Also worth noting is the
effect of the restriction against flying over Manchuria, f This limited
the directions of approach to the critical Yalu River bridges and pre­
vented fighter escort planes from covering the north flank of bomber
formations. Moreover, the enemy could concentrate his antiaircraft
weapons to cover our limited approach zones; and his defending air
squadrons were free to move across the border to oppose our aircraft
and then dart back to the safety of Manchuria.
Until 1 November our air forces had to contend with only the ob­
solescent propellor-driven aircraft of the inferior North Korean Air
Force. Up to that time only 8 United Nations aircraft had been lost
in air action, as compared with enemy losses of 102 planes. On 1
November, however, a new threat appeared when United Nations
pilots were opposed for the first time by a number of Russian-built
MIG-15 jet aircraft which appeared briefly and then escaped to air­
fields in Manchuria.
Meanwhile reinforcements for the Eighth Army continued to ar­
rive. Welcome additions were troops from the Philippines, Aus­
tralia, Turkey, Thailand, and the Netherlands. Also arriving were
advance parties from France and Canada, additional forces from the
United Kingdom, and a hospital unit from Sweden. Personnel
shortages in American units were made up by incorporating South
Korean soldiers. A double purpose was thus served: bringing the
United States units up to strength and providing training for the
South Koreans which they could later pass on to their own units.
Onjjjjjy^ovember the total of United Nations ground forces in Korea
was about 420,000, of whom 177,000 were Americans and approxi­
mately 200,000 were South Koreans.
The logistical problems involved in the Inchon landing, in the
transfer of the X Corps from the west to the east coast, and in the
rapid overrunning of nearly the whole of the Korean peninsula are
evident. That these problems were met and solved without a com­
plete operational halt is a tribute to those whose unspectacular ef­
forts kept the military machine rolling. The major problem, of
course, was transportation in Korea itself. In a land of poor and
scarce roads the railroads must always bear the brunt of the burden.
These had been severely damaged; but by the end of October the
 24

tremendous efforts of Army engineer groups, naval construction bat­

talions, and Transportation Corps units had made it possible to place
in operation 1,295 miles of rail lines, 245 locomotives, and 4,400,
freight cars. Rail and truck hauls were reduced insofar as possible
by the opening of ports nearer the front, where supplies could be
landed by DUKW's or light craft. Urgently needed supplies, includ­
ing rations, gasoline, and ammunition, were moved forward by air
transport while surface lines of communication were being opened
and expanded.
The Eighth Army offensive opened on 24' November. The attack­
ing divisions advanced against light opposition until the night of
25-26 November, at which time they were abruptly halted and
thrown back by the large-scale (eighteen-division22) attack of the
Chinese Communist Forces, which had entered Korea from Manchu­
ria. Similarly, the westerly advance of the X Corps, which began on
27 November, was quickly stopped by an enemy force of nine divi­
sions (Map 9).
General MacArthur described the new situation as follows:

The Eighth Army and affiliated United Nations units met power­
ful enemy resistance along the entire line—resistance which un­
masked the fiction of "volunteer" 23 participation and disclosed the

massive deployment of the Fourth Chinese Field Army, an impor­

tant segment of the entire Chinese Communist military strength,

in a formation of nine corps abreast in columns of divisions to an

aggregate of twenty-seven divisions, with elements of the Third

Field Army discovered in initial deployment immediately to the

rear.

The main blow fell on the right wing of the Eighth Army and
quickly severed the very tenuous contact existing between it and
the X Corps across the rugged terrain in the center of the peninsula.
Although the ensuing operations were concurrent, they will be de­
scribed separately, as they took place on two distinct parts of the
front.
Operations on the X Corps Front.—Along the greatly extended
front of the X Corps the heaviest enemy blow was directed at the
Choshin reservoir area, where the 1st Marine Division (less the 1st
Marine Regiment) had just started its attack toward the west. A
Chinese Communist force struck both east and west of the Choshin
22
A Chinese division is triangular in organization and varies in strength from
5,000 to 10,000.
23
The Peiping Government had persistently maintained that all Chinese partici­
pants in the Korean war were volunteers.
 25

reservoir on 28 November. The assault east of the reservoir quickly

pierced the light line held by two battalions of the 7th Division
(which had just relieved elements of the 1st Marine Division east
of the reservoir), fanned out in their rear, and cut them off from the
south. The most violent attack struck the marines on a broad front
west of the reservoir and soon cut the main supply road in several
places. The marines and the two battalions of the 7th Division were
swept into a pocket south of the reservoir, isolated from friendly
ground forces and hammered from all sides.
The prodigious efforts of both land- ancf carrier-based aircraft in
support of the beleaguered troops reduced to some extent the great
odds against them. On numerous occasions the close air support
made it impossible for the enemy to commit his forces in mass; his
piecemeal attacks were then turned back by the defenders. Never­
theless, the bitter cold weather combined with the fierce fighting to
take a heavy toll.
' At length, late on 9 December, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine
Regiment, which Had not been cut off, and a small task force from
the 3d Infantry Division broke through to .join the isolated troops.
After much severe fighting and many hardships the combined force
withdrew to the port of Hungnam, where the marines were loaded on
waiting transports. Their embarkation was completed on 15 De­
cember.
One of the most interesting features of the breakout from the
pocket and the withdrawal was that, in spite of almost continuous
action with the enemy and poor road conditions, little heavy equip­
ment was lost. For the crossing of one abyss C-119's dropped sev­
eral spans of bridge equipment, which were assembled to provide a
treadway bridge. Without it the column's vehicles, tanks, and ar­
tillery would have had to be abandoned.
Meanwhile the strategic effect of the Choshin reservoir onslaught,
rather than any direct attack, made it necessary for the X Corps
troops in northeastern Korea to retire.
The left flank of the X Corps, originally along the upper reaches
of the Taedong River, was entirely open except for such protection
as was provided by a few scattered patrols from the 3d Division.
Chinese columns moving around the open flank advanced toward the
port of Wonsan without opposition. In fact, this movement pro­
ceeded undetected until it was observed by air reconnaissance in the
vicinity of Yangdok. By 5 December small elements of the 3d Divi­
sion and some ROK marines were isolated in Wonsan; but they were
soonevacuated by sea to Hungnam, where they reinforced the troops
 26

of the 7th and 3d Divisions who were defending the port and the
nearby Yonpo airfield.
After the evacuation of the 1st Marine Division from Hungnam
the defensive perimeter was gradually contracted as the remaining
units embarked in succession. The troops of the 7th Division fol­
lowed the marines, and then the regiments of the 3d Division were
embarked. The evacuation was completed on 24 December.
The enemy attempts to sweep the Hungnam defenders into the sea
had been numerous and often in considerable strength; yet on no oc­
casion was he able to mount a coordinated mass attack with adequate
artillery support. The defending forces, on the other hand, were
• ably supported by artillery that was effectively reinforced by naval
gunfire. Carrier-based aircraft contributed greatly to the success­
ful evacuation by flying thousands of close-support and interdic­
tion missions. Naval vessels evacuated 203,000 persons (of whom
105,000 were troops), 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons
of other cargo. In addition, air transports took out 3,600 troops, 200
vehicles, and 1,300 tons of cargo. Needless to say, this operation
could have been carried out successfully only by the closely inte­
grated efforts of the Army, Navy^ and Air Force.
By 27 December the X Corps had completed the landing and as­
sembling of its troops in the Pusan area. On the previous day the
corps had been placed under the Eighth Army.
Operations on the Eighth Army Front.—Employing a force of
eighteen divisions, the Chinese Communists dealt the Eighth Army
a stunning blow on 26 November] ' The main effort, directed at and
around the army's east flank, quickly smashed the divisions of the
ROK II Corps in that sector and exposed the right flank of the 2d
Division, in the IX Corps sector. Savage blows were struck at the
remainder of the army front, but it was the primary threat of en­
velopment from the east that necessitated a withdrawal all along
the line.
The 1st Cavalry Division, the Turkish Brigade, and the British
Commonwealth 27th Brigade were committed against the onrushing
enemy on the Eighth Army's right flank. The combined efforts of
these and other units made the withdrawal possible. Although
losses in men and equipment had been heavy,24 by 30 November the
Eighth Army was intact south of the Chongchon River.
24
The 2d Division was particularly hard hit, suffering 4,163 casualties and the
loss of much equipment. One artillery battalion lost all but nine of its
howitzers; two other battalions either lost or were forced to destroy all of
their pieces.
 27

