Citizenship in Britain

Uilues., Participation and Democracy

Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley

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© Charles Patrie, Patdck Seyd, Paul Whiteley 2004

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First published 2004
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'lypeface Plancin 1O/ 12 pt. System 15fE'{ 2e [TB]
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library aj Cm1gress Cataloging in Publication data
Pattie, C. J., 1962-
Cicizenship in Britain: values, parcicipacion and democracy / Charles Pattie,
Pacrick Seyd and Paul Whitely.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN O 521 82732 9 - ISBN O 521 53464 X (pb.)
1. Citizcnship - Great Britain. 2. Political parcicipation - Great Britain.
3. Cicizenship - Great Britain - Public opinion. 4. Political participation -
Great Britain - Public opinion. 5. Public opinion - Great Britain.
l. Seyd, Patrick. II. Whiteley, Paul. III. Title.
JN906.P38 2004
323.6'0941 - dc22 2004045 l 77
'You gave us che finger and guess whac, we want you to keep on doing
ir. We don't want your money, just your finger. 40,000 of you pulled
your finger out, clicked on our website and emailed Nestlé asking them
to reduce their whopping S6million claim against the Ethiopian peo-
ple, which they have! Ali it takes is one of your fingers to help us ere-
ate the biggest petition in the world. Join the Big Noise. Make Fair
Trade Fair.Com. Text 'MTF7' + your name to 81003 or call Oxfam on
08700101047.'
(Advere in Guardian, 31 May, 2003)
'Ifyou want to change the world put your money in fair trade chocolate
and start volunteering.'
(Yann Marte!, author of Lije of Pi, Booker Prize winner , Guardian,
23 Octobc r 2002)
'A public is neither a nation, nora generation, nora community ...
a public is a kind of gigantic something, an abstraer and deserted void
which is everything and nothing. '
(W. H. Auden quoting Kierkegaard)

ISBN O 521 82732 9 hardback

ISBN O 521 53464 X paperback

' Ma,nnheimer Zi:-niruní für ·

Europaische S0z10.l1cxschunr
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QJ~ \ "P0t 80t_~ l81
5 Alternative Theories of Citizenship

In earlier chapters we have examined the attitudinal and behavioural foun-

dations of citizenship in Britain. As we have seen, there is a lot of vol-
untary activity, both formal and informal, which underpins citizenship
and a broad set of attitudes and values which support the democratic
system. In common usage, the term 'citizenship' is a very broad concept
and it encompasses questions of identity, ethnicity, gender, participa-
tion, attitudes and values as well as perceptions of rights and obligations.
Unfortunately, such a broad concept is not very useful for purposes of
empirical analysis, since it encompasses too many issues. In chapter 1 we
suggested that citizenship is at root a set of norms, values and practices
which evolve so that individuals can solve collective action problems.
Accordingly, we focus on just two key dimensions which are linked to
this idea, one being attitudinal and the other behavioural. The attitudinal
dimension relates to the balance between the individual's sense of their
rights and their obligations to the wider society. The behavioural dimen-
sion relates to whether or not they participare in a way which supports
civil society and democratic politics.
The key task ofthis chapter is to provide alternative theoretical accounts
of the determinants of citizenship in the sense defined earlier. We shall
consider different theoretical explanations of why people vary both in
their civic attitudes and in their behaviour. The starting point of the
analysis, however, is to clarify how the concept of citizenship should be
measured. This is a preliminary exercise to that of examining the factors
which influence it. Modelling variations in citizenship among our survey
respondents meaos explaining why sorne people score highly on the citi-
zenship scales discussed below, whereas others score poorly on them. The
former might be described as 'good' citizens and the latter 'bad' citizens.
In this sense a 'good' citizen would be someone who is aware of their
rights, but also of their obligations to other people and the wider soci-
ety. In addition, good citizens participate in voluntary activities of var-
ious kinds as well as in politics more generally, although they may not
necessarily be high-intensity participants (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002). By

