Religion and Economic Growth Across Countries

Religion and Economic Growth across Countries
Author(s): Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, No. 5 (Oct., 2003), pp. 760-781
Published by: American Sociological Association
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RELIGION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
ACROSS COUNTRIES
ROBERT J. BARRO RACHEL M. MCCLEARY

Harvard University Harvard University
Empirical research on the determinants of economic growth typically neglect

influence of religion. To fill this gap, this study uses international survey dat
religiosity for a broad panel of countries to investigate the effects of church at
dance and religious beliefs on economic growth. To isolate the direction of c
tion from religiosity to economic performance, the estimation relies on instr
variables suggested by an analysis in which church attendance and religious
are the dependent variables. The instruments are variables for the presence o
religion and for regulation of the religion market, the composition of religio
herence, and an indicator of religious pluralism. Results show that economic
responds positively to religious beliefs, notably beliefs in hell and heaven, bu
tively to church attendance. That is, growth depends on the extent of believin
tive to belonging. These results accord with a model in which religious belief
ence individual traits that enhance economic performance. The beliefs are an
of the religion sector, and church attendance is an input to this sector Hence
given beliefs, higher church attendance signifies more resources used up by t
religion sector
Some researchers, such as Huntington

PREVIOUS RESEARCH
mists has used the experience of aby econo- (1996), Landes (1999), and Inglehart and
broad panel of countries to assess the deter- Baker (2000), argue that explanations for
minants of economic growth (e.g., see Barro economic growth should include a nation's
1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, chap. culture. Culture is usually thought to influ-
12). This literature isolates a number of vari- ence economic outcomes by affecting per-
ables that predict subsequent rates of eco- sonal traits such as honesty and work ethic.
nomic growth. One general conclusion is Religion is one important dimension of cul-
that successful explanations of economic ture. Thus, Weber (1930) argues that reli-
performance must go beyond narrow mea- gious practices and beliefs have important
sures of economic variables to encompass consequences for economic development.
political and social forces. In particular, the Nevertheless, economists have rarely in-
empirical results reveal important influences cluded religion or other measures of culture
on growth from government policies and as determinants of economic growth. Our
public institutions. aim is to fill this gap by analyzing the influ-
ences of religious participation and beliefs
on a country's rate of economic progress.
Direct correspondence to Robert J. Barro, Eco-
nomics Department, Harvard University, Cam- To isolate the effects of religiosity on eco-
bridge MA 02138 (rbarro@harvard.edu). This re-nomic growth, we have to deal with the pos-
search was supported by grants from the National
sibility of reverse effects from economic de-
Science Foundation and the John Templeton
Foundation. We have benefited from comments
velopment to religion. This reverse channel
has been the focus of a substantial literature
by Gary Becker, Francesco Caselli, Mark Chaves,
Ed Glaeser, Charles Harper, Jason Hwang, in the sociology of religion. One prominent
Laurence Iannaccone, Greg Mankiw, James theory is the secularization hypothesis,
Montgomery, Thomas Osang, Robert Woodberry, whereby economic development causes in-
and participants in several seminars and classes. dividuals to become less religious, as mea-
760 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2003, VOL. 68 (OCTOBER:760-78 1)
RELIGION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 761
sured by church attendance and However, state religion

religious be- also typically in-
liefs. The beliefs may refer to
volves
heaven,
subsidies,
hell,
such as payments to church
an afterlife, God, and so on, or
employees
may and justcollections
re- of taxes dedicated
fer to tendencies of people to tochurch
characterize
uses. Economic reasoning suggests
themselves as religious. Thethatsecularization
these subsidies would encourage formal
hypothesis also encompasses the idea
religious that
activity. For example, if the gov-
economic development causes ernment
organizedpays forre-
church employees and
ligion to play a lesser role in political
buildings, deci-
we would expect to see more such
sion-making and in social and legal
employees andpro-
buildings.3 More personnel
cesses more generally.1 and improved facilities may, in turn, attract
The secularization hypothesis remainsThe point is that, through
more churchgoers.
controversial, and an important competing
subsidies, a state religion might have a posi-
theory focuses on "market" or "supply-side"
tive effect on religious participation.
The opposite of
forces.2 This second approach downplays thesubsidy is suppression,
role of economic development and
and some other have sought to sup-
governments
"demand factors" for religion
pressand focuses
religion, either specific ones or in gen-
instead on competition amongeral. For example,
religion pro-Communist countries,
viders. A greater diversity ofsuch as the Soviet
religions Union and China, tried
avail-
hard to eradicate
able in a country or region is thought to pro-organized religion. More
mote greater competition, hence, a higher
recently, former Soviet republics in central
Asia have
quality religion product and one that sought
is tai-to curtail Protestant and
other "newcomer"
lored better to individual preferences. Thus, religions (see Anderson
more religious diversity stimulates
2002). These greater
forms of oppression would be
religious participation and beliefs.
predicted to decrease church attendance.
More fundamentally, the extent of reli-
Our approach to the determinants of reli-
gious diversity and competitiongiosity
areassumes
thought that demand and supply
to depend on how the governmentforces combine to influence levels of reli-
regulates
gious participation
the market for religion. For example, the ex-and beliefs. However,
istence of an established state church-as in our interest here is not to assess the secular-
Scandinavia-is viewed as one source of a ization hypothesis or the market model of
low degree of religious pluralism and, there- religious participation. Rather, we study the
fore, of low participation in organized determinants-or,
reli- at least, the correlates-of
gion. Chaves and Cann (1992) extendreligiosity this to facilitate the analysis of the ef-
argument by using empirical measures of fects
theof religion on economic growth. Spe-
extent of state involvement and interference cifically, our study of religiosity suggests in-
with church activities. Greater state regula- strumental variables that can be used to pin
tion of religion-measured by, among otherdown the direction of causation from reli-
things, whether the government appoints orgion to economic performance, rather than
approves church leaders-is argued to de- the reverse. These instruments have impor-
crease the efficiency of religion providerstant influences on religiosity without (argu-
and, therefore, to generate lower rates ofably) being heavily influenced by economic
church attendance. growth. The estimation procedure then re-
veals how differences in religiosity-driven
1 The secularization hypothesis appears in We- by the variations in the instrumental vari-
ber (1930), but he credits the idea to John ables-influence economic growth.4
Wesley's writings in the late 1700s. For more re- Two instrumental variables that we use in
cent discussions, see Wilson (1966), Berger our study of economic growth are dummy
(1967), Martin (1978), and Chaves (1994).
variables for the existence of a state religion
2 This literature gets some of its inspiration
from Adam Smith's (1791, Book V, Article III)
views on the favorable role of competition in the 3 Other forms of subsidies, such as the favor-
religion market. Important contributions include able tax treatment of the religion sector in the
Stark and Bainbridge (1987), Finke and Stark United States, would have a similar effect.
(1992), Iannaccone (1991), and Finke and 4 For a discussion of instrumental variables,
lannaccone (1993). see Wooldridge (2003, chap. 15).
762 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
and the existence of a regulated market

size depends on the measure of religiosity.
The 2001 wave
structure in which the government of the WVS provides reli-
approves
or appoints church leaders. gion
Wedata
also
for use
aroundas70 countries for which
instruments the composition data
of on other variables are also available.
a country's
Hence, theof
religious adherence and a measure release
reli-of this new wave will al-
low a the
gious diversity constructed from substantial
data increase
on in the sample size.
religious adherence. Table 1 shows the 59 countries in the
sample. The countries covered tend to be
DATA ON RELIGIOSITY richer and more Christian than average.6 The
predominantly Muslim countries are
Our empirical research began with Bangladesh,
a previ- Malaysia, Pakistan, and Tur-
ously constructed broad cross-country key.7data
Countries that have predominantly
set. The data include national-accounts vari- Eastern religions, including Buddhism,
ables and an array of other economic, politi- among persons expressing some religious
cal, and social indicators for more than 100adherence, are China, Hong Kong, Japan,
countries observed since 1960. Our main South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thai-
data sources are the Penn World Tables of land.8 Malaysia also has substantial repre-
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002), the sentation in these religions.
World Development Indicators of the World
Bank (2002), and international data on edu-
is combined with Gallup data on weekly church
cation from Barro and Lee (2001).
attendance and belief in God for Bulgaria, Po-
We recently expanded this data set to in-land, and Romania and with Gallup data on be-
clude measures of religiosity. The most use-
lief in life-after-death for Brazil, India, Philip-
ful sources of international data on church
pines, Singapore, and Thailand. For the 1990
attendance and religious beliefs are the sur- data, the information from WVS is combined
veys reported in the three waves of thewith data from Eurodim for Greece in 1987 on
World Values Survey, or WVS (1981-1984,church attendance and belief in God. For the
mostly 1981; 1990-1993, mostly 1990; and1991 data, for some countries for which church
attendance data were unavailable from the 1991
1995-1997, mostly 1995 and 1996), the two
ISSP, we used information from the 1993 or 1994
reports on religion by the International So-
ISSP (which has information on church atten-
cial Survey Programme, or ISSP (1990-dance but not on religious beliefs). These coun-
1993, mostly 1991; and 1998-2000, mostlytries are Canada, Israel, Japan, Spain, Sweden,
1998), and the Gallup Millennium SurveyBulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovenia. The
(1999). Another wave of the WVS applies to data for Israel from the 1991 and 1993 ISSP re-
2000-2001 and will soon be available. fer to the Jewish population only, whereas the
At present, we use the survey data to cal- 1998 data refer to the overall Israeli population.
culate countrywide averages. This perspec- Our analysis takes account of these differences
tive accords with our emphasis here on coun- in religious composition. The data from WVS
and ISSP give separate information for Great
trywide policies related to religion, includ-
Britain and Northern Ireland. In the present
ing the presence of official state churches and
analysis, we combined these data into single ob-
state regulation of the religion market. servations
In for the United Kingdom, based on the
subsequent analyses, we plan to use the indi-
relative populations of Great Britain and North-
vidual data, which typically apply to 1,000
ern Ireland.
to 2,000 respondents in each survey. 6 Included here are several countries that are
Putting the various sources of religion datapredominantly Orthodox-Cyprus, Greece, Bul-
together, and considering the availability of garia, Romania, and Russia. Estonia and Latvia
data on other variables, we are able to carry also have high Orthodox representations.
out statistical analysis for up to 59 countries. 7 Azerbaijan and Nigeria have religion data
and are primarily Muslim. However, missing data
These data include up to 23 countries ob-
on other variables prevented the inclusion of
served around 1981, 37 around 1990, 22
these countries in our sample. The 2001 wave of
around 1991, 32 around 1995, 28 around the WVS will allow a substantial increase in ob-
1998, and 41 around 1999.5 The exact sampleservations on Muslim countries.
8 Some of these countries, notably South Ko-
5 For the 1981 data, the information from WVS rea, experienced large increases in Christian
Table 1. Values for State Religion, State Regulation of Religion, and

