Chancellor Martin

12/7/20

PHIL 2300

Drexler, Jane

Moral Veganism: Why It Is an Obligation For (most) Of Us

Animals have interests. That might sound odd, like something obvious is being pointed

out. Of course they do, it is clear when they recoil from pain or look expectantly at us for food

that they have their own interests and desires. However, it is of vital importance that we truly

consider this fact, else we will have a difficult time understanding why animals have rights,

same as anyone else, and that moral veganism is an obligation that (most) of us should follow if

we want to live an ethical life.

The framework that we will be using to explain why veganism is morally correct is a

rights framework, ultimately stemming from a Kantian view. A framework that makes use of the

distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value, of means and ends. 1 Something that is of

instrumental value, in other words something that we are morally justified as looking at as

merely a means for us to gain something, is something that is not, as Tom Regan put it, a

“subject of a life”2, which we will get back to. A classic example of something with only

1
Kant makes his means/ends distinction here: Kant, I., Denis, L., & Gregor, M. J. (2017). The Formula of the
End in Itself. In The metaphysics of morals (pp. 95-98). It should also be noted that Kant didn’t agree with
treating animals as ends in themselves, although the case is made here as to why they should be.

2
Regan, T. (2003). Animal Rights. In Animal rights, human wrongs: An introduction to moral philosophy (pp.
112-117). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
instrumental value would be a pencil. A pencil is something that requires no moral

consideration because it has no desires, no sentience. It cannot hope for things to be different

or better, so we can use this pencil for whatever purpose we deem necessary, barring that

choice doesn’t hurt something that is a “subject of a life”.

It has now been established that there are some things free from moral consideration,

that fall outside of the moral circle, as it were, and we are now tasked with deciding what does

fall within this circle, and why this would lead us to a vegan lifestyle. We will start with

something that is, hopefully, noncontroversial: human beings have rights, and we all

understand, with some differences, why this is so. The easiest way to understand why, and that

we can then use to expand our criteria to non-human animals, is this term that we have

touched on already, this “subject of a life”. Regan invented this term to illustrate where this

moral consideration comes from in the first place. “We are the subjects of a life that is better or

worse for us, logically independently, of anyone else’s valuing us or finding us useful.” 3 It is not

hard to see how this definition applies to human beings. Especially from this Kantian

perspective, that there is this difference between means and ends, and that human beings fall

into this latter category. We have intrinsic value, independent of other human beings valuing

us, just by nature of our existence.

Why does Regan seem to think that this definition helps him expand the moral circle, in

other words, what do we have in common with these animals, that makes them more than just

tools for our own ends? Well, he points out that animals too have the ability to judge their

present circumstance and decide for themselves if they are well off or not, even if they haven’t

3
Ibid page 116
known any other life than the one that they have. [subject to change] It is well documented

that pigs and chickens, for example, are miserable when they are put into factory farming

situations. Pigs will actually attempt to chew through the metal bars of their pens, hoping to

escape.4 This, of course, will never work, but the pig is so desperate for something different

than what it is experiencing, that it will destroy its own mouth and bleed everywhere. In the

case of chickens, they will sometimes peck each other to death because of the stress, and as a

result, farmers have taken to chopping their beaks off at an early age to prevent this. 5 This has

been stated, not to emotionally manipulate, but to make a point that these animals have only

ever seen the inside of a pen or cage, and yet they know that something is wrong. They don’t

get the stimulus that they have evolved to have, and they suffer immensely because of it. They

have their own life, that they are able to judge for themselves, and their suffering is very real.

We should use this information to ponder whether it is morally acceptable to use these animals

in this way, to violate their agency, for a momentary sensory pleasure of our own, to get us

cheap clothing, or whatever other manor in which we would like to use them.

