EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2068             October 20, 1948
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO,
Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, Respondent.
E. M. Banzali for petitioner.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent
TUASON, J.:  in which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion
with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound
over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of
origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on
the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.
The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney
to the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused,
assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that
investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and
asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered
the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined
and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The
fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule
108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's
counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court
of first instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his
right to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was
committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of
the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his
jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's
motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito
and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated,
accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and
her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be
cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said
that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the
justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of
Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the
preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law
restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a
course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right,
compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what
they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of
the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the
constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses
against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the
absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right
to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation
may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional
right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority
went farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on the
part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary
investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify
anew.
1
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed
with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 101797 March 24, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant.
CARLOS DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO
ASMOLO, TEODULFO DAGUING, FEDERICO SIMPRON,
BIENVENIDO SIMPRON and DIDOC BONGCALOS (all at
large), accused.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto D. Labastida, Sr. for accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.
In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were charged
with the crime of Kidnapping with Murder before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. 1 They were Abundio Roluna, Carlos
Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing,
Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The
Information against them reads:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the
municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping with (sic) one another, with the use of
firearms and taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously hogtie and kidnap one Anatalio Moronia
and take him away to a place unknown up (to) this
time whereat said victim was killed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted. The
other seven (7) accused remain at large.
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado
Sombilon and Buenaventura Nogalada, both of whom were residents
of barangay Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte.
CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around
seven o'clock in the morning, he was on his way to sitio Bungabungan
in barangay Amguhan to attend to the pasture of his carabao. At a
distance of thirty (30) meters, he saw his neighbor, Anatalio Moronia,
stopped in his tracks and taken captive by accused Abundio Roluna.
Roluna was then accompanied by seven (7) other persons. viz: Didoc
Bongcalos, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo
Daguing, Carlos Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo and Paterno Daguing.
Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while his companions
were carrying short firearms. Using an abaca strip, he saw Carlos
Daguing tie up the hands of Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did
not shout for help and proceeded on his way. With the exception of
his wife, he did not inform anyone about what he saw that fateful
day. 2
BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the
testimony of Sombilon. He testified that on said day, at around nine
o'clock in the morning, he came from his farm in barangay Monterico,
Baybay and was on his way home to barangay Amguhan. At a
distance of about twenty-five (25) meters, he saw Moronia walking
along a human trail in barangay Amguhan, with his hands tied by a
rope behind his back. Moronia was followed by accused Roluna,
Carlos Daguing and five (5) other persons whom he did not
recognize. Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while Carlos
2
Daguing was armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada immediately
left the place. 3
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never
seen or heard from.
At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and alibi.
Roluna claimed that on May 24, 1984, Danilo Noroño, a cousin of his
wife, went to their house in barangay Amguhan. They were informed
by Danilo that Iluminada Cortines y Noroño, his wife's grandmother,
was bedridden and seriously ill. He and his wife immediately
proceeded to Iluminada's house in barangay Banahaw, Baybay, Leyte.
As soon as they arrived, he gathered some herbal plants for
Iluminada. He boiled these plants and regularly applied them on
Iluminada's body. He and his wife attended to Iluminada for three (3)
weeks. After Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they returned to
their home in barangay Amguhan. 4 His testimony was corroborated
in substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna and his grandmother-in-law,
Iluminada Cortines de Noroño.
Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and
Nogalada, harboring ill-feelings against him, testified falsely and
implicated him in the disappearance of Anatalio Moronia. He claimed
that in 1983, he and Sombilon had a dispute over a cara y cruz game
held in their barangay. Sombilon was then drunk and he, as chairman
of the Kabataang Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon but the latter got
mad at him. Since then, they have not talked with each other.
Nogalada on the other hand, also had a grudge against him. In 1982,
they had an altercation during a volleyball game held during the
barangay fiesta. 5
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, 6 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Abundio
Roluna y Elhig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Kidnapping With Murder. As
kidnapping (and serious illegal detention) is penalized
with reclusion perpetua to death and murder
with  reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
under Article 48 of the Code, the herein accused should
be punished with the maximum of the more serious
crime, hereat the supreme penalty of death.
Considering that the Constitution of 1987 does not
allow the imposition of the death penalty, however,
herein accused is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of
Anatalio Moronia the sum of P30,000.00. He is credited
with the full period of his detention in accordance with
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
except if he did not sign an agreement to obey the
prison laws, rules and regulations at the inception.
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal.
In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant points and stresses that
the corpus delicti was not duly proved by the prosecution. He
submits, inter alia, that considering that the body of Anatalio Moronia
was never found, Moronia's questionable and unexplained absence
and disappearance should not be blamed on him for the alleged
victim, in all probability, may still be alive.
3
In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia's death and
the culpability of accused-appellant were sufficiently established by
the evidence. The People relies on the disputable presumption
provided under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four (4) years.
Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that fateful day of
May 27, 1984. During this time, Moronia, with his hands tied at the
back, was accompanied by eight (8) armed men. Clearly, he was then
in danger of death. Since that day until the date of the trial (or for a
span of six years), Moronia has not been seen or heard from. The
People urges that these circumstances raised a presumption that
Moronia has been killed by accused-appellant and his companions.
The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances proved by
the prosecution are sufficient to establish the death of Anatalio Moronia,
and; (b) if in the affirmative, whether or not accused-appellants and his
companions could be held liable therefor.
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime
and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been
actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the
actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 7 The corpus
delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2) things,  viz: the existence
of a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and
the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. 8
Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this case?
Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last
seen on May 27, 1984 with his hands tied at the back and
accompanied by eight (8) armed men undoubtedly shows that his life
was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact that Moronia has
been absent and unheard from since that time until the trial of this
case (or a total of six years), a presumption of death was sufficiently
raised. This is in consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four (4) years.
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not
be enough to hold accused-appellant responsible for the death of
Moronia.
In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the conviction
of the accused for murder although the body of the victim was not
found or recovered. In said case, we ruled that in case of murder or
homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body of the victim or show
where it can be found. It is enough that the death and the criminal
agency causing death is proven. The Court recognized that there are
cases where the death and intervention of the criminal agency that
caused it may be presumed or established by circumstantial evidence.
4
However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at
bench. In the Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4)
armed accused forcibly take the victim from his house to a lake,
beating him up all the way to the boat. While sailing, the accused
continued ill-treating the victim until the latter died. The body of the
victim was never found.
In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they
merely saw one of the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of
Moronia. He was then taken in the direction of barangay Monterico
and was never seen or heard from since. At no point during the trial
was it ever established that any of the eight (8) accused beat up
Moronia or in any way laid a violent hand on him. Nogalada even
testified that he did not hear any shot fired by any of the eight (8)
armed accused 10 so as to warrant a reasonable conclusion that
Moronia was killed by accused-appellant or any of his co-
conspirators. Indeed, even the possible motive of accused-appellant
and his group for abducting Moronia was not definitively established.
To be sure, the circumstances proved are insufficient to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the serious crime of
kidnapping with murder.
There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption
under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would apply,
but only insofar as to establish the presumptive death of Moronia. Whether
accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia is a
different matter. The Rules did not authorize that from this disputable
presumption of death, it should be further presumed that the person
with whom the absentee was last seen shall be responsible for the
subsequent unexplained absence/disappearance of the latter. The
conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping
with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous
facts established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the
evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the events of that
fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of
accused-appellant for the death of Moronia.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused is
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. No less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required to convict him. On the whole,
the evidence adduced by the prosecution would not prove beyond a
shadow of a doubt that accused-appellant should be convicted for the
serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was
proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was
established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention
under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime,
more than three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its
commission. Thus, since the generic aggravating circumstance of
band 11 attended the commission of the crime and there being no
mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period as maximum and  prision mayor as minimum should
be imposed on accused-appellant. 12
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal
detention and is meted an indeterminate sentence from twelve (12)
years of  prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum. 13 Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
5
 That on or about the 7thday of March, 1992, in the Municipality of
Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another with treachery and abuse of
superior strength, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, strike, stab and wound
one Marlo Casiong with short bolos locally known as pisao which
accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and
inflicting upon the said Marlo Casiong with fatal wounds on the
different parts of his body which caused his death shortly thereafter.

