LEBIN V.

MIRASOL

Summary: Spouses Lebin offered to buy a parcel of land forming part of the estate of LJ
Hodges. The court conditioned the approval of the offer on the spouses being the sole actual
occupants of the property. When the court found out through an ocular visit that the spouses
were indeed the only occupants, it approved the offer. However, it turns out that Mirasol
(because of a misidentification of the land her house stood on) was also occupying the same lot.
This prompted Mirasol to also offer to purchase the property. The RTC ordered the sale of the
land to both parties in equal shares. The Lebin spouses appealed the decision to the SC. The
SC, however, affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Doctrine: The RTC may authorize the sale, mortgage, or encumbrance of assets of the estate.
This power includes the authority to nullify or modify its approval of the sale of the property of
the estate to conform to the law or to the standing policies set and fixed for the purpose, where
the invalidation or modification derived from the falsity of the factual basis of the disposition, or
from any other factual mistake, or from the concealment of a material fact by a party.

Facts:
● Spouses Elbe and Erlinda Lebin relayed their offer to the administrator of the estate of
LJ Hodges to purchase a parcel of land (Lot 18) forming part of the estate. They made a
deposit of 20% of the offer.
● The administrator asked for the approval of the RTC. The RTC asked that an ocular be
conducted to determine if Lebin was the sole actual occupant. Upon finding that she
was, the RTC approved.
● Meanwhile, respondent Vilma Mirasol also offered to purchase the lot, since her house
stood there. The lot was initially identified as Lot 4, but a later survey revealed that her
house actually stood on Lot 18.
● When she learned of the approval of petitioners’ offer to purchase, she filed a petition for
relief from the RTC’s order.
● Pending resolution of the case, petitioners paid the last installment on Lot 18, and
moved for execution. The motion was not acted upon by the RTC.
● RTC: ordered the execution of the corresponding deed of sale in favor of the 2 offerors.
● Petitioners appealed to the SC through a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue and Held:

● WoN the RTC erred in allocating Lot 18 in equal portions to both petitioners and
respondent- NO.
○ This is in keeping with the policy to prefer actual occupants in the disposition of
estate assets, in order to prevent dislocation of such occupants. This policy was
entirely within the power of the RTC to adopt and enforce as the probate court.
○ Also, the approval of the offer to purchase was conditioned upon whether the
petitioners were the only actual occupants. It just turns out that there was a
mistake with respect to the petitioners being the only actual occupants, because
the house of Mirasol happened to be within the same lot subject of the
 petitioners’ offer to purchase. The confusion arose from the misdescription
described above.
○ Under Sec. 4 Rule 89, the RTC may authorize the sale, mortgage, or
encumbrance of assets of the estate. This power includes the authority to nullify
or modify its approval of the sale of the property of the estate to conform to the
law or to the standing policies set and fixed for the purpose, where the
invalidation or modification derived from the falsity of the factual basis of the
disposition, or from any other factual mistake, or from the concealment of a
material fact by a party.

Ruling:
● Petition denied.

Other issue:
● WoN the spouses failed to file a timely record on appeal- YES.
● Among the innovations introduced by BP 129 is the elimination of the record on
appeal in most cases, retaining the record on appeal only for appeals in special
proceedings and in other cases which the ROC allows multiple appeals.
● The ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal instead of only a notice of
appeal is the multi-part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each part
susceptible of being finally determined and terminated independently of other
parts.
● Sec. 3, Rule 41 of the ROC retains the original 30 days as the period for
perfecting the appeal by record on appeal to take into consideration the need for
the trial court to approve the record on appeal. Within that 30-day period a party
aggrieved by a judgment or final order issued in special proceedings should
perfect an appeal by filing BOTH a notice of appeal and a record on appeal in the
TC, serving a copy of the notice of appeal AND a record on appeal upon the
adverse party within the period.
● In the case at bar, although the petitioners filed the notice of appeal on March 27,
1998, they submitted the record on appeal only on May 5, 1998. Undoubtedly,
they filed the record on appeal 43 days from March 23, 1998, the date they
received the denial of their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial.