Northeastern Political Science Association

(Re)Turning Derrida to Heidegger: Being-with-Others as Primordial Politics

Author(s): Nicholas Dungey
Source: Polity, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Spring, 2001), pp. 455-477
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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Polity * Volume XXXIII,Number 3 * Spring 2001

(Re)Turning Derrida to Heidegger:

Being-With-Others as
Primordial Politics*
Nicholas Dungey
Universityof California,Davis

Fordecades two questionshave dogged Derridaand his account of decon-

struction:Whatis his relationto Heidegger? And,is deconstruction political?While
Derridahas always acknowledgedhis debtto Heidegger,and claimedthatdecon-
structionis politicalin nature,these two issues have been treatedseparately.How-
ever, I thinkthey are related.LocatingDerrida'scritiqueof modernsubjectivity
withinHeidegger'snotionof being-with-others makesexplicitthe politicalimplica-
tions of deconstruction.I arguethat Heidegger'sanalysisof Dasein'sfall into the
"they"providesthe philosophical(con)textin which to situate Derrida'sdecon-
structionof the self-presenceand autonomythatgroundsthepoliticalagencyof the
modernsubject.WhileHeidegger'sanalysisof the "they" seeks to recoverauthen-
tic identity,Derrida'scritiqueof logocentrismasks us to recall our inescapable
responsibilityto others.In politicizingHeidegger'sontologyof Dasein, I contend
thatDerridaseeks to replacethe desireforauthenticity withthe call forjustice.
Nicholas Dungey is a lecturerin PoliticalScienceat the Universityof Califor-
nia, Davis

I. Introduction
Deconstruction'sbearingon politicalthoughthas been controversial forthe last
thirtyyears.'AlthoughDerridahas alwaysclaimedthathis writingsare politicalin
nature,2thateverydeconstructive
readingis a politicalact,andthatthereis an essen-

*Theauthorwishesto thankThomasSchrockandPeterDigeserfortheircriticalguidance,support,and
friendship.Hewouldalso liketo thankthe refereesandeditorialstaffatPolityfortheirhelpandcomments
duringthe preparation of thisessay.
1. Fora sampleof the vastsecondaryliterature on thisdebatepleasesee: MarkLilla,"ThePoliticsof
JacquesDerrida," New York Reviewof Books45 (June1998):36-42;Catherine Zuckert,"ThePoliticsof Der-
rideanDeconstruction," Polity23 (Spring1991):335-56;StanleyRosen,Hermeneuticsas Politics(NewYork:
OxfordUniversity Press,1987);RichardBernstein,"SeriousPlay:TheEthical-Political Horizonof Jacques
Derrida," TheJournalof SpeculativePhilosophy1 (1987):93-116;DavidNovitz,"TheRagefor Decon-
struction,"TheMonist69 (1986):39-55;NancyFraser, "TheFrenchDerrideans: Deconstruction
Politicizing
or Deconstructing the Political?"
New GermanCritique33 (1984):127-54;ThomasMcCarthy, "ThePolitics
of the Ineffable,"
ThePhilosophicForum21 (Fall-Winter, 1989-90):146-68.
2 Fora surveyof the politicalimplications
of Derrida'searlierworksee: OfGrammatology, trans.Gay-
atriSpivak(Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press,1976);"Violenceand Metaphysics" in Writingand
Difference,trans.Alan Bass (Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1978);Positions,trans.Alan Bass
 TO HEIDEGGER
DERRIDA
456 (RE)TURNING

tialconnectionbetween"thephilosophicaland the political,"3 onlyrecentlyhas he

explicitlytakenup the questionof deconstruction's relationto politics.4Derrida's
most recentwritingssignalhis long awaitedengagementwith the many political
themeshe has heretoforeso deliberately, anddexterously, avoided.Derrida's turnto
politicsalso placesnew demandson his theoreticalapparatus,forcinghim to de-
emphasizesome aspectsof deconstruction, whileassigningnew purposesto it.
However,thenas now, Derrida'seffortsto articulatethe politicalimplicationsof
deconstructionhave been met with criticism.CatherineZuckertand Thomas
McCarthy have arguedthat deconstruction's suspensionof normativeclaimsand
standardsof judgment"deprives[us] fromthe capacityto think"5about politics-
resultingin what McCarthy callsthe "politicsof the ineffable."6Morerecently,Mark
Lillahas writtenthat Derrida'slatestcontributionto politicalthoughtstill suffers
fromdeconstruction'seschewalof grounding."Anintellectually consistentdecon-
Lilla
struction," writes, "entaills]silence on political matters."7 While deconstruc-
tion continuesto be recognizedas a rigorousway of readingtexts,and a provoca-
tive challengeto our theoreticalfoundations,its criticsclaim thaton its own it is
incapableof givinga politicalpositionanypurchase.AndDerridahimselfseems to
acknowledgethe difficultyhe has in makingpositiveclaimsabout humanagency,
while remainingopen to the critiqueof politicsgeneratedby deconstruction.Ithas
not seemed possiblefor Derridato haveit bothways. Myargumenthere is thathe
can; I believeit is possibleto anchordeconstruction withoutdiminishingitscritical
impact. We do that by having Derrida revisit
Heidegger.
LocatingDerrida'scritiqueof modernsubjectivity withinHeidegger'snotionof
being-with-others makes explicit politicalimplicationsof deconstruction,and
the
does so without bluntingits criticaledge. I argue that Heidegger'sanalysisof
Dasein'sfallintothe "they"providesthe philosophical(con)textin which to situate
Derrida'sdeconstructionof the self-presenceand autonomythatgroundsthe polit-
icalagencyof the modernsubject.ReadingDerrida's critiqueof logocentrismwithin

(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1981);"TheEndsof Man"inMargins of Philosophy,trans.AlanBass

(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1982);"Critical Response,"trans.PeggyKamuf,CriticalInquiry13
(August1986);"Afterword: Towardan Ethicof Discussion"inLimitedInc.,trans.SamuelWeber(Evanston:
Northwestern Press,1988).
University
3. Derrida,"Endsof Man,"in Marginsof Philosophy,111.
4. Fora surveyof Derrida's morerecentpoliticalwritingssee: "Beforethe Law"inActsof Literature,
ed. DerekAttridge(London:RoutledgePress,1985);"Racism'sLastWord,"trans.PeggyKamuf,Critical
Inquiry12 (Autumn1985),290-99;ThePoliticsof Friendship, trans.GeorgeCollins(London:Verso,1997);
"TheForceof Law:TheMystical of Authority"
Foundation inDeconstruction and the Possibilityof Justice,
trans.MaryQuaintance,Cornell,Rosenfeld,Carlson,eds. (New York:Routledge,1992):3-67;TheOther
Heading:Reflectionson Today'sEurope,trans.Anne-Brault and Naas (Bloomington:IndianaUniversity
Press,1992);Spectersof Marx.trans.PeggyKamuf(NewYork:Routledge,1993);Deconstruction in a Nut-
shell:A ConversationwithJacquesDerrida,ed. JohnCaputo(NewYork:FordhamUniversity Press,1997).
5. Zuckert,"ThePoliticsof DerrideanDeconstruction,"354.
6. McCarthy, 146.
"ThePoliticsof the Ineffable,"
38.
7. Lilla,"ThePoliticsof JacquesDerrida,"
 Nicholas Dungey 457

Heidegger'sanalysisof Dasein's being-with-othersand its fall into the "they"

accomplishestwo things.Itshows how logocentrismoperatesin a politicalmanner,
and it anchorsthe politicalimplicationsof deconstruction
by indicatingthatthereis
a normativemode of beingresponsible-to-the-other thatis recoverablebeyondthe
deconstructionof the subject.While Heidegger'sanalysisof the "they"seeks to
recoverauthenticidentity,Derrida'scritiqueof logocentrismasks us to recallour
inescapableresponsibility to others:what Derridameans by the call of justice.In
politicizingHeidegger'sexistentialanalyticof Dasein,Derridaseeks to replacethe
desireforauthenticitywith the call forjustice.

II. Derrida's Ambiguous Relation to Heidegger

MarkLillaclaims that Derrida'sdecision to side with Heidegger,againstthe
"humanist" philosophersof the time, is the fatefulmove to which "allthe political
problemsof deconstructionmaybe traced."8 Whilethisis a common reading,it is
nevertheless,onlyhalfcorrect.Onthe one hand,Derridareadilyacknowledgesthat
"Heideggeris probablythe most constantinfluence,"9 acknowledgingas well that
what he has "attemptedto do would not havebeen possiblewithoutthe opening
of Heidegger'squestions."'0 Therewould be no differance,Derridastates,without
Heidegger'sarticulationof the relationbetween beings (Dasein)and Being (the
ontic-ontologicaldifference)."
On the other hand, Derridahas always been adamantabout distinguishing
deconstructionfrom Heidegger'sphilosophicalproject. "I have marked quite
Derridawrites,"inall the essays I havepublished... a departurefrom
explicitly,"
the Heideggereanproblematic."12"WhileI owe a considerabledebtto Heidegger's
'pathof thought,'we differin ouremploymentof language,in ourunderstanding of
language.I write in anotherlanguage-and I do not simplymean in Frenchor
German."'3 Itwould be a mistake,Derridainsists,to reduce"deconstruction to a
prefabricated Heideggereanism."'4 On the whole, Derrida'sattemptto distinguish
his thoughtfrom Heideggercharacterizesthe greaterpartof Derrida'sencounter
with Heidegger.Therefore,notwithstanding Derrida'sobviousdebt to Heidegger,I
takeissuewith Lilla'sclaimand suggestratherthatit is onlyrecentlythatDerrida-
throughhis politicalwritings-signalsa returnto the Heideggereanorbit.15 We can

8. Lilla,"The Politicsof Jacques Derrida,"37.

9. Jacques Derrida,"Deconstructionand the Other,"in RichardKearney,
Dialogues with Contemporary
Continental Thinkers (Manchester: UniversityPress, 1984): 9.
10. Derrida,Positions, 9.
11. Derrida,Positions, 9-10.
12. Derrida,Positions, 54.
13. Derrida,"Deconstructionand the Other,"110.
14. Derrida,Positions, 55.
15. Therefore, it is not, as Lillaclaims, Derrida'sdebt to Heidegger's
philosophy that cripples the polit-
ical saliency of deconstruction. But rather, Derrida's past insistence on
distancing deconstruction from
 DERRIDA
458 (RE)TURNING TO HEIDEGGER

makegreatersense of Derrida'spoliticsby viewingit in lightof Heidegger'sessen-

tialnotionof being-with-others as a structuralcomponentof being-in-the-world.
A determinedattemptto investigatethe politicalimplicationsof Derrida'srela-
tionshipto Heideggercan be foundin the workof StephenK.White.'6Whiteiden-
tifiesa postmodernethicsin Heidegger'sthought,thenturnsto Derridain searchof
a politicalvision. White negotiatesthis balanceof ethicalconcern and political
actionby identifyingtwo modes of responsibility-theresponsibility to otherness,
and the responsibilityto act. By the responsibilityto otherness,White means a
mode of thoughtthatis open to the experienceof difference,and sensitiveto the
marginalization of othersthatis the by(product)of much modernthoughtabout
identity,truth,and politics.By the responsibility to act, White means the typical,
moral-prudential obligationsthatfree,rationalagentsbearin the conductof their
personallivesand expressin theirrelationswith others.'7
Sympatheticto much in Heidegger'sthought,Whitefindsin his conceptionsof
finitude,nearness,and dwellingthe foundationfora multilayered responsibilityto
otherness.The essence of this responsibilityis found in Heidegger'smovement
awayfroma mode of thinkingandrelatingto othersthatis governedbyoverlytech-
nologicalinterpretations of languageand rationality. Throughhis analysisof fini-
tude, and the reawakened awareness of the nearness of othersthatfinitudefacili-
tates, one comes to stand toward others in less domineering and controllingways.
Sucha posture,whatWhitecalls "otherthinking," entailslettingthe otherbe in his
or herdifference,by givingto himor herthe space and respectthatis necessaryfor
theirpassagein life.
The problem,Whiteclaims,is thatsuch a postureof thinkingand relatingto
othersprovidesan insufficient grounduponwhichto buildandmaintaina politicsof
action.Toremedythis,Whiteturnsto Derridain the hope of findinga postmodern
responsibilityto act. At first,WhitesupportsDerrida'scall fora new law and right,
locating two possibilitiesfromwhichan alternative politicsmaybe launched.'8The
firstis Derrida'streatmentof politicalfounding,the second is locatedin his analysis
of friendshipas incipientpolitics.WhileWhiteis enthusiasticaboutthe possibilityof
a new politicalfounding,he is troubledby Derrida'slanguage.Suspiciousof revolu-

Heidegger'sphilosophythatlentto deconstruction a senseof perpetualdrift.Thisdistancingby Derrida was

no doubtmotivatedby his desireto avoidlapsingintothe metaphysical traphe saw ensnaringHeidegger.
Ina way,Derridasoughtto do to Heidegger, whatHeideggerdidto Nietzsche-thatis, catchhimbeingthe
lastmetaphysician.Inthisregard,Derridamaybe a victimof hisown success.Itis notcoincidental thatDer-
rida'sclearestattemptsto distancehimselffromHeideggeroccurredduringa timewhen he was conspicu-
ouslysilentaboutpoliticalmatters.Therefore,it is strangeforLillato claimthatthe failureof a "politicsof
deconstruction," whichDerrida was notexplicitly was theresultof hisdependenceon a thinker
articulating,
he was outwardlydistancinghimselffrom.
16. StephenK.White,PoliticalTheoryand Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991).
17. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, 19.
18. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, 76-9.
 Nicholas Dungey 459

tionarybreaksand clean ruptures,Derridaacknowledgesthat the way to a new

responsibilityto act mustincludesome negotiationwith the currentconceptionsof
rightand law.Tothisend, Derridaseizes upon the notionof a lever,as a metaphor
of pryingloose ourattachmentto traditional ideas,and as a way of gainingtheoret-
ical weight in the transitionfromone conceptualmode to another.The political
problemthenbecomes,as Derridasees it,choosingthe appropriate lever.Whatdis-
turbsWhiteis not the issueof negotiationbetweenone constructand another,but
ratherDerrida's use of a mechanicalmetaphorto describethisprocess."Itis difficult
to see,"Whitenotes,"whatis gainedfora rethinking of the responsibilityto act from
the recourseto such mechanicalmetaphors."19 White claims that relianceupon
mechanicalmetaphorsis insufficientfor understanding the shift in politicalcon-
sciousnessthatdeconstruction seems to promise.
Thesecond possibilityfora Derrideanresponsibility to act is foundin his analy-
sis of friendship.Thethrustof thisresponsibility is groundedin Derrida's claim,one
thatWhitefinds"startling," thata minimalcommunityis openedthroughthe shar-
ing of a language.Derridaclaims thatconcomitantwith sharinga languageis a
formof responsibility thatbindsthe interlocutors in a primordial ethicaland politi-
cal association.Deconstruction, it is argued,is the privilegedtheoreticalperspective
fromwhichtheserelationships arebestcultivated.Whitereadilyacknowledgesthat
Derrida's"rationale" for privilegingfriendshipmakes sense. "Bybeginningone's
reflectionson politicsand responsibility in thisway, one dropsan anchorinto the
problematicsof doingjusticeto the particular, concreteotherin the hope thatthis
will withstand the strong currents of the universalizing . . . discourse of modern
politicalthought."20The problemhere,Whiteargues,is thatsuch a conceptionof
responsibility and friendshiprequiresone to take a positionon concretematters.
And,thisis a responsibility thatWhiteclaimsDerridaconsistentlyavoids.
White'scritiqueof Derrida'snotionof responsibility to act is promptedby what
Whiteviews as one of the centralambiguitiesof postmodernthoughtin general.
Insofaras deconstructionand otherpostmoderntheoriesinterrogateand weaken
whathas been traditionally acceptedas authoritative,
theyact politically.
Yet,despite
these interventions,the questionremainswhetherpostmoderntheorycan move
from criticismto contribution.In White'sview, the postmodernrecordon this
accountis weak. Facedwith the challengeof makinga positiveassertionabouta
particular politicalorientation,deconstructiontendsto "withdrawto deeperlevels
of reflection,"resultingin what Whitecalls a sort of "perpetualwithholdingges-
ture."Sucha move, Whiteargues,rendersdeconstructionincapableof contribut-
ing constructivelyto politicalthought.
The failureof postmoderntheoryto addressthe fullrangeof politicalquestions

19. White,PoliticalTheoryand Postmodernism,

80.
20. White,PoliticalTheoryand Postmodernism,
83.
460 (RE)TURNING
DERRIDA
TO HEIDEGGER

leadsWhiteto negotiatea rapprochement betweenmodernityand postmodernity,

arguingthatthe two need each other.White'sshotgunmarriageof modernityand
postmodernity is broughtaboutby hisrecognitionthatthe two sensesof responsibil-
ity-to othersand to act-are equallyimportant. He acknowledgesthatpostmodern
theorycontributes mostto theformer,whilemodern,liberalstylesof ethicalandpolit-
icalthoughtdominatein the latter.Whiteturnsto Jirgen Habermasfora viableartic-
ulationof theresponsibility to act,doingso fortwo reasons.First,Whitecontendsthat
Habermasprovidesa way of understanding action and cooperationthat is not
reducibleto the modelof the strategically behavingsubject.21 Second,Whiteturnsto
Habermas'snotionof languagebecauseit providesa way of understanding binding
actionsthroughspeech which are not reducibleto interestmaximizingstrategies.
Thereis somethingconveyedthroughthe "illocutionary force"of thespeechactitself
thatcoordinatesaction.Whiteclaimsthatthe world-disclosing natureof Derrida's
understanding and use of language inhibits it from functioning an actioncoordi-
in
natingway. And it is this fundamental liability cripplesits politicalsaliency.
that
Thisis where ItakeissuewithWhite'sreading.We do not need to callon Haber-
mas fora cogent articulation of a responsibility to act. Sucha resourceis available
withinpostmodernity itself.Locatingdeconstructionin the (con)textof Heidegger's
ontologyallows us to meet both of White'sobjections.RegardingWhite'sfirst
objection,Heidegger'saccountof Dasein'sbeing-with-others providesus with a
way of comprehending action and cooperation that is not reducible to
autonomous, self-interested In
subjects. fact,Heidegger demonstrates the extentto
which socialactionand cooperationcan be understoodwithoutrelianceuponthe
subject,and in thisway Heidegger'sanalysisgoes furtherthan Habermas's.
Moreover,it is the successof Heidegger'saccountof Dasein'sbeing-with-others
thatweakensWhite'ssecond objection,his narrowfocus on the world-disclosing
aspectof postmodernlanguage.The veryfactthatactionand cooperationcan be
explainedin Heideggerrean, and otherpostmodernterms,that are themselvesnot
to
reducible egoisticactors, demonstrates thatlanguageis radically actioncoordinat-
ing.Attheveryleast, Derrida's notion of performativity suggests that allspeechandlan-
guageis nothingbut action. What is needed is a way of firstcontextualizing thisaction,
thensecond,identifying theways in which this activitycarries politicalimplications.By
readingdeconstruction as thepoliticization of Dasein'sbeing-with, we achievedirectly
a postmodernaccountof the politicaldimensionsof "communicative action."

III. Reading Derrida in Light of Heidegger

of
Derrida'sturn to politicscommits him to a deeply situatedinterpretation
humanagencythat furthersthe For
projectbegunby Heidegger. Heidegger and Der-

21. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, 22.

 Nicholas Dungey 461

rida,the "who"of everydaysubjectivity-thesubstanceof identity-is a contested

issue.22HeideggercontendsthatDasein's23 everydayinvolvementin its world,the
originalsource of understanding of itselfand the world,conceals it fromits own
authenticity.AnalyzingDasein'sfallinto"publicness" clarifiesthe socialontologyof
Daseinand pointstowardthe possibilityof authenticselfhood.Likewise,Derrida
arguesthatlogocentrism-the phenomenonthatbindsthoughtand speech to self
presence-conceals the rupture,or differance,withinself-identity, thus givingrise
to a misleadinginterpretation of personal,national,or racialidentity.ForDerrida,
logocentrismleads to a formof politicalinauthenticity because caughtup in the
dynamicof logocentrismis an economyof violencethatrepressesdifferancein an
attemptto maintainthe sensationof spontaneous,self-grounding identity.
Rejectingthe claimthatpositsmanas a "worldless" subjectwhose substanceis
definedapartfromthe livedworld,HeideggerdemonstratesthatDasein'sself is dis-
closed throughits being-in-the-world. "Daseinis not also extantamongthingswith
the differencemerelythat it apprehendsthem. Insteadthe Daseinexists in the
mannerof Being-in-the-world, and thisbasic determinationof its existenceis the
presuppositionforbeingable to apprehendanythingat all."24Daseinis not in the
world like a cup is in a cupboard,but rather,has its experienceof itselfand the
worldfromwithinthe world.Being-in-the-world meansthatDaseinalwaysalready
findsitselfsituatedin a worldlycontextof meaningandactivities.As such, a funda-
mentalunderstandingof its self, and a practical,common understanding of things

22. InHistoryof the Conceptof Time,trans.TheodoreKisiel(Bloomington: IndianaUniversity

Press,
1992):237,Heidegger writes:"Whenwe askaboutthisentity,the Dasein,we mustat leastask,Whois this
entity?,and not,Whatis thisentity?Itis thereforea matterof definingthewho of thisbeing."Heidegger's
interestin the "who"of Daseinis motivatedby hisdesireto clarifytheontologicalgroundof Dasein.InPol-
iticsof Friendship,
Derrida writes:"Wewillaskourselveswhata decisionis andwho decides.Andifa deci-
sion is-as we aretold-active, free,consciousandwillful,sovereign.Whatwouldhappenif we keptthis
wordandthisconcept,butchangedthe lastdeterminations? Andwe willaskourselveswho setsdownthe
law here.Andwho foundsthe lawas a rightto life.Wewillaskourselveswho grantsor imposesthe right
to allthesedistinctions...?"(xi).Inthe past,Derridawas contentallowingthequestionof "who"to remain
undetermined. However,Derrida's recentturnto politicsforceshimto takeup theissueof "who"ina direct
manner.Derrida'sinterestin the "who"of identityand law is motivatedby his claim thatthe common
answerto thatquestion-logocentrism-authorizes a misleadingunderstanding of agencyandpolitics.
23. Translatedliterallyas there-being,DaseinrepresentsHeidegger'sattemptto avoidthe manytradi-
tional,metaphysical terms-subjectivity, ego, consciousness,spirit,soul-most oftenused to describethe
natureor essenceof humanbeing."ThisdesignationDasein... does not signifya what. Theentityis not
distinguishedby its what, like a chairin contrastto a house. Rather,this designationin its own way
expresses the way to be" (History of the Concept of Time, 153). Heidegger explicates Dasein's way to be
in bothan onticandontologicalmanner.Ontically, as a beingthatexists,Daseinhasitslifeto live,it is noth-
ing but the variousactualpossibilitiesit undertakes. Daseinis thatbeingthatis concerned
Ontologically,
about its Being.As being-in-the-world, Daseinis involvedin the questionof its Being.Therefore,an
"/ujnderstanding of Being is itself a determination of being of Dasein. The ontic distinction of Dasein lies
in the factthatDaseinis ontological."
Beingand Time,trans.JoanStambaugh(NewYork:StateUniversity
of NewYorkPress,1996):36.
24. MartinHeidegger,TheBasicProblemsof Phenomenology, trans.AlbertHofstadler
(Bloomington:
IndianaUniversityPress,1988):164.
462 (RE)TURNING
DERRIDA
TO HEIDEGGER

and othersis constitutiveof Dasein'sbeing.As LeslieThieleputsit, "Daseinis not a

substancebut a relation,a disclosiveweddednessto the world."25
Perhapsthe mostimportantrelationDaseinfindsitselfin is its being-with-others.
Elaboratingupon the ontologicalstructureof being-in, Heideggerdenies that
Daseinfirstexistsas a solitaryindividual."Itis assumedthata subjectis encapsu-
latedwithin itselfand now has the task of empathizingwith anothersubject."26
However,thereis nevergivensuch an original,epistemologically isolatedsubject.
"Theothersare not encounteredby graspingand previouslydiscriminating one's
own subject,initiallyobjectivelypresent,fromothersubjectsalso present."27 Dasein
encountersothers because as being-in-the-world, Daseinfinds itselfconcernfully
involvedwith othersas theyshow up in the domainof its activities.As such, "the
worldof Daseinis a with-world.Being-inis being-withothers."28 Theprimordial dis-
closureof othersthroughour involvementwith the worldindicatesthatan under-
standingof othersalreadylies in Dasein'smode of being,i.e., its understandingof
Being.It is the ontologicalstatusof being-with-others that providesthe necessary
conditionsfor relationsbetweenand amongpeopleto occurat all.
Andthisis whereDerridacomes in.Theclaimthatan understanding of othersis
caughtup in ourinterpretation
constitutiveof ourway of being,thatit is inextricably
of experience,is sharedby Derrida.InhisPoliticsof Friendship,DerridadeepensHei-
degger's claim by locatingour primordial understandingof othersin an economyof
call and responsethatis constitutiveof a "minimalcommunity.""Evenbeforethe
question . . . of speaking in one's own name [is posed]," Derridawrites, "we are
caughtup, one andanother,in a sortof heteronomical... curvingof socialspace-
more precisely,a curvingof the relationto the other."29 DerridahyperbolizesHei-
degger'saccountof being-with-others bysuggestingthatthe experience"isassigned
to us by the other,fromthe placeof the other,well beforeanyhope of reappropria-
tion allows us the assumptionof this responsibility ... in one's own name, in the
of
space autonomy. ..."30 Like Heidegger,Derrida suggests that subjectivityis
opened in and through a disclosivewebbing of relationships. UnlikeHeidegger,
though, Derrida conceives of our as
being-with-others more itcomes from
transitive;
a
the other,uponus, demanding response. ForDerrida, responding the callof the
to
other is evidence of our situated,worldlybeing, and is the openingof the political.It
is becauseHeideggerand Derridaconceivethe subjectas inherentlysocial,and yet
capableof modifyinghis orhergivenpossibilitiesin significantways, thatan analy-
sis of how ourbeing-with-others becomesdistortedis important.