Countries in the Sample
State State Pluralism State State Pluralism

Country Religion Regulation Index I C
Cameroon 0 0 .73 Cyprus 0 0 .36
Ghana 0 0 .72 Denmark 1 0 .02
South Africa 0 0 .63 Finland 1 1 .03
Canada 0 0 .56 France 0 1 .17
Dominican Rep. 1 0 .05 West Germany 0 0 .54

Mexico 0 0 .05 Greece 1 1 .04
United States 0 0 .64 Hungary 0 1 .47

Argentina 1 1 .13 Iceland 1 0 .03
Brazil 0 0 .20 Ireland 1 0 .08
Chile 0 0 .22 Italy 1 1 .01

Colombia 1 0 .05 Netherlands 0 0 .53
Peru 1 1 .09 Norway 1 1 .01

Uruguay 0 0 .14 Poland 0 0 .19
Venezuela 1 1 .08 Portugal 1 0 .02

Bangladesh 1 1 .24 Spain 1 0 .00
China 0 1 .46 Sweden 1 1 .08
Hong Kong 0 0 .60 Switzerland 0 0 .51
India 0 0 .31 Turkey 0 1 .01

Israel 1 0 .19 United Kingdom 1 1 .33
Japan 0 0 .46 Australia 0 0 .51
South Korea 0 0 .33 New Zealand 0 0 .37
Malaysia 1 0 .68 Bulgaria 0 0 .28

Pakistan 1 0 .06 Czech Rep. 0 1 .43
Philippines 0 0 .28 Estonia 0 1 .48
Singapore 0 0 .63 Latvia 0 1 .68
Taiwan 0 0 .58 Lithuania 0 1 .13
Thailand 1 1 .14 Romania 0 0 .40
Austria 0 0 .15 Russia 0 1 .51
Belgium 0 0 .05 Slovak Rep. 0 1 .34

Slovenia 0 0 .12
Note: Countries are listed alphab

religion (= 1) refers to the situatio
35). We assigned the value 1 only if
state as favoring religion in genera
approves church leaders. This desig
and elsewhere and typically app
Herfindahl index based on the frac
ing adherence to some religion. Th
other Eastern religions, Jewish, O
European countries shown at the e
The countries shown are the ones
ability).
indexes
Some of the survey questions in 1980to
relate for at-
the countries used in the
tendance at religious services. We use
statistical these
analysis (as dictated by data avail-
responses to generate the fractions of with
ability). Countries thelow levels of plural-
ism (values
population that attended church of the index close to zero) in-
or analogous
houses of worship at least weekly
clude some thatand at
are predominantly Catholic
least monthly. Subsequently, we
(Spain, call
Italy, thisBelgium, Ireland, and
Portugal,
variable church attendance. Some of the sur- much of Latin America), Protestant Scan-
veys (the two ISSP waves) include questions dinavia, Orthodox Greece, and Muslim Pa-
about time spent at prayer. Other queries kistan and Turkey. Places that exhibit high
concern religious beliefs and attitudes; for levels of pluralism (values of the index of .5
example, do you believe in heaven, hell, life or higher) include the United States, Ger-
after death, and God (in various senses)?9 many, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austra-
Other questions, which might be more ro- lia, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa.
bust across religions, are whether the re- We used tabulations by Barrett et al.
spondent considers himself or herself to be a (2001:834-35) to measure the presence or
religious person and whether religion plays absence of a state religion. These classifica-
an important role in one's life. tions are clearer for some countries than oth-
We used tables from the first edition of the
ers. In some of the straightforward situa-
World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett tions, the constitution designates an official
1982) to assemble information on religious state church and restricts or prohibits other
adherence, as professed in surveys or cen- forms of religion. However, even without
suses in which people are asked to state the these designations or prohibitions, the gov-
religion, if any, to which they adhere. These ernment may systematically favor a selected
data, which apply to 1970 and 1980,10 allow religion through subsidies and tax collec-
us to construct measures of religious plural- tions or through the teaching of religion in
ism, based on Herfindahl indexes for the re-public schools. These considerations cause
ligion shares." Table 1 shows the pluralism Barrett et al. to classify some countries as
having a "state religion," despite the absence
of an official state church in the constitution.
adherence over the last 30 years. The 2001 wave
Controversial cases in this category include
of the WVS will provide more observations on
East Asian countries. Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which are consid-
9 The meaning of some of these questions isered by Barrett et al. to have a Catholic state
unclear for some religions. For example, Hindu-
ism and Buddhism view heaven and hell as inter- a country (among those adhering to some reli-
mediate stages between reincarnations, whereas gion) belong to the same religion. Hence, our
Christianity regards heaven and hell as ends, not pluralism index-defined to equal one minus the
means, to salvation (McCleary 2003). Herfindahl index-is the probability that they
10 For some of the eastern European countries, belong to different religions. This index can,
which did not exist or were not covered in therefore, be viewed as an indicator of religious
Barrett's (1982) first edition, the data come pluralism
from or diversity. (Implicitly, the differences
Barrett et al. (2001) and refer to 1970 and between
1990. the religious groupings are assumed to
An alternative procedure would be to use bethe
the same for all pairs. Otherwise, one could
countrywide averages of religion data in the vari-weight religions in accordance with the extent of
ous international surveys. We did not proceed differences between them.) If everyone belongs
this way because the categories of religion differto the same religion, the Herfindahl index equals
across the surveys and because of some coding
one, and hence, the pluralism indicator equals
problems for religions in the World Values zero.
Sur- If there are two religions of equal size, the
vey. Herfindahl and pluralism variables each equal
11 We grouped data on religious adherence
one-half. If there are a large number of religions,
from Barrett (1982) into nine major categories:
each of which covers a negligible fraction of the
Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhist,
population, the Herfindahl index equals (almost)
other Eastern religions, Jewish, Orthodox, and and hence, the pluralism indicator equals
zero,
other religions. The Herfindahl index-the(almost)
sum one. With nine groupings, the lowest
possible value of the Herfindahl index is .11, so
of the squares of the population fractions belong-
ing to each religion-can be interpreted as thethe highest possible value of the pluralism
that
measure
probability that two randomly selected persons in is .89.
religion, even in 2000. Table church

