Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
the first to write such logoi. But this is immaterial to our present interest. What-
ever his historical position in this respect, he certainly brought the genre to its
perfection – with an important difference to boot, which will occupy us as we
go along. The other logoi sokratikoi exhibited Socrates’ modus philosophandi
and, at most, conveyed a moral message detachable from the dialogical form,
or were of merely protreptic intent. As a matter of fact, if anything can be said
about the historical Socrates, his intent seems indeed to have been mostly pro-
treptic.
However, for our purposes, we are interested not in the historical Socrates,
whoever he may have been, but in the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues. Yet, Socrates
in the Republic says things that in the Apology he would not say, or flatly contra-
dicts them: immortality of the soul (whatever that means), ideas, etc. This is not
a chronological distinction, not the venerable one corresponding to the ‘early’
and ‘later’ dialogues, respectively. It is rather the distinction between the aporet-
ic Socrates, such as that in Laches or Euthyphro, and the ‘positive’ Socrates, such
as the one in Phaedo or the Republic. Socrates of Plato’s dialogues is a complex
figure. Elsewhere, I have called these two strains of Socrates of the dialogues
‘Plato’s Socrates’ and ‘the platonic Socrates’: the agnostic, aporetic, and the py-
thagorizing, mythologizing, metaphysical Socrates. In the same dialogue both
may be there at different times. Euthydemus, Phaedrus, even Phaedo and the Re-
public have both. Traits of the first appear also in ‘later’ dialogues, such as The-
aetetus, and of the second also in ‘early’ dialogues, as Protagoras. Here, I am in-
terested mainly in the platonic Socrates, although I shall be referring
occasionally to Plato’s Socrates. The difference should be clear from the context.
Neither of these is necessarily Plato’s mouthpiece. Socrates often says different
things in different dialogues and even sometimes, if we take his words at face
value, contradicts himself from one dialogue to another and even in the same
dialogue.
One might say that, as in good drama, Plato is behind all of his characters
and, what amounts to the same, in none of them. Or perhaps he is in his char-
acters not only as their creator but also as voicing through them views that he
himself held or, at least, considered. Shakespeare did not put part of himself
into Iago, but Callicles may have a good claim to a part of Plato, or so the argu-
ment goes.
A playwright does not commit himself to consistency over different pieces. It
does happen sometimes, particularly when the author has a social or political
agenda, but this is certainly not the rule. The same has been sometimes said
of Plato: each of his dialogue is to be read on its own, without taking over
ideas from one to another. But Plato himself quotes from one dialogue in anoth-
E. g., Crombie 1962. For a variety of approaches, see now Press 1993.
See Phaedo 107b.
Cf. Owen 1953 and Cherniss 1957.
Republic iii 394d ff.
In both cases, Plato’s dialogues are incomplete. Aporetic dialogues are such
by their own nature. But, narrated or not, his dialogues contain purposeful in-
consistencies in chronology or other disturbing details precisely in order to
warn us against taking at face value all that is said. And one should never forget
that the narrator is himself a dramatis persona. As such, he has his own interests
and point of view and his report is never to be taken without more ado as nar-
rating things as they presumably were.
But, one may say, when Socrates is the narrator, he is surely to be trusted. –
Or is he? Take the case of Euthydemus. Twice in the course of the dialogue, Soc-
rates is on the verge of admitting that his story is not well told. At the third time,
Crito himself challenges Socrates’ narrative to the point that Clinias – Socrates’
young respondent, credited by him of quite unlikely answers – immediately
drops out of the dialogue altogether.⁹
Euthydemus teaches us something important about Socrates’ method. While
the two sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, put their questions from their
own point of view, without any preparation of their interlocutor,¹⁰ Socrates ar-
gues dialectically. In this dialogue as in all the other dialogues, he starts always
from the point where his interlocutor stands and aims at disproving him and
sometimes, if possible, at leading him gradually to change his views. In so argu-
ing, Socrates is necessarily being ironical. He takes on positions that are not his,
but his method brings him to develop them only for the sake of the argument.
One should, thus, be very careful when ascribing to Socrates views that he pres-
ents during the conversation.
In Meno 80, Plato introduces his hypothetical method, to be fully explained
in Phaedo 100 – 101.¹¹ This method, inspired by the geometrical method of anal-
ysis, starts from an accepted conclusion and looks for the minor premise that
will support it. For Plato, philosophy is not primarily a deductive science.
Against the rules of good logical reasoning, accepted at least since Parmenides,
the conclusion is taken to be stronger than its premises. The hypothetical method
goes ‘the wrong way’: ¹² it goes from the conclusion to the premise, which is now
the desideratum.
The source of that premise is irrelevant. It could be a few lines from a poem,
an accepted scientific theory, a myth (invented ad hoc or pre-existing), a purport-
ed dream. If that premise is not consistent with other opinions accepted by the
interlocutor, either it or the opinions that conflict with it are to be discarded as
Euthydemus 293b-end.
Euthydemus 274d-e.
Cf. Scolnicov 1975.