Contrary to law.5 

Appellant surrendered to the police authorities on August 18,

SECOND DIVISION 19946 while his other co-accused remain at-large. When arraigned on
[G.R. NO. 133541. April 14, 2004] September 28, 1994, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.  RICKY a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
QUIMZON, Appellant.
DECISION The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On the night of March 7, 1992, victim Marlo Casiong, his sister
Emolyn Casiong, and one Rommel Redoa were at the social hall of
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Burauen, Leyte attending a benefit dance. Around 11:30 of the same
Rules of Court assailing the decision 1 dated December 17, 1997 of the evening, while dancing with one Salvacion Lacsarom, Marlo
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case accidentally bumped his cousin, herein appellant Ricky Quimzon.
No. Bn-92-7-2924, finding appellant Ricky Quimzon2 guilty of murder Emolyn and Rommel, who were then dancing with each other and
and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. were about one meter away from Marlo and Salvacion, witnessed the
incident. Thereafter, while the dance continued, Salvacion held
In an Information dated July 28, 1992, appellant and three other Marlos hand and invited him to go outside the dance hall as she had
persons, namely Salvacion Lacsarom, Canoto Cabero 3 and Edgardo something important to tell him. Thereupon, Marlo asked Emolyn to
Detona4 were charged with the crime of murder allegedly committed stay put because he was coming back. Feeling apprehensions about it,
as follows: Emolyn and Rommel followed Salvacion and Marlo as they went out
of the dance hall. Emolyn noticed that Canoto Cabero, Edgardo
Detona and appellant Ricky also went out of the hall in a hurried
6
manner thereby overtaking them (Emolyn and Rommel). Outside the
social hall, Emolyn heard Salvacion say ito na then saw her push
Marlo towards the group of Canoto, Edgardo and Ricky. Canoto then
grabbed Marlo by the wrist and repeatedly stabbed him with a short
bolo locally known as pisao. Edgardo followed suit by stabbing Marlo
twice at the back. Despite being wounded, Marlo was able to get
away from Canoto and Edgardo and walked fast towards the nearby
health center. Marlo was about to reach the gate of the health center
when Ricky, who was behind Marlo, held the latters hands. Marlo
tried to free himself from the clutches of Ricky but in the course of his
struggle he fell down. Thereupon, Ricky rode on the back of Marlo
and repeatedly stabbed him on his back. Emolyn and Rommel
shouted for help prompting an unidentified person to throw stones
and utter, that is enough. Thereafter, Canoto, Edgardo and Ricky fled.
With the help of some persons, Emolyn brought Marlo to the Burauen
General Hospital but Marlo died before reaching the
hospital.8 cralawred
In denying criminal liability, appellant interposed the defense of alibi.
He claims that he does not know Salvacion Lacsarom, Canoto Cabero
and Edgardo Detona. He denies that he stabbed Marlo Casiong.
Appellant testified, as follows: He could not have been at the scene of
the crime when the incident happened as he was in Barangay Patag
attending another benefit dance. He arrived at Barangay Patag around
7 oclock in the evening of March 7, 1992 and stayed there until 7
oclock of the following morning. Barangay Patag is 18 kilometers
away from the poblacion of Burauen where Marlo was killed and can
only be reached by riding a horse or a carabao or by hiking for five
hours. He only came to know of the death of Marlo when he went to
the poblacion of Burauen. He was included as one of the accused
because he refused to testify in favor of the prosecution. 9 cralawred
Alfredo Rellesiva, then Barangay Chairman of Barangay Patag,
Burauen, Leyte; and Mauro Lobriquinto, then second Barangay
Councilor of Barangay Candag-on, corroborated appellants
alibi.10 cralawred
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the evidence of the prosecution
having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
Court hereby renders the conviction of the accused Ricky Quimzon of
the crime of Murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. The crime currently is punishable by RA 7659 classifying
Murder as heinous crime to which the death penalty is to be imposed.
However, the crime was committed on March 7, 1992 and the
effectivity of RA 7659 is January 1994. This act therefore cannot apply
in the case at bench.
Two qualifying circumstances are alleged in the Information; namely,
treachery and abuse of superior strength. However, the latter
circumstance is absorbed by the former.
There is no other aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. The
penalty therefore to be applied is reclusion perpetua being the medium
of the penalty from minimum which is the maximum of reclusion
temporal to death.
The accused is therefore sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua.
On the civil aspect, the defense admitted the expenses incurred for the
wake and burial of the victim and neither did he controvert the moral
damages suffered by the mother of the victim. The accused is ordered
to pay the sum of P53,000. 00 as actual expenses for the wake and
7
burial, and P75,000. 00 as moral damages payable to the mother of the
victim Erlinda Casiong.
The Philippine National Police and the NBI are urged to exert efforts
to bring the at large co-accused to justice for their complicity in the
crime. Furnish them a copy. Meanwhile, until they are placed under
the custody of the law, archived the case.
SO ORDERED.11 cralawred
Hence, the present petition with the following Assignment of Errors.
I Casiong, and that it was Dr. Villanueva who conducted the autopsy
IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITHOUT A
CORPUS DELICTI.
II
IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF EMOLYN CASIONG THE
LONE PROSECUTION EYE WITNESS, LEADING TO THE
CONVICTION OF APPELLANT ON THE CRIME CHARGED IN
THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE.12 cralawred
In support of his first assigned error, appellant contends that the
testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Adelaida Asperin on the report
of the autopsy conducted on the body of the victim Marlo Casiong
was designed to prove the corpus delicti. Appellant, however, claims
that Dr. Asperin is incompetent to testify, as she was not the one who
personally examined the body. Instead, it was a certain Dr. Amparo
Villanueva who conducted the autopsy on the body of Marlo Casiong.
Appellant asserts that the trial court should have regarded the
testimony of Dr. Asperin as inadmissible for being hearsay; and, in
the absence of such testimony, the prosecution would not have been
able to prove the corpus delicti.
A review of the oral and documentary evidence presented before the
trial court reveals that it was indeed Dr. Amparo Villanueva, not Dr.
Adelaida Asperin, who conducted the autopsy taken on the body of
Marlo Casiong. As the attending physician, Dr. Villanueva was the
one who signed the autopsy report.13 In fact, Dr. Asperin herself
admitted in her testimony that she never saw the victim, Marlo
and was the one who prepared the autopsy report.14 However, Dr.
Villanueva died before the prosecution was able to present her as
witness.
Nonetheless, even if Dr. Asperin is an incompetent witness as to the
autopsy report and her testimony could not have probative value for
being hearsay, we still find that the prosecution was able to
sufficiently establish by competent evidence the corpus delictiin the
instant case.
Corpus delictiis defined as the body, foundation or substance upon
which a crime has been committed, e. g. the corpse of a murdered
man.15 It refers to the fact that a crime has been actually
committed.16 Corpus delictidoes not refer to the autopsy report
evidencing the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim nor the
testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy or medical
examination.17 It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result
has been proved, for example, a man has died and (b) that some
person is criminally responsible for the act.18 cralawred
8
Proof of corpus delicti  is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies and
offenses.19 While the autopsy report of a medico legal expert in cases
of murder or homicide is preferably accepted to show the extent of the
injuries suffered by the victim, it is not the only competent evidence to
prove the injuries and the fact of death. 20 It may be proved by the
testimonies of credible witnesses. Even a single witness
uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor.21 cralawred
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that the testimony of
Dr. Asperin is not indispensable in proving the corpus delicti. Even
without her testimony, the prosecution was still be able to prove
the corpus delictiby establishing the fact that the victim died and that
such death occurred after he was stabbed by appellant and his co-
accused. These facts were established by the testimony of prosecution
witness Emolyn Casiong.22 cralawred
The question that remains, therefore, is whether the trial court erred
in giving credence to Emolyns testimony over and above the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.
In his second assigned error, appellant questions Emolyns credibility
as a witness by pointing out that Emolyn did not execute an affidavit
regarding the events that she allegedly witnessed on March 7, 1992;
that she did not present herself as a witness during the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Burauen, and
that she only appeared as a witness when the case was already being
tried before the trial court. Appellant posits that Emolyns delay,
which consisted in her failure to execute an affidavit and her belated
appearance as a witness, puts the trustworthiness of her testimony in
serious doubt.
We are not persuaded by appellants arguments.
When the credibility of witnesses is in issue, appellatte courts
generally defer to the findings of the trial court, considering that the
latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.23 cralawred
It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of a
witness is a function that is best discharged by the trial judge whose
conclusion thereon is accorded much weight and respect that will not
be disturbed on appeal unless a material or substantial fact has been
overlooked or misappreciated which if properly taken into account
could alter the outcome of the case.24 cralawred
After going over the records of the case, we find no compelling reason
to disturb the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility
of Emolyn. Contrary to appellants assertion, we find that she took no
delay in relating the killing of her brother to the police authorities.
Emolyn testified that shortly after the killing of her brother, she
submitted herself for investigation before the police authorities of
Burauen, Leyte. However, the chief of police informed her that she
could not execute an affidavit because she is a sister of the victim, but
if the court would need her, then she can execute an affidavit.
Unschooled on the rules on evidence, it is but natural for Emolyn to
have readily accepted the explanation of the chief of police. In her
direct examination, she testified, thus:
QNow, shortly after the killing of your brother were you investigated
by the police in connection with the killing of your brother?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AWe were investigated by the Chief of Police of Burauen, Leyte.
QWhen you said we, to whom are you referring?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
9
AMe and Rommel Redoa because we were the companions of my QBeing an alleged eye witness did you submit yourself for
brother Marlo Casiong. investigation by the police?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

