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 LET'S SIMPLIFY LEGAL LANGUAGE
JOHN W. HAGER*

This article is not written in the iconoclastic' tradition of a

Jeremy Bentham, a Jerome Frank, or even a Fred Rodell. Rather,
it is a modest effort to follow President Theodore Roosevelt's wise
counsel that: "Every man owes some of his time to the upbuilding
of the profession to which he belongs." It has been given a Caesarean
treatment, and, like ancient Gaul, is divided into three parts. Part I,
by the use of selected examples, shows that legal language is com-
plicated and that such complication is wholly unnecessary. Part 1I
warns that we of the legal profession must abandon "Legalese" and
simplify our language, or, alternatively, be prepared to find many
of our professional services dispensed with.2 Part III suggests several
ways to bring about simplification with a loss for none, but a gain
for all.
I. GIBBERISH, JARGON, AND GOBBLEDYGOOK
"Speak English," said the
Eaglet. "I don't know the
meaning of half these
long words, and what's
more, I don't believe you
do, either."
Alice in Wonderland
Lincoln's statement, "A lawyer's time and advice are his stock in
trade," which graces the walls of many law offices as a not-so-subtle
hint to clients to state their business quickly and then depart, might
better read, "A lawyer's gibberish, jargon, and gobbledygook are his
major stock in trade." When a man gives you an orange, he simply
says: "Have an orange." But when the transaction is entrusted to a
lawyer, he adopts this form:
I hereby give and convey to you, all and singular, my estate
and interest, right, title, claim and advantages of and in said
orange, together with its rind, skin, juice, pulp and pips and
all rights and advantages therein and full power to bite, suck,
or otherwise eat the same or give the same away with or
without the rind, skin, juice, pulp and pips, anything here-
inbefore or hereinafter or in any other means of whatever
*Professor of Law, University of Tulsa.
1. Whether the use of this adjective does these men an injustice must be
decided by each reader for himself. Undoubtedly, the writing of these three scholars
contain much that is provocative and worthwhile.
2. The language purist who is horrified to discover a preposition at the
end of this sentence is referred to Sir Winston Churchill's now famous defense when
accused of a similar error: "This is the type of arrant pedantry, up with which I
shall not put."

[74]
 LET'S SIMPLIFY LEGAL LANGUAGE

nature or3 kind whatsoever to the contrary in anywise notwith-

standing.
Admittedly, the example given is an exaggeration. But you and
I make a grave mistake if we fail to realize that its humor depends,
to a large extent, on the fact that the example is a caricature of true-
to-life situations. "Have an orange," is of sufficient clarity for most
people, and most people are the ones who should be considered first.
A more true-to-life example is found in a Colorado statute 4 which
provides:
No person, firm or corporation shall conduct or carry on
any trade system, practice or business scheme or plan which
includes or involves the offering or delivery, with or in con-
sideration of any purchase of goods, wares and merchandise,
of any bonuses, premiums, discounts, rebates, credits or prizes
or any trading stamps, profit sharing coupons, tokens or other
evidences of liability of any sort, which are redeemable or
exchangeable in any way for bonuses, premiums, discounts,
rebates, credits, or prizes, where the success or maintenance
of any such trade system, practice or business scheme or plan,
or any advantage or profit to be derived in the course of it,
arises from or depends upon any or either of the following
factors or causes:
(1) Arises from or depends upon the credulity, ignor-
ance, misinformation or negligence of the person to whom
said bonuses, premiums, evidences of liability or other devices
above mentioned are offered or delivered, or of the public,
or of the persons who are dealt with in the course of such
practice or business plan.
(2) Arises from or depends upon the failure or negli-
gence of any person to whom such offer or delivery is made
or of the beneficiaries of any such bonuses, premiums, re-
bates, tokens, evidences of liability, or other devices above
mentioned, or of the general public, or of the customers or
persons trading with the persons making such offer and
delivery, or of part of either, to accept or take the advantage
of any such bonuses, premiums, discounts, rebates or prizes,
or other devices, or to redeem or exchange any token, tokens,
or evidence or evidences of liability therefor.
(3) Arises from or depends upon the encouragement of
any profligate, excessive or inconsiderate purchasing of goods,
wares and merchandise or from or upon anything which
materially encourages or tends to encourage any of the same.
(4) Arises from or depends upon the opportunity for
deceit, fraud or misrepresentation in the course thereof, or
the opportunity to play upon the ignorance, credulity or
inexperience of the public.
(5) Arises from or depends upon the inducement or
encouragement given the general public or the persons dealt
3. The Tulsa Tribune, October 6, 1959; permission to quote given by its
general counsel, Mr. Samuel Boorstin.
4. COLO. RY. STAT. ANN. § 40-16-15 (1953).
 32 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW (1959)