We will now explore the differences between vegetarianism and veganism, and explain

why vegetarianism doesn’t take things far enough, why it doesn’t solve many of the problems

that it hopes to. Why is this so? First, let us define the difference between vegetarianism and

veganism. Vegetarians don’t eat meat, and they also object to the use of animal products that

require slaughter, such as furs and leathers. On its face, this seems like it would be enough. We

aren’t directly killing animals, so why go any further? Well, vegans would disagree. They, on the
4
Zhang MY, Li X, Zhang XH, et al. Effects of confinement duration and parity on stereotypic behavioral and
physiological responses of pregnant sows. Physiology & Behavior. 2017 Oct;179:369-376. DOI:
10.1016/j.physbeh.2017.07.015.
5
“The Ethics of Qualified Moral Veganism.” Animal (De)Liberation: Should the Consumption of Animal Products Be
Banned?, by Jan Deckers, Ubiquity Press, London, 2016, pp. 52-53. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv3t5qmj.6.
other hand, choose to abstain from all animal products, including milk, eggs, and honey. The

reasons that vegans do this are many. A lot of them have to do with factory farming, (some

problems with which we have already discussed), and it’s important that we see a few more, to

show how many humans tend to view animals, and why they are wrong.

Factory farms are a large source of animal products, at least in places like the U.S., so it

makes sense that we should be concerned with how they are run, and what happens to the

animals that are kept in them. So, why are they so bad, even for the animals that are used for

eggs and milk, not solely for their meat? We will start with chickens, and how we get their eggs.

These chickens are often kept in tiny cages, stacked several high, with no room to move around.

They are left to stand in their own filth, which often leaks down to the chickens below them. 6

Not only this, but even in so called “free-ranged farms”, baby male chicks are ground-up or

gassed to death moments after hatching, as the farmer has no instrumental use for them. 7

Things aren’t any better for dairy cows. They are artificially inseminated by having a large metal

instrument forced into their vaginas, because dairy cows don’t naturally produce milk unless

they have recently given birth. Shortly after these cows give birth, their babies are stolen away

from them, and either taken to suffer the same fate, or if they are male are often killed within a

few months and sold as veal. Cows are like most other mammals, they have an intense

attachment to their young, and it is horribly distressing for them when they are separated. 8 This

6
Ibid pages 52-53
7
Ibid pages 52-53
8
Kathrin Wagner, Daniel Seitner, Kerstin Barth, Rupert Palme, Andreas Futschik, Susanne Waiblinger. Effects of
mother versus artificial rearing during the first 12 weeks of life on challenge responses of dairy cows. Applied
Animal Behaviour Science, 2015; 164: 1 DOI: 10.1016/j.applanim.2014.12.010
is leaving aside all the horrible selective breeding practices that have riddled these animals with

health problems.9

All of this is to say, that factory farming is horribly unethical in its practices. This now

raises the question: are there ways to farm animals in an ethical manor? We will see that there

are not. Michel Pollan makes the argument that sure; these factory farms are horrendous. They

treat their animals terribly. However, there is a certain kind of farm, one that treats its animals

well, and gives them a good life. “…let me describe a very different sort of animal farm… its very

existence puts the whole moral question of animal agriculture in a different light.” 10 He paints a

picture of one of these farms, run by a Joel Salatin. Salatin raises these animals in harmony with

nature, tries his best to emulate natural process by rotating the ways in which he feeds his

animals, lets them roam free. Pollan makes this all sound lovely, so what’s the problem? Well,

there are many problems here that Salatin isn’t escaping, and let’s see why.

First, this doesn’t escape the means/ends distinction. Kant makes the argument that we

can use others as means at times, but never solely as means. Pollan can try to make the

argument that this is what is occurring here, but there’s reason to doubt this. Could Salatin

honestly make the case that he is somehow doing this for the animals’ sake, that he is valuing

them in an intrinsic way? He gets a lot out of the arrangement himself; he profits financially and

he, presumably, gets to use some of these animal products himself. Killing someone, whether it

is an animal or a human being, doesn’t appear to be valuing them, seeing them as an ends in

9
Grandin, T., & Johnson, C. (2013). Animals in translation using the mysteries of autism to decode animal
behavior (pp. 69-81). Prince Frederick, MD.: Recorded Books.

