ZUR DISKUSSION

The Soul’s Instrument for Touching in Aristotle,

On the Soul II 11, 422b34–423a21
by Abraham P. Bos (Amsterdam)

Abstract: From ancient times Aristotle, On the Soul II 11, 422b34 ff. on the perception of
touch has remained incomprehensible. We can only start to understand the text when
we see that Aristotle, in talking about “the ensouled body” (423a13), means “the soul’s
instrumental body” and views this as the actual instrument for the perception of
touch. The visible body is only an intermediary between the soul-body and the object of
touch.

1. The instrument for the perception of touch:

the hands or something ‘within’?

According to Aristotle, the soul is the first entelechy of a natural body which potentially
possesses life and is ‘organikon’. Traditionally the word ‘organikon’ has been translated
as ‘equipped with organs’. However, recently there has been a change to the translation
‘instrumental’, ‘serving as an instrument’.1 In the case of an animal this instrumental
body is also the soul’s instrument for perception. I propose to demonstrate this in what
follows on the basis of Aristotle’s argument on the sense of touch. In this way it can
be demonstrated that On the Soul holds the same view as the one defended in Aristotle’s
biological writings, which situate the soul in the centre of a living creature.2
In On the Soul II 11, 422b19–23 Aristotle discusses two problems in connection with the
perceptive faculty of the soul which we call the sense of touch. The first problem is
whether the sense of touch is one perceptive faculty or more than one.3 The second prob-
lem is: what is the actual aisthètèrion for the sense of touch?

1 See Reale/Bos 1995, 288; Everson 1997, 64; Bos 2003, esp. 69–122; see also Barnes,
1999, 121; Gerson 2005, 136; Quarantotto 2005, 240; Bronstein 2006, 425; Gregoric
2007, 19 and 23; King 2007, 323.
2 See Sens. 2, 439a1–3; Somn. 2, 455b34–6a4; Insomn. 3, 461a5–8; Iuv. 3, 469a5–12; 14,
474a25–b3; Part. anim. II 1, 647a24–31; II 10, 655b36 f.; 656a27–29; III 3, 665a10–15;
III 4, 665b10–6b1; Gener. anim. V 2, 781a20–22; Motu anim. 9, 702b20–25; Probl.
III 30, 875b10.
3 This was already announced in Anim. II 6, 418a13, where first ‘hearing, seeing and
smelling’ are listed, and then ‘touching’ is mentioned separately. See also II 7, 419a30.

Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosophie 92. Bd., S. 89–102 DOI 10.1515/AGPH.2010.004

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90 Zur Diskussion

He provisionally solves problem (1) by stating that one faculty of sense perception can
provide consciousness of several contrasting perceptions (422b23–34), but he returns to
this problem in 423a16–21 and then distinguishes between the sense of touch and the
sense of taste, and specifies that the sense of taste is an independent subvariant of the
sense of touch.4
Problem (2) is thornier. Aristotle formulates it as follows in 422b20: “What is the instru-
ment (aisthètèrion) of touch” (τ τ ασητ ριον τ το 4πτικο)?5 And he states the di-
lemma: (a) is it the flesh (or its equivalent in living beings which have no flesh) or (b) is it
not the flesh but is the flesh the medium of touch, and is the ‘primary (prôton) aisthètèrion’
something else, which is located inside?6
We start by recalling that in Parts of Animals II 1 Aristotle introduces his important dis-
tinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous parts of living beings. The heteroge-
neous parts are instruments for activities (ργα) and operations (πρει«) (646b12). For
this reason they can also be called ‘instrumental parts’ (ργανικ µωρη) (646b26). As
examples Aristotle lists: eye, nose, face, finger, hand and arm (646b13 f.). But they do not
include aisthètèria. ‘Instruments of perception’ are always homogeneous7 (647a5).8

4 Cf. also Sens. 2, 438b30: τ δ γεψστικν εδ« τι 4φ« !στν.

5 Thus Förster 1912, 86; Siwek 1954, vol. 2, 166; Jannone/Barbotin 1966, 60. Ms P
reads here 4πτο (an objective genitive) instead of 4πτικο (a subjective genitive).
Hett 1936, 128 changed to: τ τ ασητ ριον τ το 4πτο 4πτικν. Perhaps the
P reading, which is also advocated by Theiler 1959, 126, is preferable on account of
Aristotle’s conclusion in 423b22: — κα" δλον $τι !ντ« τ το 4πτο ασητ ριον.
Jannone/Barbotin 1966, 68, rightly opt there for the reading of the single manuscript
Marcianus gr. 214 ασητ ριον, though all other mss read ασητικν there. The P
reading is supported by 423b29: Τ δ ασητ ριον α&τ'ν τ 4πτικν.
6 The term ‘within’, ‘inside’, ‘farther inward’ (entos – !ντ«) is important. Aristotle uses
the same term again in his conclusion in 423b23. Cf. also Sens. 2, 438b10; Insomn. 3,
461a5; Part. anim. II 10, 656b36. Of a living being, only the ‘outside’ is visible.
The soul and its ‘instrumental body’ are not visible, because they are located ‘within’ –
cf. Mu. 6, 399b14–15: “the soul […] though invisible, is yet seen in its operations”.
In Anim. II 8, 420b20 Aristotle talks about the “vital heat within”. In 420a5 we find a
reference to “the air within” (eisô – ε(σ)), which forms a natural unity with the sense
of hearing and with “the ensouled part”. Anim. I 4, 408b25 talks about “something
within” (esô – σ)) that “contains the soul”.
7 See also Parts of Animals II 1, 647a12–14: “the natural philosophers pair each of
the aisthètèria with one of the elementary bodies” (τ'ν δ* ασητηρ)ν +καστον πρ«
+καστον !πιζεψγν-οψσι τ'ν στοιξε)ν, τ µν 1ωρα φσκοντε« εναι τ δ πρ) and
Sens. 2, 438b17–19: “if we must give an explanation and would have to connect each
of the aisthètèria with one of the elements” (ε δε2 […] προσπτειν +καστον τ'ν α-
σητηρ)ν Ψν" τ'ν στοιξε)ν).
8 According to Aristotle, the soul itself is not a body, but it is ‘not without sôma’ (Anim.
II 2, 414a19 f.; cf. I 1, 403a5–7). The soul’s faculty of touch is also a function which the
soul cannot perform ‘without body’. An aisthètèrion is an instrument for perceiving
material objects, and as such it is itself necessarily material too. Inasmuch as Aristotle
also assigns a role to the flesh and the tongue in the senses of touch and taste, but
assigns to the flesh and the tongue an intermediate role, Aristotle’s words in 422b22
about ‘the primary instrument’ of the perception of touch, which is ‘something else
within’, must refer to a material instrument of the (immaterial) soul. Cf. also II 7,
419a13, where the intermediary diaphanous air is contrasted with the aisthètèrion
of seeing. In 423b30 he talks about “to aisthètèrion in which the sense of touch, as it