1 shows the
attendance and beliefs co-vary wit
classifications in 1970 for the countries used per capita GDP, education, and urbanizatio
in the analysis. while holding fixed other measures of
nomic development and the other indep
We use Barrett's (1982) and Barrett et al.'s
(2001) discussion of each country (supple- dent variables. These partial correlatio
mented in some cases by individual country provide useful information but may not h
reports) to obtain a proxy for state regula- simple causal interpretations. However
tion of religion. We used the concept sug- these concerns do not prevent our using t
gested by Chaves and Cann (1992)- analysis of religiosity for our primary pu
whether the government appoints or ap-pose, which is to isolate instrumental v
proves church leaders. The Barrett et al. dis-ables for the study of economic growth.
cussions of this concept typically refer to the
late 1970s. However, the information is of-
SETUP OF THE PANEL ESTIMATION
ten incomplete and is not fully consistent
Table 2 shows the means and standard de-
across countries. Table 1 presents the data
used in the present analysis. viations of the variables used in the analy-
Future research will be able to exploit the sis. Table 3 contains panel estimates for sys-
Religion and State data set, described in Fox tems in which the dependent variables are
and Sandler (2003), to construct improvedmeasures of religiosity. In column 1 of Table
measures of state religion and state regula- 3, the dependent variable is the fraction of
tion of religion. Measures of state subsidy the population who attend religious services
and suppression of religion will also be(at churches or analogous houses of wor-
available. The Religion and State tabulationship) at least monthly.12 In column 2, the de-
describes the relation between religion and pendent variable is the fraction who believe
the state in four categories: separation of re-in heaven, and in column 3 it is the fraction
ligion and state, discrimination against mi- who believe in hell.13 Results for the frac-
tion of persons who believe in an afterlife
nority religions, restrictions on majority re-
are similar. We also considered the fraction
ligions, and religious legislation. These data
will eventually be available for most coun- of the population who believe in God, as
tries as far back as 1960. However, at well as the fraction who consider themselves
present, the tabulation is complete for only areligious or for whom religion plays an im-
subset of countries and only starting in 1990.portant role. However, these other measures
turned out to be less useful in our subsequent
CROSS-COUNTRY FINDINGS analysis of economic growth. The form of
ON RELIGIOSITY each dependent variable in Table 3 is the
transformation log[x/(1-x)] of the original
As a prelude to our analysis of theseries x. This of
effects form confines the fitted value
religion on economic growth, weofestimated
x to the interval (0,1).14
panel systems in which the dependent vari-
ables are country averages of answers to sur-
12 We get similar results for the fraction of the
vey questions about attendance at religious
population who attend church at least weekly.
services and about religious beliefs.
ForThe ex- and Gallup Millennium Survey, the
the WVS
planatory variables include a set of country-
attendance variables come from answers to the
wide factors: economic and demographic
question "Apart from weddings, funerals and
variables, government policies and institu-about how often do you attend reli-
christenings,
gious services
tions related to religion, the country's com- these days?" For the ISSP data, the
position of adherence to the majorquestion is "How often do you attend religious
religions,
services?"
and the measure of religious pluralism,
13 For WVS and ISSP, the questions are "Do
which is constructed from the data on adher-
ence.
you believe in Heaven?" and "Do you believe in
Hell?" These questions are not in the Gallup Mil-
This exercise yields a set of partial corre-
lennium Survey.
lations at the countrywide level between theform, the marginal effect of an inde-
14 In this
measures of religiosity and the explanatory
pendent variable on x equals the coefficient of
variables. For example, we determine howmultiplied by the quantity x. (1-x).
the variable
Table 2. Meansfive
Each system in Table 3 comprises and Standard
or Deviations for
six equations corresponding to the Variables

religios-in the Analysis
ity survey data. The first equation is for data Standard
around 1981 from the World Variable
Values Survey,
Mean Deviation
the second is for data around 1990 from
Weekly church attendance .24 .21
WVS, the third is for data around 1991 from
Monthly church attendance .36 .23
the International Social Survey Programme,
the fourth is for data around 1995 from Belief in heaven .55 .22
WVS, the fifth is for data around 1998 from
Belief in hell .38 .21
ISSP, and the last is for 1999 data from
Belief in after-life .58 .17
Gallup (which lacks data for belief in heaven
Belief in God in some form .80 .14
and hell).
Our panel estimation technique allows usReligious person .61 .20
to combine countries that are represented in
log[x/(1- x)] for:
different surveys, as well as to include mul-
Monthly attendance -.74 1.20
tiple observations for a single country. We
Belief in heaven .33 1.15
recognize, however, that observations at dif-
Belief in hell -.55 1.06
ferent points in time or from different sur-
vey sources for a single country are not in-
Per capita GDP (logged) 9.37 .69
dependent. Therefore, we use the method of
Years of education 8.29 2.11
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR),
Urbanization rate .70 .15
which estimates (along with the coefficients)
the correlations of the error terms in the Life expectancy at age 1 74.1 4.1
equations for the different surveys for a (in years)
given country.15 We also allow for differ-
1/(life expectancy at age 1) 1.35 .084
ences in average survey results across the (x 100)
sources by including a different intercept
Population share over age 65 .112 .041
term for each source-WVS, ISSP, and Population share under age 15 .238 .073
Gallup.16
Religious pluralism .29 .23
The explanatory variables include four
State religion .33 .47
measures of economic development: real per
capita gross domestic product (GDP), aver-
Regulation of religion .37 .48
age years of school attainment of the adult
Communist regime .23 .42
population aged 25 and over, the urbaniza-
Catholic
tion rate (typically the fraction of the popu- fraction .46 .40
lation living in places with at least 2,500

Eastern religion fraction .073 .240
people), and life expectancy. Life expect-
Hindu fraction .012 .086
ancy appears as a reciprocal as of age one
Jewish fraction .015 .099
and, hence, corresponds roughly to the mor-
Muslim fraction .043 .147
tality rate per year. The systems also include
Orthodox fraction .077 .211
two measures of age structure: the fractions
Protestant fraction .29 .34
Hence, the marginal effect of an explanatory

Other religion fraction .022 .067
variable on x diminishes in magnitudeNonreligious
as x ap- fraction .107 .123
proaches 0 or 1. For a broad range of x-say be-
tween .2 and .8-the functional form is roughly
Note: This table shows the (unweighted) means
linear. and standard deviations for the variables used in
15 For a discussion of the SUR technique, Table 3,see
plus some additional variables. The sample
Wooldridge (2002, chap. 7). for most variables is the set of observations for
16 Formally, we included a constant term which data
andare available for church attendance or
two dummy variables, one for the ISSP source
belief in heaven and for the explanatory variables
and one for the Gallup source. The Gallup used in Table 3. For the religious belief variables,
dummy variable was excluded in the systems for the set of observations is smaller. The religion frac-
belief in heaven or hell, for which Gallup data tions, aside from "nonreligious," are relative to the
were unavailable. population of adherents to some religion.
Table 3. Regressions for Church Attendance and Religious Beliefs for C
(1) (2) (3)

Monthly Belief in Belief in
Church Attendance Heaven Hell
Explanatory Variable Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Per capita GDP (logged) .04 (.16) -.28 (.21) -.28 (.18)
Years of education .192*** (.036) .253*** (.040) .234*** (.038)
Urbanization rate -1.49*** (.34) -1.65*** (.43) -2.11*** (.41)
1/(life expectancy at age 1) 2.21 (1.20) -3.52 (2.00) -2.49 (1.72)
Population share over age 65 .32 (3.19) -9.84* (4.74) -12.51** (4.18)
Population share under age 15 5.51** (2.03) 4.88 (2.92) 1.49 (2.59)
Religious pluralism 1.35*** (.32) 1.24** (.38) 1.13** (.37)
State religion .87*** (.14) 1.07*** (.18) .79*** (.17)

State regulation of religion -.64*** (.11) -.36** (.13) -.12 (.13)
Communist regime -.69** (.21) -.77** (.24) -.88*** (.23)
Ex-Communist, 1995 .20 (.19) .43 (.23) .79*** (.21)
Ex-Communist, 1998 .33* (.16) .20 (.16) .47** (.17)
Ex-Communist, 1999 .59* (.23)
ISSP data -.17* (.08) .10 (.08) .35*** (.08)

Gallup data -.01 (.11)
Eastern religion fraction -2.53*** (.24) -1.56*** (.30) -.85** (.28)

Hindu fraction -.80 (.48) -2.05*** (.56) -1.28* (.50)
Jewish fraction -2.75*** (.43) -2.51*** (.38) -1.20** (.41)
Muslim fraction .26 (.30) 1.94*** (.41) 2.55*** (.37)
Orthodox fraction -1.83*** (.24) -1.54*** (.29) -.95** (.30)
Protestant fraction -2.30*** (.19) -1.32*** (.24) -1.46*** (.22)
Other religion fraction -.61 (.89) 3.00** (1.10) 1.43 (.99)
Number of countries and 59, 181 50, 130 50, 130

total observations
Number of observations 22, 36, 22, 21, 33, 16, 21, 33, 16,
for each equation 32, 28, 41 30, 30 30, 30
R-squared for each equation .87, .77, .80, .69, .79, .90, .77, .75, .71,
.89, .84, .74 .85, .84 86, .71
Note: Each system consists of five or six equations, co

dependent variables at five or six points in time: 1981-
information from Gallup surveys for a few countries)
tions on some variables for Greece in 1987 from Eur
1997 (WVS data mostly for 1995 or 1996); 1998-2000
lennium Survey). The last source has data only for mo
population averages of monthly church attendance in c
hell in column 3. The measured value is either the fract
belief. For example, in column 1, monthly church atten
countries with 1990 data, 22 countries with 1991 data,
data, and 41 countries with 1999 data. Each dependent
system is estimated by the seemingly unrelated (SUR) m
over the time periods for each country. This procedur
other characteristics. Constant terms, not shown, are in
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
of the population over age 65dhist),

andHindu,
under Jewish,
ageMuslim, Orthodox,
Protestant,
15.17 These demographic variables and other
relate toreligions.19 In each
economic development because case, the variablecoun-
richer refers to the fraction ad-
tries tend to have relatively large
hering elderly
to the specified religion among per-
sons who
populations and relatively small childexpressed adherence to some reli-
popu-
lations. gion.20 The specification treats the Catholic
Previous analyses of the determinants of fraction as the excluded category. Hence,
religiosity have viewed economic develop- each coefficient should be interpreted as the
ment as a single dimension. However, the relationship with the indicated religion
present cross-country panel includes share, measured relative to the Catholic
enough observations to distinguish relation- share.
ships with the individual dimensions of de- The regression systems also include the
velopment. The breadth of the data is cru-previously mentioned pluralism measure
cial when trying to disentangle, for ex- computed from the Herfindahl index for the
ample, the partial associations of religiosity religious adherence shares in 1980 (1990 for
with education, urbanization, per capita some Eastern European countries). This in-
GDP, and life expectancy, all of which typi- dex was calculated from a nine-way break-
cally rise along with economic develop- down of religions that distinguishes Bud-
ment.18 dhism from other Eastern religions.
Another set of explanatory variables in- Finally, the systems include variables re-
cluded in Table 3 measures the composition lated to government influences on the reli-
of the population by major religion in 1980. gion market. These variables are the
The analysis uses an eight-way breakdown: dummy variable for the presence of an offi-
Catholic, Eastern religions (including Bud- cial state religion, the dummy variable for
whether the government regulates the reli-
17 The GDP data are from version 6.1 of thegion market (by appointing or approving
Penn World Tables, described in Summers and church leaders), and dummy variables for
Heston (1991) and Heston et al. (2002). These the presence and subsequent removal of
values, available on the Internet, adjust for pur- Communist regimes.
chasing power differences across countries. The
schooling data are described in Barro and Lee
(2001). Most of the other data are from World 19 Buddhist and other Eastern religions were
Bank (2002). The log of real per capita GDP, av- combined because of a lack of sufficient data
erage years of schooling of adults aged 25 and from Asian countries to distinguish these two cat-
older, the urbanization rate, the reciprocal of life egories. Our present data do not allow us to dif-
expectancy at age 1, and the shares of the popu- ferentiate among theological subgroups, for ex-
lation over age 65 and under age 15 are observed ample, types of Muslims and Protestants.
just prior to the dependent variable. For example, 20 The composition of religious adherence
1980 per capita GDP is matched with the depen- across persons who exhibit some adherence may
dent variables for 1981, 1990 per capita GDP conceivably be exogenous with respect to church
with the dependent variables for 1990 and 1991, attendance and religious beliefs. However, it is
and 1995 per capita GDP with the dependent unreasonable to regard the breakdown between
variables for 1995, 1998, and 1999. Because of some and no adherence (appearing in the data as
missing data for 1990, GDP data for 1995 are nonreligious or atheist) as exogenous with re-
used for Bulgaria and Russia in the systems for spect to attending church or holding religious be-
WVS90 and ISSP9 1. Because of missing data for liefs. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to in-
1995, GDP data for 1990 are used for West Ger- clude among the explanatory variables a measure
many in the systems for WVS95 and ISSP98. of the fraction of the population that expressed
The dummy variable for ISSP data applies to the no religious adherence. In practice, the fractions
1991 and 1998 equations and that for Gallup ap- of persons characterizing themselves as atheist
plies to the 1999 equation. or having no religion is small-on average, 11
18 Inglehart and Baker (2000) use a single percent in our sample for 1980 (see Table 2).
cross-section from the World Values Survey to Countries with high nonreligious fractions in
assess the relation of religious and other values 1980 include China at .71, Russia at .43, Uru-
to per capita GDP and industrial structure. They guay at .35, Sweden at .29, Czechoslovakia at
also look at effects from different religions and .29, Bulgaria at .17, Italy at .16, France at .16,
from a history of Communist government. and Hungary at .16.
INFLUENCES ON RELIGIOSITY 36 percent).22 This pattern conflicts with

the one predicted in the religion-market
model described before. In that model, state
Table 3 reveals interesting partial relation-
ships between religiosity and indicators
religion of
promotes monopoly and, therefore,
economic development. For present poorpur-
service and low rates of church atten-
dance.
poses, the important observation is that However, because state religion
reli-
giosity responds to economic forces. typically
There- goes along with state subsidy, it is
fore, to isolate the effect of religiosity on
not surprising that the overall relation be-
economic growth, we must addresstween reverse
state religion and church attendance
causation from economic outcomes to reli- would be positive.
giosity. That is, we must allow for the endo- The results for state religion in Table 3 ap-
geneity of the religiosity variables. ply when we hold constant a measure of re-
We handle this problem by using instru- ligious pluralism. One part of the argument
mental variables suggested by the results in in the religion-market model is that an es-
Table 3. Our instruments are variables that tablished state religion will sustain a low di-
have important influences on religiosity but versity of religion. Hence, the pluralism
are arguably exogenous with respect to eco-variable could be getting credit for some of
nomic growth. Specifically, we use the dum- the influence on church attendance that
my variables for the presence of a state reli-
stems ultimately from the presence of a state
religion. If we delete the pluralism index
gion and for state regulation of religion, the
adherence shares for the major religions, and
the pluralism index, which is constructed
22 These results apply when we use the status
from the religion shares. We discuss the re-
of state religion as of 1970. Our sample does not
sults from Table 3 for these variables, but
contain enough instances of change after 1970 to
will leave the other findings in the table toassess the dynamic responses of church atten-
another paper (see Barro and McCleary
dance and religious beliefs. The main example of
a shift since 1970 is Ireland's abandoning Ca-
2002). These other findings relate to the eco-
nomic and demographic variables and to thetholicism as its state religion in 1972, although
presence and removal of Communist re-Barrett et al. (2001) continue to classify Ireland
gimes. as officially religious but not officially Catholic.
Table 3 shows that the estimated coeffi- Legislative changes also occurred after 1970 in
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, but Barrett et al. con-
cients on the state-religion dummy variable
tinue to label these countries as maintaining
are significantly positive for monthlyCatholic state religions even in 2000. In 1991,
church attendance. The estimated coeffi-
the Bulgarian constitution recognized the Eastern
cient of .87 (S.E. = .14) in column 1 im- Orthodox Church as the country's traditional re-
plies, if viewed causally,21 that the imposi- ligion. In 2000, Sweden dropped the Lutheran
tion of a state religion would raise the Church as its state religion. If we compare 1970
monthly church attendance rate by 21 per- with 1900, we find many examples of countries
centage points (starting from the mean of abandoning state religions. Using Barrett et al.'s
(2001) data, examples for countries in our sample
are Brazil, Chile, China, Japan, South Korea,
21 One potential concern is that greater reli-
Turkey, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Russia.
giousness among a population might help to Some
ex- countries that were not independent in
1900 (Bangladesh, Israel, and Pakistan in our
plain why a country has a state religion. An op-
posing argument is that state religions, such as
sample) introduced state religions when they be-
Lutheranism in the Scandinavian countries, were
came independent. We also have information
typically implemented long ago. Moreover, fromthe Barrett et al. (2001) for governments that
introduction of a state religion often accompa-
are officially religious, although not maintaining
nied a change in the political regime, whichawe single religion. Examples in 1970 for countries
can reasonably regard as exogenous with respect
in our sample are South Africa, Brazil, Philip-
to religiosity. However, it could be argued that
pines, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Switzerland,
less religious nations would be more likelyand to Australia. If we enter an additional dummy
abandon their state religions. Thus, Sweden variable into the systems of Table 3 to capture
eliminated Lutheranism as the state religionthis
in officially religious category, the estimated
2000--but that was more than 400 years after coefficients
the on this new variable are close to
religion was established. zero.
from the system for monthlypluralism

church andatten-
government regulation. If we
dance, the estimated coefficient forthe
delete the statevariable from the sys-
pluralism
religion dummy becomes .57 tem(S.E. = .14),
for belief in heaven, the estimated coef-
which is smaller than before ficient
but still
for theposi-
state religion dummy variable
falls to .77
tive and significant. Our analysis (S.E. in-
also = .16). If we also delete the
cludes a dummy variable for the dummypresence
variable for
of state regulation of reli-
state regulation of religion. Since
gion, this
the estimated
regu- coefficient for the state
latory system often accompanies religion dummy
a state variable falls further to .62
reli-
gion (see Table 1), the regulatory variable
(S.E. = .15). Although this estimated coeffi-
cient is about
could be getting credit for effects that half that found in column 2 of
stem
ultimately from state religion.Table
If we3, itdelete
is still positive and statistically
the regulatory variable and the pluralism in-
significant.24
dex from the system for monthly The church
results in Table
at- 3 suggest that govern-
tendance, the estimated coefficient for the
ment regulation of religion depresses church
state religion dummy variable attendance and belief
decreases to in heaven. That is, the
.29 (S.E. = .14). argument from the religion-market model
In the literature, the Scandinavian
about thecoun-
negative effects of government in-
volvement
tries are often cited as places in whichonstate
religious participation are con-
churches coexist with low rates of church at- sistent with the negative coefficients esti-
tendance. That pattern characterizes the data mated for public regulation. Better measure-
in our study. However, the low rates of at- ment of the indicator for regulation may
tendance in these countries turn out to be sharpen these results.
explained by the model estimated in TableQuantitatively, the estimated coefficient of
-.64 (S.E. = .11) for the state-regulation
3, despite the positive coefficient for the
state-religion dummy variable. For example,dummy variable in column 1 of Table 3
in the system for monthly church attendancemeans, if viewed causally, that the introduc-
(column 1), the residual for Sweden in 1990tion of a government regulatory system for
is actually positive. That is, although religion lowers monthly attendance by 13
monthly church attendance is only 10 per- percentage points. As already noted, state re-
cent, it exceeds the value predicted by the ligion and government regulation of religion
model. The reason is that the other variables often come as a package (Table 1). If a state
contained in the system-notably the over- religion is imposed along with state regula-
all influence of the economic variables and tion, the estimated net effect on monthly
the composition of religious adherence (dis- church attendance is positive but only by
cussed below)- predict low rates of church about 5 percentage points.
attendance. This pattern also applies to the Table 3, column 1 shows that the religious
other Scandinavian countries-Denmark, pluralism indicator (see Table 1) has a sig-
Finland, Iceland, and Norway-all of which nificantly positive coefficient in the system
have state religions. for monthly church attendance. This pattern
Table 3 shows that the estimated coeffi- accords with the religion-market model's ar-
cients for the state-religion dummy variable gument that greater diversity of religion en-
are also significantly positive for beliefs in courages competition among religion pro-
heaven and hell. For example, the estimatedviders and leads, thereby, to better service
coefficient for belief in heaven in column 2 and higher rates of attendance. The esti-
is 1.07 (S.E. = .18). This result, if viewed mated coefficient of 1.35 (S.E. = .32) means
causally, indicates that the state sponsorship that an increase in pluralism by .23 (its
that encourages church attendance also en-
genders higher levels of religious beliefs.23
24 For belief in hell, the coefficient for the state
As before, the effect from state religion
religion dummy variable in column 3 of Table 3
may interact with the influences of religious is .79 (S.E. = .17). With the pluralism measure
deleted, the estimated coefficient becomes .53
23 Again, the reverse interpretation would be (S.E. = .15). With the regulation variable also
that strong religious beliefs make it more likelydeleted, the estimated coefficient is .49 (S.E. =
that a state religion exists. .14).
sample standard deviation)adhering

