SPOUSES MAMADSUAL v MOSON

Remedies of party aggrieved by registration

Facts:
Spouses Hadji Ali and Hadji Salika Mamadsual filed a complaint against Spouses Kagui Abdula and Kagui
Rakma Macarapan for quieting of title to property and annulment of original certificate of title and damages with
application for writ of preliminary injunction before Shari’a District Court at Cotabato City on Nov. 14, 1988.
On the other hand, spouses Macarapan argued that spouses Mamadsual have no title to the property which is
the subject of the suit; that their action to quiet title is not proper; that the spouses Mamadsual are not the proper
parties to ask for the annulment or cancellation of their certificate of title; and that the action, being based on implied
trust has already prescribed and could not be maintained.
The spouses Mamadsual contended that the title referred to by them in the complaint means the legal title or
ownership or dominion over the land in dispute acquired by them from their ancestors by operation of the law on
succession; that they are real party in interest because they will be benefited by the judgment or entitled to the avails
of the suit in their own right; and that since they are in possession of the land, an action to quite title does not
prescribe.
The case was set for trial on May 22, 1989, but postponed at the instance of private respondent. Then on July
4, 1989, filed a pleading designated as ‘Amplification of Affirmative or Special Defense with prayer for dismissal of
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
RTC dismissed the complaint (Nov. 7, 1989), averred that petitioner/plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title
to land in question, thus there is no cloud to be removed or to be prevented from being cast upon and that action had
already prescribed. MR was also denied by RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the action of spouses Mamadsual to quiet the title has already prescribed?

Held:No.
A reading of the complaint shows that it is an action for quieting title. Therein, it is alleged that spouses
Mamadsual are in “actual, continuous, and adverse possession” of the land in question “since time immemorial” in the
concept of owners.
An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property.
It is an established rule of American jurisprudence that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of
the plaintiff are imprescriptible. The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as
against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain
in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in
fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a
court of equity in his favor to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert
any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to
remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complainant when he is in possession. One who claims property
which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period.
In this case, spouses Mamadsual alleged that recently spouses Macarapan (respondents) have disturbed
their possession of the property by surreptitiously constructing dikes. The rule is that spouses Mamadsual
(petitioners) may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title is attacked before they may take steps to
vindicate their right. The statute of limitation is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from
title over property in possession of the petitioners.
In an action to quiet title the plaintiff “must” have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. It interpreted legal title to mean registered ownership and equitable title to
mean beneficial ownership.
It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the property in
question. The action to be one for quieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual possession since
time immemorial of the property in question by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, while
defendants secured a certificate of title over said property through fraud, misrepresentation and deceit.
Thus, “title” to property does not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of title. It can
connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. Indeed, one who has an
equitable right or interest in the property may also file an action to quiet title under the law.
SPOUSES DE GUZMAN JR. v THE NATIONAL TREASURER AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA CITY
Remedies of party aggrieved by registration

Facts:
Urlan Milambiling and Asuncion Velarde purchased a parcel of land situated in Antipolo from Sta. Lucia Realty
and Development, Inc. (July 1, 1985). Then after their wedding they left for abroad, but they entrusted the Deed of Sale and
certificate of title still in the name of Sta. Lucia Realty to their friend Marilyn Belgica – who volunteered to register the sale
and transfer the title in their names but failed to give the title to spouses Milambiling.

Then Milambing was informed that the certificate of title was transferred into their names however it was
subsequently transferred in the names of Spouses De Guzman. And that they found out that while they are in Saudi there
was impostor-couple posing to be Spouses Milambing, who somehow obtained the possession of owner’s duplicate copy of
certificate of title, thus able to convince Spouses De Guzman to buy the property. And that on November 20, 1985 the
impostor-couple executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses de Guzman, who paid P99,200.00. On April 30,
1986, spouses De Guzman registered the sale, thereby cancelled the TCT in the name of Milambings and issued TCT N-
117249 in their names.

Spouses Milambing filed an action against Spouses De Guzman before RTC of Antipolo for declaration of nullity
of sale and title with damages. RTC, CA and SC ruled in their favor, thus annulling the sale and title. Spouses De Guzman
filed an action for damages against the Assurance Fund before RTC of Pasig, impleading the National Treasurer of the RP
and Register of Deeds of Marikina. RTC ruled in favor of spouses De Guzman, however, CA reversed the decision of RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the assurance fund is liable for the loss of spouses De Guzman?