25. LesliePaulThiele,TimelyMeditations:MartinHeideggerand PostmodernPolitics(Princeton:

Press,1995):45.
PrincetonUniversity
Historyof the Conceptof Time,243.
26. Heidegger,
Beingand Time,112.
27. Heidegger,
Beingand Time,112.
28. Heidegger,
231.
Politicsof Friendship,
29. Derrida,
232.
Politicsof Friendship,
30. Derrida,
 Nicholas Dungey 463

IV.Dasein's Fall into the "They"

What Heideggercalls the "they-self"is the ontological fusion of Dasein's
being a self and being-with-others."Theself of everydayDaseinis the they-self
which we distinguishfrom the authentic self, the self which has explicitly
graspeditself.As the they-self,Daseinis dispersed in the they and must firstfind
itself."31 Daseinis dispersedin the "they"because, initiallyand forthe most part,
Dasein'severydayinvolvementwith thingsand others determinehow the char-
acterand identityof Daseinis firstraised.Understandingitselfand its possibilities
throughwhat it has been given, Daseintakes over the dominantinterpretations
of the "they,"and confusesthem forits own. Itis this fundamentalconfusionthat
characterizesthe differencebetween inauthenticityand authenticity.Originally,
and for the most part,everydayDaseinis inauthentic.Therefore,the clarification
of Dasein'sontologicalcharactermust pass throughits most immediate,inau-
thenticself-understanding.
When Daseinreflectsupon itself,it alwayssays "I."For,"whatis less dubious,"
Heideggerposits,"thanthe givennessof the I?"32 Yet,it is this certaintyof self that
Heidegger,and laterDerrida,seek to disturb."The... obviousnessof the statement
thatit is I who is in each case Daseinmust not misleadus into supposingthatthe
way foran ontologicalinterpretation of what is 'given'has been unmistakably pre-
scribed."33 Counterintuitively,Heideggercontendsthatit is the self-evidentcharac-
ter of Daseinitselfthatconcealsthe genuineontologicalcharacterof Dasein.What
if it turnsout, he asks,thatthe who of everydayDaseinis preciselynot I myself.34
In claimingthat everydayDaseinis not itself, Heideggerdoes not mean that
Daseinlacks "I-hood."He does not deny the individuality of Dasein.Rather,he
claimsthatthe commonprivilegegivento the self-certainty of the "I,"paradoxically
concealsfromDaseinits own authenticity, doingso as longas the substanceof this
"I"remains unquestioned.Contraryto indicatingsome lacuna, the "not I" of
Dasein'soriginal(they)self pointsto a positive,"definitemode of being of the 'I'
itself;forexample,havinglostitself."35 ForHeidegger,losingoneselfin the common
understanding of the worldis an existentialmode of Dasein'sbeing.The "notI"of
Dasein'soriginalself is positivein that it indicatesthe possibilityof establishing
some criticaldistancefromwhat one has been given.
Dasein has originallylost itself because as being-in-the-world, Daseinalways
findsitselfabsorbedin some situation.Dasein'sbeing-in-the-world is the resultof a
ratherbrute fact-it is thrown into the world. Deliveredover to the there of its

31. Heidegger,Being and Time, 121

32. Heidegger,Being and Time, 109.
33. Heidegger,Being and Time, 108.
34. Heidegger,Being and Time, 108.
35. Heidegger,Being and Time, 109.
464 (RE)TURNING
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TO HEIDEGGER

being, Daseinis thrownintoa worldwhich is inhabitedand determinedby others.

"Knowingoneselfis groundedin primordially understanding being-with.[...] This
common world,which is there primarilyand into which every maturingDasein
grows, as the public world, governs every interpretationof the world and of
Dasein."36 Realizingits identityfromwithinthiscommonworld,Daseindriftsfrom
itself,definingitselfnot in its own terms,but in referenceto the termsand possibil-
ities"they"makeavailable.As the "they-self," Dasein'spossibilitiesaredetermined
by what Heideggercalls "publicness." The maincharacteristics of "publicness" are
conformityof thoughtand certaintyof knowledge,both of which are conveyed
throughidle-talk.
Idle-talkis the ubiquitousdiscourseof everydayDasein.Throughidletalk,a gen-
eraland averageintelligibility is conveyed.Butit is exactlythisgeneralintelligibility
thatdistractsthe discussantsfroma deeperunderstanding of things.Idletalkis the
possibility of understanding everything that is said, without any realcomprehen-
sion. Whatis conveyedis not the substanceof what is said,but the factthatsome-
thing has been said and understoodin a common way.37Carriedalong by gossip
and chatter,thingsareso because"one"saysso. However,idle-talkis not a neutral
phenomenon.The ease and familiarity with which Daseintrafficsin idle-talkgives
to Daseinan inauthenticunderstanding of its self and others."Ontologically,this
means thatwhen Daseinmaintainsitselfin idletalk,it is-as being-in-the-world-
cut off fromthe primaryand primordially genuine relationsof being towardthe
world, toward and
Mitdasein, being-in itself."38Thisaverage,common understand-
ing of what is talked about conceals from Dasein a more primordial understanding
of its ownmostpossibilities.
The pervasivenessof idletalkand the depthof Dasein'sabsorptionin the "they"
keeps Daseinfromraisingthe questionof its beingauthentically. Unwittinglyrepro-
ducing the dominant interpretations of the "they," Daseinfailsto recognize thatit
has its own choicesto make.Paradoxically, the contextin which Daseinfeels most
comfortable-its absorptionin the "they"-establishestheverygroundsof Dasein's
radicalgroundlessness.Thisconditiongivesto Daseina sortof homelessness,one
that,forthe most part,remainshiddenfromDasein.Thisessentialhomelessnessof
Daseinis capturedin what Heideggercalls Dasein'sfallingpreyto the world."This
absorptionin ... mostlyhas the characterof beinglostin the publicnessof the they.
As an authenticpotentiality forbeinga self,Daseinhas initiallyalwaysalreadyfallen
away from itself and fallen prey to the world."39As facticalbeing-in-the-world,
has
Dasein alwaysalready fallen awayfromitself(as individual)and intothe "they-
self" (as anonymous).

36. Heidegger,Being and Time, 116, and History of the Concept of Time, 246.
37. Heidegger,Being and Time, 158.
38. Heidegger,Being and Time, 159.
39. Heidegger,Being and Time, 164.
 Nicholas Dungey 465

The nearlyinescapableconditionof fallennessholdsDaseinin its grip,mislead-

ing Daseinintobelievingthatthe understanding it has of itself,others,andthings,is
genuine.40 Thebeliefthateverythingis in order,and thatall possibilitiesarewithin
one's grasp, tranquilizesDasein.41Anonymous,tranquil,and masteredby the
"they,"Daseinexistsinauthenticly. Misunderstanding its own ontologicalcharacter,
Daseininterprets its Beingin lightof otherobjectivlyexistingbeingsandthings.Itis
fromthisvantagepointthatDaseininhabitsa mode of subjectivity thatis grounded
in the self-certaintyand presence of the thinkingsubject. Dasein'sfall into the
"they,"its secure sense of at-homeness within the "public"interpretationof itself
and the world,drawsDaseinaway fromunderstanding
the authenticnatureof its
Being-there.