As the Eighth Army continued south across the Taedong River,

the intensity of the fighting tapered off considerably. However, the
right flank was still in the air; and a Chinese column succeeded in
cutting the Pyongyang-Wonsan lateral highway at Songchon while
the Eighth Army was still north of the road. This and other similar
threats were reduced, but there was still no hope of stabilizing a line
north of Pyongyang.
The southward movement continued to positions below, Pyongyang
and the Nan River. General Walker made every effort to contract
his broad front, refuse his right flank, and concentrate his delaying
action along the terrain corridor in the west. ,
After 5 December the Chinese confined their offensive efforts to
patrolling and probing action, though they continued to follow up
the withdrawing troops. Even though enemy pressure had relaxed
considerably, it was considered advisable for the Eighth Army to
continue its retirement to a stronger defensive position. The X
Corps had been cut away from the rest of the United Nations forces;
and even if it could be evacuated and brought around by sea, it was
not available now to reinforce General Walker's troops. Therefore,
between 5 and 15 December the Eighth Army moved from south of
the Nan River to a strong position which ran behind the lower
Imjin in the west and thence eastward along the 38th parallel. The
ROK units that had been delaying small bands of infiltrating North
Koreans in the mountains to the east were assigned zones of respon­
sibility on the right of the new position. With minor exceptions,
this front remained unchanged through 31 December.
In the meantime remnants of North Korean units in South Korea
had infiltrated northward in sizable numbers to add seasoned vet­
erans to divisions being reconstituted in North Korea and in Man­
churia. After mid-December friendly patrols discovered an increas­
ing number of North Korean units in the forward areas. Concur­
rently there was a decided decrease in the numbers of Chinese in
the line. During the latter half of December both air and ground
reconnaissance observed an extensive build-up in rear areas of both
enemy troops, and equipments Then during the last few days of De­
cember major Chinese Communist forces moved into the line in the
sector north of Seoul. Their patrols became more numerous and
more aggressive. Several attacks of regimental size against the
ROK units on the right were apparently intended to draw attention
to that sector. In short, at the year's end there was every indication
of an impending large-scale enemy assault.
 28

On 23 December, General Walker had been killed in a traffic acci­

dent north of Seoul. Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway suc­
ceeded him as commander of the Eighth Army. General Ridgway's
combat forces now included contingents from nine nations other
than the United States and the Republic of Korea.25
It was estimated that enemy forces at the end of the year exceeded
400,000, of which approximately 250,000 were Chinese Communists.
Estimates of the total Chinese forces in Korea and in Manchuria
were about 740,000.
There has been much controversy over the deployment of the
United Nations forces in their advance from the 38th parallel to the
Manchurian border, based on the fact that the X Corps functioned
as a separate corps directly under General MacArthur and that a gap
existed between it and the Eighth Army. The reasons for this can
probably be understood by noting the objective of the United Na­
tions Forces at that time, the forces available for the attainment of
that objective, and the terrain.
The objective was to end the conflict at the earliest possible date
by capitalizing on the already sorry plight of the North Korean
Army. All of North Korea was to be overrun and the remaining
enemy forces destroyed.
To accomplish this objective, the plan, as previously indicated, was
to strike northwest with the Eighth Army along the North Korean
main* line of communication—toward Sinuiju—while the X Corps,
on the east flank, struck down the Yalu River. There was such a
scarcity of roads that a larger enveloping force could hardly have
been supported; nor, in view of the lack of enemy strength in eastern
Korea, does it appear that a larger force would have been required
had not the Chinese Communists intervened.
The reasons for the employment of the X Corps as a command
apart from the Eighth Army may be found in the terrain and in the
small number of troops available to cover a front of 300 miles. The
maps give some idea of the terrain in the area between the two com­
mands. The mountains are high, and the deep gorges between them
are a bar to traffic even when the streams are dry or frozen. Roads
are few, and those that do exist are not suited for heavy traffic.
Transportation then becomes a problem for the pack mule and the
human back rather than the self-propelled vehicle. Telephone wires
are difficult to lay and, with guerrillas on every hand, are doubly
hard to maintain. Even radio is limited by such terrain, with a con­
25
Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom.
 29

siderable reduction in range. In all, most observers have agreed

that American forces have seldom fought in terrain to which modern
means of war are less adaptable.
There has been much discussion as to why the Chinese Commu­
nists were able io obtain such complete surprise for their offensive
that began in late November. General MacArthur has given the fol­
lowing explanation:
Political intelligence failed to penetrate the iron curtain and pro­
vided no substantial information of intent. Field intelligence was
handicapped by the severest limitations. Aerial reconnaissance be­
yond the border, which was our normal source of field intelligence,
was forbidden. Avenues of advance from border sanctuary to bat­
tle area, only a night's march, provided maximum natural conceal­
ment. No intelligence service in the world could have surmounted
such handicaps to determine to any substantial degree enemy
strength, movements, and intentions. This left ground reconnais­
sance in force as the proper, indeed the sole, expedient.

The Second Invasion of South Korea (Map 10).—Prior to Christ­

mas the enemy began a series of probing and softening attacks
against the ROK units near the east coast and succeeded in pene­
trating to a distance of about eight miles through the sector of the
ROK 9th Division. This secondary attack was apparently intended
to draw attention to that part of the front.
On the last day of December the main attack came. Chinese Com­
munist divisions poured across the 38th parallel on a broad front,
from Kaesong east to the Pukhan River. Lacking the high" degree
of surprise enjoyed by the North Korean Army in June 1950, the
Chinese nevertheless moved quickly and with great weight down the
same invasion paths. Attacking in waves and seemingly indifferent
to losses, by sheer weight of numbers they advanced through mine
fields, barbed wire, and automatic-weapon and artillery fire. On the
first day the defenders were forced back ten to twelve miles.26
On 2 January the X Corps assumed operational control of the
. American 2d Division and the ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions—in
the central sector. The American 3d and 7th Divisions, recently
evacuated from the Hungnam beachhead, moved forward to bolster
the I and X Corps, respectively.
26
The serious situation on the left flank was caused by a regiment of the ROK
1st Division (which was not properly dug in) allowing itself to be taken
completely by surprise. Before the adjacent units knew what had hap­
pened, the Chinese in large numbers had penetrated this regiment's po­
sition.
 30

Strong, unremitting Chinese and North Korean onslaughts, which

were particularly successful in the sector east of the Chungpyong
reservoir, compelled a general United Nations withdrawal. On 4
January, Seoul changed hands for the third time as the-1 and IX
Corps moved south of the Han River and occupied defensive posi­
tions. However, the continued success of the North Korean and
Chinese Communist forces in the salient to the east soon rendered
this position untenable.
By 7 January the United Nations forces had drawn back to and
were holding firm on a line that ran from Pyongtaek, on the west
coast, northeast toward Wonju.
From the beginning of this second invasion the ROK units in the
eastern sector experienced much difficulty in combatting thousands,
of infiltrating North Korean soldiers, many of whom donned civilian
clothes and mingled with the crowds of refugees moving south. Also,
the refugees themselves were a serious problem. As many as two
million South Korean civilians streamed south to escape the Com­
munists, clogging roads and rail facilities and seriously hampering
military movements in either direction. At Suwon a mob of nearly
100,000 refugees blocked the railroad yards and prevented trains
from moving. The problem was further complicated by the increas­
ing activities of guerrilla bands behind the United Nations lines.
After the first week in January activity in the western sector was
confined to light-patrol contact as the enemy's main effort shifted
to the center of the peninsula. A strong force of Chinese and North
Koreans drove down the Chunchon-Wonju-Chechon corridor. De­
spite valiant defensive efforts, including numerous counterattacks,
the enemy wrested from the 2d Division the important highway and
rail center of Wonju. In the sector east of Wonju he was able to
penetrate to within ten miles of Yongju. Part of the enemy forces
drove east from this salient; part crossed the Chechon-Yongju road
and moved toward Mungyong and Chungju; and one North Korean
division infiltrated across the Andong-Yongdok road to the moun­
tainous terrain between Andong and Yongchon. This last column
was finally driven back by the 1st Marine Division. By 24 January
the invaders (except for those units which had infiltrated through
to the rugged terrain below Yongju) had been halted along the gen­
eral line Pyongtaek-Wonju-Chechon-Samchok. This marked the
high tide of the second invasion of South Korea.
 31