Held: No.
It may be discerned from Sec 95 of P.D. No. 1529 that the persons who may recover from the Assurance Fund are:
1. Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions:
a. that there was no negligence on his part; and
b. that the loss or damage sustained was through any omission, mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel, or
the Registrar of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the performance of their respective
duties under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now, the Property Registration Decree; or
2. Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein under the following conditions:
a. that there was no negligence on his part;
b. that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest therein under the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree; or by the registration by any other person as owner of such land; or by mistake,
omission or misdescription in any certificate of owners duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the
register or other official book or by any cancellation; and
c. that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or interest
therein, or claim upon the same.
Petitioner’s claim is not supported by the purpose for which the Assurance Fund is established. Assurance Fund is
intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate is conclusive evidence of an
indefeasible title to land. They did not suffer prejudice because of the operation of the said doctrine.

In this case, the circumstances of spouses De Guzman do not fall under the first case. They have not alleged that the
loss or damage they sustained was through any mission, mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel, or the Registrar of
Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the performance of their respective duties. Moreover, they were
negligent in not ascertaining whether the impostors who executed a deed of sale in their favor were really the owners of the
property.

Nor does the spouses De Guzman’s situation fall under the second case. They were not deprived of their land as a
consequence of the bringing of the land or interest therein under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree. Neither
was the deprivation due to the registration by any other person as owner of such land, or by mistake, omission or
misdescription in any certificate or owners duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book
or by any cancellation.

The claim of spouses De Guzman is not supported by the purpose for which the Assurance Fund was established.
The Assurance Fund is intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate is
conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land. They did not suffer any prejudice because of the operation of this
doctrine. On the contrary, they sought to avail of the benefits of the Torrens System by registering the property in their
name. Unfortunately, the original owners were able to judicially recover the property from them. That spouses De Guzman
eventually lost the property to the original owners, however, does not entitle them to compensation under the Assurance
Fund.

PAJOMAYO v MANIPON
Remedies of party aggrieved by registration

Facts:
On 5 June 1963, Mariano Pajomayo filed a complaint before RTC Pangasinan alleging that they are owners pro-
indiviso of the parcel of land land covered by OCT 1089 (issued on November 27, 1931) in the name of Diego
Pajomayo, their father issued under Free Patent; that they had acquired the land as an inheritance from their late father;
that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession of said property in the
concept of owners for a period of more than 70 years , until 1956 when defendant Manipon dispossessed them of such.
They are praying that they be declared as the lawful owner of the said property.; and that Rodrigo Manipon and Perfecta
Zulueta dispossessed them of said property.

On the other hand, Manipon and Zulueta argued that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by
OCT 14043 (issued on April 1, 1957) in the name of Rodrigo Manipon (defendant); that said land have been
adjudicated to them in the cadastral proceedings; that they had acquired the land mentioned by inheritance from their
deceased father Pioquinto Manipon; that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse
possession of said land for more than 70 years to the reclusion of Pajomayo; that they are possessors in good faith; and that
Pajomayo’s action was barred by res judicata and/or prescription.
They also prayed to be declared as lawful owner of said property. RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs, because OCT of
plaintiffs was issued earlier than the defendants.

Issue:
Whether or not the title of Manipon and Zulueta should prevail?

Held: No
Necessarily when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be declared null and void and should
be ordered cancelled. And if a party is declared to be the owner of a parcel of land pursuant to a valid certificate of title said
party is entitled to the possession of the land covered by said valid title. The decree of registration issued in the cadastral
proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the title that had previously been issued in accordance with the provisions
of the Land Registration Law.

Thus, once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act registered pursuant to Section 122
of Act No. 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the
Land Registration Act.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the
same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive
registration where, more than one certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled
to the land as against the person who relies on the second certificate

In this case, the OCT upon which Manipon and Zulueta base their claim of ownership over the land in question was
issued on 1 April 1957, while the OCT upon which Pajomayo base a similar claim was issued on 27 November 1931, under
the law and the authorities. The latter certificate of title should prevail, and the former should be cancelled.

Issue:

WON plaintiffs’ action is already barred by res judicata.

Ruling:
 NO. The doctrine of res judicata is not applicable in the case because plaintiffs base their claim of title over the
land on OCT 1089 by virtue of free patent is already irrevocable and indefeasible since 1 year from its issuance has
already expired, just like the certificate issued in registration proceeding.

Once a homestead patent granted in accordance with Public Land Act registered, the said certificate of title issued
by virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act.