V. Deconstructing Logocentric Subjectivity

FollowingHeidegger'sclaim that the "they-self"conceals from Dasein its own
authenticity,I contend that logocentricsubjectivityconceals a positivemode of
being-toward-the-other: what Derridacalls responsibility to otherness.In addition,
I contendthattheway of beingthatlogocentrismconcealscarriespoliticalimplica-
tions.Deconstructing logocentricsubjectivityallows the self to recognizethe web-
bingof relationsthatconstituteindividualidentity.Andin doingso, deconstruction
seeks to lessen the effectof originaryviolencethatattendsthe creationof identity
and the institutionof law.
MirroringDasein'sfallinto "publicness,"Derridamaintainsthatlogocentrismis
a "natural"
(practically) way of interpreting experience.Just as Heideggerclaims
thatfallinginto "publicness" is ontologicallyconstitutiveof Dasein'sbeing,Derrida
suggeststhatthe "natural" experienceof logocentrism-the relationbetween the
spokenwordand self-gives riseto the sensationof spontaneouslygroundedself-
presenceandautonomy.Derrida writes"thatthe privilegeof the phone [voice]does
not dependupona choice thatcouldhavebeen avoided.Itrespondsto a moment
of economy(letus sayof the 'life'of historyorof 'beingas self-relationship')."42
Like
Dasein'sentanglementin the "public,"the logocentricexperienceof self-presence
indicatesan ontologicalstructurethatcould not havebeen avoided.Justas Dasein
does not "choose"to fallintothe anonymityof the "public,"the self thatinterprets
its being logocentricallydoes not "choose"self-presenceand autonomy;it simply
findsitselfthere,"objectively"presentamongstothers.
The experienceof hearing-oneself-speak, which presentsitselfas immediate,
interior,and noncontingent,is itselfan existentialphenomenonthatarisessimulta-
neouslywithself awareness."Withinthe logos,the originaland essentiallinkto the

40. Heidegger,
Beingand Time,166.
41. Heidegger,
Beingand Time,166.
42. Derrida,
OfGrammatology, 7.
466 (RE)TURNING
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TO HEIDEGGER

phone has neverbeen broken.. . [the essence of the phone would be immedi-
atelyproximateto thatwhich within'thought'as logos relatesto 'meaning',pro-
duces it, receivesit, speaksit, 'composes'it."43In the Westerntraditionthis deter-
minationhas expresseditself in variousways: "presenceas substance/essence/
existence,temporalpresenceas pointof the now or moment,the self-presenceof
the cogito,... the co-presenceof the otherandof the self."44 Interpretingone's self
and being-with-others logocentricallymeans that when "wordsare spoken the
speakerandthe listeneraresupposedto be simultaneously presentto one another;
they are supposedto be the same, pure unmediatedself-presence."45 Corroborat-
ing Heidegger'sclaimthateverydayDaseininterpretsits own being-in-the-world as
objectivepresence,logocentrismlocatesthe agencyof the subjectin the absolute
proximitybetweenvoice/thoughtand being:cogito ergosum. Logocentrism,Der-
ridawrites,"mergeswith the historicaldeterminationof the meaningof Beingin
generalas presence."
Logocentrism, likethe "public,"indicatesa mode of being,a particular way that
the self interprets the thereof its being.Seducedby the appearanceof spontaneous
self-presenceand identity,logocentrismconcealsthe relationshipsthatpresuppose
identity.In this way, the self falls prey to the myth of its own self-presenceand
autonomy.Fallingprey to the myth of autonomy,the logocentricsubject, like
Dasein's"they-self," misunderstandsits more genuine relationto othersand the
world.It is a misunderstanding, however,thatis alwaysoperative,and rarelyover-
come. LikeDasein'sfallinto the "they-self," the existentialstructurein which the
logocentricsubject feels certain of itself, grounded in the immediacyof its own
presence, is the very structurethat conceals it froma moregenuineunderstanding
of itself,others,and the world.

VI. Originary Violence and Logopolitics

Accordingto Heidegger,Daseinalways has an implicitunderstandingof the
ontologicalstructuresby which its own beingand the beingof othersacquiretheir
sense. I suggestthatDerrida's interrogation politicizesthis
of logocentricsubjectivity
implicitunderstanding. As a radicalmode of questioning, deconstruction not only
indicates thatour being is an issue forus, but it suggeststhatour being is the "site"
and movement of the political.46

43. Derrida,OfGrammatology, 11.

44. Derrida,OfGrammatology, 12.
45. Derrida,"Deconstructionandthe Other,"115.
46. Here,I am utilizinga Heideggereanconceptionof Dasein,or the self,as "site."Dasein,or,in Der-
rida'sterms,the subjectas propername, is alwaysan entityand a movement.What Heideggercalls
Dasein'show. Foran excellentdiscussionof Heidegger's treatmentof Daseinas "site,"see JamesF.Wards,
Heidegger'sPoliticalThinking(Amherst,Universityof MassachusettsPress,1995):3. I suggestthatHeideg-
notionof agency.Thesubject,as "site"of
ger'sconceptionof Daseinas a "site"can be appliedto Derrida's
the political,mustalwaysbe thoughttogetheras empiricalentityanda movementof relations.Asa proper
 Nicholas Dungey 467

Furthering Heidegger'sclaimaboutthe dangersof idle-talk,Derridawritesthat

"everyday languageis not neutral.It is the languageof WesternMetaphysics, and it
carrieswith it ... a considerablenumberof presuppositions."47 The presupposition
of logocentrism restson a particular of therelationship
interpretation betweenthought/
speechandself-presence. Logocentric discourse,or everydaylanguage,is not neutral
because it fostersa particular understandingof our own identity,the presenceof
others,andourrelationto theother.Asan existentialphenomenon,thefall intologo-
centrismgivesriseto a particular of politicalagency.Inorderto sustain
interpretation
the experienceof spontaneousself-grounding, logocentrismimposesorderuponthe
conditionof differance.Arrestingthe play of differance,logocentrism"violently"
imposesa rigidunityuponthe economyof differance.Asa result,logocentrisminau-
guratesa totalizingpoliticalgesturebecausethe typeof identitythatit fosterssup-
presses,andconceals,the self'sessentialrelationship withthe other.
Derridaconsidersthe suppressionof differancewithinmetaphysicsa primor-
dially"violent" act.48Thedesireforpureidentityand idealmeaningsets intomotion
an entireeconomyof violence:

Therewas in facta firstviolenceto be named.Toname,to givenames... such

is the originaryviolenceof languagewhich consistsin inscribingwithina differ-
ence.... To think the unique [proper, ideal] within the system ... such is the
gestureof arch-writing:arch-violence... [theconsolidation]of self-presence...
of a self-presencewhich has neverbeen givenbut onlydreamedof and always
alreadysplit. ... Outof thisarch-violence... [occurs]a secondviolencethatis
reparatory, protective... moral.... We couldnamea thirdviolenceof reflection
which [laysbear,and mustreconceal]... originaryviolence....49
Derridaidentifiesthree momentsof violence,which despitetheirorderingin the
passage,and theirapparenttemporalchronology,occur equiprimordially.50 As a
way of interpretingour experienceof being-in-the-world,
logocentrismauthorizes,

name,the subjectis someoneas someone,as movement-existenceas the finiterangeof its own possi-
bility-it is aneconomyof relations.Asthe "site"of thepolitical,thesubjectalwaysalreadyreflectsan impo-
sitionof order,an impositionwe see comingfromthe other,andan impositionto whichit is ourresponsi-
bilityto respond.
47. Derrida, Positions,19.
48. Intheessay"ViolenceandMetaphysics," in Writingand Difference,Derrida writesthatphilosophy
violentlyopens historyby opposingitselfto nonphilosophy. BythisDerridameansthatphilosophy,begin-
ningwithSocrates,opensthe historyof metaphysicsby initiating the pursuitof idealtruth.Sucha pursuit,
basedas itwas on theabilityof reasonto revealtheessentialtruthandunityof things,inaugurated thebifur-
cationof theworldbetweenphilosophyandpoetry,worldlyandtranscendent, insideandoutside,etc. Itis
primordially violentbecauseit constitutesan exercisethatnot onlydeniesthe differential relationof con-
cepts,modesof knowledge,andindividuals, butit perpetuatesthisdenialthroughdiscoursesof powerthat
organizesandregulatesthatpursuit.
49. Derrida, OfGrammatology, 112.
50. Beardsworth, Derridaand the Political,24.
468 (RE)TURNING
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TO HEIDEGGER