Cf. Cornford 1932.
goes without saying. Is Socrates’ irony all of it Plato’s? Not impossible, but I per-
sonally find it hard to believe.¹⁷
Yet, socratic irony never discloses what Socrates means. It only makes ex-
ceedingly clear what he does not mean. In this, it is not like ordinary irony, or
antiphrasis, which says the opposite of what is meant.¹⁸ Nor is it like romantic
irony, or Vlastos’s complex irony, which leaves us undecided between ‘yes’
and ‘no’.¹⁹ It is open irony, in which the opposite pole is never given.²⁰
Socratic irony cannot tell us, not even indirectly, Socrates’ meaning. Socratic
irony involves a different understanding of the very words used. Using other
words would be of no avail. Language is essentially ambiguous, as Euthydemus
and Cratylus teach us. Time and again, Socrates’ argumentation brings us back to
what seems to be the accepted virtues.²¹ The words are the same, but, for Socra-
tes, they bear a different meaning, for which there are no other words than the
ones he and everybody else use.
Here an important distinction is in order: the distinction between utterance
and proposition. An utterance is a unit of speech, long or short, the actual token
of words emitted by the speaker at a given moment, essentially dependent on
him as the speaker. A proposition is the content expressed in the utterance, in-
dependent of him who produced it or of the language in which it was produced.
(For our purposes, the modern distinction between sentence and proposition is
irrelevant.) The dialogue format presents us with purported utterances, not with
propositions. All that is said is dependent of he who says it and in which context
and is inextricable from the sayer and from its context.
In Euthydemus, Plato makes a firm stand on the view that words have no
meaning in themselves. He is careful not to say that such is the meaning of
this word; instead he says that people use this word to convey such a meaning.
Words are tools ²² used by the speaker to convey what he wants. Any word can
bear any meaning. I may, of course, use ‘dog’ to mean cat, if I disregard the
risk of being misunderstood. The meaning of the words is not in themselves
but in the soul of the speaker (and of the hearer).²³
Holger Thesleff, in private correspondence, pushed me towards taking a stand on this ques-
tion.
Quintilianus 9.2.44.
Vlastos 1991.
On Socrates’ open irony, see Scolnicov 2004.
Cf. Desjardins 1988.
Cratylus 388c ff.
Euthydemus 295b5, e8.
Euthydemus 295c.
Seventh Letter 341c.
As held, in modern times, among others by Krämer 1959 and Szlezák 1993.
Hoffmann 1947.
Phaedo 89b. The place of the passage in the almost exact middle of the dialogue is a prime
example of ‘pedimental structure’, as it called by Thesleff 1966, in Thesleff 2009, 28 and passim.
Thesleff 2000, 241– 550.
Works Cited
Allen, R E (ed.) 1965, Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, Routledege & Kegan Paul, London.
Berkeley, George 1713, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.
Cherniss, H F 1957, ‘The relation of the Timaeus to Plato’s later dialogues’, in Allen 1965.
Cornford, F M 1932, ‘Mathematics and dialectic in the Republic vi-vii’, in 1965.
Crombie, Ian M 1962, An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines, Routledge & K. Paul, London.
Desjardins, Rosemarie 1988, ‘Why dialogues?’, in Griswold Jr. 1988, 110 – 15.
Galileo Galilei 1632, Dialogo dei due massimi sistemi del mondo.
Giannantoni, Gabriele 1983, Socraticorum reliquiae, Bibliopolis, Roma.
Griswold Jr., C.L. (ed.) 1988, Platonic writings / Platonic readings Routledge, London.
Hoffmann, Ernst 1947, ‘Die literarische Voraussetzungen des Platonsverständnisses’,
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 2, 465 – 480
Krämer, Martin 1959, Arete bei Plato und Aristoteles, Heidelberg.
Owen, G E L 1953, ‘The place of the Timaeus in Plato’s dialogues’, in Allen 1965.
Press, Gerald A 1993, Plato’s dialogues: New studies and interpretations, Rowman &
Littlefield, Lanham, Md.
Quintilianus, Marcus Fabius, Institutio oratoria.
Scolnicov, Samuel 1975, ‘Hypothetical method and rationality in Plato’, Kant-Studien 66,
157 – 162.
Scolnicov, Samuel 2004, ‘Plato’s ethics of irony’, in Maurizio Migliori (ed.), Plato ethicus
Academia Verlag, St. Augustin, 289 – 300.
Szlezák, Thomas A 1993, Platon lesen, frommann-holzboog, Stuttgart.
Thesleff, Holger 2000, ‘Plato and his public’ (2000), Studies in the styles of Plato, 241 – 250.
Thesleff, Holger 2009, Platonic patterns: A collection of studies, Parmenides Publishing,
Zurich.
Thesleff, Holger 1966, Studies in the styles of Plato (1966), now reprinted in Thesleff 2009,
28 and passim.
Vlastos, Gregory 1991, ‘Socratic irony’, in Socrates: Ironist and moral philosopher, Cambridge
University Press Cambridge, 21 – 44.