Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila City

JUANA DELA CRUZ, CIVIL CASE NO. L-12345

Defendant-Petitioner, For: Ejectment

-versus-

JANE DOE,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
x------------------------x

MEMORANDUM

COME NOW PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, through the

undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Supreme Court most
respectfully submit and present this Memorandum in the above-
titled case and aver that:

THE PARTIES

1.Plaintiff-Respondent Jane Doe is of legal age, single, and

residing on 1010 Ginoo Boulevard, Pasay City, where she may be
served with legal processes and notices issued by this Honorable
Court;

2.Defendant-Petitioner Juana Dela Cruz is of legal age and

residing on 123 Binibini Street, Quezon City, and may be served
with legal processes and other judicial notices thereto.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.On February 11, 2008, herein Plaintiff-Respondent filed a

Complaint for Ejectment dated February 7, 2008 against
Defendant-Petitioner;

2.On December 22, 2008, an Answer dated December 15, 2008

was filed by the Defendant-Petitioner;
 3.On February 3, 2009, a Decision was rendered by Branch 1 of
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City in favor of the Plaintiff-
Respondent;

4.On August 6, 2009, a Motion for Reconsideration filed July 5,

2009 by Defendant-Petitioner through legal counsel was denied by
Judge Lorenzo Menzon of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court
Pasay City;

5.On September 14, 2009, a Petition for Review dated September

9, 2009 was filed to the Court of Appeals by Defendant-Petitioner;

6.On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff-Respondent through legal counsel

filed a Comment dated April 19, 2010;

7.On May 13, 2010, as per Verification and Report from the
Judicial Records Division (JRD) no Reply was filed by the
Defendant-Petitioner;

8.On May 21, 2010, a Resolution was rendered by the Court of

Appeals denying Defendant-Petitioner’s Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO);

9.Accordingly, the Honorable Court of Appeals ordered the

parties to submit their respective Memoranda fifteen (15) days from
notice, otherwise regardless whether or not Memoranda were filed,
the petition shall be submitted for decision;

Hence, the filing of the instant Memorandum.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

10. Plaintiff-Respondent seeks that a parcel of land located at

123 Binibini Street, Pasay be returned to her possession, but due to
Defendant-Petitioner’s occupancy thereat, the former cannot claim
possession which left her with the option of residing at 1010 Ginoo
Boulevard, Pasay City. It is noteworthy to stress that Plaintiff-
Respondent is the registered owner of the land subject under TCT
No. 12345 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. The property was
sold to them by the now deceased original owners, Spouses Marcelo
and Marcela del Pilar;

11. Defendant-Petitioner, on the other hand, is an alleged

lessee of the original owners of the land since September 1955.
They had repeatedly assailed the verbal contract of lease for more
than 50 years;
 12. Plaintiff-Respondent was not able to claim immediately
the land for it was previously subject to a pending legal proceeding
and that there was still no urgent necessity of using and occupying
it. When the event came that Plaintiff-Respondent was able to
enforce her right over the land, Defendant-Petitioner, despite
earnest and peaceful efforts of the Plaintiff-Respondent still refused
to vacate the land. This led her to seek help from the Barangay
officials for mediation and/or conciliation in accordance with law.
However, the Defendant-Petitioner still persistently occupied the
land without heed to the serious and constant demand of the
Plaintiff-Respondent which rendered it unattainable to reach an
agreement;

13. Due to the foregoing failure to claim the parcel of land

attributed to the obstinate refusal of the Defendant-Petitioner,
Plaintiff-Respondent was compelled to hire the services of a legal
counsel to commence the enforcement of ejection under the wings
of the courts of law.

III. ISSUES OF THE CASE

A.) WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIAL

COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS UNLAWFUL
DETAINER ACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE OF
OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HAD RAISED IN
DEFENSE THE LESSEE’S RIGHTS UNDER P.D. 1517, P.D.
2016, APD 1-12 – PASAY CITY;

B.) WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER

ACTION BARS THE BONA FIDE LESSEE’S RIGHT TO AVAIL
THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6
OF P.D. 1517;

C.) WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE

COVERAGE OF AREAS FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT
(APD), REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THE LIST OF THE
STREETS SUBJECT TO THE ZONAL DEVELOPMENT AND
NOT TO THE AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY
METES AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE
PROCLAMATION ITSELF.