with in the case of retail trade in articles or materials for

food, clothing, household supplies or other articles of ordinary
family or personal use, to purchase such articles either wholly
or partially because of the value of or any profit or advantage
to be devrived from the acquisition of any such bonus,
premium, discount, rebate, credit or prize as distinguished
from purchasing the same solely because of the intrinsic
value of or need for any advantage in the acquisition of the
articles themselves which are accompanied by such bonuses,
premiums, discounts, rebates, credits or prizes or by some-
thing exchangeable therefor. Every day on or in which any
trade system, practice, business scheme or plan forbidden
under any of the foregoing paragraphs is conducted or
carried on shall constitute a separate offense.
(6) Provided, that nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to prohibit the giving or receiving of cash discounts.
Presumably, the Legislature of Colorado was composed of in-
telligent men who wrote and passed that section for the guidance of
merchants in the state, and not for the purpose of creating business
for Colorado lawyers. If that presumption be true, such purpose was
not attainedl It is doubtful if the average businessman (or, perhaps,
the average lawyer) can struggle through this complicated legal
language and decide what is forbidden and what is permissible under
the terms of the act. The "Legalese" used in this particular statute
is typical. It seeks to anticipate and plug every conceivable loophole
through which a shady merchant might crawl. Such effort pre-
supposes that Colorado merchants are not basically law abiding. It
is doubtful that violations of this statute would increase if it were
reduced from its present 504 words to 54 words, and rephrased to read
as follows: "No business shall offer its customers any bonus for pur-
chasing merchandise unless such bonus is offered solely as a cash
discount, and customers are actually informed of the bonus and its
purpose as a cash discount. Each day, or part thereof, during which a
forbidden bonus plan is in operation is a separate offense." 5 In
truth, Colorado merchants might then understand what it is they are
forbidden to do.
Dr. Rudolf Flesch, when asked to rewrite certain governmental
regulations, took the following definition:
Ultimate consumer means a person or group of persons,
generally constituting a domestic household, who purchase
eggs generally at the individual stores of retailers or purchase
and receive deliveries of eggs at the place or abode of the
individual or domestic household from producers or retail
route sellers and who use such eggs for their consumption
as food,
5. Candor compels an admission that this sentence does not encompass all
substance of the original statute. The omissions, however, relate to matters clearly
unenforceable.
 LET'S SIMPLIFY LEGAL LANGUAGE