THE FIRST UNITED NATIONS COUNTEROFFENSIVE,

25 JANUARY-21 APRIL 1951 (Map 11)
In mid-January the tide of battle changed once more. Enemy lines
of communication, which had lengthened steadily since 26 Novem­
ber, now offered an unlimited number of remunerative targets for the
air forces. This situation was in marked contrast to that which pre­
vailed in late October and November, when enemy supply lines from
the inviolate Manchurian border were so short that convoys could
travel the distance in one night. Now, however, bombers blasted
lucrative targets day and night.27 Naval aircraft and warships ag­
gravated the foe's logistical problem by constantly pounding key
coastal communications centers.
The Eighth Army inaugurated a series of limited-objective at­
tacks that were preceded by reconnaissance operations of sufficient
strength to sweep back all enemy elements in front of his main line
of resistance. The efforts of air and naval forces were closely inte­
grated with those of the ground forces. The campaign objectives
were several: to retain the initiative; to keep the enemy off balance
by unremitting pressure; to thwart his efforts to mass sufficient
power to undertake another general offensive; to inflict upon him
the heaviest possible losses in men and materiel. General Ridgway
stated his purpose in these words:
We are not interested in real estate. We are interested only in
inflicting" maximum casualties on the enemy with minimum losses
to ourselves. To do this, we must wage a war of maneuver—slash­
ing at the enemy when he withdraws and fighting delaying actions
when he attacks.
Operation Thunderbolt.—When patrols from the I and IX Corps
Were unable to locate enemy forces on their front, the I Corps, on 15
January, sent forward a reinforced regiment to make a reconnais­
sance in force. These troops, in what was called Operation Wolf­
hound, advanced north to Suwon and discovered that the front op­
posite the I Corps was only lightly manned. A similar force, known
as Task Force Johnson, was dispatched by the IX Corps on 22 Janu­
ary. It brought back a similar report. With like reports from all
along the front, General Ridgway, on 25 January, launched Opera­
tion Thunderbolt, a limited-objective attack with the objective of re­
gaining the territory south of the Han River. Supported by inten­
sive interdiction attacks from the air, the I and IX Corps each ad­
27
The effectiveness of night close-support efforts, as well as night sweeps along
lines of communication, had been increased by the use of improved equip­
ment and procedures, particularly by the use of high-candle-power flares.
 32

vanced initially with one division in multiple columns. The advance

was deliberate, great care being exercised to insure that no by-passed
enemy forces remained to harass rear elements. While unspectacu­
lar, the advance was steady. Additional units were soon committed,
and the operation changed from a reconnaissance in force to a full-
scale attack.
Opposition remained light until 30 January, when considerable re­
sistance was met on the front of both corps. Fighting south of
Seoul was intense until 10 February, when resistance suddenly van­
ished before the 25th Division. The division made an 11,000-yard
advance on that date and secured the port of Inchon and Kimpo air­
field, both of which had been demolished barely a month before by
the departing United Nations forces. However, the enemy retained
a bridgehead south of Seoul that was not eliminated until the next
month.
The Communist Counterattack.—Meanwhile the X Corps and the
ROK I and III Corps launched a limited-objective attack similar to
Operation Thunderbolt. Known as Operation Roundup, this attack,
begun on 5 February, met little initial opposition. But by & Febru­
ary resistance had stiffened greatly. Sightings of large enemy units
from the air and increased vehicular movement in his rear areas in­
dicated that a counterattack of major proportions could be expected.
This blow fell on the night of 11-12 February, when the enemy at­
tacked down the Hoengsong-Wonju corridor. Fighting around
Wonju and Chipyong was heavy during the next four days, but the
garrisons of these towns fought valiantly and held on until rein­
forced. To the east the Communist drive carried to within seven
miles of Chechon before it was halted.
The enemy's purpose in this large counterattack was probably
twofold: (1) to relieve pressure on the Communist toehold south of
the Han; and (2) to penetrate General Ridgway's lines, divide his
forces, and sever his vital lines of supply. But neither purpose was
•achieved. The United Nations troops and commanders had learned
to "roll with the punch", inflicting the maximum punishment as
they drew back. Heavy casualties and the pause necessary for the
Chinese to reorganize and replenish supplies brought the counter­
attack to a standstill, and by 19 February the initiative had again
passed to our hands.
On 21 February, Operation Killer was launched with the objective
of wiping out the salient produced by the Communist counterattack.
By 25 February the salient had been eliminated, and the Communist
 33

forces were falling back under the pressure of our ground and air
attacks.
Operation Ripper.—During the last two weeks in February the
western sector of the front had been relatively quiet, with the United
Nations forces holding a line just south of and overlooking the Han
River. There was no indication that either Seoul or the line south
of the Han was heavily defended. However, to avoid a possible costly
frontal assault on the city, it was decided to by-pass it in the next
operation. This attack, known as Operation Ripper, began on 7
March. The purpose, like that of the preceding attacks, was to in­
flict the maximum casualties and at the same time to outflank Seoul
and thus force its abandonment by the enemy. One of the primary
terrain objectives was the town of Chunchon, where the enemy was
believed to be concentrating his troops and supplies.
In the zones of the IX and X Corps, where the terrain was most
difficult, the advance progressed slowly against strong resistance.
Tank operations and the forward movement of supplies were particu­
larly affected by the combination of precipitous mountains, deep val­
leys, rivers, and rice paddies. Nonetheless, Hongchon was taken by
the middle of the month; and Chunchon was captured on the 22d.
Meanwhile, on the first day of the offensive, the 25th Division,
which had heen moved to the east flank of the I Corps sector, crossed
the Han River fifteen miles east of Seoul, at the confluence of the
Han and Pukhan Rivers. The enemy counterattacked this bridge­
head, but after three days of hard fighting he retired in disorder.
The division's advance up the Pukhan Valley caused the Commu­
nists to evacuate Seoul on the night of 14-15 March, patrols of the
ROK 1st Division entering before daylight. This was the fourth
time that the city had changed hands.
Resistance along the entire front quickly dwindled, and advancing
units began losing contact with the enemy. In an effort to block his
withdrawal route, from Seoul to Kaesong, the second and largest
airborne operation of the conflict was launched on 23 March. At
0900 on that date the 187th Regimental Combat Team and two com­
panies of Rangers were dropped in the vicinity of Munsan, together
with such heavy equipment as 14-ton trucks, weapons carriers, and
howitzers. Resistance was slight, and in a matter of hours an ar­
mored column had made contact with the airborne troops. While it
had been hoped that many of the enemy would be trapped, the actual
number was negligible. They had retired too rapidly.
 34