QIt is clear now that only you and Rommel Redoa were the AMy affidavit was not prepared because according to the chief of
companions of Marlo Casiong on that fateful evening? police of Burauen, Leyte I cannot have my affidavit because I am the
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary sister of the victim and only Rommel Redoa was prepared.

AYes sir. QSister of whom?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

QIn the course of your investigation by the Chief of Police of Burauen AMarlo Casiong.
relative to the killing of your brother, was that investigation
conducted on your person reduced into writing? .. ..
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COURT:
AThe Chief of Police told me that when needed I might be
investigated by the Court, I was not asked to execute an affidavit, it QWho is the police who said because you are the sister of the victim
was only Rommel Redoa who executed an affidavit. you cannot have an affidavit?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

QSo no affidavit was made by the police when you were investigated? AThe Chief of Police Nuevarez, the one who prepared the affidavit of
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Rommel was sir Juanico.

ANone because the Chief of Police informed me that Rommel Redoa ATTY SAY:
would only be the one to execute an affidavit but if the Court would
need me then I will execute an affidavit because I am a sister of the QWill you still insist that Nuevarez refused to take your affidavit
victim and I may not be allowed.25 cralawred because you are a sister of the victim?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

And on her cross-examination, to wit: AYes, sir.

QBeing the witness will you tell us were you the one who reported QEven if we present Nuevarez in the witness stand you will still
this incident to the police?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary insist?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AMy mother. AYes, sir.

10
QIs it not a fact that your affidavit could not be taken because you
were still in Manila?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI was in Burauen, Leyte when that incident occurred.
QBut one thing is you have been in Manila?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI went to Manila in 1994 already I went after Rommel Redoa.
QThe deceased Marlo Casiong was a very close, aside from being
your brother you were very closely associated with him?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AYes, sir.
QAnd you want to do anything for him?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI will do everything because I was there when the incident took
place.26 cralawred
As to her apparent delay in testifying, Emolyn explained that she
would not have appeared as a witness if Rommel Redoa testified.
However, she clarified that she only appeared as a witness when the
case was being tried by the trial court because she was left with no
choice but to testify in place of Rommel Redoa who told her that he no
longer wanted to be a witness because he was being threatened by
appellant, to wit:
QWhat was your purpose in going after Rommel Redoa in Manila?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ABecause a subpoena reached us informing us that the one who killed
my brother had already been apprehended and because he was one of
the eye witness I have to fetch him in Manila and I even went there
twice and my mother went there third time, only last November.
QDo you know the reason why he went to Manila despite the fact that
he is one of the witnesses in this case?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AWhen I went to Manila I met him and he told me Molin I really
cannot testify because I have been threatened by Ricky and company.
.. .
RE-CROSS BY ATTY. SAY:
QNow since Rommel Redoa refused to testify you have to testify
despite the fact that you were told by the chief of police Nuevarez that
you cannot testify in this case being a sister of the victim?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AThe chief of police there Nuevarez told me that if ever I will be
needed by this Court I could testify but only, my affidavit cannot be
prepared then because I was the sister.
QThen how did you know that the court needed your testimony?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COURT:
QWere you subpoenaed by the Court?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ANo.
ATTY. SAY:
11
QSo it was not the court actually required your testimony because ANo, Your Honor.
you did not receive subpoena?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
QSo you are testifying to substitute only the testimony of Rommel
AI did not receive any subpoena but Rommel Redoa whom I met Redoa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
many times was firm that he cannot testify because he would be killed
by the accused and because it was only the three of us, Rommel, AYes, your Honor, because Rommel Redoa did not want to testify
myself and the victim who went to the dance. anymore and we could not find any other witness and since I was
with them when the incident occurred, I testified here.27 cralawred
QIt is only reason why you testified in this case because Rommel
Redoa has manifested that he will not testify? Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary General (OSG) that the apparent delay in Emolyns appearance as a
witness is explained by the fact that while a complaint against
AYes, sir. appellant and his co-accused was filed as early as May 7, 1992, the
case was archived because all the accused remained at-large. 28 It was
COURT: only on August 18, 1994 that appellant was arrested, which
sufficiently explains why Emolyn was only able to appear as a witness
QSo if Rommel Redoa would have testified in Court you do not need on February 21, 1995.
to testify?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellant further attacks the veracity of Emolyns testimony by calling
AI will not anymore because I have no affidavit. our attention to some purported inconsistencies and improbabilities in
her account of the events that took place prior to and during the
QIt was your lawyer Atty. Adaza who adviced you to testify in this stabbing of Marlo. Appellant contends: It could not have been
case?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary possible for Emolyn to overhear the conversation that took place
between Salvacion and Marlo while they were dancing because the
AHe did not, because we could not find any other witness I have to music was loud, the beat was fast and furious, and Emolyn was
testify. engrossed in her dancing. It was impossible for Emolyn to hear
Edgardo Detona, Canoto Cabero and appellant ask permission from
QYour lawyer did not advice you to testify? their respective dancing partners before going out of the dance hall
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary because Emolyn went out of the dance hall ahead of them. Emolyn
failed to accurately recall the sequence of events that led to the
ANo, Your Honor. stabbing of Marlo. She could not have witnessed Marlos stabbing as
she admitted that it was dark where the incident took place.
QYour lawyer did not say that you are not qualified to testify in this
case because you are a sister?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary We are not convinced by appellants contentions.
12
First, it is not improbable for Emolyn to overhear the conversation QSo, in other words the three gentlemen Canuto Cavero, Edgardo
between Salvacion and Marlo while they were dancing because she Detuna and Ricky Quimson left their partners because they will be
(Emolyn) testified that she was just one meter away from Salvacion going out for a while?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
and Marlo at that time. The fact that they were dancing, that the
music is loud and that there is another couple between them and her AYes.
does not discount the possibility that she could have heard them
talking. Given the above circumstances, it is expected of Salvacion QYou are sure of that, you cannot be mistaken?
and Marlo to have raised their voices in order to hear each other, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
which then enabled Emolyn to hear their conversation.
AI will not be mistaken.
Second, while Emolyn admitted that she and Rommel started to go
out of the dance hall ahead of Edgardo, Canoto and appellant, she QYou are very sure because you heard each one of them, Canuto
sufficiently explained that she was able to hear the three men talk to Cavero, Edgardo Detuna, and Ricky Quimson left their respective
their respective partners because she was still near them when they partners and told them, Wait because I am going out for a while, you
asked permission from their partners. Emolyn explained thus: cannot be mistaken.