and simplified it to read: "Ultimate consumers are people who buy

eggs to eat them.'"'
Even relatively short and comparatively uncomplicated legisla-
tive enactments can be simplified for the benefit of the general public
for whose guidance such acts are passed. England's Anglo-Portuguese
Commercial Treaty Act of 1914 provides: "The description 'Port' or
'Madeira' applied to any wine or other liquor other than wine the
produce of Portugal and the island of Madeira respectively shall be
deemed to be a false trade description within the meaning of the
Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, and that Act shall have effect accord-
ingly." The average wine merchant, bottler, or manufacturer can
understand the terms of this Act once he mentally eliminates the un-
necessary legal language and gets past the word "other" which is used
twice with but a single word in between. To save him that trouble
the act could read simply: "Wine from Portugal is 'Port.' Wine from
the island of Maderia is 'Madeira.' Describing other alcoholic bever-
ages as 'Port' or 'Madeira' is unlawful."
The foregoing paragraphs demonstrate only briefly and very
inadequately the use of "Legalese" in legislative enactments. A
cursory glance at the statutes of any state will reveal that legal
language used therein is highly complicated. A few minutes thought
will show that such complication is unnecessary. The brunt of
criticism for the complicated legal language found in most legislative
enactments need not be borne by lawyers only. Most legislatures are
composed of men from all walks of life. These non-lawyer legislators
must share the blame for making it unnecessarily difficult for their
constitutuents to read and undertsand the laws by which their lives
are to be governed. However, complicated legal language is, un-
fortunately, not confined to legislative enactments. It permeates legal
education in our law schools, a trial court's instructions to a jury,
documents prepared for a client's use, and pleadings, as the remainder
of Part I will demonstrate. In these areas lawyers, judges, and law
professors must bear the brunt of criticism for using and thereby
perpetuating complicated legal language, which has been dubbed
"Legalese" in this article.
It is doubtful if there ever was, or is now, a single law student
in any of the numerous law schools in this country who did not find
himself confused, bewildered, and frustrated as he began his legal
education. Only a very few law instructors will tell their students,
and even fewer students discover for themselves, that much of a
student's confusion, bewilderment, and frustration arises because he is
not being taught law only-he is being taught a foreign language as
welll It is bad enough that law professors generally refuse to be
6. Fu.SCH, THE ART OF PLAIN TALK (1946).
 32 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW (1959)

realistic with their students on this point. But their crime is com-
pounded by a failure to face the fact that law, for the most part, does
not have to be taught in a foreign language at all. Certainly law
professors did not create this foreign language-this "Legalese" which
we of the legal profession learn to speak so fluently. Therefore, they
argue that their students must be taught the words, phrases, doctrines,
maxims, etc. in the language in which these things will be encountered
in the courts, statutes, and appellate decisions. As valid as this
argument may be, it is, in its final analysis, merely another example
of "passing the buck." If the thesis of this article that legal language
can be, should be, and must be simplied has any merit, there is no
better place for such simplification to be started than in our law
schools.
There are four main factors which cause legal language to be
complicated-factors which create confusion not only in the mind
of a beginning law student but in the minds of the general public
and even lawyers as well. These four factors are: (1) The use of
archaic, obsolete, old English words which have passed from the
English language but have been kept alive by frequent transfusions
from the legal profession; (2) The use of Latin, and sometimes
French, words and phrases to express a rule, principle, doctrine,
maximum, etc. which could be phrased just as well, if not better, in
English; (3) The corruption of English words having a commonly
understood meaning by assigning to these words a new, different,
unusual, and purely legal meaning, or assigning to these words, not
one, but several exclusively legal definitions; and (4) The well
known and often ridiculed tendency of lawyers to write interminably
long sentences with little or no punctuation and frequent words of
qualification and exception. Earlier paragraphs might have led to a
belief that I regard brevity and simplicity as synonymous. If so, it
should be noted here that of the four suggested factors causing legal
language to be complicated, only one, the last, has anything to do
with brevity. A complete list of archaic and obsolete English words
in legal language would be far too lengthy to include in an article of
this size. However, almost everyone's list would include the follow-
ing: whence, hence, wherefor, indenture (for "agreement") , bequeath,
devise, hereof, covenant, said (when referring to a previously named
person, event, thing, etc.), trover, and bounden. Fortunately, the use
of Latin or French words and phrases by courts in their opinions is
on the decline. Unfortunately, Latin is still sprinkled through many
opinions, causing the busy lawyer to waste his valuable time in the
use of a law dictionary. In this day and age there appears to be no
justification for continuing to use such foreign words and phrases as:
res ipsa loquitur, a fortiori, nunc pro tunc, a posteriori, a priori,
 LET'S SIMPLIFY LEGAL LANGUAGE