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 Zur Diskussion 91

So if we follow the scheme of Parts of Animals II 1, then the eye is not an aisthètèrion.
Aisthètèria are homogeneous substances which correspond to the various objects of per-
ception, which are homogeneous themselves too. For these are air and water, in which
movements occur which are registered by the sensitive soul (647a6–9). This allows us to
formulate more clearly what an aisthètèrion actually is in Aristotle’s view. It is the homo-
geneous matter which corresponds to one particular category of sensible objects, from the
heart as far as the boundary of the visible body of the living creature.9 As regards hearing
this is the air present ‘within’ (Anim. II 8, 420a5), from the eardrum as far as the heart (as
the seat of the soul). And as regards the eye it is the diaphanous substance present ‘inside’
(Sens. 2, 438b10), from the pupil of the eye (which consists of diaphanous water) as far as
the heart (as the seat of the soul).10
The very way that Aristotle asks the question about the aisthètèrion of touch suggests
that he will opt for the somewhat cryptically formulated alternative, that is, for “some-
thing situated farther inward”. However, it would seem natural to present the animal body
in its entirety as the subject of the sense of touch. After all, we touch both with our fingers
and with our toes.
But confronted with the dilemma posed by Aristotle, we should also consider that, for
Aristotle, each faculty of sense perception is connected with the soul. And Aristotle often
says of the soul that it is located ‘in the centre’, ‘in the heart’ (or its equivalent) of a human
being or animal.11 It is not the external parts of the body which perceive, but ‘something
else inside’, via what we call ‘sense organs’. The soul or the perceptive part of the soul
is not situated on the outside, says Aristotle, but ‘inside’ the body. And in On Sense 2,
439a1 he says that the sense of touch and the sense of taste are located “near the
heart”.12 We also do well to consider that Aristotle developed a concept of the ‘common
sense’ (sensus communis)13, i.e. the perception of properties of things like movement, rest,

is called, primarily resides”. Cf. 424a24. For to prôton aisthètikon, cf. Somn. 1, 454a23.
But Aristotle can also talk about τ σξατον ασητ ριον (Anim. III 2, 426b15). See
also 2, 455a33: to kyrion tôn allôn pantôn aisthètèrion; 455b10: to prôton hôi aisthane-
tai pantôn; 456a21: en tôi prôtôi aisthètèriôi. Aristotle’s definition of sleep in Somn. 3,
458a28 is illuminating: it is said to be “a paralysis of the first aisthètèrion to prevent it
from functioning”. Clearly there aisthètèrion does not stand for an eye or an ear, but
for the soul’s ‘instrumental body for perception’.
9 Only the sense of touch itself forms an exception to this, as Aristotle explains in Anim.
II 11.
10 Thus Aristotle can talk about τ 6µµατα 7ρ'ντα in Somn. 1, 454a28. And thus
the tongue can be presented as the last (or the first) part of the aisthètèrion of
taste (Hist. anim. IV 8, 533a24: τ τ'ν ξψµ'ν ασητ ριον, τ8ν γλ'τταν and a26;
cf. Anim. II 11, 423a29: Ε µν ο:ν κα" ; <λλη σρ =σνετο το ξψµο) and the
(eardrums in the) ears of the aisthètèrion of hearing (Hist. anim. IV 8, 533a34; b14).
11 Cf. Anim. II 8, 420b28: >π τ« !ν το-τοι« το2« µοροι« χψξ«. Ross 1955, 7, believes
that this view was later abandoned by Aristotle: “Finally, there is the view that is
expressed in the De anima, where we hear no longer of a location of the soul in any
one part of the body, but it is described as the entelecheia, the principle of structure, or
organization of the whole body.” See also id. 1961, 10. Ross here followed Nuyens
1939 (French ed. 1948). For a critique of this developmental hypothesis, cf. Bos 2003,
13–30, and id. 2006.
12 Lanza/Vegetti 1971, 1088, translate rather curiously: “il loro organo di senso è in cor-
respondenza del cuore”.
13 On this subject, cf. Gregoric 2007.

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92 Zur Diskussion

shape, magnitude, weight, hardness, by different senses in one coordinating centre of per-
ception.14
In On the Soul II 11, 422b32 he concludes his treatment of problem (1), whether there
are one or more senses of touch, by saying: “However, it is not yet clear what the single
underlying subject is (for the various qualities which the perceptive faculty of the sense of
touch discerns), which corresponds to sound (being the single underlying subject for the
qualities of high/low, loud/soft which are the objects) in the case of the sense of hearing.”
So this question is held over.15 (But it is answered, viz. in 423b26, where Aristotle observes
that the sense of touch discerns the properties of a physical body as body, and therefore
not of one particular physical body.)