QHow about Canuto Cavero when he went out together with Ricky
Quimson, Edgardo Detuna, did Canuto Cavero also leave his partner?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AHe told his partner to wait for a while because he will be going out.
QHow about Edgardo Detuna he also left his partner when he went
out?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AHe also told his partner to wait for a while because he will be going
out.
QAnd likewise, Ricky Quimson also told his partner to wait for a
while because he will be going out?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AYes.
AYes because we were close to each other.29 cralawred
As to who went ahead of whom, Emolyn satisfactorily explained as
follows:
QIn other words it is very clear that after Salvacion Lacsarom and
your brother left you immediately followed because you were were
deeply alarmed leaving inside the hall Edgardo Detuna, Canuto
Cavero and Ricky Quimson?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AEdgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero were already outside ahead of
us.
QDo you mean to tell us that Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero left
the hall ahead of Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

13
AThe two, Canuto Cavero and Edgardo Detuna were able to reach
outside ahead of Marlo Casiong and Salvacion Lacsarom because they
walked fast.
QBut the fact is, Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong left the
dancing hall ahead of everybody?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AThey went out ahead but they were overtaken by Canuto Cavero
and Edgardo Detuna.
QSo it is not correct to say that you were the one who immediately
followed Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong because according
to you Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero followed Salvacion
Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong, you were not the one who immediately
followed the pair but Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero, is that
correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ANo because Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero were faster and
they went out the shorter way while I followed Marlo Casiong and
Salvacion Lacsarom who took a little slower in going out.
.. .
QHow about Ricky Quimson, was he still dancing when you
immediately followed Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong
outside?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AHe was already outside the dancing hall because he followed
Canuto Cavero and Edgardo Detuna.
QBut he was behind Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AYes.30 cralawred
Third, we find that the alleged probabilities and inaccuracies
committed by Emolyn in recounting the events that took place prior
to and during the stabbing of Marlo refers to trivial matters that do
not refer to material points and do not detract from Emolyns clear and
positive testimony that she saw appellant and the other accused stab
and kill her brother.
Settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not
affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the
weight of their testimony.31 In fact, such minor flaws may even
enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized
falsities.32 cralawred
Fourth, while Emolyn testified that it was dark inside the dance hall,
it is also clear from her testimony that the stabbing took place outside
the hall and there were fluorescent bulbs near the places where Marlo
was stabbed by Canoto, Edgardo and appellant. When cross-
examined, she testified as follows:
QHow many times did you meet the accused in dances?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ASeveral times because we meet at dances whenever there is one.
QThis incident happened outside the dancing hall, is that correct?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AYes.
QBut the alleged bumping of Ricky Quimson by Marlo Casiong
happened inside the dancing hall?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AYes.
14
QAnd it happened while the dance was going on? AWitness points to a distance which indicated 4 meters when
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary measured.

AThe dance was in progress but the four of them went QHow about the lamp from the ground, how high?
out.33 cralawred chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Emolyn testified further: AThe same height, about 2 meters and 35 cms. from the
ground.34 cralawred
QWhat kind of light was illuminating the dancing hall?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary We have held that kerosene lamp, flashlight, even moonlight or
starlight may, in proper situations, be considered sufficient
AFluorescent bulbs. illumination.35 In the instant case, the fluorescent bulbs situated near
the places where appellant and his companions attacked Marlo
QHow many fluorescent lamps were there? enabled Emolyn to witness the killing of her brother.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, we reiterate the well-entrenched rule that in assessing the
AThere were two outside and one was at the gate of the health center credibility of witnesses, the factual findings of the trial court should
and one at the gate of the dancing hall. be respected. The judge a quowas in a better position to pass judgment
on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when
QHow far was the nearest fluorescent lamp where the first stabbing of they testified and observed their deportment and manner of
the victim was made?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary testifying.36 cralawred

AWitness points to a distance which indicated 4 meters when Appellant interposes the defense of alibi. However, alibi, like denial,
measured. is an inherently weak defense as it is easy to concoct and difficult to
prove.37 While appellants testimony is corroborated by defense
QHow high was the fluorescent lamp from the ground? witness Rellesiva and Lobriquito, the trial court correctly gave more
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary probative weight to the lone testimony of prosecution witness Emolyn
who positively identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
AAbout 2 meters and 35 cms. high from the floor. crime.