caveat emptor, a mensa et thoro, and volenti non fit injuria. If the
average layman were asked to define the word "negligence," he prob-
ably would use the word "carelessness." This is generally recognized
and commonly understood meaning. It is perfectly clear to a layman.
But when he encounters this familiar word in the language of the law,
he finds that it is no longer his old friend "carelessness." He discovers
to his everlasting confusion (if not outright amazement, disgust, or
amusement) that negligence has become carelessness only if a certain
part), called the defendant owed a legal duty to another party called
the plaintiff, which duty was breached by the defendant and this
breach caused certain damages to the plaintiff's person or property.
So far, the layman, although resenting this new meaning which he is
having to learn, is able to see that it is at least a first cousin to his
old friend carelessness. But then he is told that carelessness isn't
quite yet negligence in a legal sense, rendering the defendant liable,
unless defendant's carelessness proximately caused plaintiff's injuries
If our astute layman pays close attention to the law's explanation of
proximate cause, he finds that it has very little to do with proximity
and practically nothing to do with causation. Little wonder that
he prefers to go back to his safe, sane definition of "carelessness."
It is bad enough to take our layman's ordinary word and give it a
new, different, unusual, and purely legal definition . It is far worse
when we take such a word and give it, not one, but several exclusively
legal meanings. The average person knows that malice means ill
will, spite, or hatred. But when that word is added to legal language,
sometimes it means ill will. At other times it means criminal intent,
an act done without legal excuse, a wanton disregard of consequences,
a general wanton desire to annoy, etc., ad infinitum and ad nauseaml
Even this characteristic of being able to fit almost any situation
does not exhaust the virtues of this legal word "malice." It is also
divided into: express malice, implied malice, particular malice, special
malice, universal malice, general malice, constructive malice, malice
in fact, malice in law, and malice aforethought. Were one to take
another word, fraud, which has a common, ordinary meaning and show
its meanings when used in legal language, he would have to write a
small book at least. One need not look far for examples of intermin-
ably long sentences in the law. An Oklahoma statute 7 has 845 words
and only one sentence, although a period is thrown into the middle
of the statute, undoubtedly to indicate a rest stopl
As no one has conducted a thorough scientific study on whether
juries understand and follow the law as laid down for them in
instructions by courts, it remains a matter of pure conjecture. It
would not be surprising to find that jurors do not, as a general rule,

7. 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 170 (1937).

 32 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW (1959)

follow such instructions to any great extent in view of the complicated

legal language in which such instructions are couched. The fact that
lawyers in their requested instructions and trial judges in the in-
structions finally given in a case use language which is difficult enough
for persons trained in law, and almost impossible of understanding
by persons lacking that training, would seem to be some indirect
evidence that we of the legal profession do not believe that jurors
follow the law as given to them by a court, nor do we really expect
them to do so. Rather, instructions would seem to be prepared with
an eye toward an eventual appeal. Instructions would seem to be
phrased to gain approval by an appellate court and not written to be
understood by the jurors for whose guidance they, theoretically at
least, are given. The following instruction, with only minor changes
in phraseology, is a common one given by the trial judges of many
states:
You are instructed that the burden of proof in this case is
upon the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence all of the material allegations in his petition contained;
likewise, the burden is upon the defendant to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the affirmative allegations in
his answer. By a preponderance of the evidence, as the term
is used in these instructions, is not meant the greater number
of witnesses either on one side or the other, but refers to that
class or character of testimony which weighs most heavily
upon the minds of the jurors and is most convincing in its
nature.
The instruction quoted could be simplified in several ways. The easiest
way would be to eliminate all words which are strange and unusual
to the average layman. Jurors should be instructed in ordinary
English which they understand, not in language which is understood
only by members of the legal profession. The average person either
believes or disbelieves a story related to him by another person.
Further, he has criteria, recognized or unrecognized, by which he
determines the truthfulness or falsity of a story. But when a court
instructs him as a juror on what the law requires of him in this
regard, he is told:
You are instructed that you are the exclusive judges of all
the questions of fact in this case and of the credibility of the
witnesses who have testified before you and the weight you
will give to the testimony of each of them. In determining
such weight or credibility you may consider: the interest, if
any, which the witness may have in the result of the trial;
the relation of the witness to the parties; the bias or pre-
judice, if any has been apparent, the candor, fairness, intelli-
gence, and demeanor of the witness; the ability of the witness
to remember and relate past occurrences, and means of obser-
vation, and opportunity of knowing the matters about which
the witness has testified. From all the facts and circum-
 LET'S SIMPLIFY LEGAL LANGUAGE