2. The hypothesis of a covering membrane

Then he returns to problem (2). The section which follows, On the Soul II 11, 422b34–3a12,
seems reasonably comprehensible at first sight. But on closer inspection there are various
aspects of the text that raise questions to which a coherent answer seems virtually impos-
sible. It is, however, very clear that Aristotle arrives at option (b), i.e. that the actual instru-
ment of the sense of touch is not the flesh, but something else ‘within’ (cf. 423b22–26).16
But the path by which he reaches this conclusion is not at all easy to reconstruct.
I first give Smith’s translation of the entire passage in Ross ed. vol. 3, 1931:

14 Cf. Anim. II 6, 418a17–19 and Sens. 1, 437a8; Iuv. 1, 467b28–8a1 (in the centre!).
Corresponding terms are eisangellô (Insomn. 3, 461b3; Sens. 1, 437a2; 6), dihikneisthai
(Anim. II 11, 423a5), dierchesthai (Anim. II 8, 420a6) and eiserchesthai (Anim. II 8,
420a12), which Aristotle uses regularly for the ‘motions’ of perceptive stimuli. The
suggestion is that of a command centre as described by Aristotle in Mu. 6, 398a18–35,
when he talks about the Persian royal palace hierarchy. Aristotle’s theory of perception
is also monarchianist. Webb 1982, 26, rightly emphasizes: “for Aristotle the peripheral
organs, central organ and connecting vessels are but part of a single mechanism”.
15 The perception of hearing was discussed in Anim. II 8. Aristotle argued there that
the air serves as the entity ‘between’ what can be heard and the hearing subject.
Sound (psophos – χφο«) was conceived of by Aristotle as the “movement of air”
(419b33–35). On the need for something ‘between’ the perceived object and the per-
ceiving subject, cf. Anim. II 7, 419a7–b3. Aristotle had already said there in 419a30 f.
that the situation for the sense of touch is the same as for the senses of seeing, hearing,
and smelling, but that at first sight it seems to be different. With the remark in
422b32–34 Aristotle indicates that, on the basis of what was said about the other
senses, we can intuit that in the case of the sense of touch, too, there must be an entity
‘intermediate between’ the perceived object and the actual subject of perception. To
this extent it is not surprising that he goes on to conclude that the flesh is the entity
‘between’ the tangible and the subject of touch (423b26). In passing this also emerged
from his discussion of taste in Anim. II 10, 422a8–10. Aristotle subsumed taste under
the sense of touch and noted there that taste is therefore not perceived via an ‘inter-
mediate entity’ formed by an external body of a different kind.
16 He repeats this viewpoint in Anim. III 2, 426b15–16. Cf. Polansky 2007, 313: “Aris-
totle argues instead that the tongue or outer flesh is part of the medium for taste or
touch, the true organ being farther within.” Aristotle can thus conclude in this
chapter too: “We perceive everything through its (related) intermediate” (ασανµε
γε πντ)ν δι το µωσοψ) (423b7).

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 Zur Diskussion 93

To the question whether the organ of touch lies inward or not (i.e. whether we need
look any farther than the flesh), no indication in favour of the second answer can be
drawn from the fact that if the object comes into contact with the flesh it is at once per-
ceived. For even under present conditions if the experiment is made of making a web
and stretching it tight over the flesh, as soon as this web is touched the sensation is
reported in the same manner as before, yet it is clear that the organ is not in this mem-
brane. (423a5) If the membrane could be grown on to the flesh, the report would travel
still quicker. The flesh plays in touch very much the same part as would be played in the
other senses by an air-envelope growing round our body; had we such an envelope at-
tached to us we should have supposed that it was by a single organ that we perceived
sounds, colours, and smells, and we should have taken sight, hearing, and smell to be a
single sense. (423a10) But as it is, because that through which the different movements
are transmitted is not naturally attached to our bodies, the difference of the various
sense-organs is too plain to miss. But in the case of touch the obscurity remains.17 (my
italics to indicate difficulties in the translation)
Of the most difficult passage, 423a5–10, I also give the Greek text according to Jannone
and Barbotin 1966, 61:
ε δ κα" σψµφψ« γωνοιτο, »ττον τι διικνο2τ* @ν ; α(σησι«. ∆ι τ τοιοτον µριον
το σBµατο« οικεν οCτ)« ξειν Dσπερ @ν ε κ-κλ8 ;µ2ν περιεπεφ-κει 7 1 ρ. !δοκοµεν
γρ @ν Ψν τινι ασνεσαι κα" χφοψ κα" ξρBµατο« κα" σµ«, κα" µα τι« α(σησι«
εναι 6χι« 1κο8 6σφρησι«.
Aristotle observes first that as soon as we touch something (with our hands or feet or
other parts of our body), a perception simultaneously takes place. But this is not a solid
indication in favour of option (a), and leaves the dilemma unresolved. For if, in the state
we are in now (‘nun’: 423a2), we were to make a close-fitting membrane18 and stretch it
around our body, the touching of an object would realize a simultaneous sensory impres-
sion in exactly the same way.19 But it is clear that in this situation the instrument for per-