129
130 Modelling Citizcnship
implication a 'bad' citizen is an individual who demands their rights,
but is reluctant to acknowledge their obligations to the rest of society.
Moreover, they are unlikely to participate either in voluntary activity or
in politics more generally.
To organise ideas, we structure the discussion around two overarching
meta-theories, each of which encompasses alternative models of citizen-
ship. Within these meta-theories there are a total offive models of citizen-
ship to be examined, and the task of the present chapter is to set out the
theoretical ideas behind each of these models. In a subsequent chapter
we will examine evidence which explores which of the models provides
the best empírica! account of citizenship in the survey. But we begin with
the task of measuring citizenship.
Measuring citizenship
We have suggested that the attitudinal dimension of citizenship involves
the recognition by individuals that they have both rights and obligations
to each other, and also to the state if democracy is to work properly. We
shall translate this idea into practice by developing measurement scales
of both rights and obligations, which are designed to capture the values
underpinning citizenship. Secondly, the behavioural dimension of citi-
zenship will be measured using indicators of participation and voluntary
activity which have been examined already in previous chapters.
If there is an imbalance between the individual's perceptions of their
rights and of their obligations, then society and the state will face
great difficulties in delivering the benefits and services which individuals
expect. This is because to a large extent one person's rights are another's
obligations; a social benefit far one person is a tax far another. As we
suggested in chapter 1, a purely rights-based definition of citizenship
ignores this important point. So the starting point ofthe measurement of
citizenship is to examine the balance between perceptions of rights and
obligations among the respondents in the survey.
It will be recalled that we examined indicators of attitudes to rights
in table 2. 12. Toe measures were classified into three groups: prívate
rights relating to issues like paternity leave, gay rights and abortion; state-
provided rights relating to housing, jobs and income inequalities; and
finally, individualistic rights, relating to privare health care and retirement
costs. Sorne of these indicators relate to the individual's private freedom
of action, and others to their expectations concerning the role of gov-
ernment in supporting rights. As table 2.12 showed, many of the rights
induded are controversia!, and this was the reason far including them.
Since there is near unanimity about the desirability ofbasic human rights
Altemative Thcorics of Citizcnship 13 1
like freedom of speech and the independence of the judiciary from polit-
ical interference, there is little point in trying to measure var iations in
public attitudes to such widely accepted rights. It is at the margins of
rights discourse where we find debates and disagreements. Despite this
point, there was a good deal of support in ta ble 2.12 far the right to
paternity leave and also the right to die, with a majority of respondents
supporting both rights. On the other hand, gay rights are more contro-
versia], with quite a lot of opposition to the recognition of gay mar riages.
Looking at state-provided rights in table 2. 12, there is strong support
for government action in relation to the right to work, the right to hous-
ing, and support far greater income equality and a reduction in poverty.
Responses to these indicators show that citizens have a strong preference
in favour of the state intervening to guarantee such rights. At the same
time there is pn awareness that individuals may not be able to rely exclu-
sively on the state far their retirement income, and there is also support
for the idea that wealthy people should pay for their own health care. Thus
support far state action to provide far the basic needs is apparent in the
survey, but there is also a willingness amongst respondents to consider
prívate alternatives as well.
If the demand for rights is fairly strong, the sense of citizen obligations
is also quite strong, as can be seen in tables 2.10 and 2.11. In table 2.1 O
there is very strong support far the idea that citizens should pay their taxes,
obey the law and not claim benefits when they are not entitled to them.
There is also considerable support for the idea that individuals should be
willing to participare in voluntary activity. Moreover, nearly two-thirds
of people think that they are very likely to vote at the next general elec-
tion. So there is considerable evidence of a strong social norm operating
which suggests that participation is desirable. This is further reinforced
by the evidence on attitudes to specific types of voluntary activities in
figure 2.8. Almost three-quarters of citizens are willing to serve on a jury,
and seven out often are willing to give blood orto participare in a Neigh-
bourhood Watch scheme. Toe recognition of obligations only declines
somewhat when individuals are considering high-cost activities like assist-
ing in a meals-on-wheels service and helping volunteers to renovate a local
park.
There are many indicators of rights and obligations in chapter 2 and so
befare we can use them in a modelling exercise it is important to exam-
ine the extent to which these attitudes are structured in the minds of
respondents. Clearly if individuals saw no particular links between dif-
ferent rights, for example, favouring sorne and opposing others more
or less at random, then little underlying structure to attitudes would
exist. On the other hand, if relationships existed between perceptions of
132 Modclling Citizenship Alternative Theories of Citizenship 133

Table 5.1 The Structure of Attitudes to Rights Table 5.2 The Structure of Actitudes to Obligations

State-provided lndividualistic Obedience

rights Private rights ríghts Voluntary action to the law Civic service

Government find job 0.65 Help renovare a local park 0.72

Government reduce income 0.73 Help with meals on wheels 0.74
differences Help with Neíghbourhood 0.58
Government provide 0.65 Watch
housing Work for voluntary o.so
Spend money on poverty 0.59 organisation
Paternity lcave 0.54 Never evade taxes 0.79
Gay relationships 0.82 Always abey the law 0.79
Right to die 0.65 Claim benefits without -0.58
N ot rely on state for 0.65 entitlement
retirement Serve on a jury 0.68
Individuals meet cost of 0.67 Giveblood 0 .50
health care Vote in the next election 0.68
Encourage prívate medicine 0.62
Eigen values 1.9 1.9 1.3
Eigen values l.96 1.44 1.28 Variance explained 19 19 13
Variance explained 20 14 13
Weighted 2000 face-to-face survey.
Weighted 2000 face-to-face survey. Note: This table shows the strength ofthe correlations between the responses to
N,ne: This table shows the strength of the corrclations between the responses to the ques- the ~uestions in the survey and three underlying latent rneasures of obligations
tions in che survey and three underlying latcnt measures of rights (varimax rotated factor {varimax rotated factor matrix).
matrix).

that individuals should provide for themselves. lt is clear that citizens who
different rights, with citizens favouring one also supporting others, this
feel that the state should not provide for their retirement are also quite
would imply that rights were grouped together. In this case, attitude
likely to favour private medicine, so this dimension is described as an
structures would exist which underlie these perceptions. The principal
'individualistic rights' dimension.
components analysis in table 5.1 confirms that there are three separare
Table 5 .2 examines the structure of attitudes to obligations indicators
dimensions to the rights indicators in table 2.12. 1 The first dimension
examined in chapter 2, and much like perceptions of rights this involves
relates to state-provided rights such as employment, housing and income
three dimensions. 2 Firstly) there is a voluntary action dimension in which
equality. Thus individuals who support employment rights, for exam-
individuals who support participation in a Neighbourhood Watch scheme
ple, tend also to support housing rights. These are described as 'state-
are also quite likely to support working for a voluntary organisation or
provided rights'. Toe second, independent dimension relates to prívate
helping with the renovation of a local park. These are relatively high-cost
rights such as paternity leave and the right to die. These are rights which
types of activities from the point ofview of the average citizen. Toe second
involve tolerance of others rather than subsidies from the state, although
dimension relates to obedience to the law, so that individuals who oppose
state action may be involved to enforce them. For that reason they are
tax evasion also have strong views which oppose individuals claiming
described as 'private rights'. The third dimension are rights which value
benefits to which they are not entitled. Clearly, this is a lower-cost set of
individualistic action unfettered by the state and which support the idea
activities than is measured by the voluntary action dimension. Finally, the