stances appearing in evidence and coming to your observation

during the trial, aided by the knowledge which you each
possess in common with other persons, you will reach your
verdict and your conclusions. You should not let sympathy,
sentiment or prejudice enter into your deliberations, but you
should discharge your duties as jurors impartially, con-
scientiously and faithfully under your oaths and return such
verdict as the evidence warrants when measured by these
instructions.
In preparing documents for a client's use, the lawyer seems to
follow a theory that the longer the document and the wordier, the
better the document is. Or else it is an effort to impress the client.
In either event, such ramblings are unnecessary and the document
should reflect in ordinary language the particular needs of the client.
Authors, editors, compilers, and publishers of the numerous form
books encourage lawyers to draft long, complicated documents with
much flowery language by suggesting forms which incorporate these
useless features.8 Last wills and testaments, in particular, seem to
lend themselves well to such treatment. I once filed for probate a
will written by an attorney for the disposition of his own estate.
The will was written in pencil on the back of a used envelope, dated
and signed, and said simply: "Everything I have is to go to my wife."
This will was admitted to probate. However, in drafting wills for
his thousands of clients, many of whom had no more complicating
factors in the disposition of their estates than the attorney had in
disposing of his own, he used this form:
I, John Doe, of Podunk, County of Legalese, State of Okla-
homa, being now in good health, strength of body and sound
of mind, but sensible of the uncertainty of life, and desiring
to make disposition of my property and affairs while in such
good health, strength of body, and sound mind, do hereby
make, publish, and declare the following to be my last will
and testament, hereby revoking and cancelling any and all
or former wills by me at any time made.
(1) I direct the payment of all my just debts and funeral
expenses.
(2) All the rest, remainder, and residue of my property,
both real and personal, of every kind, and wherever situated,
whether vested or contingent at the time of my death, I
give, devise, bequeath and will to my loving spouse, Anna
Marie Doe, nee Roe, absolutely free and clear of any con-
ditions, obligations or restrictions whatsoever, and hereby
appoint and designate said Anna Marie Doe, nee Roe, sole
executrix without bond of this, my last will and testament.
In witness whereof, I, John Doe, have hereunto set my
hand and seal at Podunk, Oklahoma, on the date herein-
after designated.
8. Probably the worst one of these many form books is an eight volume
work by a law professor named "Hager."
 32 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW (1959)

Even in states where pleadings are not read to the jury but are
summarized by the trial judge, lawyers seem to love burdening the
record and the pleadings with unnecessary recitations, lengthy passages,
and archaic language. (Seemingly forgetting that it is the client who
must pay for the filing of all this verbosity) . Oklahoma statutes, in
common with those of many other states, provide that the petition
and answer shall contain statements of the facts constituting the cause
of action or defense "in ordinary and concise language, and without
repetition." 9 Despite the plain injunction of the statutes, rarely is
a petition filed which does not begin its tale of woe with these words:
"Comes now the plaintiff, and for cause of action against the de-
fendant alleges and states." Nor have there been many injured plain-
tiffs who did not endure "horrible and excruciating pain and
suffering of great intensity." Also, for some unknown reason, parties
to a contract must never be referred to by the names given them at
birth by their doting parents. They must be de-humanized by legal
language into "The party of the first part" and "The party of the
second part."
It is hoped that the paragraphs so far have demonstrated that
legal language is complicated, not only for laymen but for law students
and lawyers as well. It is hoped also that such complication has
been shown to be unnecessary. If we of the legal profession persist
in our use of "Legalese," we should not be surprised if one of our
clients tells us in the words of the Eaglet: "Speak English. I don't
know the meaning of half these long words, and what's more, I don't
believe you do, either."
1 o
II. CAVEAT TO COUNSELORS