then conceals,the incidenceof originaryviolenceunderthe guise of self-presence

and autonomy.
The firstgestureof "originary violence"namesthe momentof signification. The
individualis named,ex-posedfrom the conditionsof possibility(differance),and
broughtinto the social context. Here, DerridaradicalizesHeidegger'snotion of
Dasein'sthrownness,whereinDaseinis deliveredoverto the brutefactof itsbeing-
there. Deliveredover to the "purethat"of one's identity,one simplyfindsoneself
alreadythere,withoutany"whenceor whither."Beingex-posedintothe socialcon-
textindicatesthatthesubjectdoes not posititsown identity, butrathersuffersit,takes
it up in the contextof the callof the other.Beingdeliveredoverto one's identityis an
immanentlypassiveaffair.This original,insurmountable passivityinsuresthat our
identityis essentiallymediatedby andthroughothers.Signification, as necessaryand
benevolentas it is, marksthe firstmomentof violencein constituting the (im)possi-
bilityof the propername.Theveryfactthatwe are named,thatwe arecalledfrom
the other,rendersimpossiblethe dreamof spontaneous,self-grounding identity.
In callingattentionto the radicalpassivityof the subject,and the mannerin
which the subjectsimplyfindsitselfalwaysalreadyunderway,deconstructionradi-
calizesHeidegger'scritiqueof Dasein's"they-self." Itwill be recalledthatin stating
thatthe "they-self" is in factnot itself,Heideggerdoes not suggestthatDaseinlacks
"I-hood,"but ratherindicatesthe possibilityof Daseinresituatingitselfvis-a-visthe
worldand otherDasein.Likewise,deconstructingthe subjectdoes not entaildis-
solvingthe significanceof the individual. Todeconstructthe subjectdoes not mean
to deny its existence. "Thereare," Derridacontends, "subjects,'operations'or
'effects'of subjectivity.Thisis an incontrovertible fact.Toacknowledgethisdoes not
mean, however, thatthe subject is what it says is."51On thisaccount,the subject
it
is not some meta-linguistic substanceor purecogito of self-presence.As was the
case withthe movementbetweeninauthenticity andauthenticity,to deconstructthe
subject is not to the
destroy subject, but rather to resituateit.
Inpoliticizingthe resituation of the subject,Derridaasksus to recognizethat"the
of
rapport self-identity is itselfalwaysa rapportof violencewiththe other,so thatthe
notions of property,appropriationand self-presence,so centralto logocentric
metaphysics,are essentiallydependentupon an oppositionalrelationwith other-
ness."52 Whilerecoveringthe recognitionof one's oppositionalrelationwith other-
ness has long been one of Derrida'sstrategies,it is only recentlythatit has been
givena specificallypoliticalcharacter.Yetthe politicalimplicationsreleasedthrough
the deconstruction of the subjectonlymakesense if thereis some notionof agency
thatis recoverablebeyondthe deconstructionof the subject.Hereinlies the signifi-
cance of readingdeconstructionin lightof Heidegger.Itsituatesoriginaryviolence

andthe Other,"125.
51. Derrida,"Deconstruction
andthe Other,"117.
52. Derrida,"Deconstruction
 Nicholas Dungey 469

and politicsontologically,
while at the same time indicatingthe possibilityof a nor-
mativemode of being-with-others, somethingthatDerrida'spoliticsdesires.
The second regionof violence is motivatedby the desire to consolidatethe
properidentityintoa moralcode-authorized by the tribe,sect, or nation.Theges-
tureof moralconsolidationis necessaryto conceal, throughthe institutionof the
law,the aporia(differance)thathas alwaysalreadyinsinuateditselfwithinproper
identity.America'sfoundingprovidesa good example:
The "we"of the declarationspeaksin the name of the people. Butthis people
does notyet exist.Theydo not existas an entity,it does not exist,beforethisdec-
laration,notas such. Ifit givesbirthto itself,as freeand independentsubject,as
possiblesigner,thiscan hold only in the act of signature.The signatureinvents
the signer.53
Thatthis "we"did not exist priorto the signature,and yet it is in the name of this
"we"thatthe signaturegroundsits legitimacy,revealssimultaneouslythe necessity
of the law,and the inabilityof the law, to concealthe essentialaporiathatattends
all politicalfounding.Thissecond gestureof originaryviolenceis necessaryin order
to codify,and morallyconsolidate,a specificidentity.
The desire for communal identityrequires that a nation write its own
autochthony,thatit writeits historyand laws in the discourseof birth,blood, and
land.Thesecondmomentof originaryviolencesignifiesthecomingtogetherof two
writings,it constitutesthe geographicaldimensionof the desireto achieveimma-
nent self-identity. The proper(ty)in one's name and body findsexpressionin bor-
ders.Thatthe second momentof violenceis necessaryindicates-is the firstactual
politicalexpressionof-Derrida's fundamentalclaim that no act of signification,
self-assertion,or declarationpossesses the resourcesthat would insurethe self-
groundingthatis the foundationuponwhichthe legitimacyof anycommunityrests.
"Sincethe originof authority,the foundationor ground,the positionof the law
can't rest on anythingbut themselves,they are themselvesa violence without
ground."54 Thesignaturecreatesthe signers,the law mustcodifywhat namingsets
in motion. To fill the gap retroactivelyrequiresa politicalgesture,one typically
accompanied,or followed,by force.Thenobilityof anyfoundingis always,in some
way, constitutedby this regionalviolence that codifiesthe distinctionbetween a
people and itsother.Allpoliticalfoundingshavetheiroriginin thisviolence.
The oftenintensedesireto maintainthe integrityof personaland nationaliden-
tity,as well as to securethe borders,contributesto occasionsof violencebetween
individualsand between states-what Derridacalls the thirdmomentof violence.
Intermsof domesticpolitics,thisviolencefindsexpressionin policiesof exclusion

53. JacquesDerrida,"Declarations
of Independence,"
New PoliticalScience15 (1986):10.
54. Derrida,"Forceof Law,"inDeconstruction
and the Possibility
of Justice,14.
470 (RE)TURNING
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TO HEIDEGGER

directedat undesirableideasand others.Onthe statelevel,thisformof politicalvio-

lence is directedagainstotherswho constitutea threateitherto one's identityor
way of life.Complicating thissituationstillfurtheris the increasingdifficulty
we now
encounterin drawingcleardistinctionsbetweenthe two, as examplesin the West
Bank,the formerYugoslavia, and Africademonstrate.
Theclearestexpressionof politicalviolenceemployedon behalfof pureiden-
tityand statecohesionmaybe foundin variousformsof national,religious,ethnic,
and racialoppression.In the last few decades, the desireto maintainracialand
nationalpuritythroughforce is clearlydemonstratedby the Holocaust,Apartheid,
and the numerousexamplesof ethniccleansingin the erstwhileYugoslavia, Africa,
and the West Bank.These examples representthe violent,politicalarrestof the
name,the other,andthe other'srelationto the law.55Theysignifythe politicalman-
ifestationof the desireto see the segregationof wordsand peopleas natural,or as
revealedby the wordof God.56Derridamakesa ratherboldclaim:
... there'sno racismwithouta language.Thepointis not thatactsof racialvio-
lence are onlywords but ratherthatthey have to have a word. Eventhoughit
offersthe excuse of blood,color,birth-or, rather,becauseit uses thisnaturalist
andsometimescreationistdiscourse-racismalwaysbetraysthe perversionof a
man,the "talkinganimal."57
This passage links the theoreticalto the empirical.It indicatesthe connection
between politicalviolence and the logocentricdesire to seek ever-greatertrans-
parencyin meaningand identity.As a way of organizingwordsand people,nation-
alismand racismrepresentthe most radicalexpressionof the logocentricdesireto
instituteproperspaces,freefromcontaminationbythe other.Logocentric discourse
seeks to assigncorrect(binary)relationships,
ground these relationsin a discourse
of Truth,andcodifythese relationsintoan economyof laws.Politicalviolencein the
name of nationalismpolices the conditionsin which the other is linguistically
defined,organized,andcontrolled.58Ultimately,thislinguisticpolicingfindsempir-
ical expressionin the formof barbedwire,securityzones, racialghettos,and laws
thataredesignedto separateand isolate.

55. Derrida,"Racism's LastWord,"292.

56. Derrida,"Racism's LastWord,"292-93.
57. Derrida,"Racism's LastWord,"292.
58. Derrida'sinterpretationof the linguisticsourcesof nationalismis the most radicalexpressionof
Heidegger's claimthatthe metaphysical approachto languageas an instrument of technologyleadsto the
of people,andthe relationsbetweenthem.FromDerrida's
totalobjectification pointof view,theattemptto
pursuepureidentitythroughwordsand laws representsthe politicaldimensionof the objectification that
Heidegger warnedus about."Thinking," Heidegger writes,"hasslippedout of itselementbybeingthought
of as a technicalinstrument....Thewidelyandrapidlyspreadingdevastation of language... undermines
aestheticand moralresponsibility in everyuse of language.... Language[now] surrendersitselfto our
merewillingandtrafficking as an instrument of dominationoverbeings.""Letter on Humanism," inBasic
Writings, trans.DavidKrell(NewYork:HarperRow,1977):220-23.
 Nicholas Dungey 471

Derridacontends that this sort of politicalviolence may be attributedto the

impossibility of the desiredgoal-pure identityandcommunity.Thisformof politi-
cal violenceis an expressionof metaphysicaldesireandempiricalfrustration. Itindi-
cates the essentialinabilityof any law,or interpretation of experienceand identity
(logocentrism),to arrestthe play of differance.This is what Derridacalls auto-
deconstruction,a processby which the structuresof identityandcommunitymust
by theirvery naturedisruptthemselvesand foil any attemptto achieve perfect
union.Physicalviolencebecomes the necessaryinstrumentto forciblysecureand
maintaina structurethatby itsverynatureresistssuch efforts.
Seen fromthe perspectiveof originaryviolence,the self is primordially political
because the arrestof differanceis never fullyaccomplishedby any individual,
group,religioussect, or nation.Originaryviolence is experiencedas inescapable
passivity,a conditionthatalwaysaccompaniesthe agent.Thispassivityis, for Der-
rida,expressedin and throughthe presenceof the other.Bearingwitness to the
other,to the differanceof identity,opens a structureof responsibility
thatcan never
be reducedto the autonomyof the individual,nor to the law as emblematicof the
responsibilitybetweentwo individuals.
Thisreadingof the essentialpassivityof the agentmirrorsHeidegger'sclaimthat
the "I"is neveralone in its experienceof Dasein,thatan ontologicalunderstanding
of others is itself a form of being. Derridapoliticizesthe essentialpassivityof
Dasein-its way of being-by locatingthe source of Dasein'sprimordialunder-
standingof itselfand othersin the movementof signification. Whatfor Heidegger
is an ontologicalstructure-being-with-others as being-in-the-world-isforDerrida
the movementof the political(it)self.