QAt the health center where Marlo Casiong was attacked by Ricky Appellants defense of alibi fails in the face of Emolyns positive
Quimson, how far was the fluorescent light? identification of him as one of her brothers killers. Positive
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent,
especially where such identification is credible and categorical. 38 The
15
defense of denial is unavailing when placed astride the undisputed
fact that there is positive identification of the felon. 39 cralawred
We affirm the trial courts finding that there was treachery in the
killing of Marlo. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.40 The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission with no risk to the aggressor. 41 In the present
case, Marlo accepted Salvacions invitation for them to go outside the
dance hall on the impression that the latter has something important
to tell him. He has no inkling of any impending danger on his life as
he even told his sister, Emolyn, to wait for him because he will be
coming back.42 Outside the dance hall, as soon as Salvacion pushed
Marlo towards them, Canoto and Edgardo immediately attacked him
without warning, inflicting wounds on the front and back portions of
his body with the use of bolos. Although this initial assault on Marlo
was frontal it may still be considered treacherous because the attack
was sudden and unprovoked. There is no evidence showing that the
attack was preceded by any exchange of words or any untoward
incident between the assailants and Marlo, sufficient to warn Marlo of
the impending attack on him. The mode of execution was in such a
manner that Marlo was left with no opportunity to repel the attack or
avoid it. Moreover, he was unarmed while all three assailants were
carrying deadly weapons. The treachery continued when appellant
held the hands of Marlo as the latter was running away from the
initial stabbings of Canoto and Edgardo, rode on Marlos back when
the latter fell down and repeatedly stabbed Marlo who had already
been rendered weak by the multiple stab wounds inflicted by
Edgardo and Canoto. Appellant attacked Marlo from behind and
repeatedly stabbed Marlo when he was already in a defenseless
position.
In any criminal prosecution, the only requisite is that the prosecution
proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof that,
excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.43 cralawred
Hence, we uphold the trial courts judgment declaring appellant guilty
of murder beyond reasonable doubt. The attendant circumstance of
treachery qualified the killing to murder as defined under paragraph
1, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Since treachery attended the
killing, abuse of superior strength alleged in the Information is
absorbed by said circumstance.44 cralawred
Aside from abuse of superior strength, no other aggravating
circumstance was alleged and proved by the prosecution.
In a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide open
for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though
unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.45 cralawred
It appears in the Commitment Order, dated August 14, 1994, issued
by the Municipal Trial Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Burauen,
Leyte, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to SPO1 Josefino
Agustin of PNP Burauen, Leyte on August 18, 1994. 46 An examination
of the records reveals that it can not be considered as a mitigating
circumstance. For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
to be appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply with three
requisites:(1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered
himself to a person in authority or the latters agent; and (3) the
surrender is voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and
16
an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either
because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare
them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture.47 cralawred
The surrender of appellant was far from being spontaneous and
unconditional. The warrant of arrest is dated June 17, 1992 and all the
accused, including appellant, remained at-large, which prompted the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte to archive
the case.48 It took appellant two years before he finally surrendered to
the police. In between said period, appellant, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Fix Bail Bond49 without surrendering his person to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Records do not reveal that the motion
had been acted upon by the trial court. This act of appellant may be
considered as a condition set by him before he surrenders to proper
authorities, thus preventing his subsequent act of surrendering from
being considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Moreover, we noted in the Motion to Fix Bail Bond, filed on July 9,
1992, that counsel for appellant alleged that appellant is barely 15
years of age. When appellant was called to the witness stand on
August 2, 1996, or four years thereafter, appellant asserted that he was
21 years old. The stabbing incident took place on March 7, 1992, thus
placing appellant to be 17 years old, a minor, when he committed the
crime. The records do not show that the prosecution refuted
appellants minority; and absent any evidence to the contrary, the trial
court should have applied in favor of appellant the benefits under
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of
age.
.. .
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the perpetrator of the
crime of Murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetuato death.
Applying the express provision of the aforequoted Article 68 and
pursuant to Article 61, paragraph 2, of the same Code, to wit:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties. -. ..
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in
Article 71 of this Code.
.. .
the imposable penalty is reclusion temporalor 12 years and 1 day to 20
years.
Considering the actual penalty to be imposed upon appellant, as
prescribed by law, is not reclusion perpetuaor death, appellant is
entitled to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 50 Thus,
from the penalty of reclusion temporal, one degree lower is prision
mayoror 6 years and 1 day to 12 years from which will be drawn the
MINIMUM period of the indeterminate sentence; while pursuant to
paragraph 2, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, in the absence of
any modifying circumstance, the penalty prescribed by law should be
imposed in its medium period, or anywhere between 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months, as the MAXIMUM period
of the indeterminate sentence.
We now come to the civil liability of appellant.
17
As to actual damages, we find that the evidence presented by the
prosecution do not adequately provide a concrete basis for the
amount of P53,000. 00 awarded by the trial court to the victims
mother, Erlinda Casiong. She testified that her family incurred
expenses amounting to P50,206. 00, during the wake and burial of her
son. As proof, she presented seven official receipts amounting
to P4,490. 00 only.51 Other evidence consisting of small pieces of paper
which were properly identified by Erlinda as having been signed by
the persons from whom she bought the merchandise that were used
or consumed during Marlos wake and burial, amounting to P4,020.
0052 may be considered competent evidence and admitted under
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 53 Thus, the prosecution was
able to prove only a total of P8,510. 00. The other receipts presented
were not properly identified and therefore inadmissible under the
Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, in our recent rulings, we have held that in cases where
the heirs of the victim failed to prove their claim for actual damages,
but have shown that they have suffered pecuniary loss by reason of
the death of the victim, an award of P25,000. 00 by way of temperate
damages is justified in lieu of an award of actual or compensatory
damages.54 In People v. Villanueva  ,55 we held that in cases where actual
damages was proven by receipts during the trial but said damages
amounted to less than P25,000. 00, as in the present case, the award of
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000. 00 is justified in lieu of
said actual damages. The rationale for such an award of temperate
damages is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the heirs of the
victim, who by presenting receipts, tried and succeeded in proving
actual damages but in an amount less than P25,000. 00, to be placed in
a worse situation than those who might not have presented any
receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000. 00 for temperate
damages.56 cralawred
Erlinda Casiong testified that her son was single when he died; 57 that
she felt sad when her son was killed. 58 We find her testimony
sufficient to sustain the trial courts award of moral damages but we
reduce the amount of P75,000. 00 to P50,000. 00 in line with current
jurisprudence.59 cralawred
Erlinda Casiong further testified that her son was working as a helper
in a passenger bus.60 The indemnification for loss of earning capacity
partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly
proved.61 In the absence of competent evidence to prove how much
the victim was earning, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto.
The trial court did not award civil indemnity. In consonance with
prevailing jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000. 00 to the
heirs of Marlo Casiong as civil indemnity for his death. The amount is
awarded without need of proof other than appellants commission of
the crime which resulted in the death of the victim.62 cralawred
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City (Branch 15) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant
Ricky Quimzon is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER and after applying The Indeterminate Sentence
Law, and there being no modifying circumstance, he is sentenced to
suffer imprisonment, from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayoras MINIMUM up to fourteen (14) years and ten (10) months
of reclusion temporalas MAXIMUM. He is ordered to pay Erlinda
Casiong, the mother of the deceased Marlo Casiong, the amounts
of P50,000. 00 as civil indemnity for the victims death; P25,000. 00 as
temperate damages; and P50,000. 00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
18
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HERMINIO
TINGA, JJ., concur. VIDAL, JR. Y UAYAN @ "PATO," ARNOLD DAVID Y CRUZ @
"ANOT," CIPRIANO REFREA, JR. Y ALMEDA @ "COBRA,"
RICARDO H. PINEDA @ "PETER," EDWIN R. BARQUEROS @
"MARVIN," AND DANIEL YASON@ "ACE," Accused.

HERMINIO VIDAL, JR. Y UAYAN @ "PATO," AND ARNOLD

DAVID Y CRUZ @ "ANOT," Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated February 24,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06206,
which affirmed with modification the Judgment 2 dated February 6,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Biñan City, Laguna
(RTC), finding accusedappellants Herminia Vibal, Jr. y Uayan @ Pato
(Vibal) and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot (David) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of the complex crime of Direct
Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos. 17646-B and 17647-B, and
one (1) count of Direct Assault with Frustrated Murder in Criminal
Case No. 17648-B.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Vibal and David, together with accused Cipriano Refrea, Jr. y Almeda
@ Cobra (Refrea), Ricardo H. Pineda @ Peter (Pineda), Edwin R.
Barqueros @ Marvin (Barqueros) and Daniel Yason @ Ace (Yason) were
charged with two (2) counts of the complex crime of Direct Assault
with Murder and one (1) count of Direct Assault with Frustrated
SECOND DIVISION Murder in an Information dated July 4, 2007 and two Amended
G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018 Informations dated March 9, 2009, respectively, the accusatory
portion of each reads:

