• Firstly, I would like to address the issue of the scope of Mr

Andrews’s authority regarding the representation he made

as an employee of our client.
• Regarding Mr Andrews express actual authority, Mr
Andrews was authorised by his employer, our client, to
enter into contracts with General Ford and done so for
many years;
• Regarding Mr Andrews implied actual authority, Mr
Andrews authority was limited to entering into single
transactions for General Ford vehicles and General Ford
vehicles only.
• This would be quite evident in the fact that our client,
Ultra, had in place separate salespeople to conduct sales
of sushi cars and fleet sales;
• However, according to the facts, he has made no
purchases with General Ford or any other vehicle
manufacturer for that matter, on behalf of my client;
• The reason being, Mr Andrews has been employed as a
“sales representative”, and he has on this occasion
entered into contracts on behalf of my client to make
purchases.
• Judging by his selling authority being limited to single
General Ford transactions, it would seem more than
unlikely or even far- fetched, for the respondents to assert
apparent authority for Mr Andrews to make purchases of
any nature on behalf of my client;
• For apparent authority to exist between the agent and the
3rd party; there must be a representation by the principal
in some form or another.
• There does not appear to be any inference that can be
drawn from the facts that Mr Andrews had the authority to
make purchases at all.
• For the 3rd party to prove the agent had ostensible
authority on the basis of previous dealings, it needs to be
 shown that what the agent did on previous occasions, was
done with the knowledge of his principal, now although
this may in fact be accurate,
• If it can be shown that it’s customary for an agent to do
certain things within the ordinary course of their business,
then this will provide the foundation for the agent’s
ostensible/apparent authority.
• According to this law, the foundation for Mr Andrews’s
ostensible authority would again be limited to single
transactions, judging by this conduct being the ordinary
course of his business.
• This I base on the 1892 case of London Joint Stock Bank v
Simmons AC 201
• It is also essential that when seeking to bind the principal
by these previous transactions, the 3rd party had to know
that the agent had been acting in the same way before
and entered into the relevant contract on the strength of
the conduct.
• I base this on the authority of the 1888 case of Robinson
v Tyson- 9 LR (NSW) 297;
• In the present case, General Ford had dealt with Mr
Andrews for single transactions, Mr Andrews having
authorised a purchase, would not be considered acting the
same way as he had done in previous dealings.
• It should also be noted, that the respondents, General
Ford, should of been aware that Mr Andrews authority
would lie only with single transactions, having dealt with
him prior in this manner and only in this manner.
• This brings me back to his authority that was limited to
the selling of individual General Ford cars, not purchases;
• I would like to emphasise that his prior dealings with
General Ford NEVER on any occasion, included purchases.
• It would seem very odd that a ‘sales representative’ who
has only dealt with single sales in the past would be given
authority to make purchases on behalf of a company.
• The Marketing manager of General Ford would no doubt
have dealt with specific people when making sales to
 Ultra, having made this proposition to someone who
introduced themselves as a “sales rep” should raise
questions.
• The respondents may argue that our client ratified the
contract by accepting the sedans and not the 4wd’s
however;
• According to the (1903) case of International Paper
Company v Spicer 4 CLR 739 - “ if the principal does not
wish to ratify, he should notify his dissent within a
reasonable time”
• Our client, being the able authority to make such
purchases, advised that he would only be willing to take
the sedans and not the 4wd’s; if this was not possible, he
would no longer want any of them.
• By making such a statement, it would appear that our
client voiced his dissent of the contract
• This should therefore alleviate the possibility of
Ratification.

• In summary of our arguments;

• Regarding the 1st issue; dealt with by my co-counsel,
which was the unauthorised transaction entered into by
the agent, Mr Andrews with Wunderful Weddings;
• In those dealings, if it pleases your honour, Mr Andrews
acted without express or implied authorisation and outside
his apparent authority.
• Regarding the 2nd issue, your honour, that being covered
by myself;
• The issue of my client’s agent, being Mr Andrews, making
purchases, going beyond the duties of his employment.
• It could not be inferred that Mr Andrews had the apparent
authority to make these purchases.
• On this basis, we push for the appeal to be upheld on the
basis that Mr Andrews entered into the 2 contracts with no
authority to conduct either of the transactions.
• Therefore your honour, we wish to sever the contract and
keep the 10 sedans, but not wish to take the 10 4wd’s,
• If this not being possible, your honour, our client wishes to
not be bound by both contracts entered into by Mr
Andrews on behalf of our client, Ultra Car Sales.