VII. Deconstruction and Justice

Whilethe gestureof signifyingand namingconstitutesa practicewe cannotavoid,
it is also a practicethatemergesout of differanceand is alwayssituatedwithina
socialand politicalcontext.Derridanotes:
Thattotality[thepropernamel affectsa structure,but it is a duty,an ethicaland
politicalduty,to takeintoaccountthisimpossibility
of beingone with oneself.It
is becauseI am not one with myselfthatI can speakwith the otherandaddress
the other.Thatis not a way of avoidingresponsibility.
On the contrary,it is the
onlyway forme to takeresponsibility and to makea decision.59
Onlybecause identityis relational,dependent,and disclosedthroughlanguageis
my encounterwiththe otherpossible.The (im)possiblepracticeof naminginitiates
the structureof responsibility
to the other-the recognitionthatdiscoursealways
alreadyimplieseithera response,or a call,to the other.

59. Derrida,
Deconstruction
in a Nutshell,14.
472 (RE)TURNING
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TO HEIDEGGER

Therecognitionof a formof responsibility thatis priorto individualagencypro-

vides the justificationfor Derrida'sbold statementthat deconstructionis justice.
"Justicein itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not decon-
structible."60 Inorderto makethisclaim,Derridadistinguishesbetweenlaw andjus-
tice.Positivelaw is the impositionof order,it is authorized,legitimate,anditbelongs
to a particular historicaltime.Assuch,the law is deconstructible becauseas the law
it carriesin itselfitsown internaldifferencesthatreflectitsparticular imperativeand
historicalcontext.Everytime you overturna law, improvea law, or inventa new
one, you are practicinga formof deconstruction.6' It is the verydeconstructability
of law thatgivesit its revolutionary, ethical,and progressivecharacter.
Separatingjusticefromthe law, Derridainsiststhatit is a mistaketo thinkthat
the law is justice.Justiceis not an idea, form,regulativeprinciple,or seriesof cal-
culations.Justiceis neverreducibleto the singularityof the self or law. "Itfollows
from this paradoxthat there is never a moment that we can say in the present
thata decision is just... or thatsomeone is a just man."62Individualsand laws
may be correct,that is, theiractions or applicationsmay be in accordancewith
historicalnorms, codes, and procedures,but individualsand laws as such are
never,in themselves,just.Forin the claim thatthe law is justice,the same prob-
lem of justice is always-alreadyviolentlysettled.The law can be deconstructed,
but justicecan not.
Justice,as Derridaconceivesit, is neithera concept nora particular act, it does
not live in the present.Justiceis somethingto come, somethingthat is always-
alreadyunderway,on itsway here.Itis becausejusticeis alwayson itsway,because
we are, in the verymovementof our existence,a playingout of thiscall forjustice,
thatdeconstructionis affirmative. Justice,Derridaargues,is what motivatesus to
the
improve law, that is, to deconstructthe law.63Withoutthe call of justice,with-
out ourimplicitunderstandingof justice,we would haveno interestin the law.Itis
our desirefor justicethat motivatesus to question-deconstruct-ourselves,the
law,andourhistory.Deconstruction signifiesthemovementof humanbeing-in-the-
world, and justice is the conditionof possibilityfordeconstruction.
Justice,Derrida insists,impliesdissociation, heterogeneity, and a recognitionof
othernessin ourselvesandwithinthe politicalcontext.Itis the (re)cognitionof dif-
ferance,of alterityin the self and in the inabilityof the law to be the law.Justice,
then,is a matterof the relationship betweendifferanceandthe law,foreverdeferred
becausethereis no escapingthe factthatpeoplemustbe named,lawsenacted,and
bordersmarkedoff. ForDerrida,thereis no justicewithoutthe recognitionof this
aporia.Justiceis the experienceof this aporia,of this internaldifferencethatcan

of Justice,14.
and the Possibility
60. Derrida,"Forceof Law,"inDeconstruction
of Justice,15-6and24-5.
and the Possibility
61. Derrida,"Forceof Law,"inDeconstruction
of Justice,22.
and the Possibility
62. Derrida,"Forceof Law,"inDeconstruction
of Justice,15-6.
and the Possibility
63. Derrida,"Forceof Law,"inDeconstruction
 Nicholas Dungey 473

neverbe reappropriated withinthe domainof pureidentityand self-presence.The

call of justiceseeks to lessen the effectsof originaryviolenceas it operatesin and
throughthe movementof significationand the necessityof law.As the promiseof
justice,deconstructionalertsus to what can not be achievedin subjectivityor
throughthe law,remindingus thattherewillalwaysbe remaindersproducedin and
throughthe creationof identityand everyact of law. Indicativeof what is priorto
us, mindfulof whatescapesus, andalwaysunderwayin the movementof ourexis-
tence, justicesignifiesour hyperbolicresponsibility to the other.

VIII. Justice and the Politics of Democratic Hospitality

We can gaina moreconcreteview of Derrida'apoliticsby applyinghis analysis
of justice and hospitalityto democraticpolitics.The centralquestion that has
alwaysfaced democraticpoliticsis how to createa politicalenvironmentthat is
hospitableas possibleto the foreigner,while at the same time remainingcohesive
enough to secure a common politicalbody. On my reading,the concrete laws,
rights,and aspirationsof democraticpolitics,what Derridacalls the "lawsof hos-
are themselvesthe politicalexpressionof "thelaw of hospitality."64
pitality," Inter-
pretingdemocracyas the politicalsite of the law of hospitality,providesan alter-
nativeway of thinkingaboutthe issuesof responsibility, rights,and membershipin
the politicalcommunity.
ForDerrida,the questionof how to welcome the strangerrequiresthat we
rethinkthe conceptof the politicalin lightof the aporiaof hospitality.
Derrida
writes:
... there [is] an insolubleantinomy... between,on the one hand,Thelaw of
unlimitedhospitality(to give the new arrivalall of one's home and oneself,our
own, withoutaskinga name or compensation..), and on the otherhand,the
laws (in the plural),those rightsanddutiesthatarealwaysconditionedandcon-
ditional,as theyaredefinedby ... the family,civilsociety,and the State.65
Thelaw of hospitalityentailsan unconditional offeringto the stranger.Yet,in order
to giveat all,to be hospitable,requiresthatone be sovereignof what is offered.The
tensionin hospitalityarisesin the conflictbetweenthe commandto give uncondi-
tionally,while retainingsome control,and power,overwhatand how resourcesare
shared.Thereis no way of avoidingthistension.Toputit in Heideggerrean terms,it
is a tensionthatis always-already underway.And,as the previouspassageindicates,
thistensionoccursat the levelof the familyandthe politicalcommunity.Asit stands
now, democracyis the most promisingpoliticalorderin whichthe inescapableten-
sion betweenunconditional andconcretehospitality can be negotiated.