19
Criminal Case No. 17646-B
Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Murder
That on or about the 10 th day of May 2005, in the City of Sta. Rosa,
Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with treachery and
evident premeditation and while conveniently being armed with
firearms, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Mayor Leon C. Arcillas with the
said firearms, knowing fully well that he was a City Mayor of Sta.
Rosa City, a person in authority, and while in the performance of his
duty as such, thereby inflicting the latter fatal injuries on the head and
other parts of his body that caused his instantaneous death to the
damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17647-B
Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Murder
That on or about the 10 th day of May 2005, in the City of Sta. Rosa,
Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with treachery and
evident premeditation and while conveniently armed with firearms,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Police Officer 2 Erwin B. Rivera
with the said firearms, knowing fully well that he was a police officer
and an agent of person in authority, and in the performance of his
duty as security escort of Mayor Leon C. Arcillas, thereby inflicting
him injuries on different parts of his body that caused his
instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of his surviving
heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17648-B
Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Frustrated Murder
That on or about the 10 th day of May 2005, in the City of Sta. Rosa,
Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with treachery and
evident premeditation and while conveniently armed with firearms,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Police Officer 3 Wilfredo B.
Almendras with the said firearms, knowing fully well that he was a
police officer and an agent of person in authority, and in the
performance of his duty as security escort of Mayor Leon C. Arcillas,
thereby inflicting him injuries on different parts of his body, thus
accused performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is by
timely medical attendance on said Police Officer 3 Wilfredo B.
Almendras to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on May 13, 2009, appellants and accused Refrea,
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Accused Yason entered a
plea of not guilty to the charges during his arraignment on April 6,
2010. Accused Ricardo Pineda and Edwin Barqueros have not been
arraigned yet as they are still at-large. Pre-trial with respect to Vibal,
David and Refrea was terminated on October 22, 2009. While pre-trial
with respect to Yason was terminated on June 22, 2010. Thereafter,
joint trials on the merits followed.
20
During trial, Refrea died and as a consequence, he was dropped as
one of the accused. Meanwhile, Yason's demurrer to evidence was
granted by the RTC which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal
cases as against the said accused.
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the
prosecution in this wise:
On May 10, 2005, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, PO3 Wilfredo
Almendras, together with PO2 Binmaot and PO2 Erwin Rivera, and
two (2) other civilian escorts, was with Mayor Leon Arcillas at the 2nd
floor of the Municipal City Hall of Sta. Rosa City. The police officers
were assigned as security escorts of the Mayor. Mayor Arcillas was
then solemnizing marriages. The ceremony ended at around 10:00
o'clock in the morning. The Mayor then proceeded to the Office of the
Commission on Audit (COA) located at the same floor. While they
were going out of the room where the ceremony was conducted, PO3
Almendras noticed that they were being followed by two (2) young
kids. After spending a moment in the COA office, the group then
proceeded to the Office of the Mayor. On their way to said Office,
gunshots were fired on them. PO3 Almendras was not able to pull out
his gun since there was a rapid fire coming from their front and back.
He, PO2 Rivera and the Mayor sustained gunshots wounds. The three
(3) fell to the ground. While on the floor, PO3 Almendras heard three
(3) more gunshots before he felt dizzy. Thereafter, PO3 Almendras
and Mayor Arcillas were brought to the hospital.
At that time, SPO1 Victoriano Peria, received a call from an unknown
caller reporting that a shooting incident took place inside the
Municipal building.
Upon reaching the municipal hall, he saw Mayor Arcillas bloodied
and being carried out by several men and was put inside the vehicle.
In the second floor, he saw PO2 Erwin Rivera lying near the door
already dead, while the other victim PO3 Almendras was brought to
the hospital.
The team searched the whole building of the City Hall for possible
apprehension of the culprits, but to no avail. Thus, Regional Director
P/Chief Supt. Jesus Versoza created a special investigating task force
composed of the NBI, CIDG, Regional Intelligence Unit, SOCO and
Laguna Investigation Division to conduct an investigation to ascertain
the identity of the assailants.
During the investigation, Cipriano Refrea appeared and told SPO1
Peria that accused-appellants Vibal and David were his companions
when the killing transpired. Refrea pointed to them as the gunmen.
After knowing from Refrea the identity of accused-appellant Vibal,
SPO1 Peria asked his whereabouts. He came to know that accused-
appellant Vibal was presently detained at the Trece Martirez. SPO1
Peria, together with the other policemen visited Vibal, and when
asked about his participation on the shooting incident, he at first
denied his participation, but later on admitted to his participation.
With respect to the identity of accused-appellant David, they came to
know that he was detained at GMA, Cavite.
In his investigation, SPO1 Peria was able to ascertain that Vibal,
David and Refrea were members of the gang called Royal Blood
Gangsta.
Dr. Roy A. Camarillo, the medico-legal officer of the Regional Crime
Laboratory at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, conducted the
autopsy of the cadaver[s] of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera. Based
from the medico-legal report, Mayor Arcillas sustained three (3)
gunshot wounds, the fatal of which are the 2 gunshots in his head.
PO2 Rivera, on the other hand, sustained two (2) gunshot wounds, on
21
the nape and chest, the latter being the fatal one that caused the death
of the victim.
PO3 Almendras was examined and found to have fracture at the left
forearm and weakness of the right hand.3
Version of the Defense
The defense, on the other hand, relates its version of the facts in this
manner:
On 10 May 2005 at 10:00 o'clock a.m., accused ARNOLD DAVID was
at Tanay, Rizal, where he has been staying since October 2004 as
requested by his father because he was accused of murder in a gang
war that happened at GMA, Cavite. He was then arrested on 19
December 2006 in connection with a case in GMA, Cavite, where he
was brought somewhere blindfolded. On 2 January 2007, SPO1 Peria
arrived and showed him photographs of the gang, but he denied he
was in these. He denied knowing Cipriano Refrea, Jr. prior to his
arrest, knowing only the latter at the police station.
Accused HERMINIO VIBAL, JR. likewise denied participation in the
incident that happened on 10 May 2005. He claimed that on that date,
at 10:30 o'clock a.m., he was at GMA, Cavite, with his family,
including his sister, LORELYN CORONEL, and did not leave until
afternoon. In February 2006, he was arrested and detained at the
Cavite Provincial Jail in relation to prior cases. In December 2006,
SPO1 Peria visited him and asked about the death of Reynaldo Cesar,
to which Vibal denied. SPO1 Peria later took Vibal's photograph and
left. He was visited again by SPO1 Peria and asked if he had any
participation in the death of Mayor Arcillas. Again, Vibal denied.
SPO1 Peria once again visited Vibal, this time with PO3 Almendras.
The latter asked Vibal if he knew him, but Vibal could not answer as
he was sick at the time. He was again photographed. In January 2007,
he was again visited by SPO1 Peria and PO3 Almendras, who were
now with Cipriano Refrea, Jr. and who was asked to point at Vibal.
Another photograph was taken of Vibal. Prior to this meeting, Vibal
did not know who Refrea was.4
The RTC Ruling
In its Decision, dated February 6, 2013, the RTC found Vibal and
David guilty of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused HERMINIO U. VIBAL, JR. y UAYAN and ARNOLD
DAVID y CRUZ, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of direct assault with murder (2 counts) and direct assault with
frustrated murder. Accordingly, they are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 17646-B and 17647-B, reclusion
perpetua (two counts). As civil liability, for them to pay jointly
the following: 1) P75,000.00 as civil liability ex-delicto in each
case; 2) P500,000.00 in moral damages to the heirs of the victims
in each case;
2) In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, the indeterminate penalty
ranging from 14 years of reclusion temporal, as minimum to 17
years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. As
civil liability, accused are ordered to pay the victim the amount
of P50,000.00 in moral damages.
On the other hand, the cases against accused Ricardo Pineda and
Edwin Barqueros are sent to the archives pending their arrest.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC concluded that all the elements of the offenses charged were
satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. It rejected the twin defenses
22
of denial and alibi interposed by appellants in the light of the positive
identification of them by prosecution witness PO3 Wilfreda
Almendras (PO3 Almendras) as the culprits to the dastardly deeds.
The RTC added that the manner by which the appellants committed
the felonious acts revealed a community of criminal design, and
thereby held that conspiracy exists. Lastly, the RTC ruled that evident
premeditation and treachery attended the commission of the crimes
which qualified the killing of Mayor Leon Arcillas (Mayor Arcillas)
and PO2 Erwin Rivera (PO2 Rivera) to murder.
Not in conformity, Vibal and David appealed the February 6, 2013
RTC Decision before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On February 24, 2016, the CA rendered its assailed Decision
upholding the conviction of Vibal and David for two counts of the
complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos.
17646-B and 17647-B but held that the said appellants are criminally
liable only for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case No. 17648-B, the decretal portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
The Judgment dated February 6, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Biñan City, Laguna is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that the dispositive portion thereof is to read as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 17646-B, accused-appellants Herminia
Vibal, Jr. y Uayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are
hereby held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the complex
crime of direct assault with murder and are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of Mayor Leon
Arcillas the following amounts: Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000,00) as civil indemnity; Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages; Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 17647-B, accused-appellants Herminio
Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are
hereby held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the complex
crime of direct assault with murder and are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of PO2 Erwin
Rivera the following amounts: Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000,00) as civil indemnity; Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages; Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, accused-appellants Herminio
Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are
hereby held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the complex
crime of direct assault with attempted murder and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor. Accused-appellants are
ordered to pay private complainant PO2 Wilfredo B.
Almendras Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) as moral
damages; and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages; and
(4) Accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and
Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are further ordered to pay
interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from date of finality of this judgment.
23