Meanwhile the ROK I and III Corps advanced in their zones, cap­
turing Yangyang, north of the 38th parallel, on 27 March. By the
end of the month the United Nations front ran generally from Mun­
san east to Chunchon and thence to Yangyang.
The Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel.—Although Operation Rip­
per had completed the liberation of most of South Korea, the enemy's
obvious build-up for still another counteroffensive made it impera­
tive that he be kept off balance. To this end it was decided to estab­
lish a strong defensive line from which punishing sorties could be
made. The Eighth Army was therefore ordered to advance to the
commanding terrain north of the parallel. This would establish a
line, about 115 miles long, extending from the tidal land in the west
through the twelve-mile expanse of the Hwachon reservoir and
thence to the east coast through the almost impassible terrain east
of the reservoir. The great natural strength of the line would per­
mit a reduction of troops in forward positions and therefore an in­
crease in the depth of the defense.
The army continued its slow, steady advance, unspectacular but
with the maximum punishment being inflicted on the enemy. The
south bank of Hwachon reservoir was reached on 3 April. The en­
emy opened the gates of the dam in an attempt to slow the advance;
but the delay was slight, and on the 18th the dam and the town of
Hwachon were taken. The units on the right and left reached the
new line about the same time.
Meanwhile a limited offensive known as Operation Dauntless was
launched on 11 April in the zone just west of the reservoir. The ob­
jective was the disruption of enemy build-up in the Chorwon­
Kumhwa-Pyonggang area, commonly known as the "Iron Triangle".
That the enemy fought tenaciously to retain this area is easy to un­
derstand. For months it had been an assembly and storage area;
and, in addition, it was an all-important link in his communications
system. Once the triangle was lost, the Communists would no longer
be able to shift troops and supplies from north to south or across
the front; without it their ability to launch another general offen­
sive would be seriously limited.
As the I Corps slowly advanced toward this area, in almost hand­
to-hand combat, the enemy reaction became more violent; and all
along the front it became increasingly apparent that a new Commu­
nist counteroffensive was soon to be launched.
On 11 April, General MacArthur was relieved of his command by
the President, General Ridgway stepping up to take his place. Lieu­
 35

tenant General James A. Van Fleet was sent from the United States
to take command of the Eighth Army.
While the critical operations of the period from November through
March were being fought on the ground, air and naval forces did
much to support our successful withdrawal and subsequent counter­
offensive. That the winter drive of the Communists was not more
successful may well be due to the close support and interdiction mis­
sions flown by the Air Force and by the air arms of the Navy and
Marine Corps. Units that were cut off were supplied by air, as well
as others fighting in terrain so difficult that normal means of supply
could not be used. The importance of evacuation by air and water
has already been indicated. Nor were the naval surface' elements
lacking in means of assistance to the ground forces. Enemy supply
routes near the coast were torn by naval gunfire; amphibious dem­
onstrations, such as the one at Kansong on 31 January, kept him
off balance.
At the end of the period we were still supreme, in the air, but there
were signs that the Communists intended to challenge that suprem­
acy. The number of MIG-15's that opposed our F-84's and F-86's in­
creased steadily. At 'the end of April it was estimated that the en­
emy had a total of 860 combat aircraft, including 260 jet fighters.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES SPRING OFFENSIVE,

22 APRIL-8 JULY 1951
At the opening of the first phase of the Communist spring offen­
sive the enemy had a decided numerical superiority in ground troops.
Deployed in depth, an estimated fifty to fifty-eight divisions (includ­
ing four North Korean divisions) were in the combat zone. An es­
'timated seventy divisions, with an aggregate strength of about
700,000 men, were south of the Yalu River. An additional half mil­
lion men were believed to be in training in Manchuria.
The United Nations ground strength, including support and sup­
ply contingents, totalled 417,000 men. Naval combat vessels in sup­
port included five aircraft carriers, one battleship, seven cruisers,
and proportionate numbers of destroyers and lesser craft. Eighteen
groups of the Far East Air Forces were committed to the Korean
conflict. These included two light bomber groups, three medium
(B.-29) groups, one tactical reconnaissance group, seven fighter
groups, and five troop carrier groups. Of these only three fighter
groups could be based in Korea. The remainder operated from bases
in Japan and in Okinawa.
 36

The First Impulse of the Offensive (Map 12).—The offensive

opened at 2000 hours on 22 April with a heavy artillery concentra­
tion against the ROK 6th Division of the IX Corps, followed by in­
fantry assaults. Other attacks began about the same time. In the
west, Chinese columns crossed the Imjin River and moved toward
Seoul; in the vicinity of Inje, North Korean troops attacked the ROK
units holding the eastern portion of the United Nations line. The
initial Communist objective was apparently the envelopment of Seoul
and the cutting of our principal transpeninsular highway, running
from Seoul to Kansong.
The ROK 6th Division withdrew in an orderly manner until suc­
cessive attacks drove a wedge between the two front-line regiments
and struck the reserve regiment. Within twenty-four hours this di­
vision was over twelve miles south of its original position, where it
was attempting to reorganize. The reorganization had not been com­
pleted when further withdrawal became necessary. The division had
been reduced in strength from 8,000 to 2,500.
The precipitate withdrawal of-the ROK division left a gap between
the 24th Division of the I Corps and the 1st Marine Division of the
IX Corps. Enemy troops, including Mongolian horse cavalry, poured
through and tried to exploit the penetration by striking at the flanks
and rear of the two divisions, which countered by refusing their ex­
posed flanks. Giving ground gradually and fighting as they with­
drew, the Americans limited the rollback of the flanks. Additional
troops were committed in this sector to stem the advance; and on
26 April the IX Corps launched a series of local counterattacks. On
that same day the Seoul-Kansong road was cut near Kapyong, and
the Communists turned west to envelop that flank of the Eighth
Army. But for the most part the enemy penetration had been con­
tained, and his gains had been slight.
On the western part of the United Nations front the enemy crossed
the shallow Imjin River in force on the morning of 23 April and
struck in the Munsan-Korangpo area. Hard pressed, General Mil-
burn, commander of the I Corps, ordered his divisions to withdraw
to a more favorable line.28 With the highway from Seoul to Kan­
song cut, the enemy, on the 26th, began to concentrate his efforts
28
It was during this withdrawal that the 1st Battalion of the Royal Gloucester­
shire Regiment, 29th British Brigade, was cut off. On the 24th it was sur­
rounded on a hill near Choksong by an enemy force many times its size.
Efforts to save the battalion as a unit had to be abandoned the next day,
and orders were given for it to break up into small bands and infiltrate
back through the enemy lines. Only forty men succeeded in doing so.
 37

on Seoul. Uijongbu was taken on the 27th, and by the 29th Eighth
Army units had been drawn back to previously prepared positions
about four miles north of the capital. The enemy, moving up in
small groups, probed these defenses; but here, as in the central sec­
tor, the momentum of the attack had been dissipated. Attempts
to outflank the Seoul defenses by ferrying troops across the Han
River to Kumpo peninsula were undertaken by the Communists, but
these threats were quickly eliminated.
In the east, North Korean units attacked ROK troops, capturing
Inje on 24 April. A limited advance was continued through the 29th.
On the 30th the front was stabilized by the X Corps and the ROK I
and III Corps.
By the end of the month the Communist offensive had been
stopped on the line Seoul-Sabangu-Taepo. They had advanced
thirty-five miles on a forty-mile front (from Seoul to Hongchon) in
west and central Korea, with lesser gains in the east. The price was
high, an estimated 70,000 casualties. On the other hand, the Eighth
Army, held intact by a well-executed retirement, had suffered only a
tenth that number of casualties.
There are a number of reasons why this huge Communist assault
failed. While, in spite of air interdiction, the enemy was able to
gradually build up a sufficient force to launch the attack, he was un­
able to maintain the power necessary to overcome the determined
defenders and exploit the penetration. This was largely due to air
interdiction and his basic lack of mobility. Another factor was that
he lacked the surprise which he had attained in the drives of June
and November 1950. Still another, and possibly the most important
factor, was the coordinated effort of the three services. All ground
forces in Korea (including the X Corps) were now under the Eighth
Army, which had become a hardened, seasoned fighting team. The
Navy provided aircraft for close support, and its warships denied the
Communists the use of the east-coast road. The Air Forceflew7,240
sorties during the period, over 50 per cent of which were either close-
support or armed-reconnaissance sorties; the remainder were rear-
area interdiction sorties.
The Lull Between Impulses.—As was his custom, the enemy, after
the force of his assault had been spent, broke contact and withdrew
beyond artillery range to regroup his units and,bring up supplies.
To regain contact and at the same time to maintain a strong defen­
sive line, each corps was ordered on 3 May to establish a patrol base
six miles north of the main line. For the next week strong tank­
 38