It is settled rule that where there is 2 certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in
whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties. And in the case of successive registration
where, more than 1 certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against the person who relies on the second certificate.
REPUBLIC v GUERRERO
Remedies of party aggrieved by registration

Facts:
Sometime in December 1964, Benjamin Guerrero filed a miscellaneous sales patent application. The
same was approved and a miscellaneous sales patent was issued in favor of Guerrero together with the
corresponding original certificate of title.
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 was issued in favor of respondent Benjamin Guerrero on
August 16, 1982, then OCT O-28 issued on August 27, 1982, covering 174 sqm of land situated at Pugad
Lawin, Quezon City. On July 29, 1983, Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with Bureau of Lands claiming
that the sales patent of Guerrero was obtained through fraud, considering that her house is situated in the
land awarded to Guerrero and that she has been residing in the said land since 1961. Director of Lands
dismissed the protest which was affirmed by Minister of Natural Resources and Office of President, but after
the Motion of Reconsideration the Office of President ordered that the case be remanded to DENR for
investigation. After such investigation, it was found out that 83 sqm of the titled property of Guerrero is
under the actual possession of Bustamante and only 91 sqm under the physical possession of Guerrero.
On the other hand, the Republic assailed the validity of the sales patent on the ground that Guerrero
was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent; and that the certificate of title
was acquired through fraud and misrepresentation.
November 7, 1989, Director of Lands in behalf of RP, instituted a petition for amendment of plan
and technical description of OCT 0-28, as per order by OP. RTC ruled in favor of Guerrero and declared
that OCT O-28 is already indefeasible and that Republic failed to prove the allegation of fraud and
misrepresentation, this was affirmed by CA, MR of Republic was also denied by CA.

Issue: Whether or not Guerrero procured the miscellaneous sales patent through fraud?

Held: No.
Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action to
reopen or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional
deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud
is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private
confidence, even though the act is not done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon
other persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent
acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and
thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and
is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to
a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots
are no contested when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in
deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or
in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to
withdraw his application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud,
therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
Relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the
case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided. Thus, the denial of relief where it
appears that the fraud consisted in the presentation at the trial of a supposed forged document, or a false and
perjured testimony, or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent compromise agreement, or in the alleged
fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case
were underscored.
In this case, the Republic failed to justify a review of the decree constitute actual and extrinsic fraud.
It has not adduced adequate evidence that would show that Guerrero employed actual and extrinsic fraud in
procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of title. The Republic miserably failed to prove that it
was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by
reason of such fraud. It did not specifically allege how fraud was perpetrated by respondent in procuring the
sales patent and the certificate of title. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate the allegation. Fraud
cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of
proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may
assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways. Thus, the law requires
that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.

Issue:

WON the action of state is already barred by prescription.

Ruling:

YES. Republic failed to avail the remedy within the prescribed period. Petition for reopening and
review of decree of registration must be filed within 1 year from the date of entry of said decree (Sec. 38 of
Act 496), in the case of public land grants or patents, 1 year period commences from the issuance of
the patent by the government.

Sales patent of Guerrero was issued on August 16, 1982, while Republic commences an action to
amend only on November 7, 1989, after more than 7 years. Prescription does not run against the State, and
that State can still bring an action even after the lapse of a year for the reversion to the public domain of
lands which have been fraudulently granted. Republic cannot availed the remedy of reversion because
they failed to prove that Guerrero’s title and patent were obtained through actual fraud or other
illegal means. Remedy of reversion can only be availed by State in cases of fraudulent or unlawful
inclusion of the land in patents or certificate of titles.

In addition to, the protest filed by Bustamante before Bureau of Lands on July 29, 1983, cannot
be considered in the context of a petition for review of decree of registration though it was filed within
the 1-year prescriptive period. The law expressly state that petition of review of decree of registration
shall be filed in the proper CFI/RTC, the law did not say that such petition may be filed with an
administrative agency like Bureau of Lands. What the law contemplates is a full-blown trial before a
regular court where each party could be afforded full opportunity to present the case, and where each of
them must establish his case by preponderance of evidence and not by substantial evidence, the usual
quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings.

Review of decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very integrity of land titles and torrens
system.

(Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time and again, we have said
that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon.
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action to reopen or revise a
decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. Only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is contemplated by the law
as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration.

Here, Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question and from
properly presenting its case by reason of such fraud. Petitioner did not specifically allege how fraud was perpetrated by respondent
in procuring the sales patent and the certificate of title. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate the allegation. Fraud cannot
be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.

Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner failed to avail itself of the remedy within the
prescribed period. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration must be filed
within one year from the date of entry of said decree.
 In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences from the issuance of the patent by the
government. In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August 16, 1982, while petitioner instituted an action
to amend respondent’s certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years from the issuance of
the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to timely avail of the remedy to contest Guerrero’s title.)
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS ASSOCIATION INC. v COURT OF APPEALS
Land patents

Facts:
Lot No. 1982 located in Cotabato City was formerly a timberland . On 4 September 1956, the Bureau of Lands
released Lot No. 1982 of Cadastral 237 at Cagayan de Oro City as alienable and disposable public land. Thereafter, on
29 January 1964, the Bureau of Lands issued a survey authority granting the Cagayan de Oro City Landless
Association Inc. to survey the land for purposes of subdivision into residential lots. After which, COCLAI filed for a
miscellaneous sales application.
Meanwhile, on 22 August 1979, the National Housing Authority filed an expropriation proceeding to acquire
Cadastral Lot No. 1982. COCLAI intervened. However, the NHA sought the suspension of said expropriation
proceedings.
Subsequently, on 10 May 1993, the President issued Proclamation No. 2292, thereby reserving the entire
Cadastral Lot No. 1982 for the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Project. As a result of which, a special patent and
an original certificate of title was issued in the name of NHA.
July 24, 1990, NHA filed a complaint for Quieting of title with application of Preliminary injunction against
COCLAI (CC No. 90-337) at Branch 25 of RTC CDO, after COCLAI moved for the execution of judgment in CC
No. 11204.

Civil Case 11204, forcible entry and damages filed by COCLAI against NHA before the Municipal Trial
Court Branch 3, CDO, when NHA demolished the structures erected by COCLAI members sometime in November
1986. COCLAI basing their possession and occupation of Lot 1982 with Miscellaneous Sales Application they filed
August 13, 1970. COCLAI was able to obtain affirmative ruling when MTC and RTC ruled in their favor, and
ordering the restoration of actual possession of portions of Lot 1982 to COCLAI members.

However, while such case was pending, President issued on July 1, 1988 Special Patent No. 3551 covering
the entire Lot 1982, by virtue of such OCT P-3324 was issued in the name of NHA on January 3, 1990.

RTC ruled denying the preliminary injunction of NHA to restrain the enforcement of the decision of CC No.
11204. MR was also denied. However, CA reversed RTC and ordered the issuance of PI to respect the possession of
NHA over the land.

Issue: Whether or not COCLAI has better right over NHA?

Held: No.
The original certificate of title issued to the NHA serves as a concrete and conclusive evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property. Accordingly, once a decree of registration is issued under the Torrens systems and
the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration has lapsed, without said decree being controverted
by any adverse party, the title becomes perfect and cannot later on be questioned.
Furthermore, in this case, the original certificate of title was issued by the Register of Deeds, under an
administrative proceeding. Thus, it is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration
proceeding as the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public
Land Law. Moreover, the said certificate of title was not controverted by COCLAI in a proper proceeding nor did it
show that the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title by the register of deeds to NHA was tainted with bad faith or
fraud. Hence, said certificate of title enjoys the presumption of having been issued by the register of deeds in the
regular performance of its official duty.
NHA basing their claim on Free Patent and OCT. OCT of NHA was issued under an administrative
proceeding pursuant to Special Patent, thus it is as indefeasible as certificate of title issued under judicial registration
proceeding since the land covered by said certificate is disposable public land within the contemplation of Public land
Law. Certificate of title vested not only ownership over the lot but also the right of possession as a necessary
consequence of the right of ownership.
In addition to, NHA is not merely administrator because Proclamation 2290 gave NHA authority to develop,
administer and dispose Lot 1982. On the other hand, COCLAI only basis for claiming the land is lawful entry and
possession for an extended period of time and the final judgment in the case of forcible entry. Judgment in
ejectment case is effective only with respect to possession and in no wise bind the title or affect ownership of land.
Also the Miscellaneous Sales Application of COCLAI was not acted upon, the RD of Bureau of Lands even
rejected their subdivision survey. With such, the occupation of COCLAI on the disputed lot is illegal, and they
became mere squatters who have no legal right over the land they occupying.
MENESES v COURT OF APPEALS
Land patents

Facts:
April 17, 1919, Quisumbing filed Civil Case No. 07049 before CFI of Laguna Branch VI. Against Pablito and
Lorenzo Meneses, Braulio darum and Cesar Almendral for nullification of free patents and titles issued to Pablito
Meneses. They are alleging that such patents and titles were obtained by fraud, Lorenzo as Mayor of Los Banos used
his brother Pablito as dummy to illegally occupied the subject property herein the ‘private accretion land’. And that
they confederated with District land officer Darum and Land Inspector Almendral for the issuance of the said patents
and OCTs in favor of Meneses.