IV. ARGUMENTS
 A.) The court committed no error in deciding that an
unlawful detainer action be enforced upon herein
Defendant-Petitioner despite the assailed contention of
the former under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016.

B.) There is no bar in this instant case for an unlawful

detainer to avail the benefits and privileges provided by
Section 6 P.D. 1517 provided it is applicable.

C.) The determination of the scope and limitation of

Areas for Priority Development shall be based on the list of
specific areas prescribed by the proclamation.
V. DISCUSSION

A.) It is necessary to emphasize that the Plaintiff-Respondent

is the bona fide owner of the parcel of land located at 123 Binibini
Street, Pasay City under TCT No, 12345 of the Register of Deeds of
Pasay City. In the Philippines, the presentation of a valid certificate
of title of the real property is a conclusive evidence of ownership of
the person whose name the certificate of title is entitled to.

Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, it

provides that “the original certificates in the registration book, any
copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of the
register of deeds of the province or city where the land is situated,
and the seal of the court, and also the owner’s duplicate certificate,
shall be received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine
Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein
except so far as otherwise provided in this Act.”

Recognized jurisprudence also uphold the significance of a

certificate of title in proving valid ownership of a land. In the
decision of the case of Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel, the
ponente cited two cases which highlight the significance of a valid
certificate of title in claiming ownership over a land. It was held that
“…in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that
the trial court did not err in giving more probative weight to the TCT
in the name of the decedent vis--vis the contested unregistered
Deed of Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the
registered owner is preferred to possess the property subject of the
unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has
a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.”

The ruling of Dizon v. Court of Appeals was also used as basis for
this argument. It was stated that a certificate of title is conclusive
evidence of ownership and the questionability of the title is
immaterial in an ejectment suit. Futhermore, Article 428 of the New
Civil Code enumerates the rights of an owner. “The owner has the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations other
than those established by law. The owner has right of action against
the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.”

It is indubitable that the certificate of title of 123 Binibini Street,

Pasay City under TCT No. 12345 which is registered in the Register
of Deeds of Pasay City entitles Petitioner-Respondent the right to
exercise the aforementioned rights, specifically, in this instant case,
the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in
order to recover the land.

The contention of the Defendant-Petitioner that the verbal lease

agreement they had made with the now deceased original owners
Marcelo and Marcela Del Pilar for over 50 years shall entitle them to
the privileges under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016 (Annex “A” and “B”,
respectively) is untenable. It is expressly stated that Section 6 of
P.D. 1517 grants lessees the right of first refusal before they may be
ejected from a land, but this is only feasible under certain
conditions. It is an indispensable qualification that the land is
included in the list of Areas for Priority Development (APD) before
an owner can be granted of the right of first refusal. The land
subject of this case is clearly not included in the specific areas
enumerated in the list of APD. To reiterate the Court of Appeals
decision in CA-G.R. No. CV 12345: “Insofar as the property in
litigation, appellant Jane Doe is, consequently, correct in objecting
to appellee’s exercise of the right of first refusal granted under
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517. The fact that it is not
included in the areas for priority development specifically identified
under Proclamation No. 1967 indicates that appellee have no cause
of action for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and preliminary
injunction against appellants.”

B.) The Plaintiff-Respondent’s argument in this issue is

intimately connected with the preceding argument. Defendant-
Petitioner vigorously assails that there is no bar to the availability of
the privileges and benefits conferred to bona fide lessee whenever
there is an unlawful detainer action. It is however true. But this is
subject to circumstances that may qualify a lessee to the privileges
and benefits under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1516 such as the right of
first refusal. Unfortunately, the land possessed by the Defendant-
Petitioner does not fall under the ambit of Section 6 of P.D. No.
1517. Therefore, the Defendant-Petitioner has no cause of action in
this issue.

C.) The third issue questions the coverage of the APD

prescribed by the proclamation, whether or not it refers to the list of
streets subject to the Zonal Development or to the areas included in
the delineation of the metes and bounds indicated.