infantry patrols ranged ten or twelve miles beyond the patrol bases,
but contact with the enemy remained light and scattered,
In addition to the need to re-establish contact with the enemy, it
was equally important that a usable lateral road be- secured in order
that the ROK divisions in the east could be supplied.29 To secure
such a road, the ROK forces and the X Corps attacked to seize a line
north of and parallel to the Hongchon-Kansong road. With this
road in our possession, these units could then be supplied across the
peninsula from Kansong. The attack, supported by naval gunfire
on the east coast, followed the usual pattern of steady, methodical
advance. On 9 May, ROK patrols entered Kansong. These were
withdrawn, however, on the 11th to permit naval fire on a Commu­
nist counterattack force. (Subsequent events were to prevent an
early re-entry.) By 10 May, X Corps units had almost reached their
objectives; but units in the ROK center were still some ten miles
from theirs.
On the western half of the line the Eighth Army also forged
ahead. Uijongbu, eleven miles north of the capital, was captured by
United Nations forces on 6 May, as was also the critical communica­
tions center of Chunchon.
Beginning 10 May, enemy resistance stiffened; and gains by the
United Nations Forces were slight. Still, in the first fifteen days of
May the enemy had been driven.back five to ten miles in all sectors
and had suffered heavy casualties. It was now evident that a second
impulse of the spring offensive could be expected in the proximate
future. Increasing resistance, heavier than normal artillery and
mortar fire, prisoner-of-war reports, and air reconnaissance reports
• all pointed to a coming assault. All along the line Allied units began
laying mines, stringing barbed wire, and computing firing data in
preparation for the next Communist attack.
The Second Impulse of the Offensive (Map 13).—By 15 May the
enemy had moved men and materiel down from the Pyonggang­
Kumhwa-Chorwon triangle, and he was ready for a new drive.
Striking through the fog and rain of the night of 15-16 May, the
Communists committed twenty-one divisions on a seventy-five-mile
front extending from Tokchong, north of Uijongbu, to Nodong, east
of Inje. While a secondary effort to outflank Seoul was launched.in
the Kapyong area, down the Pukhan River and along the road to
Seoul, the Chinese struck hardest in the Naepyong-Inje-Nodong
29
At this time the terrain in which these units were located was so inaccessible
that supply was dependent on hand-carry or air drop.
 39

area. The objective of this drive appears to have been the outflank­
ing of Seoul and an advance of the front to the 37th parallel (Map
11), At this time Communist strength south of the Yalu was es­
timated at 760,000 men. It was further estimated that the enemy
had 1,000 planes at his disposal, operating from bases in Manchuria
and in North Korea.
Early on 16 May the main effort, with 125,000 to 150,000 troops,
struck the ROK III Corps (Map 13) and the two ROK divisions on
the right of the X Corps.30 Bearing the brunt of the assault, the
ROK 5th and 7th Divisions were forced to withdraw, thus exposing
the right flank of the 2d Division and the left flank of the ROK III'
Corps. Communist troops swung behind the III Corps and estab­
lished a road block across its main supply route, forcing its with­
drawal. Continued heavy pressure forced the further withdrawal
of the two ROK divisions of the X Corps, and by the 22d they had
pulled back deep into friendly territory. Meanwhile the 1st Marine
Division and the 2d Division extended their fronts and battled des­
perately to stem the Communist drives down the Chunchon-Hong­
chon and'Inje-Hongchon roads. The 15th Regimental Combat Team
of the 3d Division was moved to the right flank of the 2d Division,
and the 187th Regimental Combat Team was moved to a blocking
position near Hoengsong. The remainder of the 3d Division was
moved from reserve near Seoul to fill the gap between the 2d Divi­
sion and the ROK III Corps. After an all-night, 70-mile ride these
3d Division troops contacted the enemy near Soksa on 21 May and
recaptured that town after a sharp fight. This action marked the
turning point of the second phase of the Communist spring offensive.
To the east the ROK III Corps, under heavy pressure and its sup­
,ply route severed, commenced its withdrawal on the 18th, its units
in some disorder. Heavily attacked again on 21 and 22 May, the
corps became so disorganized that it was inactivated on the 23d. Its
divisions were then taken over by the two corps on its flanks.
Farther to the east the ROK I Corps, under less pressure, with­
drew in good order to conform to the movements on its left.
In the west the secondary attack in the IX Corps sector was halted
aboutfivemiles south of Kapyong, although some enemy forces had
advanced as far south as Masogu. In the sector of the I Corps ac-
Jivity was relatively light. In the eastern part of the corps zone the
30
In one place the Communists were reported to have driven South Korean refu­
gees through the mine fields in front of the advancing troops so as to set
off the mines.
 40

front was moved back nearly to Uijongbu, but to the west Allied ar­
mored spearheads advanced and took Munsan by 21 May.
By 22 May the offensive came to an end as exhaustion, heavy casu­
alties, and supply difficulties forced the enemy to admit failure. He
had gained less than in the first phase and yet had suffered an es­
timated 90,000 casualties in killed, wounded, and captured. Lacking
a good supply system and dependable communications, he had not
been able to exploit his initial tactical success. It was now clear that
he did not have the power to defeat the Eighth Army, much less to
drive it into the sea. The most he could hope for was a stalemate.
The Counterattack (Map 14).—While the enemy was exhausted,
the Eighth Army seized the opportunity to strike back in a major
counterattack, the first to be launched immediately after a Chinese
Communist offensive. The I, IX, and X Corps were ordered to ad­
vance on 23 May and seize important roads and key communications
centers. The main purpose, however, was to inflict as much punish­
ment on the enemy as possible.
In the eastern half of the peninsula the initial advance was rapid
in spite of the strong resistance put up by the Communists to protect
their withdrawing units. In the sector of the X Corps the 2d Divi­
sion and 187th Regimental Combat Team took Inje on the 27th, and
the 1st Marine Division seized the high ground east of Yanggu on 31
May. Farther to the east ROK troops, heavily supported by naval
gunfire, raced up the coastal road to take the wrecked port of Kan­
song on the 30th. These rapid advances left some 60,000 enemy
troops (who had advanced toward Soksa during the Communist of­
fensive) in a pocket with their escape routes cut. Here they were
decimated by the combined efforts of the 3d Division and the ROK
units of the X and ROK I Corps. Large numbers were captured; the
rest, abandoning weapons and equipment, filtered back northward
through the heavily wooded mountain terrain.
In the western half of the peninsula the 24th and 7th Divisions of
the IX Corps met considerable resistance as they advanced into the
area north of Chunchon. In spite of this, however, Hwachon was
seized by the 7th Division on 28 May. The advance in the zone of
the I Corps kept pace as the 25th Division and the 1st Cavalry Divi­
sion moved up the two main roads from Uijongbu toward Chorwon
and Kumwha and patrols of the ROK I Division operated across the
Imjin River north of Munsan.
By the end of May the United Nations held the general line Imjin
River-Munsan-Yonchon-Hwachon-Inje-Sorim-Kansong. But by
 41