1 Not ali of the indicators in table 2.12 appear in table 5.1. The principal components 2
analysis revealcd that there was a dominant three-factor solution and sorne of the indica- Again, we havc extractcd the dominant three principal components in an analysis of che
tors were unrelated rn this and so were excluded. measures of obligations in chapter 2.
134 Modclling Cicizenship Alternative Theorics of Citizcnship 135

dimension which consists of forms of participation which can be under-

Table 5.3 The Structure of Political Participation
taken without the cooperation of other people. Thus citizens can vote
Individual Contact Collective or they can boycott goods for political reasons or donate money to an
organisation on their own initiative without the help of others. This is the
Bought goods for political or 0.70 dominant factor in table 5.3, which indicates how important individual-
ethical reasons
0.69
istic participation is in Britain today.
Boycotttd cercain products
Given money to an organisation 0.64 The second factor is a contact dimension of participation, which is
Raised money for an organisation 0.48 also an individualistic type of participation from the perspective of the
Signcd a petition 0.61 respondent. However, it also involves the participation of elected repre-
Worn or displayed a campaign badge 0.51 sentatives or public officials. Very often when individuals undertake these
Voted in a local government election 0.45
0.68 types of activities they are pursuing prívate goals of various kinds; they
Contacted a public official
Contacted a politician 0.61 may go to see their MP in arder to seek welfare benefits, or write to the
Contacted an organisation 0.59 press about a planning decision which affects. them. However, it is also
Contacted the media 0.54 the case that people contact officials and the media about national issues
Comacted a solicitar or judicial body 0.52
which they care about, so this is not ali prívate in character. Thus the
Taken pare in a public demonstration 0.74
0.66 contact dimension can be individualistic or collectivist in character.
Attended a political rally or meeting
Parcicipated in an illegal protest 0.62 The third factor is clearly a collective action dimension ofparticipation.
Formed a group of like-minded people 0.39 In this case citizens must join together with others in formal or informal
organisations in arder to participate. Toe evidence shows that individu-
Percencage ofvariance explained 22 9 8
als who have taken part in demonstrations are also quite likely to have
attended a political meeting and sorne of them will have taken part in an
Weighted 2000 face-to-face survey. illegal protest, since ali ofthese items are significantly correlated with this
Note: This cable shows the scrength ofthe correlacions between che responses to
the questions in the survey and three underlying latcnt measures of partidpation factor. This dimension explains the least variance of all the factors, but it
(varimax rotated factor matrix). is clearly an important part of the structure of participation in Britain.
In chapter 3 we examined participation potential as well as actual par-
ticipation, and the structure of this is set out in table 5.4. It can be seen
third dimension relates to civic service, or the belief that citizens should that the participation potential scales are very similar to the actual partic-
be willing to serve on a jury, donate blood and to participate in a general ipation scales. Thus there is no great difference between the underlying
election. These are also slightly higher-cost activities than obedience to dimensions of what people might do and what they actually do in the
the law. way ofpolitical participation. Again there are individualistic, contact and
Citizenship can be seen in terms ofnorms and values, but as the discus- collective dimensions to participation potential.
sion in chapter 3 indicates it is also a matter of civic behaviour, that is, a In chapter 4 we examined micro leve! participation and this is clearly
willingness to participate in politics and public affairs in a way which sup- another aspect of participation which needs to be considered in any
ports democracy. We observed in table 3.1 that there were wide variations model. Table 5.5 cumulates participation activities in relation to edu-
in the willingness of individuals to undertake different types of activities. cation, health and the workplace into an overall participation scale. The
Roughly two-thirds of respondents had given money to an organisation scale measures the extent to which individuals tried to change their ser-
in the previous twelve months and about half had signed a petition. On vice provision in health and education, or their working conditions during
the other hand, few had formed a group of like-minded people or had the previous year. In the year 2000 sorne 73 per cent of citizens did not
taken part in a demonstration. participate at all in the sense of trying to influence service delivery in
The dimensions ofparticipation in Britain are set out in table 5.3 based health or education, or in relation to their workplace conditions. On the
on a principal components analysis of the indicators in chapter 3, and it other hand, sorne 22 per cent of respondents did participate in at least
can be seen that these are fairly clear-cut. There is an individualistic one of these activities, and 5 per cent participated in two or more. So
 Modelling Citizcnship Alternativc Thcories of Citizenship 137
136