is associated
to the indicated religion among
persons who express
with higher monthly church attendance by 7 adherence to some re-
percentage points. Religious ligion.
pluralism also
has significantly positive coefficients Table 3, column
in1 shows
the that most of the
systems for belief in heaven and hell
coefficients (col-shares are nega-
on the religion
umns 2 and 3 of Table 3). tive. Hence, for given values of the other ex-
Chaves and Gorski (2001) and Voas, planatory variables, most religions are lower
Olson, and Crockett (2002) criticize the use than Catholic in terms of monthly church at-
of this kind of measure of religious plural- tendance.25 The exceptions are Muslim and
ism. These authors point out problems that "other religions," which have coefficients
arise when the pluralism measure is con- that are not significantly different from zero.
structed as a transformation of the same data For the religious beliefs shown in columns 2
that are used to form the dependent variable. and 3, the coefficients for most of the reli-
For example, in some studies, pluralism was gions are again lower than Catholic. How-
calculated from the fractions of the popula- ever, Muslim and "other religions" have
tion affiliated with the various religions positive coefficients. Particularly striking
(Catholic, Protestant, etc.), and the depen- are the large positive coefficients for the
dent variable was computed as the fraction Muslim religion in the system for belief in
of the population affiliated with any of the heaven and, even more so, for belief in hell.
religions. We agree that this procedure is
problematic because it creates a mechanical DETERMINANTS OF
relation between the dependent and indepen- ECONOMIC GROWTH
dent variables, that is, a relation that does
not involve a causal link between religious We now consider religion's role in the de
diversity and religiosity. However, our situ- mination of economic growth. Our cen
ation is different because the independent perspective is that religion affects econom
variable is calculated from the fractions of outcomes mainly by fostering religious b
the adhering population affiliated with theliefs that influence individual traits such as
various religions, whereas the dependent honesty, work ethic, thrift, and openness to
variable is the fraction of the total popula-strangers.26 For example, beliefs in heaven
tion who attend church (or believe in and hell might affect these traits by creating
heaven, etc.). In this case, no mechanical re- perceived rewards and punishments that re-
lation exists between the dependent and in- late to "good" and "bad" lifetime behavior.
dependent variable. From this perspective, organized religion,
Another way to look at our specificationand more specifically, attendance at reli-
is that it includes linear terms in religiongious services, would affect economic per-
shares (fractions of the adhering population
who are Protestant, Muslim, etc.), as well as
25 These results can reflect differences across
a variable-the pluralism indicator-con-
religions in the role of attending church or analo-
structed from the squared values of the reli-
gous houses of worship. For example, religions
gion shares. Thus, the issue for us is not, per vary by the importance they attach to attending
se, whether the pluralism indicator is a sat- organized services and to professional clergy ver-
isfactory independent variable but whether sus personal prayer.
the religion shares are appropriate. In this 26 The connection between religious teachings
context, the key matter is whether the reli- and these traits appears in various religions. For
gion shares are endogenous, that is, whether example, in his sermon "On the Use of Money,"
shifts in religiosity (church attendance and Wesley (1951) relates Christian ethics to hard
beliefs) affect these shares. work, thrift, and honesty. Hospitality to strang-
Consider now the estimated coefficients ers is stressed by several religions, including
Hinduism (McKenzie 1922:56), Judaism (Mor-
on the religion shares. Recall that the Catho-
gan and Lawton 1996:151-52), and Islam (Ko-
lic share was the omitted category-the co-ran 1994:53). Throughout the centuries, inter-
efficients reveal the relations relative to that
preters of the major religions have written vol-
for "Catholic." Recall also that the shareumes on the moral nature of obligations to
variables are the fractions of the population
strangers.
average
formance mostly indirectly, that ratios
is, of investment and government
through
influences on the religious consumption
beliefs. Hence,to GDP; an international open-
we envision a chain whereby church
ness measure,atten-
based on the ratio of exports
plus
dance affects religious beliefs, imports
which to GDP; changes in the terms
affect
individual traits, which affectof individual and
trade; subjective measures of maintenance
aggregate economic outcomes. of the rule of law and democracy; and the
To put it another way, we inflation
view religious
rate. In the present analysis, we add
measuressector,27
beliefs as an output of the religion of religiosity to this list of ex-
and we view church attendance as an
planatory input
variables.
to this sector. Thus, if we holdThe
fixed the be-
regressions include all countries that
liefs, as we do in the regressions
have data that
on all ofwe the variables. We began
highlight here, an increase inwith
church
a sampleatten-
of 87 countries, but the inclu-
sion sector
dance signifies that the religion of data on is
church
lessattendance and reli-
productive. That is, more resources in lowered
gious beliefs termsthe sample to 41 coun-
of time and goods are beingtries.consumed
We end up withfor 2 countries in sub-Sa-
given outputs (beliefs). Hence,haran
ourAfrica, 8 in Latin America, 9 in Asia,
anticipa-
2 in
tion is that for given religious Eastern higher
beliefs, Europe, and 20 that have been
church attendance would show members
up asof a the
nega-
Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
tive influence on economic performance.
since the 1960s (not
A different perspective, represented byincluding Japan and
Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001)Turkey,
and which
Putnamare included with Asia).
(2000), argues that houses ofOur worship are appear in Table 4.
empirical results
Each system
important as civic organizations, per se.includes
That as explanatory vari-
ables afostered
is, the networks and interactions measure of monthly
by church atten-
churches are important elements dance and of
a measure
social of religious belief-in
the present
capital. Thus, if this social capital case, belief in heaven or hell.
is produc-
tive, we might find that, for(These givenvariables enter, as before, in the form
religious
beliefs, church attendance would have a log[x/(1-x)], where x is the fraction of per-
separate, positive effect on economic sons attending or believing.) To minimize
growth. the loss of observations, we entered into the
Church attendance might also proxy for regressions a single measure of monthly
the influence of organized religion on laws church attendance or religious belief for
and regulations that affect economic incen- each period for countries that had data on
tives. Adverse examples would be restric- these variables at any point in time. Specifi-
tions on credit and insurance markets and cally, we defined a measure of attendance or
belief for a country to be the value from
general discouragement of the profit motive.
WVS 1990 if available, then we filled in
Positive forces might include legislation and
regulation related to fraud and corruption.with the value from WVS 1981 if the 1990
Our empirical framework for studyingvalue was unavailable. (We adjusted for the
economic growth is the one described average
in discrepancy between the two values
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, chap. 12).
among countries that had information for
The dependent variable is the growth rateboth
of years.) If neither of these values were
available, we used in an analogous way the
per capita GDP over three 10-year periods:
1965-1975, 1975-1985, and 1985-1995. value for ISSP 1991, then WVS 1995, and
The explanatory variables, suggested by pre-then ISSP 1998. This procedure means that
vious studies, are the values at the start of
the systems for economic growth incorpo-
each period of the log of per capita GDP, rate
life on the right-hand side measures of reli-
expectancy (measured inversely), yearsgious of attendance and beliefs that sometimes
postdate the growth rates.
school attainment, and the total fertility rate;
One reason that the use of later observa-
27 The religion sector has outputs other thantions on the right-hand side of the growth
equations might be satisfactory is that
religious beliefs. For example, organized religion
can be important in social welfare activities andchurch attendance and religious beliefs ex-
education. hibit a lot of persistence over time. Hence,
Table 4. Regressions for Economic Growth, 1965 -1975, 1975 -1985, 198
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attendance and Beliefs