17 This translation was reproduced with only minor changes in Barnes (ed.) vol. 1 1984,
673.
18 Gohlke 1947, 89 and 91, translates ‘Handschuhe’; Theiler 1959, 44, ‘eine Haut’. In
423a3 Aristotle talks about ‘a membrane’. He returns to it in 423b9. For the reader of
Aristotle’s biological writings this term also suggests his description of the process of
fertilization, which always involves a nuclear beginning that is surrounded by a mem-
brane. Cf. Gener. anim. II 4, 739b26–33. Such a membrane is always ‘earthy’.
19 Aristotle here uses the term ‘ensèmainô’ (!νσηµαν)), ‘to make a (sensory) impres-
sion’. In II 12, 424a1 ff. he explains that this involves the ‘impressing’ of an ‘eidos’ in
the organ of perception, just as the impression of a signet ring is printed in wax. (For
the meaning of this, cf. Mem. 1, 450a27–b11. Aristotle says emphatically there that the
memory is the depository of these ‘impressions’ and that it is located ‘in the soul and
in the part of the body which possesses the soul’ (a29). He also talks about ‘hardness’
and ‘brittleness’ of ‘that which receives the impressions’, i.e. the soul’s instrumental
body. Ageing impairs the instrumental body and leads to loss of memory in Anim. I 4,
408b27 f. The example of the unity of wax and its form, which Aristotle uses in Anim.
II 1, 412b6 f. to underline the unity of the soul and its instrumental body, is chosen on
the basis of his theory of perception and his theory of memory.) Perceptive stimuli,
which have a physical nature, do not lead to a purely physical/chemical effect on the
instrumental body, but have a psychical effect.

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94 Zur Diskussion

ception (to aisthètèrion) is not present in the membrane. The instrument for percep-
tion perceives through something (the membrane) which does not form a ‘natural unity’
with it.
The important question is: what is Aristotle’s next step in his argumentation? He says in
423a5: “ei de kai symphyes genoito” (ε δ κα" σψµφψ« γωνοιτο). It is not immediately clear
whether the subject of this sentence is: ‘the membrane (mentioned)’ or ‘the aisthètèrion’.

2.1. The Standard Interpretation

(A) Every modern translator or commentator known to me takes it that Aristotle is still
talking about ‘the membrane’ here. Smith, in Ross ed. vol. 3, 1931 translated: “If the
membrane could be grown on to the flesh, the report would travel still quicker.”20 If that
was what Aristotle intended, we might well agree with Ross 1961, 262, when he comments:
“This is a remarkable piece of imaginative thinking.” After all, on this interpretation,
what Aristotle suggests here is comparable with the notion that an implanted modern ar-
tificial heart will start to form an organic unity with the body. But there are some objec-
tions to this standard explanation.
(1) If the subject of ‘genoito’ were the membrane (ho hymèn), we might at least wonder
why Aristotle in 423a5 did write a neuter ‘symphyes’ (σψµφψω«), and not the masculine ad-
jective ‘symphyès’ (σψµφψ «) as he does often when he uses the word hymèn. But σψµφψ «
has not been passed down in any of the manuscripts of On the Soul. Ross 1956, 53, did cor-
rect the text in this direction. (In his 1961 edition with commentary he retained the trans-
mitted reading, but in 423a2 inserted a <τι> before περ" τ8ν σρκα to solve this difficulty.)
(2) Aristotle returns to his example of ‘the membrane’ in 423b9. But there it functions
simply as an external membrane not fused with the flesh.
(3) What does to toiouton morion tou sômatos (τ τοιοτον µριον το σBµατο«) in
423a6 mean? In the standard approach to this passage it would also have to refer to the
membrane. Without much ado Smith replaces it by ‘flesh’.21 However, if we have to as-
sume that Aristotle supposed the membrane to form a unity with the flesh and the mem-
brane would therefore become a kind of second skin, it loses its function of external cover-
ing. But then we still have to decide whether the aisthètèrion is located in the flesh (plus
membrane) or not.22
(4) The word ‘kai’, too, is somewhat strange and is often left untranslated. If Aristotle
meant “And if the membrane were also grown on to us, the perception would reach us
even more quickly”, he would be pursuing the idea of a kind of covering which is not the
actual means of perception.

20 Along the same lines Rodier 1900, I 135; II 323; Hicks 1907, 99; Gohlke 1947, 89; Van
den Berg 1953, 140; Theiler 1959, 44: “Wenn sie nun auch zusammen wüchse”; Tricot
1959, 133: “Et même si la membrane venait à s’unir naturellement à la chair”; Ross
1961, 259; Movia 1979, 163 and 328; Gigon 1983, 313; Romeyer-Dherbey 1991, 452;
Thillet 2005, 141: “Mais si cette membrane venait à être congénitale”; Hamlyn 1968,
39; Seidl 1995, 125; Schomakers 2000, 265; Polansky 2007, 325.
21 Hicks 1907, 406, comments on this passage: “The part of the body which answers to
the inseparable membrane of the illustration: of course the flesh is meant.” Likewise
Gigon 1983, 313.
22 This is the main problem in the translation of Thillet 2005, who talks about “la partie
du corps qui aurait même caractère que cette membrane”. For in that case Aristotle
has merely established that the membrane is ‘innate’ (‘congénitale’). But what matters
is the relation to the sensitive soul.

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 Zur Diskussion 95

(5) In that case the entire sentence of “ei de […] hè aisthèsis” would be better placed
directly after ‘ensèmainei’. This not being the case, it seems more an additional after-
thought. Ross 1961, 259, therefore puts it between brackets.
(6) The meaning of dihôristhai (δι)ρσαι) in 423a10 is open to discussion. In the pre-
vailing explanations it is given the sense of ‘being separated’, ‘being non-identical with’,
so that it contrasts with ‘symphyes’.