Table 5.4 The Structure of Potential Politícal Panicipatíon participation - individuals who get involved in one are also likely to get
involved in the other. Another possibility is that macro participation is
Individual Conract Collective a substitute for micro participation - individuals who engage in macro
politics are less likely to engage in micro politics or vice versa. Toe third
Donate money to an organisation 0.78 possibility is that these forms of participation are simply unrelated to each
Sign a petition 0.70
Raise funds for an organisation 0.62
other. We can investigate these possibilities by examining the correlations
Boycott certain products 0.66 between these scales.
Vote in a local government election 0.63 Toe correlation between the micro participation scale and the indi-
Buy certain products 0.61 vidual participation scale defined in table 5.3 was 0.25, indicating that
Wear or display a campaign badge or sticker 0.49 a modest positive relationship existed between the two variables. Thus
Contact a public official 0.73
Contact a politician (for example, a mcmber 0.75
there is a weak tendency for those who undertake individualistic macro
ofparliamenr or local councillor) political actions to also undertake micro political actions, making the
Contact an organisation 0.72 relationship complementary rather than one of substitution. This is not
Contact a solicitor or ¡udicial body 0.68 really surprising since the two forros of participation are individualistic
Contact the media 0.66 in character. lt is, however, important to recall that this relationship does
Participare in an illcgal protest 0.76
Take part in a public demonstration 0.69
not apply to the whole sample, since only those eligible to take micro
Attend a political meeting or rally 0.69 actions, in other words, those with children of school age, those who had
Form a group of like-minded peoplc 0.68 sought or obtained medical treatment, and those in paid employment are
included in our analysis. The correlation between micro participation and
Variance explained 42.3 9.0 6.6 contact particípation scales was rather weaker at 0.15, and the correlation
between micro participation and collective action scales was weakest of
Weighted 2000 face-to-face survey. all at 0.06. Overall then, it appears that these types of participation are
Question: 'Wbuld you do any of ihe followi,1g to infiuence rules, laws or policies?'
Note: This table shows rhe strength ofthc correlations between the responses to the ques-
complements to each other, or in the case of collective action close to
tions in the survey and thrce underlying latent measures ofparticipation potential (varímax being unrelated.
rotated factor matrix). Up to this point we have been examining measures of citizenship in
Britain, which constitute the dependent variables in subsequent models.
Table 5.5 The Small-Scale Democracy As we have seen, there are both attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of
Participation Scale citizenship. Toe next step is to examine alternative theoretical accounts
of citizenship which can be used to explain variations in these measures.
Attempts to influence education, health
or work conditíons %
Theories of citizenship
None 73
The discussion in chapter 1 pointed out that citizenship has been analysed
One 22
Two 4 according to three alternative models: the liberal, the republican and the
Toree 1 communitarian models. Each of these provides a framework for under-
standing the concept of cítizenship. But there is a more general meta-
Weighced 2000 face-to-face survey. theoretical perspective which can be applied to the analysis of citizenship
which underlies these models and which pervades social theory. This is
although small-scale participation was a minority activity, it nonetheless the distinction between choice-based and structural-based approaches to
ínvolved large numbers of people. social analysis. Choice-based theories are exemplified in their purest form
Given that we have defined the macro and micro political participation by economics, and in this perspective actors are seen as operating in a
scales, this raises the question as to whether there is a relationship between world of constrained optimisation. In this world individuals seek to max-
them. One possibility is that macro participation complements micro imise their utility by obtaining the highest return at the mínimum cost
138 Modelling Citizenship
from any course of action which they undertake. Such utilitarian theories
are rooted in liberal conceptions of society. Applied to the task of under-
standing citizenship, this type of theory sees citizenship emerging from
the choices which agents make, and these reflect the costs and benefits
ofthe choice situation. Thus individuals choose their Ievels ofparticipa-
tion as well as their attitudes to the rights and obligations imposed by
society.
An alternative perspective sees citizenship as a matter of individuals
being socialised into the norms, values and behaviours ofthe social groups
to which they belong and into those of the wider society. In this perspec-
tive, the individual citizen is seen as being the product of social forces and
structures which mould and shape their behaviour and attitudes. Individ-
ual choice has only a limited influence on this system of ideas since the
key determinants of attitudes and behaviour are thought to be found at
the societal level. lt is apparent that communitarian theories with their
emphasis on the group and also republican theories with their empha-
sis on the nation-state are heavily influenced by this tradition of social
analysis.
These broad distinctions are useful, but for the purpose of understand-
ing citizenship they need to be refined into a more specific form which
can be measured and subsequemly tested. In the case of choice theoretic
accounts of citizenship we consider two alternative models: the cognitive
engagement and general incentives models. In the case of structural theo-
ries we examine three alternatives: the civic voluntarism, equity-fairness
and social capital models. Each of these was developed in arder to explain
different forms of politi cal participation, but they can be readily adapted
to the task of explaining the determinants of the attitudes and behaviours
which constitute citizenship. We begin this account by spelling out the
theoretical ideas behind each of the models in more detail.
Choice theories of citizenship
Cognitive engagement theory
The first of the choice theories is the cognitive engagement model. The
core idea of cognitive engagement theory is that participation depends on
the individual's access to information and on their ability and willingness
to use that information to make informed choices. Two developments
in society help to explain the growth of interest in cognitive engagement
theories of participation (Dalton, 2002). One is the growth of educa-
tion, particularly higher education, which has been very significant in
Britain. Participation in higher education increased from about 800,000
Altcrnative Theories of Citizenship 139
students in 1980/81 to more than 1,600,000 in 1996/97 (see Times Higher
Education Supplement, 26 September 1997). In addition, the Labour gov-
ernment has committed itself to the goal of ensuring that 50 per cent
of the young participate in higher education in the future. Education is
important to this type of theory because it helps people to acquire, and
more importantly to process, large amounts of information. It provides
skills, for example, in the area of information technology, while at the
same time increasing the individual's ability to analyse information by
placing it into a meaningful context - to make sense of information.
Another important development is the declining cost of acquiring infor-
mation due to its increased availabilicy in print, electronic and web-based
forms. Thus a growth of education on the one hand, and decline in the
costs of acquiring and processing information on the other, produces a
process of cognitive mobilisation (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Media con-
sumption is a key factor in this process, since the cognitively engaged are
likely to follow politics and public affairs in the media. Similarly, políti-
ca! knowledge is also important since the engaged are quite likely to be
knowledgeable about how the system works.
Viewed from the perspective of the history of citizenship, cognitively
engaged individuals are clase to the classical Greek conceptions of the
good citizen. As we saw in chapter 1, the classical citizen is an informed
member of the polis who fully participates in politics and understands the