Monthly church attendance -.0095*** -.01
(.0018) (.0044) (.0023) (.0043) (.0020) (.0046)
Belief in hell .0094*** .0140** - - .0104** .0174*
(.0025) (.0058) (.0040) (.0083)
Belief in heaven - - .0069* .0076 -.0012 .0039
(.0029) (.0048) (.0040) (.0068)
p-value for attendance .000 .001 .000 .009 .000 .002
and belief(s) jointly
Religion Shares
Eastern religion share -.010 - .003 - -.013
(.011) (.009) (.012)
Hindu share -.034* - -.030 - -.040*
(.016) (.017) (.018)
Jewish share -.004 - .006 - -.006
(.014) (.013) (.015)
Muslim share -.032* - -.012 - -.034*
(.015) (.010) (.015)
Orthodox share -.050* - -.029 - -.051"
(.021) (.017) (.021)
Protestant share -.015* - -.018* - -.012
(.007) (.008) (.008)
Other religion share -.001 - -.001 - -.001
(.015) (.016) (.015)
p-value for religion .001 - .001 - .001
shares jointly
Number of countries and 41, 118 41, 118 41, 118 41, 118 41, 118 41, 118
total observations
Number of observations 38, 41, 39 38, 41, 39 38, 41, 39 38, 41, 39 38, 41, 39 38, 41, 39
for each time period
R-squared values for .39, .77, .67, .63, .36, .68, .66, .60, .39, .78, .65, .63,
each time period .36 .25 .32 .36 .35 .19
Note: Standard errors of coefficients are in parent

coefficients are not shown. The dependent variables
1975, 1975-1985, and 1985-1995. The explanatory
1965, 1975, and 1985; years of male secondary and h
rocals of life expectancy at age 1 in 1960, 1970, and
GDP; the log of the total fertility rate in 1960, 1970
imports to GDP, filtered for the usual relation of th
for each period of government consumption (net of
rate of the terms of trade over each period, interact
the average of the Political Risk Services indicator
the first two equations); the average for each perio
rights) and its square; and the consumer price infla
cussed in the text. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include th
Catholic share is the omitted category. Separate con
the text. Estimation is by three-stage least square
ments. The instrument lists exclude the church atte
shares, the dummy variables for state religion and sta
religious diversity (1970 for the first two equations
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed t
growth for
later values may proxy satisfactorily equations.
the The main result, which
missing earlier ones, which can be viewed
typifies our findings, is that the estimated
as the true causes of differences in growth
coefficient for monthly church attendance is
rates. However, the results innegative,
Table whereas
3 sug-that for religious belief, in
gest substantial responses of religiosity
this case belief to
in hell, is positive. These es-
economic variables. Thus, the timated
religion coefficients
mea- are individually and
jointly statistically
sures might pick up reverse causation from significant (p-value for
economic development to religiosity,
the two together
rather is .000). The estimated co-
than the reverse. efficient for monthly attendance, -.0095
To deal with the reverse causation issue, (S.E. = .0018), means that an increase in this
we use the instrumental variables suggested variable by one standard deviation (1.20, as
by the regressions in Table 3, in which the shown in Table 2) would reduce the eco-
religion measures were the dependent vari- nomic growth rate on impact by 1.1 percent
ables. Specifically, we use as instruments the per year. The estimated coefficient for belief
dummy variable for the presence of a state in hell, .0094 (S.E. = .0025), means that an
religion (in 1970), the dummy variable for increase in this variable by one standard de-
the existence of state regulation of religion viation (1.06) would increase the economic
(in the 1970s), the shares in 1970 or 1980 of growth rate on impact by 1.0 percent per
religious adherence among the major reli- year.29 Similar numerical calculations can be
gions, and the religious pluralism index for applied to the other results in Table 4, using
1970 or 1980. These variables are highly sta- the standard deviations of variables shown
tistically significant for explaining monthly in Table 2.
church attendance, belief in heaven, and be- One test of over-identification is whether
lief in hell-in each case, the p-value for a group of three instruments-the dummy
joint significance is .000. Thus, we are not variables for the presence of a state religion
concerned that the instruments are weak. and for state regulation of the religion mar-
It is possible that the instruments-al- ket and the religious pluralism index-mat-
though prior in time to the growth observa- ter directly for growth. To carry out this
tions-are themselves endogenous with re- test, we maintained the hypothesis that the
spect to economic development. For ex- religious adherence shares do not enter di-
ample, over long periods, development rectly into the economic growth equations.
could induce countries to drop their official (This assumption allows us to identify the
state religions or to alter their regulatory sys- systems even when the group of three in-
tems for religion. For the composition of re- struments is added to the growth equations.)
ligions, the major concern is that the religion The p-value for joint significance of the
shares would matter directly for economic three variables in the growth equations is
growth, not just through their predictive con- .25. Similar results apply to the other cases
tent for the religiosity measures.28 To check shown in Table 4-we always accept with a
out these possibilities, the analysis includes high p-value the exclusion of the three vari-
tests of over-identifying restrictions of the ables from the growth equations. Therefore,
model. for the rest of the analysis, we include these
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 use the "be- three variables-the dummy variables for
lief in hell" variable. The first column ex-
state religion and state regulation of reli-
gion and the pluralism index-as instru-
cludes the religious adherence shares in the
28 It is possible that economic growth would, 29 If we include the monthly-church-attendance

over long periods, influence the composition of and belief-in-hell variables in the instrument lists
religious adherence. This process could involve(and exclude the other instruments associated
religious conversion, differences in fertility with religion), we get the coefficient estimates
across religions (combined with a relation be- -.0078 (S.E. = .0017) on the attendance variable
tween economic development and fertility pat-and .0088 (S.E. = .0021) on the belief variable.
terns), and immigration (to the extent that devel- These point estimates are smaller in magnitude
opment interacted with the pattern of migrationthan the ones generated by our instrumental esti-
by religious affiliation). mation.
ments but exclude them from the economic implied by the point estimates are larger than
growth equations.30 in column 1.
If we include the religious adherence Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 replace belief
shares directly in the growth equations, we in hell with belief in heaven. The results are
get the estimated coefficients shown in col- similar to those found in columns 1 and 2,
umn 2 of Table 4. The coefficients for each except that the quantitative effect and statis-
religion share should be interpreted as thetical significance for belief in heaven are
effect relative to that for Catholic. The esti- somewhat less than those for belief in hell.
mated coefficients that are individually sta- For example, when the religion shares are
tistically significant are the negative values excluded from the growth system in column
shown for Hindu, Muslim, Orthodox, and 3, the estimated coefficient for monthly
Protestant. Some of these signs are surpris- church attendance is -.0104 (S.E. = .0023),
ing, but a full interpretation has to consider whereas that for belief in heaven is .0069
that the systems include monthly church at- (S.E. = .0029). The p-value for joint signifi-
tendance and belief in hell, and these two cance of these variables is .000. When the
variables are strongly related to religious religion shares are included in column 4, the
composition (as shown in Table 3).31 The re- estimated coefficients are -.0123 (S.E. =
ligion shares are jointly statistically signifi- .0043) for monthly attendance and .0076
cant with a p-value of .001. (S.E. = .0048) for belief in heaven. In this
Since some of the religion shares matter case, the p-value for joint significance is
directly for economic growth, we also exam- .009. Thus, the results are again robust to the
ine the estimated growth effects of church inclusion of religion shares in the growth
attendance and belief in hell when the reli-
system.
gion shares are included in the growth equa- We also looked at other measures of reli-
tions. The resulting coefficients, shown in gious belief. A pattern of results similar to
column 2 of Table 4, are -.0156 (S.E. = those shown in Table 4 emerges if we use
.0044) for monthly church attendance and belief in an afterlife, rather than the more
.0140 (S.E. = .0058) for belief in hell. The specific beliefs in hell or heaven.32 For ex-
p-value for joint significance of these vari- ample, in a specification comparable to
ables is .001. Therefore, the results for those in columns 1 and 3 of the table, the
church attendance and belief in hell remain estimated coefficients are -.0094 (S.E. =
statistically significant when the religious.0021) for monthly church attendance and
adherence shares are included in the growth .0079 (S.E. = .0035) for belief in an after-
equations. Moreover, the quantitative effectslife.33
The results are much weaker if we use be-
30 The religious pluralism index plays a minor lief in God rather than the more concrete be-
role as an instrument. If we exclude this variable liefs in hell, heaven, or an afterlife. In a
from the instrument list, the estimated coeffi-
cients in the system for economic growth become
-.0104 (S.E. = .0020) for monthly church atten- 32 We again used the functional form log[x/(1-
dance and .0085 (S.E. = .0028) for belief in hell. x)], where x is now the fraction of persons who
These results are close to those shown in column expressed a belief in an afterlife. For the WVS
1 of Table 4. data, we coded an individual's dummy variable
31 As an example, if we do not include religi- for belief in an afterlife as 1 if the respondent an-
osity variables in the growth regressions, the es- swered yes to the question "Do you believe in life
timated coefficient for the Muslim adherence after death?" For the ISSP data, we coded an
fraction is close to zero. Muslim adherence is as- individual's dummy variable as 1 if the respon-
sociated with high belief in hell relative to church dent answered yes, definitely, or yes, probably,
attendance (Table 3, columns 1 and 3), and thisto the question "Do you believe in life after
mechanism tends to encourage growth, accord-death?" The afterlife question was not included
ing to the estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table in the Gallup Millennium Survey. As before, in
4. The results in column 2 imply that, once thethe economic growth regressions, we used only
connections with belief in hell and church atten- one observation per country for belief in an af-
dance are held constant, the remaining effect of terlife.
Muslim adherence on economic growth is nega- 33 The sample of observations was selected to
tive. be the same as that used in Table 4.
specification comparable to those in columns