So likewise ye, except ye

utter by the tongue words
easy to be understood, how
shall it be known what is
spoken? for ye shall speak
into the air.
I Corinthians 14:9
Even if one were to grant the validity of arguments made in the
first part of this article and agree that legal language is indeed com-
plicated, and that such complication is wholly unnecessary, one still
might inquire whether there are cogent reasons to effect changes in
legal language at this time. I believe sincerely that there are such
reasons-reasons more compelling now than they have ever been.
9. 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 264, 272 (1937).
10. Readers who detect an inconsistency in my use of words which it is
insisted should be eliminated are asked to realize that such use is for effect only
and does not destroy the arguments made.
 LET'S SIMPLIFY LEGAL LANGUAGE

Not the least of these is the fact that laymen even now are refusing
to engage the professional services of lawyers in areas where a failure
to do so can, and usually does, have grave consequences for him who
would be his own attorney.
It is not contended that the low esteem in which lawyers are held
by the general public, and the consequent refusal to retain members
of the legal profession as frequently as necessary, can be attributed
solely to the fact that lawyers speak and write a jargon unintelligible
to persons untrained in law. That is but a facet of a much larger
problem. But it is a facet!
Through books written by members of the legal profession,"
through newspaper articles and editorials, and through other media
of mass communication, the average person is made to realize that
much of what a lawyer does (and charges him for) is nothing more
than a manipulation of words-a manipulation which is unnecessary
and which, on analysis, often achieves some of the more weird aspects
of the conversations in Alice in Wonderland. It is an easy, although
illogical, step to jump from that realization to a conclusion that almost
everything done by a lawyer is but "sounding brass or a tinkling
cymbal."
Nor will it do for us to defend our legal language on the ground
that nearly every profession has its technical language and that law,
by its very nature, also needs a language of its very own. Medicine,
astronomy, engineering, theology, philosophy, etc., deal with abstrac-
tions, physical and psychic phenomena, instruments, etc., in special
words for one reason only-there are no other words by which to
describe these things. But law deals with man's relation to man, to
his society, and to his government. It deals with the ordinary, day-to-
day events and occurrences. For these, law does not need Latin and
French words; it does not need unusual definitions for ordinary
English words; and it does not need obsolete terms and phrases. The
language of the law should be as dynamic as the society which law
seeks to serve.
It is not believed that lawyers use a ponderous, complicated,
unintelligible manner of communication for the reasons set out in
these words of Samuel Butler:
Some writers have the unhappines, or rather Prodigious
Vanity, to affect an obscurity in their Stiles, indevouring
by all meanes not to be understood, but rather like witches
to cast a mist before the eies of their Readers .... To write
not to be understood is no less vaine than to speake not to
be heard.
Rather, it is believed that lawyers speak and write "Legalese" because
11. See RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1957).
 32 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW (1959)

this is the language they were taught in law school; it is the language
they carried over into their professional practice; and they have failed
to see that both they and their clients are harmed by its continued
use.
If we of the legal profession fail to take the necessary steps to
simplify legal language, not only will we discover that the general
public will dispense with many of our professional services in a belief
that such services are no longer necessary, but we will discover also
that legal language will change in spite of us and all our efforts to
delay such change. For our own self interests, we should point the
way to change and therefore bring it about sooner, rather than to
fight it in a rear guard action which can only be unsuccessful in the
end. History proves that any language dies or it changes. No living
language has ever stood still. It changes, and will change despite auth-
oritative efforts to stop it. Stability and change are dual laws in life in
language. Any language needs flexibility in order to live and grow.
But it also needs to be understood. Without undertsanding, it be-
comes as useless and as distasteful as a warmed-over fried egg.
We of the legal profession must never forget that law is for the
people. It is not a plaything for lawyers. Lawyers exist for clients,
not clients for lawyers. We are a service profession, and have much
of which we can be proud. But we need to be reminded from time
to time that whatever we do which detracts from our usefulness to
our clients should be eliminated. The use of complicated, and un-
necessary, legal language is such a detraction. We need to keep in
mind these words written by a layman: "We would like to see the
language of the law cleaned up so that any person of average intelli-
gence can understand its meaning. Language and forms of the musty
past should be brought up to date for today's jet age, it would seem
logical enough."' 12 If we fail to heed this warning, at best we may
find ourselves talking to each other. At worst, we may find ourselves
speaking into the air, for it is not known what is spoken.
a
III. RES IPSA LOQUITUR'
The power of clear state-
ment is the greatest power
at the bar.
Daniel Webster
Language, legal and otherwise, is merely a means of communica-
tion. The spoken or written word evokes a meaning in the mind of
the recipient. Since meanings exist only in minds, no two of which
are exactly alike, having been formed by different experiences, exact
12. Supra note 3.
13. Supra note 10.
 LET'S SIMPLIFY LEGAL LANGAUGE