issues and complexities of government. Cognitive mobilisation produces
individuals who have an interest in politics and civic affairs, are politically
knowledgeable and have a clear understanding of the norms and princi-
pies of democracy. In addition, the cognitively engaged citizen is likely to
be influenced by the performance of the state in delivering the benefits
of citizenship. This means that cognitively engaged citizens are critica!
citizens (Norris et al., 1999). By implication, a perception that the state
may be failing to deliver in terms of services is likely to mobilise them
to participate in unorthodox ways, for example, by protesting. lt may
also reduce their willingness to acknowledge the obligations of citizen-
ship, if they feel that they are not receiving benefits. This is why cognitive
engagement theory is at root a choice-based theory of citizenship, since
the performance of the system is a key factor in explaining why sorne
people are good citizens when others are not.
The core concepts or key variables in the cognitive engagement model
are education, media consumption, interest in politics, political knowl-
edge and policy satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Education is typically mea-
sured in terms ofwhether individuals have more than the mínimum levels
of education, in particular whether they have higher education. Media
consumption refers to their use of the media to acquire information
140 Modelling Citizenship
about politics and public affairs. Political interest is defined in terms
of their motivation to follow the activities of government and to under-
stand policy-making. Political knowledge is about their understanding of
the way the system works and about policy information which is relevant
to making a decision to participate. Finally, policy satisfaction relates to
attitudes to the performance of the system in delivering the benefits of
citizenship.
Toe cognitive engagement model has been used to provide an account
of certain types of participation, notably voting (Dalton and Wattenberg,
2000; Clarke et al., 2004), but it needs to be generalised to a wider con-
ception of citizenship. One implication might be that uneducated indi-
viduals who lack an interest in politics and who do not follow the media
are 'poor' citizens. Another might be that the disengaged are likely to
want rights while failing to acknowledge their obligations. A third is that
the engaged are likely to participate in voluntary activity whilst the dis-
engaged are likely to be apathetic. We will investigate these possibilities
further, but for the moment the theory implies that the good citizen is
educated, interested in politics and media-conscious. Of course it may
not be necessary to have these characteristics in order for an individual to
participate in informal voluntary activity such as helping out friends and
neighbours. But wider participation and the civic values which go with it
should involve such characteristics.
Ali theories can be criticised and the cognitive engagement theory is
no exception. One criticism ofthe theory is that while it is clearly choice-
based and involves information processing, it is not clear why individuals
should be willing to act on this information once they have acquired it.
Citizens may be able to process and understand information about poli-
tics and society, but in the absence of incentives to act on this information
it is not clear why this should encourage them to participate. It is easy
to imagine an individual who is educated, interested in politics, follows
current affairs in the media and is knowledgeable about how the system
works, but who <loes not participate in voluntary activity. Thus acquiring
and processing information seems an incomplete mechanism for explain-
ing participation in the absence of a theory of incentives to use that infor-
mation. Having made that point, however, cognitive engagement theory
may capture an important dimension of citizenship.
The general incentives theory
The general incentives model ofparticipation was introduced specifically
to explain the incidence ofhigh-intensity types ofparticipation involving
party activists (see Seyd and Whiteley, 1992, 2002a; Whiteley, Seyd and
Alternative Theories of Citizcnship 141
Richardson, 1994; Whiteley and Seyd, 2002). The theory is a synthe-
sis of rational choice and social psychological accounts of participation ,
and the core idea behind it is that actors need incentives if they are to
participate and have positive civic values. The emphasis on incentives for
action means that the theory has many similarities with rational choice
accounts of political action. However, it postulates that actors take into
account a wider array of incentives when they are considering participa-
tion rather than the narrowly defined individual incentives which appear
in standard rational choice models. Toe incentives to participate in the
theory are classified into five types: collective, selective, group, social and
expressive. In addition, perceptions of the costs of participation have to
be taken into account when citizens are deciding whether or not to get
involved.
To consider each of these in turn, collective incentives refer to the
benefits of citizenship which accrue to all individuals whether they par-
ticipate or not. These benefits are referred to by economists as public
goods (Samuelson, 1954; Olson, 1965) . Toe theoretical concept ofpub-
lic goods was discussed briefly in chapter 1, and it refers to goods having
the characteristics of jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion.
Basic security, that is, freedom from invasion and freedom from crime,
are goods of this type, and these are provided by the state. They are
available to all citizens and their use cannot be limited to only specific
individuals or groups. In the absence of compulsory taxation these goods
would be inadequately provided, because individuals have an incentive to
free-ride on the efforts of others and not to contribute to their provision.
Toe state also provides many other goods such as health care, welfare,
education and infrastructure, many of which are not public goods in the
formal sense of the definition, since free-riding can be avoided by selling
them in prívate markets. But the state nonetheless supplies such goods
where there is a strong argument that their provision would be inadequate
in the absence of state intervention.
r Applied to the task of explaining citizenship, collective incentives refer
~, to the policy outputs of government, particularly in relation to individual
security and economic performance, which are the most salient issues for
voters (see Clarke et al., 2004). If individuals think that policy delivery is
effective then that should motívate them to participate. If, on the other
hand, they think that policy delivery is failing and that government has
a problem delivering on its promises, this should act as a disincentive
to participate. This perception might also produce a gap between the
individual's sense of rights and obligations.
In the general incentives model the individual's sense of personal effi-
cacy, or their perception that they can make a difference to outcomes,
142 Moddling Citizenshíp
plays an important role. The reasoning behind this is simple: if individ-
uals think that the system works well, but at the same time they believe
that their own participation has little or no influence on outcomes, then
they have no incentive to get involved. But if they feel that the system can
deliver and that they can make a difference to outcomes, then it will be
rational for them to participate to try to improve its performance. The
model can be specified in terms of an interaction between benefits and
efficacy, or it can be specified in terms of benefits and efficacy acting as
separate determinants of participation and civic values.
Selective incentives refer to the benefits which individuals receive from
the exercise of participating itself, so that non-participants do not receive
these benefits. In this sense they are the prívate retums from being a
good citizen, and they may be important for understanding why sorne
people are active citizens when others are not. Selective incentives are of
two types: process and outcome incentives. 3 Process incentives refer to
motives for participating .which derive from the process of participation
itself. Different writers have referred to a number of different motives
which might be counted under this heading. Tullock(1971) has written
of the 'entertainment' value of being involved in revolution; Opp (1990)
writes about the 'catharsis' value of involvement in political protest. Por