2.2. Alternative interpretation

(B) The other possibility is that ‘symphyes’ refers not to ‘the membrane’, but to ‘the ais-
thètèrion’. This word is neuter, and so a neuter adjective is fitting. If this is the case, Aris-
totle first examined the option in which the aisthètèrion is not identical with the flesh, but
the flesh is intermediary between the aisthètèrion and the perceived object. Then the flesh
is something external and ‘grown together’ (prospephykos as in 423a16) with the aisthètè-
rion of the soul. He next focuses his attention on the option that the aisthètèrion of the
sensitive soul does form a natural unity with the soul, and he states that, even if perception
via an intermediary takes place quite quickly (whether it be a membrane or the flesh), it
would be even more conducive to this perception if the aisthètèrion does form a natural
unity with the soul. Κα in 423a5 would then have the force of: “But if it (the aisthètèrion)
does form a natural unity (with the sensitive soul) and there is no intermediary between
the actual aisthètèrion and the object of touch, then […]”. Though no one has defended
this interpretation, it is at least worth considering.23
We note that the term ‘symphyes’ here recalls the use of the term in II 8, 420a4 and a12,
where air is said to form a natural unity (to be symphyès) with the perception of hearing
(1κο ).24 If we assume that ‘symphyes’ in 423a5 refers to the word aisthètèrion, Aristotle
may be suggesting here that the aisthètèrion (which is necessarily an instrument of the sen-
sitive soul and as such forms a natural unity with the soul) is identical with the flesh of our
visible body (which therefore also forms a natural unity with the soul). In that case Aris-
totle’s argument switches from pondering intermediate entities (option (a)) to something
which is directly linked to the soul as the perceptive subject (option (b)).
The sentence in 423a6 which starts with ‘Dio’ must be an explanation of the fact that
perception, according to the preceding argument, takes place even more directly. An in-
strument of the sense of touch that is directly connected with the soul as subject of per-
ception would of course be more conducive to the perception of touch than one or more
coverings of the actual aisthètèrion. After the idea of one or more intermediate entities,
Aristotle therefore seems to be investigating the possibility of perception by the flesh as
primary aisthètèrion without any intermediary. Such an aisthètèrion, which forms a direct
unity with the sensitive soul as perceptive subject, would make for the same kind of situ-

23 Note, too, that the reading of ms P, which reads ‘eiè’ (ε(η) instead of ‘genoito’
(γωνοιτο), can then be seriously considered. True enough, P is more recent than most
of the other manuscripts relevant to the constitution of the Greek text, and had the
P variant not been passed down, no one would feel the need to change ‘genoito’. On
the other hand it is hard to understand why a copyist would want to change ‘genoito’
to ‘eiè’. ‘Eiè’ is the lectio difficilior here. It is, however, conceivable that readers who
believed ‘the membrane’ to be subject would have written ‘genoito’, because they
imagined a membrane that was first an ‘external covering’ and that then went on to
form a natural unity with the skin.
24 It should be emphasized that akoè there should not be understood as ‘ear’ but as the
perception of hearing. Cf. Bos 2010.

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96 Zur Diskussion

ation as if the air around us were to form a direct natural unity with our soul as perceptive
subject. We may notice that the words “hèmin peripephykei” (;µ2ν περιπεφ-κει) do not
mean that we, humans together with our fleshy bodies, are surrounded by a bubble of air,25
but that we are surrounded by a bubble of air in stead of by our fleshy bodies. The verb peri-
phyesthai (περιφ-εσαι) is used several times by Aristotle to indicate the way in which a
human being or an animal is clothed by flesh.26
The next part of Aristotle’s argument is therefore intended to show that the flesh of our
body itself cannot possibly be the actual instrument of the sensitive soul. Aristotle infers
this from the empirical fact that the other perceptive faculties are not situated on the out-
side, but ‘within’, and are activated by sensory stimuli via certain specific locations of our
external body.
In On the Soul II 8 Aristotle had talked explicitly about the role of air for the perception
of hearing. He had distinguished there between (a) the air which surrounds us and which
functions as intermediary for the transmission of acoustic vibrations and (b) the air which
‘forms a natural unity’ (symphyès: 420a4 and 12) with the perception of hearing and which
is the actual ensouled part (empsychon: 420a7) that is stimulated by acoustic vibrations.
He distinguishes there between the air outside us and the air inside us (420a5). He also
raises the matter there that a human being or animal perceives acoustic vibrations only via
highly specific parts of the body and not with all parts of the body. For, he says there, “the
ensouled part which will be affected (by the acoustic vibrations) does not have air every-
where” (420a6: ο& γρ πντG ξει 1ωρα τ κινησµενον µωρο« κα" µχψξον). He means that
the instrumental body of the soul can only be affected by aerial vibrations via the ear-
drums of the ear and nowhere else. In our text of II 11, 423a5–17 he uses the air in a men-
tal experiment in which there is no difference between external and internal air, but the
soul that perceives is directly connected with the air around us. But he already explicitly
ruled out this possibility in II 8, 420a5–7.
On the basis of what Aristotle said particularly in II 8 about the actual situation of
the perception of hearing, he must regard as an absurdity his remark here about the
air around us which forms a natural unity with (symphyès) our soul. Its non-reality is ex-
pressed by the use of the pluperfect with ‘an’, as in 423a19 f. Only in this way can we under-
stand why Aristotle begins the sentence starting with ‘Edokoumen gar’ with ‘for’. This
‘gar’ is never rendered meaningfully in modern translations.
This situation that the centre of perception forms a direct unity with a natural body (the
air) cannot possibly occur. “For in that case it would seem that our perception of sound,
colour, and smell were all due to one and the same thing,27 and that vision, hearing, and
smell were all one and the same sense.”
In fact (‘nun de’: 423a10), however, there is not just one instrument for hearing, seeing,
and smelling. The entities through which the sensory stimuli are conveyed are different,

25 In that case our fleshy bodies would still serve as an ‘intermediary’.

26 Cf. Gener. anim. III 2, 754a15; 3, 755a5: “the flesh grows around it” (περιφ-εται ;
σρ); Part. anim. II 9, 654b27: “the fleshy parts of the body have their place around
the bones” (περ" δ τ στ» αH σρκε« περιπεφ-κασι); Progr. anim. 10, 710a32: “strong
owing to the way the flesh grows around it” (σξψρν δ τI περιφ-σει τ« σαρκ«).
27 Because he opts for air as the aisthètèrion, Aristotle does not mention the senses of
touch and taste here. He has made it clear in the previous chapters that air plays a role
as intermediary in hearing (419a32; 420a4), seeing (419a13–15) as well as smelling
(419a32 f.; 421b9).