communication among men is impossible. Therefore, not all docu-

ments, pleadings, laws, etc., can be put in words which will be per-
fectly clear to everyone. However, many things dealt with by lawyers
can be phrased in everyday non-legal language. It is in these areas
that we must effect a simplication. Like the well known tort doc-
trine, res ipsa loquitur, legal language must be made to speak for
itself. Most language used in law can be simplified so that it needs
no official interpreters. Its meaning could be made clear to almost
everyone. There is nothing heretical or anti-literary in this idea.
Law is not primarily literature. It is one device for social control.
It should be written in plain, ordinary English so that the average
layman understands it. Nor is this argument that legal language
should be simplified a new one. As early as 1776, Jeremy Bentham
demanded that laws be codified in such clear language that the
ordinary man could understand his legal rights.
It seems to be a matter of common agreement that one way to
simplify any language is to use ordinary, plain language in short
sentences. Sidney Teiser in an address delivered in 1957 at the Uni-
versity of Virginia Law School said: "Simple words are most likely to
be properly understood than rare ones, and, of course, the purpose of
writing is to convey thoughts precisely." Sir Winston Churchill said:
"Short words are best and the old words when short are best of all."
We of the legal profession can, and should, begin a simplification of
legal language by taking the following steps:
1. Insist that the laws written by our legislatures be understand-
able to the average layman as well as to those in the legal profession.
2. Insist that these laws be written in ordinary, everyday English
and not in technical terms.
3. Insist that legislatures use short sentences with adequate
punctuation to make clear the meaning of the laws.
4. Abandon the use of Latin and French words and phrases in our
law schools (except for historical study) , in our courts, in our docu-
ments, and in our pleadings.
5. Assign the same meaning to a word used in law which it has in
common speech.
6. Agree on a single meaning in law for such words as: malice,
fraud, proximate cause, negligence, etc.
7. Write documents for a client's use in language which the client
can understand.
8. Abandon the use of obsolete, archaic English words which
would have vanished long ago but for the legal profession.
86 32 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW (1959)

CONCLUSION
By selecting examples of legal language from a trial court's
instructions to a jury, from statutes, from documents prepared for a
client's use, and from pleadings, it has been shown that legal language
is complicated. By design, the examples selected were not the worst
which can be found. They were chosen in a belief that they are
typical. Legal language need not be complicated and to make it so
is to endanger a lawyer's relations with the general public and to
make him less effective as a member of a service profession. Lastly,
a few of the many ways in which legal language can be simplified
have been suggested. It is hoped that some of these will be put into
effect before lawyers become as extinct as dinosaurs.
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BOARD OF EDITORS
Editor-in-Chief
J. DENNIS HYNFS
Business Manager Managing Editor
BOB F. TURNER JAMES 0. THORVILSON
Article Editors Symposium Editor
WILLIAM G. KEMP HARLAN L. CYPHERS
PORTIS G. WELCH Current Decisions
Comment Editor Editors
A. RYAN RAYMOND E. WILDER
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CANDIDATES
CHRISTOPHER R. BRAUCHLI CHARLES E. MATHESON
DAVID BRIcTsON PAUL A. MORRIS
PATRICK H. BUTLER GILBERT L. MCSWAIN
R. E. CAMFIELD, JR. ROBERT S. SLOSKY
ALAN C. DEMUTH STOW L. WITWER, JR.
FRED B. III
HEATH, ALBERT B. WOLF
JOHN PAUL JONES L. THOMAS WOODFORD
VAL R. KLINK ROBERT S. ZINN

J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN AND ALBERT R. MENARD, JR., Faculty Advisors

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, ADDRESS DE-

LIVERED AT THE DEDICATION OF THE FLEMING LAw BUILDING, UNIVER-
SITY OF COLORADO.