sorne people, the political process is interesting and stimulating in itself,
regardless of the outcomes or goals. Participation is a way of meeting
like-minded and interesting people, and for sorne this is motive enough
for getting involved.
Outcome incentives refer to motives concerned with achieving certain
goals in the political process, but goals which are prívate rather than
collective. An active citizen might harbour ambitions to become a local
councillor, for example, or the local mayor, or even to be elected to the
House of Commons. Others may want to become a school governor, or
a local magistrate. Yet others might be interested in voluntary activity
for its own sake because they enjoy such activities, or because they are
retired and want to occupy their time. These incentives for involvement
will ensure that sorne people participate and are good citizens for prívate
reasons.
Group incentivesrefer to the individual's perception that group benefits
are a good reason to participate and to support civic valués.When people
3
When the model is applicd to the task of explaining party activism, idcology is also
included as a selective incentive. Thus left-wing beliefa will motívate Labour Party mem-
bers to be active in Labour Party politics (Seyd and Whiteley, 2002a). This type of
incentive is not appropriatc for a wider conception of citizenship participation, however,
sinc e individuals do not have ro be Jeft-wing or right-wing to participate in voluntary
activiry.
Alternative Thcories of Citizenshíp 143
consider collective action to solve social problems, they may often think
about the welfare of the group rather than their own personal welfare.
So there is a type of group consciousness at work with individuals still
calculating the costs and benefits of collective action, but at the leve! ofthe
group rather than at the leve] of the individual. If this idea is applied to the
question of explaining what motivates individuals to be good citizens,
then it implies that one reason why sorne people participate is because
they believe that it is important to get benefits for groups that they care
about.
Another motive for involvement in the general incentives rnodel der ives
from social norrns, or people's perceptions that the attitudes and beliefs
of people close to them support participation and civic values. If indi-
viduals perceive themselves to be surrounded by people who think that
rights are important but who ignore their obligations, or who think that
sorneone else should look after the interests of the wider society other
than thernselves, this is Iikely to inhibit their own participation. Since
individuals are embedded in networks of relationships wirp others, then
social norms which recognise the views of other people should h ave -an
important influence on their own behaviour.
Finally, within the general incentives model there are motives for
engagement based on emotional or affective attachments to society. T hese
motives lie outside the standard cost-benefit model of decision-rnaking,
with its ernphasis on cognitive calculations, and are rooted very much in
the social-psychological research tradition. Such motives have long been
discussed in the literature on parcy identification, since the early theorists
saw partisanship as an affective orientation towards a significant social or
política! group in the individual's environment (Campbell et al., 1960).
Similarly, Frank (1988) has developed what he terms a commitment model
in which actors' emotional predispositions override their short-run calcu-
lations of self-interest and allow them to cooperate with each other. This
rneans that sorne people will be motivated to become good citizens by an
affective attachrnent to their country, in other words a sense of pride in
being British. This has little to do with the benefits they rnight receive
from being an active citizen, either at the individual or collective levels.
Rather, such motives for involvement are grounded in a sense of loyalty
and affection for their country.
Clearly the general incentives model <loes not have the problems of
the cognitive engagement model in ignoring the incentives for action.
But it can be criticised for over-emphasising the importance of choice
behaviour. Arguably, socialisation processes play a very irnportant role in
explaining why sorne people are good citizens and others are not. There is
evidence to suggest that people get involved in voluntary activity because
144 Modclling Citizenship
theirparents were involved in such activity (Barnes and Kaase, 1979: 449-
522). We know that partisanship is often inherited from parents and the
same may be true of patriotism. It seems plausible that individuals who
are strongly embedded in their communities with friends and relatives
living locally are more likely to be good citizens than individuals with
few such ties. Thus the emphasis on individual choice and incentives in
the theory may neglect structural determinants of citizenship emanating
from the wider society rather than from individual choices. We examine
these in the context of structural theories next.
Structural theories of citizenship
To reiterate the earlier point, structural theories of citizenship differ from
choice-based theories in that they suggest that citizenship is the product
of macro level social fo¡_-ces rather than being the product of choices by
individuals.
The civic voluntarism model
Toe most well-known and widely applied model of political participation
in political science, the civic voluntarism model has its origins in the work
of Sidney Verba and Norman Nie in their influential research on partic-
ipation in the United States (Verba and Nie, 1972). 1t was subsequently
applied by them and by others to explain participation in a number of
countries, including Britain (Verba, Nie and Jae-On Kim, 1978; Barnes
and Kaase, 1979; Parry, Moyser and Day, 1992; Verba, Schlozman and
Brady, 1995). The central ideas ofthe civic voluntarism model ofpartic-
ipation are captured in the following quote:
We focus on three factors to account for política! activity. We suggested earlier chat
one helpful way to understand the chree factors is to invert che usual question
and ask inscead why people do not become political activiscs. Three answers
come to mind: because they can't; because chey don't want to; or because nobody
asked. In other words people may be inactive beca use chey lack resources, beca use
chey lack psychological engagement wich politics, or because thcy are outside of
che recruitment networks thac bring people into politics. (Verba, Schlozman and
Brady, 1995: 269)
The authors define the resources aspect of this in terms of 'time, money
and civic skills' (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995: 271). The psycho-
logical engagements aspect is defined principally in terms of the individ-
ual 's sense of policical efficacy (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 199 5: 27 2),
and finally, the recruitment networks aspect is defined as 'requests for
Alternativc Theories of Citizcnship 145
participation that come to individuals at work, in church, or in organi-
zations - especially those that come from friends, relatives, or acquain-
tances' (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995: 272).
. Toe core idea ofthis model is that individuals with resources will partic-
1pate, where these resources are the product of social structures, inherited
characteristics from parents and education. As the authors explained in
an earlíer version of the theory:
Acdc~rding to chis model, the social status of an individual - his job, education,
an_ mcome - determines to a large excent how much he participares. It does
th1s chrough the intervening effects of a variety of 'civic attitudes' conducive to
participation: actitudes such as a sense of efficacy, of psychological involvement
in politics anda feeling of obligation to participate. (Verba and Nie, 1972: 13)
Thus resources were paramount in the original version of the model
and since these are not the product of specific choices, but often th;
product ofbirth and family upbringing, this makes the model a structural
th~or~ ~f citizens~ip. Psychological engagement is obviously more subject
to md1v1dual chmce, but in the model it is seen as being both derivative
and less important than resources.
Verba and his colleagues developed the first empirical typology of dif-
ferent modes of participation, and classified citizens into six different
groups on the basis of the types of activities they undertook (Verba and
Nie, 1972: 118-19). There are, firstly, the inactives, who as the name
suggests do little or nothing; secondly, the voting specialists, who vote