6
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court held that the credible testimony of PO3
Almendras is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellants for
the crimes charged. It likewise debunked appellants' denial and alibi
declaring that the same were not satisfactorily established and not at
all persuasive when pitted against the positive and convincing
identification by PO3 Almendras, who has no ill motive to testify
falsely against them. According to the CA, the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not
adequately established by the prosecution. Finally, the CA ruled that
the appellants should be held liable only for the complex crime of
direct assault with attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 17648-B
because the prosecution failed to prove that the gunshot wound
inflicted upon PO2 Almendras was fatal.
Undaunted, appellants filed the present appeal and posited the same
lone assignment of error they previously raised before the CA, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS' POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS WHEN THE FACTS OF THE CASE SHOW THAT
THERE ARE DOUBTS CONCERNING THE ALLEGED POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION.7
In the Resolution8 dated March 29, 2017, the Court directed both
parties to submit their supplemental briefs, if they so desire. On May
29, 2017, the accused-appellants filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of
Supplemental Brief)9 averring that they would adopt all their
arguments in their Appellant's Brief filed before the CA. On June 27,
2017, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Manifestation 10 stating
that it will no longer file a supplemental brief as its Appellee's Brief
had sufficiently ventilated the issues raised.
Accused-appellants principally contend that the CA gravely erred in
its over-reliance on the problematic identification provided by
prosecution witness/private complainant PO3 Almendras. They insist
that PO3 Almendras could not have properly seen and identity the
assailants at the time of the shooting incident because after he was
shot, he felt dizzy and lost consciousness. Also, they brand
Almendras' identification of them as the culprits to be dubious
considering that it was only made more than a year after the incident.
Appellants argue that their respective defenses of denial and alibi
assume significance because the prosecution failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the identities of the authors of the crime.
Accordingly, the decisive question that begs an answer from the
Court is whether the identification of the culprits by eyewitness PO3
Almendras was reliable and positive enough to support the
convictions of the appellants.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence
adduced by the parties, the Court finds this appeal to be absolutely
without merit.
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two
things: (1) the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of
the crime for which the accused stands charged, and (2) the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. 11 When a crime is
committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of
the perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be
no conviction even if the commission of the crime is
established.12 Apart from showing the existence and commission of a
crime, the State has the burden to correctly identify the author of such
crime. Both facts must be proved by the State beyond cavil of a doubt
on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness
24
of the defense.13 them.14

Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond The following testimony of PO3 Almendras shows beyond cavil that
reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime he saw the faces of the appellants as the two young males who
and deprived of his life, liberty or even property. As every crime must followed them from the room where Mayor Arcillas solemnized the
be established beyond reasonable doubt, it is also paramount to mass wedding, and who later open fired at them:
prove, with the same quantum of evidence, the identity of the culprit. Q: What time did the solemnization of the marriages end?
It is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and A: At 10:00 o'clock sir.
unless an accused has been positively identified.
Q: After the solemnization of marriages did you observe anything
In the case at bench, the RTC and the CA were one in declaring that unusual?
the identification of appellants Vibal and David as the gunmen based A: There was sir. When we were going out, I observed that there were
on the recognition of PO3 Almendras was clear, worthy of credence 2 young kids (2 bata) following us.
and has met the requirements of moral certainty. The Court agrees,
and finds no cogent reason to disturb this conclusion of the RTC as Q: Did you recognize those 2 kids?
affirmed by the CA. A: Yes, sir.15

The cause of the prosecution draws its strength on the positive xxxx
identification by PO3 Almendras, pinpointing to appellants Vibal and
David as the perpetrators of the gruesome killing of Mayor Arcillas Q: From the COA office where you stayed for a while, where did you
and PO2 Rivera and who inflicted gunshot wounds upon him. PO3 go?
Almendras vividly recounted before the RTC the appellants' A: We were about to go to the office of the Mayor. (Papunta sa office
respective positions and participation in the shooting incident, having ni mayor.)
been able to witness closely how they committed the crime, more so
because the crime happened in the morning when conditions of Q: As you were going to the Office of the Mayor was there anything
visibility are very much favorable. He had a close and unobstructed unusual that happened?
view of the incident and was able to take a good glimpse and A: There was sir.
recognize the faces of the gunmen as the same two young males he
saw earlier in the day following his group. Hailed to the witness Q: What was that?
stand, PO3 Almendras stuck to the essentials of his story, and without A: Suddenly I heard gunshots.
any hesitation, pointed to Vibal and David as the two culprits, which
thus eliminated any possibility of mistaken identification. Q: What happened when you heard gunshots?
Jurisprudence recognizes that victims of crime have a penchant for A: I was about to pull out my gun but there was a rapid fire so I was
seeing the faces and features of their attackers, and remembering not able to draw my gun.
25
 Mayor solemnized marriages?
Q: In relation to where you were at that time, where did the gunshots A: Arnold David and Herminigildo Vibal.16
come from?
A: In front and at the back sir. xxxx

Q: To whom? Q: If you will see these persons again, will you be able to identify
A: I was the one who was shot first and the other bodyguard was shot them?
next. A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was that person? Q: Would you kindly look inside the court room and tell us if they are
A: Erwin Rivera sir. present inside the court room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You stated earlier that the shot came in front and behind whom?
A: Because we were walking together at that time and the shot came Q: Will you kindly point to them?
in front and back.
xxxx
Q: Together with whom?
A: Mayor Leon C. Arcillas, Erwin Rivera and me sir. Interpreter

Q: Where was then the Mayor at the time when you heard the The two accused identified to by the witness, when asked of their
gunshots? names, answered Arnold David and Herminigildo Vibal.17
A: He was in between me and Erwin Rivera. Verily, PO3 Almendras had seen the faces of Vibal and David when
they committed the crimes on that fateful morning of May 10, 2005,
Q: What did you notice after hearing the gunshots with respect to the albeit brief, but enough for him to remember how they look like.
Mayor? Experience dictates that precisely because of the startling acts of
A: "Nagbagsakan na kami." (We three fell down) violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can recall
with a high degree of reliability the identities of the criminals and
xxxx how at any given time the crime has been committed by them. 18 It is
important to note that PO3 Almendras identified Vibal and David as
Q: Who fired the shots if you know? the gunmen without any presumptions or suggestions from the police
A: The two kids sir, the 2 young male(s). or the court at the trial.