Pablito alleged that Free Patent No. (IV-5) P-12807 and OCT P-1268 covering Lot 1585 with an area of
417sqm and Free Patent No. (IV-5) 12808 and OCT P-1269 for Lot 190 with an area of 515 sqm, both located in
Los Banos, Laguna on March 1, 1977, were issued legally. And that he had been occupying the property since 1956,
and further said that he acquired the property through Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights from Silverio Bautista
on May 5, 1975, and that Baustista acquired the same from his aunt Sergia Almeda.

While heirs of Quisumbing (respondent in GR 82220), traced their ownership over the said property since
September 6, 1919, when their matriarch Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisimbing was issued OCT 989 covering lot
with an area of 859sqm, with Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. And that the ‘accretion land’ was
awarded to them in Civil case B-350, where the court sustained their right over the 2,387 sqm which had gradually
accrued to their property by natural actions of the waters of Laguna de Bay. CFI of Binan even ordered the
confirmation and registration of title in their favor when they applied for registration and confirmation of title over the
said property.

RTC ruled in favor of Quisumbing and found that the free patents issued to Pablito Meneses had been
procured through fraud, deceit and bad faith (deed of waiver executed by Bautista to Pablito Meneses was simulated
contract for lack of consideration; said instrument was sworn before Mayor Lorenzo who had no authority to notarize
deeds of conveyance; Mayor Meneses exercised right of ownership over the property; District land Officer Darum
approved free patent applications and issued title without the required cadastral survey approved by Director of Land,
and other), thus declaring the OCTs and Free Patents null and void. MR was denied by RTC, and CA affirmed the
decision of RTC and subsequently denied the MR filed.

Issue:
Whether or not Meneses has better right over the property?

Held: No.
In this case, the principle of indefeasibility of title should not favor Meneses notwithstanding that the one year
period provided for by law to impugn their title had elapsed. Meneses also urged that, having been granted by the
state, their title is superior to that of the Quisumbings.

However, that in the light of the fraud attending the issuance of the free patents and titles of Meneses, said
assertions crumble. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v People which held Meneses therein liable
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.

Issue:

WON the free patent and OCT of Pablito Meneses prevails over the accession right of Quisumbing.

Ruling:
 NO. Accretion is a mode of acquiring property, and in Civil Case No. B-350, the court upheld the right of
Quisumbing, that the accretion land could only benefit the Quisumbing who own the property adjacent to Lot 190 and
Lot 1585. On the contention of Meneses that their titles are already indefeasible since 1 year period already lapsed and
that their title is superior as it were granted by the State. This assertion was beaten when fraud was confirmed in the
case Meneses v People.

GARCIA v COURT OF APPEALS

Subsequent registration

Facts:
Atty. Pedro Garcia and Remedios Garcia sold Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, to their daughter,
Ma. Luisa Magpayo. Thereafter, on 5 March 1981, the spouses Magpayo mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of
Communications. However, it was only on 9 March 1981 that a transfer certificate of title was issued in the name of
the spouses Magpayo.

The spouses Magpayo failed to pay the loan upon its maturity. As a result of which, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and PBCom was the highest bidder who bought the land. The redemption period of the
foreclosed mortgage expired, as such, the title over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom.

PBCom filed a petition for the issuance of writ of possession, which was received by Jose Ma. Garcia, who
refused to honor the same. Garcia then filed a suit for recovery of realty, claiming that he inherited the land as one of
the heirs of his parents; and that PBCom had acquired no right thereover.

Issue:
Whether or not Garcia may be held as the lawful owner of the subject property?

Held: No.
Garcia’s possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into ownership. He has no valid title thereto.
His possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith. His possession is certainly not in the concept of
an owner. This is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the spouses Magpayo which
title was subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the
issuance of title in favor of the latter in 1985.

Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person
is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty.
Garcia and his wife exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the
spouses Magpayo. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.
Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in
one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an
owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

In this case, Garcia occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by
his parents. An owner’s act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter’s favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that Gacria was in possession of
the property at the time of the sale to the spouses Magpayo It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership.

The mortgage to PBCom by the spouses Magpayo is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title
over the property was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does not confer
ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property. The deed of sale operates as a formal or
symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. All said,
the spouses Magpayo were already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.