those 1 and 3 of Table 4, the es-
in col-
umns 1 and 3 of Table 4, the timated coefficients
estimated coef-are -.0026 (S.E. =
ficients are -.0092 (S.E. = .0030) for .0026) for monthly attendance and -.0059
(S.E. = .0032) for religiousness.37 Thus, re-
monthly attendance and .0018 (S.E. = .0030)
for belief in God.34 Thus, given church at-ligiousness seems to have an effect more like
tendance, variations in professed belief inmonthly church attendance and less like be-
God have no explanatory power for eco- liefs in hell, heaven, or an afterlife.
nomic growth. One possible reason is thatColumns 5 and 6 of Table 4 include in the
most people in most countries reflexively
growth regressions beliefs in hell and heaven
simultaneously, along with monthly church
answer yes to the question of whether they
believe in God in some sense-the mean of attendance. The two belief variables have a
high sample correlation, .90, so our expecta-
the fraction of persons who expressed a be-
lief in God in the full sample is 80 percent tion was that it would be difficult to distin-
(see Table 3), much higher than the other guish the two in growth regressions.38 Sur-
beliefs (averages of 38 percent for belief in prisingly, however, the results favor belief in
hell, 55 percent for belief in heaven, and 58 hell as a determinant of growth. When the
percent for belief in an afterlife).35 Hence, religion shares are excluded from the growth
the professed belief in God may signify littleequations in column 5, the estimated coeffi-
about the religious convictions that matter cient for belief in hell is significantly posi-
for the individual characteristics that influ-tive, .0104 (S.E. = .0040), whereas that for
ence economic performance. belief in heaven is close to zero, -.0012
The results also become weaker if we sub- (S.E. = .0040). However, a test for equality
stitute for the belief variables a measure of of the two coefficients has a high p-value, (p
whether persons consider themselves to be = .12), so there is only weak statistical evi-
religious.36 In a specification parallel to dence that the avoidance of hell provides a
better incentive for economic growth than
34 We again used the functional form log[x/(1- the potential for heaven. The coefficient for
x)], where x is now the fraction of persons who church attendance is again significantly
expressed a belief in God. For the WVS data, we negative, -.0092 (S.E. = .0020). The three
coded an individual's belief-in-God dummy vari-
variables (beliefs in hell and heaven and
able as 1 if the respondent answered yes to the
monthly attendance) are jointly significant,
question "Do you believe in God?" For the ISSP
data, we coded an individual's dummy variable with a p-value of .000.
as 1 if the respondent selected any of the follow- The seven religion shares are again jointly
ing: "I know God really exists and I have no significant when added to the growth equa-
doubts about it"; "While I have doubts, I feel that tions in column 6. The preference for belief
I do believe in God"; "I find myself believing in in hell over belief in heaven still appears-
God some of the time, but not at others"; and "I the estimated coefficients are .0174 (S.E. =
don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe .0083) and .0039 (S.E. = .0068), respec-
in a Higher Power of some kind." (Results were tively. The p-value for a test of equality of
similar if we used a more stringent definition of
these two coefficients is now p = 0.13. The
belief in God from the ISSP surveys.) The sur-
coefficient for monthly attendance is again
vey responses from the Gallup Millennium Sur-
vey were not used here in order to select a sample negative and significant, -.0154 (S.E. =
that was the same as that used in Table 4. As be-
fore, in the growth regressions, we used only one the respondent selected any of the following:
observation per country for belief in God. Would you describe yourself as (1) extremely re-
35 These values are unweighted means across ligious, (2) very religious, or (3) somewhat reli-
the country-time observations in the sample. gious?" As before, in the growth regressions, we
36 We again used the functional form log[x/(1- used only one observation per country for the re-
x)], where x is now the fraction of persons who ligiousness variable.
consider themselves to be religious. For the WVS 37 Because of missing data on religiousness,
data, we coded an individual's religiousness as 1 the number of countries included here was 40,
if the respondent answered yes to the question and the total number of observations was 115.
"Independently of whether you go to church or 38 The correlations of the monthly attendance
not, would you say you are a religious person?"variable with the belief in hell and heaven mea-
For the ISSP data, we coded religiousness as 1 ifsures are lower: .75 and .81, respectively.
.0046). The three variables together .75 for belief

areinsig-
hell and .81 for belief in
nificant with a p-value of .002. heaven. The attendance and belief variables
Now we consider whether the connection also have similar sample standard deviations
between religious belief and economic per-(see Table 2). Therefore, if we consider
formance depends on the underlying reli-cases in Table 4, such as columns 1 and 2,
gious doctrine. For example, hell represents where the estimated coefficients on the two
a final state in Christianity and Islam but is religiosity variables are of similar magnitude
only a temporary setback along the road to but opposite sign, the results suggest that
enlightenment in Hinduism and Buddhism.being more or less religious overall would
Given these doctrinal differences, we would not have a strong relationship with economic
expect belief in hell to matter less for eco-
growth. That is, if church attendance and re-
nomic outcomes among Hindus and Bud- ligious beliefs move together in their usual
dhists than among Christians or Muslims.manner, the overall relation with economic
We test for this effect by modifying the sys-growth tends to be weak.
tems in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 to allow One way to bring out this result is to esti-
for two coefficients on belief in hell. The mate systems in which church attendance or
first coefficient applies to an interactionbeliefs,
be- but not both, appear in the regres-
tween belief in hell and the fraction of the sions. If we include monthly church atten-
population that adheres to Hinduism or East-dance by itself and otherwise use the speci-
ern religions (including Buddhism); the sec-fication from column 1 of Table 4, the re-
ond applies to an interaction between beliefsulting coefficient is negative but less than
half the magnitude found before: -.0039
in hell and the remaining fraction of the
population. (S.E. = .0015). If we include belief in hell
The results for this extension to column 1 by itself and otherwise use the same specifi-
of Table 4 are that the estimated coefficients cation as column 1, the coefficient is posi-
for belief in hell are .0059 (S.E. = .0101) tive but not significantly different from zero:
when interacted with the Hindu and Eastern .0033 (S.E. = .0023). For the comparable
religion population shares, and .0090 (S.E. specification with the belief-in-heaven vari-
= .0025) when interacted with the remaining able by itself, the estimated coefficient is
population share. Although this pattern-avirtually zero: -.0003 (S.E. = .0023). There-
smaller effect from belief in hell among ad- fore, we find a strong relationship between
herents of Hinduism and Eastern religions-- economic growth and religiosity only be-
accords with our hypothesis, the two esti-cause we simultaneously include measures
mated coefficients do not differ statistically of church attendance and religious belief. To
from each other (p-value = .76). If we carry put it another way, the main estimated
out this analysis as an extension to column 2 growth effect is a positive response to an in-
of Table 4 (which includes the religion crease in believing relative to belonging (or
shares in the growth equations), we get attending).
.0136 (S.E. = .0185) for the first interaction The extreme of believing being high rela-
variable and .0140 (S.E. = .0054) for the sec- tive to belonging is "believing without be-
ond. Clearly, these estimated coefficients do longing," which is Davie's (1994) character-
not differ significantly from each other (p- ization of modern Britain. In the interna-
value = .98). The main problem here is that tional survey data, Britain is not as extreme
we lack enough observations from countries as Davie suggests: In the 1990 World Values
with substantial representation among Hin- Survey, the fraction of persons who attend
duism and Eastern religions to get reliable church at least monthly is .24, the fraction
estimates of coefficients for this group. The who believe in heaven is .61, and the frac-
2001 wave of the World Values Survey may tion who believe in hell is .29. By way of
help here, because it includes increased rep- comparison, the respective sample means
resentation of East Asian countries. from the 1990 WVS are .36, .53, and .32.
As already mentioned, church attendance Thus, Britain is only moderately higher than
is highly correlated with religious beliefs-average for beliefs relative to church atten-
the correlation of the monthly-church-attendance. More striking patterns of relatively
dance variable with the belief variables is high beliefs appear in some of the Scandina-
(a) Economic Growth and Church(b) Economic

Attendance Grow
.06 .06
0 1 0 .042 - ? 0
C 0
o o
S04.- 0 o0 0
x C
.02 0 o
-coa 80o V 02 ',-, c, . 0
Drr
O ........ ..... 0 i0 _ 0 ..
- o ... - 0
0- 00O0 O.
E -.04 ....... .o0

0
-3 2 -1 0 1 2
I
3 4
E -.04 - o
W 0
-.06 -.06- I
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Monthly Church Belief in Hell

Attendance (T
(Tran
(c) Economic Growth and Church

(d) Economic Grow
.06 .06
a. a. 0 o
' .04 - .04

0
C
.02
o --
8. .
o o o
x 0
So 00 o
X 02- O 00
0 0
S-.02 - o
0 00
0..02 0 .o
O o8
0
- 60
-0 0 0 0
0 0 o
E -.04
C
- o o0
-04 0
0
LU06 , L .06 , I.
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Monthly Church Attendance (Tran