this time enemy resistance had become intense all along the line; and
the Allied offensive was further slowed as rain turned the poor Ko­
rean roads into quagmires. Henceforth Operation Piledriver, as this
counteroffensive was called, would have to face a determined enemy
in well-prepared positions. Casualties inflicted by the counteroff en­
sive thus far were estimated at 43,000. In addition, the Communists
had lost 11,000 rifles, 1,000 machine guns, 310 mortars, 120 pieces
of artillery, 400 horses, and huge stocks of ammunition and supplies.
The Advance to the "Iron Triangle".—Although General Van Fleet
realized that the Eighth Army could force the Chinese to retreat
well north of the 38th parallel, it was evident that he did not have
sufficient men and equipment to destroy the enemy armies. There­
fore, it was decided that while reserve elements constructed a strong
defensive line running from Munsan through Yanggu to the east
coast31 the remainder of the Eighth Army would continue advanc­
ing, using the same tactics that had been employed since January.
The immediate purpose of this advance was to push forward in the
east to a strong Communist area north of Inje, known as the "Punch­
bowl", and in the west to the vital Chorwon-Pyonggang-Kumwha
triangle. No large advance was planned at the extreme western end
of the front, as it was known that the Communists were building
strong defenses in that sector and as an advance there would
lengthen the front.
In the zone of the I Corps the ROK division on the left established
a bridgehead over the Imjin River north of Munsan and engaged in
patrol activities along the river line. The bulk of the corps, the 1st
Cavalry Division and the 3d and 25th Divisions, made the main ef­
fort.32 Against heavy resistance and in rains that limited air sup­
port and made roads nearly impassible, these three divisions slowly
fought through the deep defenses before the "Iron Triangle". On
12 June the two southern anchors of the triangle, Chorwon and Kum­
hwa, were taken. Tank-infantry teams drove the fleeing Chinese
toward Pyonggang and Kumsong. Two task forces raced northward
from Chorwon and Kumhwa and on 13 June linked up inside Pyong­
gang. After a brief reconnaissance these two forces evacuated the
city and returned to the Allied lines. Pyonggang was reoccupied by
the Chinese on the 17th.
The IX Corps, just east of the I Corps, advanced slowly. The ef­
fects of mobility andfirepower were minimized in the rough terrain
31
Known as the Kansas Line.
32
The 3d Division had been transferred back to this corps from the X Corps on
31 May.
 42

west of the reservoir. The man on foot became more important as

the corps inched its way northward to the heavily defended line the
Communists had established south of Kumsong.
East of the reservoir the X Corps captured Yanggu on 2 June and
advanced slowly northward against the almost fanatical resistance
of two North Korean corps.33 Heavy artillery, mortar, and auto­
matic-weapons fire poured down on the attackers from the ridge
tops. By the 10th of the month the front had been advanced only
some 12,000 to 15,000 yards. By the 16th the southern edge of the
"Punchbowl" had been reached.
To the east what remained of the enemy salient was reduced by
ROK units of the X Cqrps and units of the ROK I Corps. The divi­
sion on the coast advanced against moderate resistance and entered
Chodo on 7 June.
From the middle of June to the beginning of the armistice discus­
sions gains by the Eighth Army were almost negligible. The action
for the most part consisted of limited-objective attacks that were
stubbornly contested by the enemy. The only gain of real conse­
quence was made in the sector of the I Corps, where early in July
tank-infantry task forces succeeded in wresting from the Chinese
the commanding terrain south of Pyonggang—in the "Iron Trian­
gle". This seizure made the triangle useless to the enemy and de­
prived him of one of his major build-up areas.
General Van Fleet had every reason to be satisfied with the results
of his counteroffensive. The United Nations front was now along
essentially the same line as when the Communist spring offensive
began on 22 April; and since that date the enemy had suffered an
estimated 250,000 casualties, as well as the loss of huge quantities of
munitions and other supplies.
During the first year of the war the enemy had suffered an esti­
mated 1,165,000 casualties. Materiel losses had included 390 air­
craft, over 1,000 pieces of artillery, and large quantities of mortars,
small arms, and ammunition. Untold numbers of North Korean ci­
vilians had been killed or had died of disease or privation as the
towns of North Korea were reduced to shambles. On the Allied side
there had been approximately 250,000 casualties. Most of these had
been suffered by the South Korean Army, but American casualties
had numbered 79,000. The total figure given does not include casual­
33
The North Korean tactical doctrine forbids the surrender of territory unless
overwhelmed. To the Chinese, however, territory is of little consequence.
Their doctrine is to maintain a fluid battle line, to entice an overextension
of the opposing forces, and then to destroy them.
 43

ties suffered by the South Korean civilian population as the war

moved back and forth over their country.
As this period of the conflict ended, twenty-one nations were par­
ticipating in or were directly supporting the military operations in
Korea. These included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Den­
mark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Korea, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa,
Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Fifteen nations had furnished ground forces, and some were
represented by air and naval units as well. The remaining six had
sent medical, air, or naval units only.

THE PERIOD OF ARMISTICE TALKS

In a New York radio address on 23 June, Jacob A. Malik, Soviet
delegate to the United Nations, presented a proposal for cease-fire
discussions in Korea. An unofficial endorsement of this proposal
was broadcast by the Chinese Communist Government on 25 June.
Finally, on 4 July, it was mutually agreed by the opposing command­
ers in thefieldthat liaison officers representing each side should meet
on 8 July to conduct preliminary discussions. On that date began a
long series of conferences, first at Kaesong and later at Panmunjon.
From the first, progress was slow. Each minor point had to be la­
boriously resolved, and the talks dragged on and on. At the end of
February 1952, when this account closes, no over-all agreement was
in sight.
During the long period of negotiations no major ground offen­
sive was launched by either side. However, both the Communists
and the United Nations forces, continued limited-objective attacks
of a local nature and kept up aggressive patrol activity. The most
important Allied gain was the occupation of the "Punchbowl" by
American and South Korean troops by the middle of October. This
deprived the Communists of another strong concentration area from
which an attack could be launched. Strong defenses and unusually
difficult terrain made the fight for this area one of the most difficult
of the entire war. Some idea of the combat can be gained by the fol­
lowing excerpt from a critique prepared by the executive officer of
the 38th Infantry Regiment:
The capture of Hill 1243 on "Heartbreak Ridge" on 3 September
1951 represents the high-water mark of achievement in offensive
action by the 38th Infantry Regiment. Battle veterans of more
than a year's hard fighting in Korea, an enumeration of good and
bad points in this, their finest hours, should prove of interest to all
 44

who seek to improve combat techniques. This battle was more

technique than tactics. The tactics were fundamental and straight­
forward, made so simply by the necessity of capturing the dominant
terrain feature at the northwest corner of a ridge of mountains.
These mountains encircle a flat plain, forming the terrain feature
commonly referred to as the "Punch Bowl". Having previously
captured Hill 1179—"Fool Mountain"—which lies about one-third
the distance along the western lip of the bowl, this attack was
merely a continuation of the advance to the end of the ridge. From
Hill 1179 to the final objective—Hill 1243—is over 5,000 yards. The
ridge is a series of serrations consisting of successive hills—1059­
1100-1181-1200, and 1243—all with deep valleys in between. These
heights are in meters. From one hill to the next the straight-line
distance also entails a vertical drop of 150 to 200 meters and a simi­
lar climb up again.

This battle is an especially interesting one to analyze since it re­

duced to a minimum the usual advantages which the American sol­
dier enjoys over the Communist. More than anywhere else in the
experience of this regiment, it pitted man against man. The great
advantages accruing from our superior mobility (and this includes
the use of tanks) were absent. To get to the line of departure, you,
dismount from a vehicle at the near side of the mountain ridge,
climb steadily for two hours to a height of 1148 meters, and then
for two more hours climb up and down the rough, rocky trail to
Hill 1179. Upon arriving at the line of departure, you are sure that
you have done a good day's work, and indeed you have. For a man
has to be in good physical shape to make it at all. Every round of
ammunition, every ration, and every casualty had to be transported
over this same rough and tortuous footpath. That it takes another
four hours of climbing to cover the remaining 5,000 yards (straight­
line distance) to the objective makes it clear that this was a battle
requiring great physical exertion. In this respect, the fact that the
men had seen forty days of continuous fighting up to this point had
its advantages. It is also at once obvious that supply was the gov­
erning criterion. To compound the difficulty, this was a battle in
which the North Korean resisted stubbornly, at times fanatically.
In most cases he had to be killed in his cave, which he had hewn out
of solid rock.