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and therefore the aisthètèria must be (not one and the same but) different.28 The instru-
ment for seeing must be an instrument of the soul which is potentially colour (cf. II 5,
418a3–6); the aisthètèrion for hearing must be an instrument of the soul which is poten-
tially sound; and the aisthètèrion for smelling must be the instrument of the soul which is
potentially odour.
It is also possible to disagree on ‘dihôristhai’ in 423a10. Smith and Ross take it in the
sense that the intermedia of seeing, hearing and smelling are clearly different from the vis-
ible body of the living being (and so do not form a unity with it).29 But ‘dihôristhai’ can
also be taken in the sense that ‘we have clearly distinguished in the foregoing’30 (or in the
sense that ‘we have clearly distinguished in the living being’31) that through which the per-
ceptive stimuli of the various perceptions go. In II 8, 420a6 Aristotle had explicitly said
that “the aisthètèrion of sound does not have air everywhere” (but only via the ears). This
provides a sound basis for arguing that there must be different aisthètèria for the three per-
ceptive functions in question.
But 423a10 f. raises other questions too. (1) What is meant here by aisthètèria? Three
options are conceivable.
(a) The (secondary) aisthètèria, in the sense of ‘the diaphanous’, ‘the air’ and ‘air and
water’ as intermediate entities;
(b) the (secondary) aisthètèria, in the sense of eye, ear and nose;
(c) the primary aisthètèria/instruments of the senses of vision, hearing, and smell
(which are themselves parts/functions of the sensitive soul).
(2) The choice of one of these three options determines how we must interpret ‘di hou’
(δι* οJ). In itself it can stand for (a) the three intermediate entities for seeing, hearing and
smelling, but also (b) for eye, ear and nose.
If I am right in thinking that Aristotle in 423a5 has started to talk about the tactile ais-
thètèrion of the sensitive soul, which, in a kind of mental experiment, he identifies with the
flesh, it follows that 423a10 f. refers to the primary aisthètèria which form a natural unity
with the perceptive faculties of vision, hearing, and smell of the sensitive soul, and that
Aristotle concludes that they are different on the basis of the distinction that has been es-
tablished (or that exists in reality) regarding the intermediate entities through which (di
hou) sensory stimuli reach the subject.

28 In my view, the fact that Aristotle’s conclusion focuses on aisthètèria is a compelling

reason for accepting that the subject of ‘symphyes genoito’ (or rather: ‘eiè’) must also
be the preceding ‘to aisthètèrion’.
29 Likewise Rodier 1900, I 135: “séparés [de l’organisme]”; Van den Berg 1953, 140:
“afzonderlijk van ons lichaam” [‘separate from our body’]; Theiler 1959, 44: “vom
Körper abgetrennt”; Tricot 1959, 133: “séparés de notre corps”. (In note 7 he com-
ments: “Le raisonnement d’Ar. est confus”.) Jannone/Barbotin 1966, 61; Movia 1979,
163: “distinto dal corpo”; Gigon 1983, 314; Thillet 2005, 141. Hicks 1907, 406 f.: “with
dihôristhai understand tou sômatos (in contrast to prospephykenai or peripephyke-
nai)”. A possible point of reference for this is Gener. anim. I 20, 729a1: !ν $σοι« τ'ν
γεν'ν διBρισται τ λψ κα" τ <ρρεν.
30 Cf. Polansky 2007, 326: “We do distinguish that through which the motions arise.” Cf.
II 4, 415a21; b9; 6a20; 5, 416b33; 7b29; 8a1; 9b4 ‘dihorisômen’ and 420b5 ‘dihoristhô’;
Gener. anim. III 2, 753b12.
31 Cf. Hist. anim. IV 8, 533a20: ∆ι)ρισµωνον γρ ξει τν τπον τ'ν φαλµ'ν κα" τν
τ« 1κο«.

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98 Zur Diskussion

3. The ensouled body must be something solid

But then Aristotle rightly observes in 423a11 that it is not yet clear what the “through
which” is of the sense of touch. He still needs to give an answer to this question. He will
therefore now speak about “the ensouled body” (to empsychon sôma). What does he
mean? This brings us to the central problem of this passage.
! 1ωρο« µν γρ K Cδατο« 1δ-νατον σψστναι τ µχψξον σ'µα. δε2 γρ τι στερεν
εναι. Λεπεται δ µικτν !κ γ« κα" το-τ)ν εναι, οMον βο-λεται ; σρ κα" τ 1νλο-
γον. Dστε 1ναγκα2ον εναι κα" τ σ'µα µεταO το 4πτικο προσπεφψκ«, δι* οJ γνον-
ται αH ασ σει« πλεοψ« ο:σαι. (423a12–17)
Once again I first give the translation of Smith in Ross ed. vol. 3, 1931:32
There must be such a naturally attached ‘medium’ as flesh, for no living body could be
constructed of air or water; it must be something solid. Consequently it must be
composed of earth along with these, which is just what flesh and its analogue in animals
which have no true flesh tend to be. Hence of necessity the medium through which are
transmitted the manifold contrasted tactual qualities must be a body naturally attached
to the organism. (my italics)
Aristotle’s train of thought remains completely obscure in this rendering by Smith.33 First
he seems to argue that a living being must consist of earth and other elements. Next, it
seems as if the flesh of the living being must be ‘attached to the organism’, as if the organ-
ism is not the same as the living being. Ross 1961, 259, translates more clearly: “Therefore
the body must be the organically attached medium for the sense of touch,” but it is unclear
why this follows from the foregoing (Ross concedes this on p. 262). Theiler (in the trans-
lation reproduced by Seidl 1995, 127) chooses a different (and better) course: “Daher ist
notwendigerweise auch der angewachsene Zwischenkörper (Medium) des Tastvermögens
<gemischt>.” But in Theiler it is uncertain whether and how far “the ensouled body” and
“the flesh” differ. It seems strange to posit first that the ensouled body must have a mixed
composition, and then to infer from this that the flesh (of which the ensouled body con-
sists in the standard view) must also have a mixed composition.
Here, too, the tradition has been wrongfooted in that ‘the instrumental body of the
soul’ has always been confused with the visible body of the living being.34 But the text is
entirely compelling. Τ σ'µα µεταO το 4πτικο in 423a15 is ‘the flesh’, as Aristotle
clearly says in 423b26: Dστε τ µεταO το 1πτικο ; σρ. The necessity of flesh also
being composed of at least earth and air and water is inferred in 423a15 from the fact that