Reiteration is therefore necessary to lay emphasis on the decision

of the Court of Appeals that in the List of Areas for Priority
Development (APD’s), labeled as the South Sector of Pasay City, the
area for priority development was defined as Tramo Lines along
Barangays San Isidro, San Roque, and Santa Clara. It was
thereafter specifically enumerated the list of covered sub-areas
(please refer to Annex “C” for diagram) which are the following: 1) F.
Victor, 2) Ventanilla Street, c) Juan Luna Street, d) D. Jorge Street,
e) Viscarra Street, f) Conchita Street, g) Dolores Street, h) Leonardo
Street, i) Alvarez Street, j) Basilio Street, k) Rodriguez Street, and i)
Villa Barbara. “There is consequently no gainsaying the fact that
with its Binibini Street location, the property in litigation is not
included among the sites identified as Areas for Priority
Development in Pasay City.”The mere fact that the list does not
include Binibini Street necessarily implies that it is deemed
excluded from it.

Citing Solanada Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, it made a

profound analysis of Section 6 of P.D. 1517 (as found in Annex “A”
of this Memorandum) based on statutory construction:

“We agree. A close reading of Proclamation No. 1967 reveals

that, before a preemptive right can be exercised, the disputed
land should be situated in an area declared to be both an
APD and a ULRZ.

An urban tenant's right of first refusal is set forth in Section

6, PD 1517, as follows:

Sec. 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas.

Within the Urban Zones[,] legitimate tenants who
have resided on the land for ten years or more [,]
who have built their homes on the land[,] and
residents who have legally occupied the lands by
contract, continuously for the last ten years shall
not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed
the right of first refusal to purchase the same within
a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under
terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban
Zone Expropriation and Land Management
Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree.

Proclamation No. 1967 further delimited the areas or zones

wherein this preemptive right could be availed of viz.:
 WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued on 11
September 1979, pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1517,
declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban
Land Reform Zone.

WHEREAS, It is now necessary and appropriate to

identify specific sites covered by urban land reform in
Metropolitan Manila for purposes of making specific the
applicability of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and of
LOI No. 935.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,

President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, and
in relation to Proclamation No. 1893 declaring the entire
Metropolitan Manila area as an Urban Land Reform
Zone, and LOI 935, hereby amend Proclamation No. 1893
by declaring 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas
for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones
as described in the attached annex.

“The provisions of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and of

LOI No. 935 shall apply only to the above[-]mentioned
Areas of Priority Development and Urban Land Reform
Zones.

xxx xxx xxx”

The aforecited whereas clauses express a clear intent to

limit the operation of PD 1517 to specific areas declared to be
located in both an APD and a ULRZ.  The conjunctive and in
the last sentence of the quoted provision confirms this
intention.  And  in statutory construction implies
conjunction, joinder or union. As understood from the
common and usual meaning of the conjunction and,  the
provisions of PD 1517 apply only to areas declared to be
located within both an APD and a ULRZ.”

With the foregoing recognized jurisprudence said, the Defendant-

Petitioner’s action would necessarily lead to futility for no cause of
action.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premise considered, it respectfully prayed for

that this Honorable Supreme Court that Defendant-Petitioner’s
prayer for writ of injunction be DENIED for having no cause of
action and the petition DISMISSED for being clearly unmeritorious.
 Other just and equitable relief under the foregoing are likewise
being prayed for.

Respectfully submitted.

Makati City for Manila City, Philippines. April 8, 2011.

AZURIN BUHAIN BONTUYAN AND ARICAYOS LAW

OFFICES
Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent
10th Floor, New Building,
Makati Avenue, Makati City

By:

ATTY. PAOLO COELHO

IBP Lifetime No. 67891;
5/10/2005
PTR No. 44568; 1/10/2011
Roll of Attorney No. 2005-001023
MCLE Compliance No. III – 000899

Copy Furnished:

ATTY. JEFFREY A. ARCHER

Counsel for Petitioner
Unit 1200, Tall Building Condominium,
Espana, Manila