Since terrain prohibited the employment of tanks in the fight, the

tanks were immobilized and, the tankers used both as supervisors
over the Korean carriers and as pack-carriers themselves. To fur­
ther help meet the carrying deficit, the attached AAA battery was
employed the same way, as were all available personnel from Serv­
ice and Headquarters Companies. The Medical Company could not
be tapped, predictions being that it would have its hands full.
Neither was the Mortar Company levied upon. Desirous of em­
ploying the maximum fire power possible, the Mortar Company
was allowed to do its own hand-carrying of ammunition in order
 45

to supply the largest number of mortars it could thus support.

This turned out to be one mortar, which later delivered over 300
rounds every day. It goes without saying that the best FO and the
best gunners were used. The mortarmen carriers saw to it that
every round of ammunition scored against the enemy.

Perhaps the most outstanding single feature of the attack was

the full utilization of all available weapons. While the "mad min­
ute" of fire as shown at Fort Benning could not—for logistical rea­
sons—be approached, no opportunity was overlooked for bringing
well-aimed fire of every available weapon to bear. The supporting
fires within the companies and by the battalions were exceptionally
well handled. Water-cooled machine guns were used, as were both
the 60- and 81-mm. mortars. While some effect was realized from
the 57-mm. recoilless rifle, it was the 75-mm. recoilless rifle which
proved to be more effective in destroying bunkers. Initial attempts
to use the flame thrower were soon abandoned. It was simply too
heavy and of too short a range to do much good. Rifle grenades
were used with good results.

Air support played a negligible role in this attack. In this type

of terrain it was found that strafing was of practically no value,
rocketing of limited value, and napalm the only really effective
weapon. . . .
Although the ground forces limited their activities to minor ef­
forts during the period of armistice talks, they continued to receive
close support from the air forces. Beginning in August, however,
the major portion of the air effort was diverted to a campaign of in­
terdiction. General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, has
given the following description of this aif campaign, known as Op­
eration Strangle:
Of course, an effort like Operation STRANGLE will not stop the
enemy dead in his tracks. As long as he is willing to pay the price
in transport vehicles and equipment destroyed, he may be able to
maintain his armies in some degree of operational effectiveness on
the front lines. As you can see, we have made him pay an ever in­
creasing toll.

An important feature of Operation STRANGLE is its carefully

planned regularity and the continuous pressure which it maintains.
.As you know, air attacks have been compared to the cavalry raids
of the Civil War, which often disrupted supply lines but only for
brief periods. It was learned then that wars cannot be won merely
by occasional hit-and-run strikes behind enemy lines, and this was
all that cavalry forces could accomplish. Air power, however, be­
cause of its speed and flexibility, is capable of returning to the at­
tack day after day and hour after hour. Against targets on the
 46

move, which are the only important targets we have left in North
Korea, it is essential to keep hitting around the clock, every day, to
prevent the concentrated movements during periods when the en­
emy is not under attack. When used in this manner, air power is
able to exert constant and destructive pressure on the enemy all the
way back to his sources of supply. This destructive pressure from
the air can be as relentless as the pressure exerted by our ground
forces against his front-line troops.
The enemy reaction to Operation Strangle was an accelerated build­
up of the Chinese Air Force and an increased commitment of
MIG-15's in North Korea. Sightings of MIG's, which ran from 300
to 400 a month in the summer of 1951, jumped to 3,000 in October.
Battles between jet planes of both sides became almost daily occur­
rences. Outfought by Allied planes, the MIG's did not greatly re­
duce the effectiveness of the interdiction program.34 One other ef­
fort of the enemy to protect himself against Operation Strangle was
a sizable increase in the number and quality of antiaircraft weapons
for the defense of important points. These antiaircraft guns ac­
counted for 111 planes of the Air Force in the four-month period be­
ginning 1 October 1951. But in spite of Communist defensive meas­
ures, in the first six months of the operation our aircraft made 16,000
"rail cuts", killed 16,000 enemy troops, destroyed 200 locomotives
and damaged 240, knocked out 210 bridges and damaged another
775, destroyed 25,000 vehicles, and struck 265 supply, ammunition,
and fuel dumps.
The Navy continued its effective support during the long period
of negotiations. The blockade of the Korean coast was maintained,
and there was no letup in mine-sweeping activities. Naval gunfire
support was provided units operating near the coast, and the coastal
railroads and highways and ports occupied by the Communists were
blasted time and again by surface bombardment. Navy and Marine
Corps air units continued their support of the ground forces and par­
ticipated in the program of interdiction.
The rotation of troops continued during this period. So effective
was the system of replacements that by the end of 1951 very few
members of divisional units remained in Korea who had been there
at the beginning of the year. The major change in units was the
transfer of the 40th and 45th Divisions to Korea and the return of
the veteran 24th and 1st Cavalry Divisions to Japan.
In February it was estimated that since the beginning of the war
the enemy had suffered a total of 1,635,000 casualties. During the
34
By 13 February 1952 the air forces in Korea had shot down 186 MIG-15's while
losing only 39 jet fighters and 4 propellor-driven planes.
 47

same period American casualties had totalled 106,298, including

18,458 dead.
COMMENTS
TACTICS
Enemy.—The tactics of the enemy are by now well known to the
United Nations command. He probes the lines to locate soft or weak
spots; he moves his forces forward from the rear areas at night, con­
cealing them during the day. Concealment is made easier by his ex^
ceedingly crude system of logistics, which reduces to a minimum the
number of heavy vehicles required. Movement from the forward
concentration areas to the line of departure is also at night, usually
the night preceding the attack. Contrary to our practice, most
attacks are made at night, the day following being used to consoli­
date gains. These attacks are almost always limited in their objec­
tives ; and once an objective is attained, time out is taken to regroup,
bring artillery forward, and move up supplies. A master of camou­
flage and use of cover, the enemy has frequently resorted to tactics
of infiltration of large units through the Allied lines. The use of
such tactics has been made possible by the terrain of Korea, the rela­
tively small forces the United Nations have had available, and the
swarms of refugees moving up and down the peninsula. In the at­
tack the much-publicized surge of a human horde against a position
is the exception rather than the rule. An attack is usually conducted
by many small groups working under an integrated plan. Much; of
the fierceness of the enemy attack and the tenacity of his defense
stems from the inflexibility of his doctrine. Once a line of action has
been dictated by higher headquarters, it must be carried out in spite
of situation changes or the mandates of common sense.
American.—Early in the conflict military commentators fre­
quently criticized the alleged flaws in our tactical doctrine. Since
then many studies have been made by able officers, with the conclu­
sion that our doctrine is still sound. Forces committed to a war sud­
denly and unexpectedly must fight a few engagements before they
can reach their maximum efficiency. Training between periods of
conflict is artificial at best; and as time goes on, the full meaning of
lessons learned in the last war is lost. Furthermore, occupation duty
is almost sure to lower the combat efficiency of any unit.
The war in -Korea has again emphasized the importance of the
physical conditioning of troops. Nearly all surveys show that in the^
terrain encountered there physical condition is of special importance.
Again, we hear the criticism that our units have a tendency to be­
 48

come road-bound. As in North Africa and Italy, the enemy, hiding

in the mountains and lateral valleys, has at times been given the op­
portunity to strike our troops in rear after they have passed on the
roads. Another criticism is the failure at times to place enough em­
phasis on the age-old principle of security. In some instances too
much attention has been paid to forward speed and not enough to
flank security.
^Arnong otherjessons that have been learned or_rgzl£axned are the
following :y
1. The necessity for higher headquarters, particularly in a with­
drawal, to maintain communication and command control of subor­
dinate units.
J&2) Adequate planning and training for defense against guerrilla
/attacks by personnel of rear installations to eliminate calls on front­
line infantry to repel such attacks.
3. The necessity for intensive training and indoctrination of per­
sonnel going into the combat zone in order to avoid panic and aban­
donment of precious equipment.
4. The importance of providing front-line unit commanders at the
lower levels with combat intelligence, particularly aerial photo­
graphs.
/(JS) The seriousness of refugee and guerrilla problems when they
reach such proportions as they have in Korea.
That Korea has re-emphasized old lessons rather than providing
new ones is brought out in a combat information bulletin published
by the Chief of Army Field Forces. The following statements are
made:
As originally conceived, this publication was to be the vehicle of
"lessons learned" in Korea. Actually, the-fighting in Korea has
provided few items that could be so described. The mass of mate­
rial from Korea, on the other hand, reaffirms the soundness of US
doctrine, tactics, techniques, organization, and equipment. The one
great lesson that can be learned, however, is that these must be ap­
plied with vigor, imagination, and intelligence to the situations en­
countered there. . . . For every weakness reported against some
small part of our troops, there is somewhere in our training litera­
ture a guide for its correction; for every strength reported for the
enemy, an indicated countermeasure is already provided. . . .