32 The translation in Barnes (ed.) 1984 vol. 1, 673, differs radically from that of Smith in
Ross ed. 1931.
33 Hamlyn 1968, 112, notes: “It cannot be said that the course of Aristotle’s argument
is very obvious.” Schomakers 2000, 410, comments: “Aristotle does not say why it
follows from the mixed composition of the body that the body is located between the
capacity for touch and the object that is touched (and is not itself the capacity for
touch).” (my translation) However, in the parts of On the Soul which we can under-
stand well, Aristotle argues pellucidly and very precisely. I do agree with Polansky
2007, x, that Aristotle’s work can be shown to be “remarkably systematic and to dis-
play meticulous organization. From start to finish he is in control of his material,” and
“[d]esign can thus be seen to govern every aspect of Aristotle’s treatment of soul”.
34 Cf. Bos 2003.

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 Zur Diskussion 99

the instrument of tactile perception must be thus composed. Aristotle calls this instrument
‘the ensouled body’, for it is the instrumental body of the (sensitive) soul.35 In On the Soul
Aristotle is talking about the soul. His primary focus is not on living beings. (They will be
dealt with from the Parva Naturalia onwards.) In chapter II 11, too, Aristotle speaks about
an activity (an ‘ergon’ – ργον: cf. 402b12; b14; 403a10) of the soul, that is, perception. In
On the Soul II 1, 412a28 and b4–6 the soul is said to be inextricably linked to an ‘instru-
mental natural body’. So we should take into account that Aristotle can apply the term
‘ensouled’ to this ‘instrumental body’ with which the soul is inextricably connected.36 This
is perfectly evident in On the Soul II 4, 416b29, where Aristotle states: “Everything that
has soul in it possesses vital heat,” for it is this vital heat that constitutes the instrument
by which the soul produces the visible body. Moreover, he has said in II 4, 415b18 that “all
natural bodies” are “instruments” of the soul.37
Aristotle may therefore be saying in this text that the composite of the soul and its in-
strumental body must consist of a mixture of earth and the other natural bodies (under
the guidance of the soul as entelechy). He says the same in On Sense 2, 438b30 when he
states that ‘the instrument of touch’ (to haptikon) consists of earth, since ‘to haptikon’
there is the touch-perceiving instrumental body of the sensitive soul as perceptive subject.
The soul of a perceiving creature cannot be connected with a simple body. Aristotle
already advanced this proposition against Plato in On the Soul I 5, 411a9–11 (and see also
Anim. III 12–13). And from this fact Aristotle infers that the intermediate entity of the
tactile sense must also consist of a mixture of earth and the other elements, i.e. the external
physical body that is directly connected with the aisthètèrion of the tactile sense,38 and
through which perceptions take place, and more than one. That it is more than one is
made clear by the sense of touch connected with the tongue.39 For via (kata) this one part

35 The term ‘prospephykos’ does indicate a ‘natural unity’ of the visible flesh with the
soul-body, but only in the sense of a secondary natural unity, as in Motu anim. 10,
703b1.
36 De mundo 4, 394b11 describes life-bearing pneuma as ‘empsychos ousia’. Iuv. 1,
467b14–16 says that the soul is not a sôma, but that it is situated in a ‘part of the body’
which possesses control over the other parts. There is a similar problem in Anim. III 12
and 13 with the words ‘empsychon sôma’.
37 It is very confusing to state, as Everson 1997, 2 does: “For Aristotle, living creatures
are primary examples of natural bodies.” For that is nowhere the case.
38 The passage in 423a15 should be explained by means of the conclusion in 423b26:
“Therefore the medium of the sense of touch is the flesh” (Dστε τ µεταO το 4πτι-
κο ; σρ). For this intermediate entity is ‘the body located between the subject and
object of touch’. Cf. Sens. 6, 447a8: Pν !στι µεταO το ασητηροψ. Thus we should
interpret in 423a15: “Hence the body that is the medium for the sense of touch must
be (a mixture of these elements) too” (as Theiler indicated). This is precisely opposite
to the conception in Polansky 2007, 326: “The ensouled animal body is not simply air
or water, but flesh […] must combine earth, air, and water to be solid (423a12–15).
This flesh […] will be the medium naturally attached to what has the power of touch.”
The translation of Jannone/Barbotin 1966, 62: “aussi faut-il en rigueur que le corps
soit le milieu adhérent du toucher” seems wrong to me as well. If my explanation of
the text is right, it forms a striking example where a contrast is drawn between the
soul-body as ‘empsychon sôma’ (µχψξον σ'µα) and the visible body as ‘sôma’. Cf.
Part. anim. II 8, 653b21 on ‘sôma kath’ hauto’. But in that case it also follows that
Aristotle draws a conclusion for the visible body from the condition of the soul-body.
39 Aristotle thus returns to problem (1), which seemed to have been settled.