regularly, but do nothing else; thirdly, the parochial participants, who con-
tact officials in relation to specific problems, but are otherwise inactive;
fourthly, the communalists, who intermittently engage in political action
on broad social issues, but are not highly involved; fifthly, campaigners,
who are heavily involved in campaigns of various kinds; and finally, the
complete activists, who participate in ali kinds of activities.
. This
d theoretical model has been widely cited and replicated·, however,
1t oes face problems. The first problem relates to the use of socio-
economic status as a predictor of participation and civic values. It is
well established that participants are generally higher-status individuals
than non-participants; for example, Verba and his collaborators show that
high-status individuals are over-represented in the category ofvery active
participants and under-represemed in the category of inactives (Verba
and Nie, 1972: 131-3). What the model fails to explain, however, is why
large numbers of high-status individuals do not participate in politics.
In other words, while participation is associated with social status the
latter is nonetheless a relatively weak predictor of participation, be:ause
many high-status individuals do not get involved in politics. This problem
 Modelling Citizenship
146
for the model can be seen in Verba's recent work on participation in the
United States (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). In the theory, family
income is treated as a good proxy measure of socio-economic status in
the American context, but nonetheless it has a very weak influence on
participation. 4
This latter point explains a paradox which is apparent to students of
participation in advanced industrial societies. If so_ci?-e~onomic stan~s
is such an important determinant of political part1c1panon, then soc1-
eties which are gradually becoming more middle-class and better edu-
cated over time should experience increased rates of participation. The
increase in white-collar occupations at the expense ofblue-collar occupa-
tions, and the tremendous growth in higher education in many advanced
industrial countries is now well documented (see Dalton, Flanagan and
Beck, 1984; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995). However, there is no evi-
dence of increased' political participation in these countries, and in the
case ofthe United States boch voting turnout and participation in volun-
tary organisations have actually declined racher than increased (Brody,
1978; Miller and Shanks, 1996). 5
Ifwe apply che model to Britain there is clearly a problem in explaining
why participation in che 2001 British general election was significantly
lower than, for example, in the 1979 election, when a massive expansion
6
had occurred in higher education during the intervening years. Again, it
would have to explain che trends in party membership, which with the sole
exception of che Labour Party between 1994 and 1997 are downwards,
not upwards (Katz and Mair, 1992; Seyd and Whiteley, 2002a).
A second problem with the socio-economic model is identified by Verba
and his colleagues themselves. They write:
{T]he SES model is weak in its theoretical underpinnings. It faíls to p~o-
vide a coherent rationale for the connection between the explanatory soc10-
economic variables and participation. Numerous intervening factors are invoked-
resources norms stake in the outcome, psychological involvement in politics,
greater o;portunities, favorable legal status, and so forth. But there is no clearly
specified mechanism linking social statuses to activity. (Verba, Schlozman and
Brady, 1995: 281)
4 In their model of participation, the beta coefficienc ofthc famp~ in~ome pre~ictor variable
is only o.1 ¡, and is the weakest of seven predictors of part1c1pat1on uscd m chis model
(see Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995: 342).
5 Turnout in presidential elections has declined by more than a fifth between the 1950s
and 1980s. See Miller and Shanks, 1996: 39-69. . . .
6 Turnout in the 1979 election was 76 per cent (see figure 1.2). Part1c1pat1on m
higher education has more chan doubled from about 800,000 srudents in 1980/81 to
more than 1,600,000 in 1996/97 (see Times Higher Education Supp/ement, 1,299, 26
September 1997).
Alternative Theorics of Citizenship 147
They go on to suggest that a focus on broader resources, such as the
amount of spare time the individual has availablc in the average week and
his or her financia! resources, helps to deal with this problem. However, it
is difficult to see why this should be true, since if individuals are rich and
have plency of leisure time, there is still no reason why they should spend
thei~ money or free time on political activities, rather than on vacationing,
playmg sports or watching TV. 7
Toe key problem with the resources model is that it focuses exclusively
on the 'supply' side of che equation and neglects 'demand' side aspects.
Thus individuals supply more participation if they have the resources or
a psychological sense of efficacy. What is missing is any understanding of
why individuals have a demand for participation - what incentives they
have to get involved in politics. Many high-status individuals have no such
incentives, which explains why they do not participate. Just as the gen-
eral incentives theory neglected structural factors so the civic voluntar ism
theory neglects incentives. The theory may contribute to explaining citi-
zenship, but it is unlikely to provide the sole explanation of what makes
a good citizen.
The equity-fairness theory
~~e e~uicy-fairness model provides an alternative perspective on par-
t1c1pat10n but one which is still centred on the sociological tradition of
~nalysis. The starting point is that sociecy is divided into various compet-
mg groups which vie with each other for resources. Toe core idea of the
theo~y is that individuals compare themselves with various peer groups,
and tf these comparisons reflect unfavourably on themselves that can
produce frustration and/or aggression. This in turn can be manifested in
aggressive political participation (Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Muller,
1979; Dalton, 2002). The basic mechanism at work here is relative depri-
vation in which individuals compare and contrast their life situation with
their expectations of that situation. These expectations are commonly
defined by these comparisons with peer groups. If there is a significant
gap between expectations and reality then relative deprivation is likely to
result and this in turn wilt have political consequences. Clearly, this is
more likely to occur among groups who are objectively deprived in sorne
way, such as ethnic minorities or the low-paid. r
. ~e~erence groups or peer groups are very important to this theory, si~ce
. md1v1duals do not usually compare themselves with groups which are far
7
Putnam (1995) actually attributes che decline in civic volumarism in the Unite d States
to the spread of celevision.
148 Modelling Citizcnship
removed from their own situation. lf a well-known millionaire becomes
even richer, this is not likely to engender relative deprivation in the average
individual because they do not compare themselves with such a person.
But if a colleague at work gets a pay rise and they do not, this is likely to
create a sense of deprivation. The bigger the gap between expectations
and reality, the larger the sense of deprivation and potentially the bigger
the political consequences.
The model has been used to explain the incidence of 'unorthodox'
política! participation, involving such activities as attending protest rallies,
blocking traffic, supporting strike action and even participating in illegal
protest activities. (Gurr, 1970; Muller, 1979). It provides a theoretical
explanation of the well-known phenomenon of 'NIMBYism', or protest
against planning proposals and road schemes likely to adversely affect
the individual's property values. From this perspective, it is the relative
deprivation caused by such proposals which triggers the protest action.
There is good evidence to suggest that the equity-fairness model pro-
vides an explanation for certain types of political participation. But there
is a real question about its relevance for explaining participation more
generally, particularly orthodox types of participation such as voting in
elections and joining political parties. lt is theoretically possible that a
sense of deprivation will make people more likely to vote against a gov-
erning party, if they blame that party for their perceived deprivation.