Ross L. Malone, THE SINE QUA NON OF LEGAL EDUCATION,

Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Fleming Law Building,
University of Colorado. At the time of the dedication address, Mr.
Malone was President of the American Bar Association.

Albert A. Ehrenzweig, THE LEX FoRI IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS-

EXCEPTION OR RULE?: JUD, Vienna; J.D., University of Chicago;
LL.M., S.J.D., Columbia University. Professor Ehrenzweig was form-
erly judge and Privatdozent in Austria. He was associated with
Cravath, Swaine and Moore in New York. He is now the Walter Perry
Johnson Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley,
where he has been since 1948. In 1959 he was the Charles Inglis
Thomson Guest Professor at the University of Colorado. Professor
Ehrenzweig is the author of INCOME TAX TREATIES OF THE UNITED
 ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

STATES; NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT; "FULL AID" INSURANCE; AMER-

ICAN-GREEK PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; CONFLICT OF LAWS and
several other books as well as numerous articles in American and
foreign legal periodicals.

Fredric P. Storke, CONFLICTS ERIE CASES: B.A. 1914, Colorado

College; LL.B. 1917, University of Colorado; S.J.D. 1921, Harvard
University. Professor Storke has practiced in Colorado and New York
and is presently a Professor of Law at the University of Colorado,
teaching Contracts and Conflict of Laws. He is the author of the
COLORADO ANNOTATIONS TO RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, the COLO-
RADO ANNOTATIONS TO RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, and the
COLORADO ANNOTATIONS TO RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, and he is co-author
of COLORADO SECURITY LAW. He is a member of the American Bar
Association and the American Law Institute.

Robert E. Mathews, CRITICAL ISSUES IN ARBITRATION PRACTICE:

SENIORITY AND DISCHARGE CASES: A.B. 1915, Yale College; J.D. 1920,
University of Chicago Law School. Professor Mathews has been
Professor of Law at Ohio State University since 1924. He was visiting
Professor of Law at Columbia in 1928 and has taught summer sessions
at the University of Colorado in 1951 and 1959. He has been very
active in national and international labor relations groups and his
written work includes: MATHEW'S REVISION OF MECHEM'S CASES ON
PARTNERSHIP; CASES ON AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP; READINGS ON LABOR
LAW; EMPLOYMENT RELATION AND THE LAW and contributions to
legal periodicals.

William J. Bowe, INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF EXECUTORS AND

ADMINISTRATORS: A.B. 1929, Fordham University; LL.B. 1933, Har-
vard University. Professor Bowe practiced in New York from 1933 to
1942, at which time he went into the Judge Advocate General's De-
partment. He was professor of Law at Vanderbilt University and is
presently Professor of Law at the University of Colorado. Books
written by Professor Bowe include: TAX PLANNING FOR ESTATES; LIFE
INSURANCE AND ESTATE TAX PLANNING; INCOME rAX TREATMENT OF
LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS; ADVANCE UNDERWRITING AND FEDERAL
TAXATION; and ESTATE PLANNING AND TAXATION. He has also written
numerous articles in legal periodicals.

John V. Hager, LET'S SIMPLIFY LEGAL LANGUAGE: B.S. 1948,

LL.B. 1950, University of Oklahoma. Professor Hager is a Professor
of Law at the Tulsa School of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma, where he has
been since 1950. He is the author of VERNON'S OKLAHOMA FORMS
and law review articles, and is a member of the American and Okla-
homa Bar Associations.