AIR POWER
Although most of the burden of the conflict has fallen on the
ground forces, the vital contribution of the air forces must.not be
 49

overlooked. In the initial stages of the war dependence was placed

on air units to provide the fire power that otherwise would have been
lacking until the arrival of artillery units. Close support of the
ground forces has been continuous, as has the interdiction' which has
so seriously hampered the enemy's logistic efforts. Some critics
have jumped to the conclusion that, since interdiction has not
stopped enemy offensive efforts altogether, the value placed on air
power has been too high. These critics, however, overlook the fact
that air operations have been limited by the restriction against op­
erations north of the Yalu River or over China. This restriction,
aimed at keeping the conflict confined to Korea, has given the enemy
safety for his strategic centers, security for much of his communica­
tions system, and sanctuary for his planes. The result has been a
limited application of air power.
From the beginning of the war to 30 November 1951 the total sor­
tiesflownby air forces of the United Nations totalled approximately
440,000, of which over 280,000 were combat missions. Over 175,000
of these combat missions wereflownby the United States Air Force.
Approximately one-third were flown by planes of the United States
Navy and Marine Corps.
Less spectacular than the combat missions, but also of great im­
portance, have been the missionsflownin support of combat. These
have included the lift of airborne forces, air supply, and air evacua­
tion of the wounded. Battlefield evacuation could in many instances
be accomplished only by helicopter, with further evacuation to Japan
by conventional craft. In the first year of the war nearly 68,000 pa­
tients were evacuated from Korea by plane. In that same period of
time the Military Air Transport Service flew 32,400 short tons of
cargo and 91,500 passengers from the United States to Japan.
Those who study the Korean operations for lessons that can be ap­
plied to a future war should bear in mind that we have had complete
air supremacy in Korea, a situation that will not exist if we engage
in war with a nation that has a strong air force.

ftAVAL SUPPORT
Without the Navy, operations in Korea, halfway around the world
from the United States, would have been impossible. During the
first year it transported nearly 14,000;000 measurement tons of sup­
plies, over 45,000,000 barrels of petroleum products, and 1,230,000
troops and other passengers. In the combat zone naval gunfire sup­
port was of great value. The blockade of the Korean coast and the
 50

mine-sweeping operations in the coastal waters were other impor­

tant contributions. Better known are the difficult Inchon landing
and the efficient evacuation of ground forces from Hungnam.

REASON FOR AMERICAN PARTICIPATION

Since the beginning of the conflict in Korea the question has been
raised as to why this country involved itself in a war halfway round
the world. The answer was clearly stated by General Ridgway in an
address in Tokyo on 22 February 1952:
The issues at stake are enslavement of the body and mind, in­
stead of freedom for both . . . collective decency or group bru­
tality.
For my part, there is not . . . any question of the validity and
purpose of the American stand against deliberately planned, unpro­
voked aggression. To have done otherwise would have been a re­
pudiation of every principle we had previously professed. . . .
With the pattern of Communist intentions now spread across the
world, where even the blind can see, neither the seeming insulation
of distance nor the naivete born of a sheltered life can plead the
slightest excuse, nor abate one iota of our individual responsibility.

RESTRICTED

 S E A
®
0 F

J A P A N

M-^/y/"':^^:;;:;-;>:;
OPERATIONS IN KOREA
COMMUNIST SPRING OFFENSIVE
( FIRST IMPULSE )
S i t u a t i o n 3 0 A p r i l 1951 a n d Operations
Since 2 2 April
•1 T e r r i t o r y R e g a i n e d by United N a t i o n s
by 16 M a y
0 5 10 15 20
SCALE OF MILES
 OPERATiONS IN KOREA
UNITED NATIONS CQUNTERGfPENSIVE
C JANUARY- 21 APRIL 1951 )

Situotion 22 April 1951 and

Operotions Since 25 January
 osowe \ WONSAN

S E A ®

Y L o

E A

OPERATIONS IN KOREA
SECOND INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA

Situotion 24 January 1951 ond

Operations Since 31 December 6 5 0
0 10 20 30 40 SO 60

SCALE OF MILES
 CHONGJIN

Voluntary w i t h d r a w a l a l o n g
the east c o a s t f o l l o w e d up
by l i g h t enemy f o r c e s .

1st M a r i n e D i v i s i o n c o m p l e t e d
d e b a r k a t i o n f r o m H u n g n o m on
15 D e c e m b e r .

A P A ~N

OPERATIONS IN KOREA
CHINESE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE
IN NORTH KOREA
Situation 5 December 1950 and
Operations From 26 November
to 15 December
C / I O 20 30 40 50 60
SCALE OF MILES
 w
24 Nov
CHONGJIN

Ncvembe

In the last days of October T 0 N GJO SO N

the 2 4 i h Division and BA Y
B.C. Brigade advanced toward
Sinuiju They were drawn back
t o r l y in November
3d Division ( - ) secured the
Wonson oreo du
half of Nov«mb)
P A N

between Eighth Army

ond X Corps.
E L L 0

OPERATIONS IN KOREA

UNITED NATIONS OFFENSIVE

Situation 2 4 November 1950 and

Changes in the Front Since 26 October

20 30 40

SCALE OF MILES
 J A P A N

££i ••• 0 * « ? * / » " Z * ?

OPERATIONS IN KOREA
UNITED NATIONS OFFENSIVE

S i t u a t i o n 26 September 1950 and

Operations Since 15 September
 1
I / ' ^ • —

All dangerous bridgeheads

across the Naktong south
of Waegwan had beer
reduced by 30 August.

Shaded areas retaken

by U.N forces after
gains Tiade by North
Korears in early
September attacks.

PUSAN

OPERATIONS IN KOREA OPERATIONS IN KOREA

UNITED NATIONS DEFENSIVE UNITED NATIONS DEFENSIVE
DEFENSE OF THE PUSAN PERIMETER DEFENSE OF THE PUSAN PERIMETER
Situation 26 August 1950 and Situation 10 S e p t e m b e r 1950 and
Operations Since 5 August Operations Since 27 August

SCALE OF MILES SCALE OF MILES

 5 E A

I n i t i a l light r e s i s t a n c e by
ROK Army units south of
the 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l .

of th« S t o u l - T o t j o n axis
furnished solely by ROK units
until 2 3 July.

Y E L L

S E A

OPERATIONS IN KOREA
UNITED NATIONS DEFENSIVE

Situation 5 August 1950 ond

Operations Since 25 June
 ®

H \3

Y E L L O W Y E L L O W *

OPERATIONS IN KOREA OPERATIONS IN KOREA

TERRAIN COMMUNICATIONS

p IP 20 3D 40 y> 60 70 8P 9 0 100

SCALE OF M I L E S SWALE OF MILES

 M 0 N G 0 L I A
M A N C H U R I A

SEA OF JAPAN

HAINAN
P H I L I P P I N E OPERATIONS IN KOREA
S O U T H
GENERAL MAP
'•i C H I N A
THE FAR EAST
T H A I L A N D
SEA PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
/ FRENCH
INDO-CHINA
 DATE DUEfDA Pamp 12-23)

n
APR 197D.IPR 1 0 i m 5 (g^AR 1991

DA FORM f881, 1 JAN 57

 MAIN 951.9 U575o c 2

Operations In Korea.

United States. Military Academy, West Po

N.Y., 1954.

Combined Arms Research Library

Fort Leavenworth, KS

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