10
Pollan, M. (2002, November 10). An Animal's Place. New York Times.
themselves. The only “ends” that he values here is what he gets by “ending” their lives. We

don’t keep other people around because we can use them, at least if we are ethical. We live

with other people because we understand why we should value them, what makes them

special, and that value comes from being a “subject of a life”, not from what they can offer us.

Salatin can’t make a convincing case that this is how he lives with these animals, because his

motives will obviously be tainted by what he gets out of the arrangement. Humans can

cohabitate with other animals ethically, but only if they are doing so for the sake of the animal,

not because they have something to offer us.

We must also take a quick look at Pollan’s arguments for why Regan is wrong in his

assessment. It only touches on Regan’s points very briefly, but it would be unfair to talk past his

points on the subject. From the same New York Times article “But surely a species can have

interests -- in its survival, say -- just as a nation or community or a corporation can.” 11 He is

asking this as a response to Regan’s individualist approach to animal rights, as opposed to

looking at entire species instead. The only thing worth mentioning here is how did he arrive at

this conclusion? Leaving aside what the extinction of a species might mean for ecosystems at

large, most farmed animals don’t exist in large, or in some cases, any numbers out in the wild

anymore. How could an animal have a conception of the idea of extinction? Humans, as far as

we can tell, are the only animals with the intellectual capacity to understand such a concept. An

animal can’t think about what will happen after it’s death, so why would it care if there were no

more, say, cows anymore? It wouldn’t.

11
Ibid
 If all of what has been said so far is true, there is one question that remains. If we go

back, we can see that it has been stated that only most of us should be considered unethical for

not being vegan. Why is this so? It is common knowledge that many of us in the industrialized

world have a much easier time accessing nutrition than those that don’t. 12 We have all kinds of

supplements, and a wider variety of healthy foods to choose from. However, there are many

that aren’t so lucky. Those in more economically disadvantaged areas suffer from chronic

malnutrition. They don’t have access to the wealth of foods that we do and are forced to get

food where they can take it. One would not fault a lion for eating a gazelle, nor would they

condemn someone for killing in self-defense, and the same holds true here. It is all a matter of

necessity. It is regrettable that any animals need to die so that others may live, but that is

ultimately the form that nature takes, it is a universal truth. However, when these acts can be

avoided, as they most certainly can be by people with more access, than they should be.

If we want to live an ethical life, we should all be vegans if we can. Animals can suffer,

they can value their own life. They are as alive as any of us, and their rights as living, breathing

organisms should be respected as such. We may not have the same interests as each other, as

it would be absurd to say that a pig should have the right to vote, but where our interests are

equal, as is the case with not being killed, that should be respected.

12
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK258740/
 Bibliography

 Kant, I., Denis, L., & Gregor, M. J. (2017). The Formula of the End in Itself. In The
metaphysics of morals (pp. 95-98)
 Regan, T. (2003). Animal Rights. In Animal rights, human wrongs: An introduction to
moral philosophy (pp. 112-117). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
 Zhang MY, Li X, Zhang XH, et al. Effects of confinement duration and parity on
stereotypic behavioral and physiological responses of pregnant sows. Physiology &
Behavior. 2017 Oct;179:369-376. DOI: 10.1016/j.physbeh.2017.07.015.
 “The Ethics of Qualified Moral Veganism.” Animal (De)Liberation: Should the
Consumption of Animal Products Be Banned? by Jan Deckers, Ubiquity Press, London,
2016, pp. 52-53. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv3t5qmj.6. Accessed 10 Dec. 2020.
 Kathrin Wagner, Daniel Seitner, Kerstin Barth, Rupert Palme, Andreas Futschik, Susanne
Waiblinger. Effects of mother versus artificial rearing during the first 12 weeks of life on
challenge responses of dairy cows. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 2015; 164: 1 DOI:
10.1016/j.applanim.2014.12.010
 Grandin, T., & Johnson, C. (2013). Animals in translation using the mysteries of autism to
decode animal behavior (pp. 69-81). Prince Frederick, MD.: Recorded Books.
 Pollan, M. (2002, November 10). An Animal's Place. New York Times.
 Global nutrition challenges. (2013, January 01). Retrieved December 10, 2020, from
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK258740/