However, there is also evidence to suggest that relative deprivation inhibits
orthodox forms ofparticipation such as voting, since deprived people can
become apathetic (Clarke et al., 2004). So relative deprivation can have
different effects in different contexts, making the theoretical predictions
from the theory unclear.
The relationship between perceptions of equity-fairness and attitudes
to rights and obligations has not been clarified either. One hypothesis
would be that a sense ofrelative deprivation makes individuals more likely
to demand rights and less likely to accept obligations, but it is equally
possible that it makes people apathetic and less willing to demand their
rights as well as to acknowledge their obligations. These possibilities will
be explored further in chapter 6.
Toe criticism of the civic voluntarism model, that it does not take into
account incentives, cannot be made about the equity-fairness theory.
Incentives are at the heart of the theory, since individuals are reacting to
a sense of disadvantage and are motivated to do something about it. On
the other hand, it has little to say about the precise cakulations of the
costs and benefits ofpolitical participation, other than the argument that
a greater sense of deprivation should engender greater participation in
certain contexts. Clearly, it is possible for an individual to feel a strong
Alternativc Theories of Citizenship 14 9
sense of deprivation, but at the same time to conclude that they can do lit-
tle about it to change their life, which explains why deprivation can cause
apathy. Thus although the theory is concerned with incentives, it does not
have a clear understanding of the nature and significance of these incen-
tives. Additional assumptions are needed about the individual's sense of
política! efficacy if deprivation is to be translated into political action.
Another problem from the perspective of the civic voluntarism model
is that in the equity-fairness model resources inhibit rather than promote
participation. In this theory it is the absence of resources relative to one's
peers which motivates participation. Since a well-resourced individual is
unlikely to feel a sense of deprivation, they are unlikely to participate as a
consequence. Obviously, this is precisely the opposite prediction to that
made by the civic voluntarism model. On the other hand, this difference
in the predictions from the theories is an advantage since it provides a
clear empirical test of these rival models.
The social capital model
The social capital model is also a structural model ofparticipation. There
i~ sorne debate about the definition and meaning of social capital in the
hterature, but Putnam defines it as 'features of social organization, such
as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society
by facilitating co-ordinated actions' (1993: 167). Coleman, however, sees
social capital as a set of obligations and expectations on the one hand,
and a set of information channels linking citizens with each other on the
other hand (1988). For him social interaction generates 'credit slips' of
obligations and norms of reciprocation, and in an environment in which
individuals can trust others, these credit slips can be urilised by third
parties to salve collective action problems.
The core idea of social capital theory is that if individuals can be per-
suaded to trust each other and to work together to salve common prob-
lems then society will be much better off as a consequence. In this sense
social capital is Iike other types of capital and can be used to make society
more productive and the economy more efficient. Just as financial capital
can be invested in arder to promote economic growth, and human capital
or education can be used to promote productivity, th~n social capital can
be used to achieve similar objectives.
For most writers trust is the key indicator of sociaÍ capital (Fukuyama,
1995; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Brehm and Rahn, ,1997; Van Deth et al.,
1999). Trust is important because it allows individuals to move beyond
their own immediate family or communities and engage in cooperative
activities with others whom they do not know. There is a debate about
150 Modelling Citizenship Alrernative Thcories of Citizenship 151
the origins of social capital (Whiteley, 1999) but the dominant model explaining why sorne people should cooperate when others do not. F rom
which explains this is the de Tocqueville model, named after the French a rational choice perspective there are even stronger incentives to free-
philosopher who studied American society in the early nineteenth cen- ride on the efforts of others is such societies. This is because when social
tury. Writing in 1832 de Tocqueville noted that: capital is abundant, big gains can be made by individuals who cheat their
fellow citizens. More generally, while it is true that choice theories should
In no country in the world has che principie of association been more successfully
used or applied tO a greater multitude of objects than in America. Besides the not neglect structural explanations, it is also true that structural models
permanent associations which are established by law under che names of town- should not neglect choice explanations.
ships, cities and counties, a vast number of others are formed and maintained by
the agency of private individuals. ( 19 90: 191)
Conclusions
In de Tocqueville's theory interactions between individuals in volun- We have reviewed both choice theories and structural theories which
tary associations generate interpersonal trust or social capital. Commu- might be used to explain variations in both participation and in civic
nities characterised by high levels of social capital have dense networks attitudes in Britain. The srarting point of the analysis was to define what
of civic engagement and appear to have better health and education, less is meant by citizenship and then subsequently to examine how ir can
crime and higher rates of political participation (Putnam, 1993, 2000). be measured in terms of attitudes and behaviour. It is clear from an
Trust in this model refers to generalised reciprocity or the willingness initial look at the data in the tables that there are significant variations
of individuals to trust strangers. This is important since it represents in both civic values and attitudes and participation among citizens in
'bridging' social capital rather than 'bonding' social capital, terms orig- Britain. It is evident that rhere are 'good' citizens who participate and
inally introduced by Putnam. Bridging social capital, or the willingness have attitudes which support civic society and enhance governance. Ar the
to trust strangers, creates benign effects, whereas bonding social capital, same time there are also 'bad' citizens, or people who do not participate
a willingness to trust only members of one's immediate group, can bring and who have attitudes which undermine civic society and inhibit good
malign effects because it fragments society. governance. The explanation for these variations should lie in one or
There has been an interesting debate about the causes of a decline in more of the theoretical models examined in this chapter. Toe task of the
social capital in the United States. Putnam has claimed that television next chapter is to test these rival accounts in order to discover which one
viewing may account for this apparent decline (2000), although this has provides the most plausible account of citizenship in modern Britain.
been challenged (Norris, 1996). The evidence on trends in social capital
in Britain is notas extensive as in the United States, but it suggests that
social capital may not have declined in Britain in the same way (Hall,
1999).
Toe social capital model has received a lot of attention, but like the
other theories we have considered it does face sorne problems. One such
problem is the danger of circularity when it is applied to the task of
explaining wide forms of political participation; it comes clase to saying
that participation in voluntary activity creates further participation and
so on. This is not such a problem when one is trying to explain specialist
types of participation such as voting, but it is a potencial problem when
broad measures of participation in effect become both independent and
dependent variables in explanatory models.
A second point about the social capital model reiterates the point made
earlier about the civic voluntarism model, in that it neglects incentives
for participation. If society is characterised by high levels of social capi-
tal, which make cooperative behaviour easy, there is still the problem of