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100 Zur Diskussion

the sense of touch not only perceives all tangible qualities, but also taste. The rest of the
visible body does not perceive taste. Were this so, taste and sense of touch would coincide.
But this is not so. They are different, since they are not completely interchangeable.

4. A new translation with exegesis of 422b34–423a17

The instrument of perception (aisthètèrion) (of the sense of touch of the sensitive soul),
does it lie (b) ‘within’, or does it (a) not lie within, but is it identical to the flesh (of the vis-
ible body)?
The fact that perception is instantaneous with touch does not form a compelling indi-
cation for option (a). For even in our present state, if someone were to make a membrane
and stretch it over his flesh, touching something would provide the sensory impression (of
this contact) just as directly. Yet it is clear that the instrument (aisthètèrion) (of the sense
of touch of the sensitive soul) is not situated in it (the membrane).
[Conclusion: option (b) that the instrument of the perception of touch is situated
‘within’ and is not identical to the flesh is possible.40 However, there are objections to op-
tion (a) that the instrument of perception is identical to the flesh.]
But if it (the instrument of perception of the sense of touch) did form a natural unity
(with the soul) (and it did not have an external covering), the perception would most likely
come through even more directly. Because this part of the body (i.e. the instrument of the
sense of touch) would then seem to have the same position as the air, if around us it were
to form a unity with us (as perceiving subject). (In that case the perceptive stimuli or hear-
ing, seeing and smelling would act directly on the sensitive soul and not indirectly via ear,
eye or nose.) For we would then hold that we perceive sound, colour and smell through the
same entity (i.e. the air as an instrument of perception directly connected with the sensi-
tive soul), and then seeing, hearing and smelling would seem to be a single perceptive ac-
tivity (because there would not be different aisthètèria within the body for hearing, seeing
and smelling). But (this is not the case, for) the situation is that the said instruments of
perception are clearly different from each other, because ‘that through which they take
place’ is distinct for each of these perceptions.
But with regard to the perception of touch, that (‘through which it takes place’) is not
yet clear on the basis of the foregoing. That is because the ensouled body (that perceives)
cannot consist of air or water only. It must be something solid. So the only possibility is
that it has a mixed composition, viz. of earth and those (elements) mentioned earlier, just
as flesh and its equivalent are usually composed. It is therefore necessary that the body
which is the medium between the touching part (of the soul) (and the object of touching)
and which is fused with this touching part – through which perceptions take place, and
more than one – also has a mixed composition.
By way of completion Aristotle also removes the possible objection that, if two bodies
are separated by a third between the two, the first two cannot ‘touch’ each other. Every
perception takes place via an intermediary. He calls to mind the example of the mem-
brane, where we do not even notice that there is something between our hand and what we

40 Cf. Romeyer-Dherbey 1996, 141: “Rien n’empêche donc que la chair (sarx) joue le
rôle de cette membrane […], le siège sensoriel (aisthètèrion) proprement dit situé à l’in-
térieur du corps, près du coeur”; Polansky 2007, 325: “At least the possibility for flesh
to be the medium rather than sense organ is being established”.

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 Zur Diskussion 101

touch. The only difference is that we hear and see because something ‘in between’ acts
upon us, whereas touching takes place through but also together with the flesh. The com-
pelling conclusion is then drawn in 423b22 f.: “From this it is clear that the instrument
of perception of what is touched is within” (— κα" δλον $τι !ντ« τ το 4πτο α-
σητ ριον), as part of the sensitive soul and of the ‘ensouled body’ in the proper sense.
This underlines what Aristotle had noted in 423b17: the role of flesh for the perception of
touch and that of the tongue for the perception of taste seem just as intermediary as that
of air and water for the perceptions of seeing, hearing, and smelling.
In this way Aristotle conceives a uniform doctrine of perception,41 according to which
all perceptions are registered by a physical aspect of the soul (the primary aisthètèrion),
which is in touch with a corresponding physical intermediary (metaxy), which transmits
the stimuli of the perceived physical objects. This uniform doctrine of perception presup-
poses the location of the soul in the centre of the living being and therefore weakens the
hylomorphistic interpretation of On the Soul as argued by Nuyens 1939 and Ross.42

Anim. De anima
Gener. anim. De generatione animalium
Hist. anim Historia animalium
Insomn. De insomniis
Iuv. De iuventute
Mem. De memoria
Motu anim. De motu animalium
Mu. De mundo
Part. anim. De partibus animalium
Probl. Problemata
Progr. anim. De progressu animalium
Sens. De sensu
Somn. De somno et vigilia

Barnes, J. (ed.) 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Transl. 2 vols.
Princeton.
–. 1999. “Aristotle on Perception”. Classical Review 49, 120–122.
Berg, I. J. M. van den 1953. Aristoteles’ ‘Verhandeling over de ziel’. Utrecht/Nijmegen.
Bodéüs, R. 1993. Aristote, ‘De l’âme’. Trad. inédite, présentation, notes et bibliographie.
Paris.

41 For this reason alone there is little probability in the idea of Gohlke 1947, 12, that
Aristotle initially presented flesh as the organ of sense and later no more. In this view,
chapters III 12–13 were added as a result of this change. This hypothesis is probably
based on the incorrect interpretation of II 10, 422b5 f. Hutchinson 1987, who argued
that III 12 and 13 should be replaced between II 4 and II 5, did not mention Gohlke’s
considerations. The thesis of Romeyer-Dherbey 1996, 145–147 that Aristotle only de-
veloped this uniform theory of perception after many years seems to me to lack a solid
foundation.
42 Aristotle’s remarks in Part. anim. II do agree. Cf. II 10, 656b34–36. In II 1, 647a24–31
also the centre of perception is situated in the heart. In II 8, 653b23–27 the flesh is
called the ‘first’ aisthètèrion of touch (in distinction from the aisthètèrion ‘within’ as
second).

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