Belief in Heaven
Figure 1. Graphs Showing the R

Beliefs
Note: Figure 3a holds constant belief in hell; Figure 3c holds constant belief in heaven.
vian countries and Japan-values from the Figures Ic and id come from the estimates
1990 WVS of monthly church attendance, shown in column 3. The graphs are con-
belief in heaven, and belief in hell are: .11, structed to hold constant the influence on
.55, and .27 in Finland; .13, .44, and .19 in economic growth of all the explanatory vari-
Norway; .09, .57, and .12 in Iceland; and ables other than the one shown on the x-
.14, .43, and .32 in Japan. axis.39 These kinds of diagrams are useful
Figure 1 depicts partial relations between
the rate of economic growth and the vari-
39 To calculate the value plotted on the y-axis,
ables that measure monthly church atten- we took the growth rate of per capita GDP (the
dance, belief in hell, and belief in heaven. dependent variable) over each of the three time
Figures la and lb are computed from the es- periods used in Table 4 and subtracted the esti-
timates shown in column 1 of Table 4, and mated effect of all the explanatory variables aside
for seeing whether relationships sation

lookby linear
using the instrumental variables
or are driven by outliers. suggested by our analysis of the determi-
Note that Figure 1 a shows thenants of religiosity.
negative ef- The results remain intact
fect of monthly church attendance on eco-
when we enter the composition of religious
adherencethe
nomic growth while holding constant intobe-the growth equations. Based
lief in hell. In contrast, Figure on
Icthe
shows
arguablethe
exogeneity of the instrumen-
negative effect of monthly church tal variables, we think our estimates reflect
atten-
dance on growth while holdingcausal
fixed influences
the be-from religion to economic
lief in heaven. Figures lb andgrowth,
id show rather the
than the reverse.
positive effects of the religious Our conjecture
beliefs (be- is that stronger religious
beliefs stimulate
lief in hell and heaven, respectively) on eco- growth because they help
nomic growth while holding fixed sustainmonthly
specific individual behaviors that en-
hance productivity.
attendance. Thus, the figures represent the An interesting extension
effect on economic growth not of our study
from would examine the links be-
an over-
tween religious
all change in religiosity but, rather, frombeliefs
a and individual behav-
shift in belonging with believingiors held
or values,
fixedsuch as those we previously
or vice versa. mentioned: honesty, thrift, work ethic, and
openness to strangers. These characteristics
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS can be measured using survey responses in
the World Values Survey and the Interna-
We have used a cross-country data panel tional Social
that Survey Programme.
includes country-level information on We argue that higher levels of church at-
church attendance and religious beliefs. tendance depress economic growth because
These data derive from individual informa- greater attendance signifies a larger use of
tion collected in six international surveysresources by the religion sector, and the
between 1981 and 1999. main output of this sector (the religious be-
An analysis of the determinants of religi-liefs) has already been held constant. The re-
sults do not mean that greater church atten-
osity allowed us to construct a set of instru-
mental variables to estimate the effects of
dance has a net negative influence on eco-
religion on economic growth. The instru-nomic growth-this net effect depends on
ments are dummy variables for the existencethe extent to which an increase in attendance
leads to stronger beliefs, which in turn en-
of a state religion and for state regulation of
religion, the composition of religious adher-courage growth. Thus, another interesting
ence among the main religions, and the ex- extension of our study would be to estimate
tent of religious pluralism. the influence of church attendance on reli-
Our results show that, for given religiousgious beliefs.
beliefs, increases in church attendance tend We mentioned that church attendance
to reduce economic growth. In contrast, formight also measure the social capital built up
given levels of church attendance, increases through organized religion. We also noted
in some religious beliefs-notably belief in that church attendance could stand as a proxy
hell, heaven, and an afterlife-tend to in- for the influence of organized religion on
crease economic growth. There is some in- laws and regulations that influence economic
dication that the fear of hell is more potentbehavior. Our results indicate that, for given
for economic growth than is the prospect of religious beliefs, the overall effect of greater
heaven. church attendance is to reduce economic
We stress that these patterns of growth ef- growth. This overall effect combines the re-
fects apply when we control for reverse cau- sources used up by the religion sector, the
social capital aspect of this sector, and the
influence of organized religion on laws and
from the one plotted on the x-axis. We then nor-
regulations. An interesting extension would
malized the resulting value to have a mean of
zero-hence, the average value of the variable on
be to use Fox and Sandler's (2003) measures
the y-axis is not meaningful. The line shown in of religious-based laws and regulations-
each diagram is a least-squares fit between the once they become available-to sort out
variable on the y-axis and the one on the x-axis. these effects from organized religion.
Other useful research would assess the ef- "Religion and Political Economy in an Inter-
fects of religiosity on political and social national Panel" (Working Paper No. 8931,
variables, including democracy, the rule of May). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
law, fertility, and health. Finally, it would be
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2004.
valuable to extend our analysis of religiosity
Economic Growth. 2d ed. Cambridge, MA:
at a countrywide level to the behavior of in- MIT Press.
dividuals.
Berger, Peter L. 1967. The Sacred Canopy: Ele-
ments of a Sociological Theory of Religion.
Robert J. Barro is Robert C. Waggoner Profes- Garden City, NJ: Doubleday.
sor of Economics at Harvard University, a senior Chaves, Mark. 1994. "Secularization as Declin-
fellow of Stanford University's Hoover Institu- ing Religious Authority." Social Forces 72:
tion, a research associate of the National Bureau 749-74.
of Economic Research, and a viewpoint colum- Chaves, Mark and David E. Cann. 1992. "Regu-
nist for Business Week. He is President-Elect of lation, Pluralism, and Religious Market Struc-
the Western Economic Association and was re- ture." Rationality and Society 4:272-90.
cently Vice President of the American Economic Chaves, Mark and Philip S. Gorski. 2001. "Reli-
Association. His recent research involves the gious Pluralism and Religious Participation."
determinants of economic growth across coun- Annual Review of Sociology 27:261-8 1.
tries, and he is currently writing a new interme- Davie, Grace. 1994. Religion in Britain since
diate textbook on macroeconomics. He is pleased 1945: Believing without Belonging. Oxford,
to be publishing an article in a sociology jour- England: Blackwell.
nal. Finke, Roger and Laurence R. Iannaccone. 1993.
"Supply-Side Explanations for Religious
Rachel M. McCleary is Director of the Religion,
Change." Annals of the American Academy of
Political Economy, and Society Project atPolitical and Social Sciences 527:27-39.
Harvard University's Weatherhead Center Finke, for Roger and Rodney Stark. 1992. The
Churching of America, 1776-1990. New
International Affairs and is also a lecturer in the
Department of Government. She holds a Ph.D. Brunswick,
in NJ: Rutgers University Press.
moral philosophy from the University of ChicagoFox, Jonathan and Shmuel Sandler. 2003. "Sepa-
and a Master of Theological Studies from Emory ration of Religion and State in the 21st Cen-
tury: Comparing the Middle East and Western
University. Her current research deals with reli-
giously based private voluntary organizations Democracies." Paper presented at the Interna-
and their interactions with the U.S. government. tional Studies Association conference, Febru-
She is also studying the economic incentives con-ary 25, Portland, OR.
tained in the doctrines of the world's major Heston,
reli- Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina
gions. Aten. 2002. Penn World Tables Version 6.1
(October). Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania, Center for International Com-
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Religion and Economic Growth across Countries

Author(s): Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary

American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and

ROBERT J. BARRO RACHEL M. MCCLEARY

Empirical research on the determinants of economic growth typically neglect

Some researchers, such as Huntington

760 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2003, VOL. 68 (OCTOBER:760-78 1)

sured by church attendance and However, state religion

and the existence of a regulated market

Table 1. Values for State Religion, State Regulation of Religion, and

State State Pluralism State State Pluralism

South Africa 0 0 .63 Finland 1 1 .03

Canada 0 0 .56 France 0 1 .17

Dominican Rep. 1 0 .05 West Germany 0 0 .54

United States 0 0 .64 Hungary 0 1 .47

Brazil 0 0 .20 Ireland 1 0 .08

Chile 0 0 .22 Italy 1 1 .01

Peru 1 1 .09 Norway 1 1 .01

Venezuela 1 1 .08 Portugal 1 0 .02

Hong Kong 0 0 .60 Switzerland 0 0 .51

India 0 0 .31 Turkey 0 1 .01

South Korea 0 0 .33 New Zealand 0 0 .37

Malaysia 1 0 .68 Bulgaria 0 0 .28

Singapore 0 0 .63 Latvia 0 1 .68

Taiwan 0 0 .58 Lithuania 0 1 .13

Thailand 1 1 .14 Romania 0 0 .40

Austria 0 0 .15 Russia 0 1 .51

Belgium 0 0 .05 Slovak Rep. 0 1 .34

Note: Countries are listed alphab

religion, even in 2000. Table church

six equations corresponding to the Variables

lation living in places with at least 2,500

Hence, the marginal effect of an explanatory

Table 3. Regressions for Church Attendance and Religious Beliefs for C

(1) (2) (3)

Explanatory Variable Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)

State religion .87*** (.14) 1.07*** (.18) .79*** (.17)

ISSP data -.17* (.08) .10 (.08) .35*** (.08)

Eastern religion fraction -2.53*** (.24) -1.56*** (.30) -.85** (.28)

Number of countries and 59, 181 50, 130 50, 130

Note: Each system consists of five or six equations, co

of the population over age 65dhist),

INFLUENCES ON RELIGIOSITY 36 percent).22 This pattern conflicts with

from the system for monthlypluralism

sample standard deviation)adhering

Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Attendance and Beliefs

Note: Standard errors of coefficients are in parent

28 It is possible that economic growth would, 29 If we include the monthly-church-attendance

specification comparable to those in columns

.0046). The three variables together .75 for belief

(a) Economic Growth and Church(b) Economic

E -.04 ....... .o0

Monthly Church Belief in Hell

(c) Economic Growth and Church

' .04 - .04

Monthly Church Attendance (Tran

Figure 1. Graphs Showing the R

for seeing whether relationships sation

per No. 24, February). Cambridge, of International

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State religion .87* (.14) 1.07* (.18) .79*** (.17)

Eastern religion fraction -2.53* (.24) -1.56* (.30) -.85** (.28)