Q: Who are these 2 kids that fired the shot in relation to the 2 kids you This Court fails to discern any improper motive which could have
noticed earlier when you were going out of the room where the
26
impelled PO3 Almendras to maliciously impute to appellants such
serious crimes and hence, his testimony is worthy of evidentiary
weight. Further, as an actual victim, PO3 Almedras is naturally
interested in vindicating the outrageous wrong done to his person.
His natural interest in securing the conviction of the perpetrators
would strongly deter him from implicating persons other than the
real culprits. Otherwise, the latter could escape with impunity the
strong and just arm of the law. Absent any evidence showing any
reason or motive for prosecution witness to perjure, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 19
Vibal and David are clutching at straws in insisting that PO3
Almedras' identification of them as the gunmen is improbable and
should not have been accorded credence since it was made only after
the lapse of more than a year from the time the shooting incident
occurred. A perusal of the records would readily disclose that no
unreasonable delay can be attributed to PO3 Almedras. We quote
with approval the observation of the CA on this score:
Appellants' attempt to discredit the testimony of private complainant
by pointing out that there was a delay of one (1) year before he
identified appellants as the gunmen is of no moment. As correctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, private complainant
was not in a position to identify who shot him and killed Mayor Leon
Arcillas and PO2 Erwin Rivera immediately after the incident. Private
complainant was rushed to the hospital because of gunshot wounds
and was confined for around a month. Moreover, the investigation
took a long time and appellants were not immediately apprehended.
Private complainant, however, asserted that he remembers the faces
of the shooters and was, in fact, able to identify both appellants when
he finally saw them.20
Having ascertained that herein appellants are the gunmen, the Court
shall now proceed to the determination of their criminal liabilities.
The courts a quo are correct in ruling that appellants are liable for the
complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos.
17646- B and 17647-B. Direct assault, a crime against public order,
may be committed in two ways:  first, by "any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes
of rebellion and sedition;" and second, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance."21
Appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of
which are: 1) that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; 2)
the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties
or on the occasion of such performance; and 3) the accused knew that
the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the
accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the
offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.22
Here, Mayor Arcillas was a duly elected mayor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna
and thus, was a person in authority while PO2 Rivera and PO3
Almendras were agents of a person in authority. There is no dispute
that all of the three victims were in the performance of their official
duties at the time of the shooting incident. Mayor Arcillas was inside
the Sta. Rosa City Hall officiating a mass wedding, and thereafter,
while he was walking along the hallway from the COA office to his
office, he was shot and killed. Victim PO2 Rivera and private
complainant PO3 Almendras were likewise performing their duty of
protecting and guarding Mayor Arcillas at the time of the shooting
incident. Appellants' conduct of attacking the victims inside the Sta.
27
Rosa City Hall clearly showed their criminal intent to assault and
injure the agents of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in
authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of Direct
Assault with murder or homicide. 23 Here, treachery qualified the
killing of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera to murder. Treachery also
attended the shooting of PO3 Almendras. There is treachery when the
following essential elements are present, viz.: (a) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of attack employed by him. 24 The essence of
treachery lies in the suddenness of the attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring the commission of the offense without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.25
In the case at bench, the shooting was deliberate and without a
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner. Mayor Arcillas,
PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almendras were absolutely unaware of the
imminent deadly assaults, and were for that reason in no position to
defend themselves or to repel their assailants. Vibal and David, who
were armed with guns, suddenly appeared in front and at the back of
Mayor Arcillas, PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almedras and shot the three
victims. The gunshots that came from the front of the victims were
fired by Vibal, while those that came from behind them were fired by
David.26 Said manner of attack clearly revealed appellants' deliberate
design to thereby ensure the accomplishment of their purpose to kill
or injure the three victims without any possibility of their escape or of
any retaliation from them.
Conspiracy is very much evident from the actuations of the
appellants. They were synchronized in their approach to shoot Mayor
Arcillas and his group. The concerted efforts of the appellants were
performed with closeness and coordination, indicating a single
criminal impulse - to kill the victims. Conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when these point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest.27 The ascertainment of who among appellants actually hit,
killed and/or caused injury to the victims already becomes
immaterial. Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in the
present case, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless
of the extent and character of their participation because, in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 28
The Court affirms the conclusion of the CA that the appellants should
be held criminally liable for the complex crime of Direct Assault with
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 17648-B. It is well-settled
that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his
use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal
or mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical
assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated
homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying
circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are
present.29 But, if the wounds sustained by the victim in such a case
were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted
murder or attempted homicide.30
Here, the use of firearms and the manner of the commission of the
crime by the appellants unmistakably show that they intended to kill
PO3 Almendras and that treachery was present. However, no
evidence was adduced to show that the nature of gunshot wounds
sustained by PO3 Almedras was sufficient to cause the latter's death
without timely medical intervention. We note that the attending
physician of PO3 Almendras was not called to the witness stand to
testify on the gravity or character of the gunshot wounds inflicted on
28
the said victim. Also, no evidence was introduced to prove that PO3
Almendras would have died from his gunshot wounds without
timely medical attendance. Where there is nothing in the evidence to
show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the
character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may
be declared as attempted, not frustrated, murder. 31
The Court agrees with the CA that the modifying circumstance of
evident premeditation did not attend the commission of the offenses.
Here, the records are bereft of any proof, direct or circumstantial,
tending to show a plan or preparation to kill by appellants Vibal and
David as well as when they meditated and reflected upon their
decision to kill or/injure the three victims and the intervening time
that elapsed before this plan was carried out. Accordingly, the
circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be presumed against
appellants. To qualify a killing to murder, the circumstances invoked
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself and cannot be
deduced from mere supposition.32
Appellants simply raise denial, which is inherently weak and cannot
prevail over the positive identification made by prosecution witness
PO3 Almendras that they were the gunmen. Moreover, an affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness, 33 as in this case.
Appellants' defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. In order that alibi
might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been
somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be
shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere
within the vicinity of the crime scene.34 Appellants miserably failed to
discharge this burden. Besides, the prosecution was able to present a
photograph taken by prosecution witness Mercedita De Jesus, the
official photographer during the solemnization of the mass wedding,
prior to the shooting incident which showed appellant Vibal at the
background. Said picture proves that Vibal was at the Sta. Rosa City
Hall on May 10, 2005 which thus effectively belied his claim that he
was at his residence in GMA, Cavite on that day.
When the offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for
the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. 35 For the
complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos.
17646-B and 17647-B, the graver offense is Murder. Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty
should have been death. However, considering that the imposition of
death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines"; the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon
appellants. In addition, the qualification "without eligibility for
parole" should be affixed to qualify reclusion perpetua pursuant to
A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC. Thus, the CA has properly imposed upon
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.
In Criminal Case No. 17648-B for the complex crime of Direct Assault
with Attempted Murder, the penalty to be imposed on appellants
should be that for Attempted Murder, which is the more serious
crime. The penalty for Attempted Murder is two degrees lower than
that prescribed for the consummated felony under Article 51 of the
RPC. Accordingly, the imposable penalty is prision mayor. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its
periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years while the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, the maximum period
of the imposable penalty. This Court deems it proper to impose on the
appellants the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one
29
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Coming now to the pecuniary liabilities, the Court finds that the
award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages in
Criminal Case Nos. 17646-B and 17647-B should be increased to
P100,000.00 each, while the award of temperate damages should
likewise be increased to P50,000.00 being consistent with our
pronouncement in People v. Jugueta.36 In Criminal Case No. 17648-B,
the Court finds it apt to award civil indemnity, in addition to moral
damages and exemplary damages, the amount of which should all be
fixed at P50,000.00 each in line with existing jurisprudence. 37 Further,
six percent (6%) interest per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded to be reckoned from the date of the finality of this judgment
until fully paid.38
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated February 24,2016 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06206 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1.) In Criminal Case No. 17646-B, accused-appellants Herminio
Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Direct Assault with Murder. Accordingly, each is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for
parole. Further, they are ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Mayor Leon Arcillas the amounts of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
2.) In Criminal Case No. 17647-B, accused-appellants Herminio
Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Direct Assault with Murder. Accordingly, each is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for
parole. Further, they are ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of PO2 Erwin Rivera the amounts of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
3.) In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, accused-appellants Herminio
Vibal, Jr. y Uayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Direct Assault with Attempted Murder. Accordingly, each is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Further, they are
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the private complainant
Wilfreda B. Almendras the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
4.) Accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and
Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are
also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of finality of this Decision until
fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral
damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
30