64. JacquesDerrida,
OfHospitality,
trans.RachelBowlby(Stanford:
Stanford Press,2000),77.
University
65. Derrida,Of Hospitality, 77.
474 (RE)TURNING
DERRIDATO HEIDEGGER

The responsibilitythat attends the (in)finitegivingof democratichospitality

derivesfromDerrida's notionof subjectivity.Oneis responsibleto the otherbecause
one's relationshipto the otheris predicatedon a mode of experiencethatpreceeds
the volitionand legal identityof the autonomousagent. "Letus say yes," Derrida
writes,"towho lever]turnsup, beforeanydetermination, beforeany anticipation,
beforeanyidentification, whetheror not it has to do witha foreigner,an immigrant,
an invitedguest, or an unexpectedvisitor....66 Responsibility, and the "yes"of
hospitality, is priorto the assertionof rights.
Thisradicalassignationof responsibility forces us to revisitthe issue of rights,
andthe relationship betweenrightsandmembershipin the democraticcommunity.
Themost primordial formof "right" is containedin the linguisticandpoliticalspace
openedby the callof the other,and the questionof the foreigner.Thecommandto
respond,the "right"to respond,and the responsibility thatattendssuch gestures,
comes beforethe determinationof any identity-whetheras foreigneror citizen.
Findingoneself always-already within the community,speakingits language(s),
responding to itsdemands of personal andcivicresponsibility, andcallinguponthe
community to liveup to its own commitment to protectionand opportunity, is itself
the most primordial formof rightfullybelonging.
Itis here thatDerrida'saccountof the relationshipbetweenthe law of hospital-
ity and the lawsanddutiesof democraticpoliticsmirror,and politicize,Heidegger's
analysisof Dasein'sbeing-with-others, and its pursuitof authenticity.Authenticity is
possibleonly because Dasein has a relationshipwith Being thatis recoverable from
its entanglementin the "they."Whatmakesthis possibleis Heidegger'sassertion
thatthe two need each other.Beingneeds Daseinto findempiricalexpression,and
Daseinneeds Beingfor its openingand authenticity. Derridamakesa similarclaim
the
regarding relationship between the law of and the democraticpoli-
hospitality
tics thatattemptsto enactit. Derridawrites:
Butevenwhilekeepingitselfabovethe lawsof hospitality, law
the unconditional
of hospitalityneeds the laws, it requiresthem. Thisdemandis constitutive.It
wouldn't be effectively unconditional ... if it didn't have to become effective,
concrete,determined,if thatwere not its beingas having-to-be.... Inorderto
be what it is, the law thusneeds the laws....67
Whileit is clearthatthe two laws of hospitalityare dependenton each other,Der-
rida also insiststhat there is a "strangehierarchy"between them.68There is a
dependent,hierarchicalrelationshipbetween the justicepromisedby the law of
hospitalityand democraticpolitics.Derrida'sown words appearto mirror,on the

66. Derrida,Of Hospitality, 77.

67. Derrida,Of Hospitality, 79.
68. Derrida,Of Hospitality, 79.
 Nicholas Dungey 475

politicallevel,Heidegger'sontic-ontologicalanalysis.The law of hospitalitywould

not be unconditionalif it didnot have"itsbeingas having-to-be" in the formof the
concrete laws and obligationsof democracy.Readingdemocracyas the site of
unconditionalhospitalitymakespoliticalthe implicitunderstanding of justicethatis
constitutiveof our being-in-the-world-with-others.
So, what sortof practical,socio-politicalpoliciesemergefromdemocratichos-
pitality? Oneexampleis to lookat the debatesurrounding bilingualeducationin the
UnitedStates.Thecontinuationof Englishlanguageonlypoliciesin Westernstates
is culturallyoppressive,and even counter-productive to currentsocial and eco-
nomic forces. Languageis the mediumof alterity,and in a multicultural society,
political,legal,and culturalsupportforthe teachingof multiplelanguagesis essen-
tial. In fact, institutingbroad based multilingualeducationwould consist of the
politico-legalinstitutionsin severalstatescatching-upwith, and sanctioning,what
localcommunitiesarealreadydoing.
Relatedto the issue of language,is the questionof immigration.This issue
unfoldson severallevels.First,democratichospitalityrequiresthatwe continueto
fundand educatethe childrenof illegalimmigrants.Recentinitiativesin California
callingfor an end to the educationof childrenof illegalimmigrantspointsto the
necessityof rethinkinghow we understandour responsibility to others(especially
our responsibility to the most vulnerablemembersof the community),and what
constitutes membershipin the community.The politicalevents in California
demonstrateall too well Derrida'sclaimthateven democratic,pluralistic, and mul-
ticulturalcommunitiestend to drifttowardhomogenization.It demonstratesthat
democracy,as it is now understoodand practiced,is not a sufficientguardagainst
oppressive,marginalizingpolicies. In additionto the questionof education,the
questionof how citizenshipis definedmust be recast.How is it thata democratic
societyacceptsand benefitsfromthe presenceandcontribution of thousandsupon
thousandsof laborers,yet deniesthemcitizenship,andthereforea politicalvoice in
theirown destiny.
These considerationsare, of course, only indicationsof the sort of work that
must be started.What is importantis the recognitionthat the politicaltrajec-
tory of my readingof Derridaand Heideggeris neitherapocalypticnor utopian.
In fact, it looks like many of the thingswe alreadydesire, and seek to achieve.
Partof what keeps "us"from solving many of the problems that face contem-
porary democratic politics is precisely the way "we" define and understand
human agency, responsibility,rights, and membership in the community.To
begin the process of thinkingthese concepts differently,we must first follow
Heideggerin realizingthat there is never an isolated experienceof Dasein,that
to be in the world means to be disclosed to one's self in and throughothers.
Andsecondly,it requiresthatwe come to bearwitness to the mannerin which
such linguisticdisclosureinitiatesour responsibilityto the other and opens the
politicaldomain.
476 (RE)TURNING
DERRIDA
TO HEIDEGGER

IX. From Authenticity to Justice

At the very least, deconstructionis inherentlypoliticalif by politicalwe mean

whatconcernsourhighestaspirations-theorderingof humanaffairs.Inthisessay,
I seek to demonstratehow Derrida'scritiqueof logocentrismis clarifiedby reading
deconstructionas the politicization of Heideggereanbeing-with.ReadingDerridain
of
light Heidegger reveals how we misunderstand(our)selvesand our politicsby
our
grounding identity and politicsin terms and concepts that are "closest"and
"nearest" to us. Itdemonstratesthatthe selfof ourimmediate,everydayexperience
is not what it says it is. Losingitselfin the "they,"Daseinunderstandsitselfand the
world in terms that the "they"make availableto it, therebyinterpreting its own
characterand rangeof possibilitiesin an inauthenticmanner.Authenticity, for Hei-
degger, entails the of
necessity questioning one's existence,and from this question-
ing choosing endeavorsthat give one's life meaning.As such, authenticityis an
immanentlypersonalaffair.And,in the end, it is Heidegger'sfocus on the coura-
geous, individualizing aspectsof authenticitythatkeep his critiqueof Dasein'sfall
intopublicnessfromtakingon politicalovertones.Theseovertonescan be foundin
Derrida's work.
FollowingHeidegger,Derridainsiststhatthe "who"of everydaysubjectivity is a
and
contestedissue.ForDerrida,logocentrism originary violence indicate how Hei-
degger'ssocial ontologyof Daseinbecomes politicized.Seekingto maintainthe
experienceof self-presenceand pureidentity,logocentrismconcealsthe ruptureof
differance,imposesa rigidorderon identity,and initiatesan economyof violence
thatendlesslyrehearsesa metaphysicsof desireand frustration. As a way of inter-
pretingour experienceof being-in-the-world, logocentrism conceals our essential
being-with-others and leads to a false sense of identity and community.Decon-
structinglogocentricsubjectivity callsattentionto thewebbing relationsthatcon-
of
stituteidentity,and signifiesthe movementof the political.
ReadingDerridain lightof Heideggeris importantto politicaltheoryfortwo rea-
sons. First,Derrida'snotionsof originaryviolenceand justicerepresentnovelcon-
tributionsto the literature on violenceand justice.Locatingthe openingof violence
in the (im)possiblestructure-necessityand deference-of the propername, Der-
ridaindicateswhy the desireforpureidentitymustalwaysbe frustrated. Itindicates
how our ex-posureto the social scene alwaysentailsthe violentimpositionof an
order.While this happeningcan never be avoided,awarenessof it may lead to
reducingthe expressionof actualviolence in the name of pure identity.Reading
Derridain lightof Heidegger'sontologysituatesDerrida'snotionof justice.On this
account,we have an intrinsicunderstandingof justice.Constitutiveof our very
being,justice is somethingthatwe are always alreadydoing.Clarifying the social
and politicalmoments when justice is either thwarted or released, by viewing
democracyas the site of hospitality, is a worthwhile avenue for research.
Second, Heidegger'sontologyanchorsDerrida'spoliticsin a claim about the
 Nicholas Dungey 477

way of human existence. Heideggerdemonstratesthat Dasein always has an

implicitunderstanding of the ontologicalstructuresbywhichitsown beingandthat
of othersacquiretheirsense. Derridabuildson this primordialunderstandingby
deconstructing the logocentricsubject,liberatingit fromits inauthenticconception
of self-presence.Readinglogocentrismin lightof Heidegger'scritiqueof the "they"
demonstrateshow our being-with-others becomes distorted,and indicatesthat
thereis a positivemode of ourbeingthatis recoverablebeyondthe deconstruction
of the self-centered(thoughtin both senses of the term) subject.Such a reading
helpsus makesense of the undeniablyaffirmative, positiveclaimsthatDerridanow
ascribesto deconstruction. SituatingDerrida'spoliticsin an economyof ontological
relations,an economy that includesethicaland politicalimplications,providesa
normativeorientationto deconstruction.